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The interactional bind of “Just [do X]”

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Abstract

This paper examines the use of “*just*”-formulated advisings in ordinary, naturally-occurring sequences of unsolicited advice-giving when produced in response to troubles-tellings. Drawing on two examples from our broader collection, we demonstrate that such advisings are employed in response to advice-resistance and function to minimise proposed courses of future action, attenuating their imposing nature. We show they place an interactional bind upon advice-recipients which contributes towards further resistance. This paper explicates this bind and its categorial, epistemic and moral implications. Data are in American and British English.

In their seminal research on the rejection of advice, Jefferson and Lee (1980; 1981/1992) demonstrated that advice-giving is oriented to as a misaligned response to troubles-tellings, and routinely occasions resistance from troubles-tellers. They explain this resistance on categorial grounds; namely, if a troubles-teller were to accept advice from an interlocutor, this would proposedly transform their discourse identity from that of a “troubles-teller” to an “advice-recipient”, substituting the categorial perquisites (e.g. entitlements, rights, obligations, etc.) that are normatively afforded by the incumbency of the former category with those associated with the latter. Likewise, the previously positioned “troubles-recipient” would proposedly transform their discourse identity to that of an “advice-giver”, claiming the perquisites that are implicated, normatively, by the incumbency of the latter category. As Jefferson and Lee (1980; 1981/1992) observe, this disrupts the progressivity of the troubles-telling. The previously positioned troubles-recipient has – by misaligning with their categorial positioning as such – initiated a transformation of the interaction from a “troubles-telling” to a “service encounter”, focusing off the troubles-teller and his/her experiences, and focusing on the trouble as a ‘problem to be solved’ (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 416). The production of advice-giving in response to a troubles-telling thus engenders ‘interactional asynchrony’ (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 402), with interlocutors pursuing two diverging interactional trajectories.

In this paper, we revisit the period of interactional misalignment to hone in on a peculiar feature that recurs in *responses* to advice resistance; namely, the delivery of “*just*”-formulated advisings. Examples of this practice include the following.

Extract 1: Frankel: T.C.: Reel 1: Call 1

126 Jen: °.p.t° We:ll jis study diffrently this ti:[me.°

Extract 2: Rahman II

321 Myra: [Jis ^send im round here fer a[couple'v: hou:[r:s
(...))

368 Myra: [So jst]

369 (.)

370 Myra: ulittle patience with im coz I: doh:n't mind you knoh thaht.

Extract 3: NB:IV:13:R

451 Lot: = [**Jis** get tur]:key.=
 ((...))
481 Lot: =it.=I mean rilly: s:tick to it. Yihknow non't (.) fuss around a
482 bout it **jis:(.)t** go ahead'n do it'n .t.hh.hhhh an' uh=

Extract 4: CTS01

36 Pen: Right you know you're like pissed off an' stuff like you know
37 that you're- sorry not pissed off paranoid that y- people are
38 like .hh looking at it an everything why don't you **just** like do
39 yer hair? hh.hh

We propose that “*just*” is employed, in these cases, in what has been referred to as its “belittling” (Tannen, 1977), “depreciatory” (Lee, 1987; 1991), “diminishing” (Hulquist, 1985), “downplaying” (French, Simpson and Harvey, 2006), “limiting” (Rymes, 1995), “minimising” (Holmes, 2014a, 2014b), and “weakening” (Wauchope, 1993) usage.¹ The adverb operates, in this sense, to attenuate the imposing and/or constraining nature of a proposed course of future action. We propose that it is this formulation which places a further interactional bind upon the recipient of the (re-issued) advice: having already resisted the delivery of advice in response to their “trouble”, the advice-recipient is now issued advice that positions the solution to their trouble as designedly easy to enact. On the one hand, this promotes the acceptance of the advice by advocating a course of action that is construed as easy to implement; on the other, it inferentially minimises the nature of “trouble”, and is morally compromising in its implication that the troubles-teller was unable to perform this simplistic solution. We demonstrate the unfolding of this bind through two examples; one in a disaffiliative environment in which advice-resistance might be expectable, and the second in an overtly affiliative sequence, in which it might not. First, however, we supply an overview of previous research on “*just*” and “advice-giving”, and explicate our methodological approach.

‘*Just*’

Injunctions to “*just*” do something, or to refrain therefrom – such as those instanced in Extracts 1-4 – are a ubiquitous feature of modern social life, and have been brought to bear upon almost all conceivable dimensions of human sociality.² Accordingly, in a number of disciplines – including psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and sociology – such uses of “*just*” have occasioned a diverse range of theoretical disquisitions and empirical research (e.g. Best, 2000; Allen and Munich, 2006; Wagner, 2008; Böhm and Batta, 2010). Concerning the word “*just*” alone, a large body of exegeses has, since Plato, converged in discriminating its adverbial (e.g. Pirsig, 1974: 226-241) and adjectival meanings (e.g. Ryan, 1993). As an adverb, a substantial body of linguistic research has also extricated the pragmatics and semantics of “*just*”, and documented its semantic change over time (e.g. Staubach, 1946; Nevalainen, 1991; Kishner and Gibbs, 1996; Aijmer, 2005; Molina and Romano, 2012). The production of “*just*” within situated

¹ Various differences obtain in the syntactic design of the formulations in which “*just*” is produced. For review, see Lee (1987).

² A review of such usages – and of their versatility within the “discursive consciousness” (Giddens, 1984: 45) – transcends the limits of space, and warrants an independent, empirical, sociological enquiry.

instances of talk-in-interaction has, however, received comparably little research (e.g. Sacks, 1995 [1967]; Craig and Sanusi, 2000; Weltman, 2003; Goodman and Burke, 2010; Childs, 2012; Skalicky, Berger and Bell, 2015; Haugh, 2016). Indeed, whilst its minimising operation has been analysed in prior research (e.g. Schegloff, 1996a: 78-79),³ there remains a lack of investigation into its employment within various ‘analytically delimited sequential environment[s]’ (à la Schegloff and Lerner, 2009: 91). This paper, therefore, poses one response to this omission.

Advice-giving

Advice-giving is defined, following Heritage and Sefi (1992: 368), as a prescriptive social action whereby an interlocutor ‘describes, recommends, or otherwise forwards a preferred course of future action’. As a ‘problem-solving endeavour’ (Vehviläinen, 2009: 163), advice-giving can be solicited or unsolicited, designed implicatively or explicitly, and can concern ‘any number of personal or impersonal topics’ (Hudson, 1990: 285) or ‘territories of knowledge’ (Shaw, 2013: 18). Furthermore, advice-giving also intimates a complex of normative, epistemic, and moral dimensions. Advice-giving ‘is “normative” insofar as it prescribes a course of future action that the recipient *should* undertake’ (Butler et al., 2010: 267; italics in original). It also co-implicates an asymmetry in knowledge – or “epistemic gradient” (see Heritage 2012) – by positioning the advice-giver as knowing more than the advice-recipient concerning the domain of knowledge to which the prescribed course of future action relates. As the accountability of knowing has been demonstrated by conversation analytic (CA) research to be imbued with moral implications (e.g. Stivers, Mondada and Steensig, 2011), advice-giving also implicates a ‘moral subtext’ (Shaw, 2013: 346), whereby ‘the value of knowing about and indeed performing a particular course of action is given varying degrees of weight’ (Shaw and Hepburn, 2013: 347).

Research into advice-giving has paid scant attention to the adverb “*just*”. Where it has formed the focus of research, it has been examined only in *reported* formulations of advice-resistance in institutional talk (see Spruiell, 1993). This paper therefore complements this focus by contributing findings of the first known investigation of the situated production of “*just*” in recorded instances of advice-giving in ordinary talk. In so doing, we show that “*just*”-formulated advisings are among the repertoire of resources employed by interlocutors to manage advice-resistance (e.g. Waring, 2007; Emmison, et al., 2011; Hepburn and Potter, 2011; Heritage and Lindström, 2012; Stommel and te Molder, 2015). Whereas prior research has observed how such resources can effectuate acceptance and/or closure from previously misaligned advice-recipients in institutional interactions, we demonstrate how “*just*”-formulations engender further advice-resistance.⁴

³ We are grateful to Celia Kitzinger for drawing our attention to this analysis.

⁴ It is quite possible that the phenomenon discussed in this paper obtains in “institutional” contexts. Our focus on “ordinary talk” leaves this matter equivocal, however. Note that Schegloff (2007a: 459-460, fn. 11) provides one conforming example from an interaction between a string quartet ensemble. The extent to which the interlocutors’ respective institutional identities are of “demonstrable relevance” (see Schegloff, 1992: 107-110) to this sequence is, however, unclear.

Data and method

This research was conducted in partial fulfilment of the first author's undergraduate dissertation (Holmes, 2014a) and was ratified by the ethical review committee of the authors' University. The research was conducted in accordance with the principles and practices of conversation analysis (CA). The focus of the research concerned the social organisation of unsolicited advice-giving in ordinary, naturally-occurring forms of talk-in-interaction. Heritage and Sefi's (1992) definition of advice-giving informed collection building but did not circumscribe its remit, which remained inductive and otherwise unmotivated. The data analysed included interactions co-produced in American ($n=47$) and British English ($n=133$), derived from several of the "classic" and "contemporary" CA corpora ($n=180$). Following collection-building, the first author directly experienced the interactional bind focalised in this paper. This encouraged a re-analysis of the established collection, resulting in a small collection of the phenomenon reported here. This collection was then augmented through the analysis of an additional corpus of ordinary instances of talk-in-interaction ($n=293$). This was made available by other researchers and through the data repository TalkBank (MacWhinney, 2007). In total, 473 interactions were analysed in this research, comprising data in both American ($n=93$) and British English ($n=380$).⁵

The collection of instances accrued in this investigation is a small one for CA research.⁶ This we attribute to the nature of the interactional environment that the bind occupies and to the n^{th} sequential position in which "*just*"-formulated advisings can – but need not necessarily – be employed. As addressed above, the bind is occasioned in a moment of perduring "interactional asynchrony"; an environment for which interlocutors are equipped with resources by which to circumvent, resolve, or extend (whether intentionally or not) such misalignment. The quantity of cases acquired in this research is, accordingly, considered indicative of the nature of this interactional environment, and not to belie the putative instability of the focal practice. Note also that our present concern lies with the endogenous logic of the phenomenon as it is exhibited across our collection. The matter of "generalisability" (howsoever characterised) is thus immaterial. We qualify only that the manifestation of the phenomenon on a single occasion denotes its availability to users of the natural language. Thus, it is at least possible – if not expectable – that the phenomenon will recur within additional, hitherto unexplicated occasions.

⁵ As these data were parsed purposively – that is, for comparable instances of the interactional bind – an analysis of "*just*"-formulated advice-giving in different sequential positions cannot be taken up here. This is an avenue for future research.

⁶ The operative impediment to quantification here is the inherent "contingency" of social interaction (see Schegloff, 1996b: 21-22). Turns-at-talk may, for example, be restarted, repaired, abandoned and/or escaped over the course of their production. No turn-at-talk is insulated from such contingencies (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977: 363). As Curl (2006: 1259, fn. 2) observes in an analogous context, this implicates a range of obstacles for quantification. We therefore made no attempt to quantify the frequency or distributional properties of the focal phenomenon. Moreover, whilst our sample is small, it remains equivocal what the relevant quantity of cases would need to be parsed in order for this (or any) phenomenon to be explicated "adequately". In the absence of such a threshold, we continue then, as Schegloff (2000: 241, fn. 20) writes, 'to limp along on the grounds of mere cogency'.

Analysis

The “*just*”-formulated advice-giving turns on which we focus in this paper form one part of a much longer sequence of talk-in-interaction. The sequence with which are concerned is schematised in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The focal sequence

a →	Interlocutor A	(Troubles-recipient <i>qua</i> Advice-giver):	Advice provision
b →	Interlocutor B	(Troubles-teller <i>qua</i> Advice-recipient):	Advice resistance
		(With n^{th} repetition of the above)	
c →	Interlocutor A	(Troubles-recipient <i>qua</i> Advice-giver):	“ <i>Just</i> ”-formulated advice
d →	Interlocutor B	(Troubles-teller <i>qua</i> Advice-recipient):	Advice resistance

“*Just*”-formulated advisings here constitute non-minimal post-expansions (Schegloff, 2007b). They are produced by troubles-recipients (*qua* advice-givers) after advice has been given (a→) and resisted (b→) on at least a single occasion. These turns may not necessarily be produced, however, after the first iteration of this sequence. Instead, advice may be produced and resisted an indeterminable number of times before the focal “*just*”-formulation is eventually produced (c→).

In the remainder of this paper, we track how the sequence shown in Figure 1 unfolds across two cases. These are taken from telephone calls between two sets of friends: Katharine and Jenny, and Myra and Gwen.⁷ As the bind unfolds across “long sequences” (à la Sacks, 1995 [1971]), we confine our analysis to these cases for the sake of economy.⁸ The analyses which follow are, therefore, illustrative rather than exhaustive of our collection. To reflect the composition of our dataset, Extracts 5 and 6 are co-produced in American and British English, respectively, and exhibit the bind in both an overtly disaffiliative and affiliative context, respectively.

Affiliative environment

The sequence of advice-giving shown across Extract 5 concerns Katharine’s “Law School Admission Test” (LSAT; ‘*Elset*’; line 74) result. The focal turn – “*just study differently this time*” – has been shown already in Extract 1, and is situated here within its wider sequential context (Extract 5c; line 126). As we will show, this phenomenon follows a putative troubles-telling by Katharine, which is met (amongst other things) with advice-giving by Jenny and subsequent resistance by Katharine. The extract begins as Katharine nominates the topic, informing Jenny that she has received the result of her LSAT earlier the same day (line 74).

Extract 5a (Frankel: T.C.: Reel 1: Call 1)

74 Kat: Figure(s/d). .hhhhh Oh: I got my (Elset) score back t'day.
75 Jen: Yer kid
76 ((TAPE BREAK))
77 (6.5)
78 ((TAPE RESUMES))

⁷ These are pseudonyms.

⁸ For additional examples, see Holmes (2014a).

79 Jen: (). .hhhhh Thet's about hh- what ha: a little:, more
80 then[half,
81 Kat: [That's very ba:d.h=
82 Jen: =It is ba:d?
83 Kat: Yeah,h
84 (.)
85 Kat: .hh very bad.
86 (0.5)
87 Jen: B'did- (.) uh:: Dave git his score ba:ck?=
88 Kat: =No Dave's not taking his til Decemb[ē:r.
89 Jen: [Oh:: oh::,
90 (.)
91 Jen: .hh=
92 Kat: =(hh[hhh)
93 Jen: [Sih yih g'nna take it agai:n?=
94 Kat: =nNo.
95 (0.5)
96 Jen: No:?
97 Kat: °No.°
98 (0.3)
99 Jen: Why no:t.=
100 Kat: =.t.hhhhh I don't rilly wan'to.
101 Jen: Yih don'wanna go through all the ha:ssle?=
102 Kat: =.hhhh I don'know Jenny,
103 (.)
104 Kat: I've I've stopped crying uhheh-heh-heh-heh-heh,
105 Jen: Wuh were you cr[y:ing?
106 Kat: [.hhhhhh Oh I wz hysterical.
107 (0.4)
108 Kat: Yihknow how much I p't out fer this?
109 Kat: .hhhhhhhhh But I feel better a:n' (.) now the neh- th'nex'
110 queshion is what I'm g'nna do next year.

Whilst the tape break disguises Katharine's LSAT score (lines 76-78), she explicitly assesses her result as "very bad" (lines 81 & 85), a position that Jenny questions (line 82), and with which she does not subsequently affiliate (e.g. lines 84 & 86). Heritage (2011: 164) describes moments such as this negatively-valenced telling as an 'occasion for empathic response', arguing that the least empathic responses are those that raise 'a somewhat related question about the matter', thereby refocusing the interaction 'at the point where an empathic response [...] would otherwise be due'. We see this precise interactional move prosecuted by Jenny when she enquires about Dave's score (line 87). When Jenny produces a possible advice-implicative interrogative (AII; Butler et al., 2010) at line 93, then, the two friends are already out of alignment, with Katharine having launched a troubles-telling, but finding a misaligned troubles-recipient in Jenny.

This moment of "interactional asynchrony" then develops analogously to that observed by Jefferson and Lee (1981): having already failed to address the impact of the "very bad" (lines 81 & 85) test result on Katharine personally, Jenny produces a turn (line 93) which posits a possible solution to the trouble rather than addressing 'the teller and [her] experiences' (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 411). There is not space here to detail the full extent of the misalignment that ensues. However, it is worth noting that the declarative syntactic construction of Jenny's possible AII (line 93) indexes a privileged degree of epistemic access to the referent and conveys both the expectation and preference for confirmation from Katharine. Nevertheless, Katharine rejects (line 94) Jenny's candidate understanding of her future course of action – and thus also the implied

solution to her problem. Following pursuit of an account for this rejection (line 101), Katharine articulates her negative reaction to the score in overtly emotional terms: “I’ve stopped crying” (line 104).

This is another occasion in which an “empathic response” could be produced fittingly by Jenny, but who once again foregoes this opportunity (cf. line 105). Katharine then characterises her reaction in extreme terms (Pomerantz, 1986; line 106) and, after receiving no response (line 107), underscores the amount of effort she put in to taking the test (line 108). Finding no immediate response forthcoming, Katharine casts herself as troubles-resistant, able now to consider her options for the future more rationally (lines 109-110), and explaining to Jenny that attending law school the following year – and, by extension, retaking the LSAT – is an unlikely course of future action (Extract 5b; line 112).

Extract 5b

111 (0.2)
112 Kat: .t.hhhh B't I rilly don't think I'm g'nna go tuh law school.
112 (0.3)
113 Kat: et least not right now.
114 (): .hh
115 Jen: Are you se:rious,=
116 Kat: =Yeh,
117 (0.2)
118 Kat: Very.
119 (0.6)
120 (): .t.hh
121 Jen: a→ .hhhh Kath:arine, I mean why don'tchu try taking it agai[:n.
122 Kat: [.hhh-
123 Kat: b→ .hhhhh Cz I rilly don'know if I c'd put myself through it all
124 over again.
125 (0.3)

In a disagreement-implicative response, Jenny checks Katharine’s stance (line 115). Once her seriousness has been confirmed (line 116), and upgraded (line 118), Jenny reformulates the expectation indexed in her AII (line 93) – that Katharine *will* retake the LSAT – into an on-record, propositional formulation (a→). Thus, the advice is doubly inapposite: not only does it occur following a clear indication that Katharine has already decided against the advised upon course of action, but it occurs in the context of Katharine’s multiple, failed bids to construe her ongoing interaction as a troubles-telling. Jenny, by contrast, has resolutely avoided aligning as a troubles-recipient, recasting the trouble – *qua* advice-giver – as a ‘problem to be solved’ (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 416).

Jenny’s on-record advice-giving (a→) re-construes her previously expected course of future action (line 93) as one that Katharine *should* undertake (see Drew, 2013: 14-17), but, at the same time, downgrades the normative and epistemic dimensions of advice-giving by using the ‘injunction mitigator’ (Schegloff, 1984: 31) “why don’t you”. This formulation enables Katharine to resist the advice – in the form of an account for not taking the test again (b→) – whilst nevertheless aligning as a question-answerer. It is then here, after Katharine’s pursuit of a candidate course of future action has been checked (line 93) and disconfirmed (line 94),

reformulated into a mitigated propositional construction of advice (a→) and then resisted (b→), that Jenny advises Katharine on a new course of future action; this time, employing the focal “*just*”-formulation (c→; Extract 5c).

Extract 5c

126 Jen: c→ °.p.t° We:ll jis study diffrently this ti:[me.°
 127 Kat: d→ [.t.hhh I don'kno:w
 128 it's on the Saturday before final exams.
 129 (0.8)
 130 Jen: Tu take one later then that.
 131 (0.2)
 132 Kat: I ca:n'.
 133 Jen: Why:.
 134 Kat: Becuz they don't let you. You haf to take it by the end a'
 135 this year.
 136 (0.4)
 137 (J): ((sniff))
 138 (0.2)
 139 Kat: They offer it three times en I c=yihknow I wasn't about tih
 140 take it in July:,
 141 Kat: .hhhhh I don'know what I'm g'nna d[o (on this)]
 142 Jen: [W' whatsco]res dih yih
 143 usually nee:d,h .hhh to get in[to a la[w school.]=

In this formulation, Jenny does not recycle her previous advice – i.e., retaking the LSAT – but instead responds to Katharine’s advice-resistance by advising her to “just study differently this time” (c→). This advice is built responsively to Katharine’s prior advice-resistance (b→) inasmuch as it addresses the very bulwark of her opposition; that is, the “effort” involved in retaking the LSAT. Jenny not only proposes a fitted course of future action by proposing this specific solution to Katharine’s resistance, but designedly attenuates its imposing and/or constraining nature through inclusion of the adverb “*just*” in its minimising faculty. By so doing, Jenny’s proposed course of future action is not only attentive to the grounds of Katharine’s resistance, but is designedly cast as one that can be accomplished easily, with the exertion of minimal effort.

Jenny’s advice nevertheless elicits further resistance from Katharine (d→), who invokes the proximity between the LSAT and her final exams as an externally imposed constraint (see Drew, 1984). This report functions to account for why even a minimised solution will not be possible to enact: there would be competing demands on Katherine’s time, and, moreover, those demands would be of a directly comparable nature (i.e. requiring study). The minimised solution is thus received by Katharine as failing to take account of the full complexity of her situation. Jenny then continues to pursue a solution, issuing another formulation of advice in an imperative formulation (line 130); this time targeting the occasioned issue of the test’s timing. Following yet further resistance (line 132), the sequence of advice-giving and advice-resistance is suspended by Jenny as she commences ‘diagnostic talk’ (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 409; lines 142-143).

Extracts 5a-c thus present an instance in which both an advice-implicative action (line 94) and an on-record formulation of advice-giving has been rejected (lines 123-124), and to which a “*just*”-formulated advising has been produced responsively (line 126) and subsequently resisted (lines

127-128). We have argued that the “*just*”-formulated turn designs Jenny’s advice as ostensibly easy for Katharine to implement yet, in situ, occasions further advice-resistance from Jenny. Across this example, we have tracked the “interactional asynchrony” between the two co-interlocutors: Jenny has repeatedly resisted being positioned as troubles-recipient and, moreover, in each of the turns in which Jenny issues advice, she could have produced situated enactments of empathy (cf. Heritage, 2011). Our analysis develops this further by demonstrating how advice-resistance may itself be resisted by the advice-giver and how advice-giving following resistance may be formulated to minimise the effort required of the advice-recipient. Following Jefferson and Lee (1981), we note that the rejection of minimised advice may, in this instance, be readily anticipated owing to the disaffiliative interactional environment. Thus, we turn next to a contrastive example, one progressively realised by the interlocutors as overtly affiliative, demonstrating that in this environment, also, minimised advice-giving occasions further advice-resistance.

Disaffiliative environment

This extract comes from a telephone call between two friends, Gwen and Myra. As shown in Extract 2, above, the focal practice occurs twice: “*just send him round here for a couple of hours*” (lines 318 & 321) and “*so just a little patience with him coz I don’t mind you know that*” (lines 368 & 370). Again, these turns occur during an extended sequence of advice-giving and advice-resistance, produced in response to a troubles-telling. We join the interaction as Myra announces why one of Gwen’s sons, Thomas, phoned her (lines 202-203).

Extract 6a (Rahman II)

202 Myra: Eh::: when wez it was it Thur:sday. .h eh: Thomas ruhng tih
 203 see if you w'h^hyeah:r.
 204 Gwen: .tch.h Oh I think he rahng e:v'ybohdy[h^hones']ly=
 205 Myra: [Dideh]
 206 Gwen: =.h ^My[ra .h
 207 Myra: [*ha-ha-ha*

Myra’s announcement is received with an extreme case formulation by Gwen (“he rang everybody”; line 204), displaying a degree of exasperation with Thomas (lines 204 & 206), the cause of which is then explicated by Gwen as she proffers her “side of the telling” (Pomerantz, 1980). Whilst a considerable amount has been observed elsewhere concerning the unfolding of this sequence (e.g. Jefferson, 1985), it will suffice to note that this telling is elaborated collaboratively by the interlocutors. At a gloss: Gwen reports having left a note for Thomas explaining her temporary absence, which was, from Gwen’s perspective, minimal as Thomas was late home from school. Despite this, Thomas had phoned Myra in search of Gwen. Upon returning, Gwen found Thomas upset. We rejoin the interaction as Gwen speculates about the cause of Thomas’ reaction (Extract 6b; lines 283-291), which Myra receipts with an emphatic, overlapped claim of understanding (“I know”; line 292).

Extract 6b

283 Gwen: [The o:nly thing I]: c'd think of when I came
 284 in ah c'd s[ee he'd been |*cryin'e said 'e hahd't.*
 285 Myra: [*Yass.*

286 (0.2)
287 Myra: *Ya:s[::*
288 Gwen: [But- ee- ee *two pihleece cah:rs'd* stopped outsi:de.
289 Myra: =eeYe::[s?,
290 Gwen: [.h An' that whether he thou:ght that I ed'n
291 ac[cidn't ohr (some)th]ing I don't kno:w.=
292 Myra: [I::: k n e o : w]
293 Gwen: =[B't .h
294 Myra: =[n|No::[:a.
295 Gwen: [Yihknow eez a funny little in[secu:re l]ittle boy:=
296 Myra: [eeYe:h,]
297 Gwen: =isn['t he:.]
298 Myra: [Beh-uh B]'t the point is Gwennie don't fehget no:w. .h
299 (0.3)
300 Myra: Eh:m
301 (.)
302 Myra: 'E w'so: close t' David wa:sn't'e.=
303 Myra: ='E wa[s ^v e r y :. .]
304 Gwen: [*Well this's it]chu see[::,*
305 Myra: [An' no[w he's ^go:ne.=
306 Gwen: [Mm:,
307 Myra: An'ee thinks ^yoor g'nna goh ez well yih s[ee:.
308 Gwen: [Well I think
309 this's it [(But it- it's)
310 Myra: a→ [Well ih- So:h=
311 Gwen: =Oh[::
312 Myra: a→ .h[be patient with ih couhrss we:: dohn't mi:nd,

Gwen's assessment of her son (line 295 & 297) is met with a diagnosis of the nature of Gwen's trouble from Myra (lines 308 & 310-312): she reminds Gwen of the close relationship Thomas had with his father, who died eighteen months before (Jefferson, 1985: 448), and expounds, euphemistically, the perceived implications of this event for Thomas (lines 305 & 307). This parallels Gwen's earlier candidate account for Thomas's apparent overreaction to her absence – the presence of two police cars (lines 283-284, 288 & 290-291) – displaying further Myra's claimed understanding regarding the impact for Thomas on seeing these. Gwen agrees with Myra's analysis (lines 304 & 308-309), and Myra's first formulation of advice is produced 'as a logical outcome' (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 411) of this agreement: that given what has happened, Gwen should be patient with Thomas (a→). This advice is bolstered through the production of a contiguous account by Myra (line 312), which positions the perceived burden of constraint for Gwen (i.e. Thomas's "separation anxiety") as one that does not encumber Myra ("we don't mind").

Unlike in Extract 5a, then, we have here a more affiliative interactional environment. Indeed, even the disagreement about how to characterise Thomas may be understood as akin to disagreeing responses following self-deprecations, an exigency which Pomerantz (1984) has demonstrated to be structurally preferred. By explaining Thomas's behaviour in a way that removes any implication of an innate character defect, Myra gently resists the idea that Gwen has somehow produced a "problem child", thereby proffering her support even as she avoids agreeing with Gwen. Moreover, as Myra's advice implicitly contains an ongoing offer by Myra (et al.) – to support Thomas without "minding" – she is also cast as affiliative in this sense. The advice itself, nevertheless, occasions resistance (Extract 6c, b→), a foretaste of which can

be seen discontinued in the overlapped qualification of Gwen’s previously agreeing turn-at-talk (line 309).

Extract 6c

313 Gwen: b→ But it gets me down a bit you know[ah: mean I cah:n't
 314 Myra: [(Loo:k.)
 315 Gwen: b→ I cah:n't mo:ve? yihknow 'ee[siz wheah yih goi:[n g,]=
 316 Myra: [(What) [Well]=
 317 Gwen: b→ =[(goin ot- we:y-)]
 318 Myra: c→ =[a h'v to:ld j]u:.
 319 (.)
 320 Gwen: Mm[:?
 321 Myra: c→ [Jis ^send im round here fer a[couple'v: hou:[r:s
 322 Gwen: [ehh! .hh [But then

In close parallel to Extract 5a, we see Gwen resist the advice by refocusing the talk from “problem-solution” to the emotional impact on her using an extreme case formulation: “I can’t move” (line 315). Thus, as Jefferson and Lee (1981) argued in relation to this very case, we see the implicit ‘tussle’ between the two for what sort of interaction this is to be: one focused on the troubles-teller and her experiences, or one focused on the problem and its potential solution. But more than this, through her response, Gwen also resists how the nature of her trouble has been construed in Myra’s formulation of advice (a→). Specifically, the trouble is re-cast by Gwen not as Thomas acting as an encumbrance upon others, but as Thomas restricting Gwen’s autonomy, and diminishing her sense of well-being. Myra’s advice is then resisted insofar as it advocates a course of future action (i.e. patience with Thomas) which is predicated upon a misconception of the very coordinates of Gwen’s trouble. As such, regardless of the previously affiliative environment, “interactional asynchrony” is observable here on multiple levels. And it is here, in response to Gwen’s advice-resistance, that Myra responds with the production of further advice – this time formulated using “*just*” (c→).

Like Jenny’s formulation of advice in Extract 5c (line 131), the adverb “*just*” operates in Myra’s advising in its minimising faculty: attenuating the imposing and/or constraining nature of Myra’s proposed course of future action, positioning it as designedly easy for Gwen to implement. Moreover, this turn is “multifunctional” (see Schegloff, 2007b), operating, simultaneously, to explicate the offer (see Kendrick and Drew, 2014) implicit in the earlier account (“cause we don’t mind”; line 312); namely, for Gwen to send Thomas to Myra. The turn is also formulated as a *renewal* of this advice/offer, marked through the preface: “I’ve told you” (line 318). Thus, the minimising operation of “*just*” also, implicitly, promotes acceptance of the offer, suggesting that this is a course of future action that is both easy to implement and which emplaces little imposition upon Myra. Despite this construction, however, and echoing Katharine in Extract 5 (lines 132-134), this formulation occasions further advice-resistance (d→) in the form of further refocusing away from the solution embodied in the advice, back to the substantial impact of Thomas’s behaviour on Gwen.

Extract 6d

323 Gwen: d→ (tha-) B't[you know ^M:yra I]never go ^anywheah [do I:.]
 324 Myra: [()] [I:: kn]ow=

when no one co-occupies it with him. It is here that the focal sequence schematised in Figure 1 recurs.

Extract 6e

354 Myra: a→ Ih-ih-it Let im coss I min iss not all thaht long yih kn[ow
355 Gwen: b→ [Yeh=
356 Gwen: =.h[Well y'see it's diffrent f'me:. <eh f'(.) the othuh boy:s=
357 Myra: [Jis:
358 Gwen: =be[cuz they always had each othu:h.
359 Myra: [Yeh
360 Myra: E:xahc'ly. [Wheahr Tho[mas<]
361 Gwen: [(B't) [Yea:s,]
362 (.)
363 Myra: [W e l l 'e]
364 Gwen: [Well thz e] only Te:rry en they fight like th'(dev'l)=
365 Myra: =uWell thi[s is i:t.]E[g z]a c]ly, ya[s.
366 Gwen: [ehhhhh hh] [heh]heh] [.hhhhh=
367 Gwen: =An[d u h]
368 Myra: c→ [So jst]
369 (.)
370 Myra: c→ **ulittle patience with im coz I: doh:n't mind you knoh thaht.**
371 Gwen: d→ Yeh b't ih- ih- [it's]=
372 Myra: [Yas,]=
373 Gwen: d→ =You know it's I try:=
374 Gwen: d→ =I try t'be ba[^]tient hh[a ha ha I][:(j's)/(deh) eh!]=
375 Myra: [I kn::ow,][a n d i t ' s]=
376 Myra: =easy fer me tih say th[is,
377 Gwen: [.hhhe:hhh aOh::[: dearie m]e: ,=
378 Myra: [e e: Yah.]

On this occasion, Myra advises Gwen to allow Thomas to remain in the house on his own (a→). This is responded to with an ‘unmarked acknowledgement’ (see Heritage and Sefi, 1992: 395) by Gwen, by which passive resistance is enacted (b→). Gwen then returns immediately to “diagnostic talk”, distinguishing Thomas’ circumstances from those of his brothers (lines 356, 358 & 364). This occasions strong agreement from Myra (lines 359-360 & 365) who follows this with a second “*just*”-formulated advising (c→).

In this formulation, Myra designedly minimises her first iteration of advice-giving (lines 310 & 312), advocating that Gwen simply shows a “little patience with him” (line 370). Her proposed course of future action is, accordingly, reconstructed as one that can be enacted easily by Gwen. Whereas previously this formulation was issued as the upshot of Thomas’ putative anxiety of Gwen also “going” (line 307), it is now marked as the upshot of Gwen’s diagnostic talk (lines 356, 358 & 364); namely, that Thomas – unlike his brothers – lacks fraternal support. In both cases, then, Myra’s advice is designedly fitted to the local context. Despite the minimisation of this advice, however, this formulation elicits the previously demonstrated pattern, occasioning further advice-resistance from Gwen (d→). On this occasion, Gwen enacts resistance by reporting having already attempted this unsuccessfully (see Sacks, 1986: 134). It is at this point that the sequence of advice-giving and resistance is suspended in the interaction.

In this extract, then, in a strongly affiliative interactional environment, two advising turns formulated with the minimising usage of the adverb “*just*” (c→) have been produced after

formulations of advice were produced (a→) and resisted (b→). On both occasions, these have been marked by the advice-giver (Myra) as easy to implement, and yet have neither eventuated acceptance, nor terminated the sequence. Instead, whilst functioning to minimise the imposing nature of the advice, they have nevertheless occasioned further advice-resistance (d→). Notably, Myra herself orients to the juxtaposition of the advice-giving as easy to do, but the enactment of the advice as (implicitly) far more difficult (lines 375-376). Myra thereby self-identifies that her formulation has, inferentially, minimised the nature of Gwen's trouble, which is thereby recognised to be more significant than the design of Myra's advice-giving implies.

Discussion

This paper has introduced an interactional bind that is occasioned at the interface of troubles-tellings and advice-givings in ordinary interaction. Through the illustrative analysis of two extracts taken from a broader collection, we have shown that after advice has been produced and resisted on at least a single occasion, a recurrent practice enacted by advice-givers is to produce a minimised formulation of advice. This is accomplished through the production of advice that includes the adverb “*just*” in its minimising faculty. This design constructs the advice as easy to implement. However, as we have shown in Extracts 5 and 6, the practice occasions further advice-resistance from troubles-tellers. As summarised above, Jefferson and Lee (1980; 1981/1992) argued that this resistance was not dependent on whether the advice was auspicious or inauspicious but was, rather, attributable to the exigencies of the local interactional environment, their epistemic upshot, and to the categorial implications posed by accepting the advice. Furthermore, whilst not formulated by the authors in these terms, such a categorial shift also has a clear epistemic upshot; specifically, the troubles-teller would be relegated from their position as more knowledgeable (K+) regarding the nature of the trouble, to the position of being less knowledgeable (K-) regarding the nature of the solution. Focussing on “*just*”-formulated advisings, however, we further note that their turn-design presents additional epistemic and moral reasons which contribute towards this resistance.

As addressed above, advice-giving involves the stratification of interlocutors' rights to access a domain of knowledge between the advice-giver (K+) and advice-recipient (K-). Advice designed in its most minimal form, therefore, exacerbates the epistemic gradient between interlocutors, and polarises the distribution of these rights. Thus, were the troubles-teller (*qua* advice-recipient) to accept the “*just*”-formulation, this would imply – in the first instance – that the recipient was unaware of this easy to enact solution. Accepting the advice would thereby result in constructing the recipient in the face-threatening position of relative incompetence regarding the domain of knowledge implicated by the content of the advice.

This epistemic dimension also co-implicates a moral concern. Were the designedly minimised advising to be accepted by the troubles-teller (*qua* advice-recipient), this would imply that the trouble had a relatively simplistic solution. If the solution were accepted, then, this would have the corollary of downgrading the nature of the “trouble” – or even capitulate this status wholesale. Indeed, if the advice was received as a revelatory matter, this would cast the troubles-teller (*qua* advice-recipient) in the morally-compromising class of persons (e.g.

malingeringers, histrionics, phoneys, etc.) whose professed “trouble” has not warranted a telling – and nor, inferentially, the extended telling sequence over which it has been realised.⁹ The acceptance of a “*just*”-formulated advising would, then, not only institute a categorial and epistemic shift prospectively, but would further problematise the interlocutor’s incumbency of the category of “troubles-teller” reflexively and retroactively, positioning them as having unduly masqueraded in this discourse identity, and/or having fabricated their warrant for so doing wholesale.

Conclusion

The production of advice using the adverb “*just*” is a ubiquitous interactional and rhetorical practice. In interactionally “synchronous” contexts – e.g. those collaboratively construed as “service encounters” – such a minimising operation may be well received. In this paper, however, we have explored this practice at the interface of a troubles-telling and advice-giving, showing that in such an “asynchronous” context – in both an affiliative and disaffiliative environment – it places an interactional bind upon advice-recipients. By minimising what is required of the advice-recipient to resolve their trouble, the advising implies that troubles-telling should be readily brought to a close. However, as this paper has demonstrated, “*just*”-formulated advisings recurrently occasion further resistance from advice-recipients. We propose that this is precisely because they are processed to minimise what is required of the advice-recipient. In the context of a trouble requiring advice, to accept a minimal course of action as a legitimate solution would not only undermine the severity of the trouble, but may prove morally compromising for the advice-recipient. Not only would it imply that they were unable to reach that simplistic solution on their own, but would render them liable to a constellation of moral inferences regarding their incumbency of the discourse identity “troubles-teller”.

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⁹ This is evocative of the “Type 1 disjunction operation” described by Jayyusi (1984: 123, 134).

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