

Reproducing the ‘national home’: gendering domopolitics

Introduction

In October 2016, it was reported that St. George’s Hospital in London will require that pregnant women prove their entitlement to free NHS care when accessing non-emergency medical services. Reports suggest that these measures might include women trying to ‘book’ a bed for labour at a future date (BBC News 2016c; Donnelly 2016). This scheme brings together several trends in recent immigration policy: the expansion of the ‘border’ into institutions and daily life; increasing restrictions around migrants accessing welfare state services; and the construction of pregnant migrants as posing some kind of threat. In his paper, “Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics”, William Walters (2004) argues that the securitization of migration, as exemplified in the above example by the expansion of border checks to NHS facilities, contributes to the construction of the UK as the ‘national home.’ What Walters overlooks, however, is that liberal discourses of citizenship, have relied upon a gendered conceptualisation of the ‘private home’ in order to give meaning to the political ‘public sphere’ (Pateman 1989; Erel 2011). The ‘public sphere’, the domain of citizens, has been historically coded as male; the ‘private home’, by contrast, is associated with women. Women have been constructed as responsible for the maintenance and reproduction of the ‘home’, even while their relegation to the ‘private sphere’ has led to their exclusion from full citizenship (Pateman 1989; Lister 2003; Bakker 2007; Erel 2011). Domopolitical policies both rely upon, and reinforce, this gendered notion of citizenship, producing migrant women’s reproductive practices as a legitimate and necessary site of securitised state intervention, as part of a broader project constructing the national ‘home’.

For the purposes of this paper, I conceptualise migrant women’s reproductive practices as including both biological reproduction, e.g., actually giving birth to children, and social reproduction. With regard to the latter, I use Laslett & Brenner’s (1989, 383) definition:

[V]arious kinds of work-mental, manual, and emotional-aimed at providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically, defined care necessary to maintain existing life and to reproduce the next generation.

This work should be understood as involving not only the reproduction of the labour force under capitalism, as in classical Marxist definitions (Katz 2001), but also those activities necessary for the inculcation of appropriate values and traditions to the next generation, thereby reproducing the ethnic and/or national collectivity (c.f. Yuval-Davis 1997). As I elaborate upon

below, even as this work has been deemed ‘private, nothing to do with citizenship’ (Pateman 1989, 12), women’s reproductive activities, and especially migrant women’s reproductive activities, have historically been a site of considerable public anxiety and intervention (Luibhéid 2006, 2013; Gedalof 2007; Tyler 2010, 2013; Erel 2011). Women have been often disciplined to ensure they reproduce the next generation of citizens ‘correctly’, although the nature and impact of these regimes has varied according to how a particular woman is located within broader discourses of national identity and belonging.

Immigration policies play an important role in the production of these discourses of national identity and belonging (Anderson 2013). The construction of certain migrants as potentially threatening to the nation-state is both underpinned by, and contributes to, an image of the ‘good’ citizen (see also Luibhéid 2013). The association between Britishness and whiteness (c.f. Gilroy 1987), for example, was produced and reinforced by successive Immigration Acts in the 1960s and 1970s. These Acts restricted immigration from the Global South especially, on the grounds that Black and Asian migrants were too ‘culturally different’ to integrate into the UK (Bloch 2000; Samantrai 2002; Solomos 2003). Constructions of masculinity and femininity played an important role in these racialised discourses of ‘culture’; to quote Samantrai (2002, 64) ‘promiscuous sexuality, high rates of birth, arranged marriage, the “traditional” oppression of women, and so forth’ were used ‘to define alien ways of living.’ Class was another critical element of this racialization of citizenship, as it was Black and Asian migrants who were singled out in both the media and government policy as placing an economic burden on the welfare state (Cohen 2002; Samantrai 2002; Solomos 2003; Squire 2005), even as thousands were being recruited to work in welfare state jobs.

While anxiety around migration is not new, it is only relatively recently that immigration has become constructed as a ‘problem’ to be dealt with through security measures (Bigo 2002; Andreas 2003; Walters 2004). The Blair government greatly expanded immigration detention, for example, which had previously been very rare (Fekete 2001; Solomos 2003; Bloch and Schuster 2005). Similarly, improvements in technology have enabled more sophisticated surveillance and identity -checking techniques, for example, the use of biometric passports (Bigo 2002; Sparke 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2010). Furthermore, while race continues to be an important element of anxieties around immigration, criteria for entry and settlement into the UK are increasingly based on a neoliberal ideal of citizenship. Immigrants are now expected to ‘earn’ the right to stay in the UK, by demonstrating neoliberal

qualities such as independence, self-sufficiency, and economic productivity (Anderson 2013; Lonergan 2015; Sirriyeh 2015).

I begin this article by reviewing Walters' (2004) work on domopolitics. Walters (2004) contends that we must understand the securitization of migration and 'the border' as intertwined with a particular construction of the UK as the national 'home'. Under domopolitics, migrants are 'guests', who must be monitored and disciplined to ensure 'good' behaviour (Walters 2004). The securitised disciplinary regimes to which migrants are subjected also contribute to the production of discourses of national belonging and citizenship (Walters 2004; Anderson 2013). In particular, domopolitical policies produce the UK as the home of neoliberal citizens, who must be disciplined into autonomy, independence, and economic productivity. Walters' (2004) intervention is tremendously useful, but he does not discuss the gendered construction of 'home' at the heart of liberal discourses of citizenship. In the third section of the paper, I explore why this is a crucial oversight. While women's reproduction activities are coded as 'private' and apolitical, there is in fact a long history of disciplining women, citizens and migrants, to ensure they reproduce the nation-state 'correctly', in accordance with dominant discourses of belonging and citizenship. Women have been impacted differently, according to how they are constructed within these discourses. In the final section of this paper, I use a gendered lens of analysis to demonstrate that migrant women's reproductive practices are a central preoccupation of current domopolitical policies and discourses. While anxieties about migrant women's reproductive activities are not new, the emergence of domopolitics has greatly expanded the securitisation and disciplining of these activities. Indeed, although ostensibly gender-neutral, domopolitics actually rely upon, and produce, a gendered construction of (neo)liberal citizenship and belonging.

Domopolitics, securitization, and the 'national home'

It is only relatively recently that immigration has become constructed as a 'problem' to be dealt with through securitization (Bigo 2002; Walters 2004; Sparke 2006). In the UK context, this approach became prevalent under New Labour, for reasons which I will discuss below (Bloch & Schuster, 2005; Walters 2004). The securitisation of migration involves the use of advanced technology to intensify surveillance of migrants and borders, for example, the use of biometrics (Bigo 2002; Sparke 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2010). It is additionally characterised by the 'delocalization of the border' (Walters 2006, 193), whereby the functions

and duties of the border are undertaken by agents away from the physical border itself, both outside and inside the nation-state (Bigo 2002; Andreas 2003; Vaughan-Williams 2010). *Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain*, for example, suggests fingerprinting all visa applicants *before* they travel to the UK (Home Office 2005). The British government has also adopted ‘internal’ bordering, expanding the ‘sorting’, surveillance and control functions of the border within UK territory (Home Office 2005, 2007; Darling 2011; Aliverti 2015; Nava 2015). Under the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts, landlords as well as NHS, bank, and DVLA staff, are now expected to verify a prospective client or patient’s immigration status before providing services, or letting a property (see also Aliverti 2015; Nava 2015).

Domopolitics examines how this securitisation of migration, and the external and internal expansion of the border, contribute to the production of the UK as the ‘national home’. Walters (2004, 241) defines domopolitics as

an analytic which captures certain significant features and tendencies within the political meaning and governance of security today. Domopolitics implies a reconfiguring of the relations between citizenship, state, and territory. At its heart is a fateful conjunction of home, land and security. It rationalizes a series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home.

Securitization measures are necessary to protect our national home from outsiders. We may invite guests in, but they are expected to abide by the ‘house’ rules, and will be asked to leave if they do not. Moreover, we must ensure that the ‘right’ migrants are invited in, and that they arrive through appropriate channels, and behave in appropriate ways. This relates to the second aspect of domopolitics as identified by Walters (2004, 242):

...—domo as conquest, taming, subduing; a will to domesticate the forces which threaten the sanctity of home... the homeland becomes the home front, one amongst many sites in a multifaceted struggle.

Maintaining and protecting ‘our’ national ‘home’ therefore not only requires the securitization of the border, but also the proliferation of these measures throughout the national territory in order to ensure that guests are properly identified, disciplined, and if necessary, expelled.

Domopolitics therefore involves the production of various categories of guests, with differing levels of desirability, and subject to differing regimes of securitization. Darling (2011, 266) argues that domopolitical logic

produc[es] both the categories of position through which individuals are sorted and understood and the route or pathway of response which such positions imply, as categories of position come to be linked to particular responses in terms of case management, welfare entitlements and the provision of accommodation and services.

A migrant can travel to the UK on a Tier 1 ‘Entrepreneur’ visa; or as a spouse; or as a European migrant exercising freedom of movement; or as an asylum seeker. However, a migrant can only be in one category; if one comes to the UK as a spouse, this defines one’s relationship with the state and the immigration system, even if one is a highly-skilled surgeon. Furthermore, each particular ‘category’ of migrant comes with its own relationship to the government and the welfare state, and to various securitization and disciplinary regimes. Those on work and spousal visas, for example, are denied access to public funds, and this must be enforced by employees of the Job Centre. Domopolitical policies also produce the pathways by which ‘guests’ can become full-fledged members of the ‘national home’, i.e. citizens. Migrants must fulfil certain criteria to qualify for settlement, and these may vary depending on their particular ‘category’; so, asylum seekers are more or less forbidden from working,¹ while a migrant on a work permit must maintain employment at her sponsoring company.

It is not only migrants who are produced by domopolitical policies; as Anderson (2013, 2) argues, ‘close attention to the border (physical and metaphorical) reveals much about how we make sense of ourselves’ (see also Luibhéid 2013). Who is allowed to enter and settle in the UK, and on what terms, contributes to the construction of the UK as a ‘national home’. To quote Anderson (2013, 99):

The ways in which individuals become citizens, and who is able to become a citizen, reveal ideals of citizenship, membership and statehood in specific states, and how the nation/state community is imagined. In this way, formal and substantive citizenship are inextricably linked and we can see citizenship’s moral space, a space that extends beyond the Migrant to encompass migrant and citizen alike.

Domopolitical regimes seek to discipline migrants into behaving as ‘ideal citizens’, and in doing so, contribute to wider discourses about belonging, identity and citizenship (Anderson 2013; Luibhéid 2013). ‘Good’ migrants are those who ‘fit’, both through their behaviour, and

¹ Asylum seekers can apply for the right to work if they have been waiting over 12 months for a decision to be made about their case (or about further submissions made after a refusal) *and* they are not considered responsible for the delay in the decision (Gower 2016). However, they can only take up jobs on the ‘shortage occupation list.’ In practice, it is very rare for asylum seekers to secure the right to work and take up employment (Lewis *et al.* 2014).

through other characteristics, like ethnicity, with aspirational discourses of citizenship; that is, who we ‘want’ to be. At the same time, the exclusion of certain groups of migrants points to who we could ‘never’ be, and in doing so, acts as a negative image of national discourses of identity. Thus, the exclusion of ethnic minority migrants through Immigration Acts in the 1960s and 1970s, discussed in the introduction, affirmed racialised discourses associating Britishness with whiteness.

Importantly, though, immigration controls are not the only policies that contribute to the construction of the ‘national home.’ Loretta Ross (2006) notes the parallels between immigration policies and discourses, and those around state support (or lack thereof) for biological reproduction, e.g. access to maternity care, or welfare support for low-income families. Both types of policies are underpinned by, and reinforce, a construction of the ‘ideal citizen.’ Restricting state support to low-income parents with more than 2 children, or limiting certain women’s access to free maternity care, sends a clear message about who can be trusted to reproduce the next generation of citizens, who can help build the ‘national home’ (Lonergan 2012; Ross 2006; Solinger 2001). Consequently, such policies and discourses can also be understood as domopolitical. Furthermore, as I discuss in the final section of this paper, immigration policies and discourses can involve state intervention into biological and social reproduction.

Domopolitics and neoliberalism

Domopolitical policies and discourses, under both New Labour and the Coalition² government, were underpinned by, and contributed to, the construction of the ‘ideal citizen’ as the *neoliberal* citizen, and the UK as the ‘national home’ of neoliberal citizens. Under neoliberalism, the ideal citizen is independent, autonomous, self-managing, entrepreneurial, and financially productive (Brown 2005; 2015; Nyers 2004; Rose 1999; van Houdt *et al.* 2011). Whereas post-war Keynesian discourses treated welfare state benefits as an entitlement of citizenship, under neoliberalism, social rights must be *earned*, by demonstrating the aforementioned qualities (Nyers 2004; Rose 1999; van Houdt *et al.* 2011). Hence, for example,

² After the 2010 UK General Election left no party with an overall majority in parliament, the Conservative party (which had the most seats) and the Liberal Democrats entered into a Coalition. The Liberal Democrats agreed to vote with the Conservatives until the next general election, allowing the Coalition to function as a majority government.

the increasing obligations put on those in receipt of Job Seeker's Allowance to 'prove' that they are sufficiently committed to finding a job.

New Labour's policy documents constructed the 'good' migrant as the neoliberal migrant. The Blair government diverged from previous administrations' portrayal of migrants as a problem, arguing that highly-skilled migrants could bring economic benefits. The White paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven*, argues that '[m]igration brings huge benefits: increased skills, enhanced levels of economic activity, cultural diversity and global links', and that one of the key goals of immigration policy should be to 'ensure that [the UK] has the people it needs to prosper in the world economy...' (Home Office 2002, 9 and 11). Nonetheless, the criteria to qualify as a 'highly-skilled' migrant were very strict, and policy documents suggested that those who could not meet this criteria would be an economic burden (Home Office 2002; Yuval-Davis *et al.* 2005). Furthermore, New Labour also betrayed significant concerns about the supposed cultural and security threat posed by certain migrants, especially ethnic minority and Muslim migrants (McGhee 2005, 2009; Worley 2005; Yuval-Davis *et al.* 2005; Gedalof 2007; Fortier 2010; Tyler 2013; Kundnani 2014). These tensions were resolved through the *managed migration* paradigm.

Under *managed migration*, the securitized border acted as a filter, excluding 'undesirable' migrants, while simultaneously allowing the flow of goods and skilled people required by neoliberal capitalism (Andreas 2003; Sparke 2006; Andrijasevic 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2010). The goal of immigration policy was to produce migrants that displayed neoliberal qualities, such as autonomy, independence, and economic productivity. Thus, in 2002, the Blair government introduced the Highly Skilled Migrants Program, designed to allow the immigration, without a prior job offer in place, of 'individuals with exceptional personal skills and experience' (IND 2003, 2). The Highly Skilled Migrants program was gradually replaced from 2008 by a points-based immigration system for migrants hoping to work or study in the UK. Tier 1 (General) under this scheme enabled 'Highly skilled individuals to contribute to growth and productivity' (Home Office 2006) to enter the UK under the same terms as the HSMP. In both cases, the criteria were based on age, level of education, UK experience, and previous earnings.

Publicly, the Coalition government downplayed any potential economic benefits of migration, instead insisting on the need for a net reduction Cameron (2011).³ However, in practice, the Coalition government increased the securitisation of migration while re-emphasising the expectation that migrants demonstrate the neoliberal qualities of autonomy, entrepreneurialism, and economic productivity. The Tier 1 (General) category of the points-based immigration system was scrapped because, according to then-Home Secretary Theresa May (2010), '[a]t least 30% of Tier 1 migrants work in low-skilled occupations such as stacking shelves, driving taxis or working as security guards and some don't have a job at all.' However, May (2010) hoped to attract more migrants in the other Tier 1 categories, 'Investor', 'Entrepreneur' and 'Exceptional Talent', characterising them as 'wealth creators'. The Coalition also introduced the 2012 Family Migration Rules, which require that anyone seeking to sponsor a spouse from a non-EU country have an annual income of at least £18,600, rising to £22,400 to sponsor a child and a spouse, and increasing by £2,400 for each additional child (Home Office 2012, 6). This amount was chosen because it is the point at which a couple no longer qualifies for income-related benefits (Home Office 2012, 16). The right to live with a migrant spouse in the UK is thus dependent on demonstrating financial autonomy (Anderson 2013, Lonergan 2015, Sirriyeh 2015).

Domopolitical policies and discourses thereby restricted entry and settlement, and therefore eventual citizenship, to those migrants who could demonstrate the qualities of 'neoliberal citizenship.' Following Anderson's (2013) argument that migrants are expected to be 'super citizens', these policies produced the UK as the 'national home' of neoliberal citizens. Indeed, it was not only migrants who were disciplined by these policies; sponsoring a spouse requires a UK citizen to perform neoliberal citizenship by demonstrating sufficient economic productivity. Moreover, these immigration controls must be situated within a range of other policies, notably those related to access to the welfare state, which similarly can be read as attempting to produce neoliberal citizens. Domopolitical policies serve as tools of neoliberal governmentality, for immigrants and citizens.

Gender and Domopolitics

With 'domopolitics', Walters (2004) provides a lens through which to analyse how the securitization of migration contributes to the construction of discourses of national identity and

³ Then Coalition government never came close to fulfilling their promise to reduce net migration to the 'tens of thousands' (Portes 2015).

belonging, and following this, how immigration policy can be a form of governmentality. However, Walters (2004) does not incorporate a consideration of the role of gender in this process. This is unfortunate, because, as noted, a gendered dichotomy involving ‘the home’ lies at the heart of modern liberal citizenship (Pateman 1989; Lister 2003; Erel 2011). Pateman (1989) argues that, under liberalism, ‘the political’ is constructed as taking place within the ‘public sphere.’ However, this ‘public sphere’ depends for coherence on a contrasting, apolitical ‘private sphere’. The family ‘home’ is constructed as belonging in this private sphere, and is therefore held to be outside of politics. Moreover, this binary is gendered, with the political ‘public’ sphere coded as the domain of men, and its necessary opposite, the ‘private’ sphere, associated with women (Pateman 1989; Lister 2003; Erel 2011). This public/private dichotomy underpins women’s historical exclusion from full liberal citizenship, for example, the right to vote (Pateman 1989). It is important to note, though, that liberal citizenship was shaped by other power structures, such as race and class, so that certain groups of men were similarly excluded; for example, prior to 1918 property restrictions prevented many men from voting in UK elections (Foot 2005). Additionally, different groups of women experienced exclusion from liberal citizenship differently, depending on their social location; Anderson (2013, 96-97) notes ‘[a]t certain times and under certain regimes, both master’s wife and slave were not legally recognized as full persons, yet a wife was not the same as a slave.’ Nonetheless, women’s association with the apolitical ‘private’ sphere had significant implications for how they were constructed within discourses of liberal citizenship. As Cisneros (2013, 292-293) argues

Women have been cast as maternal producers of citizens rather than citizens in their own right, and have historically been denied the political relevance, rights, and participation of the male citizen.

Leading on from their role in the social reproduction of the ‘private home’, women are also frequently constructed as responsible for the biological and social reproduction of the nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Yuval-Davis 1997; Erel 2011). Women are expected to give birth to, and raise, the next generation of citizens, and inculcate them with ‘our’ national values. A paradox emerges here: women’s biological social reproduction activities are associated apolitical ‘private’ sphere, but because these activities reproduce the nation-state, they have historically been, and continue to be, the site of intense public anxiety and intervention. These interventions have been shaped by discourses of national belonging and identity, and women (and their children) have been impacted differently according to how they

are constructed by these discourses. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, middle-class white women in the UK reported difficulties in obtaining the consent of two doctors in order to get an abortion; Black feminists, by contrast, wrote of being pressured into having abortions (Samantrai 2002; Hoggart 2003). Black feminists linked this treatment to racialised discourses of Britishness that devalued Black children (Samantrai, 2002).

Because women are constructed as responsible for reproducing the nation, migrant women's reproductive activities have long been a key site of state anxiety and intervention in the UK and other liberal nation-states (Luibhéid 2006, 2013; Gedalof 2007; Tyler 2010, 2013; Erel 2011; Marchesi 2012). Discussing the Italian context, for example, Marchesi (2012, 173) points out:

[W]hile there is a broad (although not universal) consensus that Italy needs more children, it is native Italians who are being hailed in demographic discourses. The reproduction of immigrants, in contrast, is construed as a problematic and even dangerous contribution to the nation.

Similarly, Gedalof (2007) notes that, in discussions around *Secure Borders, Safe Haven*, 'the migrant woman' was frequently constructed as passing on 'her culture' (homogenous and unchanging) onto her children, preventing them from ever integrating and thus disrupting 'social cohesion'. Because they are not citizens, migrant women must be disciplined to ensure they can nonetheless raise citizens and reproduce the nation-state. Indeed, as noted previously, migrants are often expected to behave according to discourses of the 'ideal' citizen, and therefore migrant women are expected to be 'ideal' mothers of 'ideal' children.

Importantly, the extent to which an individual migrant woman is perceived as a threat, and her reproductive activities disciplined, depends on her social location with regard to discourses around citizenship, national identity and belonging. The racialisation of citizenship in the UK, for example, has meant that ethnic minority migrant women have been especially seen to be threatening the integrity of the UK nation-state through their 'problematic' reproductive practices. Yuval-Davis et al. (2005) note that official discussion around *Secure Borders, Safe Haven*, included the suggestion that a lack of English language skills on the part of mothers and grandmothers of British Asian men contributed to the 2001 disturbances in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham. Ethnic minority migrant women were thus held responsible for their children and grandchildren behaving as 'bad' citizens.

The implementation of neoliberal economic policies, and the concomitant emergence of neoliberal discourses of citizenship in the UK, has influenced the construction and disciplining of women's reproductive activities. As under classical liberalism, women continue to be associated with the private 'home', and deemed responsible for its reproduction and maintenance. Indeed, this gendered construction of the 'home' has actually become more pronounced under neoliberalism. Welfare state retrenchment has resulted in governments cutting back or privatising state-sponsored caring support (e.g., respite homes for those with severe learning difficulties); because of the historical association between women and care work, it is women who are now expected to provide these services, free of charge, in 'private' (Bakker 2007).⁴ Yet, this social reproduction work is simultaneously devalued as non-economically productive, and consequently, undertaking this work is not seen demonstrating the qualities of 'good' neoliberal citizenship (Bakker 2007). Neoliberalism has thus reinforced the paradox whereby social reproduction is considered a woman's 'duty', and yet also does not qualify one for 'full' citizenship. Additionally, as domopolitical policies have constructed the UK as the home of neoliberal citizens, women's duty to 'reproduce the national home' now involves raising children to be autonomous, independent, and economically productive (De Benedictis 2012; Lonergan 2015). As I discuss in the final section of this paper, domopolitical policies consequently target migrant women's reproductive practices as legitimate, and necessary, sites of state intervention. Migrant women must be disciplined to ensure they are reproducing the neoliberal national home.

Gender, reproduction, and domopolitics in recent immigration policies

Domopolitics both relies on, and reinforces, gendered (neo)liberal constructions of citizenship. Domopolitical policies and discourses function as tools of governmentality, disciplining migrants into behaving as 'ideal' citizens, and thereby producing the UK as a 'national home'. This necessitates securitised intervention into, and disciplining of, the activities of those responsible for reproducing this home, and raising the next generation of citizens. Even where policies are ostensibly gender-neutral, closer examination reveals a tacit understanding that it is *women* who are responsible for reproduction, and consequently, a potential threat to the 'national home'. A woman's perceived fitness to reproduce this home is often dependant on how she is located within dominant, racialised, neoliberal discourses of

⁴ More privileged women have also been able to 'outsource' this labour to the less privileged (Ehrenreich 2002).

national identity and citizenship. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the reproductive activities of British citizens may also be subject to state intervention. The recent requirement that women who wish to claim tax credits for more than two children prove that the additional children were conceived through rape (Walker 2017) can be read as disciplining poor women so that they are not using welfare state services they haven't 'earned.' Nonetheless, as 'outsiders', the ability of migrant women to 'correctly' reproduce the nation-state is always in question, *especially*, if they do not 'fit' with broader discourses around citizenship. The reproductive activities of ethnic minority migrant women, for example, are understood as particularly problematic because of the association between Britishness and whiteness. Furthermore, migrant women are subjected to different disciplinary regimes depending on how they are 'categorised' under immigration policy. Migrant women's reproductive activities are thus constructed as a legitimate, and indeed necessary, site of securitised state intervention.

The 'pregnant migrant'

The figure of the 'pregnant migrant' appears in domopolitical policies and discourses as particularly threatening and 'undesirable'. She is portrayed as undermining the 'national home' through her hyper-fertility. In March 2015, in the House of Lords, Lord Bates, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Coalition government, said 'For the calendar year of 2013, births in the UK to non-UK born mothers accounted for 25% of all live births. That is why we need to reduce immigration.'⁵ In the same vein, the *Daily Express* ran an article in November 2014 with the headline 'Population soars due to foreign family baby boom' (Hall 2014). The 'pregnant migrant' is also portrayed as posing an undue economic burden. A 2008 BBC news article, titled 'NHS 'not ready for immigration' asserted that: 'The NHS is spending £350m a year to provide maternity services for foreign-born mothers, £200m more than a decade ago' (Easton 2008). Similarly, the 'pregnant migrant' features prominently in policies and discourses around 'health tourism': 'New arrivals on visitor visas seeking immediate or major treatment including maternity services' were listed as an example of people who would be charged for NHS services under the 2014 Immigration Act (Department of Health 2013). It is not simply that 'pregnant migrant' is undermining the 'national home' by having 'too many' babies; she also failing to act as a 'responsible' neoliberal citizens using welfare state services she has not *earned*.

⁵ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/150316-0001.htm#1503166000476>

Unsurprisingly, real-life pregnant migrants are particularly targeted by ‘delocalised border’ measures in hospitals. As noted above, in October 2016, St. George’s hospital in London announced a pilot scheme, backed by the Home Office, whereby pregnant women’s passports would be checked to verify their right to access non-emergency antenatal and maternal care free of charge on the NHS. It was not clear what would happen to women without appropriate documentation (BBC News 2016c; Donnelly 2016).⁶ In practice, migrants are impacted differently depending on their immigration ‘category’, with undocumented migrants and failed asylum seekers not entitled to free care on the NHS. Placing domestic politics within the context of gendered constructions of citizenship allows us to understand why pregnant migrants are particularly targeted by these policies and discourses, to the point of potentially endangering their lives and that of their unborn children.⁷ Pregnant migrants must be disciplined to ensure they are not threatening the ‘national home’, either by having ‘too many’ children, or by using welfare state services irresponsibly and posing an economic burden.

Spousal visas

The scare figure of the ‘pregnant migrant’ is very clearly gendered as a woman, and the above domestic discourses and policies target women, especially those constructed as otherwise unfit in dominant narratives of belonging, e.g. undocumented migrants. Other policies, however, are ostensibly gender neutral, but may rely on a tacit understanding that women are responsible for biological and social reproduction, and/or may reinforce such an understanding. This can be seen in the 2012 Family Migration Rules. Under these rules, a person on a spousal visa must pass the Life in the UK test *and* an English language and speaking qualification level at B1 in order to qualify for Indefinite Leave to Remain (Home Office 2012).⁸ The Rules make it clear that a person on a spousal visa *can* be deported, regardless of their marriage to a British citizen, if they fail to comply with these requirements. This policy is not explicitly gendered; however, most people on a spousal visa are women (Blinder 2017), so women will be disproportionately affected by these changes.

⁶ At present, pregnant migrants are entitled maternity care, but, if they do not qualify for free care, may be charged for it afterwards. According to Maternity Action (2017), pregnant migrants who are not eligible for free care, but cannot pay, cannot be turned away by hospitals. However, the pilot at St. George’s suggests this policy may be under revision.

⁷ Research suggest that the current system of charging for maternity services deters women from accessing care until late in their pregnancies, putting their health, and the health of their child, at risk (JCHR 2007, Bragg 2008)

⁸ Prior to the implementation of the 2012 Rules, only one of these was mandatory (Home Office 2012).

Furthermore, these requirements must be placed within wider discourses that call into question (racialized) migrant mothers' ability to reproduce 'British' children, and cite English language fluency as a particular concern. In January 2016, then- Prime Minister David Cameron promised £20 million to help Muslim migrant women learn English – after years of severe cuts to ESOL funding – in part because he argued that it would help to prevent terrorism (BBC News 2016b). As discussed previously, it is specifically migrant *women* who are constructed as failing to raise 'integrated' children (Gedalof 2007), rather than migrant *parents*. It should additionally be noted that these concerns are racially coded: In an essay for *The Guardian*, for example, David Blunkett (2002), then the Home Secretary, bemoaned that '[i]n as many as 30 per cent of Asian British households, according to the recent citizenship survey, English is not spoken at home'. It is significant that it is Asian British households, rather than Italian households, that are constructed as a problem.

The disciplinary effect of the English language requirement of the 2012 Rules can therefore only be understood within the context of broader discourses that construct racialised migrant women as failing to raise 'integrated' citizens. Within that context, the requirement can be read as disciplining migrant women to ensure that they produce 'good' members of the nation-state (Lonergan 2015). Moreover, we must note that, notwithstanding the Cameron's government's £20 million pledge, overall the Coalition government enacted severe cuts to ESOL funding (Shepherd 2011). While it may seem contradictory to both discipline migrant women into learning English and simultaneously restrict their access to ESOL classes, this makes sense when we remember that domopolitical policies and discourses construct the UK as a *neoliberal* national 'home'. The 'good' neoliberal migrant is self-sufficient, and can therefore learn English without state assistance (van Houdt *et al.* 2011; Soysal 2012; Lonergan 2015). The changes to the 2012 Rules therefore not only work to produce English-speaking migrant mothers, but independent and autonomous English-speaking migrant mothers.

Additionally, as noted previously, the income requirements for the spousal visa were set at the point at which it was assumed a household would no longer qualify for income-related benefits. The government thus made financial autonomy a prerequisite for family life in the UK, where one partner is a migrant. Importantly, this also served to reinforce the devaluing of reproduction in work, in that unpaid labour within the home would of course not 'count' towards the minimum income for sponsorship. In addition to this, the 2012 Rules greatly extended the time one must spend on a spousal visa before qualifying for Indefinite Leave to

Remain (ILR). Prior to the 2012 Rules, a person on a spousal visa had to apply for ILR after two years. Now, she must renew her spousal visa after 30 months, and then must apply for ILR after 5 years (Home Office 2012). At both points, the couple must meet the income requirements, which as noted above, increase for every child. These new Rules, it should be clear, are a significant expansion of government surveillance of, and intervention into, families where one spouse is a migrant. In short, the Rules are a striking example of the ‘delocalization’ of the border.

Furthermore, the income requirements at the 30 month and 5 year point mean that, in order to avoid deportation, a couple might postpone, or forego, having (additional) children, to ensure the requirements are met. Again, these policies are ostensibly gender-neutral, but must be located within wider (neo)liberal discourses that construct women as responsible for biological and social reproduction. As a consequence of these rules, for example, a woman may feel that she has to terminate a wanted pregnancy in order to ensure she, or her partner, can renew their spousal visa (Loneragan 2015). Moreover, these changes require migrants and their partners to behave as ‘responsible’ neoliberal citizens, only having children if they will not require income-related benefits. Thus, the Family Migration Rules can be read as a tool of governmentality, one that seeks to *produce* neoliberal citizens, and one in which the reproductive practices of women on spousal visas (as well as those of British women with partners on spousal visas) are tacitly constructed as a legitimate and important site of securitised intervention.

Asylum seeking women

Asylum seekers are constructed in domopolitical policies and discourses as a distinctly problematic group, because, in theory, their right to remain in the UK is not dependent upon demonstrating ‘neoliberal’ qualities, but upon proving they are at risk of severe human rights violations. As a consequence, they are subjected to especially repressive securitisation measures. Thus, for example, since 2002, asylum seekers have been required to sign-in regularly at reporting centres; failure to do so could result in their immediate detention (Tyler 2013). Similarly, under the policy of ‘dispersal’, again started by New Labour, asylum seekers must agree to live where the government places them in exchange for housing and basic financial support (Fekete 2001; Bloch and Schuster 2005; McGhee 2005; Hynes 2011). In practice, asylum seekers often find themselves repeatedly relocated, which, as Gill (2009) points out, interrupts whatever relationships they had been able to form within a particular area

(see also McGhee 2005; Darling 2011; Hynes 2011). This undermines asylum seekers' ability to form networks of support, which makes them more vulnerable to deportation, while also reinforcing the narrative that asylum seekers are not 'at home' in the UK.

These disciplinary measures have had a particular impact on pregnant asylum seekers and those with children. As noted above, the 'border checks' conducted at NHS hospitals, are primarily targeted at undocumented migrant women, including 'failed' asylum seekers. In addition, pregnant asylum seekers are not exempt from dispersal and relocation, even where it means they will be moved far away from their doctor and medical support network late in their pregnancy (Feldman 2013). Indeed, this disciplining may be felt most acutely by pregnant women, and young mothers and their children. While being evicted is always very serious, it is especially catastrophic when the evicted person is a pregnant woman, scheduled to have labour induced that same day, as happened to one asylum seeker in Rotherham (Guiton 2012). Similarly, no one should be forced to live in unhygienic housing, but such conditions pose particularly severe risks to the health of babies and young children. Mothers of babies in asylum accommodation have noted that their carpets are so dirty, they can't put their baby down on the floor to play (Grayson 2012, 2015). In one such situation, a mother found a cockroach in her baby's bottle; yet G4S, the company responsible for the women's housing, refused to act for months (Grayson 2012).

Furthermore, prior to the 2016 Immigration Act, pregnant women could be detained indefinitely; even now, they can still be detained for up to a week with ministerial permission. The medical care provided to pregnant women inside detention centres is grossly inadequate. *Expecting Change*, a report compiled by Medical Justice on the situation of pregnant women in Yarl's Wood, noted that respondents reported rarely seeing a midwife, that routine screenings were missed, that medical personnel failed to identify high-risk pregnancies, and that in some cases, the standard of mental health provision was below that required by NICE guidelines (Tsangarides and Grant 2013). The 2016 Immigration Act also removed the automatic right to government financial support from 'failed' asylum seekers with children, leaving these children destitute.

In short, various domopolitical policies, in particular, securitization measures, 'delocalized' border checks, and denial of welfare state support, have resulted in pregnant asylum seekers and those with children being subject to conditions that would be considered

unacceptable for UK citizens, or more 'regular' migrants. As with the Family Migration Rules, these policies are ostensibly gender-neutral. However, within the context of (neo)liberal discourses that construct women as responsible for the reproduction and maintenance of 'the home', we should not be surprised that the impact of these policies may be gendered. Indeed, it can be argued that gendered discourses of citizenship are in fact an unacknowledged, yet critical, element of these policies. Women on spousal visas, are disciplined to ensure they reproduce 'good' neoliberal, English-speaking, 'integrated' citizens. But asylum seekers, I have noted, are constructed in domopolitics as particularly undesirable 'guests', who cannot be part of the neoliberal 'national home.' Consequently, it can be argued that domopolitical policies seek to discipline women asylum seekers so that they refrain from reproducing *at all*.

Conclusion

Domopolitics both relies upon, and reinforces, (neo)liberal discourses of citizenship that construct women as responsible for the reproduction of both the 'private' and the 'national' home. While often superficially gender-neutral, domopolitical policies and discourses in fact construct migrant women's reproductive activities as a necessary and legitimate site of securitised state intervention. Walters (2004) uses domopolitics to describe the way in which the securitization of migration is underpinned by, and contributes to, the construction of a particular kind of 'national home.' Domopolitical policies discipline migrants into performing 'ideal' citizenship, and in doing so, produce dominant discourses of national identity and belonging. At present, domopolitical policies construct the UK as the 'national home' of (preferably white), economically productive, neoliberal citizens. Importantly, the concept of 'home' has a particular genealogy within liberal discourses of citizenship. As Pateman (1989) contends, the political 'public' sphere of liberal citizenship is constructed in opposition to an apolitical 'private' sphere. The public sphere has been coded as the domain of men, while women have been relegated to the private 'home'. Consequently, women have been deemed responsible for the reproduction of both the private, and the 'national' home. This binary has persisted under neoliberalism, with women constructed as responsible for reproduction, even as these activities are devalued as economically non-productive.

Once we situate domopolitical policies and discourses within this gendered construction of neoliberal citizenship, it is possible to identify the extent to which these policies and discourses discipline migrant women's reproductive activities. Securitization measures introduced by New Labour, such as the dispersal of asylum seekers, and immigration detention,

can be read as denying asylum seeking women particularly the basic resources needed for bearing and raising children. The figure of the ‘pregnant migrant’ has similarly been adopted by both politicians and the media as threatening the state through her ‘hyper-fertility’, and her illegitimate use of the NHS. This culminated in pregnant migrants being particularly singled out for ‘immigration checks’ at hospitals and required to prove their right to access free care. More subtly, the 2012 Family Migration Rules can be understood as a tool of governmentality, producing ‘responsible’ migrant mothers who will speak English (thereby aiding in their children’s ‘integration’) and only raise children when they can do so without requiring state assistance.

There is, as discussed, a long history of state anxiety around migrant women’s fertility and reproductive practices (Luibhéid 2006, 2013; Gedalof 2007; Tyler 2010, 2013; Erel 2011). Indeed, immigration controls have, in the past, involved significant intrusions into migrant women’s sexual and reproductive practices – notably, for example, the ‘virginity tests’ forcibly conducted on South Asian women immigrating for marriage in the late 1970s (Samantrai 2002; Smith and Marmo 2014). What is novel about recent policies is the intensity, and the dispersed nature, of the disciplinary and surveillance regimes to which migrant women are subjected. It is no longer sufficient to ‘prove’ your marriage is ‘genuine’ when applying for a spousal visa – you now have to re-apply for the visa after 30 months, learn English, and maintain a minimum income, rising in line with any children you may have, for 5 years. Border checks are no longer at the territorial border, but spread across various locations and institutions – hospitals, banks, workplaces – often, as Gedalof (2007) points out, the very places where we look for support in building a home.

This securitisation of migrant women’s reproductive practices is likely to intensify. Xenophobia and nationalism are on the increase in both UK government policy, and in wider public discourse. A promise to reduce immigration was a major factor in the victory of the ‘Leave’ side in the 2016 EU referendum (Ashcroft 2016). Following the referendum, there was a significant increase in reported racist and xenophobic hate crime (Weaver 2016), and it is not yet clear on what terms EU migrants currently living in the UK will be allowed to stay (BBC News 2016a). The securitisation of migration is also intensifying: it was recently revealed that the NHS has handed over patient records to the Home Office, in order to help the latter track down overstayers (Travis 2017). Moreover, in 2016, the government began taking steps to expand the border into schools, another key site of state support in social reproduction. Since

October 2016, the school census has asked parents to provide information about their children's country of birth and nationality. For now, this information is sought on a voluntary basis, and parents are free to refuse (Department for Education 2016). However, the Department of Education has agreed to share data with the Home Office, to help them locate families with whom the Home Office has lost contact, and 'create a hostile environment' for irregular migrants (ABC, 2016; Gayle 2016). Increasingly, securing the 'national home' means state intervention into the private 'home'. We must maintain a gendered perspective on domopolitics to fully appreciate the origins of this shift, and its material and discursive consequences.

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