Divine Action and Operative Grace

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Operative grace is generally considered to be a paradigm example of special divine action. In this paper, we suggest one reason to think operative grace might be consistent with general divine action alone. On our view, then, a deist can consistently believe in a doctrine of saving faith.

Orthodox Christian belief about salvation is tempered by what Kevin Timpe calls 'an Anti-Pelagian Constraint':

> (APC) No fallen human individual is able to cause or will any good, including the will of her coming to saving faith, apart from a unique grace.[1]

This unique, or operative, grace is taken to be a gift from God, and, as such, is often held up to be a paradigm example of special divine action.[2] We can see why this is the case in how Aquinas defines 'operative grace':

> An operation which is part of an effect is attributed to the mover, not to the thing moved. The operation is therefore attributed to God when God is the sole mover, and when the mind is moved but not a mover. We then speak of 'operative grace.'[3]

By speaking of God as the mover, it seems that God is here acting specially, rather than generally. But we want to suggest that need not be the case; rather than God moving the mind, that is, acting on the mind Himself, it is the revelation of God which moves the mind. In this paper, we will explore one way of explaining operative grace that is consistent with the Anti-Pelagian Constraint, and yet also consistent with it being an example of general divine action and not special divine action.[4] Once this account has been set out, we will address two major objections to this view.

I. Aquinas's Moral Psychology

On a Thomist moral psychology, a person's mind is composed of a will and an intellect.[5] The will is an appetite or inclination for goodness in general; however, the will cannot apprehend what is good on its own. Apprehending something as being 'good for a person' is the responsibility of the intellect. Every act of will is, therefore, necessarily preceded by an act of intellect, such that the will (the 'moved mover') is always an efficient cause, and the intellect is always the final cause. Because it is also possible for the will to move the intellect (so long as there is a preceding act of intellect), Eleonore Stump has argued that this Thomist account of the mind fits well with Harry Frankfurt's account of the hierarchy of the will, such that there are first-order intellect-will moves, second-order intellect-will-intellect-will moves and (quite rarely) third-order intellect-will-intellect-will-intellect-will moves.[6]

Now, the intellect is capable of, and, in fact, does, apprehend numerous actions as being 'good for a person' at any given time. The will, naturally, will incline itself toward anything apprehended by the intellect as being 'good for a person'. However, the will is not a digital

on / off switch. As a rational appetite, the will is capable of inclining itself further towards those desires to which it is most disposed, and to act on the desire it is most disposed toward to form an effective desire (that is, a volition). A first-order volition produces action, a second-order volition strengthens or weakens the first-order act of intellect (or will), and a third-order volition strengthens or weakens a second-order act of intellect (or will).

On this account, first-order desires are always apprehended by the intellect (a first-order act of intellect), but they can be involuntarily prompted by a whole series of causes external to either the intellect's reflection on some knowledge or a second-order act of will.[7] For instance, the intellect's involuntary apprehension of the sensitive appetites (the passions) or the natural appetites can also prompt a first-order desire in the will. Second-order desires, however, cannot be involuntarily apprehended, for they represent an act of reason concerning first-order desires (namely, a second-order act of intellect). In this way, second-order desires can be said to represent the desires with which a person would choose to identify.

On this account, a person is said to act with freedom of the will if their first-order and second-order volitions align, that is, if that person does what they *want to* want to do. However, that person remains morally responsible for their first-order volitions regardless of whether first- and second-order volitions align, assuming there has been no internal manipulation between the first-order intellect, will, and action.[8] It will prove instructive to note that such misalignment can be caused in two different ways. Consider first the unhappy heroin addict, John. John is also a new father, and has decided he wants to (want to) quit his drug use in order to be a better parent to his child. John has a second-order volition to quit heroin. Unfortunately for John, although this second-order volition

strengthens his first-order will a little, he does not have the strength of (first-order) will to resist all temptation. The next time he is offered heroin he turns it down, but the time after, he gives in and takes the drug. He is disgusted at himself, upset at what he has done, and on this Thomistic account, has not in fact acted with freedom of the will. Nevertheless, John and only John is morally responsible for his action. But there is another general way John's first- and second-order will might misalign. Over time (and repeated relapses), John loses both his job and his partner, and turns to crime to fund his habit. John is arrested, and in consequence of his actions, loses visiting rights to his child, the one thing he really cares about. As the months pass by, John comes to think his only solace in life comes whilst in a heroin induced stupor, and indeed, he comes wants to want this escape from his shame and guilt and loneliness. Although there is still a part of John's volitional complex that wants to want to be good part of his child's life, there is a part of John that now wants to want to escape into a heroin induced stupor. As it would happen, these two desires are just strong enough to prevent one being preferred over the other. John has conflicting second-order desires, but no second-order volition. Whatever John's unreflective first-order volitions are, they cannot align with his second-order volitions, because he does not have any. John is, with respect to choices about his heroin addiction, what Harry Frankfurt would describe as a wanton.[9]

II. Grace as Revelation

With so much said, given that on this Thomist account of mind, a person's will is already inclined to goodness in general, and, given that most theists (and certainly all Thomists) are committed to the belief that God is good, and that union with God is the greatest good for a

person, it seems that all God needs to do to motivate a desire for Him in a person is simply to reveal, partially or fully, His goodness to them. If this person appropriately attends to God's revelation of goodness, this person would come to desire union with God, that is, they will come to have saving faith.[10]

Although of course it might involve special divine action,[11] this revelation of divine goodness need not *require* special divine action. According to the Apostle Paul in Romans 1:19-20, God placed evidence of His divine nature, that is to say, His goodness, into His creation at the point of creation, and that this revelation can still be seen. He writes,

> For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse.

So, reflecting on the beauty of a spectacular sunset on the ocean, or the grandeur of a Himalayan mountain range, or even just the beauty of a tree, or a mathematical proof, or one's spouse, might be sufficient to perceive the goodness of their creator. If operative grace can be explained as the revelation of God's goodness, and, if this revelation is readily available to all in God's creation, it looks like operative grace does not require an act of special divine action at all. If general divine action can explain creation as we perceive it, operative grace is always and everywhere available to all, and has been since the divine first cause.

III. Objection 1: Special Divine Action and Quiescence

But perhaps this move is too quick. According to the Anti-Pelagian Constraint, no fallen human individual is able to cause or will any good, including the will of her coming to saving faith, apart from a unique grace. There is a crucial step between God's revelation of His goodness in creation and a person coming to have saving faith, namely, that person appropriately attending to this revelation. Inasmuch as the Anti-Pelagian Constraint prevents a person from coming to saving faith by themselves, it would also seem to prevent a person from coming to appropriately attend to this revelation. Rather than accept such a revelation as being from God, and reflecting His goodness, the fallen human individual looks set to reject this revelation. The Anti-Pelagian Constraint, then, entails a sort of willed blindness or deafness to God's goodness by the fallen human individual.

The Thomist account, however, has the resources to respond to this difficulty. Recall that on Aquinas's account of the will, the will is not just a binary switch between 'accepting something' and 'rejecting something', for the will is more akin to an appetite, and as such, can also be quiescent with respect to something, neither accepting it or rejecting it, but rather, neutral to it, that is to say, having no attitude toward it. If it is the case that quiescence with respect to God's revealed-in-creation revelation of goodness is sufficient for 'appropriate attendance', that is, omitting to reject that this is a revelation of God's goodness, all that is needed for Anti-Pelagian Constraint compatible saving faith is for the will to become quiescent with respect to this operative grace.[12]

However, if the Anti-Pelagian Constraint entails that a fallen human individual's will's natural state is to reject this operative grace, either God must (1) internally manipulate a person's will to a state of quiescence, or (2) that person's will must be externally motivated towards such quiescence. So, an objector might respond, both (1) and (2) look like examples

of special divine action. If this is the case, it will be of little importance that operative grace itself is compatible with general divine action.[13]

But this objection is not as problematic as it might initially seem. Whilst (1) looks incompatible with general divine action, (2) very plausibly is not. Elsewhere Eleonore Stump argues that external motivation to quiescence takes the form of 'melting' or 'cracking a person's heart. Stump argues that suffering, along with the experience of blessings and love, is an important part of this melting or cracking process.[14] But, why think such blessings or suffering are necessarily instances of special divine action? If, through general divine action, God created the world as a difficult place, where natural suffering abounds, and where natural blessing is possible, although perhaps not as efficient a world where only supernatural suffering occurs, assuming these might be sufficient to motivate quiescence, such a world would be entirely consistent with operative grace's compatibility with general divine action.

IV. Objection 2: Grace and the Will

A more difficult objection to avoid comes from tradition, where grace is seen as operative on the will (through 'infusion'[15]) as well as on the intellect. In the account we have so far provided, operative grace seems operative on the intellect alone (through what we might call 'inspiration' or 'motivation'). On the account we have been discussing, it seems less that the will actually changes its disposition and more that it is overpowered by the intellect. The concern here, then, is that unless supernaturally changed, the will will just revert back to its 'default' fallen dispositions once the revelatory stimuli is removed, or lessens.

But note that Stump's version of Thomist moral psychology has the resources to deal with this objection, too. On the Thomist account, whilst both are appetites for goodness in general, we can offer a more fine-grained distinction between the dispositions of the first- and second-order will. The second-order will is (was) ordered around a desire for goodness as justice ('rectitude') whilst the first is (was) around the desire for pleasurable good ('concupiscence'). Aquinas believed that the correct ordering of the second-order will for justice was a gift of grace given to Adam by God, and that this was lost after the fall.[16] With justice now un-guided, Adam and those who follow him would do what was right in their own eyes, and in such a confused state, their first-order volitions would no longer necessarily align with their (now confused) second-order desires.[17]

With that in mind, we can draw out two responses. The first is just this: if the correct ordering of Adam's second-order will was a gift of grace, such that when it was removed, Adam could no longer correctly order his desires, how is that any different to the account we are proposing? On our account, when appropriately attended to, God's gift of grace (the revelation of his goodness), is also sufficient to correctly order desires. The only difference is, perhaps, in degree. The revelation of God's goodness that Adam received might have been in some way clearer than the revelation we receive, and so the revelation we receive might have a weaker effect on our intellect and will. But, just as Adam's will became disordered when this grace was removed, so might a person's will become likewise disordered should grace, this revelatory stimuli, be removed or weakened.

Secondly, note that on Stump's account, there are both first-, second-, and, crucially *third*-order desires possible.[18] Third-order desires have the capacity to move second-order acts of intellect and will.[19] In being able to move the will, third-order volitions also have the

capacity to affect the disposition of the will. Thus, these third-order volitions look like they have the capacity to affect the disposition of the second-order will, as a third-order act of will can act on the second-order will directly. Just as first-order habits can be formed by second-order acts of will, perhaps third-order acts of will can forge second-order habits, directly affecting the *dispositions* of the second-order will in a way second-order acts of intellect alone were unable to do. Recall our drug addict, John. When we last saw him, John was unable to form second-order volitions. He wanted to want to quit, and he wanted to want to continue to take heroin. Now, whilst in this state, John hears that his former partner has late stage cancer and is not long for this world. Shortly thereafter, John wakes up in the emergency room; he had (inadvertently) taken an overdose. Whilst still in the emergency room, his doctor, a childhood friend and someone familiar with his situation, reprimands him seriously:

> Look, John. You could easily have died tonight. Had you been found five minutes later, you would not have made it. Think of your daughter. If you died, your child would soon be an orphan. You have no other family – your child would be put into the foster system. Have you thought about what might happen to her?

With this, the doctor turns and leaves the room. John in stunned. The doctor's reprimand cuts him to the core. This event is an occasion for him to see afresh the cost his wanting to want to remain an addict might have on his child, and in so reasoning about what he now wants to want to want, he is able to weaken his second-order desire to remain an addict, and strengthen his second-order desire to quit such that it forms a second-order volition. His addiction has not disappeared, but John now has the strength of will to start to fight against

it. Over time, through repeated reflection on the doctor's comments, and through habitual rejection of drugs, John is now, perhaps, able to strengthen his will to the place where he can control his drug use.

Returning back to our account of grace; all we need now to do is posit that God's revelation of goodness motivates an analogous second-order habit forming third-order desire. When appropriately attended to, such a revelation of God's goodness could, then, in some indirect sense, be operative on the dispositions of the second-order will. So, if either one of these responses gains traction, it looks like this objection from tradition can be addressed as well.

V. Divine Action and Other Grace

Might this account of operative grace extend to other sorts of grace as well? As far as we can see, the general way we have explained operative grace (strengthening the will through appropriate reflection on the revelation of God's goodness in creation) is the only way to explain how *any* sort of divine grace might be consistent with general divine action. So, if normal grace or cooperative grace are also consistent with general divine action, there can be no majorly substantive difference between normal, cooperative and operative grace. Is there reason to think this is the case? We think so.

'Operative grace' is just the name we give to grace that actually motivates a person to effectively desire union with God for the first time (which is, we have argued elsewhere, culminates the process of justification).[20] Likewise, cooperative grace is just the grace that continues to motivate a person to desire union with God once they already have a second-order volition for union with God (which we described as the process of sanctification). The

only difference between operative and cooperative grace is that in the latter case, the recipient of grace already has a second-order volition for union with God. Cooperative grace is considered cooperative *because* the recipient accepts the gift of grace (that is, the effect of operative grace is to leave them with a second-order volition to accept future revelation of God's goodness), rather than merely being quiescent with respect to it. If we can explain operative grace in a way that is compatible with general divine action, we can also explain cooperative grace in such a manner, too, for the only difference between the two is the in the recipient of such grace, and not in either the grace itself or the giver of the grace, and this difference in the recipient of grace is explained by the effect of operative grace.

In the case both operative and cooperative grace, a person's will can be strengthened by reflection upon the revelation of the goodness of God revealed through God's general act of creation. Operative grace requires our quiescence to this general revelation (but not our cooperative *acceptance* of it as being a revelation from God), whilst cooperative grace includes our cooperation with this general revelation (that is, the second-order volition we now have to desire union with God, and therefore, the willingness to see the revelation of God's goodness in creation).

Perhaps, indeed, normal grace, the general motivating or strengthening of the will, is either operative or cooperative, with no remainder. For this to be the case, grace must always ultimately motivate a desire for union with God. But here note that the desire for union with God is an ultimate end, and often worked out through a complex system of secondary desires. For instance, the desire for union with God is incompatible with a desire to leave the naked unclothed, and the hungry unfed. As a result, this desire for union with God prompted by grace could also prompt (or strengthen) the desire to feed the hungry and

clothe the naked, and indeed, this desire for union with God may only even manifest itself in this desire to clothe and feed. If this is the case, we suggest that *all* instances of grace might be (although of course, need not be) explained by general divine action.

VI. Conclusion

In concluding, then, we have proposed an account of operative grace that is compatible with general divine action. We have suggested that operative grace just is the revelation of God's goodness, a revelation which God placed evidence of into His creation at the point of creation, and that this revelation can still be 'understood and seen through the things he has made' (Romans 1:19-20) such that this grace is always and everywhere available to all, and has been since the divine first cause. When appropriately attended to, this grace, we argued, prompts and strengthens a desire for union with God (a constituent aspect saving faith, or so we say). We discussed what it might mean to 'appropriately attend' to this revelation in a way consistent with both general divine action and the Anti-Pelagian Constraint. We then addressed one concern from tradition, that operative grace be operative on both intellect *and* will, suggesting that our 'inspiration' account has an advantage over the traditional 'infusion' account, as our account is better suited to explain APC compatible moral responsibility for coming to saving faith. Finally, we suggested one reason to think that this account of operative grace might extend to every instance of grace; operative, cooperative and normal.

[1] Kevin Timpe, 'Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause' in *Faith and Philosophy* 24 (2007), 285.

[2] Take, for instance, the following from 'The Special Divine Action Project' at the at the University of Oxford:

> Is there special divine action in the world, beyond the purported effects of a divine first cause? Beliefs about particular kinds of special divine action (such as incarnation, inspirations, grace, miracles, providence, and resurrection) are central issues of theology, religion, and Biblical studies. But what should we make of these claims in the light of contemporary science, theology, and philosophy? (http://www.ianramseycentre.info/seminars/upcoming-seminars/sda-aar.html accessed 03/12/2016).

[3] *Summa Theologicae*, I.II, q. 111, a. 2.

[4] For other accounts of grace as special divine action, see Eleonore Stump 'Grace and Free Will' in *Aquinas* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 389-404, C. P. Ragland 'The Trouble with Quiescence: Stump on Grace and Freedom' in *Philosophia Christi* 8 (2006), 343-62, Timpe, 'Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause', 284:299, J. B. Gould 'The Grace We Are Owed' in *Faith and Philosophy* 25 (2008), 261-275, Heidi Russell 'Efficacious and Sufficient Grace' in *Philosophy and Theology* 22 (2010), 353-372, and J. A. Gibson 'Anselm on Freedom and Grace' in J. Kvanvig (ed.) *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 5* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 88-121.

[5] We recognise that a deist is likely not inclined to adopt a Thomist model of moral psychology, but, as far as we are aware, it is not conceptually inconsistent to be a deist and adopt such a model. A deist, might, for instance, think is not befitting God that he acts specially in creation after His general act of creation. But, this belief does not preclude belief that God might still want people to desire union with Him (affectively or otherwise).

[6] Stump suggests the possibility of infinite regress is avoided, as any possible fourth-order combination has in fact has exactly the same composition as a second-order combination, and any fifth-order combination will have exactly the same composition as a third-order combination (and so on). As a result, all higher-order combinations will collapse back into either second- or third- order combinations. See Eleonore Stump 'Aquinas's Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will' in Brian Davies (ed.) *Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 275-294.

[7] Stump writes

> It is important to understand that an agent's reason for an action may also be only implicit and not an explicit or conscious feature of his thought….On this view, then, it is possible that an agent's intellect have gone through some process which contributes to a certain action on the agent's part, without the agent's being aware of that process as it is occurring….So to hold, as Aquinas does, that an agent wills to do some action p only if his intellect represents p as the good to be pursued does not entail that an agent does an action willingly only in case he first engages in a conscious process of reasoning about the action. Aquinas's view requires only that some chain of reasoning (even if invalid and irrational reasoning) representing p as the good to be pursued would figure in the agent's own explanation of his action.
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> Eleonore Stump 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will' In *The Journal of Philosophy* 85: 8 (1988), 400.

[8] For instance, the sort of manipulation wrought by some future mad neuroscientist.

[9] See Harry Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', in *The Journal of Philosophy* 68:1 (1971), 11-12. Frankfurt writes:

> I shall use the term 'wanton' to refer to agents who have first-order desires but who are not persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second -order, they have no second-order volitions.

[10] For an account of saving faith as a second-order desire for union with God, see David Efird and David Worsley, 'Critical Review of Eleonore Stump's Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering' in Philosophical Quarterly 65:260 (2015), 547-558.

[11] For instance, through some miraculous second-personal encounter with God, or with God's word.

[12] There is a debate in the secondary literature over the level of control one has over coming to quiescence. For Stump (in 'Grace and Free Will'), coming to quiescence is not necessarily something that can be controlled (that is to say, quiescence is not intentional, not a product of a second-order volition). However, Timpe argues (in 'Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause'), if it cannot be controlled, strictly speaking one cannot be said to have had any control over whether one comes to saving faith. For Timpe (and Ragland, 'The Trouble with Quiescence'), therefore, coming to quiescence *is* a state that you have some sort of quasi-control over

(that is, that quiescence is intentional, it is the product of a second-order volition). Responding to Timpe's claim, Simon Kittle 'Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control' in *The Journal of Analytic Theology* 3 (2015), 89-108, argues that, if one can control (quasi or directly) whether one is quiescent or not, then, however this is explained, such a view *cannot* be compatible with the Anti-Pelagian Constraint set out at the start of this paper (for if quiescence is intentional, if it is the product of a second-order volition, and if one knows one will come to saving faith if one is quiescent, coming to quiescence looks very similar indeed to APC incompatible 'acceptance'). In response to Kittle's concern, we follow Stump's initial position: you are not in control over whether you are quiescent with respect to God's operative grace. By that we mean that you do not form an intentional second-order volition to become quiescent, so quiescence is best considered a first-order wanton omission (first-order because one has not formed a second-order volition motivating this desire). However, it may be the case that your actions might, unintentionally, make it easier or harder to for God (or natural sufferings and blessing) to motivate you to such a wanton first-order omission, and you do have control over that. The difference between our position and Stump's comes in the nature of grace. For Stump, grace is infused into a person's will by God. On our account, grace inspires a quiescent person's intellect to move their will to desire union with God. On our account, it is your intellect that presents to your will the goodness of union with God, and the will which then desires this. Unlike on Stump's (and Timpe's) infusion account, there is no internal manipulation present, there is only mere external motivation or inspiration. Although this movement from intellect to will might be a subconscious process, it is a process contained entirely within the agent, and recall that on Aquinas's account, one therefore remains morally responsible for this action. Inasmuch as unintentionally falling in love with another person does not look problematic to the seriousness of whatever relationship ensues (so long as the other has not internally manipulated your brain to so fall in love), neither is unintentionally falling in love with God problematic, at least as far as we can see it. Just as one's prior action, action one does in fact control, might influence the sort of person one falls in love with, even if one never intends nor foresees this outcome, so it may be with coming to desire union (that is, coming to love) God. Interestingly, coming to have saving faith looks like it might mirror almost exactly the primal sin. Whilst the primal sinner had a second-order volition for justice that should have made willing lesser goods impossible, they nevertheless somehow still managed a first-order volition for a lesser good. For the fallen person coming to saving faith, whilst they have a second-order volition for lesser goods that should have made willing greater goods impossible, they nevertheless somehow still manage to some sort of first-order volition for a greater

good. We suspect whatever solution we have for the primal sin (for instance, that it occurred due to an omission to reflect on second order volitions) will also come to bear on this problem.

[13] We thank an anonymous referee for pushing us on this point. They write:

> In this situation the Will knows that 'quiescence' will not save it; something like 'appropriate attention' - or even stronger – is required. Specifically, it needs to concentrate or fixate on the one aspect of the situation its desires want it to leave out, and block out those aspects they want it to uniquely attend to. Typically the Will knows its needs special strengthening in such situations; thus the relevance in religious services to singing a given hymn or reciting a certain prayer; we are not disembodied angels who can simply 'attend' to creation in its completeness and respond appropriately, but must become 'self-movers', treating ourselves as both subject and object, to change our mood, perspective, sense of priorities, etc., - to empower ourselves to withstand the 'siren's song' emanating from our desires. It is for this alteration of the Will BY the Will that we request God's 'special' grace.

However, as we suggest, God's help in bringing us to 'appropriate attention' can come in two ways. Certainly, God can internally manipulate a person's will, causing their will to focus their intellect on one aspect of the situation its desires want it to leave out. However, God might also use external methods to achieve this same end. We suggest that natural suffering, or blessing, or perplexity, might also lead to the same effect, causing a person to block out certain desires, indeed temporarily, perhaps, all desires. And in that state of quiescence, a person might appropriately attend to this revelation of goodness and come to saving faith. We think that whilst the former 'internal manipulation' is necessarily an instance of special divine action, and incompatible with libertarian free will, the latter 'external manipulation' is not necessarily an instance of special divine action (although it could be), and is compatible with liberation freedom of the will.

[14] See Stump, 'Grace and Free Will', 387, for more details. Stump writes:

> The notion of a heart's cracking or melting is, of course, a metaphor. To speak of something's cracking or melting is to describe something's giving way to an external force after (or in spite of) some internal resistance or disinclination. To say that a heart cracks or melts, then, is to imply that a will which previously was resistant or disinclined towards something urged on it by someone (or something) else gives over its dissent and leaves off its resistance.

[15] One problem with this 'infusion' account comes when one thinks about the nature of union. Serious sorts of union must be product of *two* wills, but on this infusion account, unless one intentionally acts to permit such an infusion (the position Timpe (in 'Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause') argues must be the case), union can only ever be the product of one will, namely, Gods. For God infuses in you the desire to will union with Him. On our account, God merely inspires this desire, and so there is no such internal manipulation in a person's moral psychology. Without this internal manipulation, intentional control is less important for us than it is for Timpe. In as much as Jack unintentionally falling in love with Jill does not reduce the seriousness of whatever union then follows between them, neither would Jack unintentionally falling in love with God reduce the seriousness of whatever union then follows between them.

[16] See his *Summa Theologicae*, I.II q. 82 a. 2,

> Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as stated in the I:100:1, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.

[17] See Genesis 5:7, 6:5 and Judges 17:6.

[18] Stump writes,

> [I]n forming a third-order volition, the agent is not reiterating the process gone through to formulate a second-order volition...forming a third-order volition consists in reasoning about and either accepting or rejecting a second-order volition. So an agent has a third-order volition V3 to bring about some second-order volition V2 in himself only if his intellect at the time of the willing represents V2, under some description, as the good to be pursued. But since V2 is a desire for a first-order volition V1 generated by a reason's representing V1 (at that time) as the good to be pursued, V3 will consist just in reaffirming the original reasoning about V1 which led to V2. In forming a third-order volition

> and considering whether he wants to have the relevant second-order volition, the agent will consider whether a desire for a desire for some action *p* (or state of affairs *q*) is the good to be pursued. But a desire for a desire for *p* (or *q*) will be a good to be pursued just in case the desire for *p* (or *q*) is a good to be pursued, and that in turn will depend on whether the agent considers *p* (or *q*), under some description, at that time, a good to be pursued. So a third-order volition that supports a currently held second-order volition is in effect just the expression of a re-evaluating and affirming of the reasoning that originally led to V1. And, in the same way, a third-order volition that rejects a currently held second-order volition will just be an expression of the re-evaluation and rejection of the reasoning that led to the second-order volition. A third-order volition, then, is a result of a recalculation of the reasoning that originally underlay a second-order volition. (Stump, 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Wil', 405)

[19] Stump ('Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', 406) writes regarding third-order desires, 'There are also cases in which an agent's reasoning is confused and warrants conflicting second-order desires. An agent who notices such a conflict in his second-order desires and who reflects on it may then sort out the confusion in his reasoning and form a third-order volition in consequence.'

[20] See Efird and Worsley, 'Critical Review of Eleonore Stump's Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering' 547-8. We argue that justification and sanctification refer to two aspects of the same continuous process, namely, the integration of all second-order desires around a second-order volition for union with God, and the alignment of first- and second-order volitions. The process of justification prompts a (non-wholehearted) second-order volition for union with God. The process of sanctification integrates other second-order desires around the second-order volition of justification, as well as strengthening this second-order volition so as to ensure first-order volitions align with it. We conclude that union with God requires acting upon a wholehearted second-order volition, and the completion of this two-part process is the only mechanism by which this can happen in a fallen person.