**Book Section:**

The History of EC Foreign Relations, 1957-1992
**Enlargement as Foreign Policy: The Quest for Security?**
Eirini Karamouzi


*Introduction:*

The decision of the British electorate to leave the European Union has ultimately shaken to the core the beliefs of EU supporters in the self-evident benefits of membership. Juggling concurrent crises, and eking out barely any concrete results has called into question the orthodox view of European integration as a necessary historical process.[1] The Western Balkan applicants waiting in the wings to join the European Union feel neglected and deeply concerned that the enlargement process could be put off track by a distracted 'Europe', while their own people grow even more disillusioned with the EU dream. Progressively, accession talks resemble a religion: 'Be good, and you'll see the benefits once you die.'[2]

Before 'Europe' found itself in the throes of its worst 'existential crisis',[3] the dominant view concurred that the EU had contributed significantly to the reshaping of the European order, especially since the end of the Cold War, by extending EU membership to an ever-increasing number of countries.[4] Admittedly, for the nations of former Yugoslavia, the promise of EU membership became a cause for both elites and public opinion, and aided in curbing nationalism and ethnic tensions in the region. EU accession talks may have pirouetted off to the margins, but as Karen Smith wrote in 2014, 'the enlargement train moves haltingly, but it is still moving'.[5] At the heart of such assertions lies the fact that the promise of enlargement remains one of the most effective means by which the EU is able to play a regional role in transforming the economic and political systems of aspirant countries. Either as 'an impressive exercise in empire building'[6] or exploiting its *civilian* clout (namely its 'power of attraction'), even with inconsistent and at times counterproductive use of conditionality, the experience of enlargement has been diverse, unpredictable and multi-dimensional.[7]

The current crises may cast doubt on the EU's capacity to sustain the enlargement momentum but reinforce the need for a *longue durée* historical analysis in order to better comprehend how these heightened expectations of the utility of enlargement in foreign affairs came about. Enlargement as a tool of foreign policy was fully institutionalized only with the end of the Cold War, which partly explains why the theory-oriented research on enlargement has focused on the two major rounds of 1995 – which included three former EFTA members – and the Big Bang enlargement of 2004. Indeed, the volume and nature of applications for membership forced European officials to devise a sophisticated and ever-growing list of demands to make the candidates

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[1] On the teleological trap, please see Mark Gilbert, 'Narrating the process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46:3 (2008), 641-662.

[2] Quoted in Alberto Nardelli, 'This is why Balkan states fear Brexit could kill of their EU dream', BuzzFeed, accessed on 20 September 2016, https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/this-is-why-balkan-states-fear-brexit-could-kill-off-their-e?utm_term=.kfRoG5mQP3#.on4brkMXOL

[3] Jean- Claude Juncker, 'State of the Union Address: Towards a better Europe- a Europe that protects, empowers and defends', Strasbourg, 14 September 2016.

[4] Lisbeth Aggestam, 'New actors, new foreign policy: EU and enlargement', in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy, Theories, Actors, Case* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 431-451.

[5] Karen E. Smith, 'Is the European Union's Soft Power in Decline?' *Current History* (March 2014), 104-109.

[6] Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 44.

[7] Karen Smith, 'Enlargement, the Neighborhood, and European Order', in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.) *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

compatible with existing member states whilst allowing for their adaptation to the EU system. However, political and economic conditionality and accession practices did not take place in a vacuum; rather, they grew and were gradually articulated partly through the earlier enlargement experience.[8]

Admittedly, the new international order that broke through the barriers of the Cold War was more propitious for a genuine transformation of the EU; but this chapter will show the period prior to the formal introduction of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 to be a fertile ground for the study of enlargement politics. During the Cold War, enlargement was a quite sporadic event with no formalized framework, despite carrying both a political and a legal dimension. In fact, Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome provided scant details on the kinds of criteria and practices involved for aspiring members, thus rendering the procedure of entry much more politicized and less institutionalized.[9] Individual member states could much more easily impede the process based on threats to their diverse national interests, or even reject application as in the case of the long-drawn British EEC story in the 1960s. Moreover, early enlargement procedures were much less interventionist in their exchanges with the candidates, who were left to their own devices in tackling obligations arising from accession and with few pre-accession carrots and sticks. The lack of an institutionalized framework, with the exception of the respect for the acquis that had arisen from the first round of enlargement, ultimately restricted the effectiveness of the Community's enlargement policy; but it did allow for experimentation. In the long decade of the 1970s, ideas flourished, and accession talks constituted a worthwhile political exercise in which the Community started toying with the idea of enlargement as a foreign policy tool. In these discussions over possible ways of implementation, Community institutions such as the Commission and the European Parliament were pivotal and have thus far been overlooked.[10]

This chapter seeks to investigate the historical evolution of enlargement as a foreign policy tool, the gradual eminence the policy gathered as a weapon in the Community's civilian arsenal, and the progressive and unplanned discovery of soft aid instruments in ensuring different forms of security in Europe. The quest for security, 'an essentially contested term',[11] is featured in both rounds of enlargement covered in this chapter – albeit debated in different ways, ranging from the geopolitical to the cultural and above all the economic dimension. The first wave of expansion to the north covers eleven years, from Britain's first failed attempt of 1961 to its accession along with Ireland and Denmark in 1973. Then, the focus shifts to the then recently democratized countries of Southern Europe with the applications, debate and final accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal from 1975 to 1986. Interestingly enough, both rounds of enlargement engulfed the common discursive terrain of security from which both the EC and the applicants debated, and framed the prospect of membership as a way to legitimately further their own interests and foreign policy aims.[12]

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[8] For instance, Daniel C. Thomas, 'Constitutionalisation through Enlargement: the contested origins of the EU'S democratic identity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13,8 (2006), 1190-1210; Emma de Angelis & Eirini Karamouzi, 'Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity', *Contemporary European History* 25:3(2016), 439-458.

[9] Mark Dawson, 'The European Union as a Community of Law, Achieving Diplomatic Goals through Legal means?', in Robert Hutchings, and Jeremi Suri (eds.), *Foreign policy Breakthroughs. Cases in Successful diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)

[10] Jan van der Harst, 'Enlargement: The Commission seeks a role for itself', in *The European Commission, 1958-1972. Histories and Memories of an Institution* (Luxembourg: Peter Lang, 2014), 533-556.

[11] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, ECPR Press, 2007), 26-32.

[12] Hazel Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 27

The chapter will attempt to stay away from a descriptive, exhaustive analysis of the two major EEC enlargement rounds that took place in the years from 1957-1986, mostly gauging the evolution of the practices of enlargement policy and the discovery on the part of the Community of its usefulness as a foreign policy tool, utilizing the growing body of literature recently published on the topic. In contrast to political science research that tends to prioritize the EU enlargement politics dimension, the bulk of the historical research on enlargement has been conducted from the point of view of the single nation-states.[13] These national studies highlight first and foremost the economic rationale and the (geo-)political motives behind enlargement.[14] The introspective character of such research has a plethora of merits but fails to capture the transformative impact that each round of enlargement has had on the mindset and practices of the Community's enlargement policy; it also gives scarce attention to the foreign policy discourse surrounding enlargement.

The chapter will demonstrate how both the Community's formal institutional framework as a whole and the applicants themselves experienced enlargement and started to see it as a foreign policy in itself, rather than considering enlargement's impact on the EC's foreign policy or on the process of European integration and the institutional build-up of the Union.[15] It is vital to understand the social and structural changes that created the broad conditions within which the Community and prospective candidates operated and responded to these challenges. There was no strategic plan within European circles, and the historical analysis of enlargement's earlier rounds unearths an almost accidental use and appreciation of its value for the Community's foreign policy machinery. Moreover, it will shed light on member states' internal debates, as national politics are still the crucial arena for the 'politicization of European integration'.[16] Adding to the importance of exploring these earlier rounds of enlargement is the fact that the question of the EC's political identity also gained relevance during the 1970s and 1980s and stood at the heart of enlargement, with both existing member states and the aspiring applicants feeling increasingly compelled to define their own interests and goals. Each enlargement constituted a key moment of self-definition for the Community. Even more explicitly, however, the question of European identity came to the forefront of European political discourse after the transition to democracy in southern Europe and the demands of Greece, Spain and Portugal to be anchored to the democratic system of the EEC. The chapter identifies how the different institutions of the Community developed a discourse of political identity in the 1960s and 1970s, introducing the idea of the Community as a political entity based on shared values. The institutions increasingly articulated these values around the concept of democracy, not merely in terms of rhetorical self-identification, but as a framework within which policies had to be formulated.[17] Teasing out the interplay of political action and situational

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[13] There are exceptions with research on enlargement by Piers Ludlow, Eirini Karamouzi, Lorena Ruano; Piers Ludlow, 'History Aplenty: But Still Too Isolated', in Egan, Michele, Nugent, Neil and Peterson, William (eds.), *Research Agenda in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

[14] A few among many: *Journal of European Integration History*, Special issue on enlargement, Vol. 11/2 (2005); Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (eds.), *European Union Enlargement: a comparative history* (London: Routledge, 2007); Christopher Preston, *Enlargement and integration in the European Union*, (London/New York: Routledge, 1997); Loukas Tsoukalis, *The European Community and its Mediterranean enlargement*, (London: Allen &Unwin, 1981);

[15] Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2015); Marise Cremona (ed.), *The Enlargement of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013);

[16] Hanspeter Kriesi, 'The Politicization of European Integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54 (2016), 32-47.

[17] de Angelis and Karamouzi, 'Enlargement and the historical origins,

context lies at the heart of the enlargement story.

**_Enlargement as a one-off event: 1961-1973:[18]_**

In 1961, the Commission considered then British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's application for EC membership to be 'a turning point in post-war European politics…regard[ing] it as fresh recognition of the economic and political values of the work of European integration undertaken since 1950'.[19] Historians and political scientists have offered contrasting explanations for Britain's turn towards the EEC and away from the Churchillian doctrine of 'with but not of Europe' that dominated Britain's attitude towards the formative years of the European Community. Andrew Moravcsik rightly noted that the British application targeted 'the advancement of British commercial interests', [20] whilst others such as Bange have stressed the primacy of political considerations in bringing about the membership bid.[21] Notwithstanding such diverse interpretations, British application in the summer of 1961 presented the Community with its first taste of its potential civilian appeal via the simple force of economic attraction. To be more precise, the success of the EEC as a commercial powerhouse had brought home the realization that the country was running out of options, rendering the EEC the only game in town, despite the problematic – for the Brits – supranational character of the Community. The Six's decision to hasten moves towards a common external tariff and accelerate reduction of trade barriers amongst themselves in May 1960 raised concerns within Whitehall of a possibility of discrimination, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Maudling, warning against the possible damage to trade.[22] Fears were made more acute as, in Macmillan's own words, 'we are a country to whom nothing at this moment matter except out exports trade'.[23] So from early on, trade and the size of the customs union stood at the core of the Community's civilian power with the Commission increasingly, as the years went by, elaborating and negotiating on behalf of its members bilateral trade agreements and major rounds under the GATT.[24]

Moreover, in the 1960s, there was a hope that EEC membership would bolster prevalent perceptions of a 'sense of relative decline' in UK's international reach and power.[25] Britain's sluggish growth – not by historical records but in relation to the comparatively higher growth rate of EEC economies – meant that 'by 1950 the difference in per capita GDP between the UK and Six was 28%. Seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, it stood at 15%, and in 1961 when Britain applied, the difference had reached 10%.'[26] With the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) being less

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[18] Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway pursued membership during the 1960s and 1970s. In the case of Norway, a referendum on EEC accession produced a negative result in 1972, see more Haakon Ikonomou, 'Europeans, Norwegian Diplomats and the Enlargement of the European Community, 1960-1972', PhD Thesis, (European University Institute, 2016)

[19] Quoted in *History of European Commission, 1957-1972*

[20] Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power. From Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 164.

[21] Cited in John Young, *Britain and European Unity, 1945-1990* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 200), 79; Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community* (Oxford: University Press, 1998),40;

[22] Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years, 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth* (London: John Murray, 1995), 155.

[23] James Ellison, 'Accepting the Inevitable: Britain and European Integration', 171.

[24] Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'The European Union as Trade power', in Hill, Christopher & Smith, Michael (eds.), *International Relations and the EU* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 276; Lucia Coppolaro, *The Making of a World Trading Power: The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations, 1963-1967* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).

[25] Jim Tomlinson, *The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain* (Harlow: Longman, 2001)

[26] http://voxeu.org/article/britain-s-eu-membership-new-insight-economic-history

competitive, less sophisticated and thus inferior in trade performance to the emerging EEC,[27] the British membership bid constituted 'the response of a political system trying to catch up with economic realities', thus further exemplifying the lure of the Community as economic powerhouse affecting a country's foreign policy choices.[28] The emerging salience of European integration as a political concern was also reflected in the Foreign Office's capture of the agenda away from the Treasury, which had tended to dominate the dossier of European affairs during the previous decade.[29] The same applied to Denmark, which ditched its neutrality policy in favour of EEC membership in a bid to solve the agricultural outlet problem as well as to further boost exports with its main trading powers of Britain and West Germany.[30] Equally, Ireland was following Britain's suit on the grounds of economic prudence.[31]

Commercial imperatives were consistently linked to geopolitical concerns underpinning Britain's European policy. For instance, Macmillan discussed how staying out would 'have the effect of excluding us both from European markets *and* from consultation in European policy'.[32] The single most important document on Britain's first attempt to enter the EEC, namely the April 1961 Frank Lee Report, drew attention to the fact that 'the Commonwealth is not likely to flourish under the leadership of a United Kingdom shut out of growing European markets'.[33] The report went on to state that the economic consequences of exclusion from the EEC would be significant in the long term because the Community's size made it a formidable competition, and Britain's alternative, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), was not a coherent unit. More broadly, the economy was strained as the gap between Britain's available resources and the cost of its overseas commitments widened. Economic turmoil and the threat of political marginalization formed the basis for Macmillan's turn to Europe. Joining the EEC was, as Milward notes, 'a last concession to preserve the national strategy pursued since 1950' either in terms of Commonwealth, special relationship and changing Cold War fluctuations.[34] It is interesting, therefore, how enlargement to the EEC echoed political and economic realities, entangled in a reassessment of the foundation of British foreign policy.[35] Similarly for Ireland, the smallest and most economically underdeveloped country to apply, the economic benefits of possible membership to the EEC – cemented of course by the British decision to apply – aided the country's move

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[27] Aitken, N, 'The Effect of the EEC and EFTA on European Trade: A Temporal Cross-Section Analysis', *The American Economic Review*, 63:5 (1973), 881-892; Also Alan Milward, *The UK and the European Community, vol 1: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963* (London: Cass, 2002), 313; Roland Maurhofer, 'Revisiting the creation of EFTA', *Journal of European Integration History*, 7:2 (2001), 65- 82.

[28] Cited in Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the European Cooperation since 1945* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 82.

[29] N. Piers Ludlow, 'A Waning Force: The Treasury and British European Policy, 1955-1963', *Contemporary British History*, 17:4 (2003), 87-104.

[30] Thorsten B. Olesen, 'The Dilemmas of Interdependence: Danish foreign policy', *Journal of European Integration History* 7:2 (2001), 37-63; Johnny N. Laursen and Thorsten B. Olesen, 'A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark's Nordic and European policies, 1945–1998', *Contemporary European History* (2000), 9, 59-92

[31] Mervyn O'Driscoll, Dermot Keogh, and Jérôme de Wiel (eds.), *Ireland through European eyes: Western Europe, the EEC and Ireland, 1945– 1973* (Cork, Cork University Press, 2013).

[32] Ellison, 'Accepting the Inevitable', 179.

[33] PRO CAB134/1820/EQ(60)27.

[34] For a diverse set of the political considerations: Piers N Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK application to the EEC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Wolfram Kaiser, *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 1945-1963* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); Nigel Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)

[35] James Ellison, 'Accepting the Inevitable: Britain and European Integration', in Kaiser, Wolfram and Staerck, Gillian (eds.), *British Foreign Policy, 1955-1964: Contrasting Opinions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 171.

towards membership and marked, as Geary has claimed, 'a decisive economic foreign policy change for Ireland'.[36]

In January 1963, several days after General de Gaulle's veto, Harold Macmillan wrote in his diary: 'the great question remains: What is the alternative to the European Community? If we are honest we must say there is none.' [37] Echoing similar disillusionment, but several years later, the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson would also come to acknowledge how far economic realities dictated Britain's move towards the Community. Historians differ in their explanations of the rationale behind Wilson's turn towards Europe. Parr concludes that the application was a pragmatic result of the July 1966 sterling crisis, while Kaiser argues that it was a tactical effort to deny the Tories a policy upon which they could attack. Despite their differences, they both concede that, as with the first attempt, economics interacted with political considerations in the British mindset. [38] Indeed, the British and the 'friendly Five' couched the prospective enlargement in terms of prolonging Western Europe's ties to the Atlantic and ensuring that the Americans remained committed to the defence of western Europe, especially following the French double challenge to the EEC and NATO in 1966.[39] The French, however, still with de Gaulle at the helm, would not even permit the enlargement talks to commence – pointing to Britain's financial problems and capitalizing on Wilson's decision to devalue the pound in October 1966 and its balance of payment deficit.[40]

By the time Edward Heath became prime minister in 1970 and revived the failed second application, Britain's political elite hoped that joining the Community would achieve multiple goals. Rather than being relegated to the sidelines, Britain would be in a position to reap the economic and political benefits of Community membership. Importantly, accession to the Community would allow Britain to catch up to the superior economic performance the Six had experienced over the 1960s. Furthermore, membership signalled a chance for Britain to recover international influence through full membership in the dynamic Community, which was becoming an increasingly important international player. In the early 1970s, British, Irish and Danish EEC enlargement complemented the Community's 1969 strategy of completion and deepening as well as Duchêne's calls for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world. Enlargement, still not seen as foreign policy tool in and of itself, was in its earliest guise designed to fortify and complement the rising commitments of the EEC in external commercial relations, aid to developing countries, social policy, environmental and industrial policies and the emerging political cooperation and monetary affairs. Heath, upon his departure from the October Paris Summit of October 1972 – to which he had been cordially invited by the President of France, Georges Pompidou – was filled with

[36] Michael J. Geary, *An Inconvenient Wait: Ireland's Quest for Membership of the EEC, 1957-73* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2009); John Kurt Jacobsen, *Chasing Progress in the Irish Republic: Ideology, Democracy and Dependent Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[37] Cited in Vernon Bognador, 'Footfalls echoing in the memory. Britain and Europe: the historical perspective', *International Affairs* 81:4 (2005), 693.

[38] On the reaction of the Community to the British application see Piers N. Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp.137-142.

[39] Helen Parr, 'Anglo-French relations, détente and Britain's second application for membership of the EEC, 1964 to 1967', in Ludlow, Piers (ed.), *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-westpolitik, 1956-73* (Routledge, 2007); Stephen Wall, *Official History of the United Kingdom and the European Community Volume II, 1963-1975* (London: Routledge, 2012)

[40] Bossuat, 'De Gaulle et la Second Candidature Britannique aux Communautés Européennes', in Loth, William (ed), Crises and Compromises: The European Project, 1963-69 (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag, 2001), 511-538;

joy for the 'the advantages the enlargement of the Community will bring to us in Britain, to Europe and to the rest of the world'.[41]

The story of Britain's quick disillusionment and concomitant frustration upon accession to the EEC has been the subject of numerous recent studies, ranging from rising food prices to political outcry over the budgetary terms of membership to issues of sovereignty and European identity.[42] Moreover, the experience of the first years of membership show how the success of enlargement was dependent on the environmental context and how the policy could evolve from a successful tool of foreign affairs to a divisive domestic issue with unwelcome repercussions.[43] From 1973, the sentiment within the enlarged Community went from hope to uncertainty to despair – damaging the perception of the beneficial aspects of enlargement within the British public debate. On the Community side, the Six, in dealing with Britain, Ireland and Denmark and in the absence of criteria, were called upon to draft a procedure for moving the enlargement dossier forward. In his authoritative study on Britain's conditional application in 1961, Piers Ludlow has convincingly argued how the Community, in an attempt to safeguard its nascent achievements and avoid any interruption to its inner workings in dealing with such a demanding applicant as the United Kingdom, adopted an accession doctrine, defensive at heart, that protected the acquis at all costs. Through this process of discovery of the available tools and the eligibility of its relevant institutions, the EEC prioritized an enlargement doctrine of 'take it or leave it' that would become a staple of the next rounds of enlargement and responded more to the logic of protecting the current member states' interests than to the applicant's capacity or willingness to adapt to the acquis.[44]


## The unexpected turning point: Southern European Enlargement, 1974- 1986

When negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom were concluded in January 1972, the EC dismantled its enlargement unit, as it did not expect to deal with the issue of enlargement in the near future.[45] However, the question re-emerged in 1975, after the collapse of right-wing authoritarianism in Greece, Spain and Portugal. With all three countries, the Community had to take into account for the very first time the changing nature of prospective members – from long-established democracies and market economies to recently democratized and economically disadvantaged states.[46] Moreover, the transformative politics and the international geopolitical reconfigurations of the 1970s, which had been less pronounced in the previous round of accession, were brought to the forefront and became intertwined explicitly with the enlargement process for the first time.

In 1975, contemporary pundits, journalists and politicians were convinced that events on the ground in Southern Europe had reached their tipping point, leaving the European

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[41] TNA/PREM15/895, Statement by Heath, 21 October 1972.

[42] David Gowland, Arthur Turner and Alex Wright, *Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the Sidelines* (London: Routledge, 2010); Piers N Ludlow, 'Safeguarding British Identity or Betraying It? The Role of British 'Tradition' in the Parliamentary Great Debate on EC Membership, October 1971', *Journal of Common Mark Studies*, 53 (2015)18–34.

[43] Geoffrey Evans, Noah Carl and James Dennison, 'European but not European Enough: The Causes and Consequences of Brexit',

[44] Piers N. Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain.*

[45] *The European Commission, 1973-1986. Histories and Memories of an Institution* (Luxembourg: Publications Offices of the European Union, 2014), 429.

[46] Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974-1979. The Second Enlargement* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2014), 194

Community as a whole but also its member states at a loss on how to handle the crisis.[47] The perfect storm was brewing in Western Europe's own backyard, with different elements interacting simultaneously – and what is more intriguing, against the transformative environment of superpower détente.[48] Despite its conservative character of stabilizing the status quo, détente between the two superpowers had unintended consequences in the volatile environment of Southern Europe, where the relaxation of the once constraining framework of the Cold War had further fostered domestic instability.[49] Southern European societies, still sober from the experiences of the brutal dictatorships, became less convinced by the incessant gesturing towards the ubiquitous shadow of an endless crisis that the Cold War fostered, and thus during the apogee of superpower detente and in the absence of the galvanizing effect of the Soviet threat felt more confident to pursue their perceived national interests at the expense of wider Alliance interests. The biggest fear for the Western elites therefore became the lack of political legitimacy and respectability that the Cold War narrative seemed to foster in these recently democratized countries, as well as the potential ramifications of diminishing domestic popular support for the American-led Western order. The threat for Southern Europe did not emanate primarily from the East but was mostly framed and understood as the devastating effect of a possible loss of faith and ultimately disillusionment of the Southern European public opinion with the merits and benefits of a Western connection. Such fears were confounded by a series of disasters, ranging from the global monetary and energy crises to the rifts in the transatlantic relationship, that threatened to upend the basic premises of what had contributed to the 'making of the West' – wrong-footing assessments of a monolithic bloc, bent on progressing in uniformity and adhering to its hegemon.

The first shock came with the unanticipated toppling of the Portuguese dictatorship on 25 April 1974, which sank the country into political turmoil and caught the West off guard. The new military-dominated regime in Portugal was undecided as to the direction in which to take the country and whether or not to hand over power to a democratically elected government. There were concerns that the country might slide towards a kind of Euro-Communism and undermine Portugal's membership in NATO. Such concerns were strongly voiced in Washington. For Kissinger, it was essential to isolate Portugal, as the country had allegedly been 'lost' to Communism.[50] The Nine were equally troubled about Portugal's uncertain future, with then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson declaring Portugal a 'test of détente'.[51]

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[47] Ennio di Nolfo, 'The Cold War and the Transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960-1975', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, eds. Melvyn Leffler & Odd Arne Westad, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 238-257.

[48] Jussi Hanhimaki, 'Conservative goals, revolutionary outcomes: the paradox of détente', *Cold War History*, 8:4 (2008), 503-512; On the transformative character of the 1970s, see Barbara Zanchetta, *The Transformation of American International power in the 1970s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[49] Effie Pedaliu, 'A Sea of Confusion. The Mediterranean and Détente, 1969-1974', *Diplomatic History,* 33:4 (2009), 735-750;

[50] Mario Del Pero, 'A European Solution for a European Crisis', *Journal of European Integration History*, 15:1 (2009), 21; Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Mario del Pero, 'Which Chile, Allende? Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese revolution', *Cold War History*, 11:4(2011), 625-657.

[51] For more analysis on support for Portuguese socialist party: David Castano, 'A practical test in the détente; International support for the Socialist Party in the Portuguese Revolution (1974-1975)', *Cold War History*, 15:1 (2015), 1-26; Keith Hamilton, 'Regime Change and détente: Britain and the transition from Dictatorship to Democracy in Spain and Portugal, 1974-1974', *The Maghreb Review*, 31:1 (2006), 22-41.

Only four months after the Carnation revolution, the Greek dictatorship instigated a coup against Archbishop Makarios that ultimately led to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Cyprus issue per se was not as destabilizing to the strategy of the West. The American interest in Cyprus was essentially a preventive one: to keep its political problems from boiling over and throwing wrenches into the Greco-Turkish relationship.[52] As declared in a State Department briefing paper of early August 1974, 'our strategy is directed toward removing Cyprus as a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey'.[53] Indeed, it seemed that rather than from the other side of the Iron Curtain, the biggest challenge and threat for the two countries was emanating from each other. Breaking free from the restrictive Cold War ideological straitjacket, fears arouse that 'defense expenditure by Greece and Turkey has been motivated more by the threat each perceived from the other than by a common Soviet threat', as posited a report by the Joint Intelligence committee.[54] Kissinger was eager to cooperate with the British on the Cyprus front, especially since America's latitude had been restricted by the strong and influential presence of the Greek lobby in Congress. Moreover, Britain, as signatory to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee of the Cypriot state, was thrust into a position of responsibility. However, the British lacked the power to take effective action, suffering from what then Foreign Secretary James Callaghan described as 'responsibility without power'.[55]

Following the failed coup that led to the fall of the dictatorship, and confronted with a rapidly growing anti-Americanism and the humiliating consequences of the recent double Turkish invasion in Cyprus, the newly installed government in Athens was pressured to act.[56] Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis concluded that war against Turkey would be a highly dangerous option, as the seven years of the *junta* had left the Greek armed forces in a fragile state.[57] Instead of war, Karamanlis announced the country's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure and requested renegotiations on the future of US bases on Greek soil.[58]

The threat to NATO's southern flank in the aftermath of Greece's withdrawal and the country's unstable domestic political situation during transition to democracy loomed large. Although Karamanlis was firmly attached to the West and his government had made it clear that the withdrawal from NATO was the least damaging and only acceptable policy to the public at the time, fears over Greece's future policy orientation were abetted by the rise of the Left in domestic politics. The newly formed Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) under Andreas Papandreou, despite coming third in the 1974 legislative elections, was becoming a progressively more popular party, campaigning on an anti-American and anti-EEC platform. An illustration of this line of thinking was evident during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Athens in May 1975. Karamanlis went on to

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[52] James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece. History and Power, 1950-1974* (North Carolina: The North Carolina University Press, 2009).

[53] Quoted in Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Manheim: Bibliopolis, 2001), 418.

[54] Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, Cabinet Office, 29 April 1976, in Hamilton, Keith & Salmon, Patrick, *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series III, Volume V (London: Routledge, 2012), 526.

[55] Quoted in Andreas Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure* (Milton Keynes: Author House, 2009), 382.

[56] Ivan-Andre Slengesol, 'A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 22: 2 (2000), 96-129; Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus;* Konstantina Botsiou, 'Anti-Americanism in Greece', in *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes and Themes*, ed. Brendon O'Connor, vol. 3 (Oxford, Westport, CT, 2007), 213-345.

[57] NARA: RG59, Diplomatic Record of the State Department, Historical Office Research projects, 1969-1974, box, 205; Svolopoulos, Constantinos (ed.), Constantinos Karamanlis: Archives, Event and Texts [in Greek], vol.8 (Athens, 1997) (hereafter *Karamanlis*), pp

[58] Constantinos Svolopoulos, *Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1981* [in Greek], vol. 2 (Athens, 2002)

explain to the Chancellor that, although his parliamentary control was complete and the country's NATO withdrawal had reached its limits in terms of political gain, it would be a mistake to assume that he could or would pursue policies that were unacceptable either to his opponents or to Greek public opinion.[59]

Europe's fears over Greece were exacerbated by its potential spillover effect on the neighbouring countries in the Southern European region. Franco's dictatorship in Spain seemed to be nearing the end in 1975, with the 1953 base agreement with the United States in the air. Western leaders were equally concerned about Italy's domestic instability and economic crisis. Italy in the 1970s was caricatured as an unreliable partner and 'the soft underbelly' of the Atlantic alliance.[60] Anxiety heightened even more with *compromesso storico* and the probability of the Italian Communist Party coming to power. All of these factors helped to exacerbate the already dismal strategic outlook in the Mediterranean region. In contrast to the first postwar decades, when the American fleet dominated the Mediterranean, the 1970s witnessed a growing Soviet infiltration.[61] In the face of deep economic malaise, Britain had already undertaken the defence review that had led to a phasing out of its Mediterranean defence.[62] In the minds of the political elites on both sides of the Atlantic, therefore, the unstable internal order in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, with its possible ramifications for the robustness of NATO's southern flank, became part and parcel of this changing setting of crisis in Southern Europe.[63]

How could the European Community step in and guarantee internal stabilization in these counties? The answer on how to diffuse the crisis surprisingly came from the applicants themselves, who flocked to the EEC, viewing it as the only appropriate forum to support their countries' democratization processes. Since the 1960s, the EEC had engaged with the region in different shapes and forms. Athens and Ankara had signed privileged Association agreements in 1961 and 1963, respectively, which were designed specifically to lead to full membership and as such, maintain close ties with the West.[64] In February 1962, Spain, sketching out the road map along the Greek and Turkish path, requested association membership as a first step towards accession. Whilst the French and West Germans were willing to examine the request from Madrid, the idea of association was eventually dropped for political reasons and instead a simple preferential agreement was reached in October 1970.[65] Echoing similar political concerns for the lack of democratic rule, Lisbon's link with the process of European integration was limited to a free trade agreement signed in July 1972, as a consequence of the Community's first

[59] Berlin, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik des Bundesperublik Deutschland (hereafter AAPD) 1975, Meeting between Karamanlis and Schmidt, Bonn, 16 May 1975, Doc 120, 534-541.

[60] Mario del Pero, 'Italy and the Atlantic Alliance', in Erik Jones & Gianfranco Pasquino (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 691.

[61] Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 'The Cold War as a Frontier. The Mediterranean Cleavages and the view from NATO, 1967-1982', *Journal of European Integration History* 1:15(2015), 21; Milan Vego, 'Soviet and Russian Penetration strategy in the Mediterranean since 1945', in *Naval Policy and strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future* ed. John Hatterdorf (London: Frank Cass, 200), 164.

[62] NARA, CFSF, 1973-1976, Telegram by D. Bruce, Brussels, 6 March 1975.

[63] Sotiris Rizas, *The Rise of the Left in Southern Europe: Anglo-American Responses* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012).

[64] Jean Rey, 'L'association de la Grèce et da la Turquie à la C.E.E', *European Yearbook* 11 (1963), 50-59; Ziya Önis, 'An awkward partnership: Turkey's relations with the European Union in comparative historical perspective', *Journal of European integration history* 7:1 (2001), 105-120.

[65] Juan Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-1985* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 75-81; On the issue of informal EEC democratic conditionality see Daniel C. Thomas, 'Consitutionalization through Enlargement: The Contested Origins of the EU's Democratic Identity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13: 8 (2006), 1190–210.

enlargement to Britain.[66] Discussions around the idea of the EEC as a community of values with the right and duty to uphold democracy were enhanced with the imposition of the Greek junta and the resulting EC decision to freeze the Athens agreement. For the EEC, democratic rule was becoming an informal requirement for accession; for the Greeks, the freezing of the agreement, coupled with the forced withdrawal from the Council of Europe, lodged in the Greek consciousness the EC and the Council of Europe as the only two organizations that had, at least symbolically, denounced the dictatorship – unlike the transatlantic allies.[67]

In the 1970s, therefore, all three southern European countries approached the European question, trading on the simplified but convincing political argument of democratic promotion that transcended the merely economic focus of the previous decades. Karamanlis, upon applying for Community membership, made a case to his fellow Europeans that failure to grant him a success on the EEC application front would undermine his position, jeopardizing the country's smooth democratization process and, in turn, its foreign policy direction.[68] In a semblance of the Greek strategy, Portuguese domestic elites linked the democratization process with the European option and applied to join on 28 March 1977. Soon after, the Spaniards followed. On 28 July 1977, barely one month after the first democratic parliamentary elections, the Spanish EC application was lodged. The decision was prompted by the unparalleled political consensus – across the Spanish party system and public opinion – on the question of EEC membership.[69] Simultaneously, however, the Spanish government was acting with its back against the wall, since failure to act swiftly could mean losing out on the momentum building up for a second enlargement. Fears of lagging behind its other two Southern European neighbours militated against any delays.

However, it was not just the applicants themselves that were setting the agenda for the Community. The Americans – reluctantly at first but forcefully after 1975 – started framing prospective membership into a guarantee of domestic stability and security for the region. The US administration was painfully aware of the tide of anti-Americanism, with its ebbs and flows, that had swept Southern Europe, limiting Americans' room for manoeuvre. To make matters worse, the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate had paralysed the presidency, with Congress becoming more assertive. The Ford administration no longer enjoyed the same flexibility in foreign affairs, a development that would add an unexpected layer of complexity in the conduct of US foreign policy.[70] Especially, the US embargo on arms for Turkey was an illustration of how the US 'could be paralyzed to the disadvantage of NATO'.[71]

In an effort to overcome such constraints, the Americans looked – not immediately in the case of Portugal but quite forcefully over Greece – to their European allies for help. A paper on transatlantic cooperation highlighted the importance they

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[66] Nicolau Andresen Leitão, 'A Flight of Fantasy? Portugal and the First Attempt to Enlarge the European Economic Community, 1961-1963', *Contemporary European* History, 16:1 (2007), 71-87; Lucia Coppolaro &Pedro Lains, 'Portugal and European Integration, 1947-1992: an essay on protected openness in the European Periphery', *E-journal of Portuguese History,* 11:1 (2013), 61-81.

[67] Emma de Angelis & Eirini Karamouzi, 'Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity, 1961–1978', *Contemporary European History*, 25:3 (2016), 439–458.

[68] Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War*, 35-63.

[69] Carlos Closa & Paul M.Heywood, *Spain and the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 6-30**.**

[70] Henry Kissinger*, Years of Renewal* (New York, 1999), 192; Yanek Mieczkowski, *Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s* (Kentucky: Kentucky University Press, 2005), 3835- kindle; John Robert Greene, *The Nixon – Ford Years* (New York, Facts on File, 2006), xxv.

[71] NARA, CFSF, 1973-1976, Telegram by D. Bruce, Brussels, 29 May 1975.

placed for the EEC's regional stability role: 'During the past year the EC- nine have gradually refined a common approach to problems in the Mediterranean's northern ties, based on a desire to promote stability and political moderation and using the joint instruments of trade concessions, financial assistance, and ultimate closer association with or without membership in Europe. The Nine's approach reflects a growing sense of responsibility, based on self- interests. There is a major US interest involved in accepting and encouraging the sharing of the Mediterranean burden with the Nine.'[72]

Without fear of antagonizing their transatlantic partner, the Nine progressively adopted a more confident view, putting emphasis on strengthening the hand of the democratic forces in Southern Europe, and utilizing the diverse set of economic and political tools at their disposal, with EEC membership as the grand prize. In practice, the Germans shared American anxieties over the predicament of Southern Europe and Greece in particular, noting that 'although his [Karamanlis'] own position on NATO and on the US presence in Greece was well known, we should not expect him to alienate public support at this stage by pro-American gestures or by a conspicuous return to NATO'.[73] The Germans, like the rest of the Nine, came to support Greece's wish to join the Community – knowing very well that the Community's unequivocal support would find approval with Greek public opinion and buttress the new social order, if only because the Greek government had oversold membership as being key to protecting democracy. The British shared the need for the EEC to offer the solution, as by their own admission, 'We are too poor to do much ourselves. Logically, we should leave it to others to make the running. … We should therefore be ready to encourage our allies to help. The Germans and the French are the key.'[74] It was therefore within the EEC context that Britain also chose to act, and though this medium to consult with the Americans.[75] The policy of enlargement therefore did not seek to reduce the role of the United States in Greece.[76] Europeans had the diplomatic and political means of influence that *complemented* those of the United States.

The merits of approaching enlargement in purely political and security terms was little disputed within European circles; it was thus hardly surprising how quickly the discussion ceased to revolve around the question of whether enlargement should take place, moving on to the 'how' and 'when'. In other words, how would you ensure that enlargement, with all its complications and technocratic character, would serve the security concerns of the applicants? It was an arduous task to flesh out a roadmap to membership that would accommodate the applicants' heightened hopes and dreams for security without jeopardizing the cohesion and identity of the club. The terms under which Greece would be admitted, for instance, 'would set a pattern for other nations that would demonstrate to what extent the "Six" form a closed shop'.[77] The Commission's Opinion, published on 28 January 1976, understood fully the political importance of supporting the Greek application, but at the same time considered that enlargement called for speeding up the process of integration, given the serious political and economic implications of a possible accession.[78] The suggestion for a pre-accession

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[72] NARA, CFSF, 1973-1976, Telegram by J. Greenwald, Brussels, 27 January 1976.

[73] AAPD, Doc 120, 1975, Meeting between Karamanlis and Schmidt, Bonn, 16 May 1975, 534-541.

[74] Keith Hamilton & Patrick Salmon (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas, Series III, vol V, The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976* (London: Routledge, 2006), Submission from Baker to Goodison, London, 22 August 1975, no 138, 480.

[75] NARA, CFSF, 1973-1976, Telegram by E. Richardson, London, 8 January 1976.

[76] Geir Ludnestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic rift* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2003),

[77] Quoted in Mervyn O'Driscoll, 'The "Unwanted Suitor", West Germany's Reception, Response and Role in Ireland's EEC entry request, 1961-1963', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 22:2 (2011), 8

[78] Commission Working Document, HAEC, no. 373, 28 January 1976.

period stemmed from several considerations.[79] It presented an opportunity for the Community to reform its institutions and at the same time to develop a substantial programme for economic aid that would enable Greece to overcome its structural weaknesses and adapt more easily to the Community's obligations and mechanisms. Moreover, a preparatory period seemed to reflect the desire of some member states to delay Greece's accession without causing a political rebuff.

Despite the problems it had raised, the Commission's Opinion concluded that 'it is clear that the consolidation of Greece's democracy, which is a fundamental concern not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its member states, is intimately related to the evolution of Greece's relationship with the Community. It is in the light of these considerations that the Commission recommends that a clear affirmative reply be given to the Greek request.'[80] Therefore, notwithstanding serious misgivings about the challenges of a Greek accession, the Commission concluded that democratic concerns overshadowed all others when it came to providing a rationale in favour of accepting the Greek application. Attempting to walk the same thin line between the need to welcome a recently democratized Portugal and the impact that its accession would have on the EC's institutional and economic structures, the Nine suggested to then Prime Minister Mario Soares in his early 1977 tour of Western European capitals that he opt for the alternative formula of 'pre-accession status' or 'privileged association', given that further domestic political upheavals were bound to complicate and prolong the negotiations on all the issues pertaining to Portugal joining the EEC.[81]

Although the Spanish application followed the Greek and the Portuguese in March 1977,[82] it far outweighed them in terms of complexity and consequence. Indeed, in an informal discussion at the European Council on 29 June 1977, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing revealed that Madrid's entry without CAP reform would be impossible in French domestic political terms, given the threat posed by cheap Spanish competition to the interests of southwestern France farmers.[83] The negotiations on terms of entry were bogged down as soon as some chapters opened up. In fact, Giscard chose the Assembly of French Agricultural Chambers for his speech on 5 June 1980 in which he requested 'a pause in the EEC's second enlargement'. [84] The Spanish government reacted fiercely, accusing Paris of adopting an obstructionist policy, while the press portrayed the French as 'the villains of the enlargement negotiations'.[85]

The proposed pause in the talks with the EEC was a major setback that forced the Spanish government to reshape its entire international agenda. Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez was too busy fighting for his political life to react, leaving Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja, and the minister responsible for negotiations with the EEC, Calvo Sotelo, with the task of finding an adequate response. This answer was formulated in mid-June 1980, when the Spaniards linked entry into the EEC to membership in

[79] See Karamouzi, *Greece, 1974–1979*, 35–62.

[80] European Commission, 'Enlargement of the Community: Conclusion', *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 1/78.

[81] David Hannay, *Britain's Quest for a Role. A Diplomatic Memoir from Europe to UN* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 76.

[82] Paul Preston & Denis Smyth, *Spain, the EEC and NATO*, Chatham House Papers 22(Routledge: London, 1984), 66.

[83] Note on Enlargement, Paris, 7 October 1977, AMAE, d/e, 1389.

[84] *Le Monde*, 7 June 1980.

[85] Fernando Rodrigo, 'Western Alignment. Spain's security policy', in Gillespie, Richard et al (eds.), *Democratic Spain: reshaping external relations in a changing world* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 54-56.

NATO.[86] Sotelo, who replaced Suarez in February 1981, thought of the link as not only perfectly compatible, but mutually reinforcing.[87] If the linkage was not enough to convince the EEC, the member states were reminded of the political imperative of bringing Spain into the EC when a group of military officers led by Colonel Antonio Tejero attempted a coup in the Spanish Parliament on 23 February 1981.[88] The plotters attempted to take full advantage of the unravelling of order following Suarez' resignation. By revealing the fragility of Spanish democracy, the attempted coup altered the perception of the interests at stake in the Community's enlargement. It gave real meaning to the Spanish thesis that its new democracy required a more propitious international environment in which to be nurtured.[89]

The Ten condemned the coup, reaffirming their desire to see a democratic Spain accede to the EEC. Renewed promises by the member states, however, failed to translate into practical steps, as progress in the pace and rhythm of negotiation remained limited. The harsh realities and internal dissent that had plagued the Community since 1979 enfeebled the lure of membership and its promise as a tool of stabilization. The second oil shock of 1979 choked off the tentative economic recovery of the preceding two years, and the political situation was equally unpropitious. New leaders such as Kohl and Papandreou came to the fore, while the Community was paralysed over budgetary issues, the British fiscal rebate and the future of the CAP.

Hopes for resolution of the enlargement question heightened when Francois Mitterrand came to power in 1981, followed by Spain's PSOE victory in 1982. The new Spanish Socialist Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, was eager to reverse the unfortunate situation he had inherited from the previous administration, which saw his country inside NATO and outside the EEC. The promise of socialist solidarity that could deliver 'Europe' for him lay at the heart of his electoral promises.[90] He would be swiftly disillusioned when Mitterrand visited Madrid in June 1982; in the President's own words: 'What I can tell you is that there is political will to bring Spain into Europe. But I will not take the risk of adding to the present miseries of Europe, an additional misery. It would be useless to build new ties, when old ties could not only bend but actually break'. He moved on to note : 'The general discourse that access to the EEC is open to countries that have chosen democracy, actually conceals a willingness to obstruct. Our partners are at the very least alarmed. The hypocrisy reigns supreme. The double language is devastating.'[91]

Ultimately, it was not until Mitterrand's pro-European turn, reform of the CAP and solving of the budgetary conundrum that the possibility of the Spanish entry became a distinct possibility. Lisbon's predicament was even worse, since newly appointed Mario Soares in 1983 realized early on that the fate of his country's application hinged on the outcome of the Spanish negotiations. West Germany, as in the case of Greece, was willing to shoulder the financial burden to assuage the French fears over the impact of Spanish entry. [92] Similarly, the Commission adopted amendments to rules related to fruits, vegetables and olive oil, as well as the guidelines of the integrated Mediterranean

[86] Emilio A. Rodriquez, 'Atlanticism and Europeanism: NATO and Trends in Spanish Foreign Policy', in Gil, Federico & Tulchin, Joseph, *Spain's Entry into NATO. Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 65.

[87] Charles Powell, *The Long Road to Europe: Spain and the European Community*, 1957-1986, 19

[88] *The Economist*, 10 November 1984.

[89] Glen D. Macdonald, 'European Community Enlargement and the Evolution of French-Spanish Cooperation 1977-1987', in Gil, Federico & Tulchin, Joseph, *Spain's Entry into NATO. Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives* (Boulder& London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 76.

[90] Mark Gilbert, *European integration. A Concise History* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012)

[91] Roland Dumas, *Affaires Etrangeres I*, 1981-1988 (Fayard: Paris, 2007), 238.

[92] Macdonald, 'European Community Enlargement', 82.

programs;[93] The Integrated Mediterranean Programme, a lavish project costing $4.8 billion over six years, was cooked up by the Commission to compensate Greek, Italian and French farmers for losses they might suffer from Spanish entry into the community.[94]

However, Germany's generosity was, albeit not explicitly, linked to the condition of continued support for Spain's remaining in NATO. Unanimous cross-party support for the EEC may have weakened Spain's hand, but lack of popular support for Spain's continued membership in NATO became possible leverage over the EC partners. The Socialists had stocked up votes on the Left by promising a referendum on NATO membership in the 1982 elections. After 1983, therefore, the negotiations with the EEC acquired an added political dimension, as the question of Spain remaining in the NATO alliance galvanized political debate within the country.[95] Early on, the Germans, along with the British, utilized the carrot of EC membership to convince Gonzalez to contribute to the 'conversion of the PSOE from its neutralist position to being in favor of remaining in NATO'.[96] The United States administration and the EC governments knew that an acceptable package for Spain on Community membership could ensure that González put his prestige behind staying in NATO.[97]

## *Conclusions*

Enlargement, like other EU policies, runs on deference to steadily accumulated precedent. It started off as a random event, but through successive rounds the Community actors discovered a series of instruments that transformed enlargement from an ad hoc process into a formalized policy, starting with the notion of the acquis and the power of economic attraction during the first round to the role of democratic stabilizer through the second enlargement and the emergence of informal criteria for admission, laying the ground for the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Even before the end of the Cold War, the member states of the Community took the first taste of what would take place in the post-1989 rounds of enlargement and its multidimensional nature of power:[98] the interplay between geopolitical considerations, market policy and normative power as formed against a cumulative precedential need to conform to norms and identities.[99]

However, the EC was defensive and assertive at the same time in facing up to the challenges of enlargement. In every round, the aspirant applicants encountered ample amount of incredulity among the existing member states of the Community, who were wary of the possible diluting effects of enlargement on the institutions, and of the financial costs involved. At the same time, however, they were eager to respond to the applicants' calls for security in the form of democratization, social cohesion and economic modernization. In accepting the southern Europeans' bid for membership, the Nine set out on a path that would eventually lead to far-reaching changes in the whole

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[93] Bulletin of the European Community no 2, Brussels, 1983, 46-47

[94] *The Economist*, 8 December 1984.

[95] Benny Pollack & Graham Hunter, *The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy. Spain's International Relations from Franco to Democracy* (London: Pinter Publications, 1987), 138-139.

[96] Julio Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-1985* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 168

[97] Jonathan Story, 'Spain's external relations redefined: 1975-89', in Gillespie, Richard et al. (eds.), *Democratic Spain: reshaping external relations in a changing world* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 38.

[98] David A. Baldwin, 'Power and International Relations', in Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas and Simmons, Beth (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (Los Angeles and London: SAGE, 2013),

[99] Anna Michalski, 'The Enlarging European Union', in Desmond Dinan*, Origins and evolution of the European Union* (OUP, 2006)

nature of the Community and its role as an international actor.[100] At the same time, however, and unlike the first enlargement, the Southern European countries became 'European' not because of what they could offer, but because of what they lacked: fragility and weaknesses constituted the countries' assets, creating a precedent of expectations and influencing their behaviour and discourse once they became members of the EU. Moreover, during the years under examination, there was a 'politicization' of enlargement where the technicalities were overlooked to serve geopolitical and normative considerations, whilst at the same time member states utilized the prospect of enlargement to strike better deals within the EEC, thus increasing uncertainty and limiting the impact of the promise of accession.[101] Since it was mainly the applicants that brought home the effectiveness of the tool of conditionality, it is hardly surprising that when faced with the prospect of a big bang round, the enlargement process and criteria required underwent a major shift.

The Copenhagen 'conditions of eligibility' institutionalized in 1993 were products of specific political circumstances and attuned to meet the needs of the Central and Eastern European enlargement, but they echoed the processes that had taken place in the preceding years. The historical record of the period of 1957-92 offers the broad brushstrokes of a more complicated enlargement picture, which confirms the lack of a monolithic progress but more highlights the contingent character, reflecting the changing self-perceptions of the applicants and the evolution of the nature of the European integration process. Ultimately, accession to the EU but mostly withdrawal, as with the case of Brexit, acts as a powerful reminder of the voluntary character of enlargement; it is this freedom of choice that strengthens the policy's appeal and explains its success as a foreign policy tool.

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[100] For more recent work on the appeal of the EEC to Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, please see:
Federico Romero and Angela Romano (eds.) European Socialist regimes facing globalisation and European co-operation: dilemmas and responses", special issue of the *European Review of History*, 21:2 (2014);
[101] Karen Smith, 'EU membership conditionality', in Cremona, Marice (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)