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Book Section:
Ziemann, Benjamin (2007) Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War. Introduction. In: Ziemann, Benjamin, (ed.) Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War. Frieden und Krieg. Beiträge zur Historischen Friedensforschung, 8 . Klartext , Essen , pp. 11-38. ISBN 9783898617635

Peace Movements
in Western Europe,
Japan and the USA
during the Cold War

Edited by Benjamin Ziemann

Peace and War

Contributions to Historical Peace Research

Historical Peace Research analyzes the prospects and limits for the realization of peace in all its historical dimensions. It is orientated towards peace as a key value, and considers the question if modern societies are able to achieve peace as its key driving force and point of reference for scholarly work. This endeavor is not based on any political commitment to a specific concept of peace. With regard to conceptional clarification, peace is basically defined as an effort for the institutional limitation and reduction of the collective use of physical violence against human beings. In the age of an emerging world society, with new hopes and at the same time new threats for mankind, peace has become a universal matter of concern.

Peace as the limitation and reduction of collective violence and war as the organized use of collective violence are the poles between which the work of Historical Peace Research is situated. This approach seeks to take up ideas from other scientific disciplines, both in terms of methodology and in terms of research areas. Historical Peace Research is particularly indebted to research objectives of social, political and cultural history. Peace movements, peace efforts and peace processes are part of its field of enquiry, but also the history of the military and the use of violence in wartime. Not least, it includes a reflection on the idea of a progress towards a non-violent modernity, in terms of both an intellectual history and a history of scientific concepts.

The series *Peace and War. Contributions to Historical Peace Research* is connected to earlier publications of the *Arbeitskreis Historische Friedensforschung* (Working Group for Historical Peace Research). It is designed to document the proceedings of the academic conferences of the group, but is also open for monographic studies into the topics of Historical Peace Research.

Detlef Bald – Jost Dülffer – Andreas Gestrich – Karl Holl – Thomas Kühne
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Acknowledgements

This volume presents the papers of the conference "Peace movements since 1945 in comparative perspective: strategies, symbolism, patterns of mobilization, political culture", held in Bochum, 28–30 October 2005. The conference was organized on behalf of the Arbeitskreis Historische Friedensforschung (Working Group for Historical Peace Research). It brought together participants from no less than seven European countries, Japan and the USA. During our intensive debates over three days, the participants enjoyed the hospitality and splendid facilities of the Institut für soziale Bewegungen at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Special thanks for their generous support before and during the conference go to Klaus Tenfelde, the director of the institute, and Jürgen Mittag, the deputy director, who went way beyond the call of duty to help us. The conference was generously funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung in Cologne, a support that is particularly appreciated in times of shrinking funding resources in the humanities. The Department of History at the University of Sheffield provided a grant for the translation of one chapter. I would like to thank Martial Staub for this support. Barbara Hövener and Michael Roelen-Hövener kindly granted permission to use their poster "Ärzte warnen vor dem Atomkrieg" as a cover image for this volume.

At the Bochum conference, Thorsten Bonacker, Jutta Held, Gerd Rainer Horn, Thomas Kühne, Dieter Rucht and Klaus Weinhauer acted as commentators. Their thoughtful and stimulating remarks sparked substantial discussions. During the preparation of the conference and the volume I have benefitted from the liberal and cooperative atmosphere in the Arbeitskreis. My thanks go to the whole group, and in particular to Jost Dülffer, Andreas Gestrich, Corinna Hauswedell, Karl Holl, Christian Jansen, Thomas Kater, Thomas Kühne and Gottfried Niedhart. A stay as a Visiting Scholar at the Nobel Institute in Oslo allowed me to focus on the topic of this volume. My thanks go to Helge Pharo, who invited me and offered hospitality and inspiration, to the staff of the Nobel Institute, particularly Anne C. Kjelling, who guided me through the magnificent library she has build up over the years, and to the staff of the research project on the Norwegian peace tradition, with whom I could talk about their exciting research. In the revision of their papers, the authors of this volume have made substantial efforts and have made the process of editing a delight. Finally, I would like to thank my friend and colleague Holger Nehring, who offered kind support during the preparation of this volume. In addition to that, he has substantially expanded my understanding not only of peace movements, but of contemporary history in general.

Benjamin Ziemann

Sheffield, April 2007

Situating Peace Movements
in the Political Culture of the Cold War.
Introduction

Benjamin Ziemann

This collection of essays seeks to broaden the study of domestic politics and the international situation during the Cold War through a fresh analytical perspective on peace movements as important collective actors. It covers several Western European countries, Japan and the United States. In particular, the contributions to this volume address three points: first, they argue that the Cold War can be interpreted as an attack not primarily on the bodies of the people in the 'belligerent' countries, but rather on their imagination. The capacities for nuclear destruction, which had been amassed on both sides of the iron curtain, were a "simulation" of annihilation.[1] Insofar as peace movements were eager to cast doubt on the logic of this simulation, they tried to get round the bipolar logic of the Cold War and to reclaim their own collective imagination. Seen in this perspective, the conventional narratives of the history of the Cold War, which tend to either ignore or glorify peace movements, appear to be less convincing; and new criteria to assess their significance and political impact have to be developed.

Second, this book contributes to the debate on the specifics of peace movements as social movements. It is an established practice to distinguish between 'pacifism', largely in the period up till 1945 on the one hand, characterized by a strong ideological commitment and the rather exclusive and rigid forms of sociability in associations formed by middle-class dignitaries, and the 'peace movements' since 1945 on the other hand, with their ability to attract highly volatile mass support in

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single-issue campaigns.[2] Traditionally, there has been a strong interest by historians of peace movements in sociological concepts such as the 'resource mobilization' approach from social movements theory. The articles in this volume aim to expand the interdisciplinary exchange between history and sociology on social movements. They use the concept of 'framing', argue that symbolic politics are a key prerequisite for the self-constitution and agency of protest movements, and explore some of their most important elements and media.

Third, this volume intervenes in an ongoing inquiry into the aims and possible forms of transnational history. Although this approach has been en vogue in the last couple of years, its precise contours and notions are not yet determined. The contributions to this volume point to both the expanding intellectual horizon and practical connections of peace movements, and they show how a framework of shared sympathies and antipathies brought peace activists from different countries closer together. Since the 1950s, peace movements had a clear awareness that their fundamental aim of non-violence could only be realized on a global scale, that 'peace' needed to be conceptualized as "world peace".[3] But many contributions to this volume show that even amidst a growing web of transnational interconnections and orientations the nation state retained its importance as the primary "identity-space" for peace movements.[4] It is thus necessary to interpret the national and transnational dimensions of peace movement mobilization not as mutually exclusive or as elements of two distinctive, successive periods, but rather as two different but entwined aspects of protest movements during the Cold War.

I. The Significance of Peace Movements for the History of the Cold War

In 1960, the German New Left journal "Argument", edited by a group of students and teaching staff members at the Free University in West-Berlin, published a brief text entitled "Theses about the Atomic Age".[5] The author, the philosopher and essayist Günther Anders (1902–1992), was one of the most powerful intellectual critics of the logic of deterrence in the Cold War, and it is worth recalling his intellectual biography here at least briefly. Anders, the son of the Jewish psychologist William

2   For a brief sketch, see Benjamin Ziemann, Peace Movements, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Detroit 2008 (2nd edition); see the chapter by Dieter Rucht in this volume.

3   On the concept of a 'world peace' see Thorsten Bonacker, Der fragmentierte Frieden. Der Weltfrieden im politischen Programm der Moderne, in: Mittelweg 36, 15 (2006), no. 1, pp. 49–60.

4   For this terminology see Charles S. Maier, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History. Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era, in: American Historical Review 105 (2000), pp. 807–831.

5   Here cited after the reprint: Günther Anders, Thesen zum Atomzeitalter (1960), in: Das Argument, Sonderband 1/1 (1974), pp. 226–234.

Stern, had taken on his nom de plume (which meant and indicated both dissent and difference) in the late 1920s while working as a freelance writer, after failed attempts to establish himself as an academic philosopher. Nonetheless, Anders had studied with Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger and had written his PhD-dissertation under the supervision of Edmund Husserl. His text indicates this intellectual training in the German tradition of dialectical thinking he had received as a student. After the emigration in 1933, which brought him first to Paris and then to the USA, where he had to take on many 'odd jobs' and divorced in 1937 his first wife, the philosopher Hannah Arendt, 6 August 1945, the day when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, marked the second decisive turning point in his life, the "day zero of a new calendar".[6] Anders, who lived since 1950 in Vienna, got in touch with the international movement against nuclear armaments, as the correspondence with Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer and Martin Niemöller in his personal papers reveals. But he was never an active member of the peace movement (and by the way also not a fellow-traveller of Communism), but rather a loner. His main interest was an intellectual reflection on the conceptual and anthropological situation created by the bomb, which he comprehensively delivered in the first volume of his book on the "Antiquatedness of Man", published in 1956.[7]

His brief text from 1960 delivered the substance of these extended arguments, hammered out in a string of snappy, antithetical bullet points aiming to drive home his main point: that the "atomic age" since 6 August 1945 was characterized by fundamental antinomies, of which the most fundamental one was the discrepancy between the "total power" for global "self-extinction" and the "total powerlessness" this caused for mankind. Anders underpinned the logic of anti-totalitarianism by stating that to use atomic weapons as a threat was in "its very nature totalitarian itself", since it rested on "blackmail" and turned the whole earth "into an escapeless concentration camp". To justify the bomb with the "totalitarian threat" from the

6   Quote from an interview in Mathias Greffrath, Die Zerstörung einer Zukunft. Gespräche mit emigrierten Sozialwissenschaftlern, Reinbek 1979, p. 44. For a good intellectual biography of Anders, see Konrad Paul Liessmann, Günther Anders: Philosophieren im Zeitalter der technologischen Revolutionen, Munich 2002; in English, compare Paul van Dijk, Anthropology in the Age of Technology. The Philosophical Contribution of Günther Anders, Amsterdam 2000, pp. 52–60. For important reflections on the context and relevance of his thinking, see Thomas Kater, Gegen den Krieg – für welchen Frieden? Philosophie und Pazifismus im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Barbara Bleisch/Jean-Daniel Strub (eds.), Pazifismus. Ideengeschichte, Theorie und Praxis, Bern 2006, pp. 89–106; Daniel Morat, Die Aktualität der Antiquiertheit. Günther Anders' Anthropologie des industriellen Zeitalters, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 3 (2006), no. 2, pp. 322–27, online at: <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Morat-2-2006> [30.1.2007].

7   Günther Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Bd. I: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten technischen Revolution, Munich 1956; on his correspondence partners, see <http://www.onb.ac.at/sammlungen/litarchiv/bestand/sg/nl/anders.htm> [30.1.2007].

East was thus the "climax of hypocrisy".[8] These remarks were not at least a scathing criticism of a book published by the philosopher Karl Jaspers in 1957, in which he had justified the preparations to equip the *Bundeswehr* with tactical nuclear weapons. Amidst the growing popular protests of the campaign "Fight against Atomic Death" and a public declaration of 18 leading German physicists, who had rejected these policies, Jaspers had tried to rebut these critics with the challenge posed by Communist totalitarianism, comparing it with the threat of nuclear annihilation in the words: "There the existence is lost, and here the existence worth living".[9] But Anders did not only undermine the discourse of anti-totalitarianism, widely used to justify atomic armaments at the time, he also reflected on the ecological consequences of nuclear arms tests. "What can target everyone, concerns everyone", and thus there were only "neighbors" left – with these words, which referred to the fact that radioactive fall-out transcended borders, he anticipated the debates on the "risk society" which ensued since the 1980s.[10]

Another target of Anders' criticism were the "mendacious forms of contemporary lies", the discourses used to legitimize the Cold War and the use of atomic weapons as a deterrent. Already the term "atomic weapons" as a "naked single word" was according to Anders a "mendacious assertion", because it implied that the bomb was a weapon and thus a mere instrument. But due to the all-encompassing nature of the bomb, it could in fact not be used as a means, and had rather fundamentally reversed the relation between means and ends. The "ultimate dilemma" posed by the bomb and its use in the Cold War was for Anders the discrepancy between the human ability to "produce" (in German: *her-stellen*) and to "imagine" (*vor-stellen*). Human beings had thus been turned into "inverted utopians", unable to imagine the effects of the very destruction they could produce. He analyzed the apparent lack of moral consequences drawn from this situation with the concept of a "Promethean slope", referring to the ancient Greek god who had introduced fire to mankind.[11] Those who had triggered the bomb (and "triggering" had in fact replaced human agency and had thus turned the bomb itself into an "action"[12]) were morally detached from the effects of their 'deed'. This insight motivated him in 1959 to

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8   Anders, Thesen (footnote 5), pp. 226f.

9   Quoted in Bruno Thoß, NATO-Strategie und nationale Verteidigungsplanung. Planung und Aufbau der Bundeswehr unter den Bedingungen einer massiven atomaren Vergeltungsstrategie 1952–1960, Munich 2006, p. 359f.

10 Anders, Thesen (footnote 5), pp. 227; compare Ulrich Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, London 1992.

11 Anders, Thesen (footnote 5), pp. 228f., 232f. This was a theme on which he had elaborated in his "Antiquatedness of Man"; cf. idem, Antiquiertheit (footnote 7), pp. 21–95. Compare the chapter by Annegret Jürgens-Kirchhoff in this volume; van Dijk (footnote 6), pp. 36–44.

12 Anders, Thesen (footnote 5), pp. 231f. For current debates in the sociology of technical weapons systems, which analyse these developments under the rubric of weapons as "actants", see Stefan Kaufmann, Technisiertes Militär. Methodische Überlegungen zu einen

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start a correspondence with Claude Eatherly, the pilot of the US Air Force weather reconnaissance aircraft Straight Flush which had supported the bomber dropping the bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.[13]

I have provided an extended account of Günther Anders' reflections on the bomb not only because they are genuinely remarkable and most probably hardly familiar to an Anglophone readership. Although he had studied with Heidegger, his interventions was rather based on the critique of a reification of actions and processes that could take the 1844 Parisian Manuscripts by the young Karl Marx as an inspiration. His intention was not to take sides, but rather to lay bare the fundamental illogic of the system of deterrence employed by both sides in the Cold War. And it is for this reason that his writings can offer a good vantage point for a new assessment of the significance of peace movements during the period of the Cold War as a war of "simulation".[14]

It is helpful to bear Anders' reflections in mind when we assess the historiography on the Cold War. The element of triumphalism which has characterized a certain strand of historical writing on the Cold War since 1990 is hard to overlook. Western democracies are portrayed as representing the 'right cause' during this confrontation, and thus their armament policies and strategic decisions seem, with the benefit of hindsight, to be justified as well.[15] Particularly striking about this historiography are not only its quite explicit value judgements, but even more so the apparently regressive methodological research agenda it applies. The Cold War is depicted as a confrontation between power agglomerations which are basically represented and driven by a handful of key politicians, their ideologies, values and ultimately their decisions. The likes of Josef Stalin, John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan loom particularly large in accounts written in this fashion, and the Cold War is narrated as the story of their personal idiosyncrasies and their mutual trust, lack of trust or betrayal. This is not only a lopsided 'top-down' approach, even more so, it is one written from the angle of a command hill both way above and detached from the rest of society.[16]

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symbiotischen Verhältnis, in: Thomas Kühne/Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), Was ist Militärgeschichte?, Paderborn 2000, pp. 195–209.

13 This correspondence was published in: Burning Conscience. The Case of the Hiroshima Pilot Claude Eatherly told in his Letters to Günther Anders, London 1961.

14 Cf. Geyer, Blick (footnote 1).

15 For examples and a critique, see Ellen Schrecker (ed.), Cold War Triumphalism. The Misuse of History after the Fall of Communism, London. New York 2004.

16 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, London 2005, and also his earlier We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford 1997. To describe nuclear weapons as the cause for a "new rationality", as Gaddis does (ibid., p. 86) is a form of reasoning which cannot be sustained in the light of Anders' arguments. See Odd Arne Westad, The New International History of the Cold War. Three (Possible) Paradigms, in: Diplomatic History 24 (2000), pp. 551–565, here pp. 552–556. Compare the balanced brief account by Gustav Schmidt, Cold

It is striking to see this relapse to the state-centered historiographic style of the Neo-Rankean school of the late nineteenth century, where 'general' history, and international relations in particular, was conceived as the result of the actions of a handful of 'great', important men.[17] Such an approach also leads to the almost total exclusion of peace movements from the overall picture. The proponents of a 'realist' interpretation of international relations consider peace movement mobilization to be almost irrelevant because it had seemingly no discernible impact on the decision making process of the political elites and governments. They tend to state the irrelevance of women's peace movements in particular, for example the peace camp set up close to the RAF base in Greenham Common in 1981 as a protest against the deployment of Cruise Missiles at this site. In a recent article, this camp has been scorned as a manifestation of a middle-class "anxiety complex", and for not ending the arms race.[18]

But is this the appropriate yardstick to assess the impact of those hundreds of women who maintained the camp under extremely primitive living conditions for more than a decade? Many of these women were young mothers with children, and the camp was not only very often their first political endeavor, but also became the most empowering experience of their lives.[19] The impact of Greenham Common on the White House and Whitehall was, admittedly, close to zero. But it was a radical experiment to build up a new form of community and to express political concerns in a radically subjective way, detached from both the established political institutions and from traditional working-class politics.[20] And the women at Greenham Common also discussed how nightmares about the possible consequences of nuclear war had haunted them and had in fact some of the motivated to join the camp. Similar to some articles in *Sanity*, the journal of CND, these reflections offered another, more personal vista on the apparent insanity of the logic of nuclear deterrence.[21]

War, in: Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavorial Sciences, Amsterdam 2001, Vol. 3, pp. 2194–2200.

17　For a critique see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Moderne" Politikgeschichte? Oder: Willkommen im Kreis der Neo-Rankeaner von 1914, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 22 (1996), pp. 257–266.

18　See Christopher Coker, Women on the verge, in: Times Literary Supplement, 17 November 2006, p. 26.

19　See David Fairhall, Common Ground: The Story of Greenham, London 2006; Ann Pettitt, Walking to Greenham: How the Peace Camp Began and the Cold War Ended, Aberystwyth 2006; cf. Holger Nehring, The Growth of Social Movements, in: Paul Addison/Harriet Jones (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939–2000, Oxford 2005, pp. 388–406; Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976, Oxford 2007, pp. 190f.

20　For this reason it is wrong to draw a parallel between Greenham Common and the British miner's strike in 1984/85, as done in Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy. The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000, New York 2002, pp. 464–467.

21　Cf. Margaretta Jolly, Nuclear Nights: The Women's Peace Movement and the History of Dreaming, in: Women: A Cultural Review 17 (2006), pp. 1–25.

The neglect of peace movements in a 'realist' interpretation does not mean that they are irrelevant for the history of the Cold War. But neither is it convincing to overestimate the impact of peace movements on international relations and decision making in the Cold War, as it has been done in scholarship written from the perspective of peace history. Peace historians are right when they explicitly flag their preference for nonviolent conflict resolution and their rejection of armaments. Nonetheless, since the interventions by Max Weber in the "value judgement controversy" in the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* around 1910 it is widely accepted that scientists can and perhaps even should have strong ethical preferences and convictions, but that these preferences are not a substitute for an appropriate research methodology which reflects the complexity of the subject matter.[22] This tendency is notable in Lawrence Wittner's trilogy on the history of the international movement to abolish nuclear weapons.[23] His account is written with an unsurpassed command of the archival materials, but it has also a number of conceptual flaws. Wittner uses the distinction between 'hawks' and 'doves' as stable categories to describe the dynamics of conflicts about nuclear armaments. But this is a terminology which has been widely used only in the USA.

Applied to the history of peace movements in Europe and elsewhere, it tends to reify the distance between politicians and the military on the one hand and the protesters on the other, instead of paying attention to the variable nature of aims and allegiances on both sides. Further research in the history of the military could reveal, for example, that top brass officers on various occasions in fact sympathized with the peace movement.[24] Wittner also tends to make a methodologically problematic use of opinion polls, in order to substantiate his claim that peace protests represented the majority of the population in many European countries, particularly during the 1980s in the movement against the NATO "double-track"-solution. Ultimately, he grossly exaggerates the impact of peace movement actors and ideas on the developments leading to the end of the Cold War in 1989/90.[25] It is much more

22　Cf. Peter van den Dungen/Lawrence S. Wittner, Peace History. An Introduction, in: Journal of Peace Research 40 (2003), pp. 363–375. For a critical perspective on peace history see Benjamin Ziemann, Historische Friedensforschung, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 56 (2005), pp. 266–281.

23　See Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953, Stanford 1993; idem, Resisting the Bomb. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954 – 1970, Stanford 1997; idem, Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement. 1971 to the Present, Stanford 2003.

24　This is, for example, a well established fact for the West German military both in the 1950s and the 1980s. See Detlef Bald, Die Bundeswehr. Eine kritische Geschichte 1955–2005, Munich 2005, pp. 52ff, 108f.

25　Lawrence S. Wittner, About the Peace Movements and their Relations. A Comparison of their Development and Impact in East and West, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 45 (2005), pp. 373–406, esp. pp. 392–394, 397, 399, 403. The fundamental flaw of Wittner's analysis

convincing to argue that peace protests throughout the Cold War have not changed government decisions, but rather norms about acceptable policies.[26]

Both the almost total neglect and the too optimistic and often unrealistic evaluation of the political impact of peace movements are not convincing. Written from different political perspectives, they both share a rather dated concept of international relations in the 'realist' tradition, focused on power politics and a narrow understanding of institutional settings. In order to reassess the significance of peace movements during the Cold War, it is necessary to broaden the framework for international history and, even more important, to put the links and relations between domestic and foreign policies centre stage. Recent attempts in this direction have convincingly argued that "security" was an issue that connected these two fields. "Security" was the cornerstone and rationale for the military and foreign policies of the Western alliance. But it was not only a key category of governmental actions, but also a wider horizon of expectations held by the population in post-war societies. As "life after death" resumed since 1945, "security" implied not only the integrity of the human body, but also the longing for affluence and social security. Concerns for security thus connected international relations with welfare state policies and with popular politics in these fields. The pivotal point of this approach is the search for discursive connections and zones of conflict and overlap between the expectations of collective actors and the sphere of 'high' politics.[27]

is to attribute decisions to peace movement pressure which were in fact taken vis-à-vis the Senate, the American Allies or public opinion, bearing in mind that it is impossible to attribute changes in public opinion to peace movements, as the influence could have been also the other way round. He is also careless in his reliance on peace movement sources, which tend to exaggerate their own importance. For a more detailed criticism cf. Benjamin Ziemann, Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA since 1945. Introduction, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32 (2004), pp. 5–19, pp. 7–10. Uninformed and exaggerated claims about the 'achievements' of peaceful protests abound even in more recent 'peace history'. See for example Scott H. Bennett, Radical Pacifism. The War Resisters League and Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915–1963, Syracuse 1963, p. 245, who cites the defeat of the Kapp Putsch in 1920 and the "Ruhrkampf" in 1923 as two major historical examples for his claim, "that nonviolent resistance can be effective". But neither the former nor the latter were strictly nonviolent, neither in theory nor in practice. Particularly the *Ruhrkampf* included a considerable number of violent clashes with the French occupation army, and had already been abandoned by the most important societal groups after several weeks because it was both untenable and ineffective, way before it was formally called off by the German government on 26 September 1923. See Heinrich August Winkler, Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1918 bis 1924, Bonn 1985, pp. 556–561, 566–568, 591, 605–607.

26 Nina Tannenbaum, Stigmatizing the Bomb. Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, in: International Security 29 (2005), pp. 5–49, p. 47; compare Andreas Buro, Die deutsche Friedensbewegung nach 1945, in: Astrid Sahm et al. (eds.), Die Zukunft des Friedens. Eine Bilanz der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Opladen 2002, pp. 131–160, pp. 134–136.

27 Holger Nehring, Diverging Conceptions of Security. NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Social Protest, in: Andreas Wenger/Christian Nuenlist/Anna Locher (eds.), Transforming NATO

These arguments are in tune with recent proposals to introduce the knowledge and perceptions of a wide range of societal actors as a systematic dimension into the history of international relations.[28] And they also coincide with attempts to analyze the interaction between protest movements and foreign policies, in particular with regard to the development of a détente between East and West since the late 1960s.[29]

From a theoretical perspective it is important to analyze the connections between foreign policy decisions and peace protests as the manifestation of a social paradox: "Decisions divide", as Thorsten Bonacker and Lars Schmitt have put it, "the world in decision-makers" and in those who are "concerned" by these decisions. Where politicians and the military see only possible "risks" of their decisions, which have to be taken and can possibly be calculated, those who see themselves as affected stress the "dangers" of these decisions. The decision is both a risk and a danger, the same is different, and these perspectives are irreconcilable.[30] Precisely this difference motivated the intervention of a participant in a peace movement poster competition in the Federal Republic in 1981. She objected against a poster by the artist Frieder Grindler, for which he received various awards at subsequent competitions for poster art. The motive, a photomontage, showed a photo of the huge crowd at the Bonn Hofgarten demonstration against the double-track solution on 10 October 1981, shot from a helicopter, and a bomb-shaped shadow hanging above the demonstration. This was, the critic complained, the perspective of an "uninvolved" person in a TV-armchair and the angle of the "cause", a bomb-dropping pilot, but not the perspective of those on the receiving end, those who were "concerned".[31]

in the Cold War. Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960, London 2007, pp. 131–147; Eckart Conze, Sicherheit als Kultur. Überlegungen zu einer "modernen Politikgeschichte" der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 53 (2005), pp. 357–381; compare Richard Bessel/Dirk Schumann (eds.), Life after Death. Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s, Cambridge 2003.

28 Cf. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht/Frank Schumacher (eds.), Culture and International History, Oxford, New York 2003; Gottfried Niedhart, Selektive Wahrnehmung und politisches Handeln: internationale Beziehungen im Perzeptionsparadigma, in: Wilfried Loth/Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), Internationale Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten, München 2000, pp. 141–157. Less convincing: Rana Mitter/Patrick Major (eds.), Across the Blocs. Cold War Cultural and Social History, London 2004.

29 Cf. Andreas Wenger/Jeremi Suri, At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History. The Nuclear Revolution, Dissent and Détente, in: Cold War History 1 (2001), pp. 1–42; Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente, Cambridge/Mass. 2003; Ziemann, Peace Movements (footnote 25), pp. 17f.

30 Thorsten Bonacker/Lars Schmitt, Politischer Protest zwischen latenten Strukturen und manifesten Konflikten, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32 (2004), pp. 192–213, p. 207. For a more detailed elaboration of this concept of "risks" see Niklas Luhmann, Risk. A Sociological Theory, Berlin, New York 1993.

31 Quoted in Reiner Diederich, Eine Taube macht noch kein Plakat. Anmerkungen zur Geschichte des Friedensplakates seit den 20er Jahren, in: Hans Jürgen Hässler/Christian von

For these reasons it is not really convincing to analyze the importance of peace movements during the Cold War either in terms of their impact on individual decisions (i.e. the 'politics' dimension of the political) or in the way they altered foreign and military policies (i.e. the 'policy' dimension). The significance of peace protests is mainly to be seen in the way they affected their respective polities in the widest sense of the word, implying not only the constitutional and institutional setting, but the implicit rules, shared assumptions and concepts which regulate political participation. And it is in this dimension, as the contributions to this volume amply demonstrate, that peace movements had had a substantial impact on Western societies during the Cold War.

First, peace movements have expanded the legitimate space for political activity beyond the confines of the post-war democratic consensus, which aimed to restrict participation to the sphere of parliamentary and governmental activity. Increasingly undermining and ultimately breaking up this consensus, they have contested existing notions of citizenship and paved the way for a more inclusive understanding of mass participation, and have proven to be an "emancipatory experience".[32] In times of war as during the US intervention in Vietnam, public and private debates triggered by peace protests were an important site for the renegotiation of the social contract, for reflections on the nature of citizenship and, last but not least, the question whether and to what extent individuals were entitled to political dissent in the times of national consensus.[33]

Second, these movements attempted and, in a long term perspective, at least partly succeeded to cast doubt on and to devalue the binary, exclusionary logic of anti-communism as the ideological and emotional framework for Western security policies during the Cold War. They argued, as Günther Anders coined it, that the "atomic situation as such" had to be seen as the enemy, and hence those who had perceived each other as enemies had to close ranks as "allies against the common threat".[34] In the same fashion, peace protests also criticized and ultimately super-

Heusinger (eds.), Kultur gegen Krieg – Wissenschaft für den Frieden. Würzburg 1989, pp. 349–363, p. 359f.

32 See the chapters by Holger Nehring, Andrew Oppenheimer, Dimitrios Tsakiris, Volker Fuhrt and Michael S. Foley in this volume. Compare Martin Conway, Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model, in: European History Quarterly 32 (2002), pp. 59–84. For peace movements in Eastern Europe, which are not covered in this volume, see Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), In Search of Civil Society. Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc, New York. London 1990.

33 For extremely rich and fascinating insights into these debates see the documents in Michael S. Foley (ed.), Dear Mr. Spock. Letters about the Vietnam War to America's Favorite Baby Doctor, New York. London 2005, pp. 50, 80, 82, 90f., 132f., and passim.

34 Anders, Thesen (footnote 5), p. 227.

seded the hierarchical and dogmatic ossification of organizations of the 'Old Left' in various countries.[35]

A third and often neglected effect of peace movement mobilization and symbolism for the polities of Western societies was their contribution to the change in gender relations and gender roles. In most Western European countries, in Japan and in the USA it was the connection between general conscription and male citizenship which had, even after the cataclysmic events of the Second World War, set the benchmark for a hegemonic concept of masculinity. The attempt to restore and strengthen this hegemonic masculinity was part and parcel of the social and political settlement after 1945.[36] Peace movement activities since the 1950s contested the principles of this system of gender roles. Visible, though less decisive for this change was the increasing number of female activists in the upper echelons of pacifist associations.[37] For a realistic assessment, it would be necessary to counterbalance this development with the huge amount of invisible and hardly mentioned clerical work provided by the wives of peace movement activists.[38]

Both more incremental and in the long run much more substantial was the challenge which peace protests posed for the traditional concept of the conscript soldier as the embodiment of legitimate citizenship. When the "good girls" fancied the "good boys" of the draft resistance movement, as it happened during the campaign against the Vietnam war in Boston and elsewhere, they laid the axe on the roots of an established pattern of masculine representation. Similarly, the successful efforts of peace activists to establish alternative service not only as a possibility, but even more as a preference for young men brought a new, civilized type of masculinity to

35 See the chapters by Robbie Lieberman, Sabine Rousseau, Volker Fuhrt, Annegret Jürgens-Kirchhoff and Massimo De Giuseppe in this volume.

36 John Horne, Masculinity in Politics and War in the Age of Nation-States and World Wars, 1850 – 1950, in: Stefan Dudink/Karen Hagemann/John Tosh (eds.), Masculinities in Politics and War. Gendering Modern History, Manchester 2004, pp. 22–40; Christa Hämmerle, Zur Relevanz des Connell'schen Konzepts hegemonialer Männlichkeit für "Militär und Männlichkeit/en in der Habsburgermonarchie (1868–1914/18)", in: Martin Dinges (ed.), Männer-Macht-Körper. Hegemoniale Männlichkeiten vom Mittelalter bis heute, Frankfurt/New York 2005, pp. 103–121. For a good case study see Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany, Princeton 2006.

37 Lawrence S. Wittner, Gender Roles and Nuclear Disarmament Activism, 1954–1965, in: Gender & History 12 (2000), pp. 197–222. For a critique see Kathleen Canning, Engendering the History of War and Peace. Comment, in: Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), Perspektiven der Historischen Friedensforschung, Essen 2002, pp. 146–152.

38 See the account by Frieder Schöbel in: Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (ed.), Geschichten aus der Friedensbewegung. Persönliches und Politisches, Cologne 2005, pp. 34–36.

the fore.[39] Female grass-roots peace movements, on the other hand, politicized hitherto largely disenfranchised of women such as housewives or women's teachers,[40]

The fourth and final point where peace protests implemented structural change in the politics in the Western military alliance was the 'blind spot' which was at the core of the Cold War as an assault on the collective imagination of the people. With happenings and other forms of symbolic politics, and with pictorial representations in various media, peace movements targeted the unwillingness and also inability of the public to imagine the consequences of a nuclear conflict. It is hardly surprising that these attempts were fraught with manifold problems, of a political, aesthetical and also artistic nature.[41] But nonetheless, it was mainly an intellectual and artistic production within the wider context of peace movement activity where some of the fundamental contradictions of the political situation of the Cold War were reflected.

II. Social Movements and Symbolic Politics

Historians working on peace movements since 1945 have early shown a substantial interest in an interdisciplinary dialogue with proponents of sociological theories of social movements.[42] During the 1980s, it was mainly the 'resource mobilization' approach which attracted historians. It focuses on the rational strategies of movement actors to accumulate the resources necessary for sustained mobilization, mostly but not exclusively money and the commitment of the rank-and-file members.[43] Whereas many sociologists subsequently became interested in the concept

39 See the chapters by Michael S. Foley and Massimo De Giuseppe in this volume. Cf Benjamin Ziemann, The Code of Protest. Images of Peace in the West German Peace Movements 1945–1990, in: Contemporary European History 17 (2008); Thomas Kühne (ed.), Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945, Hamburg 2000; Belinda Davis, "Womens Strength against Crazy Male Power", Gendered Language in the West German Peace Movement of the 1980s, in: Jennifer A. Davy/Karen Hagemann/Ute Kätzel (eds.), Frieden-Gewalt-Geschlecht. Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung, Essen 2005, pp. 244–265.

40 For Japan, see Mari Yamamoto, Grassroots Pacifism in post-war Japan. The Rebirth of a Nation, London 2004, pp. 152–203; for the UK, see the titles in footnote 19.

41 See the contributions by Annegret Jürgens-Kirchhoff and Sabine Rousseau in this volume. For the wider context, see also Thomas Kater (ed.), "Der Friede ist keine leere Idee ...", Bilder und Vorstellungen vom Frieden am Beginn der politischen Moderne, Essen 2006.

42 For a comprehensive overview see David A. Snow/Sarah A. Soule/Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Oxford 2004. The following remarks are inspired by Thorsten Bonacker's commentary at the Bochum conference. I am indebted to Thorsten Bonacker for giving me access to his written comment.

43 See some chapters in Charles Chatfield/Peter van den Dungen (eds.), Peace Movements and Political Cultures, Knoxville 1988; cf. also Charles Chatfield, Adapt or Die: The Social Dynamics of Peace Movements, in: Guido Grünewald/Peter van den Dungen (eds.), Twen-

of 'new social movements', this approach never really took of among historians. When sociologists talk about 'new' social movements, they focus particularly on the ecological movement of the 1970s and 1980s and on the protests against the NATO double-track decision and the deployment of Cruise Missiles since 1979. One focus of this approach is the constituency of these protests, which is described as the "new middle class", a group comprising "social and cultural specialists" who work in social work, teaching, arts and the universities. Most of these professions are employed by the state and thus, according to this approach, relatively unaffected by market competition. Rather, they are concerned with the strains imposed by modernization on human beings and the dehumanization caused by modern technology.[44]

This concept of "middle class radicalism" has been, as many historians will know, first applied to describe the dynamics of the British 'Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament' (CND) in a study published in 1968 by the sociologist Frank Parkin. In this study Parkin acknowledged the broad variety of motivations and political backgrounds feeding into CND.[45] It was only later, in the sociological reception of the book, that the broad variety of groups, motivations and value-systems which established the inner diversity and heterogeneity of CND got lost in an explanation which tried to attribute protests to the social strata of the movement activists.[46] Another problematic aspect of the 'new social movement'-approach is its connection with the concept of a "value change" from "materialist" to "postmaterialist" values, as it has been outlined by Ronald Inglehart in various publications.[47]

From a historical point of view, it seems to be obvious that already the activists against rearmament and nuclear weapons in Germany, the UK and elsewhere during the 1950s were driven by non-materialist values rather than by concerns about their affluence and material wellbeing. And the same holds true for European pacifists during the 1920s and 1930s. Most assertions about the connection between 'value

tieth Century Peace Movements. Successes and Failures, Lewiston 1995, pp. 33–54; idem, Peace Movements, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam 2001, vol. 16, pp. 11144–11147.

44 Bert Klandermans, The Peace Movement and Social Movement Theory, in: idem (ed.), Peace Movements in Europe and the United States, Greenwich 1991, pp. 1–39; idem, Peter H. Merkl, How New the Brave New World. New Social Movements in West Germany, in: German Studies Review 10 (1987), pp. 125–147; Hanspeter Kriesi, New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands, in: American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989), pp. 1078–1116, pp. 1080–1085; cf. idem et al., New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis, London 1995.

45 Frank Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism, Manchester 1968.

46 For criticism cf. Holger Nehring, The Politics of Security. The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons 1957–1964, Oxford 2008, chapter 2.

47 See Kriesi, New Class (footnote 44), p. 1086; Klandermans, Theory (footnote 44), pp. 4f. Compare Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution in Europe. Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies, in: American Political Science Review 65 (1971), pp. 991–1017.

change' and a propensity for peace protests are in fact statistical artifacts. They are created by the survey methods and statistical correlations which are employed in this strand of 'empirical' research. A good example is the apparently futile attempt to conceptualize a complex problem such as the religious traditions and Christian moral languages of movement activists simply in two questionnaire items on "church attendance" and "Catholic" or "Protestant parents".[48] Experts in social science methodology would perhaps talk about an 'ecological fallacy', but it might be also appropriate to apply the scathing criticism of the sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who has described the insights of this kind of survey research as the "surprise value of self-produced data'.[49]

It is not only the disappointment with this sort of playing around with statistics, which has driven historians to explore the possibilities of approaches focusing on the performative aspects of peace movements. A focus on the symbolic politics of protests is not only in tune with recent constructivist approaches in sociology, but also with the interest of historians in the various forms the "cultural turn" has taken in their own discipline in the past two decades.[50] With regard to social movements, this implies to focus on the forms and symbols of communication which foster the "self-constitution" of peace protests. In this perspective, protests do not simply emerge due to real threats posed by government decisions. Rather, they get off the ground when their communicative efforts to outline the *possibly* dangerous fall-out of policy decisions attract sufficient resonance in the public.[51] And these protests can only be sustained over a certain period when their appeal is 'framed' by collective patterns of interpretation. These frames refer either to the problems at stake and to "the attribution of blame" ("Diagnostic Framing"), to possible motives for protest ("Motivational Framing") or to the negative consequences of a mobilization that fails to materialize ("Prognostic Framing").[52] Whatever the specific function and the scope of these different frames might be, they are all defined as a specific

48 See Kriesi, New Class (footnote 44), pp. 1085, 1105.
49 Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 370; cf. Bonacker/Schmitt, Protest (footnote 30), p. 205; see also the sceptical remarks by Steve Breyman, Were the 1980s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements New Social Movements?, in: Peace & Change 22 (1997), pp. 303-329.
50 Cf. Bonacker/Schmitt, Protest (footnote 30), pp. 206-213; Victoria E. Bonnell/Lynn Hunt (eds.), Beyond the Cultural Turn. New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, Berkeley 1999.
51 Werner Bergmann, Was bewegt die soziale Bewegung? Überlegungen zur Selbstkonstitution der 'neuen sozialen Bewegungen', in: Dirk Baecker et al. (eds.), Theorie als Passion. Frankfurt 1987, pp. 362-393.
52 Cf. Jürgen Gerhards/Dieter Rucht, Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany, in: American Journal of Sociology 98 (1992), pp. 555-596, pp. 579-584.

"system of meaning". Thus, they are most often represented by texts, and these texts offer opportunities for a qualitative analysis.[53]

Such a focus on the framing of protest movements and their symbolic politics offers important vistas for a historical assessment of peace movements. Before I am going to explain some of these opportunities as they are presented in this volume, it is however necessary to clarify the usage of 'symbolic politics' as a concept. As always, it is helpful to do this by juxtaposing it with its opposite, as the clarification and validation of any theoretical term can be best achieved with the specific distinction it offers. Very often the concept of 'symbolic politics' is in fact invoked as the opposite to 'real' politics. In this fashion, it denotes what could be coined the 'expressive' aspect of politics, where politics is marketed with the help of symbols and rituals, and which is juxtaposed to the 'content' aspect of politics, i.e. the proper decision-making process.[54] This usage can be traced back to the political scientist Murray Edelman, who has described symbolic politics with the distinction between the performance on the proscenium and the decisions taken in backstage rooms. But this concept has been substantially criticized on the grounds that symbolic politics are part and parcel of the ways in which decisions are prepared and executed, and power is accumulated, shared and contested.[55]

Thus, it seems to be more viable to conceptualize symbolic politics as the opposite of "diabolic" politics, i.e. of politics who do the devil's work and deliberately divide. This notion would also be more in tune with both the original and an appropriate current meaning of the very term 'symbol'. It is derived from the ancient Greek word *symbolon* and the verb *symballein*, which means 'throwing together'. Seen from this perspective, symbols appear to be not simply signs which signify a certain objective, independent reality. Rather, they are a specific kind of signs, signs which bind together.[56] The early Christians in the Roman Empire used the term precisely in this fashion when they called their creed a *symbolon* since the council of Nicaea in 325, because it allowed them to recognize each other as members of the same church and to bridge the difference between the individual believers.

Some important implications of this understanding of symbolic politics are vividly described in various chapters of this volume. First of all, the performative use of symbols and symbolic actions was a key means of peace protesters not only to close their ranks and to create a sense of shared identity, but also in order to represent their concerns and the movement itself in the public. Peace protests

53 Ibid., p. 573.
54 See for example Joshua Miller, No Success like Failure: Existential Politics in Norman Mailer's "The Armies of the Night", in: Polity 22 (1990), pp. 379-396, pp. 393f.
55 Cf. Thomas Mergel, Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002), pp. 574-606; Murray J. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, Urbana 1964.
56 For a brief outline of this argument see Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M. 1997, 2 vols., pp. 235, 319f.

used symbols to attribute responsibilities for the dangers of wars and weapons, to acuminate these issues to trigger a moral and emotional consternation, to legitimate a collective response to these dangers and ultimately to present themselves as authoritative speakers on these issues. Only with these uses the protests created the momentum that constituted a movement and bridged the gap between the different motives and agendas of those who joined in. To construct a peace movement with symbolic politics required both, as the posters of the Communist *Mouvement de la Paix* in France and the tradition of the Easter Marches in the United Kingdom and Germany demonstrate: A pattern of easily recognizable elements which could be used repeatedly, and a certain amount of variation over time, depending from the context of an increasing secularization in the postwar-period, even secular pacifists evolution of the movement and the changing external circumstances.[57]

A second important aspect of the symbolic politics of peace movements is that the very symbols they use have no stable and fixed meaning, but are rather ambiguous and open for different readings and interpretations. This can be shown taking the cross as a key Christian symbol as an example. In various countries, the cross has been used by the local branches of the Pax Christi-movement, although it has traditionally also rendered itself for the use by Catholic army chaplains. In the context of an increasing secularization in the postwar-period, even secular pacifists could collaborate with and appreciate Pax Christi activists under this banner.[58] But the cross is not the only example for the fact that precisely the very ambiguity of symbols can strengthen their appeal. The mushroom cloud and the peace dove have been widely used by various peace movements in Europe, Japan and the USA since 1945.[59]

Even though, and at the same time precisely because the public has been accustomed to situate these symbols in the context of progressive, left-leaning protests, they have been widely employed by small groups of Neo-Fascists and the extreme right in the Federal Republic since 1990. To cite the core symbols of the peace

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57   See the chapters by Sabine Rousseau and Holger Nehring in this volume. For an overview on the repertoire of performative symbols and rituals employed by peace movements see also Michael S. Foley, Confronting the War Machine. Draft Resistance during the Vietnam War, Chapel Hill, London 2003, and his chapter in this volume.

58   See Barbara Stambolis, "Shared memory": Erinnerung an deutsch-französische Annäherungen am Beispiel symbolischer Orte der Grenzüberschreitung und ihrer Nachwirkungen, in: Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte 6 (2005) pp. 137–150; compare Penelope Adams Moon, , Peace on Earth–Peace in Vietnam': The Catholic Peace Fellowship and Antiwar Witness, 1964–1976, in: Journal of Social History 36 (2003), pp. 1033–1057, p. 1046.

59   On these symbols see the chapter by Sabine Rousseau in this volume, and also Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear. A History of Images, Cambridge/Mass. 1988; Gerhard Paul, "Mushroom Clouds". Entstehung, Struktur und Funktion einer Medienikone des 20. Jahrhunderts im interkulturellen Vergleich, in: idem (ed.), Visual History. Ein Studienbuch. Göttingen 2006, pp. 243–264; Hans-Martin Kaulbach, Picasso und die Friedenstaube, in: Georges-Bloch Jahrbuch des Kunstgeschichtlichen Seminars der Universität Zürich 4 (1997), pp. 165–197.

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movement in order to legitimize the aggressive vision of a European *Großraum* (Empire, literally 'larger space') under German hegemony seems to be an utter abuse and perversion of the 'correct' usage of these symbols. But there is, as discourse theory has reminded us for a long time, no conventional or appropriate usage of symbols. Peace signs can thus also be attractive for Neo-Fascists, either in an attempt to provoke outrage and hence media coverage, or in order to mimic the 'peaceniks' and to occupy their symbolic space in society.[60] The inherent ambiguity of symbols, their lack of "intrinsic meaning" is not a disadvantage but rather an advantage for the self-constitution of social movements, as long as they provide a shared point of reference. A key factor in this respect is their reception and interpretation by the mass media, as protests are more generally a three-way interaction between protesters, decision-makers and the "non-movement public" represented by the mass-media.[61]

A strong "consensus tradition" has been prevalent in many peace movements, as the Hamburg Quaker Konrad Tempel has put it, who brought CND's Aldermaston march in 1960 under the name of an 'Easter March' to the Federal Republic.[62] But the protestant logic of 'Do not split, reconcile!' is by no means the only way peace protests can practice symbolic politics. At certain junctures it can be, thirdly, more plausible and promising for peace movements to resort to diabolic politics. That means to employ signifiers deliberately in an attempt to create fissures and to combat the complacency and inertia of parts of the movement. Public strife, not 'peace' maybe the result of such an intervention. Nonetheless, at least for certain sections of a protest movement this could motivate them to resort to diabolic politics, in an attempt to set themselves apart from the majority current in the movement, and in order to flag the urgency of the issues at stake.

A fascinating example of diabolic politics is the use of the flag of the National Liberation Front of Vietnam (NFL) by parts of the American anti-Vietnam war movement on the peak of the mobilization in the late 1960s. Displaying the flag of the NLF, the enemy against which American troops fought a bitter war, did not only mark these groups and individuals as the radical wing of the movement and attracted widespread attention (and also revulsion) in the mass media. Since the national flag is one of the iconic symbols of the unity of the American nation, the unrepentant and vitriolic use of the NFL-flag by parts of the anti-war movement was also the most effective way to stress that the protesters were explicitly and substantially not in agreement with the majority consensus of US society.[63] Opting for

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60   See the chapter by Fabian Virchow in this volume.

61   See the chapter by Jeremy Varon in this volume, the quote on p. 252.

62   Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (footnote 38), p. 90.

63   See the chapter by Jeremy Varon in this volume. For a similar interpretation of how anti-Vietnam protests developed a confrontative political style see James Godbolt, Vietnam-protesten I Norge. Fra ad-hoc aksjoner til politisk kapital, in: Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 21 (2004), pp. 61–69.

diabolic politics, peace activists stirred up intense emotions and were able to agitate large sections of the population. When Richard Nixon talked about a "silent majority" of the Americans in a televised speech on 3 November 1969, his intervention was a direct response to the way in which the liberal mass media and the attention they paid to 'the movement' had, in his view, distorted the overall balance of public opinion in the United States.[64] But the diabolic use of signifiers was ultimately only one option, and peace activists have chosen, in the long term, more often to go in the opposite direction.

This meant, fourthly, to seek for the objectification of public debates particularly on armaments by the use of experts. Famous artists, novelists, philosophers and theologians have been widely used as figureheads of peace campaigns since the end of the Second World War. The philosopher Bertrand Russell in the United Kingdom and the theologian and physician Albert Schweitzer in Germany are good examples for this use of intellectuals as symbolic rallying points for antinuclear campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s. Their public authority rested mostly on their moral integrity, their respectability, and in both cases also on their age and its connotation of experience. It is not by chance that the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer was particularly concerned about Schweitzer's 1957 public appeal to stop nuclear testing. Although he had very high approval rates in the polls, Adenauer sensed that he could not compete with Schweitzer's authority in a predominantly ethical debate on the legitimacy of these weapons.[65]

Artists and particularly musicians could act even more powerful as peace protest symbols, not at least due to their popularity. In Mai 1964, Herbert Stubenrauch attended the first peace march from Marathon to Athens as a representative of the West German Easter March movement. He was stunned to see that the composer and musician Mikis Theodorakis, one of the co-organizers of the demonstration, needed twelve men to cordon him off from the exuberant enthusiasm of his many admirers in the huge crowd, all of whom wanted to greet and to hug him. That was, as he noted, not only a proof for Theodorakis' overwhelming popularity in Greece, but also, in a stark and irritating contrast to the traditional German pantheon, a reminder that popular heroes not always had to be "warriors".[66] Stubenrauch could not yet know that Theodorakis became one of the most popular artists at various mass rallies of the German campaign against the Euromissiles in 1982/83.[67]

But the traditional model of the liberal intellectual, whose reputation rests on his name, tends to wear away gradually with the signing of ever more public appeals and petitions. In this situation, experts on armaments and their impact could step

64   See Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, Lawrence, Ks. 1998, pp. 173–176.
65   Wolfram Wette, Der Beitrag des Nuklearpazifismus zur Ausbildung einer Friedenskultur, in: Kühne, Friedenskultur (footnote 39), pp. 144–167, pp. 148f.
66   See his account in: Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (footnote 38), p. 49–51.
67   See the posters advertising these events and Theodorakis' appearances: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie Bonn, Plakatsammlung, 6/PLUA000707, 6/PLKA036599.

in, as the for example the 18 German atomic physicists mentioned above, who signed the 'Göttingen appeal' in 1957. An early and illuminating example for this general trend from the use of liberal intellectuals and their moral authority as peace movement symbols, to the growing significance of scientific experts and their professional expertise, is the French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie (1900–1958). For the experiments he had conducted with his wife Irène they were both awarded with the Nobel prize in chemistry in 1935. Joliot-Curie became a formal member of the Communist Party PCF in 1942, but he never fitted into the usual pattern of a party intellectual. Even as the president of the Communist-led World Peace Council, he openly criticized Soviet officials for their tendency to minimize the catastrophic effects of a nuclear war. His pacifist activities were a consequence of his determination not to leave the use of atomic weapons to the politicians, because also "the men of the sciences have their responsibilities". He used his specific expertise for example to investigate the contested issue of American bacteriological warfare in Korea 1950–1953.[68]

One can raise doubts as to whether the shift from moral authority to scientific expertise was really a universal trend in the symbolic politics of post-1945 peace movements. A major exception was without doubt the liberation theologian and bishop of Recife, dom Hélder Câmara (1909–1999). For the various left-Catholic peace initiatives in Italy since the late 1960s, he was not only a major intellectual reference point, but also a hugely popular symbol for pacifist politics and a commitment to human rights. His authority rested particularly on the fact that the "option for the poor" was not only his moral and political credo, but did also reflect his personal lifestyle.[69] But Hélder Câmara's overwhelming popularity among Catholic social movements in Italy and other European countries has also to be interpreted as a symbolic surrogate and projection screen for disappointed aspirations. The thriving vitality of liberation theology in Brazil and its adversary relation with the Church hierarchy was at least partly a compensation for the frustration left-leaning Catholics felt about the constant decline of churchgoers and the ossification of the ecclesiastical structures in Western Europe.[70]

Since the early 1970s, the development and institutionalization of peace research as an academic discipline finally shifted the symbolic politics of peace movements towards a more rational and scientific approach.[71] The first generation of peace

68   See Frédérique Matonti, La colombe et les mouches. Frédéric Joliot-Curie et le pacifisme des savants, in: Politix 58 (2002), pp. 109–140, quote p. 116.
69   See the chapter by Massimo De Giuseppe in this volume.
70   With regard to the Federal Republic, see my interpretation in Benjamin Ziemann, Zwischen sozialer Bewegung und Dienstleistung am Individuum: Katholiken und katholische Kirche im therapeutischen Jahrzehnt, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 44 (2004), pp. 357–393, pp. 377–379.
71   Cf. Katrin Köhl, Denkstilwandel im Kalten Krieg. Nachdenken über Krieg und Frieden und die Entstehung von Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in den amerikanischen und westdeutschen Sozialwissenschaften, Baden-Baden 2005.

researchers shaped, along with physicians and physicists, the public face of the campaign against the NATO "double-track" solution since 1979, both in Western Europe and in the USA. One important factor of this development was the interest of parts of the mass media in this "rational pacifism" and its scientific arguments about the structure of weapons systems and alternative security policies. Together with this matter of fact-oriented style of expert advice, peace movements also developed a policy oriented approach. Instead of only trying to trigger moral outrage in the population, they also aimed to make their arguments heard in the think tanks and advisory boards of government agencies. While social science peace researchers stressed the separation of their peace ethics and academic expertise, scholars from the sciences were keen to introduce moral categories into their own discipline.[72]

It is a question for future research if the increasing recourse to 'rational' academic experts and their 'hard facts' has really increased the symbolic persuasiveness of peace protests. It could be argued that the significance of expert advice in contemporary media democracies is not so much its diagnostic, but rather its performative function.[73] And in this respect, a sit-in with the nonagenarian Bertrand Russell might have been just as effective as the televised deliberations of a peace researcher on alternative security policies.[74] The contributions to this volume show that symbolic politics are not only a vital element of peace movement mobilization, but in fact a key component of their self-constitution and appeal to the wider public.

As a result of this interdisciplinary dialogue on social movements, the older debate among historians about the classification of pacifists according to their aims has lost much of its appeal, at least for the period since 1945. According to the distinction developed by Martin Ceadel, most post-1945 peace protests would only count as "pacificism", because they did not object to the use of violent means in

72 Corinna Hauswedell, Friedenswissenschaften im Kalten Krieg. Friedensforschung und friedenswissenschaftliche Initiativen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den achtziger Jahren, Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 123–300.

73 Stephen Hilgartner, Science on Stage. Expert Advice as Public Drama, Stanford 2000.

74 The letters to Dr. Benjamin Spock, America's favorite baby doctor and a leading figurehead of SANE and the anti-Vietnam war movement, offer important material for an assessment. Many of the thousands who wrote to him disapproved that he had stepped outside the boundaries of his professional expertise. But many others embraced this step precisely because they saw it as a natural extension of his moral authority and integrity, and stated that he was already "physically (...) a tall man", but "morally (...) ten feet tall". (It is, by the way, interesting so see how, as in the case of dom Hélder Câmara, the physical appearance of a political symbol also shaped perceptions of moral integrity.) See the documents in Foley, Mr. Spock (footnote 33), pp. 37f, 46, 49, 70, 78, 104 (quote), and passim. See also Holger Nehring, Politics, Symbols and the Public Sphere: The Protests against Nuclear Weapons in Britain and West Germany, 1958 – 1963, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 2 (2005), pp. 180–202.

principle, but rather protested only against particular wars or armaments.[75] With a focus on the symbolic performance of protests, the classification of their aims has an even more dwindling importance. It seems to be much more fruitful to consider the topic of 'single-issue' versus 'multi-issue' movements. Sociologists have tried to measure the relative effectiveness of these two types, but with no clear-cut conclusions, also due to the fact that it is much easier to operationalize the success of single-issue protests.[76]

From a historical point of view, at least two points need to be made. First, it can be argued that the prevalent anti-Communist consensus in the 1950s and 1960s has hampered the success of protest movements and their ability to lay claim to a respected position in the polity. This is at least the lesson to be drawn from the example of the civil rights movement in the USA, which took up 'peace' as an aim rather late since it was connoted as a Communist issue. In comparison, it can be said that the relative strength of the anti-Vietnam movement partly rested on the fact that it combined the protest against the US-intervention with issues to which the student population could connect quite easily.[77] Second, it can be argued that peace protests in the postwar era became increasingly concerned with the issue of human rights, or, to make that point even stronger, that much of the earlier impetus of "pacifism" proper has been transformed into a concern for human rights. As the example of Italian peace movements in their encounter with Latin American liberation theology shows, it was almost impossible to disentangle an interest in nonviolent political action from the massive human rights violations in the Latin American military dictatorships.[78] The shift from pacifism to human rights activism also reflected the changing patterns of political inclusion in the postwar period. It was not any longer the nation-state which guaranteed political rights, but individuals could expect guarantees for their personal integrity as individuals.[79] In a long term

75 Martin Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War, Oxford 1987; idem, Ten Distinctions for Peace Historians, in: Harvey L. Dick (ed.), The Pacifist Impulse in Historical Perspective, Toronto 1996, pp. 17–35..

76 William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, Belmont/Cal. 1990 (2nd edition).

77 See the chapters by Robbie Lieberman and Caroline Hoefferle in this volume; Hom. Spirit (footnote 19), pp. 54–92; Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Im Kampf um 'Frieden' und 'Freiheit'. Über den Zusammenhang von Ideologie und Sozialkultur im Ost-West-Konflikt, in: Hans-Günter Hockerts (ed.), Koordinaten deutscher Geschichte in der Epoche des Ost-West-Konflikts, Munich 2003, pp. 29–47. For an interpretation that stresses racial tensions as the main factor for the division between peace and civil rights movements in the US see Simon Hall, Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s, Philadelphia 2005.

78 See the chapter by Massimo De Giuseppe in this volume. See also the illuminating remarks on René Cassin's journey from veteran's pacifism to human rights by Jay Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom. Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century, New Haven 2006, pp. 99–120.

79 See Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950, in: Historical Journal 47 (2004), pp. 379–398.

perspective it is thus important to see that the quest for peace could be combined with and at the same time expressed through the longing for human rights, but also for female emancipation and ecological awareness. The overlap and interconnections between these issues are a topic for future research.

III. Transnational Perspectives and National Identities

The history of peace protests during the Cold War is the history of a transnational and to a certain extent even global movement. Any research in this field has thus to take the ongoing debates among historians on the concept of a transnational history into account. Currently, there seems to be widespread disagreement as to what transnational history is and on which conceptual premises it should be based. The basic consensus, which should suffice as the starting point for our reflections, is that it is an attempt to break up and leave the nation-state as the main focus of and analytical container for historical research, and is focused on social and communicative connections which transcend nation-state borders.[80]

Transnational history has thus, to make that sure, a different angle of observation and cognitive interest than comparative history, the other important strand of historical research beyond the confines of the nation-state. Whereas a transnational approach is interested in entangled and connected developments at dispersed places, a comparison focuses on similarities and distinctions of phenomena in different settings.[81] A comparative history of European peace movements in the twentieth century has yet to be written, and for a transatlantic comparison we are lacking even the most basic starting points.[82] Attempts to identify common features of peace activism in Western Europe could focus on the campaign against the Euromissiles in the early 1980s. It is striking that this mobilization wave was strongest in countries with a predominantly Protestant tradition, particularly in the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom. And also in those countries with a mixed denominational background, such as the Netherlands and West Germany, both the rank-and-file

80 For reflections on these issues, see Christopher Bayly et al., On Transnational History, in: American Historical Review 111 (2006), pp. 1441–1464; Gerd Rainer Horn/Padraic Kenney, Introduction: Approaches to the Transnational, in: idem (eds.), Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989, Lanham 2004, pp. ix–xix; Klaus Kiran Patel, Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 52 (2004), pp. 626–645.

81 Cf. Deborah Cohen/Maura O'Connor (eds.), Comparison and History. Europe in Cross-National Perspective, New York 2004; Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Comparative History, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam 2001, Vol. 4, pp. 2397–2403.

82 But see the remarks by Maurice Vaïsse, Pour une histoire comparée des pacifismes Européens, in: idem (ed.), Le pacifisme en Europe: des années 1920 aux années 1950, Brussels 1993, pp. 435–442.

and the core activists were predominantly Protestant. In Catholic countries such as France and Italy, Catholic peace groups had developed since the 1950s. But the by far largest pacifist organizations in France and Italy were associated with the respective Communist parties, and independent, non-aligned protests not only in the early 1980s were considerably weaker than in other European countries.[83]

According to an argument developed by the political scientist Werner Kaltefleiter, this pattern can be best explained by the specific notions of conscience and morality which the Protestant discourse has ingrained in the political culture of these countries. Hence, Protestants were more likely to criticize the bloc confrontation and nuclear armaments "because of the immorality or immoralism of deterrence".[84] This argument can be both substantiated and sharpened in a historical perspective. It seems as if it was particularly the pietist mentality with its moralistic language and its commitment to a salvation of a sinful world, based on the conscience, the conversion and ultimately rebirth of the individual, which fed into the semantic patterns of peace activism and its often stark moral dichotomies. This would explain the particular strength of peace movements in countries with a strong pietist heritage such as England, the Netherlands and Germany (at least when we apply a wide understanding of Pietism which is not focused on the 'classical Pietism' of those who followed Philipp Jakob Spener in Herrnhut and Halle, but covers all attempts for a renewal of the Protestant faith dating back to the seventeenth century, i.e. also Puritanism, Jansenism, the "Nadere Reformatie" and Calvinism in the Netherlands, and subsequently Methodism and the Awakening movement of the nineteenth century).[85]

Lutheranism contributed to this current where it had developed a strong sense of dissent, as in the resistance of the Confessing Church against the nazification of the Protestant Churches in Germany.[86] Even in France, most of the founding members

83 Werner Kaltefleiter/Robert L. Pfaltzgraff (eds.), The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States, London 1985. For a historiographical overview, cf. Sabine Rousseau, Les Mouvements de Paix en France depuis 1945, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32 (2004), pp. 49–65; Massimo De Giuseppe/Giorgio Vecchio, Die Friedensbewegungen in Italien, ibid., pp. 131–157; see also their chapters in this volume.

84 Werner Kaltefleiter/Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peace movements, in: idem, Peace Movements, pp. 186–204, p. 196.

85 For this wider definition see Kaspar von Greyerz, Religion und Kultur. Europa 1500–1800, Göttingen 2000, pp. 122–171; Andreas Gestrich, Pietistisches Weltverständnis und Handeln in der Welt, in: Hartmut Lehmann (ed.), Geschichte des Pietismus, vol. 4: Glaubenswelten und Lebenswelten, Göttingen 2003, pp. 556–583. It should be noted that a leading expert on the history of pietism has described the atomic bomb as an example for – "secularization"!

86 See Hartmut Lehmann, Protestantische Weltsichten, Göttingen 1998, p. 104. See the chapter by Andrew Oppenheimer in this volume; compare also Steven Pfaff, The Politics of Peace in the GDR. The Independent Peace Movement, the Church, and the Origins of the East German Opposition, in: Peace & Change 26 (2001), pp. 280–300, p. 286. This touches on the older thesis, developed by the Protestant theologian and church historian Ernst Troeltsch around 1900, that Lutheranism had, in comparison with the reformed

of the *Association de la paix par le droit*, the major liberal pacifist organization founded in 1887, had been Huguenots and members of the Reformed Church.[87] It would also be tempting to explore if those strands of Catholic pacifism which stressed the necessity of penance and the need for a periodic renewal and conversion of both communities and the individual could be subsumed under a very wide definition of the Awakening movement.[88] Even the War Resisters League in the USA, a good example for what has been called the "secularization of conscience", protested against the hydrogen "Hell-Bomb", conjuring up the manichean dichotomy between heaven and hell.[89] In comparative perspective, it is a peculiarity of peace movements in Japan that they were of a "predominantly secular nature" and could not rely on traditional religious notions of morality, conscience and commitment.[90]

In a transnational perspective, peace movements since 1945 seem to be the archetypical example of a *histoire croisée* or entangled history, a perspective which is interested in the transfer and circulation of ideas and social practices.[91] Peace movements frequently shared and exchanged key activists. They were thus able to spread similar ideas, aims and concerns across national boundaries, including the transatlantic encounter between student's activists from the USA and the United Kingdom in peace protests particularly during the 1960s. Peace activists were, as the chapters in this volume argue, not only connected by networks and personal encounters. Perhaps even more important was the synchronization of mobilization waves through the dissemination of iconic images and cultural symbols in a transnational public sphere and the burgeoning consumer culture of Western socie-

churches, fostered political quiescence. It would be helpful to rediscover this debate for a transatlantic comparison of the Protestant elements in peace movements. For a brief sketch, see Frank-Michael Kuhlemann, Protestantismus und Politik. Deutsche Traditionen seit dem 16. Jahrhundert in vergleichender Perspektive, in: Manfred Hettling et al. (eds.), Was ist Gesellschaftsgeschichte?, Munich 1991, pp. 301-311. On the ramifications of Protestant notions of conscience see Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner, Das protestantische Gewissen in der Moderne, in: Johannes Dantine et al. (eds.), Protestantische Mentalitäten, Wien 1999, pp. 265-292. For the historical traditions of the Protestant peace churches see the work by Peter Brock. Against the Draft. Essays on Conscientious Objection from the Radical Reformation to the Second World War, Toronto 2006.

87 Norman Ingram, The Politics of Dissent. Pacifism in France 1919-1939, Oxford 1991, p. 27.

88 For such a usage of the term see, with regard to ultramontanism, Josef Mooser, Katholische Volksreligion, Klerus und Bürgertum in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Thesen, in: Wolfgang Schieder (ed.), Religion und Gesellschaft in 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1993, p. 144-156, p. 148.

89 Bennett (footnote 25), pp. xiii, 189.

90 Yamamoto (footnote 40), pp. 10, 211.

91 See Michael Werner/Bénédicte Zimmermann, Beyond Comparison. Histoire Croisée, Inter-crossings and the Challenge of Reflexivity, in: History and Theory 45 (2006), pp. 30-50.

ties.[92] But peace protesters were not only connected by shared concerns about wars and armaments and by common proposals how to cope with their dangers, they also developed transnational patterns of protest. The classic example for this trend is, of course, the tradition of the demonstrations for nuclear disarmament during the Easter weekend. Developed by CND and first staged in 1958 between London and Aldermaston, the "Aldermaston march" and its repertoire of symbolic actions, songs and rituals was soon adapted in many other countries. Since the beginning of the 1960s, similar events were repeatedly and successfully staged in the Federal Republic (as "Easter March"), Greece ("Marathon march"), Denmark (march from the nuclear missiles site Holbæk to Copenhagen), as well as in France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and several other European and non-European countries, including the USA, New Zealand and Australia.[93]

The Easter Marches are an example for a protest form which transcended national boundaries due to the initiative of individuals and small groups, who imported and adapted the original idea to their respective national context, and also as a result of the dissemination of news about these events by the mass media. The history of the Easter Marches shows a certain level of variation in the performance of these protests, but they do also provide ample evidence for the fact that specific songs, slogans and other symbols could be employed in a number of diverse settings. In addition to these mostly informal transnational connections and processes of emulation, peace movements also maintained links across national boundaries with permanent networks and formal organizations. One of the established examples is the War Resisters International, an umbrella organization of radical, secular pacifists and conscientious objectors founded in 1921, which nowadays comprises branches in no less than 43 countries.[94]

But the important transnational connections of peace protests in the period since 1945 were not only provided by the exchange and diffusion of perceptions, norms and aims, the emulation of protest forms and by international organizations. Another important source of collective identities which crossed national boundaries

92 See the chapters by Volker Fuhrt, Caroline Hoefferle and Massimo De Giuseppe in this volume. Cf. Dieter Rucht, Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten in neuen sozialen Bewegungen, in: Hartmut Kaelble et al. (eds.), Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt/M. New York 2002, pp. 327-351; Doug McAdam/Dieter Rucht, The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas, in: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528 (1993), pp. 56-74; Detlef Siegfried, Understanding 1968: Youth Rebellion, Generational Change and Postindustrial Society, in: Axel Schildt/Detlef Siegfried (eds.), Between Marx and Coca Cola. Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980, New York 2006, pp. 59-81.

93 See the chapters by Holger Nehring and Dimitrios Tsakiris in this volume. For a comprehensive overview, see Wittner, Resisting (footnote 23), pp. 205, 207, 211, 215, 223, 225, 233, 259, 301-305.

94 Cf. Bennett (footnote 25); Devi Prasad, War is a Crime Against Humanity. The Story of the War Resisters' International. London 2005.

was the shared antipathy against certain key actors in international politics. With variations in timing and intensity we cannot describe here in detail, anti-Americanism was most crucial for the collective identity of peace movements in Europe and Japan from the 1960s to the 1990s. It is perhaps best defined as a position which takes "America as a metaphor for a modernity threatening one's own community."[95] Particularly during the protests against the Vietnam war in the late 1960s, and once again in the huge mobilization wave against the NATO "double-track solution" in the early 1980s, anti-Americanism provided the ideological and emotional "master frame" which allowed to coordinate a highly diverse range of individual groups and campaigns from various countries, and to focus them on a shared goal.[96] The same problem was reflected in the continuous problem of American peace activists to portray themselves as the embodiment as the other, 'better' America. Anti-Americanism in Western Europe and Japan did not, however, lead to a preference for the neutrality of the respective countries. It rather spurred initiatives to get in touch with representatives of an 'other' America, both in the USA and in Latin-America.[97]

The intensive transnational connections between peace protesters during the Cold War notwithstanding, it would be wrong to portray the history of these movements from 1945 to 1990 mainly as an incremental intensification of exchanges across the borders. There are examples for this gradual shift from a preoccupation with the history and identity of a given nation-state toward a broader humanitarian vision, which included both empathy with and connections to liberation movements in non-Western countries under the heading of a "global solidarity."[98] Other movements, though, could combine transnational links between protesters with a focus on the "identity space" of their respective nation-state as both the primary context and the key aim of their engagement.[99]

95 This is the definition by Jan C. Behrends/Árpád von Klimó/Patrice G. Poutrus, Antiamerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa. Zur Einleitung, in: idem (eds.), Antiamerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa. Bonn 2005, pp. 10–33, p. 17. Compare also Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century, in: American Historical Review 111 (2006), pp. 1067–1091; Michael Hahn (eds.), Nichts gegen Amerika. Linker Antiamerikanismus und seine lange Geschichte. Hamburg 2003.

96 See the chapters by Dimitrios Tsakiris, Volker Fuhrt, and Sabine Rousseau in this volume. Compare also: Christopher Goscha/Maurice Vaïsse (eds.), La guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe 1963–1973, Brussels/Paris 2003; Davis, Women's Strength; for the concept of master-frames, see Gerhards/Rucht (footnote 52), pp. 574f.; Wittner, Nuclear Abolition (footnote 23), pp. 149, 239, fails to acknowledge anti-Americanism as a major obstacle for more intensive transatlantic peace movement coordination during the 1980s.

97 See the chapters by Massimo De Giuseppe, Michael S. Foley, Volker Fuhrt, Caroline Hoefferle and Robbie Lieberman in this volume.

98 See the chapter by Andrew Oppenheimer in this volume.

99 Cf. Holger Nehring, National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957 – 1964, in: Contemporary European History 14 (2005), pp. 559–582;

At first glance it seems as if the Marathon peace marches in Greek since 1963 are perfect examples of a transnational entanglement. In 1963, Grigoris Lambrakis, the physician and parliamentary deputy, was the only one who could actually complete the march due to repressive measures taken by the police, before he was killed by members of a right-wing paramilitary group a couple of weeks later. Lambrakis was inspired by the example of CND and had participated in the 1963 Aldermaston march. He had the support of the Bertrand Russell Youth Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, a non-aligned student peace group which had also taken, as the very name indicates, CND as a role-model. But although these transfer mechanisms initiated the protests, it seems as if the overwhelming ability of the Marathon march to mobilize the Greek population remains a mystery. Half a million people took part in Lambrakis' funeral procession, and at least 250.000 turned up for the second, this time legal instalment of the Marathon march in 1964, making it both in relative and in absolute terms by far the largest peace rally in European history before the anti-Euromissile demonstrations in 1982/83. And this unprecedented level of mobilization was achieved in despite of the apparent "weakness of the pacifist and non-aligned traditions in Greece."[100]

For a full explanation, we need to take the question of Cyprus into account, one of the most complicated political problems of post-war European history. The island had been since 1923 under British sovereignty, and both the Greek majority population on the island as well the mainland had aimed for Enosis, a unification with Greece, since 1950. But the settlement that was found in 1959/60, with an independent Cyprus, a constitutional setting that prohibited Enosis and aimed to establish a joint government and administration by Greeks and Turks under the presidency of the Archbishop Makarios, was not only a reaction to the agitation and armed attacks by the Turkish Cypriots since 1958, but also bowed to the overriding security interests of NATO and the USA. Both Greece and Turkey had joined NATO in 1952, and the creation of an independent Cypriot state did reflect the general interest to pacify the southeastern flank of the alliance. Although the conservative Greek government under Constantine Karamanlis paid lip service to the idea of Enosis, it was clear that it had given up the pursuit of unification in favor of a settlement that included financial and military support by NATO members as well as a positive Western attitude to the brutal repression of the Communist party.[101]

Wilfried Mausbach, Auschwitz and Vietnam. West German Protest against America's War during the 1960s, in: Andreas W. Daum/Lloyd C.Gardner/Wilfried Mausbach (eds.), America, the Vietnam War and the World. Comparative and International Perspectives, Cambridge 2003, pp. 279–298.

100 Wittner, Resisting (footnote 23), pp. 238–240, quote p. 239. Wittner does not mention Enosis as an issue.

101 Cf. David H. Close, Greece Since 1945. Politics, Economy and Society, London 2002, pp. 125–133; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Cyprus at the Crossroads, 1959–1963, in: European History Quarterly 35 (2005), pp. 523–540. Even Karamanlis' hagiographic biographer had

In this situation it was the United Greek Left (EDA), the legal representation of the Communists and their allies, and the affiliated peace association Greek Committee for International Détente and Peace (EEDYE), who could exploit the popular longing for *Enosis* and could present themselves as the true patriotic alternative. The mass mobilization of the Greek peace movement in 1963/64 occurred in the context of recurring violent confrontations between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. And it rested in particular on the fact that EEDYE and the organizers of the Marathon march demanded self-determination for the Cypriot people (which in fact meant *Enosis*), rejected NATO-intervention in the question of Cyprus and agitated against American military bases in Greece, thus both channeling and stirring up further the widespread anti-Americanism in the Greek population. Some of the demonstrators in 1964 burned Lyndon B. Johnson in effigy, dressed in a Turkish folklore costume. The head of the marching column celebrated the remembrance of victims of the German occupation in 1944 in the village Kato Charvati, where 54 resistance fighters had been hanged in 1944.[102]

Whereas the Marathon march was on the surface an example for a transnational exchange and entanglement, it was in substance a powerful and highly popular claim for and reaffirmation of Greek national identity vis-à-vis Turkey, the USA and NATO, but also in remembrance of the resistance movement during the Second World War. National and transnational orientations were two different but entwined aspects of peace movements during the Cold War, and the nation-state remained the primary identity space for most peace protesters. Peace movements during the Cold War were aiming for a vision of world peace. But all too often, they were preoccupied with problems of national identity.

102 Dimitrios Tsakiris, Militär und Friedensbewegung in Griechenland (1950–1967), Frankfurt/M. 1992, pp. 227–232, 254, 258f., 314; see his chapter in this volume.

to admit these facts: C.M. Woodhouse, Karamanlis. The Restorer of Greek Democracy, Oxford 1982, pp. 67, 90f., 123.

I.

Patterns of Mobilization and Transnational Connections