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## **Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' Speech: A Rhetorical Political Analysis**

### **Abstract**

This article exploits the developing political science literature on rhetorical political analysis (RPA) and applies it to one of the most controversial speeches of the post-war era in British politics. Alongside an analysis of the roots and impact of Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech the article deconstructs Powell's rhetoric and oratory. In doing so the article moves beyond the traditional modes of analysing the speech, which focus on the reproduction of 'new racisms' and which are prevalent within the sociological and social psychology academic literature. By using RPA the paper considers the speech through the use of the rhetorical techniques of persuasion i. appeals to *ethos* – i.e., the persona of the speaker; ii. *pathos* - i.e. the range of emotions evoked; iii. or *logos* – i.e. the evidence that supports the arguments underpinning the speech. This type of analysis showcases how and why Powell's speech made such an impact when just as inflammatory comments had been uttered by other Conservatives prior to 1968.

### **Keywords:**

Conservative Party, Enoch Powell, Race, Immigration, Political Rhetoric, Political Oratory

## Introduction

Enoch Powell famously commented that all political careers ‘end in failure’ (Heffer, 1998, p. 961). If success as a politician necessitates the acquisition of ministerial office and longevity in high office, then his career cannot be defined as that successful. His ascent up the ministerial ladders in the 1950s saw him appointed as Financial Secretary to the Treasury in January 1957. However, this put Powell on a collision course with Harold Macmillan who was resistant to controlling public expenditure. Powell would come to view his time in the Treasury and then his joint resignation (with Chancellor Peter Thorneycroft and fellow Treasury minister Nigel Birch) as an indicator that he was an early advocate of monetarism and an intellectual influence upon the political economy of Thatcherism (see Jarvis, 1998; Green, 2000; Cooper, 2011). His return to ministerial office as Minister for Heath (1960-63) would also come to a premature end by resignation. The succession crisis of October 1963 in the aftermath of Macmillan’s resignation resulted in Lord Home emerging from the ‘magic circle’, an outcome that was unacceptable to Powell. Believing that Macmillan ‘as a typical trickster’ had ‘fudged the figures’ (Stark, 1996, p. 18) to prevent R. A. Butler from acquiring the leadership he refused to serve under Home. His second resignation brought his ministerial career to an end at 51.

Once the Conservatives entered opposition Home stood down from the Conservative Party leadership in July 1965 following the establishment of new democratic procedures for leadership selection. Powell stood for the vacant party leadership position, against Edward Heath and Reginald Maudling despite no realistic prospect of winning. He stood for two reasons. First, to establish himself as a politician of stature who could be considered for the leadership in the future (Stark, 1996, p. 89). Second, to advance his Tory neo-liberal beliefs built around attachment to the nation state, institutions and deregulation, denationalisation and the management of inflation by the control of the money supply. However, although Powellism was gaining supporters that did not translate into votes for Powell (he secured 15 votes to Heath on 150 and Maudling on 133) (Heffer, 1998, pp. 384-5). Heath offered him the shadow Defence portfolio, which was the ‘safest portfolio’ he could find for him (Campbell, 1993, p. 240). Significantly it kept him away from economic matters and home affairs, where his ‘trenchant views would have divided the party’ (Shepherd, 1996, p. 298).

His derisory return was a reflection of the limitations of the ‘idiosyncratic’ Powell (Lindsay and Harrington, 1974, p. 255). He could provide verbal and emotional leadership to the Conservative Right but he could not provide organisational leadership. As a ‘solitary prophet’, (Hurd, 2003, p. 188) he was voice rather than a leader of a faction (Norton, 1978, p. 253). Thus,

whilst Powell would claim there was an overall coherence to his thinking, the notion of Powellism has to be treated with caution given ‘listeners were not always sure what line he would take’ (Norton, 2015, forthcoming). Succinctly, he was ‘capable both of batting all around the political wicket and of moving the stumps in order to set up a wicket of his own’ (Cowling, 1970, p. 13).

However, the political career of Powell [1] is not remembered for his ministerial resignations in 1958 or 1963, nor his failed leadership bid of 1965. Neither is it remembered for his opposition towards entry into the Common Market, his habitual rebellions against the Heath government of 1970 and 1974 (see Norton, 1978, pp. 249-54), or his resignation from the Conservative Party in 1974 and his instruction to vote Labour in the February 1974 General Election (Heffer, 1998, pp. 688-90, 735). Nor is his political resurrection as an Ulster Unionist parliamentarian between October 1974 and May 1987 the defining moment of his political career (see Corthorn, 2012). All of the above have been overshadowed by one speech delivered in Birmingham in April 1968 – the so called ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech – about the dangers of the continuing flow of immigrants from the former colonies of the West Indies, India, Pakistan and Africa. His infamous peroration predicted violence: ‘As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding...Like the Roman I seem to see “the River Tiber” foaming with much blood’ (Powell, 1968a). It is clear that Powell wanted the speech to make an impact. He had informed his constituency chair, Clement Jones, that: ‘I’m going to make a speech and it’s going to go up “fizz” like a rocket; but whereas all rockets fall to earth, this one is going to stay up’ (Heffer, 1998, p. 448). He also issued the text of speech through the West Midlands CPC and through Central Office. Once distributed this ensured the speech would be recorded to maximise television coverage and media exposure (Heffer, 1998, p. 448).

This paper re-examines the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech. In doing so the discussion is broken into three clear sections. The first section examines the ‘roots’ of the speech by considering how Conservative thinking on immigration evolved prior to 1968. It does so to identify the movement from a quasi-open door policy to a debate on controls and how restrictive those controls should be. This analysis will also showcase how ‘sporadic’ (Brooke, 2007, p. 676) Powell’s engagement with immigration was in terms of public comment (whilst noting his private reservations). It will highlight how the parliamentary and campaigning rhetoric and slogans of other Conservatives, such as Cyril Osborne and Peter Griffiths, was far more overtly racist and inflammatory than what Powell offered in ‘Rivers of Blood’. This evaluation acts as a prelude to, and justification for the second section of the paper, which provides a detailed rhetorical political analysis (RPA) of the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech. This section of the

paper considers Powell's speech in the context of the classic rhetorical techniques of persuasion; be that appeals to *ethos* – i.e., the persona of the speaker; *pathos*, i.e. the range of emotions evoked or exploited; or *logos* – i.e., the evidence that supports the architecture and structure of speech (for detailed explanations of *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* and the wider debates about rhetorical political analysis, see Lanham, 1991 and Leith, 2012). It does so in order to garner a new perspective on how Powell constructed, arranged, and delivered the speech. The final section of the paper reassesses the short and long term impact of the speech upon the Conservative Party leadership of Heath.

Through this structure the paper makes a distinctive contribution to the academic literature on Powell and Powellism and the debate on race and immigration with regard to the Conservative Party. It exploits an emerging sub-discipline within British political science – RPA – and applies to a speech which tends to be analysed within the context of the discursive reproduction of new racism. These existing interpretations tend to be policy driven, i.e. its impact on attitudes towards race and immigration, or they are located within sociological or social psychological perspectives with an emphasis on discourse analysis (see Gilroy, 1987; Layton-Henry, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Solomos and Black, 1995, Schwarz 1996; Miles, 1997; van Dijk, 2000; Capdevila and Callaghan, 2008). However, such accounts do not fully explore the speech within the context of either Conservative politics, or the centrality of Powell as the communicator, i.e. how and why Powell and April 1968 still resonates nearly fifty years later, and not other Conservatives. After all, other Conservatives held similar views, and unlike Powell, were keen to express them prior to 'Rivers of Blood'.

### **'Rivers of Blood': Identifying the Roots of the Speech**

Between the passing of the 1948 British Nationality Act and the 1961 Commonwealth Immigration Act (see Dean, 1993), Britain would witness a considerable growth of their Asian and Black communities. Until the 1961 Act Commonwealth citizens could claim unrestricted entry and rights to stay in the United Kingdom as holders of British passports, as the 1948 Act meant that those born in the British Empire had nationality rights in Britain. By the onset of the 1960s the Asian and Black population formed only 0.25 percent of the overall population, and the growth in immigration from Europe and Ireland was even greater (Spencer, 1997, p. 4; Solomos, 1989, p. 42).

However, evidence of underlying hostility towards 'coloured' immigration was emerging, both amongst the electorate and within the Conservative Party (Dean, 1992). By the end of the

1950s public opinion was shifting towards stricter immigration controls, and amongst parts of the electorate there was an association between coloured immigration and social disorder: Waters (1997) notes that whereas 27 percent of the electorate favoured unlimited entry for new Commonwealth workers in 1956, this figure had declined to 10 percent by 1964 and only 1 percent by 1968 (Waters, 1997, p. 234). The Cabinet discussed the need for greater awareness of the ‘increasing volume of immigration and of the social and economic problems to which it is likely to give rise’ (PRO CAB 128/29, CM. 14 (55), 4, 14 June 1955) and the how ‘control over coloured immigration will eventually become inescapable’ (PRO CAB 129/81 CP 125, 22 June 1956). The Cabinet also noted immigration within the context of the ‘acute’ housing shortage in both London and the Midlands (PRO CAB 129/77, CP 55 22 August 1955). The strongest language from within Cabinet came from the Lord Swinton, who as early as 1954 was supportive of restrictive legislation. He feared that ‘coloured immigration’ was a ‘threat to the fabric of British society’ (PRO CAB 124/91, 14 March 1954) and argued that ‘if we legislate on immigration, though we can draft it in non-discriminatory terms, we cannot conceal the obvious fact that the object is to keep out coloured people’ (PRO CAB 124/91 14 March 1954). However, in the 1950s the view of the Cabinet was that whilst immigration was a cause for concern, attitudes had not hardened to a point that necessitated restrictive measures (Miles, 1990, p. 284).

During the 1950s and early 1960s Powell was not at the vanguard of the political drive towards immigration controls. The most strident opposition to immigration was from Cyril Osborne, Norman Pannell, and Harold Gurden (Layton-Henry, 1984, pp. 30-43). For example, Osborne noted that coloured immigrants were a ‘problem’ because ‘they have altogether different standards of civilisation’ and ‘this is a white man’s country and I wish it to remain so’ (Speech to the House of Commons, 17 January 1961, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 634, 1960-61, col. 1933). Their language was reflective of the concerns across many Conservative local associations; concerns which escalated dramatically after the riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958 (Messina, 1989, p. 24). The rioting represented a ‘turning point’ (Dean, 1993, p. 64) that would culminate in the drawing up of the Commonwealth Immigration Bill which was passed in 1961 and brought controls for the first time through a system of employment vouchers. Macmillan would justify the legislative intervention by arguing that the ‘influx can hardly continue uncontrolled’ (Spencer, 1997, p 21). However, the expectation that some form of control was imminent, which existed for three years, appeared to stimulate an increase in numbers: 21,500 from the Commonwealth in 1959 to 58,300 in 1960, and 125,400 in 1961 (Hampshire, 2005, p. 25). Furthermore, as the Act allowed for dependents to enter, a

considerable increase in dependents was forthcoming post 1962 (Spencer, 1997, p. 133). By this time, Powell was Minister for Health, and his involvement in the recruitment of overseas doctors and nurses later led to accusations of hypocrisy (Shepherd, 1996, p. 222).

Although Powell stood by the 1962 Act at the 1964 General Election (but regretted that it was not introduced sooner) his election address indicated his growing concern about the issue. Here he stated that ‘to avoid the evils of the “colour question”... strict control must continue’. His comments generated minimal attention for two reasons. First, this was consistent with party policy; and second, Powell had stated ‘in my view [it] is essential for the sake not only for our own people, but of the immigrants themselves’ (POL 3/2/2/23, Powell constituency leaflet in the General Election of October 1964, Powell Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge). It is also significant to note that Powell played no direct role in the controversial campaign in the Smethwick constituency, where the Conservative candidate (Peter Griffiths) utilised overtly anti-immigrant rhetoric in his campaign against the Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon-Walker. The anti-immigration campaign culminated in the use of an election slogan of ‘if you want a nigger neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour’ (Hampshire, 2005, p. 33). Home attempted to distance the Conservatives leadership from it in the hope of avoiding it becoming a defining theme of the election campaign (PRO PREM 114891, Alec Douglas-Home to Patrick Gordon Walker, [Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary and Labour candidate for Smethwick], 27 September 1964). Despite these efforts Heath admitted that Griffiths had been a ‘severe embarrassment’ (Heath, 1998, p. 455). However, the success of the Griffiths campaign was interpreted as a ‘vindication’ of Osborne’s argument (Osborne, 1964).

Within the newly configured shadow Cabinet, Boyle and Macleod emerged as leading opponents of adopting a tougher line (CPA, LCC (65), 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> meeting, 1 and 2 February 1965). They argued that ‘the coloured labour force was a real asset, and also prevented wage spirals’. They were also concerned a tougher line might cause offence to their fellow liberal minded Conservative parliamentarians, but of greater significance was the risk of offending ‘the middle vote’ of the electorate, as well as ‘blowing any chance of picking up support from ethnic minorities’. As a consequence, the consensus view was that they should aim keep immigration out of party politics and sustain a bipartisan consensus. Significantly it was concluded that all members of the Shadow Cabinet should ‘make balanced and reasonable statements on the subject’ (CPA LCC (65) 29<sup>th</sup> meeting, 9 March 1965).

Internally Powell advocated that the voluntary repatriation of immigrants should be supported by government, and argued that the same rules should apply to Commonwealth citizens – i.e. they should be treated on an alien basis (see Powell speech in Wolverhampton, 21

May 1965, Powell Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge (POL 4/1/1) and Powell speech at Birmingham, 20 November 1965, Powell Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge (POL 4/1/2), and also CPA CRD 3/16/1 Immigration Policy Group Meeting, 30 April 1965). This argument tied into Powell's belief that the Commonwealth was a 'sham' and represented as 'a meaningless confederation in which countries exhibited no allegiance to each other and over which Britain lacked any actual authority' (Whipple, 2009, p. 721). However, the real problem was that Conservative thinking on immigration in the period between 1965 and 1968 was open to interpretation. Powell took a view that a statement made by then party leader, Home, spelt out the need for enforced repatriation for illegal immigrants and assisting voluntary repatriation, both of which ran parallel to the overall objective of reducing the average level of immigration (Letter from Alec Douglas-Home to Enoch Powell, 28 January 1965, Powell Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge, POL 1/1/14). The position that Powell was adhering to was broadly reaffirmed by Heath, who (in September 1967) talked about 'tight control on entry' and 'voluntary repatriation', but alongside an emphasis on 'equal treatment for all' and 'more support for local authorities facing pressures arising from immigration' (Conservative Central Office News Service Press Release, 29 September 1967, Bodleian Library, Oxford, CPA, PPB 16). However, that difference in emphasis and tone rather than policy detail was critical. That Heath and the rest of the shadow Cabinet seemed sceptical about the emphasis and tone that Powell adopted was one of a series of triggers that would intensify his concerns about immigration. By 1967 Powell was warning the shadow Cabinet about such concerns, notably within his own Wolverhampton constituency, and his fear that there may be a 'wave of emotion' on the issue (CPA LCC minutes 24 April 1967).

Indeed, Powell was influenced by developments within his own constituency because of the growth of immigrant children within schools (Reeves, 1989, pp. 61-79). However, it was the debate 'about the rights of Sikh bus drivers' [2] that prompted him to make 'his first public accusations of communalism' (Brooke, 2007, p. 680). Furthermore, his increasingly doom laden mentality and his sense of foreboding was influenced by the racially motivated violence in the United States (Roth, 1970, p. 341). This served to reinforce his belief that the 'integration of races of totally disparate origins and culture is one of the great myths of our time' (Shepherd, 1996, p. 338). The rapid influx of Kenyan Asians confirmed his view of the inadequacy of the 1962 Immigration Act (Schofield, 2015), and the decision of the Labour government to advocate further anti-discriminatory legislation by extending their 1965 Race Relations Act (see Dean, 2000), added fuel to Powell's concerns. However, Powell was also concerned about the changing nature of Britain's international role. The emergence of the Cold War between the United States

and the Soviet Union, the increasing importance of the United Nations, and the moves towards a more integrated Europe represented a significant sea-change from the days of British imperialism. Indeed, as Brooke (2007) notes “it was his rejection of empire and its colonial subjects that racialized his vigorous nationalism” (Brooke, 2007, p. 670). Powell was moving towards defending a somewhat romanticised view of national identity predicated upon British imperial exceptionalism. Powell argued that “the virtues which [Britain] has lost and which need to be restored to must have been present in an earlier age” (Powell, 1964: 260). Powell’s sense of identity revolved around their restoration, regardless of their essentially romantic nature. Furthermore Brooke (2007) argues he saw a future for the Empire: “his ideas on the nature of nations and democracy had been established whilst imagining the future of the empire, not its end” (Brooke, 2007, p. 675). Moreover as Paul (1997) noted Powell articulated a newer, more primordial form of British identity that was insular, and was predicated upon racial othering (Paul, 1997, p. 178-9). Thus ‘Rivers of Blood’ would constitute an attempt to articulate a defence of a particular kind of Britishness at a time of increasing racial tensions within the context of imperial decline. Indeed, “For Powell, reconciling himself to the end of empire involved a return to Englishness as the essential core of Britishness” (Whipple, 2009, p. 722; see also Wootten, 2000).

However, whilst these are valid drivers as to why Powell delivered his contentious speech, they also need to recognise that Powell was an ambitious and anxious politician, who was frustrated with Heath’s managerial approach to politics and consequently he felt little sense of loyalty to him (Heffer, 1998, p. 386-448). A few months before delivering his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech his position was revealed by the following comment: ‘I deliberately include at least one startling assertion in every speech in order to attract enough attention to give me a power base within the Conservative party’, so that “Ted Heath can never sack me from the shadow Cabinet’ (Shepherd, 1996, p. 343). However, his propensity to go off message across a wide range of issues beyond his portfolio irritated his shadow Cabinet colleagues (Heath, 1998, p. 291). Indeed, Powell was central to shadow Cabinet infighting over incomes policy (see CPA LCC (65) 42<sup>nd</sup> meeting, 13 April 1965; and again CPA (68) 22<sup>nd</sup> meeting and 24<sup>th</sup> meeting, 7 and 13 March); over capital gains tax (see CPA LCC (65) 34<sup>th</sup> meeting, 23 March 1965), and the extent to which shadow Cabinet members should have freedom or sign up to greater coordination in the presentation of policy (CPA LCC (64) 7<sup>th</sup> meeting, 2 December 1964).

As a consequence, even sympathisers such as Cosgrave admit that in ‘no ordinary sense of the word, could Powell be called a good colleague’ (Cosgrave, 1989, p. 228). By early 1968 Macleod was so frustrated by Powell that he wrote to Heath to say: ‘I am afraid I am getting very

fed up with Enoch...this is about the fourth time he had pre-empted a shadow Cabinet decision and taken a line which is going to be extremely embarrassing' (Heath Papers 1/1/15, Macleod to Heath, 12 February 1968). This was a reaction to a speech that Powell delivered in Walsall at a Conservative dinner (9 February 1968), in which Powell questioned the credibility of both the government and the opposition in terms of controlling immigration. Powell noted that: 'if we continue to admit by voucher about 8,000 adult male immigrants a year with an unrestricted right of entry for dependents, the present inflow, which represents an additional million taken in every twenty years, or another two millions by the turn of the century, will be easily maintained.' (Powell, 1968b).

The immediate concern for Heath was how to respond to Labour's Race Relations legislation. After all, as Whitelaw admitted: 'the Tory party is so emotional now about anything to do with race' (Swinton Papers, 7/17, Whitelaw to Earl Swinton 15 April 1968, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge). The shadow Cabinet adopted the following position based on 'limitation of immigration into Britain; equal treatment for everyone in the country once they were here; and financial help for those who wished to return to their countries of origin' (CPA LCC minutes (68) 23<sup>rd</sup> meeting, 10 April 1968). In accordance with this position they then decided to accept the *principle* of the legislation but sought to *oppose* on the grounds that it could not be effectively implemented. (CPA LCC minutes (68), 23<sup>rd</sup> meeting, 10 April 1968). This position irritated Edward Boyle who argued that they should back the legislation, because to do otherwise would allow Labour to portray them as a racist party (Ziegler, 2010, p. 206). Whitelaw was 'pleased' that Powell had 'committed himself to the compromise' reached (Whitelaw, 1991, p. 81), even if during the meeting he sat with a 'face like a sphinx, remaining silent throughout' (Hailsham, 1990, p. 370). The Walsall speech indicated that Powell may not be able to continue to adhere to the principle of collective responsibility in public.

### **'Rivers of Blood': Analysing the Rhetoric and Oratory**

A recent article by Richard Toye identified how political historians have neglected 'explicitly conceived rhetorical analysis' as a method of examining and interpreting post war British politics (see Toye, 2011, p. 177). Toye has done much to address this shortfall himself (Toye, 2013a, 2013b). He argues that rhetorically based evaluations of political elite behaviour tended to be 'rather narrowly focused work from within the discipline of linguistics', such as the work of Charteris-Black (2005) (see also Beard, 1999; Chilton, 2004 and Olmstead, 2006). However, such an interpretation overlooks the growing body of academic literature on political speeches

(Lawrence, 2008; 2009) and the significance of political oratory to the construction of political personas and reputations (Gaffney, 1991; Gaffney and Lahel, 2013). There is also a significant growth within the political science literature about rhetorical political analysis, which concentrates on examining the arguments made in political speeches and the methods for justifying the positions that political elites advance (Finlayson, 2004, 2007; Finlayson and Martin, 2008; see also Crines and Hayton, 2014; Hayton and Crines, 2015).

Rhetorical analyses enable political historians to re-examine speeches to ascertain how they were constructed and delivered. How significant was the *ethos* of the speaker – i.e. to what extent did the argument made gain traction due to the credibility and authority of the speaker, as derived from their political reputation or persona? How significant was *pathos* to the arguments made – i.e. to what extent was the argument crafted around drawing an emotional connection and response between the speaker and the intended audience? How much was the argument informed by the use of factual evidence and reason – i.e. appeal based on *logos*. These appeals to reason, the ability of the orator to validate their case, (via the use of quantifiable data) can be buttressed by their credibility as an elite, and/or the emotional reaction that they may be able to generate (Crines, 2013, p. 210). Furthermore, is the oratorical style *deliberative* (i.e. considered); is it *judicial* (i.e. forensic) or is it an *epideictic* approach (i.e. one based on drama and performance) (Olmstead, 2006, p. 16). These approaches are interdependent. For example ‘the passions of the audience can become energised by an orator’s style of delivery, to mould them into finding their argument passionately convincing’ (Crines, 2013, p. 210).

How should the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech be assessed against these rhetorical classifications? Most accounts of Powell make reference to the distinctiveness of his political persona. Campbell made reference to the ‘hypnotic oddity of his personality’ (Campbell, 1993, p. 244), which meant that to neutrals he could ‘fascinate’; to supporters he could ‘excite’ and to opponents he could ‘horrify’ (Lindsay and Harrington, 1974, p. 258). This sense of ‘magnetism’ meant that he could not be ignored (Cosgrave, 1989, p. 299). As Maclean noted, he could carry an audience due to his personality:

The name; his unmistakable accent, which seemed to move from the Birmingham of his birth to the Black Country of his constituency; and his equally distinctive piercing blue eyes, formal clothes and black hat, made an unforgettable combination. The inimitable accent added further force to his doom-laden speeches (McLean, 2001, p. 128).

His *ethos* was extensive because he was an ‘an intellectual par excellence’ (Fry, 1998, p. 139). It was also recognised that he was an ‘effective and frequently brilliant Commons debater’ (Lindsay and Harrington, 1974, p. 254) and a ‘gifted parliamentary orator’ (Norton, 1978, p. 252). However, although his intellectualism gave his arguments credibility to political journalists, the intensity of his views made for an inflexibility of mind in the eyes of fellow Tories (Boyd-Carpenter, 1980, p. 140). Nonetheless, Powell did offer credibility and he sought to affirm that credibility in his opening line - ‘the supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils’ (Powell, 1968a) – thus making his claim as a statesman to validate his *ethos*.

Thus he hoped that his intellectual reputation would add weight to the *logos* of the arguments he advanced. As a speech, ‘Rivers of Blood’ used a variety of rhetorical devices to help Powell connect with his audience using *pathos*. Flowing from his emotive style was *logos* which enhanced the *ethos* of his argument. Indeed, as Hugo Young noted in 1967, the ‘audiences are mesmerised by the crisp beauty of his logic’ and that he was a ‘mythical figure who got away with peddling nonsense because it was delivered with the unfamiliar tongue of the scholar and the logician, so people thought it must be true’ (Young, 1967). In this context it is important to note that ‘Rivers of Blood’ was different to the traditional Powell speech. He usually relied on *logos* – as Heffer notes he mostly made ‘vigorously theoretical speeches’, which ‘however much he illustrated them using examples of socialist folly, often defeated his audiences’ (Heffer, 1998, p. 450). Thus it could be argued that Powell normally embraced a rationalist rather than an empirical approach to problem solving, which meant that ‘*pathos* was not his natural style’ (Norton, 2015, forthcoming).

Whereas such an approach meant he often failed to connect with his audience (i.e. he failed in terms of *pathos*), ‘Rivers of Blood’ was different because he sought to ‘exploit the anguish’ of his constituents as ‘evidence’ and ‘rhetorical witnesses’, giving the speech ‘a drama and momentum lacking from some of his other more academic exercises...He said what he said in terms that would be universally comprehensible’ (Heffer, 1998, p. 450). ‘Rivers of Blood’ was an alternative type of speech, with it offering ‘suggestive invocation’, rather than his traditional ‘rigorous analysis’ (Norton, 2015, forthcoming).

The reasoning underpinning his argument – his *logos* – was that first, assimilation and integration were not possible [3]; second, that this lack of assimilation and integration will lead to violence; third, that the real victims of attempts to assimilate and integrate are actually the indigenous ethnic group; fourth, that they were never consulted with regard to immigration; and finally, that the answer to these problems must be a reduction in immigrant numbers (Bourne, 2008, pp. 85-6). Powell is at pains to inform his audience that the necessity of stemming further

immigration and promoting means of re-emigration are ‘part of the official policy of the Conservative Party’, although critics would claim that this was ‘disingenuous’ (Heffer, 1998, p. 459). His rhetorical method for connecting with his audience was to use statistical references on projected immigrant numbers to evoke fear, and to use anecdotes from his constituents to justify his need to speak out, thereby courting controversy.

Powell’s recourse to statistical references to imbue his speech with logical justification reflected a rhetorical technique known as *testimonia*, which entails utilising the expertise of others. However, although his statistical references were about projected numbers [4] and thus open to question, he presented them with such authority that those sympathetic to his prejudices would be persuaded regardless. He argued that by 2000 there would be ‘five to seven million’ which would equate to ‘one-tenth of the whole population’ [5], who would be made up of ‘Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants’ (Powell, 1968a). Powell extrapolated this figure on the basis of that given by Julian Snow, Parliamentary Secretary of State at the Ministry of Health and provided by the Registrar General’s Office. They had calculated that if immigration continued at its present rate, and if the immigrant birth rate remained static, then the Commonwealth immigrant and descendant immigrant population would be 3.5 million by 1985, and from this Powell extrapolated that by 2000 it would be in the ‘region of 5 to 7 million’ (Powell, 1968a).

However, these figures were contested. A counter argument was made that the rate of immigration would be reducing after 1968. Consequently, the Home Office Minister, David Ennals argued that by 1985 the figure would be closer to 2.5 million (Speech to the House of Commons, 15 November 1967, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 754, 1967-68, col. 516-570). The fact that the Conservative Party Campaign Guide of 1970 (p. 473) stated that the estimated immigrant population would be 2.8 million demonstrates that Utley was justified when writing in 1968 that ‘the truth is that those who dabble in this kind of prediction are dabbling with the completely imponderable’ (Utley, 1968, p. 181).

To his supporters these projections were facts but to his detractors they were flawed and misleading. Such an accusation was also made by Powell’s use of anecdotes. This is one of the most intriguing aspects of the speech in terms of developments in political communication, as Powell tapped into the feelings of his constituents and his responsibility to represent their views, as prior to the 1990s the use of anecdotes was limited in British political speech. (For a fuller account on the use and value of anecdotes in British political speech Atkins and Finlayson 2013). The use of anecdotes to illustrate his representative role was a rhetorical technique known as *prosopopoeia*, in which the audience emotionally connects with the argument of the orator through

the real life stories being told to them (Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 12). Powell sought to legitimate his argument by citing constituent concerns about immigration, and within this the metaphor of the decaying and threatened working class was strategically woven into his anecdotally based speech, constituting a quarter of it (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 121). The benefit of this technique was that the exploitation of *their* personal experiences (the ‘typical story’) could provide an authenticity for his arguments (Brown, 1999, pp. 29-30; 40-1) and the use of highly personalised anecdotes created a ‘human interest’ angle which Powell would ensure had a high response by the print media. Indeed, their coverage was dominated by the ‘stories’ presented to Powell by his constituents (Seymour-Ire, 1974, pp. 120-1).

Rhetorically the use of anecdotes underpinned his *pathos*, and with the assistance of his emphasis on numbers and the anecdotes presented as facts, these constructed his *logos*. As Reginald Eyre, a neighbouring Conservative MP noted, the tumultuous impact of the speech was because the public ‘knew that a major politician was giving voice to their long held views’ (Roth, 1970, p. 350); a view given credence by academic evaluations of opinion polling data, showing that Powell was ‘articulating the feelings of the public’ (Studlar, 1974, p. 381). Thus here Powell is utilising the rhetorical technique of *utilitas* – the identification of shared objectives or concerns within a community which feel bound together and to him. Here Powell is ‘speaking up for the oppressed white population, the indigenous English’ (Brown, 1999, p. 37), as he argues that his representative role is to vocalise the concerns of his constituents, those ‘decent ordinary fellow Englishmen’ (Powell, 1968a). Whipple notes that because ‘many working class Britons saw immigration as *their* problem and accordingly saw Powell as their hero’ as he ‘was not speaking for all “whites” so much as for those to whom no one bothered to listen’ [6] (Whipple, 2009, p. 729). Establishing *pathos* via ‘anecdotal evidence presented as fact’ (Brooke, 2007, p. 678) was thus intertwined with his rhetorical claim to *logos*. The letters embraced three themes that would come to dominate anti-immigration rhetoric over the following decades: first, competition for resources; second, fear of crime; and third, symbols of identify and race (McLaren and Johnson, 2007). To emphasise the first he noted that the white population have ‘found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places’, whilst at work they find ‘their employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker’ (Powell, 1968a). Powell was thus identifying and articulating their ‘litany of resentments’ (Shepherd, 1996, p. 348) at the expense of the ‘alien’ or ‘stranger’ whose behaviour is characterised by ‘metaphors of the underclass – i.e. loudness, rudeness, aggressiveness and disorder’ (Brown, 1999, p. 46).

The potency of his anecdotes flowed from exploiting the image of a defenceless, white female old age pensioner who was living in fear (Whipple, 2009, p 730). She used to live in a ‘respectable street’ until the ‘immigrants moved in’, and once one ‘house was sold to a negro’ the ‘white tenants moved out’ (Powell, 1968a). She now fears that she will be ‘attacked but for the chain on her door’, but now:

She is becoming afraid to go out. Windows are broken. She finds excreta pushed through her letter box. When she goes to the shops, she is followed by children, charming, wide grinning piccaninnies [7]. They cannot speak English, but one word they know. ‘Racialist’, they chant. When the new Race Relations Bill is passed, this woman is convinced she will go to prison. And is she so wrong? I begin to wonder (Powell, 1968a).

Powell identified how these were the concerns of his constituents, and the fear was that ‘in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man’ (Powell, 1968a). Powell utilised the classic rhetorical technique of *erotema*— the rhetorical question, and asks his audience both in the room and beyond:

I can already hear the *chorus of execration*. How dare I say such a horrible thing? How dare I stir up trouble and inflame feelings by repeating such a conversation? The answer is that I do not have the right not to do so. Here is a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman, who in broad daylight in my own town says to me, his Member of Parliament that his country will not be worth living in for his children. I simply do not have the right to shrug my shoulders and think about something else (Powell, 1968a).

This rhetorical question is early on in his speech with the remainder providing an illustration of the deployment of *anthyphona* – answering the rhetorical question. Other rhetorical questions follow – for example Powell asks his audience the ‘simple and rational’ question of how can the issue of immigration be addressed by answering his own question immediately: ‘by stopping, or virtually stopping, further inflow, and by promoting the maximum outflow’ (Powell, 1968a).

Underpinning his speech were specific attitudes towards identity. Powell was utilising his constituents experiences to articulate his fear that in due course large proportions of the population, especially those located within inner cities, ‘would be made up of black immigrants and their descendants’ (Solomos, 1991, p. 23). The sheer numbers, according to Powell,

constituted a ‘threat’ to ‘national character’ and that British society ‘was likely to be undermined by the presence of migrants from a different cultural, racial and religious background’, as the ‘black population could not be integrated into British society’ (Powell, 1968a). Thus Powell presents himself as the protector of the ordinary English and the guardian of national heritage and institutions (Behrens and Edmonds, 1981, pp. 342-8). As their guardian Powell was thereby positioned to identify the ‘race suicide’ argument that the British must be ‘mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents’, before seeking to mobilise support via *metaphor* and *pathos* by arguing that by doing so the country is ‘busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre’ (Powell, 1968a).

Here Powell appears to imply risk and potential sacrifice for himself, as he justifies his right and duty to speak out. This was encapsulated by his closing retort that: ‘All I know is that to see, and not to speak, would be the great betrayal’ (Powell, 1968a). Built into the speech was a pre-emptive defence with regard to the consequences of speaking out when he declared that ‘people are disposed to mistake predicting troubles for causing troubles’ (Powell, 1968a). However, in the aftermath Powell became tetchy about the accusations that his speech was a trigger towards racially motivated violence. He sought to deny the emotional connection (*pathos*) that had underpinned his speech when he was interviewed by David Frost. Here he argued that ‘I’m not going to be put in the absurd position of dissociating myself from people with whom you know perfectly well I am in no way associated’ (Smithies and Fiddick, 1969, p. 111).

However, the claim that it he did not have the right to not pass on the views of his constituents, even if they appeared racially motivated, seems opportunistic. This was because over the previous decade, unlike some other Conservatives ‘he had been exercising that right vigorously’ (McLean, 2001, p. 136). His claim is that he is willing to speak terrible truths because the bipartisan consensus on immigration has failed. His duty is to build a county that ‘is worth living’ in for the ‘children’ of his constituents. This is tied into the threatening plans to emigrate from amongst his constituents who have written to him. In constructing his response to such threats, Powell turns against the trajectory of thinking on race relations via the rhetorical use of *antithesis* – i.e. arguing the diametric opposite of their thinking. Powell’s *antithesis* rhetorical strategy, however, questions not just government thinking, but that of his own party. He cites how Heath wants no ‘first class citizens’ and ‘second class citizens’ before countering that:

this does not mean that the immigrant and his descendent should be elevated into a privileged or special class or that the citizen should be denied his right to discriminate in the management of his own affairs between one fellow-citizen and another or that he

should be subjected to imposition as to his reasons and motive for behaving in one lawful manner rather than another (Powell, 1968a).

Powell then critiques those who call for legislation ‘against discrimination’, and reinforces his *pathos*, by tapping into known anxieties (Whipple, 2009, p. 730) about the proposed anti-discriminatory legislation:

They have got it exactly and diametrically wrong. The discrimination and the deprivation, the sense of alarm and of resentment lies not with the immigrant population but with those among whom they have come and are still coming. This is why to enact legislation of the kind before parliament at this moment is to risk throwing a match on to gunpowder (Powell, 1968a).

Underpinning this is an *antithesis* argument that critiques Wilson and Heath through the rhetorical use of *metaphor* and *hyperbole*. Critiques of establishment thinking permeated the speech, as Powell implied that those who disagreed with him were the ‘ignorant’ and ‘ill-informed’. Of Wilson’s advocacy of non-discriminatory legislation, and the fear that Heath was abstaining on tactical grounds whilst supporting the principle, Powell concluded: ‘the kindest thing that can be said about those who propose and support it is that they know not what they do’ (Powell, 1968a).

Arguing that antithesis is a key rhetorical tool for Powell can be justified further by quantitative insights. When the content of the speech is considered by NVivo, a computer software programme that identifies and contextualises familiar words and phrases from text, the inherent negativity of ‘Rivers of Blood’ is exposed. There is a repeated emphasis, in pejorative terms, about immigrants and negroes (30 references within the speech) and the associated negative consequences (dangerous mentioned 5 times; evil 4 times) for citizens (10 references) and children (5 references) for the ‘future’ (4 references) caused by population growth (12 references) and the dilution of British identity (20 references). To emphasise the implausibility of ‘integration’ (5 references) the liberal advocates of the ‘discriminatory’ legislation being proposed (4 references) are derided as ‘mad’ and ‘misconceived’ (5 references).

In advancing his ‘populist patriotism’ Powell questions the trustworthiness of Wilson and Heath whilst aligning himself with the endogenous whites, whom he defines as victims of a traitorous state (Schofield, 2013, p. 20). In doing so, Powell behaves in a way that one might associate with a fringe anti-establishment party (AEP), rather than that of a frontbench mainstream party figure. Contemporary AEP’s in British politics, such as UKIP, construct their

rhetoric around a specific issue. They then imply that the mainstream parties are part of a monolithic establishment, which is ‘systematically’ ignoring the issue, or neutralising it from contemporary politics by creating a consensus around the issue (Canovan, 1999, p. 2 – for a wider discussion on AEPs, see Abedi and Lundberg, 2009). Powell acts like an anti-establishment figure, who is ‘voicing popular grievances’ and thus he is the ‘true democrat’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 2). Powell was thereby assuming that his *ethos* and *logos*-based arguments, interconnected through *pathos*, would resonate more than the counter arguments offered by either Wilson or Heath. To ensure this, Powell had delivered ‘Rivers of Blood’ in a dramatic performance style – it was essentially an epideictic speech in terms of its oratorical delivery, designed as political theatre to magnify its impact.

### **‘Rivers of Blood’: Identifying the Impact for the Conservatives and Heath**

The reaction within the Conservative leadership to Powell delivering his speech contravening their agreed compromise was swift. Campbell notes that it was Powell’s ‘apocalyptic language’ rather than its ‘specific’ content that appeared to most upset his colleagues (Campbell, 1993, p. 243). Whitelaw was ‘outraged’ (Whitelaw, 1991 p. 81), just as he had been over Rhodesian Oil Sanctions in 1965 (Stuart, 2002). He was left with a parliamentary party that was ‘desperately split’ (Whitelaw, 1991, p. 82). Macleod, Boyle and Robert Carr, all informed Whitelaw that they would resign if Powell was not dismissed (Shepherd, 1994, p. 500). Also compromised was the shadow Home Secretary, Hogg, given that the speech had encroached onto his home affairs portfolio without his prior warning nor his consent. If Powell was not dismissed he would also resign (Hailsham, 1990, pp. 370-1). Heath shared their view irrespective of their threatened resignations. He was ‘furious’ with Powell for his open defiance of his authority as party leader and the agreed shadow Cabinet position (Heffer, 1998, p. 456). Moreover, he thought it was abhorrent to try to whip up anti-immigrant sentiment for short term partisan advantage (Hurd, 1979, p. 50). When Thatcher urged Heath to delay making a decision, Heath snapped back ‘he absolutely must go’ (Thatcher, 1995, pp. 146-7). Heath dismissed Powell on the grounds that his speech was ‘racialist in tone and liable to exacerbate racial tensions’ before making it clear that not only had Powell ‘made an evil speech’ but it ‘had to be repudiated and he had to be repudiated with it’ (CPA, Party Political Broadcasts and Speeches 16, Conservative Central Office News Service press release, 21 April 1968, 1: Bodleian Library, Oxford).

Powell responded with a letter to Heath published in *The Times* complaining about Heath’s attempt to ‘stigmatise my speech at Birmingham as “racialist” when you must surely

realise that it was nothing of the kind' (*The Times*, 23 April 1968) [8]. In the aftermath of the speech Powell became simultaneously one of the most popular and most loathed political figures in post-war British history (Schofield, 2013, p. 1). To those within the electorate who sympathised with his argument the impact of his dismissal 'elevated' him from the 'status of champion to martyr' (Whipple, 2009, p. 718) East-end dockers and meat porters marched to Westminster holding placards saying 'Don't Knock Enoch'. His office received over 23,000 letters on the Tuesday after his speech; the next day a further 50,000 arrived, and inside the next ten days an additional 100,000 letters were posted, with only a small number being unsupportive (Shepherd, 1996, p. 353). Opinion polls suggested that 74 percent of respondents agreed with Powell; 69 percent disapproved of his dismissal (Schoen, 1977, p. 37).

Conservative members were deeply critical of Heath for dismissing Powell. Many noted the inconsistency of dismissing Powell for his speech, but not dismissing Boyle who subsequently voted with Labour on their legislation (Ramsden, 1996, p. 294). Of the 2,756 letters that came into the office of the Leader of the Opposition only 12 (0.4 percent) were critical of Powell (Prior, 1986, p. 52). One of them was from neighbouring parliamentarian, Jill Knight, who wrote that he hoped 'most earnestly that opposition from our own "left wing" will not cause the party to weaken' (Letter from Jill Knight to Heath, 21 April 1968, Heath Papers 1/ 6/ 9). The strongest support from within the parliamentary Conservative Party came from Monday Club members, a grouping that aimed to provide organisational coherence for the Right across a range of issues – Rhodesia, capital punishment, the Common Market, and the permissive society. They backed Powell (even though he was not formally a member) because anti-immigration was a central feature of their agenda (Stuart, 2002, p. 54), and because the Monday Club was effectively the 'self-appointed praetorian guard of Powell and the Powellite interest' (Heffer, 1998, p. 573). John Biggs-Davison wrote that 'his speech will have done a great deal of good if it ends an era of sloppy consensus' (Monday Group Newsletter 46, June 1968, p. 3). Even before his speech they had stated that 'drastic and immediate action' was needed to stop the 'influx of coloured peoples' (Monday Club Newsletter, 44, March 1968: p. 4), and thereafter they reasserted that there was a clear choice between, what George Pole, wrote was 'consensus politics' and 'preserving the British way of life' (George Pole, in the Monday Club Newsletter 'Statement of Priorities' 69, June 1970: p. 6). Patrick Wall was fulsome in his praise of Powell when comparing the Wilson/Heath bipartisan consensus: 'are our leaders so obsessed with multiracialism and do-goodism that they have forgotten that Britain's electorate have pride in their country'; to them Powell represented a 'leader with a genuine programme for a return to

patriotism and self-discipline [which] could sweep the nation'. (Monday Club Newsletter, 45, April 1968, p. 3).

Brooke argues that by raising the saliency of immigration amongst the electorate Powell forced Heath to shift to the right 'in the hope of accommodating the popular feeling that Powell unleashed' (Brooke, 2007, p. 670). Post April 1968 Heath would engage in a process of 'catch-up' with a series of speeches on immigration (Hurd, 2003, p. 183). However, the rationale for incrementally moving towards a tougher line was clear: it was not to capitalise on the anti-immigration feeling that Powell had tapped into, but to 'prevent it getting out of hand' (CPA, LCC minutes, (68), 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> meetings, 15 April and 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1968). Therefore, the language was moderate and measured. For example, his speech in York in September emphasised that 'our main purpose must be to maintain racial harmony. More and more will this become necessary as children of immigrants born British citizens receive their education in British schools and seek to take their rightful place in every walk of British life' (Heath 'Immigration and Racial Harmony' Public Meeting, York, 30 September 1968, Conservative Central Office News Service press release, Bodleian Library, Oxford, CPA, Party Political Broadcasts and Speeches, 17).

Although Heath was more moderate and measured in his approach than Powell, Conservative strategists remained concerned about his poor personal polling and his limitations as an orator (Lindsay and Harrington, 1974, p. 254). The content of his speeches were 'cautious' and the delivery 'laboured' (Ziegler, 2010, p. 163). In contrast, the ostracised Powell was securing popularity ratings that Heath could only dream of and was acknowledged as by far and away the most powerful public speaker in politics' (Cosgrave, 1989, p. 282). Powell's ability to tap into so much latent anti-immigration feeling (particular amongst the working class) leads to the question as to whether there was an electoral impact or Powell effect in the 1970 General Election (Whipple, 2009). An impact seems evident, even if there is disagreement about the scale of that impact. It has been argued that the Conservatives benefitted from being seen as tougher than Labour on immigration, and that their lead on this issue was equivalent to a swing from Labour to Conservative of 1.3 percent from the 1966 General Election, according to Studlar (1978), or 1.5 percent according to Miller (1980) (see also Deakin and Bourne, 1970 and Studlar, 1974).

'Rivers of Blood' also had a long term impact. Specifically it was a speech that made it more difficult for politicians to debate immigration without becoming entangled with race. Indeed, the Conservative Party has remained sensitive to the danger of being perceived as having Powellite attitudes to immigration and thereby race. This was evident nearly a decade later when Margaret Thatcher acknowledged that people feared that they were 'swamped by people of a

different culture' (Thatcher, 1978). Thatcher's remarks were condemned by Labour and caused disquiet within her own party, but nevertheless she justified them by saying 'we are not in politics to ignore people's worries' (Thatcher, 1978). However, to Powell's disappointment, the furore her comments provoked led her to be considerably more careful in her public comments on immigration thereafter (Campbell, 2000, pp. 399-400). It was evident again in October 2001, when the then Conservative Party leader, Iain Duncan Smith ordered three Conservative Party members to quit the Powellite sympathising right wing Monday Club, arguing that 'I will have no truck with racism in the Conservative Party' (White, 2001). Conservative fears of Powellite association were also evident when they sacked Nigel Hastlow, the prospective parliamentary candidate for Halesowen and Rowley Regis, for writing an article in the Wolverhampton paper *The Express and Star* that stated, 'When you ask most people in the Black Country what the single biggest problem facing the country is, most say immigration. Many insist: "Enoch Powell was right"' (Evans, 2008, pp. 304-5).

## Conclusion

Powell redefined the rhetoric that would shape political discourse over immigration, and thus race (Solomos, 1991, p. 23). In the short term 'Rivers of Blood' gave 'a fillip to popular racism that made the lives of black people hell' (Sivanandan, 1998, p. 60). Powell had brought 'reason to white working class fears and prejudices' and through his 'messianic oratory' he extended his appeal beyond the working class, by taking the 'shame out of middle class racism, and the genteel racism of the haute bourgeoisie' (Sivanandan, 1998, p. 60). As Mercer notes, Powell gave momentum to a new form of racism based on:

English cultural identity [and] not in the illegitimate language of biologizing racism, but through literary and rhetorical moves that enabled the dissemination of its discourse across the political spectrum, to the point where it became legitimised by being gradually instituted in commonsense and in state policies (Mercer, 2004, p. 304).

Conservatives with sympathies for Powell's position have attempted to argue that 'the message was right, but the medium was wrong' (Bourne, 2008, p. 82). However, by analysing the rhetoric (what was said and how it was constructed) with the oratory (how it was delivered) demonstrates the two – the message and the medium – are interconnected.

It was the *way* Powell talked, the metaphors that he chose, the cadences and the rhythms, the apocryphal stories from constituents, the references to personal responsibility, the quotations, the appeals to buried feelings of folklorishness that made his speech so momentous and resonant. (Bourne, 2008, p. 83)

Thus it was not just what was said, but how it was said, and by who. Ultimately, considering ‘Rivers of Blood’ via rhetorical political analysis demonstrates that it was one of the most incendiary speeches in post war British politics due to three reasons. First, the rhetorical *ethos*, both politically and intellectually, that Powell possessed. Second, Powell’s appeals to *ethos* constructed an emotional connection between himself and his audience, primarily through the exploitation of personalised anecdotes that legitimized anti-immigration prejudices around scarcity of resources, fears about crime and the dilution of national identity. Third, Powell buttressed his *pathos* by the use of projected numbers of immigrants and their descendants. Flowing from this Powell’s *logos* and scholarly *ethos* persuaded the audience that these were an accurate representation of projected immigration amongst a significant proportion of the electorate. The cumulative effect was a refashioned and populist anti-immigration narrative which would resonate beyond the immediate moment of delivery.

However, Powell should be viewed not just for the evocative and inflammatory language of ‘Rivers of Blood’, but as a detached figure within the anti-immigration right in the era of Conservative governance – i.e. the roots of him detonating his infamous anti-immigration rhetoric stemmed from being not just in opposition, but because he was being marginalised within the shadow Cabinet, and the cause of Powellism had stalled. But what makes the speech intriguing is Powell’s tortured positioning over immigration over the previous decade. As a minister he was reluctant to express his views about controls, even if they were expressed within government, and few public pronouncements to this effect were forthcoming (McLean, 2001, p. 136). As public sentiment turned more hostile to the expanding immigrant numbers, Powell appears to have attempted through provocative rhetoric to associate himself to the anti-immigrant cause for populist reasons. That this alignment occurred when public opinion was becoming more anti-immigration, and when he was becoming more marginalised within Conservative politics, provides the charge of opportunism.

11,662 words

**Notes:**

[1] There are a raft of biographies on Powell (see for example, Foot, 1969; Smithies and Fiddick, 1969; Stacey, 1970, Roth, 1970, Cosgrave, 1989; Shepherd, 1996, Heffer, 1998; Schofield, 2013).

[2]. The Sikh bus drivers' strike was prompted by the sacking of a driver who violated a rule prohibiting the wearing of beards. As a consequence a major outpouring of support took place in Wolverhampton which was supported by over 5,000 Sikhs (Brooke, 2007, p. 681). This became a lengthy campaign for a change to the rules which would enable Sikhs to wear beards in line with their cultural heritage. However it attracted Powell's attention, who argued 'To claim special communal rights (or should one say rites?) leads to a dangerous fragmentation within society. This communalism is a canker; whether practised by one colour or another it is to be strongly condemned' (Powell, 1968a). Powell's use of the strike to illustrate a broader argument over immigration and integration serves to highlight his conception of a monopolistic understanding of British citizenship.

[3] In the 1950s Powell believed that once immigrants entered the country they should be integrated. By the late 1950s he started to argue that integration was dependent upon the numbers entering and thus the need for restrictive controls. After 1965 he decided to stop referring to the feasibility and necessity of integration. See letter from Powell to the Bishop of Lichfield, 26 February 1965, Powell Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge (POL 1/1/11)

[4] Powell did make reference to projected numbers in earlier speeches during the opposition era. In 1966 he suggesting immigrants and their descendents would constitute 5 percent of the population by 2000 in a speech in Wolverhampton, 25 March 1966, Powell Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge (POL 4/1/12).

[5] The 2001 census showed that the actual figures for non-white and mixed groups was 8.1 percent and 4.62 million, so the actual figure was below Powell's lowest estimate, see *National Statistics, Census 2001: Key Statistics for Local Authorities in England and Wales* (London: The Stationery Office 2003).

[6] However, those sympathising with Powell on immigration may not have been aware of his eclectic positions. For example, the predominantly pro-capital punishment electorate would not

have shared Powell's opposition to the death penalty, nor would they have expected that Powell would be sympathetic towards homosexual law reform, see Fry, 1998, pp. 139-47.

[7] Of this claim Mclean notes that: 'one might also point out that 'piccaninnies' in Wolverhampton, by whom Powell, or his correspondent, presumably meant Afro-Caribbean rather than Asian children would have either been born there or have migrated from English-speaking colonies in the Caribbean. Therefore it cannot be true that Wolverhampton piccaninnies did not speak English', McLean, 2001, p. 129.

[8] Powell remained unrepentant and delivered a defence of his April speech later that year in Eastbourne on 16 November. Here he reaffirmed his concerns not only over the number of immigrants in Britain, but also the rate of reproduction and the impact it would have upon Britain's racial makeup. He noted that 'There are those who argue that the longer the immigrant population is resident in this country, the more closely their birth rate will approximate to that of the indigenous population, and thus, of course, to a rate of increase at which their proportion to the total would remain static' (Powell, 1968c). The solution he identified courted considerable controversy. He argued that 'the resettlement of a substantial proportion of the Commonwealth immigrants in Britain is not beyond the resources and abilities of this country' (Powell, 1968c). Heath was scathing of the speech and described it as a 'character assassination of one racial group. That way lies tyranny' (Foot, 1969, p. 121).

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