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## **Japan at the Summit**

**Energy, Climate Change and a ‘Gaggle of Gs’**

**By**

**Hugo Dobson**

School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield

[h.dobson@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:h.dobson@sheffield.ac.uk)

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please contact the author at: [h.dobson@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:h.dobson@sheffield.ac.uk)*

## Japan at the Summit

### Energy, Climate Change and a ‘Gaggle of Gs’

#### Abstract

This paper focuses on how energy issues and climate change are addressed at the multilateral level, specifically by the Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20). It will trace the development, trajectory, successes and failures of global summitry in addressing these issues. In addition, it will explore Japan’s contributions to these processes, as well as its motivations.

#### 1 Introduction

This paper shifts the focus of our discussion of energy issues and climate change to the international and, in particular, multilateral level. It will specifically highlight the role of the Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20), alongside a number of other alphanumeric configurations collectively known as GX summitry or a ‘Gaggle of Gs’, in shaping and promoting multilateral approaches to these challenges. The G8 and G20 summits may not immediately spring to mind as the multilateral mechanisms charged with managing and pushing forward the international community’s agenda on energy issues and climate change. This is largely because both have been written about chiefly in the context of global economic governance, and in terms of tectonic shifts in the global order and the latter replacing the former. However, in fact both groupings have a great deal in common in addressing these issues. Both were, *inter alia*, originally crisis-triggered responses tasked with stabilizing and managing the global economy. Both have also experienced a degree of ‘mission creep’ by which energy and the environment have found a regular place on the summits’ agenda. Thus, as a result of their inherent and shared nature, both groups have over time and to varying degrees engaged with these issues either explicitly or implicitly.

In this light, this paper will trace the development, trajectory, successes and failures of GX summitry in addressing these issues. In addition, it will explore Japan’s role in and contributions to these processes since the first meeting of the G8 leaders – or G6 as it was then<sup>1</sup> – in 1975 and the first meeting of the G20 leaders in 2008, highlighting successes and failures along the way. In conclusion, the paper will add to the discussion of what Japan has done by explaining why. By its very nature, an exploration of global summitry, and particularly the ‘softer’, more informal gatherings like the G8 and G20, tends towards the state-centric as a result of the central role of leaders and the informal relationships they construct that define these groups from more formal and legalistic international organizations. However, this analysis seeks to supplement this approach by highlighting the norms that Constructivists and English School scholars of International Relations would argue lie at the heart of the any state’s motivations and resulting behaviour in global summitry. Finally, the conclusion will also point to recent and countervailing developments under the current prime ministership of Abe Shinzō.

#### 2 The ‘Gaggle of Gs’ and Japan

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<sup>1</sup> The original G6 of France, the US, the UK, Germany, Japan and Italy became a G7 in 1976 with the addition of Canada. EU representation was added the following year. Russia went through a series of different statuses through the 1990s before becoming a full member in 1998 of what we understand today to be the G8. In March 2014, Russia was removed from the G8 as a result of the crisis in Ukraine with its future within the group still unclear at the time of writing. For the sake of clarity, the alphanumeric term specific to the period under discussion will be used, and where appropriate G8 will be used as a blanket term throughout this paper.

The G8 finds its origins in the informal mechanisms established by the finance ministers of the developed world in the early 1970s to manage the macroeconomic challenges of the time. These informal mechanisms were soon upgraded to the leaders' level at the first meeting of Group of 6 (G6) leaders of the leading economies in the Chateau of Rambouillet in November 1975. There was no intention to hold a second summit but the utility of this forum for discussion amongst like-minded leaders in deciding the direction and steering the global economy was clear when a second summit was held the following year in San Juan. Thereafter, the summit process steadily evolved in terms of membership and agenda items to become the forum we know today as the G8, which met most recently in Loch Erne, Northern Ireland in June 2013. The G8 was scheduled to meet in Sochi, Russia in June 2014 but in reaction to the Ukrainian Crisis the G7 boycotted the summit, temporarily removed Russia from the group and met as a G7 in Brussels.

Similarly the G20's briefer and more recent genesis follows a similar trajectory. Originally convened as a meeting of the finance ministers of the world's developed and rapidly developing major economies in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late-1990s, it went about its business from 1999 largely overlooked. However, in reaction to the global financial and economic crisis that began in 2008, the G8 was found to be both unrepresentative and ineffective. Thus, in its place, the G20 was upgraded to a meeting of leaders and met for the first time in November 2008 in Washington. Similarly concerned with predominantly macroeconomic issues, its agenda, alongside membership and hosting evolved organically. By 2011, the dust had settled to the extent that the G20 met annually and a future schedule of hosts had been decided.

Initial predictions of the G8's inevitable decline and the rise of a more (supposedly) representative and effective G20 proved to be wide of the mark (Bradford and Linn 2004; Foresti and Wild 2009).<sup>2</sup> Instead, a settlement of sorts has emerged whereby the G8 has continued to meet (usually in the late Spring/early Summer) to deal with security and political issues, whereas the G20 meets later in the year and addresses financial and economic issues. However, both Gs share a similar format in that these are informal bodies with no legal basis to exist and no constitution or charter. They rely on the willingness of leaders to come together and forge common responses to common challenges and then use their collective moral authority to ensure compliance. Equally, the agenda of both fora are flexible, moveable feasts and can be shaped by the demands of the external environment or an individual leader. Thus, as will be explored in the following two sections, both the G8 and the G20 have over time either explicitly or implicitly addressed energy issues and climate change. Before, we turn to this, the Japanese perspective on, and role in, these developments in the architecture of global governance require some brief explanation.

The G8 has traditionally mattered to Japan and the reasons for this are straightforward and uncontested. In other, more traditional, mechanisms of global governance, Japan has been regarded as a 'latecomer'. This can be seen in the case of the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in all of which Japan was initially excluded and came to regard eventual admission as symbolic of postwar recognition and reintegration into international society. In contrast, Japanese prime minister Miki Takeo was an original participant in the Rambouillet

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<sup>2</sup> The G8 represents roughly 50% of global economic output, two-thirds of international trade but only 14% of the world's population. In contrast, the G20 represents 90% of global economic output, 80% of international trade and two-thirds of the world's population (The World Bank 2014).

summit. In addition, Japan is the only non-North American, non-European member of this self-appointed elite. As a result, Japan has forged two identities and roles in the G8 over time – that of bridge (*kakehashi*) between East and West, in addition to the representative of Asia (*Ajia no daihyō*).

The rise of the G20 not only places the continued existence of the G8 under threat (although so far these doubts have been unwarranted), but also expands the number of seats at the top table of global summitry available to Asian countries. Australia, China, India, Indonesia and South Korea are all now represented alongside Japan, thus diluting the need for a regional representative and raising questions of whether Asia should caucus to achieve common goals. The Japanese government's response to this has been confused and contradictory at times. On the one hand, the Japanese government has sought to secure the success of the G20 as a true believer in multilateralism and internationalism, but its efforts have been half-hearted insofar as the Japanese government does not want the G20 to succeed at the expense of the G8 – a position that alienates Japan from some of its G8 colleagues. Equally, the Japanese government has encountered difficulties in terms of continuing to play the role of Asian representative and instead has at times engaged in competition with the new Asian additions to the G20 (Dobson 2012a). So much for Japan's response to the changes in the global balance of power and their impact upon the architecture of global governance, a subject to which we shall return in the Conclusion. Let us now turn to the G8's and G20's treatment of energy issues and climate change.

### **3 The G8's role in energy issues and climate change**

As mentioned above, the G8 was originally conceived as an informal grouping of like-minded leaders with the goal of discussing and reaching a consensus on how to address macroeconomic issues of the day. In the first half of the 1970s these discussions were driven by the chaos caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the sudden rise in oil prices instigated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus, at a time of oil shortages and price hikes resulting from the 1973 and 1979 energy crises, it was not long before the G7's discussion turned from the pressing issues of the day such as promoting free trade and non-inflationary growth, to the issue of oil consumption. The G8 Research Group of the University of Toronto has counted the words in G8 summits dedicated to the topic of energy and however blunt this bean-counting measurement may be, it does show that energy has been a constant theme in G8 summits from 1975 (G8 Research Group 2010). This discussion spiked for the first time at the 1979 Tokyo Summit, the first to be hosted in Asia, when 62% of the summit declaration was given over to the topic. As will be discussed in Section 5, this provided an opportunity for Japan to demonstrate leadership.

The 1979 Tokyo Summit was dubbed the 'energy summit' at the time and resulted in an eleventh-hour agreement on G7 members' energy consumption by which the leaders agreed to country-by-country targets through to 1985. US levels of consumption would be limited through to 1985 to the 1977 levels of 8.5 million barrels per day. The EC was to restrict its consumption to the 1978 levels from 1980 through to 1985. In the case of Japan its oil consumption would be limited to 1979 levels for 1980 – 5.4 million barrels per day – and then somewhere in the region of 6.3 to 6.9 million barrels of oil per day through to 1985. At the same time, the Japanese government pledged to meet a growth rate of 5.7% from 1980 as special dispensation for conceding on the oil issue. This momentum continued the following year at the 1980 Venice Summit where the G7 leaders added a number of concrete measures to conserve oil use and sought to «rely on fuels other than oil to meet the energy needs of

future economic growth» (G7 1980). Although these agreements may have created some short-term stabilization, these targets were never met.

Thereafter, energy issues broadly defined appeared annually on the summit agenda of G8 leaders, although they have not received the same attention as at the time of the 1979 oil shock (G8 Research Group 2010). Depth in GX summitry has also been in evidence over time with ministerial meetings supporting the leaders' discussion. The G7 energy ministers met as early as 1979 after the Tokyo Summit of that year, although this has since proved to be a one off. In contrast, G8 energy ministers have met since 1998 in Moscow albeit on an irregular basis with the last time being in 2009 in Rome.

As regards nuclear energy, although it has received treatment at previous summits, the 2011 Deauville Summit provides a clear demonstration of the nature of summitry. Ahead of the summit and in response to Fukushima, G7 central banks jointly intervened in the currency markets (the first time in a decade) to stabilize the value of the yen and Japan's exports. At the actual summit, the discussion topic of «Solidarity with Japan», which included both expressions of sympathy alongside reassurances as regards nuclear safety, was shifted to the headline issue on the first day of the summit. This makes clear not only the sense of fraternity that exists amongst the G8 leaders and comes to the fore in a time of crisis (exactly the same thing happened in 2005 in response to the London bombings whilst the G8 leaders met in Gleneagles), but also the flexible nature of summitry that allows an immediate issue to be pushed up its agenda.

As regards the G8's treatment of climate change, the environment first appeared as a topic for summit discussion at the 1985 Bonn Summit at the instigation of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Economic Declaration that emerged from the summit dedicated 217 words to the topic by which the leaders pledged to coordinate initiatives through existing international organizations such as the OECD (G7 1985). Thereafter, the topic appeared in summit discussions with enough regularity that it could be regarded as a traditional summit subject. As a result of a French initiative at the 1989 Paris Summit, a 1,700-word section on the environment was included in the resulting Economic Declaration by which G7 leaders pledge to explore how environmental protection could be inputted into individual government policies (G7 1989). The deepening of the summit process was also in evidence when the environment ministers of the G7, independent of and in addition to its leaders, came together for the first time in Spring 1992 in Germany and met annually from 1994 onwards. At the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, climate change took second place to African poverty in the media's attention but it was still the focus for much discussion, although little progress was made in the face of US intransigence on the Kyoto Protocol. This was obvious to all in UK prime minister Tony Blair's summary of the summit: «[t]hose of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol remain committed to it, and will continue to work to make it a success». The only point of agreement amongst the summit leaders was «that climate change is happening now, that human activity is contributing to it, and that it could affect every part of the globe» (G8 2005).

Climate change became the dominant and emblematic theme of two subsequent summits, the German-hosted Heiligendamm Summit of 2007 and the Japan-hosted Tōyako Summit of 2008. At the former, German Chancellor Angela Merkel's first summit as host, the G8 leaders declared that:

[i]n setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have agreed in Heiligendamm involving all major emitters, we will consider seriously the decisions

made by the European Union, Canada and Japan which include at least a halving of global emissions by 2050. We have agreed that the UN climate process is the appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on climate change. (G8 2007)

The momentum created at Heiligendamm was maintained partly a result of prime minister Fukuda Yasuo placing it on the agenda of the Tōyako Summit at a very early stage when he spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2008. This was then promoted in the media as the «Fukuda Vision» centred on pledging to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 60% to 80% by 2050 from current levels, although prospects of having this adopted by his fellow summiteers were bleak – even more so as regards the adoption of any mid-term targets for 2020. Inviting a number of developing countries and major emitters to participate in the discussions at Tōyako was a necessary step but also made the chances of reaching any agreement even slimmer.

Eventually, a commitment was made to achieving at least 50% reduction in emissions by 2050:

We seek to share with all Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the vision of, and together with them to consider and adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal of achieving at least 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050, recognizing that this global challenge can only be met by a global response, in particular, by the contributions from all major economies, consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (G8 2008).

Comparing this with the statement made at Heiligendamm, incremental progress is clear from ‘serious consideration’ to actual action and targets. However, the language used in summit statements is notoriously vague and tends to be the result of compromise so what ‘seek and share’, ‘consider and adopt’ concretely amounted to was unclear. What is more, there was some disparity between the English and Japanese translations of the above declaration with a stronger and clearer commitment implied in the Japanese version (MOFA 2008a). Equally, there was no agreement on mid-term targets or consensus on baseline years and it is debatable how committed G8 (or whatever forum may still be meeting) leaders will be to agreements made 42 years previously. On the plus side of the ledger, the US agreed for the first time at Tōyako to concrete targets to cut emissions. In addition, the incremental and iterative fashion in which the G8 functions is clear: the leaders shifted from agreeing in 2007 to seriously consider a 50% cut by 2050 to pledging a year later to promote the initiative within the UNFCCC negotiations. Another important aspect of these statements is the reference to the United Nations. The G8 leaders knowing the extent of their influence and abilities, instead recognized and reinforced the UNFCCC as the most appropriate and effective mechanism for addressing a global problem of this nature. So, all in all, this summit has been dubbed ‘a curate’s egg’ in that its outcomes were good in parts (Dobson 2008), but this characterization also captures the G8’s treatment of both issues over time.

#### **4 The G20’s role in energy issues and climate change**

Turning to the G20’s engagement with energy issues and climate change, it has obviously not benefitted from same length of time as the G8 to create momentum and even a legacy in these policy areas. Since its first meeting in Washington in November 2008, the G20 has met a further seven times at the leaders’ level: London, April 2009; Pittsburgh, September 2009, Toronto, June 2010; Seoul, November 2010; Cannes, November 2011; Los Cabos, June

2012; and Saint Petersburg, September 2013. There has been no evidence of institutional depth in terms of creating G20 ministerial meetings to address these issues. Nevertheless, even at its first gathering, the G20 experienced the mission creep in its agenda similar to that experienced by the G8 in its early years. As a result, the G20 has been tasked with a range of issues in addition to its original financial and macroeconomic focus of which energy issues and climate change are but two.

As regards energy, G20 statements reveal an increasing level of engagement with energy issues starting from minimal discussion at Washington:

We remain committed to addressing other critical challenges such as energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease. (G20 2008)

At the second London Summit there were no references to energy. However, at Pittsburgh later that year numerous statements accounting for over 10% of summit documentation were given over to highlighting issues such as energy efficiency, clean energy and energy security. In 2010, the Toronto Summit's treatment was not so sustained and it dedicated a single paragraph to energy:

We note with appreciation the report on energy subsidies from the International Energy Agency (IEA), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OECD and World Bank. We welcome the work of Finance and Energy Ministers in delivering implementation strategies and timeframes, based on national circumstances, for the rationalization and phase out over the medium term of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, taking into account vulnerable groups and their development needs. We also encourage continued and full implementation of country-specific strategies and will continue to review progress towards this commitment at upcoming summits (G20 2010c).

Later in the same year, the Seoul Summit Leaders Declaration included no mention of energy issues but the accompanying Seoul Summit Document dedicated a section that covered commitments to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, strategies to contain volatility in fossil fuel prices, in addition to welcoming and encouraging the progress of «the Global Marine Environment Protection (GMEP) initiative toward the goal of sharing best practices to protect the marine environment, to prevent accidents related to offshore exploration and development, as well as marine transportation, and to deal with their consequences» (G20 2010b).

Although the 2011 Cannes Summit was pretty much hijacked by the Eurozone crisis, sections in its various declarations and statements were dedicated to the promotion of clean energy and the smooth functioning of energy markets to avoid price volatility and ensure energy efficiency. It tasked the G20 finance ministers to press ahead with reforms and report back a year later. A year later and the Los Cabos Summit reiterated the declarations made at Cannes and tasked its finance ministers to take concrete measures in future discussions.

The statement issued at Saint Petersburg in 2013 dedicated a section to the issue and reiterated pledges to enhance energy cooperation, ensure the accuracy of energy market data and promote cleaner and more efficient energy technologies.

To cut a long story short, the G20 has essentially sought to play the role that GX summitry can play best, as a steering committee. However, expectations are naturally high ahead of the Australian Presidency of the G20 in 2014 that it can play a greater leadership role.

As regards climate change, a number of civil society groups have targeted the G20 in an attempt to shift its attention away from a narrow focus on economic growth and ensure that any consensus includes consideration for climate change. In addition, it is the richest countries represented at the G20 that are responsible for the majority of emissions so there is a rationale for the G20 to add climate change to its agenda. However, the G20's role is only ever going to be that of catalyst and ultimately it will be the UN that is the legitimate body to deal with the issue. The best a GX summit can do on any issue is overcome deadlock and create a consensus that then needs to spill over into the more legitimate and legal bodies of global governance. At a time when UN negotiations have stalled, this provides an appropriate opportunity for the G20 to step in.

Take, for example, the financial transaction tax (FTT, or more popularly the Robin Hood tax) that has been mooted as a measure that could generate the billions of dollars needed to address issues such as climate change and poverty. These taxes have found their way onto the G20's agenda and a surprising degree of consensus has even emerged with Argentina, France, Germany, South Africa, Spain, and the EU all in favour. Statements by former foreign ministers Okada Katsuya and Maehara Seiji during 2010 expressed support for the issue and at the 2011 Cannes Summit Japanese prime minister Noda Yoshihiko even expressed interest in exploring the measure further. However, UK prime minister David Cameron has opposed a measure that would damage the City of London.

However, for a number of years, G20 summits were dominated, and their agenda hijacked, by the crisis in the Eurozone. Partly as a result, at its most recent meeting in Saint Petersburg, the G20 simply repeated the anodyne statements that tend to dominate summit documentation by declaring that:

Climate change will continue to have a significant impact on the world economy, and cost will be higher to the extent we delay additional actions. We reiterate our commitment to fight climate change and welcome the outcome of the 18th conference of the Parties to the UN climate change conferences. We are committed to a full implementation of the outcomes of Cancun, Durban and Doha and will work with Poland as the incoming presidency towards achieving a successful outcome at COP-19. We are committed to support the full implementation of the agreed outcomes under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its ongoing of the United Nations to mobilize political will through 2014 towards the successful adoption of a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under the convention applicable to all Parties by 2015, during COP-21 that France stands ready to host (G20 2013).

In effect the G20 was kicking the issue into the long grass and leaving it to others to attempt (and fail) to make progress.

## **5 Japan's role and contribution**

As would be expected in these mechanisms of global governance that stress the collective leadership that presidents, prime ministers and chancellors provide, it is the Japanese prime minister that has occupied the central role. However, he is not alone and the role of the sherpa as personal assistant should not be overlooked as well as the contribution of various

ministries, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the Ministry of Finance and others on occasion.

With these actors in mind, and despite some of the weaknesses associated with them in the context of informal summitry, Japan's contribution to these developments has at times been both significant and multifaceted. Starting with the 1979 Tokyo Summit, although he described feeling «naked-like a little child» after the summit, prime minister Ōhira Masayoshi played a central role in ensuring the success of the summit generally and specifically with regard to reaching the agreement outlined above amongst fellow summiteers on oil consumption (Putnam and Bayne 1987, p. 257). At a relatively early stage, according to an article in Japan Times on 1 June, Ōhira placed energy and OPEC's sudden raising of oil prices at the top of the summit agenda. The fact that this would be a divisive issue between the United States and Europe was well known and as reported in Japan Times on 7 June, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt went as far as to ask Ōhira to act as a middle man – a role that Japan has played on occasions through the history of GX summitry. The reactions to the summit outcomes and the eleventh-hour agreement on oil consumption targets were largely positive with the Japan Communist Party the lone voice critical of Ōhira. According to a Yomiuri Shinbun article published on 1 July 1979, the approval rating for his administration was in fact bolstered by the summit rising from 37.6% beforehand to 39% after the summit. Nicholas Bayne, doyen of summit watchers and summit grader, the Tokyo Summit of 1979 received one of the more successful G7/8 summits with a grade of B plus. Energy issues featured predominantly on the agenda of the following year's summit, the first Venice Summit. However, Japan was prevented from following up on the diplomatic success of the Tokyo Summit when Ōhira passed away on 12 June 1980 ten days before the summit was due to begin.

Moving forward in time to another Japan-hosted summit, the Tōyako Summit of 2008, other significant contributions can be seen in the role played by the Japanese prime minister of the day, Fukuda Yasuo, aided by his sherpa, Kōno Masaharu. Fukuda expressed his desire to work with the rising powers not included within the G8 and One of the original developments of the summit was the creation by the Japanese hosts of space and time for the G8 and G5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) to meet separately and together before then being joined by Australia, Indonesia and South Korea on the final day of the summit as a Major Economies Forum (MEF), or G16, to discuss climate change. Thereafter, Japan was active in creating the consensus that this forum had a role to play and should continue, particularly in shaping the debate on climate change within the UN and this innovation in global summitry was adopted at the following year's summit in L'Aquila (Dobson 2012a). However, Japan's contribution appears to be largely in the area of global governance architecture and as regards the Tōyako Summit's statement on climate change mentioned above in Section 3, the reaction of summit watchers was for the most part one of confusion.

It is worth mentioning that Japan also hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD-IV) prior to the Tōyako Summit and sought to create synergy between the two (although chiefly with the goal of ensuring the success of the G8 agenda on climate change rather than African development (Dobson 2012b). The Yokohama Declaration that resulted from TICAD-IV stated that:

African countries appreciated Japan's «Cool Earth Promotion Programme» and acknowledged Japan's efforts in seeking to develop an international framework looking beyond the first steps taken in the current Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas

emissions. In this regard, the Participants welcomed the announcement by the Government of Japan, in January 2008, of its intention to establish a «Cool Earth Partnership» with US\$10 billion Financial Mechanism on the basis of policy consultations between Japan and developing countries – including African countries – to address the effects of climate change and to modernize their industries, by way of technology-transfer, to render them more energy-efficient and more environment-friendly (MOFA 2008b).

Considering that original drafts of the declaration had included considerably stronger phrases like ‘lauded’ and ‘supported’, rather than ‘appreciated’ and ‘acknowledged’, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of Japan’s initiative.

Another measure of Japan’s contribution to the G8’s treatment of the climate change and energy issues is the level of compliance with commitments made at each summit. The G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto has tracked many of these commitments over time. As regards the G8’s commitments on climate change between 1987 and 2006, Japan posts the highest compliance score of 79% with Germany on 74% and 52% as the average level of compliance amongst G8 countries (Kirton 2007, pp. 22-23). As regards energy, the average level of G8 compliance with commitments made between 1996 and 2005 is 61% but Japan finds itself towards the foot of the rankings with a compliance score of 50%.

As regards the G20’s treatment of the FTT mentioned above, Japan’s response has been vague at best. As reported in Japan Times on 1 November 2011, Japanese civil society organizations are in favour of the tax and petitioned Noda stressing that a 0.005% tax on currency transactions could raise more than 600 billion yen a year and be used as part of the 3/11 recovery. In contrast, business organisations, like Nippon Keidanren, have been against it (Nippon Keidanren 2010). Japan had previously scrapped a similar tax but as regards the FTT, little consensus within the GOJ has existed. However it did appear to have been gaining ground within the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) before its landslide defeat in the 2012 election. According to Okubo Tsutomu, head of the committee in charge of fiscal and monetary issues within the DPJ’s policy council, in light of the rise in the value of the yen, and the chances of the success of strategies such as intervention in the currency markets, the possibility of a FTT needed be considered. Moreover, if Europe were to introduce such a tax then Japan would need to follow suit to avoid the inevitable flight to the yen (Ito 2011). Finally, this may appear attractive to Japan as a means of also financing the commitment made at the 2008 TICAD-IV to double aid to Africa.

Finally, the G20 Research Group has also tracked G20 compliance scores and in February 2013 was able to report on the G20’s most recent progress in reaching its goals on development. Included in these commitments is the issue of energy efficiency, for which Japan demonstrated full compliance so far with the 2010 Seoul Summit’s pledge that «we will take steps to create, as appropriate, the enabling environments that are conducive to the development and deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies, including policies and practices in our countries and beyond, including technical transfer and capacity building» and the 2011 Cannes Summit’s commitment to «support the deployment of clean energy and energy efficiency (C3E) technologies». Japan was seen to have taken steps to create the enabling environments that are conducive to the development and deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies both at home and in other countries, specifically in the Asia Pacific and North Africa.

## 6 Conclusion

So much for what GX summitry and in particular Japan have done, or not as the case may be. In conclusion, the paper will discuss the underlying motivations behind Japan's behaviour. A range of different theoretical approaches will inevitably highlight different pushes and pulls. A traditionally Realist approach would explain Fukuda's various initiatives through the lens of undiluted national interest. For example, the creation of the MEF would be regarded simply as an attempt on the part of Japan to dilute the role of the G5 and the central role of China. Equally, the countries that the MEF initiative embraced – Australia, Indonesia and South Korea – were some of the most vocally supportive of Fukuda's «Cool Earth» initiative to halve global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. However, a purely Realist approach lacks nuance and presents an overly unproblematised view of Japan's behaviour. For example, Japan has been conflicted even in its support for its own initiatives like the MEF and this requires explanation.

At the heart of Japan's response is an impulse based on the norms of internationalism and Asianism but also Japan's self-perception of its status in the international system. In this light, the Japanese government has been committed to ensuring the success of GX summitry and to this end hosting successful summits. This can be seen not only in the various grades awarded by the G8 Research Group to Japan-hosted summit, but also in Ōhira's speech to the Diet at the beginning of 1979, the year Japan hosted the first Tokyo Summit, which demonstrated the lengths the Japanese hosts would go to in order to ensure a successful summit:

It is most significant that the summit meeting of major industrialized countries will be held in Japan this year for the first time in Asia. This meeting is a very important forum for the leaders of the nations concerned to discuss frankly their policies and to seek international cooperation for the stable expansion of the world economy. We intend to do our utmost as host country in preparation for this meeting and to work with the other participating countries for its success (Ōhira 1979, 180).

This commitment has continued through to the present day and it appears that Japan's behaviour falls within the English School's particular definition of 'great power' status. To quote Morris (2011, pp. 328-329) and his treatment of Hedley Bull's work, great powers

are not just unusually powerful states, but collectively constitute an institution of international society. Accordingly, great powers must conform to certain behavioural expectations and in particular must «manage their relationships with one another in the interests of international order». (Bull 1977, p. 202)

In Bull's classic formulation, great powers have «a special mission [as] ... custodian[s] or trustees[s] of the interests of international society» and are required to «accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear» (Bull 1977, p. 202).

In other words, by playing a number of 'recognition games' (usually played by rising powers to assert their increasing influence) that seek to reinforce its status as a great power of the day, Japan has exhibited the sense of responsibility that the English School identifies as one of the defining qualities of great power status. Even if it is evidently a great power in relative decline, certain responsibilities remain that are constitutive of this status and thereby shape behaviour. To risk banality for a moment, this is the Spiderman adage that «with great power comes great responsibility». The Japanese government has demonstrated a belief that it

should act not only as a Great Power but also as a 'Great Responsible' (Morris 2011, p. 329, in reference to the coalition government led by UK prime minister David Cameron).

However, this internationalist impulse has come directly into conflict with the hard-nosed Realism outlined above. The result has been contradictory and unpredictable behaviour at times over recent years and even paralysis on other occasions. For example, Japan has worked for the success of new mechanisms of global governance such as the G20 and demonstrates innovation in creating bodies such as the MEF. However, its enthusiasm has clear limits: the success of these new and more representative bodies should never be at the expense of Japan's preferred central mechanism of global governance, the G8. This has resulted in a more qualified internationalism than has traditionally been on display in Japan's G8 summitry. The strategy by which successive Japanese governments have recently sought to pursue these apparently contradictory objectives has been to stress the democratic values at the heart of the declaration that came out of the first Rambouillet Summit, and which are so much harder to discern in the G20. Although for a time this strategy dovetailed nicely with prime minister Asō Tarō's values-oriented diplomacy, it has generally been regarded as a hollow and retrograde approach. Equally, a surprising lack of coordination between policymakers has come to the fore on occasion, one example being prime minister Kan Naoto's idea of inviting China to future G8 summits mooted at the 2010 G8 Summit without prior consultation with MOFA officials (Dobson 2012a).

These are dilemmas that Japanese leaders have struggled to overcome not only in the way they manage the changing world order and the institutional architecture of global governance but also in terms of the global issues with which they grapple. However, the return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party in December 2012 suggests a possible resolution of this impasse, although not one that ardent supporters of global governance might welcome. Since returning to power prime minister Abe has demonstrated a more coherent approach to the mechanisms of global governance than his DPJ predecessors. With one eye on the domestic reception, he has explicitly and consistently used these mechanisms to promote and secure international support for his three-pronged economic policies popularly known as «Abenomics» as well as his more robust (some would say 'nationalistic', whereas some would say 'normal') initiatives in foreign and security policy. The resulting behaviour across the calendar of global governance from the World Economic Forum in January through to the UN General Assembly in September is certainly more joined up, strategic even. However, it focuses on national interest to the exclusion of any vision of global governance, normative impulse or sense of leadership that have previously been the hallmark of Japanese participation in global summitry (Dobson 2014). As Abe's position appears to be relatively secure with no up-coming election or intra-party threat, more of the same is to be expected.

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