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Delegitimising Nuclear Violence

Nick Richie

December, in Vienna, saw the third international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.¹ Next April will see the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and next August will mark the 70th anniversary of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All three events give us an occasion to pause, and, in different ways, to reflect on the continuing challenge of nuclear violence and on the global nuclear order we have constructed for ourselves.

Nuclear weapons mean different things to different people. In fact, it is difficult to understand national and global nuclear politics without considering the meanings or values assigned to these weapons. These values are about more than status and prestige.

In the UK, for example, nuclear weapons are assigned multiple meanings: domestic political value, not least around high-skilled jobs; identity value in terms of national role conceptions about who we think we are and how we should act in the world; institutional value in terms of the entrenched political privilege ascribed to the nuclear-armed P5 in institutions of global security governance; international order value in terms of the long-term general stability among the world's major powers attributed to nuclear weapons; relational value in terms of assured protection against specific adversaries (for the UK, the Russian bogeyman); and an operational value in terms of the value assigned to operating nuclear weapons in a 'proper' way (for the UK, nuclear-armed submarines permanently at sea on continuous alert).²

Together this set of values constitutes a specific 'regime of nuclear truth': a social, historical and generally elite discourse that legitimises and institutionalises what

The Marshall Islands' Two-Front Fight to Survive and Thrive: Climate Protection and Nuclear Disarmament

John Burroughs

"No one's drowning, baby," went the poem by Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner of the Marshall Islands that she read to the UN Climate Summit on September 23, 2014. "No one's moving/no one's losing their homeland/no one's becoming a climate change refugee." Why? "Because we baby are going to fight/your mommy daddy/bubu jimma your country and your president too/we will all fight." And: "Because we deserve to do more than just/survive/we deserve/to thrive."

And indeed the Marshall Islands is working hard to help make productive the negotiations about to begin on a new climate agreement. In August 2013, leaders of Pacific Island Forum states meeting in Majuro, the capital of the Marshall Islands, adopted a declaration setting forth commitments to implement national reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and to accelerate efforts to adapt to climate change. A stated aim of the Majuro Declaration is to contribute to mobilization of "...political will for a universal, ambitious and legally-binding climate change agreement by 2015."¹

Similar commitments were made at a meeting of a group of about 30 countries known as the Cartagena Dialogue held in Majuro in April of this year. As explained by Marshall Islands Foreign Minister Tony deBrum, the group "committed to bring forward our post-2020 emission-reduction targets as early as possible next year in time to seal an ambitious new agreement in Paris, and to use the agreement to take vulnerability assessment and adaptation planning to a new level globally."²

¹ See www.majurodeclaration.org.

² Quoted in Giff Johnson, "Majuro Cartagena Dialogue

BOOK REVIEW

The Undivided Past: Humanity Beyond Our Differences

David Cannadine

Published in United States by Vintage Books, A Division of Random House LLC, first paperback edition, January 2014: New York, New York

Vintage Trade Paperback ISBN: 978-0-307-38959-6

Optimists working toward peace among nations, and security for the world's peoples, are continuously challenged by a glum discourse that contains such commonplaces as *there have always been wars; we are a violent, territorial species; sociopaths disproportionately seek power and drive events; resource scarcity is inevitable and engenders conflict...* and the list goes on.

The book review following is the first in a series that look at works that appraise and refute such propositions, and consider a counter-narrative: hopeful but rigorous, current and synoptic assessments of our human nature, and our record of behavior. We will not be grasping at straws, but finding firm ground for optimism in such disciplines as history, evolutionary biology, psychology, and sociology. Comments and suggestions are invited.

To the book in question, then: Professor David Cannadine is an eminent historian, with a senior teaching appointment at Princeton University. *The Undivided Past* is his attempt to provide a two-domain corrective. First, to his profession's products, in that he feels academy-based historiography, as it has evolved, way too often defaults its focus toward conflict, difference, what is sometimes called "splittism" in analyzing the historical record of relations that are driven by human identity aggregations. He shows those groupings as typically being reduced to six identifications—religion, nation, class, race, gender, and civilizations. And looking beyond the academy, and into the domain of political leadership and popular understanding, he spells out and decries the all-too-convenient uses and misuses of historical theorizing in general, and in the shaping of policy and mobilization of society. Those whose theories have been misunderstood and misapplied, in his view, comprise a who's who of the discipline, including Gibbon, Spengler, Toynbee, and, over the boundary into political science but drawing on historical evidence, Samuel Huntington.

What he seeks to show, in a clear-eyed examination that considers the record from the ancient city states and religions to the present day, is that the human enterprise has been every bit been as devoted to amity, compromise,

syncretism, tolerance, assimilation, and respectful exchange as it has been to war, bigotry, dominance, exploitation, fanaticism, stereotyping, suspicion, and the like.

If this sounds rather abstract, it is not: in a very colorful way he cites the beliefs and actions of impactful figures from Mani to Kipling, Germaine Greer to W. E. B. DuBois, Pope Benedict XVI to the Emperor Qianlong, and investigates the Great War, the shifting and self-serving usages of "barbarism" and "civilization", the Japanese push-back against white racism, the uncertain character of the nation-state, and as they say, much more.

It is not a quick read, but intellectually exhilarating--quite a ride. For purposes of this publication, we will narrow our review to his treatment of nation and civilization, the principal purveyors of armed conflict; although in his treatment the role of religion is intertwined with both.

Regarding nation and its heir the Westphalian nation-state, Cannadine emphasizes that the very notion is constructed, elusive, and subject to constant revision and shoring up. The original term *natio* in Latin has a meaning closer to our "ethnicity"—a country almost always contains many—and the word "nationality" itself did not emerge until the 1790's. The idea of nation almost always incorporates a creation myth that has been continuously refined in the absence of sufficient evidence, and draws its strength as much from carefully cultivated images of evil enemies and great battles fought, won or lost—definition by conflict--as from a positive celebration of a nation's virtues. Drawn boundaries are critical—consider the Chinese word for country, *guo*, among the few characters that satisfy the pictographic cliché: a population and its armaments, contained by borders—and yet incredible sophistries, propaganda campaigns, commercial competition, and, at the extreme, state violence, are devoted to disrupting and redrawing this marker of sacred identity. And so we have thalassocracies dissolving (the Hanseatic League), colonial caprice (Iraq), homogeneous nations sundered (ROK/DPRK), and so on... in the long view, an amoebic dance of power superseding all the nationalistic pieties.

In the 19th century, economic and social trends, political leaders, and historians, too, nurtured the ideal of the nation-state as a "secular religion", noted in the reflections of historian Charles Maier as "a 'bordered political space,'" which created the essential framework for exploiting material resources, for wielding temporal power, and for nurturing common notions of national consciousness." (Cannadine, p.68) This ideal was advanced by such means as the growth of nationally conformed education, the rise of mass political parties, protective tariffs, state welfare programs (beginning

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*A message from
NGOCODPS President Bruce Knotts*



2014 is past and 2015 brings opportunities and challenges for our committee. There is growing awareness of the importance of disarmament, peace and security issues and some of that, we believe, results from our programming, on-line and in-print publications.

We are noticing a growing concern over drones and other autonomous weapon systems. We see clearly what the proliferation of the types and numbers, and the lethal effectiveness of weapons, is doing to people: men, women and children around the globe. These are non-combatants: innocent civilians suffer more than anyone else from weapons sold to enrich investors and companies in the world's wealthiest countries, harming many of the world's poorest and most vulnerable.

With renewed vigor, we commit ourselves to inform and advocate for the elimination of all such weapons and to turn our financial and intellectual assets towards peaceful endeavors. The Quakers, probably more than any other faith, have consistently highlighted the opportunity costs of weapons and military spending, which directly cause schools, hospitals, roads, parks, museums and concert halls not to be built or maintained so that the military industrial complex can continue to reap its bloody profits. We stand as people of faith shoulder to shoulder with secular activists to end war and the spending on weapons that rob us of opportunities to do what's important, which is to make this a better world for generations to come.

Let's work together to make 2015 the year we make this world a better place.

In Peace,
Bruce Knotts

Editor's Note

At a time of armed conflict in Southwest Asia, flare-ups around Kashmir, horrific terrorist attacks in Paris and Yemen and a sobering trial in Boston, grim jockeying over Ukraine and senseless confrontations in the South China Sea, it seems strange to celebrate hope as the year turns into 2015. And yet as the peace advocacy community rides the long arc of history, signs of a shift are appearing. We try to capture some of that in this issue.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands' bringing suit in the International Criminal Court of Justice against the nuclear powers throws sharp focus on their fundamental violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The suit will highlight the deadly game that world citizens continue to tolerate, at a crippling cost and unthinkable risk. Our article looks at this betrayal in an analysis of "good faith" in global negotiations. In another piece, deterrence theory is challenged. What is it worth? How can it be justified? As we went to press, such arguments as our author makes have received powerful endorsement in the address of the Holy See at Vienna's conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—a development we will explore further in our next issue.

We conclude our two-part behavioral science analysis of the inefficacy of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. Our authors draw on the work of a notable organizational psychologist, Chris Argyris, to show the self-imposed constraints with which signatories thwart themselves, to our common detriment. A new book review series is also underway, featuring works rooted in research that examines the better angels of our nature.

Finally, this issue incorporates our annual accounting of Conference on Disarmament member-state voting on GA resolutions relating to peace and security. This is an informational service we are pleased to provide.

Once again we encourage you to subscribe to our bimonthly e-NEWS edition free of charge...an email to disarmeditor@gmail.com is all it takes. As for the print edition in your hands, we invite comments, and suggestions for future coverage...just mail to chuckrose2@gmail.com. And by the way, we depend totally on subscriptions and donations to keep up and running. It is surprising how little in-depth analysis of our topics appears in the mainstream press. We are deeply grateful to our contributors for their knowledge and generosity—they are paid only by our thanks. As for you, dear reader, please support us by voting with your wallet!

Charles Rosenberg, Editor (Print)

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The Marshall Islands is also battling on another front. In April of this year, it filed applications in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the nine nuclear-armed states, claiming that they are in violation of the international legal obligation to pursue in good faith and achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons. At the time, deBrum said: “Our people have suffered the catastrophic and irreparable damage of these weapons, and we vow to fight so that no one else on earth will ever again experience these atrocities.”³

For the Marshallese, global warming is truly an existential threat; the projected rise in the ocean will make their home islands unlivable, even disappear. And they know from first-hand experience the threat to everyone that nuclear weapons pose. The United States conducted 67 atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the Marshall Islands from 1946 to 1958 while it was a UN trust territory. The power of the 1954 “Castle Bravo” nuclear test was 1,000 times greater than the bomb that destroyed the city of Hiroshima. The health and environmental effects of the tests still plague the Marshallese today. US tests of missiles and anti-missile systems are also conducted in the Marshall Islands. The control center for the Ronald Reagan Test Site, a Pacific missile test range, is at Kwajalein Atoll.

So the Marshall Islands has compelling reasons to fight on both fronts. Their experience and example are instructive. First, the world as we now know and inhabit it is imperiled by both nuclear weapons and global warming. Second, nuclear disarmament and climate protection are both intrinsically global political and legal processes. They involve implementation of general obligations setting a framework for action contained in international legal agreements, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

NPT Article VI requires the pursuit of negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The UNFCCC sets as the



Tony deBrum, Minister in Assistance to the President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, delivers the key note address at Waves of Change: Climate Change in the Pacific Islands and Implications for Hawai'i

“ultimate objective” the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-caused] interference with the climate system.” It sets out general obligations, including that each developed state party “shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.” It also envisages further cooperative action, including the adoption of additional agreements.

In both arenas, a central question is whether states parties are acting in good faith to meet their obligations. That question is squarely raised by the Marshall Islands’ cases in the International Court of Justice, and also by the climate negotiations soon to be underway.

Wraps Up, Optimism Expressed,” Pacific Islands Report, April 7, 2014, <http://pidp.org/pireport/2014/April/04-07-06.htm>.

³ Quoted in “Marshall Islands Challenges Nine Nuclear-Armed States in Lawsuit before the World Court,” Press Release, April 24, 2014, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/pacific-nation-challenges-nine-nuclear-armed-states-in-lawsuits-before-the-world-court/>.

The Marshall Islands' Nuclear Zero Cases

The Marshall Islands' filings mark the first time the ICJ has been asked to address issues relating to nuclear weapons since its 1996 advisory opinion. In that opinion, largely interpreting Article VI of the NPT, the Court unanimously concluded that there "exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." The initiative comes at a time when there are no negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Indeed, aside from modest US-Russian bilateral agreements on reductions, that has been the case for many years, dating back to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Three cases are now in motion: those against the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan. They are the states among the nine nuclear-armed states which have accepted the general ("compulsory") jurisdiction of the ICJ. The Marshall Islands has invited the other states – the United States, France, Russia, China, DPRK, and Israel – to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter and explain their view of the disarmament obligation. So far none have done so. The Marshall Islands also has a companion case against the United States in U.S. federal court in San Francisco.

In the UK case, a central issue is simple and stark: Is the UK's opposition to General Assembly resolutions calling for commencement of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and its refusal to participate in the 2013 UN Open-Ended Working Group on taking forward proposals for multilateral negotiations, a violation of the obligation to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament?

In the India and Pakistan cases, a threshold question is raised by the fact that those states are not parties to the NPT. The Marshall Islands holds that they are nonetheless bound by customary obligations arising out of NPT Article VI as well as the long history of UN resolutions on nuclear disarmament. The framing of the nuclear disarmament obligation in the ICJ's 1996 advisory opinion and the Court's underlying analysis strongly suggest that they are so bound, but the question remains to be explicitly determined.

In all three cases, important issues are raised by modernization of nuclear arsenals through their

qualitative improvement and, for India and Pakistan, quantitative build-up and diversification. Among them: India and Pakistan call for commencement of negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament, but do not seek agreements that would, for example, cap the number and kind of delivery systems they possess. Is that posture a violation of the obligation to pursue negotiations on measures to halt the nuclear arms race? The same issue is raised by Pakistan's refusal to allow negotiations to begin in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty cutting off production of fissile materials for weapons.

The UK, India, and Pakistan all are planning and spending for maintenance and modernization of forces and infrastructure over decades to come. Does that conduct undermine the achievement of the objectives of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament? If so, it would seem to violate the fundamental legal principle requiring that international legal obligations be performed in good faith.

The relief requested is a declaratory judgment of breach of obligations relating to nuclear disarmament and an order to take, within one year of the judgment, all steps necessary to comply with those obligations, including the pursuit, by initiation if necessary, of negotiations in good faith aimed at the conclusion of a convention on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The ICJ has set briefing schedules in the three active cases. Hearings on preliminary issues relating to whether the cases are suitable for decision by the Court probably



will take place by late 2015 or early 2016. Proceedings on the merits could take another two or three years. For the filings in the ICJ, media coverage, and presentations, see www.icj-cij.org, www.nuclearzero.org and www.lcnp.org/RMI.

Negotiations on a New Climate Agreement

Pursuant to the UNFCCC, in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol, itself a treaty, was adopted. It provided that developed states parties were to reduce their collective emissions of greenhouse gases by 5% by 2010 compared to the year 1990. The United States never became a party. Climate experts agree that the objective set by the Kyoto Protocol was much too modest. Global emissions have continued to climb, despite voluntary commitments on reductions made at annual meetings of the parties to the UNFCCC. In 2013, they rose by 2.3 percent, to a record 40 billion tons.⁴

Now there is a process to create a post-Kyoto agreement, still under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. A meeting in Lima in December will work on a draft text, and the final agreement is supposed to be adopted in Paris late next year. Even the form the agreement will take is up for grabs. Thus it could be a protocol, a legally binding supplementary agreement to the UNFCCC, like the Kyoto Protocol. Or it could be “an outcome with legal force,”⁵ which could reaffirm basic UNFCCC obligations and set out political commitments regarding reductions of emissions, policies of adaptation to climate change, and financial support for developing countries.⁶

The Obama administration may prefer the latter or similar approach that would not require gaining Senate approval of a treaty. The Marshall Islands and most other states would clearly prefer a global treaty containing binding obligations on emission reductions and other substantive matters.

Negotiations on a new agreement – and other actions and policies as well – should be guided by the objective set by the UNFCCC: stabilization of greenhouse

gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system. Indeed that is required by the legal principle *pacta sunt servanda*: a treaty is legally binding and must be performed in good faith. In this case that means negotiating within the UNFCCC process so as to achieve its objective; the same is also true of the NPT and its Article VI. Good faith in conducting negotiations requires among other things awareness of the interests of other parties; a persevering quest for an acceptable compromise, with a willingness to contemplate modification of one’s own position; and no undue delay or prolongation of the process.

Conclusion

In the seminal and too often forgotten 1978 Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, the General Assembly declared that states should “refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.” That is the course of action the Marshall Islands is seeking to stimulate with its initiative in the International Court of Justice. The General Assembly’s injunction is a fitting guide as well for climate protection. In each field, the Marshall Islands exemplifies both what is at stake and the courage to fight for what is needed.

John Burroughs is Executive Director of the New York-based Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy and a member of the Marshall Islands’ legal team in the cases before the International Court of Justice. This article draws on remarks he made at a September 20, 2014 Climate Convergence workshop, “Deadly Connections: Challenging Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Climate Change” (see www.wslfweb.org/deadlyconnections.htm for videos of presentations).

⁴ See David Wei, “Six Feet Above Sea Level: Marshall Islands and Climate Diplomacy,” *Courier*, The Stanley Foundation, October 2014.

⁵ See “Durban: Towards full implementation of the UN Climate Change Convention,” http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php.

⁶ Cf. Coral Davenport, “Obama Pursuing Climate Accord in Lieu of Treaty,” *New York Times*, August 26, 2014.

Different Paths to Peace



*Former child soldiers headed for home, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, January 2009
Credit: UN Photo/Marie Frechon*

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in Bismarck's Germany), the official promulgation of festivals and ceremonies, and the militarization of society at large, as distinct from the armed forces serving the needs of the royal household. All these phenomena made it feasible for a cohort of 19th century historians in Western nations, typified by Macaulay in Britain, Guizot in France, Parkman in the United States, and Ranke in Germany to write, as Cannadine observes "...narrative history (each) tracing the rise of his respective nation and insisting on its exceptionalism and providential blessing and thus its superiority to the rivals against whom it had often made war..." They "...provided the carefully selected collective memory that became an essential prop to this new and widely shared sense of national identity." (Cannadine, p.70)

When the bleak test case of modern national identity in the West was launched in August of 1914, a great deal of denial was required to reckon the Great War as a play among nations as advertised. Consider language as a quintessential marker. Half of French schoolchildren at the outbreak of the war spoke another language at home... mutually unintelligible dialects and patois, or, in border departments, Catalan, Flemish, or German. Italian unification, officially completed in 1871, created a polity in which, at the beginning of the War, less than 5% of the population was speaking Italian. Germany was also polyglot; Austria-Hungary, spectacularly so.

What we would call the executive leadership of the participating countries, mostly regal, fails to stir the native blood as well. Queen Victoria and her consort: Germans whose extended families were significantly intermarried with Russian aristocracy. The Hohenzollerns themselves, who were at least as much Romanian as German, nonetheless, under a dubious constitutional reform, ruled both as kings of Prussia and emperors of Germany... confusing for the poor subject who receives a draft notice. The Habsburgs, originating in an 11th century Swiss castle, over the centuries, in their two branches, succeeded in intermarrying with almost everyone and at various times supplied kings for a range of countries from Sicily to England to Hungary, as well as, in the person of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the ruler of Austria-Hungary whose assassination triggered the war with Serbia and then the cascade into continental conflict.

All in all, the Great War has the flavor of a family feud...but difficult to construe as among discrete nations led by royals, because the imperial factor prevailed. As Cannadine points out, "...Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman realms were not single-identity nations at all: they were land-based empires where many nationalities coexisted, with varying degrees of amity and success." Further, France, Britain, and the United States had

established maritime-based dominions, each with different political and emotional relations to the center. One has only to think of the varied perspectives of Cote d'Ivoirians, New Zealanders, and Filipinos. The outcome of imperial reach was more cultural diversity but a dilution of identity, and ambiguity in affiliation (the misuse of ANZAC troops in the Turkish and South African campaigns of the Great War remains an iconic source of controversy for some).

But it was the imperial aspect which made it impossible for most Western nations to sit things out; of the European nations, only Spain, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries were able to resist participation. For some countries, like possessing nuclear weapons today, enlisting was a ticket to the important club...hence, Brazil, an independent country, went to war alongside the Entente. And almost all African countries were dragged in; only Ethiopia and the small North African colonies of Spain remained neutral. And, en suite, a key result of the War as world maelstrom was the dissolution through defeat of the German, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires.

From the present perspective, it seems like a global fever, with terrible cost. And if the millions of human beings swept in seem compliant at this distance, that may be a distortion by broad brush. As this reviewer was reading up on the well-known anti-war poetry of British young men in the trenches (Brooke, Sassoon, Graves, and so on), he discovered a body of pro-war poetry and poster art devoted to shaming young men into enlisting...psychological mobilization. Evidently all were not so eager.

Cannadine raises other factors that diluted the national identities of the late 19th century even as they were being molded, including the internationalization of business and communications (a European common market in 1860, and the first true international organizations that were dedicated to postal service and cable traffic); the expansion of significant expatriation, such as the German colony in Manchester; and the first substantial exchange of what we would call "best practices" today, in government services and business...the emergence of the "foreign expert" (other than the court musicians and jesters of old). Ours is now the second round of globalization.

His discussion of "civilizations" as a variant form of aggregated identity is if anything even more dismissive. The term "civilization" itself is a late-comer, emerging in France during the Enlightenment, slowly gaining acceptability in England, and by the end of the 18th century becoming a cross-Channel commonplace. "Zivilization" did not come into ascendancy in Germany, however; Germans subordinated it to the preferred "Kultur"...this, not civilization, which sounded much more mechanistic and vulgar to Teutonic

sensibility (he cites Thomas Mann, among others), was where the deep resonance of a people's nature lay, their artistic and philosophical expressions, and their soul. Later, in Gibbon's classic *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, the concept of classical civilization (quintessentially the Roman republic, not the later imperial period) was counter-posed with the "barbarianism" of first the Goths, and then a congeries of peoples beyond Roman-controlled territory, who ultimately both conquered and reinvigorated Rome.

Like many folks, your reviewer had thought the term "barbarian" referred to the unbarbered, the bearded yahoos across the Mediterranean from the smooth-cheeked Attic Greeks. No, it is much worse, in fact a xenophobic insult to the languages of The Other, sounding in the superior ear as "ba-ba, bar-bar" babble, and thus an insult to its speakers. The insistence on difference does become embedded in inferiorizing language, with the dog radical integral to ancient Chinese names for Central Asians beyond the Great Wall, and of course in wartime emerges the tribalized sanctioning of ugly epithets, which need not be recorded here...you know the ones.

In essence, the phenomenon is to define by difference and to dehumanize the threatening other, the better to defend against or, as desired, to conquer. Who, then, are "we"? Why the civilized ones, of course--those who embody the traditions and values of a great civilization. As Montaigne said, "Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice."

By the early 20th century, variants of Gibbon's model, further influenced by the emergence of the social sciences, especially anthropology and sociology (with an explosion of research into non-European peoples) began to map a world of civilizational pluralities and differences. None of this made a great deal of sense...there was a constant definitional sloshing about, with odd attributions and promotions and demotions in the works of Taggart, Spengler, and Toynbee. Leaders of the warring powers in both World Wars, however, exploited rhetoric that called for the defense of this or that civilized set of values. Most recently, political scientist Samuel Huntington, in response to an article by Bernard Lewis, adopted what turned out to be a Monster Meme, the Clash of Civilizations. And what does that mean, exactly? Huntington himself backed away from his original unconvincing lineup of Western, Latin American, Islamic, Confucian, Hindu, Japanese, Orthodox, African, and Buddhist. Although his intention seemed to have been to emphasize a prospective shift away from Western dominance, the taxonomy is clearly riddled with inconsistencies and curiosities, such as an India dubbed "Hindu" which has a secular constitution and the third-largest Muslim population on earth. Korea

was put with China ("Sinic" in an amendment), but Japan comprises its own civilization. And so on. Cannadine guides us through Huntington's considerable back-pedaling on such points, allows that he was really posing an admonition, not a probability of conflict, and provides a good account of why and how a vulgarized version was adopted by neo-conservative supporters of the Iraq War.

Throughout, the author's tour of his six categories of identity is lively and persuasive. *The Undivided Past* is highly recommended. Professor Cannadine obliges us to revisit the history of wars and geopolitical antagonisms that we as non-specialists thought we understood sufficiently, and guides us through a much richer and balanced alternative narrative. In graceful and occasionally mordant prose, he treats us to a past filled with fruitful interactions and cooperative efforts, and verifies and celebrates our common humanity.

Charles Rosenberg

"From out there on the Moon, international politics look so petty. You want to grab a politician by the scruff of the neck and drag him a quarter of a million miles out and say, 'Look at that, you SOB.'"

Edgar Mitchel, Apollo 14 astronaut, 8 April 1974.



69 th UN General Assembly Action Initiated by the First Committee on Disarmament & International Security			China	France	Russia	United Kingdom	United States	Algeria	Argentina	Australia	Austria	Bangladesh	Belarus	Belgium	Brazil	Bulgaria	Cameroon	Canada	Chile	Colombia	Cuba	DPRK	DR Congo	Ecuador	Egypt	
Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context	A/RES/69/46	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels	A/RES/69/47	181-1-2	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	
Regional confidence-building measures: Security questions in Central Africa	A/RES/69/73	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Strengthening security & cooperation in the Mediterranean region	A/RES/69/80	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Other Disarmament Measures and Intl Security	Resolution #	Yes-No-Abstain																								
Information and telecommunications in international security	A/C.1/69/28	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	A/RES/69/44	162-1-17	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	-	Y	A
Promotion of multilateralism in disarmament & non-proliferation	A/RES/69/54	131-5-49	Y	A	Y	N	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y
Observance of environmental norms in disarmament agreements	A/RES/69/55	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Relationship between disarmament and development	A/RES/69/56	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Compliance w non-proliferation/arms limitation/disarmament agreements	A/RES/69/59	170-1-10	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	-	A	A
Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures	A/RES/69/60	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control	A/RES/69/61	183-0-0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y
Information on confidence-building in the field of conventional arms	A/RES/69/64	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education	A/RES/69/65	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Disarmament Machinery and Programs	Resolution #	Yes-No-Abstain																								
U.N. Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific	A/RES/69/68	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
U.N. regional centres for peace and disarmament	A/RES/69/70	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
U.N. Disarmament Information Programme	A/RES/69/71	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
U.N. Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean	A/RES/69/72	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
U.N. Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament in Africa	A/RES/69/74	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
U. N. disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services	A/RES/69/75	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Report of the Conference on Disarmament	A/RES/69/76	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Report of the Disarmament Commission	A/RES/69/77	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Report of the Conference on Disarmament	A/RES/69/64	without vote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Note about the chart: This chart shows voting records from the 69th U.N. General Assembly (2014) on issues of disarmament and international security. The countries shown are the 65 members of the Conference on Disarmament. A full listing of the resolutions of the General Assembly is available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/resolutions.shtml>. Additional information, including the First Committee Monitor, is available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org. This chart and past years' voting charts are available at www.ngocdps.org

continued from page 1

counts as 'normal' understandings about nuclear weapons and nuclear practices. It is these regimes of nuclear truth that perpetuate the social-technological networks that continue to produce nuclear weapons. These networks comprise bureaucracies, technologies, industries, allies and politicians. They will not endure on their own but need to be continually reproduced over time. Narratives of nuclear truth that continue to assign multiple values to nuclear weapons facilitate this process. In fact, it is hard to imagine such networks holding together without these narratives.³

This dynamic is at work in Ukraine where advocates of NATO's nuclearized 'strategic concept' tell us the solution is more nuclear weapons to deter Russian adventurism, Moscow threatens nuclear retaliation for any attempt to retake Crimea, and nuclear 'realists' lament Ukraine's negotiated repatriation of its Soviet weapons to Russia in 1994.⁴ Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggressive destabilisation of Ukraine are framed as a fundamental challenge to the fabric of international order, an order that can only be maintained through Western military might and the ultimate sanction of massive nuclear violence. Western and Russian strategic specialists in foreign and defence ministries and their associated think-tanks have been quick to dust off a Cold War playbook and interpret contemporary events through a comfortably familiar lens. Nuclear weapons are revalidated through the resurgent language of strategic stability, alliance credibility, and *realpolitik*. They are valued as part of the solution to geopolitical threat rather than part of the problem for cooperative human security. Russia's actions in Ukraine should not be condoned—they do indeed ride roughshod over hard won international norms and laws—but reducing the political violence in Ukraine to a Cold War redux not only re-values nuclear weapons in a narrow geopolitical conception of state security, but also buries the complex socio-political and economic origins of the crisis and the practical hopes of Ukrainians of all creeds for a better standard of living and political accountability.

Nuclear truths are therefore not self-evident but contingent. They are actively constructed as a discursive political act. It is important, then, to challenge received strategic 'facts' that insist on the necessity of nuclear weapons for our security—to shine a light on the social and historical contingency of these nuclear 'truths' in order to create political space for different conceptions of security that do not rely on threats of appalling nuclear violence. To accomplish this we need to think about nuclear weap-

ons culturally and sociologically as well as politically and technologically.

This is where the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons initiative is posing a real challenge to nuclear orthodoxy. It actively challenges the meanings assigned to nuclear weapons by reframing nuclear weapons discourse away from an agenda that privileges a glacially protracted nuclear force reductions process dominated by NPT nuclear-weapon state interaction, to one that includes serious consideration of the unacceptable humanitarian impact of using nuclear weapons.⁵ In doing so the initiative is implicitly (and for some explicitly) seeking to delegitimise nuclear weapons as acceptable instruments of statecraft.⁶

Nuclear weapons are valued in part because they are deemed legitimate to so value. If normative and legal changes were to render nuclear weapons wholly illegitimate through explicit and widespread political and social stigmatisation, then the values assigned to nuclear weapons would change.⁷ A growing coalition of non-nuclear weapon states and global civil society organisations have been working together to undermine the value of nuclear weapons by stripping their use and possession of any legitimacy. This discourse builds on the informal stigmatisation of the use of nuclear weapons captured in the idea of a "nuclear taboo".⁸ A number of those who drive this process are seeking to codify the normative illegitimacy of nuclear violence in a legal instrument that outlaws nuclear possession and use for all states.⁹

What we are witnessing, then, is the emergence of a fresh discourse on nuclear weapons that challenges the justifiability of the rules and norms that are used to legitimise the continued possession and potential use of nuclear weapons by invoking a different narrative of global society based on a different set of rules and norms.¹⁰ In short, the political authority of the humanitarian approach rests on the basic 'cosmopolitan' idea that we should place the individual and common humanity at the centre of our thinking about security, rather than the state, territory, and militarised conceptions of the 'national interest'. It is part of a broader and ongoing international project to develop and institutionalise a network of interlocking rules and norms that limit the indiscriminate and arbitrary use of power for advantage. This includes laws, regimes, rights and responsibilities that govern the conduct of war and proscribe unacceptable weapons.¹¹

This approach gathered momentum with the for-

mation of a coalition of states ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, following the successful negotiation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2008. An emerging consensus was reflected in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference that noted for the first time ‘the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.’¹² It was followed by further statements at the 2012 and 2013 NPT PrepComs by Norway and Switzerland that gained ever more support. This led to a ground-breaking conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo in March 2013, to a second conference in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and now, a third conference in Vienna in December 2014. The ‘Joint statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament’ delivered at the 2012 NPT PrepCom by Switzerland’s Ambassador, Benno Laggner, had 16 signatories.¹³ This expanded to 34 nations at the UN General Assembly First Committee in October 2012 when Laggner delivered a similar statement.¹⁴ This more than doubled at the April 2013 NPT PrepCom to 80 nations for the statement delivered by South Africa’s Ambassador, Abdul Minty.¹⁵

Ambassador Minty stated: ‘It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances. The catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, cannot be adequately addressed. All efforts must be exerted to eliminate this threat. The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is through their total elimination. It is a shared responsibility of all States to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament, including through fulfilling the objectives of the NPT and achieving its universality. The full implementation of the 2010 Action Plan and previous outcomes aimed at achieving the objectives of the NPT must therefore not be postponed any further.’

The Oslo conference hosted by the Norwegian government attracted 128 countries, as well as several UN organisations and the International Red Cross movement. The humanitarian disarmament narrative was reiterated at the UN General Assembly’s High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in September 2013, the UN Open-Ended Working Group on multilateral nuclear disarmament that also reported in September 2013, and the UN General As-

sembly First Committee in October 2013.¹⁶ New Zealand delivered an additional ‘Joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons’ at the latter, this time sponsored by 125 countries.¹⁷

The narrative was further developed at the second conference on ‘The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’ in Nayarit attended by 146 states. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear conflict and compliance with International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed conflict were explicitly referenced in the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting Chair’s concluding recommendations to 2015 NPT Review Conference.¹⁸ A ‘Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons’ was delivered by New Zealand at the General Assembly’s First Committee in October 2014, this time sponsored by 155 countries.¹⁹ Finally, 159 countries and many international organisations attended the third conference in Vienna on 8-9 December 2014. The Austrian government closed the conference with a formal pledge to ‘to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders, States, International Organisations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements, parliamentarians and civil society, in efforts to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks.’²⁰

For the majority of the world, the risk of nuclear violence posed by the continued existence, proliferation, and modernisation of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. A growing coalition of states is no longer prepared to accept the slow and open-ended ‘step-by-step’ nuclear disarmament agenda endorsed by the nuclear weapons states. Their reaction, borne out of frustration, is challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weapons based on the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of the use these weapons. The legitimacy of nuclear weapons has been questioned since the beginning of the nuclear age. The humanitarian initiative is placing that sense of illegitimacy in a contemporary context, not least by questioning how a state can be committed to the threat and use of nuclear weapons with all their devastating consequences on the one hand, and committed to human rights, the rule of law, Millennium Development Goals, human security, and international order on the other. Supporters of the initiative are marshalling institutional and normative power to try and change the discourse on nuclear weapons and mobilise irresistible pressure for significant change.

Their underlying argument is that a stable and se-

cure global society does not need nuclear scaffolding--simply, that nuclear weapons constitute a continuing threat to global society rather than an inescapable structural necessity. The challenge, then, is building the institutions, cultures, and ways of thinking that enable the integration of rising powers into an 'expanded global consensus' in ways that do not run dangerous risks of catastrophic nuclear violence and perpetuate the statist, patriarchal, militarised 'necessity' of nuclear weapons. In short, the project—and it is a noble one—is to strip nuclear weapons of value and legitimacy to ensure that we don't collectively reproduce global structures of nuclear violence for another 70 years.

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Confidence in the Biological Weapons Convention: What is it? How can it be secured?

Brian Rappert and Chandré Gould

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has defined biological weapons as categorically illegitimate. As such, this represents a major achievement of the international community. And yet, in recent years, many States Parties to the BWC have expressed unease about its accomplishments and future direction.

A key topic of concern is confidence in the Convention itself, and the role of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in securing confidence. As part of the political obligations on governments, those party to the treaty are meant to complete CBM declarations each year. The stated intention of these declarations is to establish confidence in the commitment of parties to the Convention. As Filippa Lentzos overviewed in the Spring/Summer issue of *Disarmament Times*, in recent times, much of the consideration of confidence has been couched in terms of CBMs – and yet some states argue that they may even offer a distraction from finding more substantial means to build and secure confidence in the treaty. In this article we consider the limits of CBMs and ask what more is needed to establish and maintain confidence among States Parties.

Discussions about CBMs within the BWC since 2007 have been preoccupied with significant -- but largely technical -- issues of how to improve the quality and the number of States Parties submissions. It is our contention that promoting confidence requires something other than further discussion and further refinement. Indeed, expending more energy on CBMs might ultimately prove counter-productive. Instead of more of the same, alternative types of discussion needed to be nurtured.

CONFIDENCE IN THE PAST

This conclusion follows from research conducted by the authors that took as its topic the way in which States Parties have dealt with declarations about past of-

fensive programmes. 'Form F' of the CBMs asks states to declare past offensive and defensive research and development programs. While this is likely to be a sensitive issue for some states, forthright declarations about past programmes are part of states' commitment to the treaty. Yet neither the declaration form itself, nor its contents, have been the subject of any significant attention in recent years by those party to the BWC.

We were interested in why this was the case, particularly since what is known publicly would suggest that several states with past major offensive programmes have failed to declare them, or have only declared limited aspects. We found it difficult to reconcile the CBMs stated goals of transparency and building confidence with the limited attention given to the Form F declarations in BWC meetings. We wanted to understand how this was tied to confidence in the BWC and belief in the value of CBMs.

While several country cases could be used, we examined these issues in relation to the lack of a declaration of South Africa's past biological weapons programme. Under the code name Project Coast, between 1981 and 1995 a chemical and biological warfare programme was established and maintained in South Africa. This case was chosen because of the authors' familiarity with it, and because significant detail about the programme is already in the public domain. In addition, the ideological and temporal distance between the apartheid state and the current South African state, as well as the positive contribution to the BWC made by South Africa for many years since the end of apartheid, meant this case was relatively open for examination.

Despite this, not only has South Africa not declared an offensive biological research and development programme under the Biological Weapons Convention, but little to no mention has been made of this non-recognition within the proceedings of the Convention by other states, in the same way that little mention has been made about the absence of, or incompleteness, of other states' CBM declarations.

INQUIRY INTO THE PRESENT

In order to understand why this was the case and what it suggested about the origins of confidence, in 2013 and 2014 we conducted 16 interviews with key individuals from South Africa as well as leading international contributors to recent CBM discussions. From these we hoped to

hear what interviewees would (and would not) say about the history of the South African programme today, as well as what they thought what should (and should not) be said about it.

Our initial round of interviews suggested two important points. One, our respondents offered substantially divergent assessments about fundamental issues, such as whether South Africa had an 'offensive' bioweapons programme at all, as well as whether the lack of an declaration should be of concern.

Two, defensive reasoning was also prevalent. Interviewees conveyed that in the course of their work they avoided making statements that were threatening or could cause political embarrassment to others. Upon reflection, we also noticed that we as researchers were engaging in such defensive behaviour ourselves. Within the interviews we avoided issues we thought would be too personally or professionally threatening, so as to maintain rapport. Neither we nor the interviewees mentioned, much less explored, the fact that this was taking place.

In light of such experiences we decided to take the prevalence of defensive reasoning as our focus. In doing so we drew on the work of scholar Chris Argyris. Based on numerous ambitious and well-regarded efforts to foster organisational change, Argyris concluded that many forms of interaction foster self-reinforcing defensive routines that inhibit robust inquiry. Attempts to stay in control of situations and avoid oneself or others being threatened means there is often little testing of the basis for views and evaluations. Defensive reasoning leads to the use of covert attributions of motives, scapegoating, the treatment of one's own views as obvious and valid, and the use of unsupported evaluations. The common end result is the reproduction of (potentially invalid) assessments and inferences that decrease possibilities for changing thinking and behaviour, a kind of frozen state.

One technique proposed by Argyris for exploring and altering learning patterns involves the production of 'Action Maps'. These seek to reveal the inter-related variables that individuals identify as relevant to their learning; notably those self-maintaining and self-reinforcing patterns that limit learning. The maps themselves also act as hypotheses to be debated and refined over time, and in this way Action Maps can provide the basis for building agreement about what is really taking place (and not), why, and what needs to be done to alter such circumstances.

Change can be accomplished if Action Maps are used patiently and persistently in cycles of dialogue, reflection and intervention--their use can foster alternative behaviours and relationships within organizations and other groups..

Figure 1 provides the Action Map we produced through the interviews and subsequent feedback pertaining to why South Africa's failure to declare an offensive programme has been 'bypassed' or made irrelevant within the BWC.

The box on the extreme left sets out the general governing conditions that influence and inform interactions between states. These conditions define possibilities for action, and constraints on action, by officials across the topics covered in the BWC. The map then lists the factors specific to the case of South Africa that our interviewees thought contributed to the lack of recognition or relevance of the past programme. The map then identifies more general factors that led to some CBM-related concerns becoming non-issues. We then mapped the consequences interviewees identified on group dynamics, which then have consequences for problem solving and decision making within the BWC.

For instance, anyone seeking to raise fundamental concerns about the contents of CBMs wrestle with a basic bind: if they raise points of concerns with what is (or is not) being discussed, then this is likely to be seen as politically motivated posturing. Drawing attention to awkward matters could also be seen as counterproductive to achieving positive reforms. Yet if points of concern with what is (or is not) being discussed are not raised, then it is also not possible to achieve positive reform. Within these difficult situations, frustration and withdrawal are likely. Without the airing of varied perspectives, alternative options, and conflicting viewpoints, collective reasoning is impaired. All these factors taken together reduce confidence in the international prohibition.

As indicated by the flow of arrows, each set of issues shapes the others. For instance, the inability to identify that there is a problem that ought to be addressed, at least in the eyes of some, makes it more difficult to build a process in which CBMs are discussed and, where necessary, queried. This in turn hinders the ability to identify problems collectively, as there is no other multinational forum in which to raise it.

As set out in this map, the ways in which the South

African past programme and declaration became non-issues reflect a much wider set of countervailing pressures and competing imperatives within the BWC that have negative consequences for international relations and weapon prohibitions--including how little time and opportunity there is for collective discussion.

FIGURE 1 ACTION MAP



MOVING INTO THE FUTURE

A key prediction follows: in the absence of attention to what does and does not become the focus of attention in the BWC today – and to the underlying and unstated assumptions that determine what is and what is not discussed, attempts to enhance confidence through greater participation in CBMs are likely to be of limited potential. Indeed, without addressing why some matters become ‘non-issues’, greater participation in CBMs might well result in more matters being sealed off from consideration because of defensive reasoning. Rather than simply re-doubling efforts then, it is necessary to question what action should be undertaken.

Since the production of this map, we have sought to use the formation and discussion of this map as basis for encouraging reflection among government officials, members of civil society, and others about the role of CBMs in confidence building, and to use it as a basis for exploring what else, other than CBMs, might enhance confidence in the treaty. We invite readers to respond to us about the value and validity of the map.

What the map shows is that the potential of CBMs to serve the purpose of building confidence is constrained by overarching conditions within the BWC. These are expressed in an ironic tension. Under the defensive reasoning and action in the BWC, it is the lack of transparency that is often taken by those interviewed as a requirement for maintaining confidence. As such there is no direct relationship perceived between a lack of information sharing and a lack of confidence. And yet, in longer term, the incentives and disincentives associated with defensive reasoning were also regarded as having significant negative consequences that could, or have, undermined confidence in the international prohibition of biological weapons.

Although the challenges of moving beyond entrenched and self-reinforcing defensive routines are considerable, developments in arms control and disarmament more broadly suggest grounds for optimism. In recent years a number of attempts have been made to devise fora that provide opportunities for non-traditional forms of interaction between officials and civil society. The Oslo Process that led to the signing of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008, and the ongoing efforts to address the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, illustrate the ability of groupings of interested parties to

devise novel forums for action. In their substantive focus, location, governing rules, participation, and duration, such fora have provided a basis for taking forward demanding matters. The hope is that similar novel and productive means of moving forward can be found for the BWC.

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Bacteriological Warfare Convention Review Conference

Different Paths to Peace



Weapons ready for destruction by the UN Mission in South Sudan, December 2014

Credit: UN Photo/Isaac Billy

ANNALS OF UNCERTAINTY

From the beginning, engineering the first experimental nuclear explosive devices into stable weaponry, safe to its architects and handlers, was an enormous challenge. At the time of the U. S. attack on Japan, 2/3 of the weight of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was comprised of shielding to prevent nuclear detonation if hit by enemy fire. Later, developments in the sensitivity of the high explosives in the fission chain reduced this chance to nearly zero, so that the principal threat to nuclear safety was human error or misjudgment.

And with all the sophisticated calculations by a group comprised of many of the world's eminent scientists, the yield of these weapons could only be verified through tests. The power of the weapon detonated in the Castle Bravo test at Bikini Atoll came as a surprise; it was ultimately rated as the second-most powerful explosion ever. Here is a first-hand account excerpted from Richard Rhodes' *Dark Sun: The Making Of The Hydrogen Bomb* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2012):

On March 1 (1954), Los Alamos and Livermore initiated a new thermonuclear test series, ...exploding the first lithium-deuteride-fueled US thermonuclear, a Los Alamos device called "Shrimp"... The...device used lithium enriched to 40 percent lithium6; it weighed a relatively portable 23,500 pounds and had been designed to fit the bomb bay of a B-47 when it was weaponized. It was expected to yield about five megatons, but the group at Los Alamos that had measured lithium fusion cross sections had used a technique that missed an important fusion reaction in lithium7, the other 60 percent of component. "They really Harold Agnew explains, was an n,2n reaction [i.e., lithium nucleus knocked missed it entirely. That's gangbusters."



Bravo exploded megatons, the largest-device the US ever expanded to nearly four engulfed its 7,500-foot the way out to the earth-bunker, which barely people in experiment the expected limits of task force ships far out at was thirty miles away," Marshall Rosenbluth

this horrible white stuff raining out on us. I got 10 rads of radiation from it. It was pretty frightening. There was a huge fireball with these turbulent rolls going in and out. The thing was glowing. It looked to me like a diseased brain up in the sky. It spread until the edge of it looked as if it was almost directly overhead. It was a much more awesome sight than a puny little atomic bomb. It was a pretty sobering and shattering experience." Bravo vaporized a crater 250 feet deep and 6,500 feet in diameter out of the atoll rock; Rosenbluth's "horrible white stuff" was calcium precipitated from vaporized coral.

the Shrimp lithium fuel didn't know," (physicist) "that with lithium7 there one neutron entering a two neutrons out]. They why Shrimp went like

with a yield of fifteen yield thermonuclear tested...the fireball miles in diameter. It diagnostic pipe array all banked instrument survived. It trapped bunkers well outside its effects and menaced sea. "I was on a ship that (Theoretical physicist) remembers, "and we had

Different Paths to Peace



A Nuclear-Weapons-Free State

With the final withdrawal of all Russian troops in September of 1992, Mongolia, a client state since the early 20th century, and a de facto enemy of China, had a unique opportunity to assert its neutrality and cultivate friendly relations with its two nuclear power neighbors.

President Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat wasted no time in declaring that his country would seek to become the first single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone (SS-NWFZ). This unprecedented option (for other than groups of states, or a region) was supported by a study directed by the UN General Assembly through Resolution 3261 F. It did take until February 3, 2000 to fully enter into force.

Under Mongolia's treaty, any individual, legal person or any foreign State is prohibited on its territory

from committing, initiating, or participating in a) developing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring, possessing, or having control over nuclear weapons; b) stationing or transporting nuclear weapons by any means (includes air space, land, waters, and sub-soil); and c) dumping or disposing nuclear weapons-grade radioactive material or nuclear waste. All transshipment of such weaponry or materials is forbidden, and a full range of entities, national and international bodies, and, in addition, commissioned NGO's and individuals, are empowered to verify compliance.

Mongolia removed itself from the nuclear shadow and stands among those seeking to de-legitimize nuclear weapons.