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VINCY: A Smart-contract based Data Integrity and Validation Tooling for Automated Vehicle Incident Investigation

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Abstract—Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) are being manufactured at an accelerated rate, leading to improvements in traffic safety, reduced energy consumption, pollution, and congestion. ADS relies on various data streams from onboard sensors, external road infrastructure, and other vehicles to make driving decisions. For effective traffic accident reconstruction, investigators must produce, collect, store, and access real-time data. To ensure meaningful investigation, the data used by investigators must be accurate and maintain its integrity.

In this paper, we propose a smart-contract based data integrity and validation tool for automated vehicle incident investigation during road trials, considering uncertainties in a real-world environment.

Index Terms—Smart contract, Validation, Data Integrity, Autonomous Vehicles, Accident Investigation, Safety, Blockchain, Trustworthiness, Future Networks, Autonomous Systems, Ethereum

I. INTRODUCTION

Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) are being developed and integrated into vehicles at an increasing rate. These systems have the potential to significantly disrupt the fundamentals of road transport in the coming decade and beyond. As automation takes over the primary functions of dynamic driving tasks (DDT), the reliance on human drivers for decision-making decreases. This shift is expected to enhance road safety and reduce energy consumption, pollution, and traffic congestion.

However, ensuring public safety and security remains a crucial aspect when deploying vehicles with automated control technologies. While car manufacturers extensively test their technologies in controlled environments during development and verification stages, public road trials are necessary to validate the safety of newly developed ADSs in real-world conditions that involve unpredictable elements.

ADSs rely on various data feeds from onboard sensors, external road infrastructure, and other vehicles to make control decisions. To understand and analyze traffic events, investigators need access to real-time data that is produced, collected, stored, and made available. Reconstructing traffic events through real-time data can help identify causes and provide recommendations to minimize the risk of future incidents. For meaningful investigations, it is crucial that the data used by investigators is accurate and maintains its integrity, and investigators can trust its reliability.

This paper focuses on ensuring the integrity of incident data, and it explores the potential of blockchain technology to provide data immutability through cryptography and distributed peer-to-peer networks. Modern blockchains allow both data and programs (smart contracts) to be stored, eliminating the need for reliance on trusted third parties for data collection, storage, processing, and distribution. This is particularly important for ADSs, considering the significant intellectual property, reputational, security, and safety issues involved. There may even be liability and potential criminal proceedings implications for organizations developing and operating ADSs. To address these challenges, the paper introduces a software tool prototype called VINCY, designed to assist trial organizations (TO) and safety investigators in incident investigations involving ADSs. The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides background information and discusses related work. Section III presents the problem statement and motivation behind the project, along with a brief explanation of the current challenges. Section IV describes the system architecture and requirements for the proposed support tool. Section V discusses the evaluation results, and Section VI concludes the paper by summarizing the findings and suggesting avenues for future work.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A. Automated vehicles and Automated Driving Systems

In this report the term “on-road” is used as defined by the International Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in their Ground Vehicle Standard [1]: On-road refers to publicly accessible roadways (including parking areas and private campuses that permit public access) that collectively serve all road users, including cyclists, pedestrians, and users of vehicles with and without driving automation features.” It has been widely recognized that driver performance is a key factor impacting the safety of on-road vehicle transport. A 2015 report by the US National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation estimated human error as the critical causation for 94% of vehicle accidents[2]. A U.S congressional report states that the three motivations for driving motor innovations are:

- technological advances enabled by new materials and more powerful, compact electronics;
- consumer demand for telecommunications connectivity and new types of vehicle ownership and ridesharing; and
- regulatory mandates pertaining to emissions, fuel efficiency, and safety [3].

As a result, the automotive industry has been introducing vehicle features which assist the driver's operation of a vehicle with a vision toward more vehicle automation through ADSs and a longer-term goal of a fully autonomous vehicle. New vehicle technology has often translated into a safer environment for road users [3]. Widely used augmentation features among cars include vision such as cameras and sensors, detection and response through collision warning and assisted lane keeping safety technology. More recently, ADSs are being developed and deployed that go beyond augmenting the driver's awareness and operation, by performing driving functions automatically such as emergency braking to avoid collisions. A review carried out by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 2018 identified twenty-four unique conceptual ADS features for on-road vehicles which were subsequently grouped into seven generic categories [4]. As such, vehicles and their subsystems don't fall into binary categories "automated" or "not automated". Therefore in 2013, the NHTSA introduced a taxonomy of five levels of vehicle automation. Conversely, in 2014, SAE introduced a six-level taxonomy for driving automation systems [1]. The NHTSA has since adopted SAE's six level taxonomy which has become the widespread industry standard. The six levels range from no driving automation (Level 0) through to full driving automation (level 5). These levels are broadly defined as:

- Level 0: No Driving Automation
- Level 1: Driver Assistance
- Level 2: Partial Driving Automation
- Level 3: Conditional Driving Automation
- Level 4: High Driving Automation
- Level 5: Full Driving Automation

These standardised levels refer to driving automation features that are engaged during on-road operation of the vehicle at any given time. Therefore, although an ADS equipped vehicle may be capable of achieving any given level of driving automation, the level of driving automation at any given time is classified by the features that are engaged in that instance.

B. Advantages of Automated Vehicles

Widespread use of AVs potentially brings a broad range of benefits and influences to society including:

- **Accident Reduction:** AVs have the potential to reduce most accidents and mitigate the severity of injuries by using technologies that outperform human driver's "perception, decision-making and execution" [5]. Bocca and Baek [6] reviewed 50 accident reports from 2018 to analyse the impact careless human-driving had on the collisions with AVs and found that 92% of collisions were caused by human drivers. Furthermore, the reported collisions caused by AVs vehicles caused only minor damage.
- **Congestion:** AV technologies may reduce road congestion if large scale adoption takes place. This reduction would be due to more efficient routing of vehicles, AV sharing services, less accidents and innovative combined vehicle ownership models. However, it's possible that this benefit

is diminished if individual ownership models for vehicles remains the popular choice, or there is an increase in vehicle usage if passengers opt to be dropped off and have their vehicle move to low-priced car parking or run other errands [7]

- **Economic Benefits:** Andersson and Ivehammar [8] used a cost-benefit analysis to determine the generalised cost of operating an AV versus a manually driven vehicle (MDV). They concluded that operating an AV had a lower generalised cost than an MDV. They illustrated that for the capital costs to outweigh the combined benefit from operating costs and travel time saved by using ADVs, an increase in capital costs of 22% and 3% was needed for cars and trucks respectively. In addition, the study points out there is a potential added economic gain to the traveller if AVs operate at a level of full driving automation as the traveller's attention can be saved for other uses. A further research report [9] estimated the societal cost of accidents in the U.S. is around 1 trillion USD annually. They then argued that assuming AVs would only address crashes resulting from "gross human error (distraction alcohol and speeding etc)" there would be a conservative annual reduction to societal costs of 500 billion USD.
- **Improved access:** Bocca and Baek [6] report that Owner operated vehicles have a barrier for non-drivers including young, and some elderly and physically challenged who are forced to use drivers or public transport options. A move to level-5 AVs will provide transport independence for non-drivers.

C. Implications of Automated Vehicles

Although the introduction and adoption of AVs will likely have its benefits, the move away from traditional driver operated vehicles brings with it a range of challenges to regulatory frameworks, liability laws, infrastructure and vehicle safety, communication, security, and privacy considerations.

Traditionally, governing frameworks have been setup to regulate road transportation through laws that license drivers, traffic regulation, liability, and insurance. As a result, regulatory institutions are having to react by introducing new policy and guidance at pace to keep in step with advancements in technology to not only provide a level of safety for the public but also a framework which allows the automotive industry to innovate.

Liability for an on-road traffic accident is conventionally assumed to be the driver of the vehicle at fault. Complexity is added when determining liability if responsibility of decision making and control input is being executed in part or in full by the vehicle at fault [5]. Liability assignment between driver, prime vehicle manufacturers and third parties involved in the design of the vehicles safety systems and sub systems lacks clarity as currently much of the world has no legal framework to assign liability from incidents involving ADS. This leaves manufacturers vulnerable to reputational risk from accidents that involve ADS and insurers attempting to assign liability for compensation and calculating risk-based insurance premiums.

UK law attempts to resolve this ambiguity between liability and insurance for AVs under certain accident scenarios, with Germany taking a similar approach albeit with less clarity [5]. Although the UK and Germany have provided some guidance, unlike most other countries, much of the liability is still assigned to the driver of a vehicle in the event of a crash which an ADS may have contributed to.

D. Safety Investigation Considerations

Modern systems entering the data centric age [10] are becoming increasingly integrated with extensive sociotechnical components including software, machine learning, IoT, autonomy and distributed cognition. Advanced ADS fit into this category. The scope, complexity and scale of automated systems continue to increase due to their varying levels of interconnection, the data points that they produce and the open context in which they operate in [11]. Analyzing the causal factors and the links between them for incidents involving these systems is becoming progressively more complex [12]. As a result, accident models are being developed and used to investigate safety related incidents to deal with data centric systems[10]. By considering the data from the entire system, including the organisation, management, policy, equipment, interfaces and integrations, analysis can be done to look at what went right as well as what went wrong. Conducting a system-based analysis can then be used to establish lessons learnt and subsequent recommendations. Large data collections will need to be analysed to enable accident investigation using systematic models with graphical solutions to augment textual techniques such as accident reports. Graphical solutions provide a means to represent properties of events, such as timing and sequences as factors.

Common techniques and models employed for causal analysis include traditional models such as fault trees, event tree analysis, Ishikawa diagrams and Petri-nets. More recent examples of safety analysis models, which take a systems safety approach, are Causal Analysis based on System Theory (CAST) [13] and the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM)[14]. The CAST approach to accident analysis takes a layered systems approach through a series of practical steps that investigate why existing preventative measures were not successful. FRAM models and assesses the complex functional interactions between elements within socio- technical systems and is primarily used for accident investigation [14]. Although all these models are useful for analysis and representation, there is no over-arching model which fits the full set of causal factors, instead they are each used to explore, analyze and represent the incident from different angles which can then feed into recommendations or be used to inform proactive system-based analysis models that are useful for identifying hazards and causes of accidents, such as a System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and a System Hazard Analysis (SHA).

E. Governance and Regulation

As discussed, validating ADS operational safety on public roads remains a challenge. While the use of emulators, such

as the Connected Autonomous Vehicle Emulator (CASE)[15], and private isolated road trials are useful when gathering validation data for safety analysis on general operation and edge case scenarios, they are unlikely to provide the full level of safety assurance required for commercial use on public roads [16]. Therefore, on-road trials of ADS are required to achieve safety assurance, at least within current frameworks. Furthermore, Koopman and Wagner [16], argue that to effectively and efficiently gather sufficient datasets for safety validation, a nuanced approach to data collection and safety analysis is required. Their suggested approach involves using high fidelity testing regimes to validate the assumptions and simplifications resulting from low fidelity testing.

Governments around the globe are implementing legal frameworks and guidance to allow and encourage on-road trials of AVs.

For example, the UK government published a Code of Practice in 2019 providing guidance to organizations wishing to carry out on-road trials [17]. The Publicly Available Specification (PAS):1881 [18], was published in 2020 compliments the code of practice. It provides a framework for safety cases specifying the minimum requirements for AV trials and development testing in the UK. The UK's PAS process "enables a specification to be rapidly developed in order to fulfil an immediate need in industry", displaying the government's commitment to efficiently provide a legal framework and guidance to facilitate ADS trials. In addition, PAS 1882 [18], released in 2021, specifies data collection and management for AV trials for the purpose of undertaking a safety incident investigation. This document recognizes the role data collection has on the ability to conduct meaningful causal investigations following an incident. It specifies the information gathering requirements that a trialing organisation (TO) needs to collect when conducting trials on the public road. This system-based approach to incident investigation is akin to that used in other critical safety sectors such as aviation, rail and marine, and contrasts with the current practice to vehicle investigation which, in general, only focuses on the driver and the vehicle. Not only does this document specify the information requirements for data collections deemed essential, but it also includes recommendations of additional information that should be collected. As there are an infinite number of data points which can support an investigation, planning needs to be conducted before a trial to ensure that all data collections are identified against known hazards and accident causes. Further, the ability to identify currently unknown hazards and causal factors must be considered. The information gathering requirements address data sets, access, storage, security, and stakeholders. Also included in the PAS:1882 is additional information that is recommended TOs collect to meet best practice. Moreover, it emphasizes that to enable system-based, fact-finding incident investigation, the provision of data collection, curation, storage and sharing needs to be trustworthy. Such information may also be requested and valuable to other stakeholders, including criminal and civil investigators and insurers. These information gathering requirements and recommendations bring challenges to TOs and their stakeholders. Firstly, in general, the technology used in ADSs generates

large quantities of data. Secondly, on-road trials will likely require multiple information producing sources, including data received, generated, or held but which is not used for the direct operation of the vehicle, potentially making retaining the data an expensive task. Additionally, manufacturers and suppliers need to be able to retain privacy over their IP and therefore releasing information can become problematic. There may also be privacy concerns due to personal data of operators that needs consideration. Lastly, investigators need to have confidence that the data they are analyzing is trustworthy, in that it hasn't been manipulated, censored, or corrupted. In response to these challenges, TOs are required to develop an Information Management Plan (IMP) which identifies what data will be collected and how it will be managed so that the data required to derive the causes of an incident during a trial is available to investigators. Other notable guidance documents and specifications for the operation of AVs in the UK include the PAS:1883 - Operational Design Domain (ODD) taxonomy for an automated driving system [19], and PAS:1884 - Safety operators in automated vehicle testing and trialing [20].

Like the UK, the U.S. Department of Transport (US DOT) has an approach to enable development and deployment of ADS technology for public use. In 2017 the U.S DOT released the Automated Vehicles Comprehensive Plan (AVCP)[21], as their road map to facilitate an era of safe automated road transport. The AVCP communicates three goals: "Promote Collaboration and Transparency, Modernize the Regulatory Environment, and Prepare the Transportation System". Furthermore, the US DOT have released a series of guidance documents for Automated Driving Systems, AV 2.0 [22], AV 3.0 [23] and AV 4.0 [24] with each building on the previous. AV2.0 is described as the "cornerstone voluntary guidance document for Automated Driving Systems." It takes a non-regulatory approach by providing voluntary guidance for the safe design and testing of AV technology. Within this guidance, the NHSTA emphasize the importance that the recording of data during trials has on understanding the safety potential of ADSs and the lessons that can be learnt from a thorough reconstruction of a crash. The NHTSA encourages trialing entities engaged in on-road testing to establish a documented process for "testing, validating, and collecting necessary data", a process which is comparable to the IMP required by PAS:1882. Additionally, much like PAS:1882, the guidance recommends that ADS data be collected, stored, and made available for retrieval. At a minimum, entities trialing ADS should have all information relevant to a crash available to allow the events leading to the crash to be reconstructed. Besides collecting, storing and maintain this data, the guidance states that those entities should have the ability, both technically and legally, to share all data required for crash reconstruction with government authorities, again a similar approach to that required by the PAS:1882.

F. On-Road ADS Trials

With the introduction of laws, frameworks and guidance, entities around the globe have been able to successfully conduct various on-road trials of ADS technologies. The first example of a live on-road trial in the UK is currently underway

in a government backed scheme (The UK Autonomous Vehicle Scheme), Project Endeavour [25]. The aim being "to accelerate and scale the adoption of AVs services across the UK through advanced simulations alongside trials on public roads." The project involves a fleet of vehicles equipped with level-4 ADS which are being exposed to a range of traffic scenarios and weather and lighting conditions, within predefined areas. The first ADS is set to be approved in the UK to perform a DDT instead of a human, is the Automated Lane Keeping System (ALKS). The regulation enabling this is the ALKS Regulation developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe which sets out the technical requirements for ALKS. Certain aspects of its use still require consideration. Once these aspects are addressed, the UK's Department of Transport expects amendments will be made to the Highway Code allowing the incorporation and use of ALKS of vehicles on the public road [26].

G. Current Solutions

The UK's Governments code of practice for automated vehicle trialing strongly recommends TOs "to develop plans for police investigators and relevant organisations to readily and immediately access data relating to an incident in a way that maintains the forensic integrity, security, and the preservation of the data" [27]. With the aim of preventing fraudulent tampering and accurate auditing, blockchain technology has been utilised for forensic purposes, where AV data is stored on an externally storage that is accessible by authorised third parties. In order to determine whether the sensors have been attacked in traffic incidents involving AVs Sharma et al. provide an AI-based forensic investigation protocol. It collects data from storage and memory devices, uses a supervised deep convolutional neural network model to analyse the accident, and finds anomalies in collected data. However, the useability of their technique have not been justified [28]. In [29] a non-intrusive mechanism is proposed for the collecting and storage of forensic data from AVs in smart cities through safely transferring it to cloud storage. Using a hybrid of centralised and decentralised databases and smart contracts, Parlak et al [30] suggested a blockchain-based insurance decentralised application to verify the authenticity and provenance of the accident footage and decentralise the failure-adjusting process. They aimed to avoid time and processing power consuming in in-line detection using AI analysis against deepfake. Thus they proposed a hybrid setup is advised, commencing with an application that records claim-related media and authenticates them at the point of recording while retaining a counter-deepfake tool for in-line detection. Another approach was created using blockchain technology where, in the event of accidents, the events are recorded for forensic purposes [31]. This plan is dependent on the endorsements from several authorities. The Authors discussed just their theoretical analysis, but their consensus method for the blockchain enabled a reliable and verifiable proof-based system to track accidents by CAVs. By combination of cooperative event correlation and trust model, a framework was suggested [32] to detect malicious

and false reporting, followed by Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) and Bayesian model to resolve conflicting event reports. Authors in [33] propose a forensic technique for an accident where the vehicles are using blockchain consensus mechanisms to come to an agreement on accident details. In this approach, data is collected from nearby vehicles through DSRC communication, hashed, and stored in a blockchain. They propose a quick leader election algorithm and Hyperledger Cloth Blockchain Network emulator test. Na et al propose a multi-signature-based access control method by grouping and storing video data of multiple vehicles based on GPS (Global Positioning System) data [34]. They used formulas for the GPS-based grouping method and access method to the Dashcam video data for decentralized Oracle configuration.

Communication among connected vehicles has become a significant requisite. Many researches recently have deployed blockchain technology to achieve steady and diminutive transmission. A blockchain-based protocol is presented in [35] to address security concerns, particularly to assure safe emergency VANET message transmission. One blockchain is used to store the vehicle's authentication data, and another is used to store and distribute blockchain services. Also for secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) data transmission, the authors in [36] utilise consortium blockchain technology to enable anonymous and traceable data sharing without the need of RSUs. Their proposed combination of 5G and blockchain technologies can prevent malicious data sharing.

Using blockchain-based anonymous voting, Ren et al [37] proposed a feedback mechanism in IoVs that exploits the decision made by the transport manager to enhance the learning approach. To enable anonymous vote, they used the attributes of decision-related nodes instead of their identities. To validate car voting data in that work, the Blockchain layer communicates with the other microservices. To ensure the secure transfer of information among drones, a blockchain-based security mechanism for cyber-physical systems is proposed by Singh et al [38]. In their encryption architecture, a deep Boltzmann machine is used to select a miner node based on features such as computational capacity, available battery power, and drone flight time. In the same era, intelligent security solutions are required to detect new cyber threats automatically. Based on blockchain, a framework has proposed in [39] in order to guarantee privacy and security in Cooperative Intelligent Transport System C-ITS infrastructure. The suggested approach uses deep learning modules and the blockchain to provide two levels of security and privacy. First, a blockchain module is created to safely transfer C-ITS data between AVs, RSUs, and Traffic Command Centres TCCs, and an enhanced Proof of Work (ePoW) technique based on smart contracts is created to ensure data integrity and prevent data poisoning attacks. In order to prevent inference attacks, a deep learning module is created that uses the Long-Short Term Memory-AutoEncoder (LSTM-AE) technology to encode C-ITS data into a new format. The proposed Attention-based Recurrent Neural Network (A-RNN) uses the encoded data

to identify intrusive events in the C-ITS infrastructure. Other work that aims to facilitate secure communication in vehicular networks is a proof-of-concept of PKI based on Ethereum certificate management scheme [40]. They suggest PKI based Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to be used by vehicles instead of private keys which further reduces verification time and cost

III. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Data plays a crucial role in the success of incident investigation of ADS systems by informing crash reconstruction and system-based analysis modelling when determining causation. Government regulations require Trial Organisations (TOs) to collect, curate, store and share all the data with investigators that can be used to reconstruct an incident during an on-road ADS trial. TOs are required to develop an Information Management Plan (IMP) which identifies what data will be collected and how it will be managed so that the data required to derive the causes of an incident during a trial is available to investigators. Modern on-road vehicles are often highly integrated with sociotechnical components, which produce an increasing number of data collection points, including data-intensive feeds such as video footage. Data sources for ADS trials are retrieved from the vehicle and its subsystems and an increasing number of external sources, such as road infrastructure, nearby vehicles, and meteorological information. Moreover, modern systems are often an assembly of subsystems and components from various manufacturers that are at risk, reputationally and legally, if found liable for causing an incident. Equipment manufacturers may also be concerned that information from a vehicle trial may contain their IP, which requires concealment. Safely curating and storing large quantities of trial data from multiple sources while having it accessible and available for investigators creates a challenge for a TO. Furthermore, investigators need to be sure that the data they receive has retained its integrity from when it was collected, i.e., it has not been corrupted, manipulated, censored, or erased through malicious acts, equipment failure, error or otherwise. This project endeavours to design and develop a proof-of-concept software tool that will provide a TO and its stakeholders with a collaborative means to safely curate, store and distribute ADS trial data while maintaining its integrity and privacy.

IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND DEVELOPMENT

An iterative development process[41], analogous to agile the methodology was the approach taken to develop this project's proof-of-concept. An iterative process was favoured over an incremental approach, such as waterfall modelling [41], to allow for flexibility throughout the design process. High-level project requirements were established upfront to inform the design and were used in each iterative design stage to verify against. The project's high-level requirements and their respective justifications are provided in table 1. They were established from the UK government framework and their guidance to TOs for ADS trials.

TABLE I
High-Level System Requirements

Requirement	Justification
Controlled Access The system shall ensure read and write access rights are enforceable.	The PAS:1882 [18] states that TOs shall have a plan which states the level and type of information that each stakeholder can gain access to. The proposed system shall be capable of enforcing this plan.
Data Security and Immutability The system shall be resilient against physical and cyber-attacks and ensure the data is resistant to fraudulent acts, data manipulation, deletion, and corruption.	The Code of Practice [17] states that “Each organization shall adopt the security principles set out in BS 10754-1. The TO shall secure all data collected and mitigate the security risks of the connected automotive ecosystem per PAS 11281.” Additionally, [18] states, “TOs shall record any indicators of integrity to give confidence that the data are authentic and have not been maliciously modified or corrupted.
Scalability The system shall be capable of indefinitely storing large amounts of data from multiple data sources.	The PAS1882 specifies that the TO shall preserve all information, that is, or might reasonably be considered relevant to an investigation of an incident. The TO needs to determine the period for securely retaining information in-line with data protection laws. This period may vary between trials depending on stakeholder requirements such as insurers and law enforcement agencies
Data Type Agnostic The system shall accept data in all-digital formats and sizes.	The PAS:1882 requires the TO to collect all relevant information to the investigation of an incident. There is no exhaustive list of information types, therefore, the tool must have the ability to manage any format. Furthermore, the amount of data required will vary between trials and will likely increase as technology evolves, therefore, the tool must be able to scale to support increasing data requirements.
Accessible and Available The system shall remain available and accessible by all entities requiring write and read access.	The PAS:1882, recommends “that the TO develops plans for police investigations and relevant organizations to readily and immediately access data relating to an incident in a way that maintains forensic integrity, security, and preservation of the data. The TO shall prepare a data interface plan as part of the IMP, that sets out the approach to the sharing of information between the systems that make up an automated system and the organizations that operate them.
Auditability All Data entries and behaviour shall be traceable.	The PAS:1882 specifies that data which describes and/or identifies the “specific incidents shall be collected as a form of metadata and shall provide a way to create a trail of information. In addition, the PAS mentions that audit processes shall be put in place over the IMP and associated Information Management Systems.
Environmentally Considerate The system design should consider environmental impact when making design decisions.	In line with the UK government’s 25-year environmental plan, consideration needs to be given to environmental sustainability when designing and operating Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) systems.




Fig. 1: System diagram for the proposed tool - VINCY.

A. High-level System Overview

Figure 1 illustrates a high-level system diagram of the developed proof-of-concept solution. The two main components are the front-end web application and a smart contract deployed on a blockchain. The project makes use of an existing cloud storage solution. In this system, the ADS trial data, outlined by the trial’s IMP, is uploaded into cloud storage. A unique hash of this data is created and uploaded to a blockchain, along with helpful metadata, using a web application as an interface. If an incident occurs, an investigator can retrieve the data to inform their investigation from the cloud storage. To ensure the data has not been corrupted, manipulated, censored, or changed

since being submitted, they can cross-check its hash against the original stored in the blockchain. In this way, data integrity can be assured. Additionally, the TO can store the list of required files, detailed in the IMP, for a trial on the blockchain. They can monitor what files have been submitted into the system by using the web application to query the blockchain. In this way, the completeness of the IMP data set can be managed and ensured. In the rest of the paper, we call this developed proof-of-concept - the Automated Vehicle **INC**ident investigation data s**Y**stem (VINCY). The term “transactions” when used in the context of databases in this paper represents a set of changes to a database which must be accepted or rejected. Table I presents the high-level of the system requirements.

B. Blockchain and Smart Contracts

Blockchain technology was first introduced in 2008 by an anonymous entity, Satoshi Nakamoto, to instantiate the decentralised digital currency known as Bitcoin [42]. The basic idea is to form an immutable record of transactions between peers on a digital ledger. If the ledger cannot be changed, the integrity of the data on record is maintained with no reliance on a trust-based model, which has inherent weaknesses (e.g., vulnerability to cyber-attacks, corruption, and deceit). Each peer that opts into the network can maintain a copy of the ledger, making its storage decentralised as not one person or organisation owns or operates it. The integrity of the transac-

tions are maintained through cryptographic proof, called Proof of Work (PoW) which makes them computationally impractical to reverse or modify. The process of nodes providing PoW is referred to as mining, an analogy to the process of mining resources such as gold, as nodes which provide computational power to PoW are rewarded with block rewards in Bitcoin. Using PoW as a consensus mechanism provides security to the network enabling participants to interact with the record through transactions without reliance on a trusted third party. A further development was the introduction of scriptable smart contracts, first introduced in the Ethereum Blockchain in 2015 [43]. A scriptable smart contract is an automation application capable of self-execution based on predetermined conditions that operate on a blockchain. Adding scriptable smart contract functionality turns a blockchain into a globally decentralized computer that can execute many applications at the same time. Developers can create, manage, and update their smart contract using the blockchain to synchronize and store its state changes while inheriting the availability, auditability, transparency, neutrality, security, and robustness of the blockchain. Smart contracts built on Ethereum reside at an Ethereum address and run functions when triggered by a transaction.

The VINCY makes use of the Ethereum blockchain by developing a smart contract to validate the integrity of ADS trial data submitted and stored in the cloud database before, during and after an incident. VINCY uses a public blockchain as a metadata file system to a database that adds transactional assurance and traceability for its readers. Although the blockchain is a database, it is only practicable to store small quantities of data for applications as each byte written to the network requires a financial payment, so only the hash and essential metadata is being stored to Ethereum by the VINCY. The blockchain-based solution was chosen over the alternatives for the combination of the following reasons:

- No need for a central trusted intermediary.
- Each accepted entry onto the blockchain is unerasable.
- No capital purchase, licencing or subscription to software is required.
- The Ethereum blockchain have a near 100% uptime, ensuring availability.
- Although in general a relational or noSQL database will transact quicker, a transaction speed faster than Ethereum offers will offer negligible difference to the user of the interacting with the VINCY.

Solidity is Ethereum's native Turing-complete programming language that is used for implementing smart contracts. It's a curly-bracket language [44] designed to target the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [45]. Interacting with the components of the Ethereum blockchain is performed through transactions. Web3.js gives developers the methods for this interaction by facilitating a connection to Ethereum nodes through a JSON RPC interface.

The smart contract has been developed to securely store the metadata of each data collection submitted to a database that can be retrieved later. The four supported primary blockchain tasks are:

- Allowing the IMP authority to store data requirements

from the IMP into states on the blockchain.

- Allowing the owner of trial data records to record the metadata associated with their trial data on the blockchain.
- Following an incident in a trial, an investigator and IMP authority can retrieve the metadata against each data collection associated with the trial and can check which data collections required by abn IMP have not been submitted.
- Allow an investigator to trace the history of changes made to a data collection i.e., what was the original data, when was it changed and by who. Therefore, it is important that traceability and integrity of data are preserved throughout the investigation process as incident data is produced by analysis and fusion.

The following is a high-level overview of the proposed contract's mechanics:

- The metadata submitted to the contract for each data collection is held in a struct and pushed onto a dynamic struct array.
- As each entry is pushed onto the array, a unique ID is created which reflects the entry's indexed position in the array. This entry is added to a key-value store with the key being the index and the value being the trial ID.
- To prevent unauthorized users from entering bogus data into the contract, function modifiers have been added to create exclusive contract rights. The function modifier `onlyOwner`, imported from the community `Contract Ownable` [46], restricts access to a whitelist of addresses so that only the contract owner can amend it. The contract owner is assigned when the contract is deployed. This can only be reassigned later by the current owner. The whitelist is a list of authorised addresses. The whitelist is used as a function modifier to the contracts POST functions.
- Each time a struct is pushed onto the array, an event is triggered which allows any users with a listener setup to receive the event that a new entry has been made, what it was and who submitted it.
- In solidity, there is no way to return an array of structs. Therefore, when a user wants to view the collection of metadata entries associated with a trial ID, the return is broken into two parts. Firstly, the contract returns an array containing the keys in the key-value store that have a value of the requested trial ID. This informs the user of the array index of each struct associated with trial ID. The user can then use consecutive queries to the contract requesting the struct of each index they received previously.
- An additional key-value map is used to record the number of data collections submitted against a Trial ID. A user can query the contract to receive this information.

The following metadata is stored for each data collection on a contract:

- The Filename of the data collection for identification of the dataset.
- The Trial ID which the data collection belongs to.

- The File Hash of the data collection used as a checksum against the stored dataset.
- The Timestamp of the block which contained the transaction. Used to record the time of submission for auditability.
- The submitter of the transaction identified through of the user’s public key, also for auditability.

Following the successful deployment and testing of the contract on a local blockchain using Ganache, the smart contract was deployed on the public Ethereum Test Network “Ropsten” to further simulate a production-like environment on Ethereum [47]. Ropsten was chosen to use over the alternatives as it’s the closest like-for-like representation of the Ethereum mainnet [47]. To transact with the contract on the Ropsten network, test Ether (rETH) is needed as gas for the transactions. rETH can be obtained by either providing computation power to the network through PoW mining or requesting some from a faucet. For this project, rETH was obtained from a faucet [48].

C. IPFS

The default file storage and distribution component of this prototype’s concept design utilises the Inter-Planetary File System (IPFS).

VINCY makes use of IPFS as its cloud database by using an IPFS Cluster [49]. An IPFS Cluster is an application that works as a side network to the IPFS where a global pin set (the list of files that the network is responsible for storing and maintaining) is intelligently allocated amongst the cluster’s peers [49] to ensure data redundancy and availability is retained. Using an IPFS cluster, the VINCY benefits from the benefits of storing its data in a distributed network while retaining a permission model. The permission set consists of standard peers (VINCY administrators) who can change the cluster pin-set, and follower peers (content providers and host nodes) which provide, and store content as instructed but cannot modify the pin set. In the case where the loss of privacy of a dataset is detrimental, such as an equipment manufacturer protecting their intellectual property, these files will need encrypting before being submitted to the network and the encryption key to authorised entities offline.

D. User Interface

The front-end user interface component for the VINCY is a decentralised web application (dApp). Its purpose is to provide a GUI to the users which facilitates transactions to and from the smart contract.

Using a web application makes it simple for users to use as no software is required. React has been used as the frontend framework to create a single page application for user interaction with the smart contract. React is a JavaScript Library used to create websites and was used because it implements a single page application (SPA). Implementing a SPA creates a smooth use experience as only a single initial HTML request is made to a server which passes the user’s browser the data and information required to operate the application without

making further server requests. All interactions with the smart contract on the blockchain will have unavoidable delays while using the dApp interface as the user will need to wait for block times when submitting transactions and async request to nodes when fetching data. Therefore, using the React framework helps mitigate the latency in the user experience. The objective of this project was to create a proof-of- concept; therefore, limited aesthetic features were added to the dApp. However, some CSS styling was applied to ensure the page’s workflow was laid out logically for user trials and presentation.

The dApp adhered to the Model-view-controller (MVC) software design pattern [50]. A separate file in the dApp was used that contained all its functions to manage its logic, data, and rules which were then exported to the frontend. To interact with the smart contract the dApp uses the contract’s Application Binary Interface (ABI). Smart contracts are stored on Ethereum as bytecodes in a binary format and the ABI defines the functions you use to interact with it as well as the format of return data.

Before any data is written to the contract, the user submitting the data needs to sign the transaction using their private key. This dApp uses Metamask, a virtual wallet in the browser to manage the user’s Ethereum account which provides the user with functionality to sign their transactions. To use Metamask in the dApp a button is provided on the top right corner, see figure 2, which connects the users in the browser to the dApp. If Metamask is not installed JSON object is returned and a JSX object is relayed to the user prompting them to install it before continuing.




Fig. 2: dApp page used by the TO to submit the list containing the names of datasets required by the IMP to the smart contract.

The WebSockets API key from Alchemy [51] facilitates the setup of a listener in the dApp that detects the events emitted by the contract when the metadata has successfully been stored. This data is then displayed in a JSX object to alert the user that their submission was successful. Additionally, a link is provided to the user once they’ve submitted a transaction which directs them to Etherscan [52], an Ethereum block explorer which displays the block information related to a transaction and would alert the user to any issue with their transaction. Although this is suitable for a proof-of-concept, a production ready tool would likely require a more obvious error message in the GUI. The first page of the dApp, as seen in figure 2, is used by the TO to submit a list of dataset

filenames documented in the IMP against a trial to be stored in the blockchain. The second page of the dApp is used by stakeholders who are submitting metadata associated with a trial's data collection stored on the IPFS to the smart contract, as seen in figure 3.

Fig. 3: dApp page used to view metadata stored on the blockchain

The final dApp page is used by investigators or TO. Using his page, the user can achieve two tasks: retrieve the metadata of each data collection submitted to the contract against an ADS trial or check to see what data collections are yet to be submitted. The Alchemy Web3 API is used by the dApp to make read calls to the contract to receive this data.

Figure 4 illustrates an example of a fictitious ADS trial where the IMP has called for three datasets, however, only two have been submitted to the VINCY.

Fig. 4: The dApps page displaying the data retrieved from the blockchain

V. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION

User evaluations were carried out to evaluate the intuitiveness of the front-end dApp as well as testing for software bugs, design oversights and efficiency of workflow. The users selected for user testing had varying levels of experience and knowledge with blockchain applications, ranging from an

active developer to users who had only heard about bitcoin without directly interacting with it. Five individual users were used for user testing, all were independent from this project's development up until they carried out the user evaluation. The users were supplied with an information sheet which provides a background to the study as well as describing the objective of the dApp. They were also supplied with a data pack which contained "dummy" IMP data and access to an IPFS desktop node with the files added that were required for the test. They were asked to carry out three tasks on the dApp: firstly, to submit the filenames of the data collections to the dApp required in the IMP; secondly to update the metadata of stored collections against given trials; and lastly, to retrieve the data collections against a given trial, determine what had and hadn't been submitted against the trial's IMP and whether the data had retained its integrity. The trials were conducted over the internet using ADS trial or check to see what data collections are yet to be discord [53] for video conferencing. The users accessed the submitted. The Alchemy Web3 API is used by the dApp to dApp, Meta mask and the provided IPFS node through Team make read calls to the contract to receive this data. Viewer [54]. They were asked to "think out loud" as they worked their way through the evaluation. Any perceived issues or difficulties the users had were noted down for discussion following each task. Once each task was completed, the user was asked to elaborate on what they were having difficulty with each recorded issue and asked to rank it given three options: Catastrophic (task cannot be completed without a change), Severe (task can be completed but is difficult or doesn't work properly), Cosmetic (the task was completed without difficulty but was not intuitive or something was misleading).




Fig. 5: Recorded import, hash and download times of IPFS Node

To evaluation the efficiency of the proposed system, the import and retrieve times were measured. Data files of varying sizes were generated and the average time to import the files to a local IPFS node and generate their associated were recorded. The average block time on the Ethereum network during 2022 was calculated at 13.18 secs using the data set available from Etherscan[52] which is considered negligible when evaluating the upload time of large data sets against the IPFS. Additionally, the average download time to retrieve these files from IPFS were also recorded. Data retrieval from

the Ethereum network is ≈ 1 second which is also considered negligible. The results from this evaluation are displayed in Figure 1.

Following user evaluation, VINCY was compared against its high-level requirements to verify the design and implementation. The verification summary is detailed below:

- **Controlled Access** – Access control is achieved by the white list encoded into the smart contract giving write permissions. Private data can be kept secure through encryption on the IPFS.
- **Data Security and Immutability** – IPFS’s distributed network provides mitigation against files from being deleted. By storing the file’s data hash on the blockchain it becomes immutable, therefore the integrity of its corresponding dataset can be checked and maintained.
- **Scalable** – VINCY is capable of scaling both vertically and horizontally improving efficiency and throughput capacity as demand grows. VINCY benefits from the data efficiency protocol operated by IPFS which through the evaluation discussed proved to support efficient data import and recovery.
- **Data Type Agnostic** – VINCY supports all digital file formats through the IPFS.
- **Accessible and Available** – As both IPFS and Ethereum run on a distributed network they are resilient against outages, ensuring it remains available. By deploying the dApp on the IPFS and using it as its webserver, it will also become resilient against outages. As the VINCY interface is a web application, it is accessible to all users who have an internet connection and a web browser without the need to install additional software.
- **Auditable** – Storing the trial data’s meta maintains an auditable trail of the data during its life cycle.
- **Environmentally Considerate** – On demand cloud storage solutions have been shown to be more energy efficient than using private storage. The Ethereum blockchain was used to host VINCY’s smart contract because has moved to a PoS consensus which addresses the power consumption concerns of PoW.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

ADS on-road trials necessitate the collection, curation, storage, and distribution of a substantial amount of information to support incident investigations. To ensure the integrity of this information throughout its lifecycle and utilize it as factual evidence in investigations, VINCY, a proof-of-concept software tool, has been developed to aid Trial Organizations (TOs) in data management. VINCY combines the accessibility, efficiency, and reliability of a distributed cloud storage protocol with the immutability of blockchain to securely store data hashes and metadata. The web application interface allows users to interact with the blockchain application, enabling transactions and queries.

The high-level requirements of VINCY were derived from relevant ADS trial standards and guidance, and it has undergone verification against them. Future work will focus on the following recommendations:

- 1) Conducting user testing with TOs and stakeholders in a more representative simulation of a trial and shadowing a live trial. This will provide valuable insights for further system development and validation of requirements.
- 2) Simplifying the user experience by amending the decentralized application (dApp) so that users don’t need to directly interact with the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), streamlining the process.
- 3) Automating the submission of datasets and metadata to VINCY for data coming from a “black box,” such as an onboard data recorder. This automation would enhance the integrity of the submission process, as it eliminates the need for human intervention.

By addressing these recommendations, VINCY can be enhanced to better serve the needs of TOs and stakeholders involved in ADS trials, providing a more efficient and reliable platform for data management and investigation support.

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