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17 A CRIP READING OF FILIPINO PHILOSOPHY

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Introduction

This chapter is my *mestiza* understanding of the philosophy of disability, as it is produced at present. The chapter is *mestiza* because I am a disabled Filipinx, a half-Filipina, half-white French Canadian. It is *mestiza* because I have settler privilege. It is *mestiza* because I have "passing" privilege with respect to disability and race. But, mostly, the chapter is *mestiza* because I cannot approach a philosophy of disability, let alone create within it, in any other way. The chapter is my inchoate and exciting contribution to the discourse on what it is to conceive of disability philosophically. I want to draw you, my reader, into this incompleteness, this ambiguity and in-betweenness. Inspired by Gloria Anzaldúa's "*mestiza* consciousness" (1987), I echo Mercado's point in the opening quote about lateral thinking. By working through the complicated questions of "what is crip philosophy?" and "what is Filipino philosophy?" together, I hope to identify and represent some of the many possibilities of dialogue between these hitherto separate domains and open windows on horizons for a crip Filipino philosophy of disability.

The figure of the *mestiza* is complicated and not innocent. In the context of the history of the Philippines, the mixed-race people that resulted from the union between Spanish colonizers, Chinese traders, and American invaders and indigenous peoples have held an ambiguous relationship with power and colonial violence (Tan 1986; Goh 2008). My project in this chapter is, paraphrasing Anzaldúa, to take inventory of what was inherited, what was acquired, and what was imposed when it comes to thinking about the intersection between crip and Filipino philosophy (Anzaldúa 1987: 82). One of the obstacles that philosophy of disability encounters and aims to undermine is the entrenched belief that

disability is "natural." On the other hand, the very quest for a "Filipino philosophy" is rooted, though not uncritically, in a nationalistic and naturalizing project. For example, Filipino philosophical traditions call on a "Filipino way" of thinking that depends on contentious anthropological and sociological analyses. As Filipino philosopher Leonardo N. Mercado has pointed out, nevertheless, entertaining a Filipino specificity can be extremely fruitful:

> Does Filipino logic follow lateral thinking? Scientists will have to find out, but we are inclined to suspect that lateral thinking is the answer. Both induction and deduction are complementary ways of arriving at the same truth. The Filipino way of looking at the truth illustrates his (*sic*) intersubjective way of thinking. [. . .] Objectivism has a totally falsified conception of truth, by exalting what we can know and prove, while covering up with ambiguous utterances all that [we] know and cannot prove, even though the latter knowledge underlies, and must ultimately set its seal to, all that we can prove. In trying to restrict our minds to the few things that are demonstrable, and therefore explicitly dubitable, it has overlooked the a-critical choices which determine the whole being of our minds and has rendered us incapable of acknowledging these vital choices." (Mercado 1994: 45–6)

Philosophy of disability is in many respects wrestling with the ableism of the discipline of philosophy and the attachment of the discipline to Western reason. Filipino philosophy, too, is wrestling with philosophy's attachment to Western reason in addition to the way that it negotiates the colonized history of the geographical region. In this chapter, I want to explore these intersections and divergences.

I endeavor to do so by analyzing Jeremiah Reyes's article "*Loób* and *Kapwa:* An Introduction to a Filipino Virtue Ethics" through a crip reading lens. In other contexts, I have used Reyes's article to discuss power as a virtue, identifying how Reyes's work can be fruitful for an analysis of feminist relational ethics (Gauthier-Mamaril 2022). In this chapter, I engage in a cripistemological dialogue with Reyes's article to demonstrate how Filipino philosophical concepts can contribute to philosophy of disability.

In many ways, Reyes's work represents a long tradition of philosophy in the Philippines insofar as it draws on the writing of Thomas Aquinas. A legacy of the Spanish colonial rule and the presence of Dominican friars on the isles, Thomism continues to leave its mark on Filipino philosophy departments in the present. Like Reyes, I was philosophically raised by Thomists, though thousands of miles away in a small university in Canada run by Dominican friars. Although some of the friars read Aquinas with a Derridean lens, they were Thomists nonetheless. The commonalities between Reyes and I extend even further because Reyes engages with virtue ethics, a task with which I am intimately familiar given my research on feminist theory and bioethics. If to "do philosophy" is, as Pada says, to "engage in philosophical dialogue"

(2014), in this chapter I will "do crip Filipino philosophy" with you, in part through an analysis of Reyes's article. I propose the following roadmap for the chapter: In the first section, I will outline the Filipino notions of *loób* and *kapwa*, as well as argue that they are foundational ontological concepts that allow us to understand individual agency as intrinsically relational within this Filipino context. My aim is to present the onto-ethical framework that *loób* and *kapwa* create as one in which the possibilities of crip agency are accommodated. The second section is devoted to the analysis of four of the five "Filipino virtues" that Reyes derives from the relation between *loób* and *kapwa*. These four virtues address moral relations that range from familial responsibility to political engagement. I will highlight the ways in which each of the virtues both opens possibilities for a critical philosophy of disability and create tensions with the aims of such a way of thinking about disability. Finally, the third section considers the fifth Filipino virtue that Reyes identifies—namely, *lakas-ng-loób/Bahala na*—and the ways in which it can be understood to overlap with the notions of crip hacking and crip time. To increase the accessibility of my chapter, I have provided an appendix that comprises a pronunciation guide of the italicized Tagalog words that appear throughout the chapter.

Loób and *Kapwa*: Finding Relational Common Ground

Reyes identifies the concepts of *loób* ("relational will") and *kapwa* ("together-with-the-other") as two pillars of Filipino virtues that can be compared and contrasted with Thomistic virtue ethics. I use Reyes's identification of Filipino virtues to discuss the possibilities that are opened and the tensions that are created when we approach Reyes's conceptual taxonomy from a crip perspective. In line with my reading of Spinoza (Gauthier-Mamaril 2021), that is, I join Jasbir K. Puar who writes: "I want cripistemologies to articulate not only alternative epistemologies, but also ontologies, challenging the limits of intersectional analyses and noting the disciplinary character of any subject-driven endeavor" (2014). In other words, I will treat *loób* and *kapwa* as ontological terms relating to agenthood that have epistemological and ethical consequences.

In the following three subsections of the chapter, I argue that *loób* and *kapwa* explain a kind of relational agency that is relevant to both the elaboration of Filipino philosophy and the practice of philosophy of disability. In the first subsection, I define *loób* and its particular role within the history of thought in the Philippines. In the second subsection, furthermore, I define *kapwa* while making links to feminist relational autonomy, drawing the conclusion, in the third subsection, that these two concepts present a fruitful foundation for crip Filipino philosophical reflections.

Defining *Loób*

Reyes tells us that the literal translation of the term *loób* is "inside" (2015: 153), which can be used in relation to objects such as pots or cabinets. When the term *loób* is applied to human individuals, it is usually understood as "the will." Yet the history of the concept is important to bear in mind because, as Reyes makes clear, *loób* has evolved from the mixing of tribal animist worldviews and teachings from Spanish Catholicism rather than the Cartesian will or for that matter the Kantian will. Because concepts such as body/mind dualism and atomistic individualism did not become widely spread in the Philippines until the end of the nineteenth century when the United States took up the mantle of colonialism in this region from the Spaniards, a Filipino sense of identity and agency was thinkable outside of the category of the (Cartesian) "self." To quote José de Mesa, " *loób* apart from referring to the core of personhood, also states what kind of core that is in relationship. Loób, one may say, is a relational understanding of the person in the lowland Filipino context" (De Mesa 1987: 46). In other words, *loób* expresses the concept of relational personhood without appeal to an autonomous or rational self. In fact, *loób* is characterized by becoming-in-relation, that is, by its intrinsic and ontological relationality. This etymology of the term *l loób* means, furthermore, that the concept *l loób* does not result due to the segregation of emotion and intuition from the realm of rationality. With respect to the concept of *loób*, Reyes notes, no distinction is made between the powers of the soul (including reason) and the appetitive powers of the will and the senses, as is made in Aquinas's moral philosophy (Reyes 2015: 155).

The apparent ambivalence toward reason—which the absence in Filipino philosophy of a distinction between reason and the senses seems to imply—has been used to argue that there is in fact no such thing as Filipino philosophy (Pada 2014). I contend, however, that a more holistic approach to agency and, indeed, to the agent themself resonates with the aims of a critical philosophy of disability. The relational stance of *l loób* does not preclude rationality nor, however, does the stance give rationality automatic priority as we in the West have been trained to do. One's *lloób* expresses itself in practice, through the acts of ordinary life, and by living in relationship with others. In this way, the relational stance of *loób* is similar to grassroots feminist ethics that propose ethical norms based on actual human relationships rather than the application of norms to actions in a top-down approach. As much as the *l loób* describes the agency of one soul or one individual, it can only be defined in relation with the other, that is, with *kapwa*.

Defining *Kapwa*

Kapwa, like *loób*, is difficult to translate into European languages such as English. It means *others*, a term that is laden with mountains of philosophical baggage.

Between Levinas's Other, the *autrui* of French existentialists, and Anglo-American individualistic political philosophy, the self/other dichotomy is part of the majority of modern Western philosophical edifices. In the Filipino context, however, *kapwa* does not signal separateness or outsideness but rather expresses the concept of "self-in-the-others" or "together-with-the-person" (Reyes 2015: 156). To evaluate one's *loób* with respect to how well or how poorly it relates to *kapwa* is to take togetherness or relationality as the core priority of ethics. And, given how much *loób* depends on *kapwa* conceptually, I would argue that it presents a core ontological map.

The relationaliity of *kapwa* is not without its drawbacks. As colonized peoples, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were repeatedly depicted as naturally subservient and docile. Even as recently as the 1960s, anthropologist and sociologist Frank Lynch proposed "smooth interpersonal relationship" (SIR) as the highest value of Filipinos (Lynch 1962; Reyes 2015: 155), perpetuating a naturalized conception of Filipinos as upholding the status quo at all cost, prioritizing community harmony over individual agency. This characterization is harmful for multiple reasons, not least because it denies agency to Filipino peoples because they value the recognition of shared identity. In other words, as long as the importance given to *kapwa* is viewed through the lens of a reason-first conception of agency, it will appear as a disadvantage. However, the concept of *kapwa* did not evolve in a context where rationality is the gatekeeper of agency, therefore what it offers us today is a different expression of relational personhood.

Relational Agency is Important to Philosophy of Disability Too

Although it might be difficult to think of agency founded in relationality, it is not impossible and should be understood as a goal of philosophy of disability. Thus, a conceptual framework (like that of Filipino philosophy) in which personhood is defined outside of the usual parameters of rational capacity holds considerable promise for a (Filipino) philosophy of disability. The logic of colonialism encompasses the social and institutional devaluation of marginalized bodyminds, including the bodyminds of disabled people who operate on crip time. I want, therefore, to show that the person-with-others or one-within-otherness version of the agent that the *loób-kapwa* combination proposes can contribute significantly to the elaboration of a philosophy of disability ontology that prioritizes alternative modes of power and agency.

Sources of Possibilities and Tensions

In my *mestiza* reading of Reyes, I was struck by all the possibilities that I envisioned could bloom between Filipino concepts and philosophy of

disability. Nevertheless, I also perceived possible points of tension that I want to render in this chapter. The two conceptual pairings that I analyze later, namely, *kagandahang-loób/utang-na-loób* and *pakikiramdam/hiya*, represent two concentric circles of relation: the familial or close kin circle and the larger social circle of the community, respectively. Both my interpretation of Filipino concepts and Reyes's interpretation of them challenge these boundaries. I take my challenge in the direction of crip philosophy and explore how these Filipino concepts interact with crip concerns, whereas Reyes's challenge remains largely wedded to comparisons between Filipino concepts and Thomistic virtue ethics. I think that the tensions and obstacles involved in a union between crip philosophy and Filipino philosophy are not insurmountable. Indeed, my argument is that the four virtues that I outline in what follows can be used in interesting crip ways. I do not wish to have the last word on whether or not the four virtues are completely compatible, but rather hope that my fellow scholars will find this topic important enough to continue research on crip philosophy and the four virtues of Filipino philosophy. My aim in this chapter is a modest one, namely, to give an account of an interaction between these two sets of concepts, regardless of whether that leaves us with some unresolved questions.

Kagandahang-loób and *Utang-na-loób*

The first pairing that I will examine is *kagandahang-loób* and *utang-na-loób*, or, in other, Anglicized words, "beauty of will" and "debt of will." *Kagandahang-loób* and *utang-na-loób* are complementary ethical terms that can be roughly translated as selfless benevolence and indebtedness, respectively. The terms capture the two extreme ends of an asymmetrical power relation. In fact, *kagandahang-loób* is often associated with motherly love and devotion for her child, who, in return, has *utang-na-loób*, an unpayable debt of gratitude, for her. Historically, these terms have been applied to familial and kin links, although Reyes, for one, argues that the Christian tradition sought to widen the ethical reach of the terms (2015: 160). Reyes also disagrees with thinkers who dub *kagandahang-loób* as a "feminine" concept akin to Nel Noddings's feminist care ethics (De Castro 2000). For Reyes, this claim ignores the socio-historical context of the term and the concept that it signifies. I agree with Reyes's objection in this context and would add that to approach *kagandahang-loób* through the mother-child lens imposes rather arbitrary limits on what is a selfless definition of responsibility: *kagandahang-loób* is probably neither Kantian disinterestedness nor emotional love. Like everything else related to the *loób*, *kagandahang-loób* is invested in fostering and protecting a worthwhile relationship through practice, not through moral reflection or feeling.

While responsible devotion is practiced in a relationship by the person in it who has more to give, the receiver of care or vulnerable person in the relationship reciprocates by expressing *utang-na-loób* to their caregiver. An example of this

reciprocity is a child's respect for their parents' wishes and their attempt to "make their family proud" by communicating how grateful they are for their life and upbringing. Another example is a debtor who voluntarily pays interest on the loan that they owe a friend as a way to express their gratitude for the relationship of trust that made the loan possible. Just as the mother-child relationship is not the only way to consider *kagandahang-loób*, *utang-na-loób* need not be understood as unidirectional. Insofar as all of us are in multiple relational webs, there is no one way to care for and be cared for; our relationships with one another are dynamic and they evolve over time and space.

Possibilities

This responsibility-for/gratitude-toward pairing opens up multiple possibilities for philosophy of disability, especially if we explore the different modality of caring relationships beyond blood kin. I want to emphasize the absence of any reference to pure reason or sentimentality in both *kagandahang-loób* and *utang-na-loób*. As I have noted earlier, *loób* does not involve rationality as a core criterion and there seems to be no explicit injunction to be dispassionate in one's relation to *kapwa*. Rather, what is important is that the relation remains harmonious, which might involve reason but does not depend on it. Caring for the *loób-kapwa* relationship also need not be motivated by emotion or affect. One should, for example, express *utang-na-loób* because it is an ethical practice that acknowledges and reinforces community relations rather than because one is grateful. In a way, *kagandahang-loób* and *utang-na-loób* prompt us to consider radical dependence beyond ideas of desert: because we live in community, we all should be responsible for one another and grateful to one another.

Tensions

Like the figure of the *mestiza*, the concepts of indebtedness and gratitude are not innocent. Within the framework of settler colonialism, for example, narratives of the grateful/ungrateful native have been used to justify all kinds of violence and to deny entire peoples agency. From an intersectional feminist perspective, women have, for centuries, been asked to be grateful for their enforced subservient social roles; Black and brown people are supposed to be grateful that they are allowed to exist; and disabled people are expected to rejoice that society diligently tries to discover ways to fix them. The charitable model of disability provides excellent examples of how someone's "selfless sense of responsibility" harms another's agency when unconditional gratitude is expected. Therefore, we must recognize that *kagandahang-loób* and *utang-na-loób* can be used to support disempowering relationships in the name of respecting *kapwa*.

However, this disempowering interpretation of these terms is not inevitable. In the spirit of bringing my *mestiza* inquisitiveness to this topic, I cannot leave at the

door my hermeneutical resistance to the concept of uncritical indebtedness. Then again, that is not what *utang-na-loób* implies. Although Lynch's concept of SIR has been used to depict a pliable and docile Filipino identity, placing relationality at the core of personhood and agency does not necessarily require that critical thought be relinquished but rather that we give priority to the shared part of our agency. Giving the shared part of our agency priority over the unique and particular part of it will require that everyone who has long bathed in the waters of atomistic individualism do some deep conceptual reconfiguring. In short, these Filipino concepts do not tell us in advance what kind of relationship is worth protecting other than the relationships that involve vulnerability and dependence beyond transactional relations, a focus that is extremely relevant to the philosophy of disability.

Pakikiramdam and *Hiya*

In this section, I will analyze the concept pairing of *pakikiramdam* (relational sensitivity or prudence) and *hiya* (shame or embarrassment). Reyes links both of these concepts to social self-restraint, empathy, and "emotional intelligence" (2015: 163). *Pakikiramdam* in particular concerns "reading the room," that is, one's awareness of or attunement to the social dynamics of a given time or place before one acts. For these reasons, Reyes compares *pakikiramdam* to the Thomist virtue of prudence, a virtue that is useful when one has only indirect access to power. With *pakikiramdam*, we can see, once again, how a Filipino ethical concept that involves a considerable amount of contextual awareness can be (and has been) used to claim that Filipinos are too sensitive and that they care too much about public opinion. Among other things, such a claim disregards the extent to which social praise and blame are important to most ethical theories, including Kant's. Indeed, members of marginalized and socially disempowered groups in philosophy can learn a great deal about how power operates in mainstream philosophy by considering the ways in which prudence is mobilized in ethical theories.

The concept of *hiya* is more difficult to grapple with than the concept of *pakikiramdam*. Reyes makes a distinction between "passive" and "active" *hiya*, or shame that one suffers versus the self-control that motivates us to avoid causing *hiya* to others (Reyes 2015: 164). I consider shame to be a fickle concept: it can be extremely useful, extremely damaging, or both simultaneously. When we consider *hiya* in the context of a relationality that is placed at the core of our ethical practice, we can recognize that *hiya* would serve as a non-rational stopgap that to prevent us from destroying community relations out of recklessness or imprudence. One could argue that feeling shamed by one's close friends and family often more effectively motivates behavioral changes than a clear but impersonal rational argument. Historically, however, shame has also been directed at marginalized

people in oppressive ways, such as conveying to them that they are defective or dangerous, that they do not belong in public spaces, and that their desires and needs are invalid. Thus, out of all of Reyes's discussions of Filipino concepts, it is the discussion of the concept of *hiya* that gives me the most pause.

Possibilities

With respect to agency there are (as I have suggested) very interesting points of intersection between *pakikiramdam*, *hiya*, and the aims of a philosophy of disability. Whereas *kagandahang-loób* and *utang-na-loób* are originally directed at immediate relations with the people closest to us, *pakikiramdam* and *hiya* offer the opportunity to think of relationality in a broader sense. Indeed, the concept of *hiya* can be used to discuss our relation to nonhuman animals and the environment by prompting us to consider the strength of all the connections that support our communities. The kind of prudential practices that *pakikiramdam* and *hiya* recommend are less concerned with personal moral valor than with acknowledgment and maintenance of webs of support. This framework is particularly instructive for a philosophy of disability that aims to be anchored in a relational ontology insofar as the framework represents interdependence and the need for mutual aid as the foundation of ethics rather than merely as effective means in special circumstances only. More than that, the framework explicitly values relationality rather than cast it as a weakness or the inability to be a "fully-fledged" agent.

Tensions

One way in which to redeem the concepts of *pakikiramdam* and *hiya* in a crip context is to view them as possible support for solidarity. Both intra-group relationships within disabled communities and inter-group relations with institutions and able-bodied agents require boundary practices. I understand a boundary practice to signify the recognition and expression of the limits of particular instantiations of relationality. In order for me to be in solidarity with blind and visually impaired people, for example, I need to acknowledge that our experiences and needs do not overlap completely. As an Asian-Canadian disabled person who wishes to act in solidarity with Black and Indigenous disabled individuals and communities, I must "check myself" before I act. That is, I must think critically about, for example, whether I have taken up discursive space on their behalf that Black and Indigenous disabled people themselves should have occupied, whether I have misrepresented their issues because of my own social privilege, and so on. Although we can (and often should) conceive of relational sensitivity and shame as mechanisms of assimilation and disempowerment, we can also use them as safeguards against our impulse to center ourselves and overlook critical differences in our effort to create communities for ourselves.

Embracing Uncertainty

In this last section of my chapter, I want to turn to the fifth "Filipino virtue" that Reyes examines, *lakas-ng-l loób*. Doing so will enable me to return to a statement that I made at the outset of this chapter, according to which *loób* and *kapwa* should be considered as ontological terms as well as ethical terms. On my understanding of it, the concept of *lakas-ng-l loób*, or "strength-of-will," is a worldview, a way of relating to time and becoming by embracing uncertainty. While some philosophers have equated this attitude with fatalism (Bostrom 1968), I want to demonstrate how it can intersect with the concepts of crip time and crip futurism in a way that maps out a different kind of relational agency.

Lakas-ng-loób is often linked to the expression *Bahala na*, which roughly translates into English as "God willing," signifying everything from optimism to fatalism, passing through indifference and irresponsibility. Note that like all of the Filipino concepts that I have discussed in this chapter, the concept of *Bahala na* is a double-edged sword: it can be used as an excuse to reinforce the status quo or as a tool to bring about change. I will not dwell here on the disempowering aspects of fatalism that have been attributed to *lakas-ng-l loób* and, by implication, *Bahala na*. Rather, I want to focus on how *lakas-ng-loób* and *Bahala na* can fruitfully intersect with crip ontology.

Lakas-ng-loób can, according to Reyes, be compared to the Thomist virtue of courage, specifically with respect to courage for the *kapwa*, not for ourselves (2015: 166). It implies sacrificing oneself for the community in a way that cannot be disentangled from the Christian idea of ultimate sacrifice. This meaning, in and of itself, may not seem appealing to disability theorists or indeed most feminists; there is no shortage of ethical discourses that encourage us to sacrifice ourselves "for the greater good" to view ourselves as a burden, and so on. Yet, *lakas-ng-loób* is primarily directed at the preservation of community relations rather than the agent's moral goodness. In this sense, (self)sacrifice is not a goal in itself, but rather another tool in our relational ethical toolbox. Incidentally, Reyes's examples for this "virtue" relate to the well-being of the nation and thus he names celebrated Filipino revolutionaries and political dissidents José Rizal and Ninoy Aquino, further expanding the scope of ethical webs (2015: 167). I will argue that *lakas-ng-l loób*, when taken together with *Bahala na* as an ontological worldview, provides us with examples of crip hacking and resistance.

The notion of courage raises alarm bells for my disabled bodymind. It seems dangerously close to "resilience" and the pervasive inspirational supercrip narratives that celebrate disabled peoples' strength (and continued existence) in order to avoid responding to our needs. Given the socio-historical context of *lakas-ng-loób*, however, to have courage can also be understood to mean to be motivated to resist oppressive structures. As much as *loób* and *kapwa*'s emphasis on inherent relationality can be used to justify prioritizing social harmony over

change, the *loób*'s effort to benefit the *kapwa* takes shape in *lakas-ng-loób* when the community is threatened. In other words, relationality does not necessarily involve uniformity but rather reminds us that "together-with-others" is our ontological reality and that which to we should aspire, as well as what we should protect. In short, we must resist the forces that threaten our shared selves. As disabled people, we are constantly faced with a world that wants us to change, to leave, to not exist. When we dare to reject the frameworks that deem us essentially unworthy of life, power, and agency, we practice resistance. Although we experience resistance individually, a relational philosophy of disability would argue that *lakas-ng-l loób* is both practiced for the good of the community and experienced communally through communal action. Although Reyes heralds the resistance of individuals, we would be justified in thinking that insofar as the agent is intrinsically relational, resistance is also an intrinsically relational endeavor.

If we recall, *pakikiramdam* is an indirect strategy to achieve relational harmony. In other words, *pakikiramdam* relies on empathy and consideration rather than on confrontation, the latter of which is a tool that only the powerful can wield carelessly. If we imagine someone who exhibits *lakas-ng-loób* and *pakikiramdam*, we have the makings of crip hacking. In the "Crip Technoscience Manifesto" (CTP) Aimi Hamraie and Kelly Fritsch (2019) discuss the history of feminist hacking and how the concept of repurposing, diverting, and remaking technology is an important expression of disabled agency. The article also cites Yergeau's (2014) "criptastic hacking" as a "disability-led movement, rather than a series of apps and patches and fixes designed by non-disabled people who cannot even be bothered to talk with disabled people." The CTP is primarily concerned with material hacks or changes to the material world that disabled people have enacted; however, I see no reason why the term *hacking* cannot be applied to social and relational situations as well. In this sense, a disabled person who practices *lakas-ng-loób* and *pakikiramdam* can hack through oppressive situations by drawing upon their crip support systems in order to preserve crip community. The sacrifice (or, at least, the willingness to sacrifice) implied in *lakas-ng-loób* need not be *self*-sacrifice, especially given that there is no *loób* separated from *kapwa*. Rather, the "sacrifice" might be willingness to relinquish oneself of the goodwill and protection of people who uphold oppressive social, political, and institutional norms in order to preserve alternative communities. Crip hacking becomes a necessity because crip lives are systematically deemed disposable in our societies; therefore, hacking is always a rebellious act. I want to suggest that by linking hacking with *lakas-ng-l loób* and Reyes's proposal of "Filipino virtues," we can arrive at crip Filipino hacking, which will always be a rebellious *practice*. As Yergeau states, hacking is a dynamic movement that needs to be continuously recharged and renewed. In short, choosing to hack is choosing *lakas-ng-loób* as a way to express community activism and solidarity.

In drawing this chapter to a close, I would like to address the possible conceptual alliance between *Bahala na* and crip time. Both concepts function against or outside of the confines of linear time and theories of progress. *Bahala na* exhibits a trust that the universe will eventually balance itself out and that neither good times nor hard times are eternal. "Crip time," as defined by Alison Kafer, "is flex time not just expanded, but exploded; it requires reimagining our notions of what can and should happen in time, or recognizing how expectations of 'how long things take' are based on very particular minds and bodies" (2013: 27). In this sense, *Bahala na* seems to offer a more interesting temporal framework than a progressive capitalist timeline because it accommodates variable, flexible, and dynamic relationships to temporal existence and activity. Although *Bahala na* has been critiqued as a cultural excuse to relinquish agency, this criticism is true only if we assume a very narrow understanding of what is required for one to "take action." For example, disabled life has taught me that more often than not, refusal to act in conformity with "straight time"—for example, by resting—is the most empowering choice that I can make in some situations. *Bahala na* is not necessarily fatalist but rather can be read as determinist, encompassing the belief in a holistic worldview where my acts are importantly embedded in and supported by webs of relations with other humans, rocks, and trees. Much like *pakikiramdam* and *hiya*, *Bahala na* exhorts us to understand our agency within its limits so as to better learn how to flourish in our shared identity.

Conclusion

We have now followed down the path that Reyes carved out for us, examining the essential relationality of the *loób/kapwa* pairing, a conceptual cluster that defies dualistic and individualistic logic to inform onto-ethical relational practices. I have analyzed this enumeration of "Filipino virtues" in ways that highlight when they intersect with and buck against crip philosophical concerns, giving special emphasis to the construction of an agency without the Western self. By considering the virtue of *lakas-ng-l loób/Bahala na*, I explained how it provides a useful framework within which to define and explain crip hacking and crip time.

In short, this chapter is the result of a crip reading of concepts in Filipino philosophy, feminist ethics, and virtue ethics; my crip *mestiza* reading. It takes pride in not being definitive or complete. By following Reyes's beats and key concepts, I have introduced you to a few points of entry into Filipino philosophy that I deemed interesting for the purposes of developing a philosophy of disability and contributing a concept of crip relational agency. The choices that I have made throughout this chapter are the result of my own scholarly interest in relational agency. and I am sure I emphasized aspects that others would have neglected because of that bias. I likely emphasized aspects of Filipino thinking and culture

that other authors would have neglected. I have done so consciously in defiance of what a philosophy essay is usually designed to be: assertive, confident, and dispassionate. My epistemic position as a disabled *mestiza* philosopher brought me to develop and share an analysis of as-of-yet uncharted territory. Surreptitiously, I have made a bold argument of my own, that is, that my partial investigation should have a ripple effect and prompt other philosophers to excavate further, to build higher, and to sink deeper into the possibilities and tensions between two philosophical cultures. Although it would please me if they were *these*, Filipino and crip, cultures, I hope that my argument has a broader reach.

Appendix

Pronunciation of Tagalog words:

Hiya: Hee-yah

Kapwa: KAH-pooh-ah

Kagandahang-loób: Kah-gahn-dah-hang low-OBB

Lakas-ng-loób: Lah-kahss nang low-OBB

Loób: low-OBB in two syllables

Pakikiramdam: Pah-kee-kee-ram-dam

Utang-na-loób: Ooh-tang nah low-OBB

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