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6. Security and terrorism

6.1 OVERVIEW

As might be expected at the height of the GFC, the initial focus of the G20's attention, reflected in its agendas and declarations, was firmly placed on financial and economic issues rather than matters of national and international security. As mentioned in other chapters, the G7/8 provides an indicative template for the development of informal summitry and at its early summits in the mid 1970s it also focused almost exclusively on macroeconomic issues. However, it could not ignore a range of pressing geopolitical concerns and at the turn of the decade came to focus on broader Cold War-related security issues as well as the specific threat of terrorism. Since 2008, the G20 has experienced a similar development, as seen most starkly at the Antalya summit of November 2015, which took place days after the Paris shootings, and at the Bali summit of November 2022, which was dominated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This chapter will focus on how the broad and varied membership of the G20 has welcomed or resisted this development in terms of both traditional and newer definitions of security.

6.2 THE G20 AND SECURITY

Returning to 2008 and the height of the GFC, both the Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy issued at the first G20 leaders' meeting in Washington and the G20 Global Plan for Recovery and Reform issued at the second meeting in London understandably focused on identifying the causes of the crisis, diagnosing the appropriate response, supporting global trade against protectionism, reforming international institutions and restoring trust, as well as fostering a return to inclusive, green and sustainable growth (G20 Information Centre 2008a; G20 Information Centre 2009b). Nevertheless, attempts were made to complement the G20's financial crisis management with a focus on broadly defined security issues. The Chinese president, Hu Jintao, addressed the Washington summit and, while acknowledging the maintenance of economic growth as the cornerstone of addressing the financial crisis, argued that '[j]oint efforts should be made to stabilize the international energy and food markets, curb speculation and build an enabling

environment for the growth of the world economy (Hu 2008). Paragraph 15 of the leaders' declaration committed the G20 'to addressing other critical challenges such as energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease (G20 Information Centre 2008a).

Although the G20 leaders' statement that resulted from the Pittsburgh summit of September 2009 maintained the focus of the previous two summits by highlighting strong sustainable and balanced growth, it was the first declaration to dedicate a paragraph to the topic of energy security, committing to the phasing out of inefficient fossil fuels, and demonstrated throughout a strong emphasis on food security, as explored in Chapter 4 (G20 Information Centre 2009a). Although food security remained a background issue that ran through the following G20 Toronto summit declaration, the focus had returned to the core economic and financial issues that had preoccupied the G20 so far. A final paragraph with the catch-all title of 'other issues and forward agenda' namechecked development issues and protecting the marine environment in response to the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (G20 Information Centre 2010c). By the end of the year and the fifth and final biannual summit, the G20 Seoul summit leaders' declaration added development to the core business of the G20 on economic recovery and financial reform. However, the word 'security' was absent from the declaration (G20 Information Centre 2010d), and only appeared in the accompanying Seoul summit document with reference to the existing initiatives on food security and marine environment protection (G20 Information Centre 2010a). The 2011 Cannes summit also released two documents: a final declaration (G20 Information Centre 2011a) and a final communiqué (G20 Information Centre 2011e). Both documents followed a similar pattern of maintaining the focus on the G20's core business with occasional references to food security and marine environment protection. However, as host, President Nicolas Sarkozy promised that the G20 would tame volatility in food prices and achieve greater food security. The leaders' declaration that was released at the end of the 2012 Los Cabos summit continued this pattern but the summit did realize a pledge made at the Seoul summit to trial results-based payments and launched the AgResults initiative discussed in Chapter 4. The Los Cabos summit also emphasized the importance of multilateralism (although in the context of the global economy) and referred to the first informal meeting of G20 foreign ministers that took place in Los Cabos earlier in the year (G20 Information Centre 2012a). Once again, this innovation represented a developmental path similar to the G7/8, which delegated a number of specific issues to the ministerial level at its 1998 Birmingham summit.

The 2013 St Petersburg summit continued to highlight food security, referring to it as a 'top priority', in its final declaration. Energy security was also

mentioned and the Russian presidency established the Energy Sustainability Working Group, which reported to the following year's Brisbane summit. Nuclear safety, security and safeguards/non-proliferation received a passing mention in the declaration for the first time (G20 Information Centre 2013b). Although it was not reflected in the final documentation, discussions on the periphery of the summit, especially between Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin, focused on a complex but comparatively traditional security issue, that of the conflict in Syria. As discussed in Chapter 5, the following year in Brisbane saw the G20 leaders dedicate a working session, for the first time, to discussing global energy issues and releasing a G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan as well as the G20 Principles on Energy Collaboration. Food security also received attention in the leaders' communiqué and a dedicated G20 Food Security and Nutrition Network was established, as discussed in Chapter 4 (G20 Information Centre 2014b).

As discussed in more detail below, the 2015 Antalya summit proved to be a watershed, with a separate G20 Statement on the Fight against Terrorism released in response to the Paris and Ankara terrorist attacks, which took place immediately before the summit. The statement not only condemned the attacks and asserted the unity of the G20 leaders, it also outlined a number of measures that would be taken to combat terrorism and its financing, as well as support the work of the UN (G20 Information Centre 2015c). The leaders' communiqué continued to outline progress in the field of food security but also dedicated a paragraph to security in the context of the internet and information and communications technology (G20 Information Centre 2015a). The Turkish presidency also innovated by establishing the first G20 ministerial meeting of energy ministers in the run-up to Antalya.

The following year's China-hosted Hangzhou summit continued to highlight food and energy security, as in previous years' summits, while picking up on internet and ICT security from the Antalya summit and including terrorism on the leaders' communiqué. The 2017 Hamburg summit saw another but more substantial and dedicated statement on countering terrorism in the leaders' declaration (G20 Information Centre 2017d), alongside an ongoing focus on food and energy security, marine environment protection and the recently added focus on ICT security. Despite some passing references, substantial attention was also accorded for the first time at a G20 summit to migrant smuggling and human trafficking, both in their own right and also through the lens of national security. All of these issues – food and energy security, ICT, terrorism, and human trafficking were also highlighted in the agenda and declaration of the 2018 Buenos Aires summit (G20 Information Centre 2018b).

At the fourteenth G20 summit in Osaka in 2019, one specific aspect of terrorism was given its own document in the form of the Statement on Preventing Exploitation of the Internet for Terrorism and Violent Extremism Conductive

to Terrorism (VECT) that declared ‘the state’s role, first and foremost, [is] to prevent and combat terrorism’ before then bringing the internet and online platforms into its treatment of terrorism in response to the Christchurch, New Zealand, shootings that were livestreamed on Facebook months earlier (G20 Information Centre 2019a). In support of the focus of Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzō, on the cross-border Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), the leaders’ declaration contained references to security within the digital economy alongside the traditional treatment of food and energy security (G20 Information Centre 2019b).

Under the Saudi and Italian presidencies of the G20 in 2020 and 2021 respectively, the focus inevitably turned to the global pandemic and issues around vaccination. In this context, attention was still paid to security but largely continued the work of previous summits on energy, food and digital security. However, during this time and in response to a developing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, an extraordinary meeting of G20 leaders took place online on 12 October 2021, a few weeks before the Rome summit, to discuss the security of the Afghan people and the region in light of the US evacuation and the Taliban assumption of power (G20 Information Centre 2021b).

At the Bali G20 in 2022, attention was dominated by the traditional security issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A strong statement emerged in paragraph 4 of the leaders’ declaration, suggesting that the G20 was asserting its role in traditional security issues:

It is essential to uphold international law and the multilateral system that safeguards peace and stability. This includes defending all the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN and adhering to international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians and infrastructure in armed conflicts. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. The peaceful resolution of conflicts, efforts to address crises, as well as diplomacy and dialogue, are vital. Today’s era must not be of war. (G20 Information Centre 2022a)

However, this was tempered by paragraph 3 in which a clear diversity of opinions among G20 members on the war in Ukraine was evident, in addition to the recognition that security is outside its remit, as highlighted by the following (added) emphases:

We reiterated our national positions as expressed in other fora, including the UNSC and the UNGA, which ... [deplore] in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and [demand] its complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine. *Most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine* and stressed it is causing immense human suffering and exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy – constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity, and elevating financial stability risks. *There were other views and different assessments*

of the situation and sanctions. Recognizing that the G20 is not the forum to resolve security issues, we acknowledge that security issues can have significant consequences for the global economy. (G20 Information Centre 2022a)

Thus, over seventeen summits spanning fifteen years, we can see the G20's treatment of security evolve from the initial position of keeping it at arm's length. The G20 followed the G7/8's lead and soon came to engage in both its traditional and non-traditional forms, as well as responding, inevitably, to the urgency of terrorist attacks. More recently, the narrative has come full circle as the G20 has sought to place some distance between its traditional economic focus and the resolution of security issues.

6.3 TRADITIONAL SECURITY

The G20 has tended to regard traditional forms of security, such as interstate conflict or nuclear weapons, as outside its wheelhouse and to treat them in passing in its agenda, meetings and resulting documentation. For the most part, this position has been supported by countries such as the BRICS group, who want to avoid an expansion of the G20's agenda into areas already having a traditional home, as security does in the UNSC, and so distract from the G20's economic emphasis. However, traditional security issues have occasionally appeared on the G20's agenda or been provided with mechanisms by which they can appear on the agenda. For example, one such vehicle was established by the Mexican presidency, which demonstrated innovation in G20 governance by establishing the first informal meeting of the G20 foreign ministers in February 2012 ahead of the Los Cabos summit. The meeting involved representatives from a range of G20 and non-G20 countries as well as representatives of international organizations and was designed to explore the opportunities for cooperation in key challenges surrounding the global economy, trade liberalization and green growth, but also disaster relief. Even though the Mexican hosts downplayed the emphasis on security issues and emphasized the informality of the meetings, they encountered some resistance among the G20 to this development and the Russian government did not send even a deputy foreign minister. In contrast, the US was vocally supportive of the meeting with Hillary Rodham Clinton arguing that 'foreign relations and economic relations are inseparable' (US Department of State 2012). The meeting ended up agreeing on the need for institutional reform in global governance, particularly in the case of the UN. In the words of Germany's foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle:

Our meeting in Mexico is a first. If it succeeds, it will convince other participants. We do not want to make the G20 a counter-format to the UN. We are just convinced

that the 20 strongest economic nations in the world are linked by more than just economics and fiscal policy but also by a global political approach.¹

At the following year's St Petersburg summit, most of the first evening was taken up with discussion of the war in Syria and the Assad government's use of chemical weapons in a Damascus suburb a fortnight previously (explored below in more detail). In addition, all G20 countries, regardless of their experience and stage of development, committed to 'strive for the highest possible level of nuclear safety, to foster robust nuclear safety and nuclear security cultures and, as called for in the International Atomic Energy Agency Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, ... encourage multilateral cooperation towards achieving a global nuclear liability regime' (G20 Information Centre 2013b).

Traditional security issues have more regularly been the focus of discussion within the numerous bilateral – and sometimes trilateral – meetings that take place on the edges of the summit. For example, bilateral and trilateral meetings have served to manage relations between regional rivals. After both assuming office in 2012, Prime Minister Abe of Japan and President Xi Jinping of China grasped the opportunity provided for direct engagement within global summity. Despite the awkwardness of their first official meeting at the 2013 St Petersburg summit, it was on the sidelines of this summit where the two leaders briefly shook hands and exchanged words directly for the first time. In his post-summit press conference, Abe touched on territorial disputes but stressed a 'mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests' (Kantei 2013). No meeting of the two took place at the following G20 summits held in Brisbane in 2014 and Antalya in 2015, and the G20 itself even served to fuel Sino-Japanese rivalry, with securing its 2016 presidency becoming the focus of ongoing competition. However, in the end, both leaders used the Hangzhou summit of that year to conduct an official bilateral meeting on its second day. The following year in Hamburg, they met once again on the sidelines of the summit on its final day in what proved to be a positive meeting that set the tone for many of the positive developments in the relationship that followed, as exemplified by Japan's understanding of China's One Belt, One Road initiative, and mutual official visits. President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Xi met the day before the summit began for what proved to be a constructive meeting to discuss North Korea, despite the shadow cast by the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea. Abe and Moon met for the first time on the first day of the summit, stressed the future-oriented nature of the relationship and agreed to resume reciprocal visits. In fact, the Abe–Xi meeting on the final day collated the bilaterals that had taken place during the summit by calling for a trilateral meeting between North-East Asia's key partners to take place by the end of 2017, thus seeking to combine these bilateral dialogues into a rejuvenated trilateral process.

However, often these bilaterals and trilaterals eschew internationalism and the provision of global public goods, focusing instead on hard national interests. For example, at the bilateral level, the discussion between Abe and Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian prime minister, on shared security concerns in the South China Sea, took place at the Antalya summit within the context of Japan's ultimately unsuccessful bid to win the contract to provide Australia with its next generation of submarines (Dobson 2017). On a trilateral level, the three-way discussion between Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, Abe and Obama on the sidelines of the first day of the Brisbane summit can be interpreted as part of Abe's efforts to reinforce key regional and democratic allies in an effort to balance against China. The three leaders declared in a thinly veiled reference to China that

this partnership rests on the unshakable foundation of shared interests and values, including a commitment to democracy and open economies, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes ... The three leaders also underscored the strength of their regional cooperation ... ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight and the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance with international law, including through legal mechanisms such as arbitration. (White House 2014b)

Similarly, the trilateral between India, Japan and the US held at the 2018 Buenos Aires summit was the first of its kind and brought together the leaders of three democracies with clear overlapping economic and security interests in relation to China.

As regards the specific security issue of the civil war in Syria, the obvious divide at the 2013 St Petersburg summit was between Russia as host and supporter of the government of President Bashar al-Assad, and the US, which was in favour of military action in response to Syria's use of chemical weapons against its own people in violation of the norms of international society. However, this divide ran through the G20 as a whole: Canada, France, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye supported military action, whereas Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Italy and South Africa opposed action, with a handful of countries hedging their bets because of domestic concerns and constraints. Perhaps aware of the divisions within the G20 and the slim chances of a consensus emerging out of these divisions, Putin was ready as host to include discussion of the situation in Syria within the format of the G20 but was not going to accept it usurping the UN: '... the G20 is not a formal legal authority. It's not a substitute for the UNSC, it can't take decisions on the use of force. But it's a good platform to discuss the problem. Why not take advantage of this?'² Not required constitutionally to put the decision to a parliamentary vote, President François Hollande was ready to commit France to participate alongside the US in military action. However, long-standing US allies like the UK, Germany and Japan, although ready to provide moral support and

condemn the use of chemical weapons, were wary of or unable to commit material support. In the case of the UK, Cameron had lost a parliamentary vote the previous week on military action in Syria. As regards Japan, this came down to long-standing postwar constitutional restrictions. Germany's position on the Syrian conflict was one of distance. German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, cited legal restrictions on Germany's military and summarized its position as follows: 'Our participation has not been requested, nor are we considering it.'³ The South Korean government actively sought to establish the existence of a link between Syria and the North Korean regime through the trade of chemical weapons. China took its traditional position of opposing military intervention by emphasizing sovereignty but adding the resulting disruption to the global economy as an additional factor. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon worked on the margins of the 2013 St Petersburg G20 as part of a two-hander with his UN-Arab League envoy on Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, to get agreement on an international conference on the conflict. At their traditional pre-summit press briefing, EU presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso were supportive of this by declaring that the 'international community cannot remain idle. We have to show that such crimes are unacceptable and will not be tolerated, to show that there can be no impunity' but calling for the crisis to be addressed 'through the UN process'. The Pope has on occasions written to the G20 leaders on the eve of their summits (for example, Seoul 2010, Brisbane 2013 and Hamburg 2017) to wish them a successful outcome and extend his blessings. Pope Francis wrote to G20 leaders on the eve of the 2013 St Petersburg summit with a plea for them to abandon a military solution in favour of a peaceful solution to a 'senseless massacre' (The Vatican 2013). So, although the leaders discussed Syria late into the first night of the summit, no mention of it was made in the final leaders' declaration. Rather, the leaders of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Türkiye, the UK and US issued a joint statement on the summit's margins that condemned the use of chemical weapons, acknowledged the paralysis in the UNSC and called for a strong response (G20 Information Centre 2013c). Once again on the summit's periphery, bilaterals provided a vehicle for attempting to address this conflict. Putin and Obama held an unplanned half-hour meeting on the sidelines of the summit on the final day and agreed to disagree with each other's positions. Putin also met with Cameron.

Parlar Dal (2019, 8) has identified the Syrian conflict as stoking Türkiye's expectations of the role the G20 could play in the field of security '[b]ecause of its flexible decision-making mechanisms', in contrast to the UN. However, she regards Türkiye's efforts in this area as essentially low profile and the attempt at the 2015 Antalya summit to place security issues on the agenda as limited. The limitations may be a result of the continued divide between the US and Russia on the Syrian conflict that was still in evidence despite a half-hour

bilateral between Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin on the first day of the summit. Despite positive White House reports of the meeting that stressed agreement on the need for ‘a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition’ including UN-mediated talks, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov, played down any results: ‘On tactics, the two sides are still diverging.’⁷⁴ While seeking regime change in Syria, the US was wary of any greater commitment of support to moderate Syrian opposition forces in their fight against Daesh and the Assad government such as enforcing no-fly zones and safe havens that might involve the deployment of US ground troops. In contrast, Russia openly supported Assad in the defeat of Daesh before any consideration of political reform in Syria. Furthermore, Putin claimed that terrorists in Syria were being financed from a number of countries, including within the G20.⁵

The G20 leaders sought to discuss the Syrian conflict within the context of the refugee crisis as a planned agenda item rather than one suddenly forced onto the agenda as a result of the Paris shootings. As host, Türkiye requested financial help to house two million refugees and a clear quota for each EU country to take refugees. Nevertheless, the Paris shootings coloured the discussion of the refugee crisis as the open borders of the EU came under scrutiny. The EU’s official position was that ‘[t]he G20 must rise to the challenge and lead a coordinated and innovative response to the crisis that recognizes its global nature and economic consequences and promotes greater international solidarity in protecting refugees’ (EU 2015b). Despite the terrorist attacks in Paris, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated that ‘I would invite those in Europe who try to change the migration agenda we have adopted – I would like to remind them to be serious about this and not to give in to these basic reactions that I do not like. I see the difficulty but I don’t see the need to change our general approach.’⁷⁶ Germany took a similar position in support of the Schengen arrangements as did President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, who similarly emphasized that despite anger over the Paris attacks, migrants must not be confused with terrorists (Zuma 2015). The issues of migrant smuggling and human trafficking were subsequently taken up more substantially at the Hamburg and Buenos Aires summits as another migration crisis threatened in Libya. The EU sought at both summits to pursue a robust response within the G20 (EU 2017; EU 2018). At Hamburg, President of the European Council Donald Tusk called on G20 leaders to be ‘less cynical’ in the fight against human trafficking and support a proposal that would institute targeted UN sanctions against migrant smugglers. The proposal received some support within the G20 but was opposed by China and Russia.⁷⁷ Although inextricably linked, in contrast to the challenges of a complex security issue like the Syrian conflict with both its regional and global rivalries and broader ramifications in the form of the refugee crisis, the G20 has concomitantly

and more consistently responded to the specific issue of global terrorism, as explored below.

Another specific security concern, North Korea, has made its presence felt at the G20 in the form of regular provocation around the time of the summit. For example, it shelled the island of Yeonpyeong two weeks after the 2010 Seoul summit, an act described as a petulant response to the attention that South Korea received as summit host.⁸ With impeccable timing North Korea also conducted ballistic missile tests during the 2016 Hangzhou summit, an act described in turn as an ‘armed protest’,⁹ and ‘Pyongyang’s way of reminding everyone of their existence at a moment when all the parties are together, in a typically defiant, North Korean way’.¹⁰ Once again, days before the 2017 Hamburg summit, the North Korean regime launched an intercontinental ballistic missile in an attempt to gain the world’s attention (Liu 2019). However, the G20 has resisted engaging with the issue on a multilateral level and in a substantive way. As Australia’s Prime Minister Turnbull, who was in favour of a unanimous statement of condemnation, explained in the case of the Hamburg summit, ‘[t]he chair of the G20, Chancellor Merkel, made the point that the G20 has been historically largely an economic conference’.¹¹ China and Russia also opposed a joint G20 statement condemning North Korea and pledging further sanctions, citing a rationale similar to Merkel’s.

G20 members with a vested interest in placing the issue of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development on the agenda of the G20 and securing international support are predominantly the regional neighbours being targeted and with most to lose: South Korea and Japan. As regards the former, ahead of the 2010 Seoul summit and although no mention was made of North Korea in the final summit documentation, the South Korean hosts regarded the event as an opportunity to secure greater leverage with North Korea and, looking ahead to possible reunification, attract assistance from the international community and multilateral bodies (Cherry and Dobson 2012). As regards the latter, although in the midst of the GFC, the Japanese prime minister, Asō Tarō, used the 2009 London summit not only as a vehicle for Japan’s substantial financial contribution to the IMF in resolving the crisis but also to discuss North Korea and its nuclear and missile development with fellow leaders, as his predecessors since Koizumi had done in the G8.¹²

Once again, bilaterals and trilaterals have played a role in discussing North Korea’s nuclear and missile development within the G20 and in immediate response to its summit-oriented provocations. Japan’s Abe met with Obama and President Park Geun-hye of South Korea on the edges of the Hangzhou summit, resulting in declarations of condemnation and cooperation (Kantei 2016). At the Hamburg summit, US, South Korean and Japanese leaders came together for a seventy-five minute trilateral meeting the day before the summit began, which resulted in a Joint Statement underscoring their trilateral

security cooperation and referring in suitably diplomatic language to China's and Russia's roles in managing North Korea and denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula (Jibiki 2017). The G20 has also provided the opportunity for ad hoc diplomacy towards North Korea, as seen at the Osaka summit when, on the evening of the first day of the two-day summit, Trump tweeted his willingness to meet Kim Jong-Un in the Demilitarized Zone and two days later became the first incumbent US president to visit North Korea.

As mentioned in the previous section, an extraordinary meeting of G20 leaders took place online a few weeks ahead of the 2021 Rome summit in response to the situation in Afghanistan, the US evacuation and the Taliban's takeover. The Italian prime minister, Mario Draghi, stressed the outcomes of the meeting: 'This was the first multilateral response to the Afghan crisis ... multilateralism is coming back, with difficulty, but it is coming back.'¹³ The resulting G20 statement called on the Taliban to ensure safe passage for refugees, contain military groups and that future humanitarian programmes should focus on women and girls (G20 Information Centre 2021b). However, Xi and Putin did not participate and sent ministers in their place. In fact, China called for an end to economic sanctions on Afghanistan and the unfreezing of Afghan international assets.

The Ukraine conflict has proved to be equally challenging and potentially disruptive. Ahead of the 2022 Bali summit, expectations were low that much could be achieved, especially with Putin not in attendance and Russia represented for only part of the summit, before Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's early departure. However, as mentioned above, a balance was struck in the leaders' declaration with, on the one hand, absolute clarity on the sanctity of international law and multilateralism in the pursuit of security, as well as the rejection of the use of nuclear weapons. It was the words of the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, that concluded paragraph 4 of the Leaders' declaration: 'Today's era must not be of war' (G20 Information Centre 2022a; Niblett 2022). On the other hand, the absence of consensus among G20 members in condemning the war and the limits of the G20 as a forum when dealing with security issues were starkly evident. In response to a missile explosion on Polish territory and the death of two Polish citizens on the first day of the summit, the first reaction of US president, Joe Biden, was to call an emergency meeting of like-minded G7 countries to agree a wait-and-see position until the facts of the incident were established. In contrast, some analysts suggested that China's position on Ukraine was a 'diplomatic dance' of balancing between 'respect for Ukraine's sovereignty' and 'Russia's legitimate security interests' (Korolev 2022).

6.4 TERRORISM

Despite an agenda ostensibly focused on macroeconomic challenges, it took the G7 just four summits before terrorism as a specific issue found its way onto the agenda of the 1978 Bonn summit in the form of a separate and brief statement on air-hijacking (G7 Information Centre 1978). As outlined above, in the case of the G20 it took slightly longer before a similar development came to pass at its tenth summit in 2015 in Antalya. However, as with the G7, the G20's Statement on the Fight against Terrorism was a response to immediate events in the form of the Ankara bombings of 10 October that killed over 100 people, and the Paris shootings on 13 November, just before the summit began, which killed 130 people and for which Daesh took responsibility, suggesting an expansion of their activities beyond northern Syria.

As will be explored in Chapter 7, hosting a summit is a 'mark of prestige' (Çolakoğlu and Hecan 2016, 143) and although Türkiye had considerable experience of organizing and hosting large-scale multilateral meetings, it was eager to ensure that this diplomatic mega-event proceeded smoothly and had concrete outcomes, to burnish its reputation. The original focus of the summit was placed on promoting growth based on inclusiveness, implementation and investment and this formed the basis of preparations from the point that Türkiye assumed the G20 presidency from Australia on 1 December 2014. The Paris shootings threatened to wrest attention away from the original economic focus of the agenda to this urgent issue and for some, a 'combination of negative and unforeseen circumstances sapped Türkiye's power and hindered it from leading a focused Presidency' (Çolakoğlu and Hecan 2016, 157). However, it was clear that the Turkish hosts sought to place the summit's attention on global terrorism, as well as the Syrian conflict and refugee crisis (as discussed above), some time before the Paris shootings. As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Türkiye, stated ahead of Antalya, reflecting the quandary faced by the G7 in the 1970s, it is

now impossible to consider the economy separately from politics, social developments and most importantly security ... and the inclusion of the issues of Iraq and Syria in the G20 agenda was not against the primary objectives of the platform ... [Thus, the Antalya summit would] address both the refugee crisis and the issue of terrorism which threaten global peace and stability. (Aliriza 2015)

As a result, the Turkish hosts performed a successful balancing act. On the one hand, they maintained the planned economic focus of the summit's agenda and introduced a range of institutional reforms to the G20, as discussed in Chapter 2. On the other hand, they were seen to respond rapidly to the Paris shootings and demonstrate unity within a diverse grouping on this issue, while leverag-

ing an immediate crisis to promote a parallel security agenda that had been planned ahead of time. In a speech on the day after the shootings, the UK prime minister, David Cameron, struck this tone by addressing the French people and linking the specific to the general: ‘Your values are our values, your pain is our pain, your fight is our fight.’¹⁴ President of the European Council Donald Tusk echoed this position with direct reference to the G20 by promising Hollande that the EU would demand that world leaders respond to the threats of extremism and terrorism.¹⁵ As host of the following year’s summit and only weeks away from assuming the G20 presidency, Chinese officials reiterated these comments. On the one hand, Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao dubbed terrorism ‘the common enemy of all mankind’ and highlighted the resulting ‘special significance’ placed upon the G20 members to ensure a successful Antalya summit.¹⁶ On the other hand, Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed that ‘joint forces should be formed to fight against terrorism, and that both the symptoms and root causes of the issue should be addressed. Double standards shouldn’t be allowed’, referring to China’s own crackdown on the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and arguing that it should become an important part of the international fight against terrorism.¹⁷

Thus, strategies to combat violent extremism were the topics of discussion at a working dinner on the first night of the summit. Modi highlighted terrorism as a principal global challenge and called for a comprehensive convention on international terrorism and restructuring of the international legal framework to deal with it. He proposed concrete measures such as isolating supporters and sponsors of terrorism by curbing the supply of arms to terrorists, disrupting terrorist movements and criminalizing terror financing.¹⁸ The gravity of the issue prompted the Turkish hosts to an innovation in the design of the summit such that foreign ministers and advisers were present at the working breakfast and working lunch on the first full day of the summit for the first time. In addition, many ceremonial aspects of the summit, such as a concert, were cancelled out of respect for the victims. The Statement on the Fight against Terrorism, like the leaders’ communiqué, was the product of months of negotiation and drafted in advance of the summit for the leaders to tweak and ultimately approve. Events conspired to make the statement more urgent and to foster G20 unity on the issue. It condemned the attacks in Paris and Ankara as ‘unacceptable insults to all humanity’, ensured buy-in from across the G20 by emphasizing that ‘terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group’; it also committed the G20 to

countering violent extremism, combatting radicalization and recruitment, hampering terrorist movements, countering terrorist propaganda and to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to incite terrorist acts, including through the internet. The direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism,

the incitement of terrorist acts and glorification of violence must be prevented. We recognize the need at all levels to work proactively to prevent violent extremism and support civil society in engaging youth and promoting inclusion of all members of society. (G20 Information Centre 2015c)

As a result, Erdoğan was able to claim that ‘[t]he main result in Antalya is the G20 countries taking a tougher stance on terrorism’.¹⁹ It is not surprising that G20 leaders were able to find common cause and rally around a condemnation of a specific and immediate terrorist atrocity. However, it should also be noted that the statement placed the onus for combatting terrorism on the UN, which would secure the support of G20 countries, such as China, Russia and South Africa, that did not want to see the legitimate centre of global governance being usurped or an expansion of the G20’s agenda. Paragraph 5 of the statement exemplified the balance between G20 unity on the issue and couching this resolve within existing and legitimate structures:

The fight against terrorism is a major priority for all of our countries and we reiterate our resolve to work together to prevent and suppress terrorist acts through increased international solidarity and cooperation, in full recognition of the UN's central role, and in accordance with UN Charter and obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, as well as through the full implementation of the relevant international conventions, UNSR resolutions and the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. (G20 Information Centre 2015c, emphasis added)

However, beyond the rhetoric, divergence was apparent across the G20 in terms of concrete actions. Although Hollande was unable to attend the summit and sent Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in his place, the French position was, understandably, as the victim of the immediate terror attacks, to declare itself to be at war and dispatch a French aircraft carrier to the Middle East to facilitate airstrikes on Daesh. However, the US position, as articulated by Obama at his post-summit press conference, was to extend rhetorical and logistical support for France but resist any further intervention in terms of the deployment of US troops (Stiles 2015).²⁰

The following year’s summit in Hangzhou built on the previous year’s treatment of terrorism by including a condemnation in the leaders’ communiqué:

We strongly condemn terrorism in all forms and manifestations, which poses serious challenges to international peace and security and endangers our ongoing efforts to strengthen the global economy and ensure sustainable growth and development. We reaffirm our solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism in all its forms and wherever it occurs. (G20 Information Centre 2016b)

The EU position was communicated by Tusk and Juncker ahead of the summit to EU governments stressing the ‘need to stand together in combatting the financing of terrorism’ and acknowledged that in a short space of time ‘[t]he G20 has already taken important steps in this direction, and should continue on this path’, specifically through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (EU 2016). During the summit discussions, Modi attempted to shift the focus onto state-sponsored terrorism and in a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan claimed that ‘[t]here are some nations that use terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Indeed, one single nation in South Asia is spreading these agents of terror in countries of our region.’ Modi continued by arguing that ‘those who sponsor and support terrorism must be isolated and sanctioned, not rewarded’ in what was seen to be another thinly veiled reference to China’s refusal to support UN sanctions against Pakistan-based terrorists.²¹ These issues had already been discussed as part of Modi’s bilateral with summit host Xi ahead of the summit. Erdoğan struck a similar tone by continuing to place terrorism firmly on the G20’s agenda and warning against double standards. Ahead of Hangzhou, he stated that ‘[t]hreats to global stability are our main problems now. One of them is terrorism and the other one is refugee crises. There is no good terrorist. All terrorists are bad. Thus, a principled stance against all these terrorist groups is needed.’²² Unsurprisingly, France supported this position, with Hollande stating that ‘[a] priority of the G20 summit is security and fighting terrorism. We should be fighting jointly sources of financing the international terrorism.’²³

In his post-summit press conference, Abe also demonstrated underlying national interest when discussing the G20’s response to terrorism and pledging Japanese leadership under the banner of Japan’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’. This has widely been regarded as part of an emerging and eponymous foreign policy doctrine that seeks to assert Japan’s great power status and overturn long-standing constraints on Japan’s power projection, such as article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, perceived as one of many postwar ‘shackles’ (Hughes 2015; Dobson 2017).

At the 2017 Hamburg summit, the German hosts took Türkiye’s approach and organized the summit to ensure dedicated discussion and a resulting statement on the issue of terrorism. The former was fostered through an informal leaders’ retreat on the morning of the first day of the summit, which was focused on terrorism and lasted two hours. The resulting stand-alone statement was more substantial than the one made in Antalya and ‘condemn[ed] all terrorist attacks worldwide’ stressing that the G20 stood ‘united and firm in the fight against terrorism and its financing’ (G20 Information Centre 2017d). Once again, India played a key role. Earlier in the year at the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Bonn, it had proposed creating a G20 working group on terrorism. At the leaders’ summit, Modi was the lead speaker at the

retreat and presented a multi-point agenda for countering terrorism, arguing that the leaders of countries supporting terrorism should be banned from G20 processes, national lists of designated terrorists should be shared among G20 countries, extradition processes should be simplified and expedited, and the Indian initiative of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism should be adopted by the UNSC.²⁴ Australia also played a proactive role in shaping the G20's treatment of the issue with Prime Minister Turnbull helping to personally draft a section of the G20's statement on counter-terrorism.²⁵ The penultimate paragraph resonated with efforts made by Merkel and May to address ungoverned, online spaces and promised that:

In line with the expectations of our peoples we also encourage collaboration with industry to provide lawful and non-arbitrary access to available information where access is necessary for the protection of national security against terrorist threats. We affirm that the rule of law applies online as well as it does offline. (G20 Information Centre 2017d)

Although not accorded its own document, and with trade dominating discussions, a strong statement on terrorism was included in the leaders' declaration resulting from the 2018 Buenos Aires summit, which supported the previous year's treatment of terrorism:

We reaffirm our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We commit to the full implementation of the Hamburg G20 Leaders' Statement on Countering Terrorism. We will step up our efforts in fighting terrorist and proliferation financing, and money laundering. We urge the digital industry to work together to fight exploitation of the internet and social media for terrorist purposes. (G20 Information Centre 2018b)

In contrast, the 2019 Osaka summit resulted in a very specific statement on preventing exploitation of the internet for terrorism and VECT, which was singled out by Putin as an important outcome and by Lavrov as a positive step, although later that year Lavrov accused the West of not wanting to involve Russia and China in the process of establishing counterterrorism guidelines for IT companies.²⁶ In addition, the G20 leaders made a much weaker statement in their declaration that was focused on 'the essential role of the FATF in setting global standards for preventing and combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing' (G20 Information Centre 2019b). In contrast, Modi used the summit to make a more robust call for a global conference on terrorism in response to what he dubbed 'the biggest threat to humanity'.

6.5 NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY

The G20's engagement with non-traditional security has been as incremental and inevitable as it has been with traditional security issues. Engelbrekt regards paragraph 15 of the 2008 Washington Declaration, quoted at the outset of this chapter, as 'a list of issues featured largely at the margins of G20 summits' (2015, 542–543). At the following year's Pittsburgh summit, a paragraph in the leaders' statement was dedicated to energy security and climate change, and food security also featured strongly throughout the document. Thereafter, subsequent summits have revisited all of these challenges in an iterative fashion. However, the G20 (and previous chapters of this book) has treated them by and large not as non-traditional security issues but as aspects of its development and climate change agenda. For example, Chapter 4 discussed food security as a specific priority in the work of the G20 on development. This issue also demonstrates how the G20's agenda can expand to cannibalize that of the G7/8, for example the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). The AFSI emerged from the eponymous 2009 Italian summit at which G8 and non-G8 countries declared:

We will aim at substantially increasing aid to agriculture and food security including through multiyear resource commitments. In this respect, we welcome the commitments made by countries represented at L'Aquila towards a goal of mobilizing \$20 billion over three years through this coordinated, comprehensive strategy focused on sustainable agriculture development, while keeping a strong commitment to ensure adequate emergency food aid assistance. (G7 Information Centre 2009)

Chapter 5 largely deals with energy as an issue, alongside an overarching response to climate change. However, it has also received treatment as a security issue. As mentioned above, under the Australian presidency, the 2014 Brisbane summit was the first to dedicate time and space to the discussion of energy issues and, although vague, established agreed principles on various aspects of energy collaboration, including energy security, namely to '[e]nhance energy security through dialogue and cooperation on issues such as emergency response measures' (G20 Information Centre 2014d). Since 2015, as a result of the Turkish presidency's initiative, G20 energy ministers have met annually ahead of the leaders' summit. These ministerial meetings have dedicated similarly worded paragraphs to energy security in their communiqués that resonate with the principles set out at Brisbane. The one exception was the German presidency of 2017, which did not convene a meeting of energy ministers but instead released the G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth at the leaders' summit. As mentioned above, and building on the Turkish initiative, the Japanese presidency innovated in summit design

by holding the first-ever G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth in Karuizawa, Japan, in June 2019. Energy security continued to receive its own paragraph at this meeting, slightly more substantial but largely similar to previous ministerials:

In light of recent developments highlighting concern about energy security, the G20 Energy Ministers acknowledge energy security as one of the guiding principles for the transformation of energy systems. The G20 Energy Ministers also emphasize the importance of resilience, protection, and development of reliable energy infrastructure to prevent energy supply disruptions; and stress the importance of diversification of energy sources, suppliers, and routes, facilitation of open, flexible, transparent, competitive, stable, and reliable markets, increasing energy efficiency. They attach importance to promotion of dialogue between consumers and producers as well as global collaboration in the business sector, and the need to facilitate the proper conditions to continue and increase energy investments to ensure ... sustainable, affordable, reliable, resilient and cleaner energy systems. The G20 Energy Ministers recognize the importance of quality infrastructure investment that promotes sustainable growth and enhances the resilience of our energy systems. (G20 Information Centre 2019a)

By acknowledging the importance of energy security and calling for improved infrastructure and diversification of energy sources (with the Japanese presidency placing a particular focus on the role of hydrogen), the G20 ministers were reiterating previous statements but also responding to suspected Iranian attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which took place while Prime Minister Abe was visiting Iran only days before the ministerial meeting.²⁷ In this vein, G20 leaders at the Osaka summit noted the outcomes of the ministerial meeting in Karuizawa and reiterated their concerns over recent events:

In light of recent events highlighting concern about safe flow of energy, we acknowledge the importance of global energy security as one of the guiding principles for the transformation of energy systems, including resilience, safety and development of infrastructure and uninterrupted flow of energy from various sources, suppliers, and routes. (G20 Information Centre 2019b)

Nevertheless, despite incremental progress, one of the major obstacles for the G20 in responding to energy security beyond platitudes is the dichotomy that exists within its membership between energy liberalizers and energy nationalists.

As regards environmental security and protection of the marine environment in particular, the G20 first engaged with the issue in 2010 with a passing and uncontroversial comment towards the end of the Toronto summit declaration that '[f]ollowing the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico we recognize the need to share best practices to protect the marine environment, prevent accidents related to offshore exploration and development, as well as trans-

portation, and deal with their consequences' (G20 Information Centre 2010c). However, by the end of the decade, protecting the marine environment had become a much more salient topic both on the international community's agenda and in the public imagination, with a particular focus on reducing the use of single-use plastics. This was partly due to the decision to prohibit the import of overseas' plastic waste by some countries, most notably China in 2017, and in part due to Sir David Attenborough's BBC programme *Blue Planet II* and the resulting 'Attenborough Effect'. The German presidency led on this issue with the adoption of the G20 Action Plan on Marine Litter at the Hamburg summit in 2017, which recognized the cross-cutting nature of the challenge across the environment, human health, economic development, social well-being, biodiversity and food security, as well as laying the foundations in terms of agreed intent and principles by which the G20 could begin to address the issue (G20 Information Centre 2017e).

As an island nation, the Japanese government sought to ensure that the issues of protecting the marine environment and reducing the use of plastics were placed visibly on the agenda of its presidency and that the G20 made concrete progress on its initial treatment of marine litter at Hamburg. It did this by demonstrating innovation in summit organization by convening the first-ever G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth. The EU was equally keen to shape the global dialogue on marine litter by sharing its experience as the first region in the world to introduce a comprehensive plastic strategy and rules to reduce the impact on the environment of some single-use plastics. It also sought to have its holistic approach pursued through the EU circular economy agenda as well as having its plastic strategy reflected in the summit documentation. It succeeded in this goal, and the ministerial meeting resulted in an agreement to create a new voluntary framework to '[p]romote a comprehensive life-cycle approach to urgently and effectively prevent and reduce plastic litter discharge to the oceans' as well as encourage countries to '[s]hare and update information on relevant policies, plans, and measures taken/to be taken in line with the G20 Action Plan on Marine Litter' (G20 Information Centre 2019c). The main criticism levelled at the framework was its voluntary and non-binding nature and the loophole of 'taking into account our own appropriate policies, approaches, and national circumstances'. It also failed to specify which kind of plastics – in particular single-use plastics – or to provide any timescales, deadlines or robust monitoring. In its defence, the Japanese government stressed the incremental first step within a future process that this agreement represented.²⁸ To this end, this expansion in ministerial meetings was continued at subsequent summits. The G20 leaders endorsed the framework later the same month in Osaka and declared that 'we share, and call on other members of the international community to also share, as a common global vision, the "Osaka Blue Ocean Vision"

that we aim to reduce additional pollution by marine plastic litter to zero by 2050 through a comprehensive life-cycle approach that includes reducing the discharge of mismanaged plastic litter by improved waste management and innovative solutions while recognizing the important role of plastics for society' (G20 Information Centre 2019b). Whether 2050 was an effective and realisable deadline for achieving zero marine plastic litter was the source of as much criticism as the absence of a deadline in the framework. However, even if a relatively diluted approach, this framework and vision did demonstrate Japan's renewed leadership on the issue and ability to keep the US on board when previously both countries had refused to sign up to a similarly phrased Ocean Plastics Charter adopted by the remaining members of the G7 at its Charlevoix summit a year earlier (G7 Information Centre 2018; Kojima and Iwasaki 2019).

Finally, the treatment of the issue of cyber security at the G20 has been both multilateral and bilateral. As regards the former, by placing the emphasis on the digital economy in the agenda, successive G20 presidencies were also highlighting the associated necessity of cyber security. Although the Korean presidency sought to address this issue from an early stage, but gave up trying to build a consensus,²⁹ and a number of US senators urged Obama to raise cyber security at the Hangzhou summit,³⁰ it began to be addressed from Antalya onwards in an incremental but consistent fashion. The leaders' communiqué at Antalya stated, somewhat obviously and belatedly:

We are living in an age of Internet economy that brings both opportunities and challenges to global growth [and acknowledge] that threats to the security of and in the use of ICTs, risk undermining our collective ability to use the Internet to bolster economic growth and development around the world ... we affirm that no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. All states in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should respect and protect the principles of freedom from unlawful and arbitrary interference of privacy, including in the context of digital communications. (G20 Information Centre 2015a)

The following year saw the Chinese presidency incrementally build on this acknowledgment of the importance of the issue with the decision to establish the G20 Digital Economy Task Force to 'propose a common understanding, principles and key areas for the development and cooperation of the digital economy' (G20 Information Centre 2016c). This was realized the following year under the German presidency.

While the German presidency demonstrated innovation in establishing the first ministerial meeting associated with digitization, much of the treatment of it in summit declarations has largely consisted of repetitious platitudes of the

importance of cyber security to the digital economy. The Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration that was issued at the ministerial meeting held in Salta, Argentina, a few months before the Buenos Aires summit, proposed a set of principles around the digital economy. As regards cyber security, the declaration stated in vague terms:

Security

Promote trust and security, as vital for harnessing the potential of digital government, by adopting a risk management approach for appropriate uptake of digital technologies to address security risks, data loss concerns, privacy, threats and vulnerabilities in the use of ICT. Adopt risk management models to identify, assess, monitor, mitigate and manage risks as well as promote resilience and security of systems. Foster the adoption of reliable identity and trust management approaches. Promote international cooperation in regard to this matter. (G20 Information Centre 2018d, original emphasis)

The Japanese presidency sought to highlight its pet policy of DFFT, mentioned above, highlighting on the one hand the contribution that digitization makes to inclusive and sustainable economic growth, while acknowledging the challenges around privacy, data protection, intellectual property rights, and security (G20 Information Centre 2019b). At the beginning of 2019 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Abe advocated the creation of the ‘Osaka Track’, an overarching framework promoting cross-border data flow with enhanced protections (Kantei 2019a). However, the challenge for the Japanese hosts was that a number of G20 countries including China, Russia, India and Vietnam (an invited guest at the Osaka summit) all operated their own restrictive data transfer regulations. In the end, Abe announced the ‘Osaka Track’ on the first day of the leaders’ summit with the support of Japan’s closest bilateral partner, the US, as well as the EU, Australia and Singapore, and managed to secure the signatures of China, Russia and Vietnam. However, Egypt, India, Indonesia and South Africa did not sign up for the initiative, leading the Japanese hosts to downplay what was intended to be a signature policy in order to avoid any diplomatic embarrassment.³¹ India argued that taking the initiative forward within the plurilateral space of the G20 undermined ‘multilateral’ principles of consensus-based decisions in global trade negotiations and that the WTO was a more appropriate forum as data is a form of trade. In addition, the Indian government believed that the initiative would restrict developing countries from developing their own policies that would allow them to bridge the digital divide with developed countries, level the playing field and ultimately benefit from digitization.

Cyber security has also been the subject of bilateral discussions on the edges of the summits. For example, in the context of concerns surrounding possible Russian interference in the UK’s Brexit referendum and US Presidential

election of 2016, Trump claimed to have raised the latter issue in a bilateral with Putin at the Hamburg summit. In typical Trumpian language, he also tweeted that the two leaders had discussed ‘forming an impenetrable Cyber Security unit so that election hacking, and many other negative things, will be guarded and safe’ (Trump 2017).³² Although the plan was ridiculed, with the Republican senator, Marco Rubio, likening the plan to working with Syria’s President Assad on a ‘Chemical Weapons Unit’ in a counter-tweet (Rubio 2017), the idea resurfaced at a later bilateral between the two leaders in Helsinki, prompting further ridicule.³³

6.6 SUMMARY

Security – traditional or non-traditional – has inexorably found its way onto a G20 summit agenda dominated by financial and economic issues. As regards the positions of G20 members on this development, Engelbrekt has suggested that ‘[l]eaders of countries that aspire to gain a permanent seat at the UNSC – primarily India, Brazil, South Africa, Germany, and Japan – are wary that expanding the scope of G20 initiatives could circumscribe the former body’s role’ (2015, 539). However, as demonstrated above, the intersection of security and the G20’s remit does not necessarily correlate with the subgroups within the G20, or desired and actual membership of the UNSC. Some G7 countries, such as the US and Germany on occasion, have been more accepting of an expansion of the agenda into the field of security broadly defined. Some of the BRICS countries, most notably China and Russia, have certainly been sceptical and resisted the development. However, India and Türkiye stand out as countries that have been more vocal in placing issues like the Syrian civil war and global terrorism on the agenda. Thus, a theme that emerges in this chapter, as might be expected in the hard-nosed realist world of security, is that a crisis can be the factor that undercuts the position of any particular government and ultimately encourages it to make use of the G20, often for explicit national interests. If the G20 is too unwieldy, then bilaterals and trilaterals have instead proved to be useful for many countries in addressing any given crisis or promoting national security interests (for the importance of bilaterals, see Dobson 2012d). The next chapter will also highlight the importance of national interest but within the context of the often overlooked domestic impact of G20 summitry.

NOTES

1. *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, 21 February 2012.
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3. *Deutsche Welle*, 31 August 2013.

4. *New York Times*, 15 November 2015.
5. *The Guardian*, 15 November 2015.
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15. *Cape Argus*, 16 November 2015.
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27. *The Japan Times*, 16 June 2019.
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33. *Politico*, 16 July 2018.