



This is a repository copy of *Unpacking the G20: insights from the Summit*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:

<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/210077/>

Version: Published Version

Book:

Dobson, H. orcid.org/0000-0003-3124-8546 (2024) *Unpacking the G20: insights from the Summit*. Political Science and Public Policy . Edward Elgar Publishing . ISBN 9781786433541

<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786433558>

Reuse

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long as you credit the authors, but you can't change the article in any way or use it commercially. More information and the full terms of the licence here: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/>

Takedown

If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.



eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/>

Unpacking the G20

Unpacking the G20

Insights from the Summit

Hugo Dobson

School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, UK



Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Hugo Dobson 2024



This is an open access work distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>). Users can redistribute the work for non-commercial purposes, as long as it is passed along unchanged and in whole, as detailed in the License. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd must be clearly credited as the rights holder for publication of the original work. Any translation or adaptation of the original content requires the written authorization of Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
The Lypiatts
15 Lansdown Road
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 2JA
UK

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA

A catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Control Number: 2023948873

This book is available electronically in the **Elgaronline**
Political Science and Public Policy subject collection
<http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781786433558>

ISBN 978 1 78643 354 1 (cased)
ISBN 978 1 78643 355 8 (eBook)

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vi
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	viii
1 Introduction	1
2 The G20 and its position within global governance	10
3 Managing the global economy	35
4 Sustainable development	59
5 Climate change and energy transitions	84
6 Security and terrorism	103
7 G20 summitry beyond global governance	126
8 Conclusions	152
<i>Appendix 1: G20 summits, 2008–2025</i>	186
<i>Appendix 2: Attendance at G20 summits, 2008–2022</i>	187
<i>References</i>	193
<i>Index</i>	211

Acknowledgements

This book took far longer to complete than I anticipated. Who would have thought that becoming a dad for the second time and taking on university leadership roles would interfere with a research project? Not me, clearly. Then there was the small matter of a global pandemic, three lockdowns and the joys of home-schooling – something we have agreed as a family to never speak of again. This book was originally meant to be published in 2018 and cover the ten years of G20 summitry since its first meeting at the leaders' level in 2008. However, as a result of the above events, ten years turned into fifteen years. To cut a long story short, this book would never have seen the light of day without the infinite patience and generous assistance of the following people.

At the University of Sheffield, I would like to thank all my colleagues in the School of East Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Humanities and Faculty of Social Sciences who helped me in various ways to begin and complete this book. In particular, I'd like to single out everybody involved in the Global Leadership Initiative, which enabled me to attend many of the G20 summits I write about in this book. Matt Bishop, Garrett Brown, Greg Stiles and a small army of outstanding students proved to be the best of colleagues in Hangzhou, Hamburg, Buenos Aires and Osaka. This initiative represents one of the most exciting academic projects I have had the pleasure to be involved with and none of it would have been possible without the support of Eva-Maria Nag, the late David Held, Tom Kirk and everyone at *Global Policy*. If you haven't looked at the work that our teams of analysts produced, then you really should: <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/global-leadership-initiative/global-leadership-initiative>. I would also like to thank the University of Sheffield's Open Access Fund for its support in making this book freely available.

At Edward Elgar, I am deeply grateful to Alex Pettifer, Nina Booth and Imogen Phillips. I am ashamed to say that on more than one occasion I had to email Alex and sheepishly ask for an extension. He must rue the day in 2015 when he met me at the Political Studies Association's conference in Sheffield and took interest in a book on the G20. A less sympathetic editor would have bailed out on me long ago. I am also grateful for the feedback of the anonymous reviewers, which helped me clarify the focus and structure of this book.

Beyond Sheffield and Edward Elgar, a number of people have provided both academic advice and personal friendship over the years. So, in no particular order, thanks to Greg Chin, Andy Cooper, John Kirton, Madeline Koch, Ella

Kokotsis, Julia Kulik, Lida Preyma, Tristen Naylor, Denisse Rudich, Brittany Warren, Jonathan Luckhurst, Tom Chodor, Dries Lesage, Alan Alexandroff and Yves Tiberghien.

Last, and definitely not least, many thanks to Elizabeth, Iris and Alex. I love you.

Abbreviations

3G	Global Governance Group (The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Finland, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Vietnam)
AFSI	L'Aquila Food Security Initiative
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMIS	Agricultural Market Information System
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (forum)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
B20	Business 20
BEPS	base erosion and profit shifting
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were invited to join the bloc in August 2023)
C20	Civil Society 20
CRA	credit-rating agency
CSO	civil society organization
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
DFFT	data free flow with trust
DRM	domestic resource mobilization
DWG	Development Working Group

EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FIAP	Financial Inclusion Action Plan
FSB	Financial Stability Board
FSF	Financial Stability Forum
FTT	financial transaction tax
G5	Group of Five
G7	Group of Seven (Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US)
G8	Group of Eight (the G7 plus Russia)
G20	Group of Twenty (the G8 plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Türkiye. The African Union's permanent membership was announced in September 2023)
G22	Group of 22, also known as the Willard Group (the G8 plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand)
G33	Group of 33 (the G20 plus Belgium, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and Thailand)
G77	Group of 77 (a coalition of 134 developing nations within the United Nations)
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GPFI	Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion
HAP	Heiligendamm–L'Aquila Process
HDP	Heiligendamm Dialogue Process
HRD	human resource development
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMC	international media centre

IMF	International Monetary Fund
L20	Labour 20
LICs	low-income countries
MAP	mutual assessment process
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIKTA	Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Türkiye and Australia
MYAP	multi-year action plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
O5	Outreach 5
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
S20	Science 20
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDRs	special drawing rights
T20	Think 20
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
VECT	violent extremism conducive to terrorism
VPLM	voluntary peer learning mechanism
W20	Women 20
WTO	World Trade Organization
Y20	Youth 20

1. Introduction

Towards the end of October 2008, in what would prove to be one of his final and possibly more significant acts as US president, George W. Bush announced that a summit meeting of G20 leaders would be held in Washington DC the following month. Although in existence since 1999 as a grouping of finance ministers and central bank governors, this decision to upgrade the G20 to the leaders' level in response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and to invite both developed and developing countries was heralded as an important milestone in the evolution of global governance mechanisms.

For many of us who had been researching the role of informal mechanisms of global governance like the Group of 7 (G7) and Group of 8 (G8) for years, even decades, and in the process had established a reputation for going straight to the periphery of the problem, this came as something of a vindication. Having been largely overlooked as irrelevant sideshows at best, the attention of scholars, policymakers and journalists was now firmly placed on the informals, especially the G20. Dare I say, even the general public was now aware of the G20. Although several pundits predicted the death of the former world order as symbolized by the apparently defunct and irrelevant G7/8 (prematurely and incorrectly, as it turned out), the purpose and operation of informal groupings like the G20 and their possible impact were now hot topics.

At first, think-tankers and policy wonks led the charge and disseminated their analyses in the form of policy briefs, blogs and think pieces on technical issues related to the immediate causes of and solutions to the crisis. However, as academic publishing cycles kicked in and dedicated journals like *Global Summitry* were established, academic researchers clawed back the G20 as a field of study. As regards substantive research monographs and edited volumes exclusively focused on the G20, Cooper and Thakur's (2013) contribution to Routledge's Global Institutions series provided an excellent, one-stop, point of entry to the subject, exploring the purpose, function and practices of the G20 in a slim volume. Postel-Vinay (2014) produced a similar but different introduction to the G20, focused on its origins and the broader issues of legitimacy and efficacy. Kirton's (2013) *G20 Governance for a Globalized World* was a comprehensive, rich and empirically driven monograph concerned with tracing the history and development of the G20 from 1999 and a meeting of finance ministers to 2010 and a summit of leaders. Hajnal (2014) provided a similarly detailed point of reference. At the same time, a number

of edited volumes have added to our understanding. For example, Derviş and Drysdale's edited volume (2014) was a timely stocktake of the G20 and its evolution from 2008 to 2013, focused on traditional macroeconomic issues, alongside important and overlooked topics such as the G20's approach to climate change. Callaghan and Sainsbury's collection of essays (2015) came out of the 2014 Brisbane summit and focused largely on global governance challenges, but with some attention given to factions within the G20 as well as China's presidency in 2016. The Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University in China (2016) published the proceedings of the meeting of G20 think tanks that took place during the Chinese presidency. These were mostly short presentations on various aspects of the role, functioning and future of the G20, with some attention paid to the perspectives of emerging economies generally and China specifically.

Luckhurst addressed big questions with theoretical rigour regarding the impact of the GFC on global governance and the influence of the G20, arguing that it had become 'an important hub of global governance networks' (2016, 1). Thereafter, Slaughter (2019a) assembled a range of international relations (IR) perspectives on the G20 and in the process demonstrated that edited volumes can be consistent in the focus and quality of their contributions. Coinciding with the Saudi assumption of the G20 presidency in 2020, a special issue of the *South African Journal of International Affairs* took stock of the ten-year summit process and explored what it has become, how it might be reformed, how it engages with a range of non-state actors, and the role of rising powers (Benson and Zürn 2019; Berger et al. 2019; Brandi 2019; Cooper 2019; He 2019; Kaul 2019; Luckhurst 2019a; Maberera 2019; Parlar Dal and Dipama 2019; Villanueva Ulfgard and Vega 2019). Inevitably, however, the discussion regularly returns to the issues highlighted by Subacchi: 'Legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability are the three key points in any discussion of the Group of 20 ... [and a] lack of legitimacy is the G20's original sin' (2019, 703).

In summary, since 2008, our understanding of the G20 has expanded to encompass the role of the G20 – whether it be an improvised crisis committee or global steering committee (Cooper 2010), club or hub, a mechanism for hegemonic incorporation and/or collectivist cooperation, or neither (Beeson and Bell 2009; Chodor 2017); its informal nature, efficacy and the related questions of legitimacy and accountability (Blom 2022); its relationship with other multilateral organizations and groupings, as well as the expansion of its agenda from macroeconomic issues to include climate change; and the extension of the format to include *inter alia* a Business 20 (B20) of business associations, a Women 20 (W20) focused on gender issues and a Think 20 (T20) of think tanks and universities.

Within these contributions to our understanding of the G20 over time, the emphasis placed on the role of the state has clearly diminished since the GFC:

What the leaders of the G20 found was that power lies dispersed in the network—the mesh of states and markets, of corporations, non-state organisations and institutions. The G20 leaders, in their communiqué, look overwhelmingly to multilateral, institutional approaches to deal with problems that have become too large, too pervasive and too interdependent for any one state to address. What the subprime crisis, the ensuing liquidity crisis and the resulting collapse of economic activities has demonstrated is that some problems—of finance, trade, poverty and the environment—are too complex for the state, any state, even the largest, to confront. (Nordberg 2012, 301)

Although the urgency of the GFC passed, the literature on the G20 continued to develop and capture this complexity by focusing on the network, transactional and relational aspects of global governance and summitry. Mabera (2019, 585) quite rightly argues that ‘Conceptualising the G20 as global summitry frames it as a “process” involving a web of actors working below the leaders’ summit, including an array of public and private networks, ministers, sherpas, international organisations and transnational policy and regulatory networks.’

This scholarship accurately captures the developments in G summitry over time from the multilateral emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation of the original G7 process to the post-GFC omnilateral focus on a range of non-state actors, the expertise they possess, and the relationships they create. This book does not deny the reality or utility of these developments. However, it is equally true that by elevating the level of analysis to the global, and exploring what the G20 as a grouping means for the resolution of collective global action problems and provision of global public goods (and in turn what they mean for the G20), the perspectives of individual members have tended to get lost. It is sometimes surprisingly difficult to get a clear picture of how Argentina, Japan, South Africa or any member regards the G20, let alone attempt to answer the questions of what they are trying to achieve, what strategies they adopt and how successful they have been. This is unfortunate because even though the nature of the G20 has shifted from crisis to global steering committee and then beyond to a hub of global governance networks embracing a range of non-state actors, the G20 is ultimately a collection of nineteen countries and one intergovernmental organization (expanding to two with the announcement of the permanent membership of the African Union (AU) at the New Delhi summit in September 2023). State-centrism is an inherent aspect of the G20. Yet, the G20 is often written about in academic and journalistic terms as acting independently and possessing some kind of agency. This is peculiar as it is not the G20 but member countries and host nations that shape the agenda and outcomes. As Slaughter (2019b, 8) explains, in the simplest of terms: ‘The G20

has no constitution or treaty, no continuing secretariat or budget and, therefore, no capability to act independently from member states.’

Certainly, in the absence of any agency, the G20’s evolution and expansion both horizontally and vertically have brought a range of actors into play, including representatives from a range of regional and international organizations, special guests, working groups, ministerial meetings and stakeholder groups. Yet, as Tristen Naylor explains through the lens of English IR theory, ‘the G20 remains at its very core a club of states, albeit one with a network of non-state actors orbiting it and playing supporting roles in the management and maintenance of international society’ (2019a, 87–88).

Moreover, country-specific perspectives, identities and capabilities clearly matter, as seen in the G20’s genesis when Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin and nominee for US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers drafted the original membership of the G20 at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors in 1999, admittedly in arbitrary fashion:

The rationale for choosing members was quite clearly a mix of instrumentalism and personal preference. As acknowledged by Paul Martin, a quantitative assessment of the candidates was part, but not the only part, of the process: ‘I felt very strongly that [the G20 had to be made up of] the regional powers’, Martin states, and ‘Larry felt that [as well] and then he also had geopolitical concerns ... In the choice of Indonesia over Thailand, the deciding factor was likely influence. The same is true with Saudi Arabia, although of course the Saudis were also close allies with the United States (US). Also interesting is the non-choice of Malaysia, which had imprisoned its finance minister, Anwar Ibrahim, or the selection of Argentina over Chile, despite the kudos given to the latter country for its impressive return to democracy and economic performance. (Cooper and Pouliot 2015, 344)

Naylor similarly captures this country-specific horse-trading: ‘Excluding any incumbents was “out of the question” in crafting the new group, and the inclusion of new members was decided based on whom they perceived to be the regionally “systematically significant” countries who subscribed to a largely neo-liberal economic agenda and upheld a standard of good governance domestically’ (Naylor 2019b, 26).

Looking beyond the origins of the G20, country-specific perspectives, identities and capabilities have continued to matter, even if the role of the state is no longer exclusive. For example, G20 processes around finalizing its outward communications are predicated on country-specific positions and the resulting compromise: ‘G20 communiqués, especially the final one at the end of the leaders’ summit, are always an exercise in compromise. With 20-plus viewpoints, it would be impossible to produce an agreement that completely satisfies all the participants.’¹

Ultimately, as Schirm (2013, 685) argues, ‘the causes for the positions of G20 members can be found in economic interests and ideas dominant in the domestic politics of countries’. Kalinowski argues along similar lines: ‘... that if we want to understand international economic conflicts and competing preferences for international institutions we need to investigate the domestic origins of these conflicts’ (2019, 2). We should also remember that the array of actors and stakeholders outlined above tend to be predicated on countries, both in the obvious case of governmental representatives such as ministers and sherpas, and also in the less obvious cases of official engagement groups created by the G20, which reflect the priorities and culture of the host country. In short, the G20’s member countries – plus the European Union (EU) and the AU from 2023 – still matter.

Cooper and Thakur (2013, 125) were right when they wrote that ‘[t]he G20 should operate as the hub of a network not just of countries, but also of international institutions, recognizing interconnections among issues and fostering points of common interest’. Yet, when surveying the ever-expanding literature, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the G20 is first and foremost organized around and shaped by countries, especially governments and their leaders. The networked characteristics of the group are important but second order aspects. By enhancing our understanding of the approach taken by member countries, we will in turn enhance our understanding of the G20’s developing role in global governance. As Cooper and Thakur go on to state, ‘[t]he G20’s destiny is to be the hub of a global network: by the top 20, but of and for all’ (2013, 135). The first step towards this ‘destiny’ is to understand the roles, perceptions and behaviours of the members. This provides a more nuanced context by which to understand the development of the G20.

When attention has focused on the member countries of the G20 – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Türkiye, the UK, the US, and the only G20 member that is not a country, the EU, up until the AU’s addition in 2023 – the focus has usually been on the big hitters like the US, the host in any given year or the most prominent of the rising powers. These contributions are often short-form journal articles, book chapters, or journalistic blogs. One notable exception is Kalinowski’s (2019) detailed book-length tracing of the domestic origins and differing capitalisms that underpin the US, EU and East Asian positions in the G20 on the governance of international finance. Kalinowski’s ambitious goal is to look ‘beneath the surface of international statements and the shadow play of events such as G20 summits ... [and refer] to historical developments, structural investigation, and the uncovering of power dynamics to investigate international cooperation and conflicts’ (2019, 236). Rather than provide a similarly broad historical sweep, the focus of this book is firmly on what happens within the forum of the G20.

Another notable example, and one that is more similar in intent to my own, is Kirton's (2016) monograph on China, the *ne plus ultra* of rising powers, and its emerging leadership role specifically within the G20. This appears to be the lone book treatment with a country- and G20-specific focus, although China has provided a focus for a number of journal articles and book chapters, occasionally on specific issues like development (Cooper and Farooq 2016; Gao and Wouters 2022). Contributions to leading journals and edited volumes have explored other rising, emerging or middle powers as a collective, or specifically in the case of India, Russia, Türkiye and Latin America, and occasionally on specific issues like development (Heine 2010; Cooper 2013a; Luckhurst 2015; Cooper and Farooq 2016; Downie 2017; Panova 2017; Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2018; Parlar Dal 2019; Sachdeva 2022). European scholars have produced a welcome body of work focused on the EU's position and performance within the G20 (Debaere 2010; Debaere and Orbie 2012; Debaere 2014; Debaere, Lesage and Orbie 2014; Nasra and Debaere 2016). I myself have made a humble contribution to our understanding of East Asia's role in the G20, specifically of Japan as a great power seeking to manage and reverse its perceived decline (Dobson 2012a; Dobson 2013a; Dobson 2017), to a lesser extent of Korea as the first Asian presidency of the G20 (Cherry and Dobson 2012), and, once again, the inescapable China (Chin and Dobson 2016). So, we are presented with an opportunity, compellingly captured in the words of Bradford (2011, 250):

The ascendance of G20 summits is emblematic of a wholly new moment in international life for still another reason. G20 summits are not just meetings of leaders of nations; the G20 represents a meeting of historically diverse cultures. The G20 represents a global encounter of cultures, a powerful new interface of cultural differences. This is the 'grand narrative', which involves all of us as individuals—including our identities, our communities, and our cultures, all of which are now interpenetrated by 'others' of different cultures, traditions, and sensibilities.

Whether you agree or not, this does beg the question of why diversity and cultural differences tend to be sidelined in the study of IR generally and global summitry specifically. It may be that the changing fortunes of area studies as a field of inquiry relative to disciplinary concerns have discouraged researchers from focusing on country-specific perspectives in the G20. In any case, we need to understand these cultures that form this 'grand narrative'. The unapologetically straightforward objective of this book is to contribute to this somewhat disparate sub-field by bringing together for the first time in one volume the diverse country-specific perspectives of G20 members over seventeen summits from Washington to Bali, across fifteen years from 2008 to 2022. To make an unwieldy subject manageable, and with respect to the demands of publishing timelines, the book's coverage ends when the G20

presidency passed from Indonesia to India on 1 December 2022 and the AU was added as a permanent member the following year. However, references to the Indian presidency of 2023 and beyond will be woven into the book where possible (see Appendix 1).

To this end, this book is based on a range of sources: the extant primary and secondary literature, summit documentation, communiqués and declarations (helpfully archived by the University of Toronto's G20 Information Centre), participation observation while working as an accredited journalist in the summit's official international media centre (IMC) or contributing to official engagement groups, and interviews with a range of G20 stakeholders. It is structured around six thematic chapters with the perspective of each member country woven into the focus of each chapter. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers of my original book proposal for this suggestion. It hopefully avoids the pitfalls of dedicating individual chapters to each G20 member, which might privilege an artificial one-size-fits-all approach and fail to reflect the differences in their capabilities, perspectives and levels of engagement. Chapter 2 will provide a history of the G20's genesis and evolution from a meeting of finance ministers in 1999 through to its upgrade to a meeting of leaders in 2008 and beyond to the Indonesian-hosted summit of 2022. In line with the approach outlined above, this history is focused on country-specific perspectives on the most effective role the G20 can play as an informal mechanism of global governance, how it should develop, which challenges it should focus on, which countries should be represented, as well as its relationship to the other informal and more formal mechanisms of global governance. Not all members of the currently constituted G20 have agreed on these existential questions. Non-members certainly have not, although the confines of space mean that non-G20 countries' perspectives cannot be addressed in detail here and become the natural sequel to this volume. The intention of this chapter, and the book as a whole, is to explore how the perspectives and positions of the member countries have changed over time in light of the constructivist idea that states can learn and their interests are fluid (Wendt 1999).

Thereafter, Chapter 3 will focus on the response to the GFC and the management of the global economy, the G20's *raison d'être*. The centrality of these priorities was evident when the G20 designated itself 'the premier forum for international economic cooperation' at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit and they have remained core business on its agenda ever since. However, at the same time, a series of G20 presidencies have placed development on the agenda, partly in response to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and with a specific focus on trade, health, education and gender, but also in an attempt to promote their own developmental models. Thus, Chapter 4 will explore country-specific perspectives on the treatment of sustainable development within the G20.

Chapter 5 will focus on some of the defining issues of our time – climate change and energy transitions. In tandem with the agendas of other mechanisms of global governance, such as the UN, and in light of the inclusion in the G20 of a number of key stakeholders on these issues, the G20 has from its outset sought to formulate a range of responses to these challenges shaped by the support and reservations of its members.

Chapter 6 will focus on security issues generally and terrorism in particular. The agenda of the G20's progenitor, the G7/8, in only a few years came to focus on broader Cold War-related security issues as well as the specific threat of terrorism. The G20 has experienced a similar development, as seen most starkly at the Antalya summit of November 2015, which took place days after the Paris shootings. With such a broad and varied membership, G20 members have inevitably welcomed or resisted this evolution and responded differently.

Chapter 7, the final thematic chapter, will shift the focus from a specific policy area to the unintended and extraneous aspects of G20 summitry beyond global governance. For each member country, the G20 is not just a mechanism of global governance created to address shared challenges. G20 leaders also engage in these summits with one eye on the domestic reception of their performance and outcomes of the summit. This is especially the case when they are acting in the role of host, an aspect that throws light upon the local impacts of hosting a summit, from policing to economic and reputational benefits. Chapter 8, the final and concluding chapter, will provide a summary of the above chapters that organizes like-minded members into subgroups within the overarching elite group of the G20.

One obvious pitfall in a book of this kind relates to its potential lifespan. All it takes to make the book outdated is for one more summit to take place between submission of the final manuscript and its eventual publication. In fact, this was the case with the expansion of both the G20 and BRICS summit processes in the summer and autumn of 2023. However, this is just one of the risks that is part and parcel of undertaking this kind of research; no project can be future proof. This book attempts to mitigate against this kind of risk by having a single voice and an overriding organizing principle running through its chapters. Furthermore, the recent expansion of the membership of both the G20 and BRICS reinforces the rationale for exploring the perspectives of their members.

Another important consideration is that even if a country-specific approach is adopted, this book still needs to account for the uneven nature of most countries' engagement with the G20 because of changes in government. This undoubtedly represents a challenge, especially in a forum like the G20 that places an onus on the role of individual leaders and the interpersonal relations they establish. Think of the rollercoaster ride that has been the UK's experience in the G20, from Gordon Brown to David Cameron to Theresa May, via

Boris Johnson and Liz Truss (who never even got to attend a summit), and most recently with Rishi Sunak, all played out against the background of the GFC, Brexit and Covid-19. This contrasts starkly with the relative stability of Germany's interaction with the G20 under Angela Merkel predominantly, or Türkiye's under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (see Appendix 2). However, this book treats these considerations not as anomalous but rather as an integral part of the narrative in making sense of any given country's overall engagement with the G20 over time.

In summary, *Unpacking the G20* provides a comprehensive analysis of the G20's development and practices from the perspectives of the nineteen countries, and one intergovernmental organization, that have shaped it. It covers the reaction of each member to the upgrading of the G20 to a summit of leaders in 2008, its development thereafter into the 'premium forum for international economic cooperation', the expansion of its agenda beyond macroeconomic issues to a range of global collective action problems, and related debates regarding its various impacts. The innovative feature of the work is that the starting point for the analysis is the viewpoint of the countries and intergovernmental organization that constitute the G20 rather than from the perspective of global governance or the various issue areas it seeks to address. Ultimately, the G20 is predominantly a group of countries, so what do they think of it, what do they seek to achieve, what strategies do they adopt, and in turn how does the G20 impact on them domestically?

NOTES

1. *Arab News*, 24 February 2020.

2. The G20 and its position within global governance

2.1 OVERVIEW

Debates surrounding the G20 have focused over time on the most effective role it can play as an informal mechanism of global governance (Slaughter 2020), how it should develop (if at all), which countries should be represented, how it is organized, as well as its relationship to the other informal and more formal mechanisms of global governance. Inevitably, not all members of a diverse grouping like the G20 have agreed on this range of key existential questions. It is these issues, positions and occasional compromises over the course of the G20's history that provide the focus of this chapter.

The G20 met for the first time as a grouping of finance ministers and central bank governors from 15 to 16 December 1999 in Berlin in the aftermath of a different crisis – the East Asian Financial Crisis that erupted in 1997.¹ This G20 was the result of a process of rapid evolution that began in immediate response to the crisis with the convening of the Manila Framework Group in November 1997. This was then expanded in April 1998 to create a Group of 22 (G22) (also known as the Willard Group), with the endorsement of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The G22 was then expanded to briefly create a Group of 33 (G33), which met twice in the spring of 1999. By autumn of that year, the G7 Finance Ministers proposed the establishment of

a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among *systemically significant economies* and promote cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all. We believe that discussions held in this group will prove useful to *complement and reinforce the role of the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions*. (G7 Information Centre 1999; emphases added)

The G33 was functionally too large and unwieldy, and in terms of membership did not meet the criteria outlined above for this new mechanism. So, in its place, the first meeting of a deliberately pared-back forum, in the alphanumeric configuration of the G20, took place in Berlin before the end of that

year, hosted by the German Finance Minister Hans Eichel and chaired by Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this was very much the creation of Martin and Lawrence Summers and their ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculations, rather than based on clear membership criteria. It was also clear from the outset that the role of this new mechanism was not to replace any governing bodies but to complement and reinforce them. With Martin as chair, the G20 met again in Montreal in 2000 and Ottawa in 2001. Thereafter, the chair and venue rotated on an annual basis.²

By 2008, as already mentioned, it was another crisis, the GFC, that acted as the catalyst for the upgrading of the G20 to the leaders’ level and its first meeting in Washington DC in November 2008. It was also a solution that failed to address a number of other issues, including the group’s North American origins and Eurocentric membership. In any case, the objective was to inject political leadership into the crisis by promoting dialogue, coordination, and consensus-building amongst the presidents, prime ministers, and chancellors of the developed and developing economies. Thus, the origins, genesis, nature, and objectives of the G20 were broadly similar to those of the G7 when it met as a G6 in November 1975 in response to a global macroeconomic crisis. However, the defining difference between the two was that the former was more representative in terms of membership and capabilities than the G7, and therefore more legitimate. The G7 includes seven countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US), as well one intergovernmental organization (the EU). It accounts for 66 per cent of global economic output but only 14 per cent of global population. In contrast, the G20 includes twelve other countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Türkiye), accounts for 90 per cent of global economic output and 67 per cent of global population. As Paul Martin, one of the progenitors of the original G20 and advocate of its upgrade to a Leaders 20, explained, ‘[p]ut simply, the right countries were not sitting down at the same table at the same time’ (2005, 2).³ Or, as Vestergaard and Wade vividly put it (2012, 258):

Whatever the miseries in its wake the 2008 global economic crisis at least served to persuade the G7 heads of government that they must consult regularly with heads of government of some developing economies. Otherwise the G7 would be like the captain of a ship who stands at the wheel turning it this way and that – knowing that the wheel is not connected to the rudder.

Thus, the G20 at the leaders’ level emerged as a crisis committee focused on an immediate goal of stemming the contagion of the GFC and reforming the global financial rulebook. The following year, the G20 moved to the centre-stage in the architecture of global governance by declaring itself ‘the

premier forum for international global cooperation' at the Pittsburgh summit of September 2009. This was no great surprise as the perceived impotence of the G8 came sharply into relief at its L'Aquila summit of July 2009, partly as a result of the sudden departure of Hu Jintao before the summit, but also as a result of the limited capabilities of the G8 in responding to the GFC, which had been evident at the previous year's summit in Tōyako, Japan. In short, the G8 was seen to be suffering a hollowing-out of its role and the G20 was now portrayed as the vehicle for tackling the GFC. Many people declared the age of the G8 to be over and attention turned from the G20 as a short-term crisis committee to a more long-term vision as a global steering committee.

However, the move from G8 to G20 was not a simple upgrade or replacement. Rather, it should be regarded within the broader context and history of the G8 struggling with the rise of multipolarity and the issue of representation in order to demonstrate relevance and legitimacy, while seeking to maintain the effectiveness that a smaller number of participants can produce. The frequency with which terms like 'BRIC(S) countries' (Brazil, Russia, India, China (and South Africa)) found their way into G8 summit discussions and preparations, the number of initiatives like the Heiligendamm–L'Aquila Process (HAP) that pre-date the GFC, and a range of proposed and actual alphanumeric configurations from 2 to 20 and beyond pay testament to this. For example, at the German-hosted Heiligendamm summit of the G8 in June 2017, an eponymous process was launched to foster dialogue between the G8 and a Group of 5 (G5) emerging economies, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa, also known as the Outreach 5 (O5). The Interim Report on the Heiligendamm Dialogue Process (HDP) was presented to the Japan-hosted G8 Hokkaido-Tōyako summit of July 2008 and signalled the leaders' intention to 'intensify their co-operation ... [and] launch a dialogue on equal footing that deals with issues of global scope and serves to enhance confidence and understanding among dialogue partners' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan 2008a). The following year, the HDP's Concluding Report was presented to the G8 leaders at the L'Aquila summit and included within the first joint G8/G5 declaration. It documented the extent of progress on a range of topics such as cross-border investment, intellectual property rights, African development, and energy efficiency. In addition, the joint declaration rebranded the HDP as the HAP, reiterated its goal of 'foster[ing] a genuine partnership, in the context of a strengthened multilateralism', and extended its mandate for another two years until the 2011 French-hosted G8 summit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan 2008b). Although these processes were eclipsed by the promotion of the G20 to the leaders' level and the centre-stage of global governance, the narrative of a zero-sum game as one group rose and another declined was an over-simplification. Rather, what we were left with was a 'messy multilateralism' or a 'Gaggle of Gs', the settlement of which remains unclear over

a decade later. Even after the creation of the G20, the traditional G7 countries initially dominated this process with the first four summits held in the US, UK and Canada on a biannual basis at the height of the GFC. The first opportunity for a non-G7 country to host the summit and thereby influence its agenda and role did not emerge until the fifth G20 summit, in Seoul in November 2010, but the following year it reverted to France. Thus, the opportunities for emerging countries to shape the G20's agenda were initially limited (Bayne 2011, 194). Thereafter, the period from 2012 to 2016 saw a series of non-G7 countries host the G20, in the form of Mexico, Russia, Australia, Türkiye and China, before the G20 presidency returned to a G7 country in 2017 at Hamburg. This period saw both an expansion of the summit agenda into new issues, as well as a consolidation on core macroeconomic business, as a series of first-time hosts sought to make their own mark on the G20, its agenda, organization and outcomes.

However, by the Hamburg summit, the lack of consensus within the G20 was becoming starkly obvious, but not as a result of the inclusion of emerging economies in global summitry. Rather, the inauguration of the Trump administration at the beginning of 2017 was the trigger for a period characterized by nativist politics, an absence of consensus, and unpredictability in global summitry. This was most evident over issues such as climate change, free trade versus protectionism and the purpose of multilateralism in general. When the G20 did function, it was not as a collective but on a minilateral basis of 19+1 that excluded the US. This was seen in the leaders' declaration at the Hamburg summit that noted the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement but stated the other leaders' position that this agreement was irreversible (G20 Information Centre 2017a). The following two summits in Buenos Aires and Osaka were similarly marked by the Trump administration's position on trade in particular, in addition to climate change.

Under the Saudi presidency, the G20 was moved online at an early stage in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. An emergency virtual summit was held on 26 March 2020 to discuss the pandemic, with the leaders' summit similarly held online from 21 to 22 November of the same year (see Naylor 2020 on the pitfalls of virtual versus in-person summitry). The leaders' summit proved to be Trump's final G20 for at least four years as he had lost the presidential election to Joe Biden earlier that month. In any case, Trump's participation, the summit itself and the G20's response to the pandemic were all muted. G20 summitry returned to something close to normality at the Rome summit of October 2021, with a physical summit taking place, but also with little in terms of concrete outcomes and sense of purpose. The following year saw first-time host Indonesia struggle, but ultimately succeed, to navigate the diverse membership of the G20 through highly divisive issues that would test the ability of the most experienced summit host, including the conflict in Ukraine, as

well as energy and cost-of-living crises. This period of summitry amplified long-standing questions around the purpose and value of the G20 that had been voiced even during the highpoint of the G20's relevance in the immediate aftermath of the GFC. Restoring a sense of purpose and direction will present key challenges for India, Brazil and South Africa in 2023, 2024 and 2025 respectively, as they all assume their G20 presidencies for the first time.

In summary, Larionova (2022, 252) has suggested a useful timeline of G20 development informed by historical institutionalism. The historical junctures she draws from 2008 onwards by and large map onto the brief history provided above. The first five summits of Washington (2008), London (2009), Pittsburgh (2009), Toronto (2010) and Seoul (2010) were formative in nature and provided the template and norms that shaped subsequent G20 summits. The Cannes (2011), Los Cabos (2012) and St Petersburg (2013) summits consolidated and expanded the G20's role, organization and agenda. Thereafter, the Brisbane (2014), Antalya (2015) and Hangzhou (2016) summits progressed incremental changes in the nature of the G20, although its sense of unity was waning. Hamburg (2017), Buenos Aires (2018) and Osaka (2019) were 'testing times', characterized by 'the absence of cohesive club dynamics' as a result of the Trump administration. Most recently, the Riyadh (2020) and Rome (2021) summits – Bali (2022) could be added to this period – saw the G20 atrophy politically and institutionally, unable to respond flexibly to multiple crises.

2.2 ROLE AND AGENDA

As regards its role, the G20 was initially hailed at its first three summits as an improvised crisis committee to address the GFC. Soon thereafter, it was cast as a global steering committee that expanded the role beyond an exclusive G7/8, which was seen to be defunct in light of the crisis, to embrace developed and developing countries (Cooper 2010). Russian President Dmitry Medvedev rashly predicted that the fifth Seoul summit was the last crisis summit and 'the next summit will be post-crisis'. However, the summiteers' attention was firmly focused on the European sovereign debt crisis and by default it continued to play an extended crisis committee role. It could even be argued that we are in an age of permacrisis that characterizes international politics and dominates the G20's agenda, whether it be Syria at the 2015 Antalya summit, the US–China trade war at the 2018 Buenos Aires and 2019 Osaka summits, Covid-19 at the 2020 Riyadh and 2021 Rome summits, or Ukraine at the 2022 Bali summit. Nevertheless, as outlined above and in Chapter 1, debates have evolved beyond the binary question of whether the G20 should act as a crisis or global steering committee to categorize it as a club, hub and network.

However, across the G20's diverse membership, these questions have attracted little consensus.

On the one hand, as regards the initial upgrading of the G20 to the leaders' level at Washington in response to the GFC, the US under President George W. Bush was an obvious driver of this development. Although other formats existed and were mooted, Bush made use of an existing and inclusive 'off the hook' solution. However, several other leaders kept the momentum going, including UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who actively lobbied and encouraged Bush in this direction (Kirton 2013, 235). Although preferring a smaller group of leaders with shared values, French President Nicolas Sarkozy directly petitioned Bush at Camp David to host a global summit of leaders and, alongside President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, they can thus also lay claim to be architects of the G20. The EU had been generally supportive of the creation of the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors, and thus supported the upgrading of the G20 to the leaders' level in 2008, and the expansion of its agenda, even if it was unable to host a summit, in line with its status within the G7/8 (Debaere et al. 2014).

Several emerging economies took a similar position in favour of establishing the G20 as a crisis committee and future global steering committee. For example, Brazil was chairing the G20 finance ministers forum in 2008 but wanted to upgrade it to the leaders' level in order to create a more 'agile' group that could respond to developments in the fast-changing GFC (Cooper 2010, 748). South Africa's intention was to 'carve out a new space for dialogue and a springboard for new ideas in the international sphere' (Postel-Vinay 2014, 2). Mexico demonstrated something close to flattered acceptance of Bush's invitation (Kirton 2013, 238). In the case of South Korea, it demonstrated enthusiastic buy-in (Kirton 2013, 237–238). It welcomed the G20's elevation to the leaders' level on a permanent basis and its evolution thereafter. Rhee Changyong, South Korea's Secretary-General of the Presidential Committee for the G20 summit, sought to consolidate its role as the 'key forum for crisis management' but also for 'beyond-crisis economic cooperation' (Cooper 2013a, 978). Il SaKong, the Korean sherpa at the 2010 Seoul summit, believed that having guided the global economy out of the current crisis, the G20 would evolve into a global steering committee, representing 'a more promising and legitimate architecture for cooperation than has existed for many years' (Cherry and Dobson 2012).

As regards the G20's evolution beyond a crisis committee, UK Prime Minister David Cameron was tasked ahead of the 2011 Cannes summit with drafting a report that came to be known as 'Governance for growth: building consensus for the future'. Although the report has been critiqued as little more than old wine in new skins (Dobson 2013b), it does represent UK thinking

on the functioning and future development of the G20. Cameron argued that ‘[t]he G20’s efforts need to be better coordinated, and backed up by effective governance, to ensure that their political commitments secure growth for the future’ (G20 Information Centre 2011a, 4). To this end, he made a number of recommendations that were welcomed by the G20 leaders in their Cannes summit declaration (G20 Information Centre 2011b). Cameron argued that the G20’s ‘role should be to promote and catalyze consensus-building’ by:

providing the space for the key global economies – advanced and emerging alike – to come together on an equal basis to discuss and resolve economic issues openly and in the spirit of enlightened self-interest, without the historical legacy of North–South divisions that may still affect institutions which were developed in a different economic and political context;

enabling leaders of the world’s major economies to find the political will necessary to coordinate and mutually assess their respective economic policies, agree approaches or solutions to the broad economic challenges of globalization, and hold each other to account for the commitments they make;

sustaining political consensus on a continuous basis, to ensure that commitments from political leaders are followed through over time;

setting an example for greater effectiveness and coherence among the range of international institutions, standards and rules that are governing international economic activity. (G20 Information Centre 2011a, 11)

On the other hand, another grouping of countries, most notably Japan, Canada and Italy, were not wholly on board with the G20, fearing dilution of the G8 and their position therein – something they had long been sensitive towards (Subacchi 2015, 11; Dobson 2012a). Canada under Prime Minister Stephen Harper accepted the G20 with a sense of the inevitable (Kirton 2013, 237). Japan reacted initially to the global shift of power and reform of global governance institutions by continuing to respond to the internationalist normative impulse that had shaped its foreign policy previously. This can be seen in making substantial financial contributions to support the work of the G20, particularly the largest loan in history at the 2008 G20 Washington summit. However, Japan experienced setbacks – most clearly demonstrated in its inability to secure the role of G20 chair and in fact losing out to regional rivals South Korea in 2010 and China in 2016. It also felt its identity-defining position as Asia’s representative in the mechanisms of global governance under threat as the G20 now included China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and even Australia as Asian members. According to one MOFA official, Japan had lost its G20 leadership role to Korea.⁴ In reaction, several Japanese prime ministers and policymakers reverted to more aggressive and competitive behaviours by openly questioning China and South Korea’s levels of commitment to the pledges made at G20 summits, and thus, their sense of responsibility to the international community and ability to behave as contemporary great powers.

In addition, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing documents stated that '[t]he G8 provides an opportunity where major advanced countries underpinned by shared values gather to show their leadership and the G20 as an opportunity where advanced and emerging countries take coordinated action for tackling global challenges' (Dobson 2012a, 242). Thus, between 2008 and 2012, Japan's leaders repeatedly acknowledged the importance of the G20 but reasserted a continued role for the G7/8. For example, in a press conference after the 2009 Pittsburgh G20, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio declared that:

I believe that the G8 should not be discarded ... The G20 involves twenty or twenty-five people gathering and discussing. It is extremely difficult to reach conclusions in such setting ... On the other hand, at the G8 political leaders can hold very frank and candid discussions with each other. The Canadian Prime Minister expressed exactly the same view when I had a short meeting with him today. He said that the merit of the G8 was that leaders whose values are similar can speak their own minds as much as they wish. I believe that a good political reason for the G8, a meeting of the developed countries, will continue to exist. On the other hand, G8 is not a gathering of just developed countries. Leaders of developing and emerging countries will take part as well [in the outreach meetings etc]. I think there are important discussions to be had in this format. It is all right to consider the G20 as being the premier forum [for international economic cooperation], but that does not make the G8 irrelevant. (Kantei 2009)

However, by the time of the first Japan-hosted G20 in July 2019, Japan was more committed to the role of the G20 and beginning to feel frustrated by the G7. Thus, Japan's role in the G20 has at times appeared either qualified, contradictory or reactionary.

Somewhere in the middle were countries such as France. Despite Sarkozy's petitioning of Bush to convene a meeting of the G20 at the leaders' level mentioned above, French officials had expressed several concerns around the original G20, especially around the issues of representation, legitimacy and efficiency. German officials had been similarly concerned (Kirton 2013, 64–65). As regards China's position on the G20's role, it was clearly more supportive of a G20 than a G7 that it had always regarded as illegitimate (Chin 2010a). However, it was initially wary of the G20 and emphasized the legitimate position of the UN as the centre of global governance. In fact, it was caught off guard by Bush's proposal and displayed reactive acquiescence (Kirton 2013, 237). Chin and Dobson (2016) have argued that the Chinese leadership held the view that the global community was living through a period of extended transition from one global order to another. As a result, they regarded the G20 as a necessary, transitional mechanism for coordination. The distance China has travelled from initial wariness of the G20 can be seen in Xi Jinping's call for concerted action among G20 member states to 'consolidate' its status as the 'premier forum for global economic governance'

and for its development from ‘crisis response mechanism to one of long-term governance’ (cited in Chin and Dobson 2016). As Zeng expertly outlines, although it would be premature to regard it as a champion, the discourse in China has embarked upon a considerable journey from the starting point of adopting a low profile in foreign affairs, with the ‘concept of “global governance” [being] a political taboo in China until the early 1990s’ (2019, 581), via its first engagement with the term ‘global economic governance’, from 2008 and the GFC, through to Xi defending globalization at Davos in January 2017. He concludes that the country’s engagement with the G20 has been a theme running through this timeframe and that ‘dialogue platforms – the G20 in particular – rather than key institutions of global economic governance such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) win overwhelming attention in the Chinese discourse’ (Zeng 2019, 578). Thus, China’s traditional and defining emphasis on the more formal and legalistic mechanisms of global governance has waned and instead it has embraced the informals like the G20.

Inextricably linked to the G20’s role is the question of its agenda and specifically whether to expand or streamline its remit. On the one hand, several members have supported expanding the G20 agenda beyond its economic and financial comfort zone. The EU was supportive of the G20 expanding its role as a crisis committee focused on the GFC to include issues such as development and climate change (Debaere et al. 2014). Türkiye has sought to widen the agenda and charge the G20 with a ‘comprehensive agenda’ of inherited and legacy issues, including *inter alia* global economic recovery, macroeconomic cooperation and coordination, work and employment, international financial regulation and architecture, corruption, development, climate change and energy, terrorism, and Middle East security issues, most prominent of which has been Syria. According to Ambassador Erdoğan Iscan: ‘[the G20’s] agenda should be expanded in a phased manner to cover other related topics, such as the development issues, food security, poverty eradication, climate change, energy security, etc.’ (Engelbrekt 2015, 550).

On the other hand, several countries have preferred a streamlined, narrow agenda. As outlined in more detail in Chapters 2 and 4, Australia sought to focus the agenda of its 2014 G20 presidency on economic growth, at the expense of climate change. Indonesia also sought to highlight the economic remit of the G20 during its 2022 presidency. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Indonesia was faced with the challenge of keeping the G20 together despite the challenge of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Thus, the resulting leaders’ declaration displayed several caveats including a reiteration ‘that the G20 is not the forum to resolve security issues’ and an emphasis that these issues would be viewed in terms of their economic impact (G20 Information Centre 2022a). As mentioned above, China initially regarded the G20 with caution,

citing a traditional and seemingly oxymoronic emphasis on the primacy of state sovereignty and preference for the UN (Cooper and Farooq 2016, 88). However, when it came to actually hosting a summit, China also took a comprehensive approach, addressing ‘global economic growth, reform of the IMF and the international monetary system, trade, development, infrastructure, financial regulation in state-owned enterprises and health’ (Kirton 2017, 19). India also displayed a similar resistance to the expansion of the G20’s role and agenda, displaying a preference for the UN with one eye on the ultimate prize of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Cooper and Farooq 2016, 92–96). Other BRICS countries have resisted climate change appearing on the G20’s agenda, preferring the more formal mechanisms that already exist to address this particular issue.

In many ways, the G20 provides a forum for a number of emerging issues, which are not covered in this book and have yet to find a natural home. Artificial intelligence and its military application provides one example (Cihon et al. 2020; Jelinek et al. 2021). Yet, there are also known unknowns and unknown unknowns that the G20 could be well placed to manage in the future. Its informality and the resulting flexibility are key strengths of the G20 in playing an anticipatory role in responding to these challenges, although the diversity of the group is the long-standing obstacle in establishing a consensus (Morin et al. 2019).

2.3 MEMBERSHIP

One definition of minilateralism is ‘the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. Think of this as minilateralism’s magic number’ (Naim 2009). Whether the G20 is a crisis committee, steering committee, club, hub, network or nexus for policy coordination in terms of its role and agenda, the number and selection of member countries are key drivers of its development and functioning. Its role as a crisis committee and *the ad hoc* nature of preparations were used as justification for keeping membership limited and using the pre-existing format of the G20 finance ministers’ process. Although this provided an off-the-peg template for use at the first Washington summit of leaders, it did not resolve the question of membership, which remains an issue today, as seen with the addition of the AU in September 2023. This is partly because the initial process was opaque and the criteria unilaterally decided and arbitrarily applied, as touched upon in the previous chapter. As Canada had been appointed as chair under Paul Martin for the first two years of the G20 of finance ministers and central bank governors, it had a high degree of influence and the criterion that appears to have been used was, as mentioned above, the vague and flexible term ‘systemically significant’ countries. For example, Sweden and the

Netherlands were culled during the shift from G33 to G20 and, ultimately, inclusion in the original G20 meant automatic membership to the upgraded leaders' G20. So, for many countries it was simply a matter of being in the right place at the right time. In any case, despite common media depictions, the G20 is certainly not a gathering of the largest economies in the world, otherwise Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland could lay claim to automatic membership (as discussed below).

As regards the UK's position, Cameron's 2011 report, 'Governance for growth', demonstrated his belief in working with other like-minded leaders but was silent on the issue of G20 membership, and thereby effectively shelved it. However, UK Foreign Minister William Hague was more explicit in stressing the shift in relevance from the G8 to the G20 and the possibility of other countries being added:

In addition to the established 'emerging powers' such as the BRICS countries, many other countries are bursting onto the international scene, powered by a combination of economic dynamism, geographic location, youthful populations, natural resources, sovereign wealth, and the spread of global connectivity thanks to the internet and related technologies. We have moved irreversibly from a G8 world to a G20-plus world. (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012; emphasis added)

China was the obvious addition under this definition and had been the subject of discussions around further G8 enlargement in the past, especially after Russia had joined in 1998. In addition to China, the other G5 countries of Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa were obvious additions, with traditional middle powers like Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Türkiye also touted successfully as 'systemically significant' countries.

European representation was an initial issue within the G20 in terms of both over-representation and who speaks for the whole of Europe. To some extent, these debates mirror similar ones that took place within the G7, which first met in 1975 and 1976 with the European countries of France, Italy, West Germany and the UK occupying a dominant position and seen to be making decisions on behalf of the rest of Europe. The 'solution' was that the European Community participated from 1977 (see Debaere and Orbie 2012), and the EU even hosted a summit in 2014 in place of the suspended Russia. In similar fashion, the EU was included within the G20 alongside the individual seats of France, Italy, Germany and the UK but without the opportunity to assume its presidency and host a summit. The challenge of so many European voices is that '[e]ither each European brings the same message, causing irritation and boredom with the other G20 members. Or the EU fails to speak with one voice, so it will not influence the result at the end of the day' (Debaere 2010, 141). So, there are a number of existing channels and representatives within

the EU through which member countries can influence preparations and shape the EU's position ahead of a leaders' summit (see Nasra and Debaere 2016).

Nevertheless, some smaller EU countries, such as the Nordic, Benelux and Iberian countries, have expressed concern about the G20's exclusivity and their possible marginalization (Debaere et al. 2014). Clearly, as a result of their individual seats at the table, the EU4 of France, Germany, Italy and the UK (pre-Brexit) are a dominant European bloc within the G20. This was evident when the G20 decided at the Pittsburgh summit of 2009 to increase the IMF voting rights of emerging economies at the expense of over-represented countries: 'Several European countries complained that they were confronted with a *fait accompli* arranged between the EU4 and the other members of the G20 (in particular the US and China)' (Debaere and Orbie 2012).

Some non-EU4 countries have been included in the summit on occasions, partly to assuage their concerns as regards possible marginalization, but also because they have something concrete to contribute. Spain is a permanent guest. The Netherlands was able to attend the first four summits in Washington, London, Pittsburgh and Toronto. Sweden attended earlier summits before the Lisbon Treaty took effect, when it occupied the rotating presidency of the European Council. So, on occasions, in different ways and on specific issues (Nasra and Debaere's analysis highlights Sweden's promotion of bank levies), countries outside the EU4 have been able to influence the G20's work.

The status of Spain within the G20 has attracted a disproportionate amount of attention and it occupies the unique position of the G20's only 'permanent guest'. Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was reportedly 'desperate' to be invited to the first Washington G20 summit, and initially 'appalled' not to be. In response, he adopted a strategy of pleading Spain's case to other world leaders, including the Brazilian, Chinese, French and US presidents, as part of a 'national obsession'.⁵ Spain's case was based on its claim to be a 'systemically significant' country and despite Bush's opposition, was not without its supporters. According to Jaime Malet, Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Spain, organizing a global summit on the financial crisis and financial reform without Spain in attendance was described in a communication with US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson as 'inconceivable'.⁶ Eventually, Zapatero secured attendance at the first G20 summit because France had dual representation at the time because it occupied the rotating role of president of the European Council. Thus, Spain secured its attendance at the first G20 summit in Washington through its relationship with France, rather than the host country. However, Spain's subsequent diplomatic manoeuvring, petitioning of host governments and charm offensive across all the G20 members failed to result in outright membership and instead a fudged permanent guest status that was intended to avoid contributing to European over-representation, but ultimately added to it (Naylor 2019b, 88–93).

Concomitantly, the Netherlands launched a campaign for G20 membership, similarly based on its systemic significance to the global economy and seeking to leverage key bilateral relationships to this end. However, it was ultimately France's dual representation that facilitated its attendance at Washington, and precedent assured its participation thereafter (Naylor 2019b, 89–90). However, in response to the issue of European over-representation, and in an effort to bolster its own status, South Korea stripped the Netherlands of its position as a guest at the Seoul G20, with the support of France as the host of the following summit (Naylor 2019b, 43, 94–97).

Switzerland was a member of the G33 and has experience of participating in G20 finance ministerial meetings. It is also another country that is nominally one of the twenty largest economies in the world. So, based on its economic and financial status, it has lobbied for either membership of, or at least an invitation to, the G20 since it was upgraded to the leaders' level (Naylor 2019b, 94–95). The Swiss efforts were eventually successful in December 2019, when it was invited as a guest to the following year's G20 under the Saudi presidency, and Swiss President Simonetta Sommaruga joined the G20 leaders at the virtual Riyadh summit in November 2020. Despite the above rationale for Swiss membership, it was ultimately the Saudi presidency's prerogative to invite guests and the relatively cordial nature of Swiss–Saudi relations that resulted in its inclusion for that year. Under the following years' Italian and Indonesian presidencies, Switzerland was not invited.

Returning to the broader issue of European over-representation, the idea of creating a single European seat has been mooted (Debaere et al. 2014). Although it may be dormant for the time being, the issue of European over-representation within the G20 remains.

Other decisions regarded by some as controversial have included membership of Indonesia instead of Malaysia. The rationale for Indonesia's membership was that, alongside Saudi Arabia, it increased representation from the Islamic world and was the only other OPEC member of the G20. However, Indonesia suspended its OPEC membership in 2009, reactivated it in 2016 but suspended it again later that same year, whereas Saudi Arabia has remained a central member. In addition, South Africa was included as the only African representative, instead of Nigeria, which requested membership at the 2010 Toronto summit. Argentina was included in the original G20 of finance ministers and central bank governors that resulted from the East Asian Financial Crisis because it was seen as a country that was impacted by the turmoil of the crisis. As a member of the original G20, it automatically became a member of the upgraded leaders' G20, although many have questioned Argentina's inclusion and contribution to the G20 process. As regards Australia's membership, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was particularly supportive of, and diplomatically proactive in pushing for, the G20's self-appointment as the 'premier forum

for international economic cooperation' at Pittsburgh in 2009. By also laying claim to be one of the G20's progenitors, this enabled him to secure his country's position at the top table in the face of attempts to maintain a G8 by expanding it to include outreach countries, focusing on BRICS countries and excluding Australia.⁷

When membership is clearly not a possibility, non-members have sought some form of inclusion rather than opposing the G20 outright (Cooper 2011a). The Global Governance Group (3G) was established in 2009 and brings together a diverse range of thirty countries.⁸ Singapore played a central role in its creation in an attempt, not to reject the G20, but to broaden its representation and enhance its legitimacy by having the voices of non-G20 countries heard in a forum where decisions might be made with impact beyond the immediate membership. In addition, the 3G is concerned that the UN retains its position as 'the only global body with universal membership and unquestioned legitimacy'.⁹ This concern was particularly salient in the early years after the G20's elevation to a leaders' summit in the wake of the GFC, and was exemplified at the 2010 Toronto G20 by the confusion over whether UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was invited as an observer or a participant. The 3G's position was that the UN should be invited and involved in future summits and preparations as 'a matter of course'. Ultimately, 'given the complexities and interdependencies of the global economy, it is important for the G20 to be consultative, inclusive and transparent in its deliberations for its outcome to be effectively implemented on a global scale' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore 2010).

The 3G has supported the growth policies of the G20, advocated an open, rules-based multilateral trading system under the WTO with the G20 as a driver of the Doha Round and a stalwart of anti-protectionism. It has also been supportive of placing development, broadly defined, on the G20's agenda and using it as a forum to drive progress towards achieving the MDGs and SDGs.

As regards the issue of non-member attendance and participation in any given summit, the G20 eventually agreed to allow the host to invite up to five guests. These five should be invited on the basis of consensus within the G20 rather than the unilateral decision of the presidency but have often increased the representation of the summit host's immediate region.

2.4 ORGANIZATION

As is already clear and will be explored in more detail below, the G20 operates in an informal space within the broader network of other global governance mechanisms, some informal, but mostly formal. The way in which it is organized has evolved over time, but in the absence of a permanent secretariat, it

is the host country that assumes the presidency of the G20 on the first day of December each year and is pivotal in shaping the agenda, deciding on guests and organizing the format of the leaders' summit in a given year. Sherpas, usually prominent bureaucrats trusted by the individual leaders, play a central role in this process. This is known as the sherpa track, which operates through a series of working groups, co-chaired by an advanced and an emerging economy, and specific initiatives focused on a broad range of issues, including *inter alia* sustainable development, education, digital economy, the environment and climate change. Working groups were a feature of the G20 when first established at the finance ministers' level in 1999 that was adopted at the leaders' level from 2008. These groups consist of experts in a given field from G20 member countries who contribute to the sherpas' regular discussion of what will appear on the agenda and in what form throughout the year (see Hajnal 2014, 41–43).

The sherpa track runs in parallel to the finance track, in which G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meet regularly throughout the year to discuss an agenda prepared by their deputies that focuses on economic and financial issues. A troika of immediate past, present and future G20 presidencies exists in an attempt to provide consistency in the agendas over time. Except for the innovation of introducing this troika, the format is similar to that of the G7/8 summit process, as is the proliferation of ministerial meetings. Ministers with responsibility for agriculture, digitization, education, energy, finance, foreign affairs, health, labour and employment, tourism and trade have all met at some time. In addition, speakers of the parliaments of G20 member states have also met on occasion. Countries that have shaped these developments include Japan, which organized the first-ever combined G20 Trade and Digital Economy Ministerial Meeting during its G20 presidency in 2019.

Debates have focused on the possible formalization of the G20 and specifically the creation of a permanent secretariat to make the organization of annual summits smoother and ensure consistency in discussions, decisions and accountability. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, was an advocate of formalization and argued in favour of establishing a secretariat to support the work of the G20. At various times, Australia, Brazil and Russia have endorsed the idea. In his report 'Governance for growth' (G20 Information Centre 2011a), Cameron advocated that the G20 should strike a balance between the

benefits of its informal nature and the formalization of structures and process. In other words, the G20 must:

- maintain its informal and Leader-driven nature for the foreseeable future, and provide a clear public declaration of its role and purpose within the global system;
- become much more consistent and effective at engaging non-members, international institutions and other actors, welcoming their effective participation in specific areas of the G20's work;
- develop clear agreed working practices to manage and deliver its agenda through time more effectively; formalize the Troika of past, present and future Presidencies; and underpin it with a small secretariat, possibly staffed by officials seconded from G20 countries and based on and chaired by the presidency. (G20 Information Centre 2011a, 5)

The emphasis was therefore placed on the G20's informality, flexibility and the opportunity it affords leaders to lead. Although Cameron resisted any radical measures to formalize the G20, he expressed support for the formalization of the troika and the creation of a small secretariat to support it, all with the emphasis on continuity and effectiveness. A number of other countries have also supported this balancing act of informality and institutionalization. Korean sherpa Il SaKong promised that Korea would cooperate with its global partners to make the G20 an 'effective and durable' permanent institution with a lean, small and efficient secretariat. By introducing country-specific undertakings backed up with monitoring and transparency, and institutionalizing the B20 summit, held for the first time in Seoul at the suggestion of the Korean government, the G20 took a step toward greater institutionalization at the Seoul summit of 2010 (Cherry and Dobson 2012).

China's position on the question of formalization of the G20 has been ambivalent. It has supported some kind of administrative mechanism to assist with logistics in hosting summits but one that is purely operational with no agency to shape the future strategic direction of the G20.

Australia has championed a number of organizational reforms, including reducing the amount of documentation that emanates from summits by limiting the G20 leaders' communiqué to three pages. It also sought to finesse interaction between the sherpa and finance tracks and bolster the troika arrangements, including personnel secondments and exchange of information between the Australian and Turkish presidencies (Downie 2017, 1503).

An energetic Australian presidency has also strengthened habits of cooperation within the forum through improvements in managing time, the length of speeches, and maintaining the relevancy of the G20 discussions through peer-to-peer conversations and informality of interactions (Sainsbury 2015a, 7).

Nevertheless, informality remains a key characteristic of the G20. Like the rest of the world, the G20 moved online in 2020 during the Saudi presidency,

although the following year it resumed physical meetings during the 2021 Italian presidency. This shift from the physical to the virtual is particularly damaging for a forum like the G20 that is based on informality, flexibility and the interpersonal experience. As Naylor (2020) has persuasively argued, although the formal agenda can be retained and slavishly followed, the grandness and pomp of a mega-event like a summit that focuses the mind and leads to concrete outcomes, as well as the opportunity for the unexpected to happen in between working lunches and formal sessions, were lost. Think of the scale and urgency of the 2009 London summit producing results in response to the GFC, or moments (whether casual or staged) like Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin meeting in a huddle with only their close advisors in a corner of the venue's lobby at the 2015 Antalya summit to discuss Syria.

One of the most visible ways in which the G20 differs from the G7 as regards addressing the issue of legitimacy is through the creation of engagement groups. Over time, the G20 has embraced these groups on a much grander and more systematic scale than the G7. There are currently eight in total, including: the B20 of business leaders and interest groups, established in 2008 and formally recognized by the G20 in 2010 under the Korean presidency; the Civil Society 20 (C20) of civil society organizations (CSOs), established in 2008 and recognized by the G20 in 2013 under the Russian presidency; the Labour 20 (L20) of trade union representatives, established in 2008 with its first formal summit taking place in 2011 under the French G20 presidency; the Science 20 (S20) of scientific researchers that was established as part of the G20 in 2017 under the German presidency; the T20 of think tankers and academics that met formally for the first time in 2012 under the Mexican presidency; the Urban 20 of mayors, governors and representatives of G20 cities that was established in 2017 and met formally for the first time in 2018 under the Argentinian presidency; the W20 of women's rights organizations and campaigners that was established in 2015 during the Turkish presidency; and the Youth 20 of youth leaders and representatives that met for the first time in 2010. For a few years there was even an alphabetical rival G20 in the form of the G(irls) 20.

The *raison d'être* of these engagement groups is to widen the range of input into the G20 deliberations and thereby bolster its effectiveness, as well as its legitimacy. The need for these engagement groups was outlined in the Seoul summit document of November 2010:

We recognize, given the broad impact of our decisions, the necessity to consult with the wider international community. We will increase our efforts to conduct G20 consultation activities in a more systematic way, building on constructive partnerships with international organizations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society, trade unions and academia. (G20 Information Centre 2010a)

In a similar vein, Slaughter regards these groups as

... transnational policy networks, which are involved in widening the field of policy communication and deliberation. The importance of these transnational policy networks rest [*sic*] upon their role in developing and disseminating G20 policy priorities and principles; and are an attempt to enhance the legitimacy and influence of the G20 and its policy proposals. (2015a, 171)

Exploring these engagement groups in turn, G20 hosts may actively seek, or at least be seen, to incorporate these voices within the summit preparations. As regards the W20, '[o]verseeing [its] establishment ... during his G20 presidency, some might nominate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Türkiye, as the surprising mother of feminist economic governance in the G20' (Harris Rimmer and Byrne 2019, 168). However, two years later:

The W20 summit in Berlin was the first engagement summit that made global news headlines due to the extended participation of Angela Merkel as the first woman to ever preside over an economic summit of this kind. The language of the Hamburg communiqué – the use of 'women's empowerment' and the avoidance of the more politically charged 'gender equality' – and the focus on entrepreneurship and leadership suggest that success for women's equality in Hamburg was partial and focused on the role of women entrepreneurs. (Harris Rimmer and Byrne 2019, 168)

Louis (2016) has argued that the B20 and L20 find their roots in the work of a number of traditional international organizations, particularly the International Labour Organization (ILO), which was represented at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit for the first time. At this summit, Director General Juan Somavia presented the ILO's Global Jobs Pact to a positive reception and thereafter a symbiotic relationship developed by which the ILO was imbued with 'renewed legitimacy' and the G20 was able to promote its agenda with a key partner.

As regards civil society, Canada hosted the Toronto G20 in 2010 in a way that isolated and frustrated CSO representatives, who found themselves excluded from the IMC and only allowed entry by invitation. Moreover, they were housed in a comparatively pared-down alternative media centre.¹⁰ In contrast, Sarkozy met with civil society representatives ahead of the Cannes summit the following year, according them considerable access, although they were not as privileged as other groups, such as the B20 (Cooper 2013b, 195). The Mexican presidency sought to incorporate the voices of CSOs in the G20, with preparations beginning some time before the 2012 Los Cabos summit, by inviting

... a variety of nongovernmental groups and individuals for consultation in a series of outreach dialogues, replicating the recent trend to open up intergovernmental fora

to civil society participants. This idea might have long-term benefits for G20 policymaking, by gaining useful contributions and feedback from key civil society and private actors while reducing legitimacy concerns linked to perceived exclusivity. It also helped the Mexican government present itself as open and inclusive, reinforcing its liberal-democratic political identity by actively promoting norms associated with it. (Luckhurst 2015, 33)

It has been argued that '[c]ivil society was granted a greater degree of inclusion at the 2012 Los Cabos G20 summit than they had ever before been granted' (Naylor 2019b, 58). However, some CSO representatives questioned the quality and degree of innovation of this engagement (Villanueva Ulfgard and Alejo Jaime 2014).

This all relates to the question of what role the G20 plays and whether it is a summit or a network (Postel-Vinay 2014, 14). The former is akin to the classic nineteenth-century concert diplomacy that operates at the elite level, whereas the latter brings in non-state actors, as can be seen in the formation of stakeholder groups, mentioned above. The G20 could, of course, be both of these things, but the expansion of ministerial meetings and stakeholder groups while resisting formalization is testament to its development as a network.

2.5 POSITION WITHIN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

As regards the G20's position in the constellation of global governance mechanisms and how it relates to the various institutions, organizations and forums, debates among member countries have coalesced around the formal–informal divide. As regards the former, attention has focused predominantly on the G20's relationship with the UN, the World Bank and the IMF; as regards the latter, debate has sought to resolve the relationship with the G7/8. In both cases, the positions of different members and debates between them have been framed by competition and compromise.

As regards the UN, the relationship with the G20 has evolved considerably from one of initial competition (Heinbecker 2011; Hajnal 2014, 52–54). From within the UN, a number of criticisms were levelled, and initiatives suggested, in order to address the G20's exclusive membership and lack of legitimacy (Debaere et al. 2014; Kirton 2015). Singapore's founding of the 3G in 2009 was a concrete outcome that emerged from these concerns. The specific question of who was better placed to deal with the GFC also surfaced. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon went as far as to suggest the UN provide the forum and venue in New York for a summit on the crisis by the end of 2008 (Cooper 2010, 751):

Ideationally, the main source of contest came from the move by the General Assembly president to convene a panel of experts, chaired by Joseph Stiglitz, in

contradistinction to the G20. Organisationally, the main alternative focal point became the UN Conference on the Global Economic Crisis at the end of June 2009. (Cooper 2011a, 204)

Similarly, Morgan (2012) highlights the UN's concerns regarding the G20's lack of legitimacy and its own proposal:

A model for a far more representative and legitimate body has already been proposed by the UN, which calls for the creation of a Global Economic Coordination Council, operating in conjunction with an International Panel of Experts. The Council would incorporate all UN member states and have a mandate over the UN system in economic, social, and environmental fields.

Similarly, the Belgian government called upon the G20:

to respect the autonomy and working methods of the international organizations and the United Nations system in particular. Belgium also advocated a composition of the G20 based on [a] constituency system, similar to the ones used in IMF and World Bank in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the group. (Debaere et al. 2014)

China was originally suspicious of the G20 and prioritized the central and legitimate role of the UN. Similarly, Kirton (2011) has outlined how 'Brazil was initially a reluctant participant [fearing] the new G20 might undermine the traditional UN-based multilateralism.' These concerns were still evident at the Antalya G20 in 2015. Not only did the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, maintain that the G20 should be subordinated to the UN on the sustainable development agenda, but his ten-point plan to combat terrorism privileged the UN as well (Cooper and Farooq 2016). However, some of this tension has waned, as have certain countries' positions. For China, this happened when it assumed its presidency of the G20 in December 2015 and hosted the leaders' summit in September 2016. In the case of Brazil, it used the G20 to become a vocal advocate of emerging economies, reform of the IMF and taking Western countries to task for their role and responsibility in the GFC.

So, over time, an alternative perspective has emerged that regards the G20 as a useful informal forum for consultation that does not seek to usurp or undermine the work of the UN system, but to reinforce it. This model is supported by the fact that the G20 is provided with some of 'its strongest allies and institutional partners' (Cammack 2012, 2) as a result of its close institutional relationship with the established mechanisms of global governance like the UN, IMF, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and so on. Thus, the heads of many of these mechanisms of global governance have been invited to the G20 summit since its inception to build a mutually reinforcing relationship whereby the G20

provides an informal forum that is more inclusive than the G7/8 and can reach consensus on specific issues before delegating them to the appropriate formal body of global governance. Zhu argues that the G20's performance can be positive when it works in this way and established international organizations match the G20's deliberative, consensus-building, leadership function with their specific and technical competence:

Over the years, about seven international organizations have been playing important roles in the G20 governance process, namely OECD, IMF, World Bank, WTO, Financial Stability Board (FSB), UN and ILO. On the one hand, these international organizations are entrusted by the G20 to provide technological proposals in preparation for its meetings, including background papers and research reports. On the other hand, these organizations have also contributed a lot to the implementation of the consensus among the G20 countries. (2016, 466)

Similarly, the relationship between the G20 and the IMF is also mutually beneficial and reinforcing. On the one hand, the G20 benefits as it can rely 'on the IMF as one of its main instruments, next to the FSB, to implement and monitor G20 decisions and recommendations. In addition, the IMF provides substantive support by putting its expertise at [the] disposal of the G20' (Debaere et al. 2014).

The close relationship between the G20 and the IMF not only makes the latter's expertise available to the former, it can also enhance the G20's legitimacy by providing 'a means for countries outside the G20 to feed in their views, since the staff could speak up on their behalf' (Bayne 2011, 196). On the one hand, the IMF's position is enhanced. Nicholas Bayne has explained how the decision at the Pittsburgh G20 summit to task the IMF with operating the new framework for economic policy coordination was 'further evidence of the Fund's revival following the resumption of its financial support operations' (Bayne 2011, 196).

The relationship between the G20 and the OECD has become stronger over recent years in a similar way. A clear division of labour has emerged between the two on the basis of the OECD's strengths in operational capacity and issue-specific expertise on the one hand and the G20's lack of a permanent secretariat on the other hand. Wouters and Van Kerckhoven (2011, 345) claim this symbiotic relation has 'allowed the OECD to regain its relevance within the global economic governance architecture, while the G20's functioning is strengthened thanks to the contributions of the OECD on a growing number of issues'. These issues include *inter alia* energy subsidies, international trade, employment and anti-corruption.

As regards the relationship between the G20 and regional organizations, the EU has already been discussed above in terms of membership. For a long time, it was the only regional intergovernmental organization to be a member

of the G20. However, this changed in September 2023 when the AU's permanent membership was announced at the New Delhi summit. As regards other regional organizations, 'regional dynamics act as both critic and driver for the G20' (Cooper 2011b, 266) but with inclusion never far away as a consideration. On the one hand, as Cooper (2011a; 2011b) outlines, a number of regional leaders and organizations, for example Nigeria and the AU as well as Norway and the Nordic Council, have sought a seat at the table. Many hosts have been responsive:

The middle powers, notably South Korea, were especially flexible in their hosting function. One example about how new types of innovation could be initiated came with the rapid move by Korea of new forms of regional outreach – embracing [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] ASEAN in particular – prior to the November 2010 Seoul summit. (Cooper and Pouliot 2015, 344)

Thereafter, and in addition to the AU and ASEAN, the chairs of other regional organizations including APEC, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Gulf Cooperation Council, Caribbean Community and Pacific Islands Forum have been invited by the summit host as guest participants, with the attendance of some more institutionalized than for others, even before the AU's permanent membership was announced in September 2023.

As regards indirect representation, South Africa, as the only African representative between 2008 and 2022, sought to amplify the region's voice in the G20 by using 'the regional "Committee of Ten" finance ministers and governors of central banks under the auspices of the African Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Commission' (Cooper 2011a, 207).

As regards the G20's relationship with the other informal mechanisms of global governance that constitute the 'Gaggle of Gs', especially the G7/8, Obama committed the US to reform after the 2009 G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy by stating that: 'in terms of the issue of the Gs and what's the appropriate international structure and framework, I have to tell you there is no doubt that we have to update and refresh and renew the international institutions that were set up in a different time and place'.¹¹ Other leaders have been more explicit in their proposals. At one extreme, and as mentioned above, for some countries the GFC represented the end of the previous world order represented by the G7/8. In the words of the Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, 'We are talking about the G20 because the G8 doesn't have any more reason to exist'.¹²

Others touted a model that respected the central position of the G7/8 as a subgroup that continues to lead, while the G20 provides legitimacy. As mentioned above, the Japanese government was one of the most vocal in advocating this relationship, with Prime Minister Asō Tarō arguing that '[w]ith the G8

at the core, dialogues and international coordination with emerging economies and others should be strengthened' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan 2009). Japan was not alone in seeking to find a working division of labour between the two. With specific reference to the field of security:

Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper ... bluntly states that 'if the world's richest and most powerful nations do not deal with the world's hardest and most intractable problems, they simply will not be dealt with'. Emphasizing the complexity of the challenges that the G7/8 faces. Harper implies that the G20 lacks the format, experience, and political desire to forge mechanisms through which non-traditional security matters are properly managed. (Engelbrekt 2015, 548–549)

Although it discussed the G20's relationship with formal mechanisms like the UN, IMF and WTO, Cameron's 2011 report, 'Governance for growth', was largely silent on its relationship with other informal mechanisms that constitute the 'Gaggle of Gs', especially the G7/8. This is a strange omission in that Cameron had previously suggested a 'division of labour' between the G20 and G7/8:

In mid-2010 Cameron told reporters that the G8, after some tinkering, can remain useful: 'You could make it more focused and strategic, majoring on foreign policy and security issues, while also keeping the particular link to accountability on development aid which is really important'. Cameron further proposed that G8 members consider 'getting rid of the pre-cooked communiqué, to turn it into a proper small strategic discussion' that would 'leave the G20 to be the big economic global governance forum, which it now is'. By refocusing the narrower group toward fireside chats that bolster mutual trust and give rise to innovative thinking, Cameron apparently believed it a good idea to cultivate its competitive advantage. In June 2013, before the Ukrainian war, Russian president Vladimir Putin made remarks to the same effect. (Engelbrekt 2015, 549)

However, these approaches either tended to view the creation of the G20 as a simple replacement for the G7/8, or regarded the resulting relationship between them as a negotiated division of labour in an attempt to avoid such a zero-sum game. The reality is that even if their genesis is similar in terms of both being triggered by crises and informal in nature, and even if the G20 has by and large also replicated traditional diplomatic practices rather than innovate radically, it has its own history as a group that brought developed and developing countries together at the same table (Cooper and Pouillot 2015). So, instead of following the G7's path of development, some have argued that it is carving out its own unique role:

It [the G20] probably prefigures a new but as yet undefined mode of world governance. It is more like a laboratory: within it, a rapidly changing international order is analysed and attempts are made to organise it ... [T]he emergence of the G20 in

the international order arose from a combination of chance and necessity. It is partly the product of improvisation ... In 2008, it was in the right place at the right time. (Postel-Vinay 2014, viii–ix)

So, for many member countries the G20 is clearly not a status quo grouping and this provides the added value in the role it plays. For example, Downie (2017) has demonstrated how having highlighted ‘reforming global institutions’ as a priority of its G20 presidency, the Australian government made efforts to ‘ensure that the USA and China cooperated in the G20 and that the BRICS countries were brought into the existing international order’ (2017, 1497). It did this by actively seeking to promote global governance reform that did not reflect the preferences of traditional great powers as captured by the G7, pushed the US to ratify the reform of IMF quotas and thereby voting rates to reflect the importance of rising powers that had been agreed in 2010, and in so doing sought to get the buy-in of the BRIC countries to the rules-based international liberal order (Downie 2017, 1501). Thus, Australia as a middle power was able to negotiate a path between the positions of established great powers like the US and rising powers like the BRICS countries in promoting reform in global governance. It also sought to ‘have the capability to set global norms as part of the G20. ... Australia wanted to ensure that the G20 remained an effective and legitimate forum for global governance negotiations [and t]his included the preference that the G20 should transition from its role as a crisis committee to a steering committee for global governance reform’ (Downie 2017, 1497–1498).

In any case, despite considerable debate and activity in this area of global governance reform, a final and strategic division of labour among the informals, and in turn between them and the formals, remains a long way off (Morin et al., 2019).

2.6 SUMMARY

The summit communiqués have often included a statement calling for strengthening the G20 but often lacking specific detail. Nevertheless, two distinct camps have emerged. On the one hand, countries including Australia, South Korea and the UK have called for greater institutionalization, including the establishment of a permanent secretariat. On the other hand, countries including Japan, the US, China and the other rising powers have argued that the G20 functions best as an informal gathering with a narrow focus in its agenda (Chin and Dobson 2016). Thus, there is not always a clear correlation or causation between developing and developed countries, rising and risen/declining powers as regards their position on the G20, the role it should play,

how it should do this, who should be involved and where it sits in the mechanisms of global governance.

NOTES

1. For detailed histories of this genesis, see Cooper and Thakur 2013, 33–51; Hajnal 2007; Hajnal 2014; Heine 2010; Kirton 2013; Postel-Vinay 2014; Wouters and Van Kerckhoven 2011.
2. India (2002), Mexico (2003), Germany (2004), China (2005), Australia (2006), South Africa (2007) and Brazil (2008).
3. See English, Thakur and Cooper 2005 for a detailed exploration.
4. *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 11 October 2010.
5. *The Financial Times*, 1 November 2008.
6. *The Financial Times*, 1 November 2008.
7. *Australian Financial Review*, 15 September 2009.
8. The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Finland, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Vietnam.
9. *Singapore Government News*, 12 November 2014.
10. *Toronto Star*, 26 June 2010.
11. *Australian Financial Review*, 15 September 2009.
12. *BBC News*, 16 November 2008.

3. Managing the global economy

3.1 OVERVIEW

As mentioned in Chapter 1, managing the global economy in terms of securing macroeconomic and financial stability was the primary task and *raison d'être* of the G20 in response to the GFC. This continued to be the G20's core business as further interconnected crises followed in the wake of the GFC, most prominently the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. As a result, for many, this assumption and extension of the role of a crisis committee represented the highpoint of the G20 in terms of focus, purpose, identity and legitimacy. A wider portfolio of issues, which will be explored in the following chapters, soon came to supplement this original economic focus, and as a result the G20's focus, purpose, identity and legitimacy as a financial crisis committee waned. Nevertheless, even if its function and remit have evolved, economic growth and financial stability have remained at the heart of the G20's agenda.

To be sure, specific emphases and nuances have changed over time and are neatly demonstrated by summit slogans. With the focus on the GFC, the 2009 summits in London and Pittsburgh focused on *Stability, Growth, Jobs and Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth*, respectively. The following year's two summits in Toronto and Seoul demonstrated a more forward-looking shift in the G20's agenda signalled by the respective slogans of *Recovery and New Beginnings* and *Shared Growth beyond Crisis*. The 2011 Cannes summit continued this post-crisis optimism by emphasizing *New World, New Ideas*. By 2015 and the Antalya summit, the focus of the slogan was on the collective and inclusion: *Collective Action for Inclusive and Robust Growth*. This emphasis was echoed the following years in the 2016 Hangzhou summit's alliterative slogan that pointed *Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected, and Inclusive World Economy* and the 2017 Hamburg summit's goal of *Shaping an Interconnected World*, although in the case of the latter the economic aspect was dropped. This omission continued the following year under the Argentinian presidency and its goal of *Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Development*. Although disrupted by Covid-19, the 2020 Riyadh summit emphasized in broad terms *Realizing Opportunities of the 21st Century for All*. The following year's Italian presidency chose the alliterative but equally wide-ranging *People, Planet, Prosperity*, whereas the

2022 Bali summit returned to an earlier emphasis on recovery in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic with *Recover Together, Recover Stronger*, before the Indian presidency eschewed any economic focus and adopted probably the vaguest slogan of *One Earth, One Family, One Future*.

In light of these shifts in the nature of its core business, and with the evolution of the G20's role from a crisis committee in mind, this chapter is structured around the key economic and financial challenges that have emerged over the seventeen summits that took place between 2008 and 2022. It will begin by focusing on the natural starting point of the turmoil in the global financial system caused by the GFC. Although this turmoil continued through a series of interconnected crises that stretched from the GFC to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and beyond to include a series of trade wars, the GFC provides the logical starting point for exploring country-specific approaches as the catalyst for the upgrading of the G20 to the leaders' level in 2008. Thereafter, the chapter shifts the focus sideways from the global financial system to the associated issue of IFI reform. It then explores the specific issues of growth, trade and taxation, all from the perspective of G20 members, their positions and approaches to these challenges.

3.2 THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

The 2008 Washington summit was for obvious reasons almost exclusively focused on the crisis at hand, billed as it was as the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy. As host, the US president, George W. Bush, took the opportunity ahead of the summit in a speech in New York to defend free market capitalism and resist European calls for increased financial regulation. Although supportive of essential reforms that increased transparency and stability, Bush regarded following the former path in response to 'a few months of crisis' as a 'terrible mistake': 'While reforms in the financial sector are essential, the long-term solution to today's problems is sustained economic growth ... And the surest path to that growth is free markets and free people.'¹

The US position was incrementalist and minimalist at Washington, characterized as 'go slow, go long, go limited and go light' (Kirton 2013, 243–245). Bush emphasized the iterative process of summitry, its role in establishing broad principles under which member countries could pursue bespoke solutions.² Ultimately, in his words, 'government intervention is not a cure-all'.³ For the US, the complicating factor at the Washington summit was that Bush was in the final weeks of his presidency and attention was focused on President-elect Barack Obama's position. The approach of the incoming Obama administration was to maintain a degree of distance. Obama himself did not attend the summit and instead dispatched former secretary of state,

Madeleine Albright, and former Republican congressman, Jim Leach, as envoys to meet with other countries' delegations.

However, divisions emerged among the G7 countries with European members wanting to 'go fast, go short, go wide and go deep' by taking a much more universal, comprehensive and rapid response to the GFC (Kirton 2013, 243–245). For example, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, approached Washington with optimism and a range of proposed ideas, including promoting transparency through a global register of large-scale loans that highlighted potential defaults, mapping risks across financial institutions and addressing CEO bonuses and salaries.⁴ The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, was one of the leaders who actively campaigned for the upgrading of the G20 to the leaders' level and advocated concrete and radical outcomes to result from the Washington summit, especially as regards tighter regulation of hedge funds, tax havens and CEO salaries.⁵ He proclaimed before the summit that '[w]e want to change the rules of the game in the financial world' and 'refound the capitalist system'. Sarkozy even threatened to walk out of the G20: 'It's very clear. If I don't get concrete results, I will go. I will leave Washington and go home.'⁶ Media representations of these differing positions were as melodramatic as Sarkozy. For example, as the summit opened, Canada's *The Globe and Mail* reported 'deepening divisions' between the US and Europe as '[l]eaders gird for battle over global finance crisis' with predictions of a stand-off between the US and Europe.⁷

Within the EU, members stressed the necessity for a single European voice and its responsibility to participate in creating a new financial architecture.⁸ To this end, the EU hammered out its position ahead of the Washington summit and as a result was regarded as speaking with a cohesive voice on financial regulation at the height of the GFC (Moschella and Quaglia 2016, 912). The EU statement released ahead of the Washington G20 stressed that 'no market segment, no territory, and no financial institution should escape proportionate and adequate regulation or at least oversight'.⁹ However, ahead of the Washington summit, France was in a strong position of influence because of its dual role as rotating president of the European Council and able to advocate concrete and immediate reforms of the global financial system to be reviewed at a second summit in early 2009, soon after Obama's inauguration as president. EU finance ministers met at the beginning of November to discuss an eleven-point plan that had been developed by France and outlined tighter regulation of credit-rating agencies (CRAs), increased transparency of financial markets and measures to deter excessive risk-taking. There was some support for the French position but also opposition, with the UK expressing concerns.¹⁰ EU leaders then met a week prior to the Washington summit to discuss the plan and establish a common stance at an informal pre-summit meeting in Brussels, which was hosted and influenced by France under its presidency of

the Council of the EU. Sarkozy was blunt in apportioning blame to the US: ‘This is a global crisis and we have to remember where it started.’¹¹ At the same time, he claimed the EU was ‘defending a common position, a vision ... for reforming our financial system’. This ‘common position’ espoused by Sarkozy was that reforms to the global financial system were required immediately and should be global in their reach. In addition, the IMF should be the ‘the pivot of a renewed international system’, working with others to prevent future financial crises, although the specifics of its role remained a moot point.

At his Lord Mayor’s banquet speech ahead of the Washington summit, the UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, argued for internationalism over protectionism and a programme of massive fiscal stimulus; at the same time, he sought to resist any attempts at excessive and formal coordination of policies that would hamper London’s financial markets and advocated more pragmatic and specific reforms that might serve as a compromise, such as the creation of a ‘college of supervisors’ to oversee the world’s thirty largest banks.¹² Also, seeking to find a middle path through these extreme positions, the Canadian prime minister, Stephen Harper, placed the emphasis on dialogue and unity.¹³ As a country that survived the GFC relatively well, Canada was able to advocate a pragmatic approach based on the selective adaptation of national regulations to avoid protectionism, citing its own regulatory framework as an exemplar, with the role of any international body being to coordinate different systems, provide oversight and act as an early-warning mechanism.¹⁴ He advocated an increased role for the IMF and a mandatory and transparent peer review system whereby G20 members collectively scrutinized, rather than regulated, each other’s financial systems.¹⁵

The newly appointed Japanese prime minister, Asō Tarō, approached the Washington G20 as a political opportunity for Japan to play a leadership role drawing on its experience during the Heisei recession of addressing a crisis in its own banking sector. His approach was centred on an eponymous initiative that was based on recent experience of economic crisis management, as well as an emphasis on Asia. As regards the former, Asō described:

... the weightiness of the role that Japan is expected to play, and the role that Japan must fulfil. One of those roles is to present Japan’s experiences. The experience of the collapse of the bubble and of overcoming it. Japan overcame that major crisis all by itself, of course also with major sacrifice. The other role is for Japan to take the lead in the building of a new framework. In order to respond to such expectations I made some concrete proposals, and I believe they have been reflected in the leaders’ declaration today. (Kantei 2008)

To this end, he supported international, rather than national, regulation of financial institutions and CRAs, as well as high-quality international accounting standards.¹⁶ As regards the latter emphasis on Asia, he argued that

regional cooperation that is open to outside the region, such as regional cooperation in Asia, I believe complements globalism. In the run up to the ASEAN + 3 summit in December and the East Asia summit Meeting that also takes place during December, Japan shall strive to make efforts to strengthen financial cooperation in Asia and to support self-sustained development. Japan feels the need to translate the result of this meeting into concrete action, and also Japan shall strive to exercise leadership toward the realization of an international economic system that corresponds to the new world economy and finance. (Kantei 2008)

BRICS countries were united by the fact that their leaders had now secured a seat at the top table of global summitry. They approached the Washington G20 seeking increased regulation of the leading economies' financial systems without damaging the growth prospects of emerging economies, an overhaul of the Bretton Woods system and avoidance of protectionism.¹⁷ They also sought acknowledgement by the leading economies of their culpability for the GFC: 'The crisis revealed weakness in risk management, regulation and supervision in the financial sectors of some advanced economies. Therefore we call for reform of regulatory and supervisory frameworks, as well as clearer rules and transparency.'¹⁸

The Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was particularly blunt in apportioning blame for the GFC by famously and provocatively arguing that it was 'created by white men with blue eyes'. He hoped to place structural reform on the table (Kirton 2013, 243–245), and stood alongside Sarkozy in terms of vocally supporting regulation:

Under the banner of 'no financial institution should escape regulation and supervision', Sarkozy has subsequently tried to bring back into international debate the regulation of offshore financial centres and the hedge fund industry. ... Lula da Silva openly chastised 'the irresponsibility of speculators who have transformed the world into a gigantic Casino'. (Helleiner and Pagliari 2009, 281)

In the case of China, it was supportive of the development of this enlarged and informal forum of leaders and was the first country to accept the invitation to attend the Washington G20 unconditionally, signalling its readiness to engage with this new forum (Cooper and Alexandroff 2019). However, it adopted a more cautious approach at Washington than some of its BRICS partners, something it could afford to in the absence of a pressing domestic crisis. As regards tighter regulation, China was cautious, supporting greater coordination while upholding national sovereignty.¹⁹ Its position was that on the national level all countries should act to improve financial supervision, restore market

confidence and maintain global economic growth.²⁰ At the same time, China made important and supportive contributions that were largely in line with what the G7 countries most impacted by the crisis had framed as the correct response. These included maintaining exchange rate stability, as well contributing a substantial share of stimulus packages agreed by the G20 to address the crisis at Washington and London (US\$40 billion of US\$1.1 trillion) (Kirton 2016, 30–44). According to Kirton and Wang (2023), this set a template for China's future engagement with G20 initiatives.

Similarly, the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, was measured in his statements ahead of the Washington summit, placing the emphasis on dialogue and unity.²¹

President Dmitry Medvedev represented Russia at Washington and argued for the harmonization of accounting standards, capitalization of financial institutions, a new global risk management system and the immediate reform of the IMF so that its role was focused on providing analysis and an early-warning mechanism.²² Like Japan, Russia was eager to stake its claim to financial leadership by heading to Washington with a range of proposals to reform the global financial system through reform of the Bretton Woods institutions and specific measures that encouraged transparency and stricter regulations.

Beyond the G7 and BRICS countries, leaders of the middle powers who had secured seats at the G20 came with specific proposals. The Mexican president, Felipe Calderón, announced ahead of the summit that he would seek the revision and reinforcement of financial control mechanisms and the transparency of regulations.²³ Australia assumed a leadership position ahead of the Washington G20 as regards the supervision of CRAs by touting its own model of regulatory reforms introduced to its parliament in the run-up to the summit. The Australian minister for corporate law, Nick Sherry, said: 'We will be using it to take a global leadership position in respect to the supervision of these entities.'²⁴ Indonesia came to Washington with a proposal it had mooted at the Sao Paulo G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors for a global emergency fund supported by countries with large budget surpluses to provide support to developing countries.²⁵

As late additions to the Washington G20, the Dutch government sought to propose a freshly constituted IMF as a putative Global Financial Stability Organization, which would have greater oversight of the domestic financial affairs of member countries. The Spanish government similarly sought higher levels of transparency and regulation in the global financial system.

By the end of the Washington summit, positions had become slightly less entrenched as European advocates of a Bretton Woods II-style overhaul of the global financial system, personified by Sarkozy, toned down their demands. In the end, there was no 'assault on capitalism, or the death of capitalism, or the

death of the free market system'.²⁶ Soederberg (2010) argues that the resulting compromise ultimately reproduced the dominant neoliberal order.

The Washington summit also called for the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to expand its membership from G7 to G20 countries and expand its remit. This was achieved the following year at the London and Pittsburgh summits with the establishment of the FSB, tasked with developing, implementing and monitoring robust policies with the goal of financial stability.

However, at the following year's London summit, differences of opinion re-emerged within the G7 over the solution to the GFC, with Brown, as host, and Obama together prioritizing growth through substantial fiscal stimulus. As leaders tend to do, Brown sought to use the 2009 London summit to promote his own vision and plan for an ambitious 'global new deal' and 'the biggest fiscal stimulus the world has ever agreed', sometimes at the expense of his precarious domestic position; as one of Brown's aides was reported to quip: 'There are no votes in the G20'.²⁷

Although he maintained an appropriate diplomatic distance from the Washington summit, post inauguration, Obama was ready to support Brown as host of the London summit. According to White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Obama's two objectives at London were '[e]nsuring there is concerted action around the globe to jump start economic growth, and ... advancing a regulatory reform agenda to ensure this crisis never happens again'. In contrast, Sarkozy and Merkel resisted additional stimulus spending, instead advocating financial regulation and austerity. Sarkozy declared ahead of London that he would 'fight for the moralisation of financial capitalism and for the refoundation of a better regulated capitalism'.²⁸ In response to Brown's plans, Sarkozy declared that '[w]e consider that in Europe we have already invested a lot for the recovery, and that the problem is not about spending more, but putting in place a system of regulation so that the economic and financial catastrophe that the world is seeing does not reproduce itself'.²⁹ Luckhurst neatly captures the dynamics and alliances at play at London:

The main proposals ... originated from two bilateral alliances: the Franco-German proposals for an enhanced international regulatory framework, which took shape in the form of the FSB; and Anglo-US proposals for a coordinated international fiscal stimulus strategy, with countries contributing US\$1.1 trillion primarily to augment the financial resources of the IMF. (2012, 756)

As part of stricter regulatory framework, Merkel advocated a 'global financial market constitution as has not existed before, so that we can finally draw lessons from this disaster'.³⁰ Once again, Sarkozy dramatically threatened to walk out of the summit if the G20 did not take action on tax havens (Kirton 2013, 269–296). The EU's joint position ahead of the London summit was

that a range of tests would form the basis of success at the London G20. These included global coordination, not necessarily boosting, of fiscal stimulus plans, increasing demand and jobs, building trust in the financial system through effective regulation, reforming and resourcing the IFIs, resisting protectionism, and responding to the crisis with development and climate change in mind. This position contributed to the divide between the Anglo-US position on boosting fiscal stimulus as opposed to the European emphasis on coordination and financial regulation to prevent a future crisis.³¹ The Czech prime minister and president of the European Council, Mirek Topolánek, was bolder in his language, calling for EU unity in the face of US pressure to boost fiscal stimulus as ‘a road to hell’,³² and seeking to resolve ‘its own problems at the expense of the rest of the world’.³³

As regards the BRICS countries, Medvedev supported Brown’s position emphasizing stimulus packages.³⁴ China continued its cautious approach by seeking to be all things to all people. It demonstrated a more high-profile role at London by contributing to the trillion-plus fiscal stimulation package as part of a strategy of presenting itself as a responsible member of the international community that was actively engaged in responding to the crisis. At the same time, China advocated economic measures in line with each country’s specific context while cooperating to stimulate growth and employment. It agreed with reform of the global financial system but in a ‘balanced, gradual and effective manner’.³⁵ This motherhood-and-apple-pie approach was evident in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s comments to other G20 leaders in London: ‘China will continue to work with the rest of the international community to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, advance the reform of the international financial system, maintain the stability of the multilateral trading system and contribute its share to world economic recovery.’³⁶

Lula da Silva’s position on the causes of the GFC was consistently clear and blunt: ‘This crisis was not caused by a black man or woman or by any indigenous person or by any poor person. This crisis was fostered and boosted by the irrational behaviour of some people that were white and blue eyed.’³⁷ However, for the G20 to agree on the international regulation of hedge funds was an important shift, considering the previous resistance and preference for self-regulation in some countries. The crisis converted the US to accepting some regulation while it also reinforced the preference for regulation in France and Germany. The UK promoted the G20’s code for fear of a stricter EU regulatory model (Fioretos 2010).

At the Pittsburgh summit later the same year, G20 leaders found themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, signs of recovery in the global economy emboldened them to declare the G20 as the ‘premier forum for international economic cooperation’ in place of the G8 and to consider mid- to longer-term challenges discussed below, such as rebalancing the global

economy and reforming IFIs in line with the aspirations of many emerging powers.³⁸ On the other hand, they felt it was too early to move out of crisis mode and the emphasis on stimulus measures. The summit saw leaders largely paper over resulting issues, differences of opinion and inevitable tensions, or in the words of the IMF's managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, '[o]nce the fire is out, there's water everywhere, it has to be mopped up. In Pittsburgh, we have to say, there are still fires to be put out, we'll see later how to do the mopping up.'³⁹

The conflicting agendas were captured in Hu's words ahead of the Pittsburgh summit:

Now the world economy is showing positive changes, but the foundation for a further turn for the better is unstable. There are still many uncertain factors. A full recovery will be a sluggish and tortuous process. ... Various countries should maintain the intensity of their economic stimulus programmes. [On the other hand], [t]here should not be slackness of determination in promoting the international financial system reform, nor should the objectives be lowered. There is a need to increase developing countries' representation and rights to speak and continuously push for substantial progress in reform.⁴⁰

So, the divisions evident at Washington and London between the Anglo-US position and the European stance continued to some extent. Sarkozy, with the support of Merkel but resisted by the UK and US, continued to prioritize penalizing previous bad practice in financial markets, including caps on bankers' bonuses. In typically dramatic language, he announced that '[t]ax havens, banking secrecy, that's all over. I will fight for sanctions tomorrow in Pittsburgh.'⁴¹ Sarkozy used his regular tactic of threatening to walk out of the summit if the G20 did not reach agreement.⁴²

However, areas of consensus within the G7 did emerge. There was agreement among Brown, Sarkozy and Merkel on imposing a global bank levy and they used Pittsburgh to request an IMF report on the issue (Kirtton 2013, 308). As regards the issue of executive pay and bonuses, the three leaders sent a joint letter to the President of the European Council arguing for a single EU voice on the issue. This was established ahead of Pittsburgh with the EU's agreed position being that of taking a firm stance in favour of stricter rules, while also supporting continued fiscal stimulus for the foreseeable future, and while establishing exit strategies at an early stage that would be implemented in coordinated fashion.

In the end, G20 leaders agreed to continue with stimulus measures and avoid an uncoordinated rush to exit strategies. They agreed on rules around how much capital banks need to maintain to avoid another crisis. On executive pay and bonuses, the G20 agreed on a basic outline of how to limit their reward and compensation, rather than strict rules and limitations.⁴³

At the 2010 Toronto summit, the focus had turned to the Eurozone debt crisis alongside the ongoing response to the GFC (Kirton 2013, 321–369). It was billed as the ‘most divisive summit to date’ with a perfect storm of divisive issues from US–European disagreements on fiscal stimulation and regulation, Canada against many members over a global bank levy, and G7 versus emerging countries over global imbalances (Kirton 2013, 321).

Ahead of Toronto, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy sent a joint letter to the other G20 leaders outlining the EU’s position, established as usual ahead of the summit. In the face of the sovereign debt crisis, several EU countries were rapidly exiting stimulus programmes and launching fiscal austerity measures. In this light, their letter highlighted the need for ‘a coordinated and differentiated exit strategy to ensure sustainable public finances’, and a reaffirmed commitment to the reform of financial markets to strengthen crisis management mechanisms and encourage cross-border coordination.⁴⁴

At Toronto, the US and China favoured economic stimulus packages as the way to promote growth, whereas Europe advocated austerity and deficit-cutting measures. On financial regulation, China’s position was one of support for a range of measures that were agreed at the meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bankers at Busan immediately prior to the summit, including the need to develop rigorous capital and liquidity rules, reduce moral hazard associated with systemically important financial institutions, establish a single set of high-quality, global accounting standards, and improve transparency, regulation and supervision of hedge funds, CRAs, compensation practices and over-the-counter derivatives (G20 Information Centre 2010b; Ren 2015, 2033–2034). However, China was still cautious in its approach to leading at the G20 and, not wanting to be singled out at Toronto or in the future, it was successful in having praise for enhancing its exchange rate flexibility removed from the summit declaration.⁴⁵ Knowing that it would be hosting the next G20 summit, South Korea was able to take advantage of the opportunity provided by foresight to approach Toronto in a strategic manner and seed new issues, especially on development as a broad issue, but also the related and the more specific issue of a global financial safety net that would support developing countries to manage capital volatility and prevent a future crisis.⁴⁶

Later that year in Seoul, under the South Korean presidency, the Basel III code was finalized with the aim of ‘making banks safer and bankers less adventurous with their customers’ (and taxpayers’) money’.⁴⁷ However, tensions emerged around the specific issues of a potential currency war and quantitative easing. Despite discussion and tentative agreement at the previous month’s G20 finance ministers and central bank governors’ meeting in Gyeongju, the leaders’ discussions resulted in modest or compromised outcomes. On the positive side of the ledger, President Lee Myung-bak declared

in his post-summit press conference that there was no currency war and that the G20 had agreed to exchange rate flexibility and avoidance of aggressive currency devaluation, as had been agreed in Gyeongju. However, the Seoul summit document went on to state that 'in circumstances where countries are facing undue burden of adjustment, policy responses in emerging market economies with adequate reserves and increasingly overvalued flexible exchange rates may also include carefully designed macro-prudential measures' (G20 Information Centre 2010a).

The Eurozone crisis continued to dominate the 2011 Cannes summit and 2012 Los Cabos summit. Pressure was placed on Germany to do more to support struggling economies like Greece, although Merkel resisted this pressure, concerned by the domestic reaction.⁴⁸ Hu was also keen to see stability in the Eurozone and to this end provide the required resources. At Los Cabos, China contributed US\$43 billion to the IMF's US\$430 billion firewall fund.

In time, the GFC receded into the G20's rear-view mirror and attention turned to its post-crisis role as the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation'. Nevertheless, the GFC and the fallout still framed the issues that the G20 sought to lead on. This was clearly evident in the case of reform of the IFIs.

3.3 REFORMING IFIS

As touched on above, as part of its response to the GFC, the G20's discussions focused on the specific role of the IMF but also the wider issue of the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods institutions. Despite many countries publicly seeking either its overhaul or at least reform, the G20 identified the IMF at the Washington summit as the vehicle for addressing the GFC. The means by which G20 countries would enable the IMF to fulfil this role as financial firefighter was an increase in special drawing rights (SDRs). However, an increase in SDRs was also linked to the need to recognize systemic changes in the global economy and resulting questions around the IMF's legitimacy and reform. The meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in advance of the leaders' summit highlighted this need by agreeing that the Bretton Woods institutions 'must be comprehensively reformed so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy'.⁴⁹

Ahead of the Washington summit, the UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, was keen to boost the IMF's emergency provision and toured the Gulf states before the summit, promising reform of the IFIs and 'to give countries like your own a bigger place in the order'.⁵⁰ To this end, he argued for updating rather than overhauling 'a new Bretton Woods with a new IMF that offers,

by its surveillance of every economy, an early warning system and a crisis prevention mechanism for the whole world'.⁵¹

Japan, under Prime Minister Asō, was keen to take a leadership role centred on the IMF and provided US\$100 billion in temporary funds to help emerging economies and called on other member states to follow suit.⁵² As regards its role in reform of the IFIs, Japan initially responded in line with its traditional, self-appointed role as Asia's representative and sought their reform to increase Asia's voice. However, much of this rhetoric was undermined by Prime Minister Abe's return to power in December 2012 and a new foreign policy doctrine that supplanted the previous low-profile Yoshida doctrine and the Asia-focused Fukuda doctrine with an 'Abe doctrine' that emphasized great power status, breaking with the postwar regime and historical revisionism. For example, in relation to promises made at the 2009 G20 London summit and reiterated at the 2010 G20 Pittsburgh summit that the head of any international institution would be chosen through an 'open, transparent and merit-based process', the Abe administration in fact reinforced its historic control of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) by installing Nakao Takehiko, another Japanese citizen, as its president to replace Kuroda Haruhiko, who was moved to the Bank of Japan (Dobson 2017).

In contrast, BRICS countries called for a reorganization of the global financial system, historically based on the Bretton Woods order, and reform of the IMF as well as the World Bank, as partial acknowledgement of shifts in the global economy and the importance of rising powers. As touched on above, China's position on responding to the GFC was that on the national level all countries should act to improve financial supervision, restore market confidence and maintain global economic growth. At the same time, on the international level, IFIs should be reformed and updated to reflect changes in the global economy and developed countries should engage with developing countries in macro-economic policymaking.⁵³ To this end, China was ready, like Japan, to fulfil its responsibilities as a global governance leader by providing the IMF with the necessary funds. However, China was equally keen to ensure that a commitment to reform was on the agenda and that related quotas and voting rights in the IMF were also addressed in order to represent its status.

As a fellow advocate of reform, ahead of the London summit, Russia called for an 'enlargement of the list of currencies used as reserve ones [and] introduction of a supra-national reserve currency to be issued by IFIs'.⁵⁴

At the Pittsburgh summit later the same year, the G20 'committed to a shift in IMF quota share to dynamic emerging markets and developing countries of at least 5 per cent from overrepresented countries to under-represented coun-

tries using the current quota formula as the basis to work from'. In the case of the World Bank, it also stressed the

importance of moving towards equitable voting power ... over time through the adoption of a dynamic formula which primarily reflects countries' evolving economic weight and the World Bank's development mission, and that generates in the next shareholding review a significant increase of at least 3% of voting power for developing and transition countries. (G20 Information Centre 2009a)

The reforms to the World Bank 'made significant progress without much difficulty' and were endorsed by the following year's Toronto summit (Rhee and Sheel 2014, 53). As regards IMF reform, the South Korean presidency progressed discussion on the issue of increasing the representation of emerging economies and reconsidering that of European countries. Specifically, it was agreed and announced in the Seoul summit document that reforms to the IMF included:

- Shifts in quota shares to dynamic emerging market and developing countries and to under-represented countries of over 6%, while protecting the voting share of the poorest, which we commit to work to complete by the Annual Meetings in 2012.
- A doubling of quotas, with a corresponding rollback of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) preserving relative shares, when the quota increase becomes effective.
- Continuing the dynamic process aimed at enhancing the voice and representation of emerging market and developing countries, including the poorest, through a comprehensive review of the quota formula by January 2013 to better reflect the economic weights; and through completion of the next general review of quotas by January 2014.
- Greater representation for emerging market and developing countries at the Executive Board through two fewer advanced European chairs, and the possibility of a second alternate for all multi-country constituencies.
- Moving to an all-elected Board, along with a commitment by the IMF's membership to maintain the Board size at 24 chairs, and following the completion of the 14th General Review, a review of the Board's composition every eight years. (G20 Information Centre 2010a)

This shift in quota shares would leave China ranked third in voting rights and raise Brazil, India and Russia into the top ten. In addition, European representation on the IMF's twenty-four-member Executive Board would decrease from eight seats to six seats. Strauss-Kahn, hailed this as 'the most important reform in the governance of the institution since its creation'.⁵⁵ Despite the hyperbole, the agreed deadlines for these reforms were missed and blocked by the US Congress (Rhee and Sheel 2014, 54). The review of quotas in the IMF that was agreed in 2010 was eventually implemented in 2016, pushing back the schedule of subsequent reviews. Reform of the IMF and World Bank to reflect the

voices of emerging economies continued to be a feature of India's presidency of the G20 in 2023.

3.4 STRONG, SUSTAINABLE AND BALANCED GROWTH

The highlight of the 2009 Pittsburgh summit was to place the G20 at the centre of global economic cooperation, a development championed by the US and rising powers like Brazil and India, despite some reluctance from Canada and Japan, who were traditionally more wedded to the G8. China was at this stage still married to the UN as the centre of global governance and would only begin to nuance this position as the 2016 Hangzhou summit approached.

As mentioned above, the slogan for the summit captured the Pittsburgh G20's commitment to *Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth* in acknowledgement of the fact that '[o]ne of the strongest common denominators amongst the crisis narratives was the identification of global imbalances as a key source of financial and economic instability' (Rommerskirchen and Snaith 2018, 391). In response to this challenge and with the goal of stimulating growth in a coordinated way to reap the benefits of an open global economy, the Pittsburgh summit adopted the eponymous Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.

This framework provided G20 countries with a mechanism by which they set macro-economic objectives, agreed on the policies by which these objectives would be achieved, and introduced the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) as a voluntary, non-binding, joint G20–IMF mechanism to monitor national growth policies. Vines describes the MAP as 'a form of "concerted unilateral action" in global macroeconomic policymaking' (2015a, 9). Rommerskirchen and Snaith (2018, 393) provide an overview of how MAP functioned:

The MAP describes an in-depth country review, carried out by the IMF and agreed by G20 leaders, to assess the existence of destabilising imbalances between countries. G20 leaders gauge progress towards the Framework goals via indicative, non-numerical guidelines to identify and assess imbalances. The guidelines feature a total of 40 indicators, called G20 MAP Inputs, spanning 6 groups (domestic variables; monetary and financial policy; fiscal policy; labour markets; external development; external variables).

They also point to Sarkozy and Obama as playing salient leadership roles in its creation. However, in the case of the latter, national interest was also behind the positive response to the MAP. The Obama administration used the Pittsburgh summit to promote a framework by which all G20 countries would adjust their economic policies to address local circumstances with the goal of rendering the global economy more balanced.⁵⁶ By arguing that China

and Germany should limit exports and increase imports, the US was clearly responding to domestic concerns and its own national interests. The MAP also deflected criticisms of US responsibility for and role in the crisis by sharing the blame, and provided a multilateral mechanism to single out Chinese policies around currency manipulation (Rommerskirchen and Snaith 2018, 397). In this light, Chodor characterizes the US approach towards the MAP as a failure to act as a responsible hegemon, from its creation at Pittsburgh through to the following year's G20 summit in Seoul, when the Obama administration pointed fingers at China for keeping its currency undervalued (2017, 217–218). China's reaction to the MAP was 'lukewarm, at best', regarding it as reflecting US national interests in particular but also those of some members of the G7 (Chin and Dobson 2016).

At the following year's Toronto summit, the G20 was held back-to-back with the G8 as a sign that the mantle of premier forum for international economic cooperation had been passed over.⁵⁷ The legacy of the discussion at Pittsburgh was also apparent. Although the focus was the European debt crisis, trade and reform of the IFIs, the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth continued to take centre stage as countries shared assessments of their national policies with the goal of achieving globally balanced and coordinated patterns of growth. Publicly China was supportive of the rationale for the framework, as seen in Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai's comments at a pre-summit press conference: 'China hopes that the G20 members at the Toronto summit would fully implement the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and enhance communications and coordination of macro-economic policies to support the global economic recovery.'⁵⁸ However, the fear that the US was using the framework for national interests and to curtail Chinese exports was clear.⁵⁸

By November 2010 and the Seoul summit, the focus had firmly shifted from crisis mode to sustained recovery and future growth, as captured by the summit slogan *Shared Growth beyond Crisis*. President Lee was able to piggy-back on the Toronto summit by highlighting that: 'We [the G20 leaders] promised to do all that we can to bring about workable and substantive agreements on issues such as reform of IFIs, financial regulatory reform and balanced and sustainable growth, among others.'⁵⁹

So, as expected, the legacy issues of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, alongside IFI reform and financial regulations, were still on the agenda. However, as mentioned above, the South Korean hosts sought to emphasize an agreement on a global financial safety net. In addition, as explored in Chapter 4, they also placed the issue of development on the G20's agenda as its contribution to global summitry, building on the momentum of the establishment of the Development Working Group (DWG) at Toronto tasked with drafting a multi-year action plan (MYAP) for adoption at Seoul.

Hu articulated China's priorities ahead of the Seoul summit as being 'the momentum of the world economic recovery', 'reforming the international financial system', 'fighting trade protectionism', and coordinating macro-economic policies on the 'principle of mutual benefit and win-win results', in a thinly veiled reference to the framework.⁶⁰ After the summit, Hu placed the onus on sovereignty: 'We should stick to the country-led principle, take into full account the different national circumstances and development stages of various members, and appreciate and respect each country's independent choice of development path and policies.'⁶¹ Only thereafter and ahead of its presidency of the G20 in 2016, as Chin and Dobson (2016) have argued, did China begin to demonstrate strategic ambitions by seeking to reset the core agenda of the G20 and the global economy through a 'structural and systemic remedy' that is more open, inclusive and interconnected between growth and development.

Although the pursuit of growth and the MAP was derailed by the emphasis on fiscal austerity that was dominant across several G20 countries from 2011, Australia sought to place global growth centre-stage as part of its G20 presidency in 2014 (Vines 2015a, 21–22). As will be discussed in other chapters, this emphasis was to the exclusion or de-prioritization of health, security and climate change as agenda items (Harris Rimmer 2015, 41). The aim was to achieve global growth through unilateral, domestic microeconomic reforms (Vines 2015a; Slaughter 2015b). In collaboration with its Canadian counterparts and with the support of China, but in the face of German opposition and scepticism on the part of Argentina, Brazil and Türkiye, the Australian government sought to use its G20 presidency to encourage fellow G20 countries to identify their own strategies in a wide range of specific areas, possibly including domestic structural reforms. These strategies and reforms would provide the foundations of Australia's overarching objective, which was to achieve a shared 2 per cent growth target and increase the number of jobs, as captured in the Brisbane Action Plan (Downie and Crump 2017, 687; Crump and Downie 2018, 37). This was consistent with the Australian government's approach to the first G20 summit at the leaders' level six years previously, when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd went to Washington with the aim of encouraging his counterparts to prioritize growth and called for a 'global war' against unemployment.⁶² The Australian presidency also worked with its Japanese counterparts and with the support of the US, Türkiye and OECD in inputting a gender perspective into this focus of G20 work, especially a '25 by 25' target; in other words, reduce the gender participation gap in G20 labour markets by 25 per cent by 2025 (Harris Rimmer and Byrne 2019, 168).

At the Rome G20 in 2021, leaders agreed on a number of responses to concerns in the global economy, specifically on recovery from the pandemic, inflation and supply chain disruption. Respectively, they agreed that:

We will continue to sustain the recovery, avoiding any premature withdrawal of support measures, while preserving financial stability and long-term fiscal sustainability and safeguarding against downside risks and negative spill-overs.

Central banks are monitoring current price dynamics closely. They will act as needed to meet their mandates, including price stability, while looking through inflation pressures where they are transitory and remaining committed to clear communication of policy stances.

We remain vigilant to the global challenges that are impacting on our economies, such as disruptions in supply chains. We will work together to monitor and address these issues as our economies recover and to support the stability of the global economy. (G20 Information Centre 2021a)

3.5 TRADE

The importance of combatting trade protectionism has been at the heart of the G20's mission since its creation. In the words of Herman and Cooper: 'The specter surrounding the G20 since its creation in November 2008 has been whether it could act collectively to stem a return to the economic nationalism that marked the Great Depression of the 1930s' (2013, 399).

At the same time, the first G20 in Washington came at a time when the Doha round of WTO trade negotiations was in its seventh year and suffering from inertia. Almost inevitably, in parallel with the G7, the G20 became a forum for nudging these stalled trade negotiations forward in some form. President Lula da Silva of Brazil was a vocal advocate at the summit of using the G20 as a mechanism to break through on stalled trade negotiations. With the implicit support of the incoming Obama administration, Gordon Brown was similarly ambitious at Washington.⁶³ He declared at the outset of the summit that '[i]f over the coming days countries can resolve what I now regard as small differences it would send a huge signal to the whole world that the answer to 2008's crisis is not the beggar-thy-neighbour protectionism of past crises, but stimulating a world trade agreement'.⁶⁴

Concerned about the impact on its agricultural sector, India advocated the conclusion of the Doha round but attached no timescale to this call. The Bush administration was in no position to negotiate ahead of the transfer of power and stressed dialogue and substance over the timing of any agreement (Kharas 2014a, 185). In the end, the G20's 'Declaration of the summit on financial

markets and the world economy’ avoided watering down the language and stated that:

We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next twelve months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports. Further, we shall strive to reach agreement this year on modalities that leads to a successful conclusion to the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA) with an ambitious and balanced outcome. We instruct our Trade Ministers to achieve this objective and stand ready to assist directly, as necessary. We also agree that our countries have the largest stake in the global trading system and therefore each must make the positive contributions necessary to achieve such an outcome. (G20 Information Centre 2008a)

Reaching agreement on modalities – the concrete way forward including targets and formulas towards the objective of cutting tariffs and subsidies – was an ambitious objective that was unlikely to have been achieved and, indeed, never was.

The following year at the London summit, domestic pressures manifested themselves as protectionist measures in both the US and France. On the one hand, ‘Buy American’ clauses in the US stimulus package barred foreign iron, steel and manufactured goods from public works projects funded by the package. On the other hand, Sarkozy encouraged French car makers in receipt of government funds to firewall domestic jobs.⁶⁵ Brown was keen to stress that the London summit should send a strong anti-protectionist message to the world: ‘... we will reject protectionist countries, we will monitor those countries and name and shame if necessary countries that are not following free trade practices’.⁶⁶ Concerned about the impact on its agricultural sector, India advocated the conclusion of the Doha round but attached no timescale to this call. The Bush administration was nearing its end at the time of the Washington summit but Obama was in power by the time of the London summit. The EU also called for a strong G20 statement in support of anti-protectionism, expressing the concern that a panic-driven knee-jerk protectionist response could extend the economic crisis.

Despite the G20’s strong and iterative statements to avoid protectionism, the evidence demonstrates that domestic pressures and national interests trumped economic internationalism and collective action with most G20 members introducing discriminatory measures and protective policies in response to the GFC. The World Bank suggested that seventeen countries introduced forty-six protectionist measures between the Washington and London summits.⁶⁷ Herman and Cooper single out India, Russia, Argentina and the EU27 (in particular, Germany), as ‘the worst offenders as measured by total implemented

discriminatory trade measures, though 2012 has seen an increase in measures implemented by the USA, notably those targeting China and Mexico' (Herman and Cooper 2013, 403).

It was clearly in South Korea's national interest to continue pushing the G20 on its anti-protectionist mission considering that exports accounted for 43.4 per cent of South Korea's GDP. However, progress was modest in this area, with no tangible movement in the DDA, to the extent that the following Cannes G20 under France's presidency admitted to past failures in this space and called for fresh and credible approaches (Cherry and Dobson 2012).

The G20's long-standing anti-protectionist position and matching lip service became controversial with the advent of the Trump administration. Trade had not been a priority for Germany when it assumed the G20 presidency in December 2016. However, Trump's election the previous month, his 'America First' protectionist rhetoric and withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in early 2017 created a 'stress test' that forced the German presidency to revise this position and instead seek to preserve the pre-Trump status quo (Berger and Evenett 2017, 130–131). The German presidency was able to include a statement on trade in the Hamburg leaders' declaration, although it represented a compromise by which, on the one hand, it name-checked the continued fight against protectionism, underlined the role of the rules-based international trading system and supported the WTO. On the other hand, it highlighted unfair trade practices and recognized the role of legitimate trade defence instruments (G20 Information Centre 2017a; for an expert close-reading of the declaration and comparison with the previous year's statement, see Berger and Evenett 2017). In November 2018, APEC leaders meeting in Papua New Guinea failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in the forum's history, due to differences on trade; this set the context for the G20 leaders' meeting in Buenos Aires, where an agreement on trade could only be reached by dropping the anti-protectionist commitment from the summit statement.⁶⁸

3.6 TAXATION

As part of the G20's actions to combat financial volatility and avoid a repeat of the GFC, attention focused upon what has been termed a global bank tax, more popularly known as the Tobin Tax, named after the economist James Tobin, or officially a financial transactions tax (FTT) (see Kalinowski 2019 for a detailed review). Regardless of the nomenclature, the idea has been championed by some economists and various CSOs to discourage short-term, speculative currency trading, encourage exchange rate stability and generate revenue for developing countries. At the time of the 2009 Pittsburgh G20, the German government released a statement advocating an FTT as one measure that could assist in paying for the damage of the GFC (Mahrenbach 2019, 260). The G20

leaders' statement spoke to this proposal by tasking the IMF with preparing 'a report for our next meeting with regard to the range of options countries have adopted or are considering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with government interventions to repair the banking system' (G20 Information Centre 2009a). However, a variety of responses within the G20 were in evidence. The French and German governments were early and active supporters of the idea of an FTT, although the US and UK blocked these initiatives within the G20 (Luckhurst 2012, 758). As host of the 2010 Toronto summit and with a banking sector relatively unharmed by the GFC, the Canadian government opposed it. Bayne explains this difference by citing the unpopularity of the banking sector in Europe resulting from the GFC, in contrast to the feeling in Canada that its banks had not behaved irresponsibly (2011). Even within Europe, there was no consistent position. The European Commission was a vocal advocate of the FTT but the agreed EU pre-summit position was lukewarm at times (Moschella and Quaglia 2016, 914). Concerned about its impact on London as a financial hub, the UK was opposed to a European FTT but indicated that it could be more amenable to a global one (Luckhurst 2012, 750). In the end, the IMF report commissioned at Pittsburgh watered down the issue, Canada and Brazil led the resistance at the Toronto summit of June 2010 that included China, Japan, Mexico and South Africa, and by the November 2010 Seoul summit the idea was left to the discretion of national governments and not pursued at a globally coordinated level as the G20's focus moved on (Cooper 2013a, 964; Mahrenbach 2019, 261).

As regards addressing tax havens during the GFC, Sarkozy's tough stance at Washington and London and threats to walk out of the summit meeting have been mentioned above. In the end, Obama brokered a deal and used bilateral meetings to secure a change in the language of the communiqué to 'note' rather than 'recognize', in reference to the list of tax havens identified by the OECD and G20 (Cooper 2010, 748). China was keen to protect Macau and Hong Kong in the discussions and keep them outside any final G20 agreed statements, but beyond that was willing to be flexible (Kirton 2016, 39–40).

The disappearance or artificial shifting of corporate profits to low or no-tax environments, known as base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), was placed on the G20's agenda under the Mexican presidency at the 2012 Los Cabos summit and with the support of the German and UK governments. The UK was active in pushing ahead on this issue unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally through the G20 as well as through its presidency of the G8 in 2013 (Motala 2019, 64; Mahrenbach 2019, 265). The same year, a G20/OECD BEPS Action Plan was adopted at the St Petersburg summit. BEPS is discussed explicitly as a development issue in more detail in Chapter 4. However, it is worth highlighting here that the G20's focus was largely on supporting the OECD's work

in this area and its February 2013 report on this issue. Zhu (2016) argues that global tax governance is an area in which the G20 has collaborated successfully with the OECD and found a successful division of labour – the former provides the leadership and the latter possesses the technical ability:

Global tax governance can be called one of the few success stories of the G20 institutional transition in recent years. In 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the G20 has made the fundamental progress and changes to international tax rules. During the summit, the G20 leaders asked the OECD to make 15 action plans to combat the tax evasion. On October 5, 2015, the OECD submitted the 15 plans, which have been rebuilding the international tax system.

From the perspective of the governance architecture, the G20 and OECD individually have been proving their comparative advantages. Considering the absence of some emerging economies in the OECD, the G20 has helped the OECD to buy-in developing countries, while the OECD has been creating a new institutional architecture for the developing countries to participate equally in initiatives on taxation, more precisely on BEPS project. From the perspective of governance process, the G20 creates political consensuses for the BEPS, while the OECD provides the feasible Action Plans for implementing the BEPS. (2016, 468)

The German G20 presidency of 2017 progressed the leadership role that the German and UK governments had previously demonstrated and added value by including Africa in discussions and actions around the global tax agenda (von Haldenwang and Schwab, 2017). The Hamburg summit's leaders' declaration reiterated their commitment to implementing the BEPS package and their pledge to 'continue our work for a globally fair and modern international tax system' (G20 Information Centre 2017a).

At the 2021 Rome summit, the G20 leaders supported an OECD-brokered reform to place a global 15 per cent minimum tax on multinationals by 2023, subject to approval in national legislatures, with a goal of creating 'a more stable and fairer international tax system'. Several high-profile examples, such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google, basing their operations in low-tax countries had raised the profile of the issue.⁶⁹

3.7 SUMMARY

Managing the global economy is the G20's core business. Over seventeen summits, it was born as a crisis committee out of financial crises, declared itself the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation', sought to address specific issues of reforming the IFIs, taxation and trade *inter alia*, and with the Covid-19 pandemic, returned to its role of a crisis committee, although with less success than had been the case at its outset. At first blush, the early summits were marked by a palpable sense of purpose and internationalism, which was embodied by leaders like Gordon Brown, in response

to the GFC. Although it was hoped that this normative impulse would trump national interests, even if only for a short time, it was not long before domestic pressures and narrow self-interest came into stark relief, sometimes in counter-intuitive ways.

Common or divergent positions rarely map onto the traditional and newly formed subgroupings within the G20, whether they be based on the G7 or BRICS distinction that was evident with the upgrading of the G20 to the leaders' level and the arrival of emerging economies at the top table of global summity. Rather than subgroup membership or geographical propinquity, the perspectives and positions of individual G20 members have mostly been shaped by domestic politics. Take the G7 as an example. As demonstrated above, Luckhurst has highlighted divisions at the height of the GFC, and how

the main proposals at the April 2009 London Summit of the G20 originated from two bilateral alliances: the Franco-German proposals for an enhanced international regulatory framework, which took shape in the form of the FSB; and Anglo-US proposals for a coordinated international fiscal stimulus strategy, with countries contributing US\$1.1 trillion primarily to augment the financial resources of the IMF. (2012, 756)

Looking beyond the G7, Schirm has also demonstrated how responses to specific issues undercut and transgressed traditional distinctions within the G20. For example, US demands that the G20 continue large-scale economic stimulus packages were aimed as much at fellow G7 members of Germany and Japan as at China. Both Germany and Brazil were critical of the loose fiscal position of the US because of domestic factors and traditional attitudes and economic practices (2013, 698–699). Schirm has also explored currency manipulation and the impact of undervaluation on trade competitiveness, demonstrating how the US was critical of China's policies but in turn found itself criticized by Germany and Brazil (2013, 701–702). These two countries were allied in their criticisms of the US as well as China as a result of domestic factors, as had been the case in their concerns over US stimulus packages. Again, it appears that the coherence of traditional and newly formed subgroups could be easily undermined by domestic politics.

Kalinowski has identified an alternative way of cutting the G20 cake that highlights three constituencies with differing positions on macroeconomic issues and financial governance shaped by domestic pressures and their differing forms of capitalism: (1) the US, which demanded strong stimulus packages within the G20, favoured open markets for the most part and sought to maintain the global role of the dollar; (2) the EU, which unenthusiastically followed the US lead on stimulus, favoured open markets for the most part and sought to stabilize the euro; and (3) East Asia, namely China, Japan and South Korea, which actively followed the US lead on stimulus, favoured more

regulation and were willing to manipulate currencies to their advantage (2019, 25). However, conflict within each subgroup is also evident, particularly in East Asia but even on occasion in the EU, although it has managed for the most part to resolve country-specific differences and speak with a single voice (Moschella and Quaglia 2016).

This messy and variable geometry of shifting alliances and divisions will emerge in the chapters that follow, both in terms of disagreement and also in cooperation across the range of other agenda items that the G20 came to address. This is also evident in the domestic reception of global summitry, as explored in Chapter 7. Chapter 8, the final chapter, will bring together this wide range of perspectives, behaviours and experiences on a country-by-country basis, loosely based around subgroups within the G20.

NOTES

1. *The Financial Times*, 14 November 2008.
2. *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 2008.
3. *The Irish Times*, 15 November 2008.
4. *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 14 November 2008.
5. *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 2008.
6. *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 12 November 2008.
7. *The Globe and Mail*, 15 November 2008.
8. *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 4 November 2008.
9. *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 12 November 2008.
10. *The Financial Times*, 4 November 2008; *The Irish Times*, 5 November 2008.
11. *The Financial Times*, 10 November 2008.
12. *The Financial Times*, 8 November 2008; *API*, 10 November 2008; *The Globe and Mail*, 15 November 2008.
13. *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 2008.
14. *Agence France-Presse*, 5 November 2008; *CBC*, 6 November 2008.
15. *The Global and Mail*, 15 November 2008.
16. *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 2008.
17. *Agence France-Presse*, 13 November 2008.
18. *Agence France-Presse*, 7 November 2008.
19. *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 2008.
20. *Xinhua*, 6 November 2008.
21. *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 2008.
22. *TendersInfo*, 10 November 2008.
23. *Agence France-Presse*, 11 November 2008.
24. *The Age*, 14 November 2008.
25. *The Financial Times*, 13 November 2008.
26. *Agence France-Presse*, 15 November 2008.
27. *The Sunday Times*, 29 March 2009.
28. *The Sunday Times*, 29 March 2009.
29. *Australian Financial Review*, 16 March 2009.
30. *Xinhua*, 29 March 2009.
31. *Xinhua*, 31 March 2009.

32. *Xinhua*, 29 March 2009.
33. *BBC Monitoring Service*, 26 March 2009.
34. *Xinhua*, 31 March 2009.
35. *Xinhua*, 1 April 2009.
36. *Xinhua*, 2 April 2009.
37. *The Sunday Times*, 29 March 2009.
38. *Colombo Times*, 24 September 2009.
39. *The Independent*, 25 September 2009.
40. *Xinhua*, 28 September 2009.
41. *Agence France-Presse*, 24 September 2009.
42. *The Guardian*, 24 September 2009.
43. *Xinhua*, 26 September 2009.
44. *States News Service*, 23 June 2010.
45. *Canwest News Service*, 27 June 2010.
46. *Xinhua*, 22 June 2010.
47. *The Korea Times*, 1 September 2010.
48. *Press Association*, 19 June 2012.
49. *Agence France-Presse*, 13 November 2008.
50. *Agence France Presse*, 2 November 2008.
51. *API*, 10 November 2008.
52. *The Financial Times*, 13 November 2008.
53. *Xinhua*, 6 November 2008.
54. *Xinhua*, 31 March 2009.
55. *The New York Times*, 24 October 2010.
56. *Xinhua*, 23 September 2009.
57. *The Canadian Press*, 24 September 2009.
58. *Xinhua*, 27 June 2010.
59. *Xinhua*, 10 November 2010.
60. *Xinhua*, 10 November 2010.
61. *Xinhua*, 12 November 2010.
62. *AAP Newsfeed*, 14 November 2008.
63. *The Guardian*, 7 November 2008.
64. *The Guardian*, 11 November 2008.
65. *Xinhua*, 29 March 2009.
66. *Xinhua*, 29 March 2009.
67. *The Sunday Times*, 29 March 2009.
68. *The Straits Times*, 19 November 2018.
69. *The Guardian*, 1 November 2021.

4. Sustainable development

4.1 OVERVIEW

Whether the G20 has been successful in engaging with sustainable development as an issue and whether it should even be on the G20's agenda are moot questions. As Robin Davies, Australia's representative on the G20's working group on development when it was established in 2010, wrote: '... the G20's achievements under its development agenda appear distinctly modest, sometimes random, and at best marginal ... for the most part, they could have as easily have been produced in a G20-less world' (2015, 150–151). In a similar vein, Homi Kharas pertinently asked, '[w]hy should a global steering committee care about development' (2011, 165), especially in such a diverse forum of countries promoting a diverse range of developmental paradigms. Kharas's answer is threefold. Pragmatically, the G20's emphasis on 'strong, sustainable and balanced growth' inevitably requires the members of the G20 and the developing world to engage with each other. Morally, the G20 was compelled to engage with development, in the same way that the G7/8 was compelled. This moral compunction resonated with the strongly held faith of Gordon Brown, one of the key influencers in the initial years of the leaders' G20, and extended more broadly: 'One could also assume that in the G20, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India and South Africa carry a moral responsibility to voice the needs and priorities of vulnerable populations and to push for development effectiveness for less developed countries' (Villanueva Ulfgard and Vega 2019, 631).

Strategically, placing a longer-term issue on the G20's agenda gave it a future *raison d'être* that transcended the GFC and its role as a crisis committee. In short, '[the G20] has the moral duty and resources to combat poverty, reduce inequality, and set the world on the path to sustainable development' (Lesage and Wouters 2022, 1).

At the same time, the G20's emergence and evolution mirror important shifts in debates and policies surrounding sustainable development. Although the G20 mirrors the G7/8 in many ways, the former's engagement with development differed significantly in that the latter focused largely on Africa as exemplified by the 2005 Gleneagles summit. At the same time, although the GFC led to the upgrading of the G20, it also presented a considerable risk to

the achievement of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) a global partnership for development. The MDGs placed the emphasis on human capital, infrastructure and human rights, whether they be social, economic or political. Each goal had a number of targets, twenty-one in total, and 2015 was the deadline for achieving them.

The other watershed event was the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 and the seventeen SDGs outlined therein. The SDGs are seventeen overarching goals, each containing a number of targets, 169 in total, to be achieved by 2030: (1) end poverty in all its forms everywhere; (2) end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; (3) ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; (4) ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; (5) achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; (6) ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all; (7) ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; (8) promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; (9) build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; (10) reduce inequality within and among countries; (11) make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; (12) ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; (13) take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; (14) conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development; (15) protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss; (16) promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; and (17) strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. So, in short, there are a number of compelling reasons why the G20 should engage with sustainable development, from the moral to the pragmatic, and from the strategic to the operational.

4.2 THE G20 AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The G20 first began to address the issues of poverty reduction, development assistance and the MDGs in its previous life as a meeting of finance ministers

and central bank governors in 2003 when they met in Morelia, Mexico (Cooper and Thakur 2013, 45). By 2008 and the upgrading of the G20 to the role of a crisis committee at the Washington summit, attention was firmly focused on addressing the GFC. Nevertheless, some leaders sought to draw attention to the perspectives of developing countries. In particular, the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, asserted that emerging markets and developing countries ‘were not the cause of this crisis, but they are amongst the worst affected victims’ (Sachdeva 2022, 85). Thereafter, Singh assumed the role of spokesperson for developing countries, ensuring that their voice was not lost in the middle of the GFC and backing up words with concrete proposals and financial contributions (Sachdeva 2022, 90–94). In the end, the leader’s declaration that came out of the Washington summit highlighted these concerns and the central importance of the MDGs:

We are mindful of the impact of the current crisis on developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable. We reaffirm the importance of the MDGs, the development assistance commitments we have made, and urge both developed and emerging economies to undertake commitments consistent with their capacities and roles in the global economy. In this regard, we reaffirm the development principles agreed at the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, which emphasized country ownership and mobilizing all sources of financing for development. (G20 Information Centre 2008b)

The declaration also highlighted the status of developing economies within IFIs and pledged to increase their voice and representation over the medium term. Some members sought to raise the profile of this issue within the G20 at this early stage while it was still in crisis mode responding to the GFC. For example, the EU was vocal in seeking a place for development within any new global financial architecture. Seeking to establish a G20 consensus on development, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel announced ahead of the Washington summit that ‘[t]he G20 must also make it one of its central priorities to address poverty’.¹

The subsequent 2009 London summit was still chiefly focused on the GFC but declared that the G20 should ‘recognise that the current crisis has a disproportionate impact on the vulnerable in the poorest countries and recognise our collective responsibility to mitigate the social impact of the crisis to minimise long-lasting damage to global potential’, before then proceeding to make statements similar to the Washington summit as regards commitments to the MDGs and strengthening IFIs to ensure capital flows to developing countries and emerging economies (G20 Information Centre 2009a).

It was not long after the Washington and London summits that a series of G20 hosts were able to move the G20 away from its role as a global crisis committee and place sustainable development on the agenda in a more

substantial manner. Ostensibly this appeared to be motivated by a desire to bolster the G20's relevance, as the GFC abated, as well as its legitimacy, as its selective membership came into question (Fues and Wolff 2010, 1). The 2009 Pittsburgh summit began this transition by placing the emphasis on macro-economic coordination, declaring itself to be the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation' and launching the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, which envisioned development playing a central role therein (G20 Information Centre 2009a). South Korea, in particular, had been pressing for the inclusion of development on the G20's agenda for some years and President Lee Myung-bak stated ahead of this summit that 'the G20 leaders should pay special attention to the needs and causes of emerging and developing countries ... The G20 should also continue to try to further increase the voice and representation of the emerging and developing world, to reflect global economic reality more closely' (G20 Information Centre 2009b).

2010 was a pivotal year when, under the Canadian and South Korean co-presidencies, development first received serious treatment. Taking place immediately after the similarly Canadian-hosted G8 summit with a strong focus on the MDGs and specifically maternal, newborn and child health, the antepenultimate paragraph in the Toronto summit declaration established the Development Working Group (DWG), which was chaired initially by South Korea and South Africa:

Narrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are integral to our broader objective of achieving strong, sustainable and balanced growth and ensuring a more robust and resilient global economy for all. In this regard, we agree to establish a Working Group on Development and mandate it to elaborate, consistent with the G20's focus on measures to promote economic growth and resilience, a development agenda and MYAPs to be adopted at the Seoul summit. (G20 Information Centre 2010c)

Later that year, and in response to this mandate, the Seoul summit leaders' declaration showcased the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth, its aims, and the emphasis on concrete measures as summarized in the MYAP on Development supported by the OECD (G20 Information Centre 2010d). The Seoul summit document highlighted six principles upon which the Seoul Development Consensus and the MYAP were based in the support of resilient and shared growth:

- First, an enduring and meaningful reduction in poverty cannot be achieved without inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth, while the provision of ODA, as well as the mobilization of all other sources of financing, remain essential to the development of most LICs [low-income countries].
- Second, we recognize that while there are common factors, there is no single formula for development success. We must therefore engage other developing

countries as partners, respecting national ownership of a country's policies as the most important determinant of its successful development, thereby helping to ensure strong, responsible, accountable and transparent development partnerships between the G20 and LICs.

- Third, our actions must prioritize global or regional systemic issues that call for collective action and have the potential for transformative impact.
- Fourth, we recognize the critical role of the private sector to create jobs and wealth, and the need for a policy environment that supports sustainable private sector-led investment and growth.
- Fifth, we will maximize our value-added and complement the development efforts of other key players by focusing on areas where the G20 has a comparative advantage or could add momentum.
- And finally, we will focus on tangible outcomes of significant impact that remove blockages to improving growth prospects in developing countries, especially LICs. (G20 Information Centre 2010e)

The Seoul summit document also outlined nine key pillars of the Seoul Development Consensus 'where we believe actions are necessary to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in developing countries' (G20 Information Centre 2010a). Building on these pillars, the MYAP outlined more detailed actions and mechanisms to address these bottlenecks and, soon thereafter, chairs and facilitators were assigned. They included: (1) infrastructure – South Korea, France and the US); (2) private investment and job creation – Germany and Saudi Arabia; (3) human resource development (HRD) – South Korea and Argentina; (4) trade – Argentina, the EU and the UK; (5) financial inclusion – an expert group; (6) growth with resilience – Australia, Indonesia, and Italy; (7) food security – Brazil, Canada, France and Japan; (8) domestic resource mobilization (DRM) (South Africa and Spain); and (9) knowledge sharing – South Korea and Mexico (G20 Information Centre 2010e; Zondi 2013, 80–81). However, Davies (2015) argues that out of the original nine, three have received most attention, namely food security, infrastructure and financial inclusion.

This was an important initiative in and of itself for the South Korean government and President Lee, who were keen to share Korea's developmental experience. Il SaKong, the Korean G20 sherpa, explained the Korean presidency's choice of agenda items: 'By bringing up the development issue, South Korea is playing a pivotal role in bridging emerging economies and advanced nations. As we still belong to the emerging economies' side group but are now an OECD member, we know better than any other country what development is.'²² At the same time South Korea grasped the opportunity to also bolster the G20's position in global governance moving forward and South Korea's position therein (Lesage and Wouters 2022). However, this positive spin that South Korea placed on its contribution to the G20's treatment of development

was not universally accepted and some analysts argued that it only represented a highly selective and sanitized version of its own development:

There is no doubt that scholars, civil society groups and government officials from developing countries can learn a lot from Korea's development successes but also from the failures and costs of rapid industrialization. However, it is important that experts from developing countries study Korean development from their own perspective and not rely on a selective and biased interpretation presented to them by the Korean government. The latter understandably stresses those aspects of the Korean development model that are in line with the interests of the powerful Korean export industry and Korean multinationals. (Kalinowski 2010, 87)

Other analysts have also been critical of the Seoul Consensus for failing to provide a genuine alternative to the growth-focused, neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus propagated by Europe, North America and the IFIs (McConnell 2010; Cammack 2012; Zondi 2013). Zondi criticizes the Seoul Development Consensus for prioritizing growth and private-sector development, while omitting social and human development from the six principles and nine pillars outlined above, and ignoring the MDGs. The result was that '[l]ike the Washington Consensus, the Seoul Declaration springs from an absolute faith in economic growth as a cure-all for the ills of the global socio-economy' (2013, 82). Yet the various documents that came out of the Seoul summit, from the leaders' declaration to the Seoul summit document to the Seoul Development Consensus and MYAP, made multiple references to the MDGs. Zondi's conclusion provides a more reasonable assessment, namely that the Seoul Development Consensus was ultimately a compromise between the countries most closely involved in its conception – South Korea, South Africa and Türkiye – and then mediated through the diversity of opinion and experience within the G20. In short, it was always likely to be a curate's egg. It is true that 'the new consensus merely modifies old ideas and paradigms in the hope that, if championed by a more legitimate institution like the G20, it would be broadly embraced' (Zondi 2013, 79). However, this is not an insubstantial achievement. Although hardly radical, these principles and areas of action did shift the focus of development away from the simple provision of financial contributions. Moreover, as Cherry and Dobson (2012) have explored in their evaluation of the 2010 Seoul summit, as the first non-G8 country to assume the G20 presidency, the South Korean hosts took a pragmatic approach in terms of striking a balance between the legacy issues that they were obliged to address and the new issues that they wanted to place on the G20's agenda and the future direction they wanted the summit to take. So, instead of adding more heavyweight issues, such as climate change, the South Korean government emphasized growth-oriented development as one of a number of its signature initiatives that it was likely to make progress on. It then made deliberate efforts

to distinguish the Seoul Development Consensus from other multilateral efforts and development paradigms such as the Washington Consensus, the MDGs or the G8's engagement with the issue, with its focus on aid (Davies 2015, 150). Ultimately, politics as the art of the possible prevailed.

Since then, the G20's efforts in the field of development have been directed through its Development Working Group (DWG), which is co-organized by the OECD and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and engages a number of other global and regional intergovernmental organizations, like the AU, as well as G20 and non-G20 members. The DWG met twice in 2011 and presented its first annual report at the 2011 Cannes summit. Although the French presidency's attention was focused on the Eurozone crisis and the threat to global recovery, it was reported at Cannes that the group had started implementing the MYAP by 'taking both individual and collective actions along two avenues: setting the foundations for strong and balanced growth and building resilience' (G20 Information Centre 2011c).

In advocating sustainable and equitable development paths as well as assisting the disadvantaged, Mexico was one of the original and vocal supporters of placing development on the G20's agenda. By 2012, and its assumption of the presidency, Mexico was able to contribute to the development agenda by emphasizing the specific importance of investing in infrastructure, reconceptualizing 'green growth' through the lens of development and food security. However, reiterating the need to conclude the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade talks was inevitably ineffective (G20 Information Centre 2012a). The leaders also released a DWG progress report, which did little apart from reinforce the emphasis on inclusive green growth, infrastructure and food security and confirm the G20's role as 'a relevant coordination forum for international economic cooperation' (G20 Information Centre 2012b).

The 2013 St Petersburg Development Outlook expanded the remit of the G20 in terms of its engagement with development by adding the adjectives 'inclusive' and 'resilient' to the mantra of strong, sustainable and balanced growth. By 2013, some observers were doubting the centrality, focus and effectiveness of the DWG as well as how seriously it was being taken within the G20 (Kharas 2014a, 179). However, 2013 also saw a three-year review of the nine priority areas that dropped the social protection elements of growth with resilience, knowledge sharing, trade, private investment and job creation and highlighted five priority areas: infrastructure, DRM, financial inclusion and remittances, food security and nutrition, and HRD (G20 Information Centre 2013a). These five priority areas provide a loose structure for the remainder of this chapter. In the following year, the Australian presidency continued this review and within the five priority areas adopted a 3+2 approach by giving greater priority to infrastructure, financial inclusion and DRM, as issues that could be incorporated into the G20's wider agenda, over food security and

HRD. It also agreed to an Accountability Framework and produced an Annual Progress Report to track progress on G20 commitments.

Under the G20 presidency of Türkiye in 2015, the G20 adopted the Low-Income Countries Development Framework. More significantly, 2015 also saw the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) affirm the SDGs and the goal of 2030 for their achievement. In many ways, there appeared to be a high degree of overlap between the G20's development agenda up to this point and the SDGs, as well as potential synergy moving forward. At least on paper, the two were happy bedfellows:

The G20 has called for economic growth that is 'inclusive and resilient' as well as strong, sustainable and balanced. Similarly, the post-2015 development agenda is aimed at finding a set of development goals that would be inclusive, transformative and sustainable. Both offer a new commitment to multilateralism in the course of enabling all individuals to grow to their full potential while avoiding environmental threats. (Kharas 2014b)

However, Kharas also points to the differing approaches between the G20, as an exclusive club focused on economic growth, and the UN, as an inclusive organization focused on poverty reduction, especially in LICs. This was an important consideration the following year when China assumed the G20 presidency. As seen in other issue-areas where the G20 and UN's roles overlap, 'China believes that the realization of these goals [SDGs] requires the UN to take the lead' (Gao and Wouters 2022, 74). At the same time, China has traditionally also assumed the role of leader of the developing world, taking the opportunity to promote its own developmental model. Thus, the emphasis given to infrastructure within the Seoul Development Consensus and thereafter resonated with China's priorities at home and internationally. So, under China's presidency, the G20's engagement with development evolved with the adoption of an Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (G20 Information Centre 2016a). This Action Plan was intended to be 'a policy framework to align the G20 Agenda with the 2030 Agenda – and ultimately aimed at contributing to global efforts to achieve all 17 SDGs by 2030' (OECD 2019). Despite this overlap of interest and leadership during the Chinese G20 presidency of 2016, the well-worn limitations and shortcomings of the G20 around diversity and effectiveness, as well as the position of the DWG within the G20's organizational structure, mean that it will not replace the central role of the UN in Chinese eyes any time soon unless substantial reforms take place (Gao and Wouters, 2022, 78–81).

The G20 specifically and multilateralism in general then hit choppy waters with the advent of the Trump presidency. However, as Lesage and Wouters (2022) demonstrate, the G20's treatment of development avoided the high-profile disengagement associated with the disrupter-in-chief on other

global governance challenges and instead developed incrementally during this difficult period. The 2017 Hamburg summit was intended from the outset to promote the 2030 Agenda and although not seen as a ‘great breakthrough for sustainable development’, provided some opportunities and concrete outcomes (Scholz and Brandi 2017, 156). The G20 published an update on the progress with the Action Plan (G20 Information Centre 2017b), and the DWG adopted the Voluntary Peer Learning Mechanism (VPLM) to foster knowledge-sharing around the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that would support individual countries’ progress towards its implementation. The German presidency proposed this initiative, which was supported by Mexico in particular, as seen in the active and inclusive participation of the Mexican Agency of International Cooperation for Development in its working groups, contributing to the creation of a governance network on this issue (Villanueva Ulfsgard and Vega 2019, 635–636). The German presidency also placed cooperation with Africa on the agenda of its Finance Track, thereby raising its profile, and introduced the Compact with Africa, whereby individual African countries would establish agreements with G20 countries to enhance the private sector investment environment (Leininger 2017, 197).

The environment worsened thereafter with Covid-19, and in the same way that the GFC threatened to derail progress towards the MDGs, as mentioned above, the global pandemic impacted negatively on the already delayed progress towards the achievement of the SDGs by 2030 (Lesage and Wouters 2022). The Saudi G20 presidency of 2020 was severely disrupted and produced little in terms of concrete outcomes in sustainable development and other challenges. However, the following year at the Rome G20 in 2021, and with the return of the US to its international responsibilities under the Biden administration, G20 leaders welcomed the IMF’s implementation of a reallocation of SDRs, which resulted in the creation of US\$650 billion of additional reserves for IMF members. They pledged US\$45 billion of voluntary contributions from these reserves to be targeted towards the neediest countries and set a new target of US\$100 billion (G20 Information Centre 2021a).³

This potted history of the G20’s engagement with sustainable development highlights many specific issues that cut across the thematical chapters of this book. So, trade could be dealt with here rather than in the previous chapter. Food security is included below in this chapter when it could be incorporated into Chapter 6. In an attempt to cut through this inevitable blurring of lines, the remainder of this chapter is structured around the five priorities outlined above: infrastructure investment, DRM, financial inclusion, food security and HRD.

However, the Achilles heel in the organization of this chapter is that health does not feature strongly. To an extent this is more a fault of the G20, as its treatment of health has not been of central importance generally, or included

within its treatment of sustainable development, except for including nutrition within its focus on food security (Kirton et al. 2014). The 2014 Brisbane summit was the first to issue a dedicated statement on a global health issue in the form of the G20 Leaders' Brisbane Statement on Ebola, expressing concern and calling for coordinated action (G20 Information Centre 2014a). Global health was given greater prominence as a result of the German presidency establishing the first-ever ministerial meeting of health ministers in Berlin in May 2017. Although this development was met with both praise and criticism (McBride et al. 2019, 2), thereafter each G20 host has continued with these ministerial meetings. As regards SDG-3 of ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages, the G20 has made reference to some of the thirteen targets, such as achieving universal health coverage and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable medicines and vaccines, supporting the research and development of vaccines and medicines for communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, increasing the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, as well as strengthening the early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks. However, the G20 has failed to mention many of the targets, including *inter alia* maternal health, child health, mental health, and sexual and reproductive health (McBride et al. 2019, 7).

The Covid-19 pandemic inevitably dominated the agenda of the Saudi presidency in 2020. The immediate impact of the pandemic was on the conduct of summitry as it shifted online for the Riyadh summit of November 2020. Naylor (2020) has convincingly explored the impact of virtual diplomacy on a process that is built on informality and interpersonal relationships. Several other factors stymied the chances of the G20 coordinating an immediate response to the pandemic, including the Trump administration's rejection of multilateralism, and tensions resulting from the US–China trade war (Nelson 2020, 9). The G20 leaders soon returned to in-person meetings without Trump from the Rome summit of October 2021 onwards, with a focus on supporting the UN-backed COVAX programme, although it was slow to roll out vaccine programmes in developing countries. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres captured the challenge in the following damning terms:

On the one hand, we see the vaccines developed in record time – a victory of science and human ingenuity. On the other hand, we see that triumph undone by the tragedy of a lack of political will, selfishness and mistrust. A surplus in some countries. Empty shelves in others. This is a moral indictment of the state of our world. It is an obscenity. We passed the science test. But we are getting an F in Ethics. (UNGA 2021)

The G20 health ministers stressed the importance of multilateralism in addressing this challenge and facilitating access to vaccines when they met a month before the leaders. Health received second billing after the global economy in the leaders' declaration the following month. This included a commitment to work towards the WHO's goal of fully vaccinating at least 40 per cent of the population in every country by the end of 2021 and 70 per cent by mid 2022 by boosting the supply of vaccines and essential medical products and inputs in developing countries as well as removing relevant supply and financing constraints. The G20 leaders tasked their health ministers with monitoring progress and identifying ways to accelerate the take-up of vaccinations globally. By the end of 2022 and Indonesia's G20 presidency, the joint meeting of finance and health ministers welcomed increasing vaccination rates but noted that they remained 'far short' of the WHO vaccination target of 70 per cent (G20 Information Centre 2022b). The leaders' declaration that came out of the Bali summit namechecked Covid-19 in its preamble but relegated the issue down the agenda as the conflict in Ukraine, food and energy security, and climate change took top billing (G20 Information Centre 2022a).

4.3 INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT

The scale of opportunities in infrastructure investment has often been demonstrated by the OECD's estimation that infrastructure requirements up to 2030 total US\$50 trillion, with much of the demand in Asia (Della Croce 2011, 27). It is therefore no surprise that infrastructure investment in developing countries and emerging economies was identified as an opportunity for the G20 to drive global growth from its first meeting. For example, Singh's advocacy was evident at the Washington summit around the role of infrastructure investment in the G20's response to the GFC and as a driver of economic growth, although his words largely fell on deaf ears until the 2010 Seoul summit when the South Korean presidency placed it on the agenda with the support of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia and South Africa (Chin and Zhu 2022, 163–166). However, according to Elek (2011), the G20's High-Level Panel on Infrastructure, established in 2010 to provide practical guidance and innovative ideas to inform its approach to infrastructure investment, was operating too narrowly in terms of its geographical remit and needed to refocus its attention to more viable projects.

The next high-profile development within the G20's treatment of infrastructure was the establishment of the G20 Infrastructure Hub as part of Australia's 2014 presidency. The hub was a key initiative of the Australian government and found its origins in a B20 proposal to address global growth and employment. To set it apart from other initiatives, the hub was initially established to operate for only four years, to avoid it becoming a permanent institution; however,

at the time of writing, it is still in operation. It is headquartered in Sydney with the Australian government providing the lion's share of US\$10 million funding per annum through to 2018 (Davies 2015, 154). The Australian prime minister, Tony Abbott, was personally associated with the initiative, having promoted himself before his election as the 'infrastructure prime minister'.⁴ A general criticism of the approach to infrastructure projects that appeared early in discussions as part of Australia's presidency was 'a sense that every country was reinventing the wheel' and promoting its own 'best practices' when they were not necessarily globally transferable.⁵ So, Abbott stressed that the hub would not be 'another international bureaucracy' and would work 'like a clearing house for ideas on raising commercial funds for new public works, such as roads and railways, [and] cut through red tape and close the "information gap" between investors and infrastructure projects in G20 states'.⁶ In contrast, at the same time Abbott conceived of the hub as a vehicle to promote Australia's 'quite innovative approach to infrastructure'.⁷ In addition, the proposal was also motivated by, and conceived as contributing to, Australia's other headline initiative of increasing growth by 2 per cent within five years. Although approved by the G20 by the time of the Brisbane summit in November 2014 and welcomed by international and regional multilateral development banks, there was a difference of opinion between the US, UK and Japan on the one hand, who were supportive, and India and France on the other hand, who were concerned that it could overlap and duplicate the work of the World Bank. Only a few weeks prior to Brisbane, the World Bank had announced its Global Infrastructure Facility with a similar mandate to Abbott's initiative. In the same month, China announced its new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which opened for business at the beginning of 2016. The result was a confusing flurry of competing initiatives and uncoordinated activity towards the end of 2014 in the field of infrastructure.

The AU's permanent membership of the G20 was announced in September 2023. However, as the only African country represented in the G20, South Africa occupied an important position between 2008 and 2022. As articulated by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Luwellyn Landers, South Africa's participation at the G20 is guided by its four strategic foreign policy pillars:

- (1) advancing its national interest to attain domestic objectives;
- (2) enhancing the African agenda and promoting Africa's sustainable development;
- (3) influencing the global multilateral architecture; and
- (4) advancing the agenda of the South through strengthening South–South cooperation and North–South Dialogue.⁸

To this end, South Africa's role at the G20 has often been to mainstream the development agenda within the G20 and focus other countries' attention on Africa's development broadly speaking, but also on specific issues such as placing the Compact with Africa under the Finance Track (as mentioned above), #eSkillsforGirls and Rural Youth Development initiatives, and the G20's prioritization of addressing illicit financial flows as a development issue for Africa. As regards infrastructure investment, President Jacob Zuma appealed to other G20 leaders at Brisbane to accelerate infrastructure investment in Africa especially, in order to sustain global growth, help lift intra-Africa trade and contribute towards industrialization and job creation in high-value sectors. South Africa was able to use the regular BRICS meeting on the sidelines of the G20 to secure the support of Brazil, Russia, India and China.⁹

A number of other countries have made considerable efforts to include infrastructure development on the G20's agenda, including Argentina, who made it one of the three priorities of its presidency in 2018. As regards the specific issue of an FTT to support development initiatives, France and Germany have been two of the more vocal advocates, whereas South Korea has been against it.

Distinct country-specific approaches to infrastructure investment are also apparent within the G20, although hard-nosed national interest and deeper rivalries are never far from the surface. China's own initiatives for promoting infrastructure investment have received the lion's share of attention, whether it be the AIIB, New Development Bank, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In some ways, these Chinese initiatives have the same intention as the more established development banks and initiatives, like the Global Infrastructure Hub, that seek to mobilize private-sector funding and match it to public works. However, one of China's objectives is that they will operate on an equal footing to the Western-dominated institutions. In addition, when the Chinese G20 presidency sought to place Africa predominantly on its agenda in 2016, this was seen to be largely motivated by its economic presence on the continent and the centrality of the BRI to its overall foreign policy (Leininger 2017, 198). Under the Japanese presidency, in 2019, the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment were adopted. These six overarching principles and seventeen sub-principles were intended to reflect the G20's common strategic direction in terms of quality infrastructure investment and were adopted unanimously at Osaka; however, they were voluntary and non-binding. Within Japanese governmental discourse, quality infrastructure investment has often been thinly disguised shorthand for criticism of China's foreign investment and the specific infrastructure initiatives mentioned above. Aizawa (2020, 5) notes this rivalry in casual terms, saying that '[s]ome joke that Japan sees quality infrastructure as anything not built by the Chinese', but also more seriously that 'infrastructure is part of Japan's strategy to ensure security in the

Asia-Pacific region in the face of an increasingly bellicose Chinese presence'. This was also reflected in Japan's G7 presidency in 2016 (Dobson 2016), as well as its support for what came to be known as the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which was agreed and rolled out during the 2021 UK presidency and the 2022 German presidency.

In this context, Chin and Zhu draw some 'sobering' conclusions in terms of the implications for the G20's engagement with infrastructure investment and place the blame firmly on the G7 countries in resisting BRICS and Asian proposals and according preference to their own initiatives mentioned above:

The deeper reality is that the story of infrastructure in the G20 process involves a lack of serious commitment from key member states of the G20 club, specifically the Group of Seven (G7) nations, to use the G20 process as a forum for dealing with infrastructure investment. The nations of the BRICS grouping and Asian members of the G20 initially showed some interest in addressing the infrastructure needs of the developing world within the G20. However, this interest was not shared by the bloc of advanced economies. When some attention was given to infrastructure in the early phase of the G20 leaders meetings, due to the advocacy of the BRICS and Asian nations, infrastructure was, nonetheless, kept low on the agenda of the early G20 summits. The area has been saddled with a low level of ambition ever since. There were, and continue to be, no tangible G20 investment commitments on infrastructure. The G20 joint statements on infrastructure were left lacking in their boldness, collective vision, and group effort. (Chin and Zhu 2022, 160)

4.4 DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

The role that the G20 can play in DRM was neatly encapsulated by the president of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, when speaking in September 2019 at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 (G77) of 134 developing nations within the UN. He stressed that it was counterproductive to highlight the importance of DRM in developing countries without addressing the gap in global governance that allows for international loopholes that impede these countries' ability to retain a large proportion of the resources.¹⁰ The disappearance or artificial shifting of corporate profits to low or no-tax environments, or BEPS as mentioned in the previous chapter, is estimated to result in the annual loss of between US\$100 and US\$240 billion, or 4 to 10 per cent of global corporate income tax revenues. At the same time, with the relative decline of official development assistance (ODA) as a source of financing development, and the principle that each country is responsible for its own development, the importance of managing domestic resources effectively has increased.

As discussed in Chapter 3, it was under the Mexican G20 presidency and with the active leadership of the German and UK governments that BEPS was taken up at the 2012 Los Cabos summit and the work of the OECD in this area

noted. The 2013 G20/OECD BEPS Action Plan identified fifteen actions to put an end to international tax avoidance, structured around three pillars: (1) coherence in domestic tax rules that relate to cross-border activities; (2) alignment of taxation with the location of economic activity and value creation; and (3) improving transparency and thereby certainty (OECD 2013). Despite the Australian presidency's 3+2 approach that emphasized DRM, and the OECD's presentation to G20 leaders at the 2014 Brisbane summit of sections of this Action Plan, the G20 only made a broad commitment to help LICs participate in and benefit from its efforts to address tax-base erosion within G20 countries through a range of toolkits and technical assistance in tax administration.

It was in the following year, at the 2015 Antalya summit, that the G20 leaders included the following paragraph in their communiqué:

To reach a globally fair and modern international tax system, we endorse the package of measures developed under the ambitious G20/OECD BEPS project. Widespread and consistent implementation will be critical in the effectiveness of the project, in particular as regards the exchange of information on cross-border tax rulings. We, therefore, strongly urge the timely implementation of the project and encourage all countries and jurisdictions, including developing ones, to participate. To monitor the implementation of the BEPS project globally, we call on the OECD to develop an inclusive framework by early 2016 with the involvement of interested non-G20 countries and jurisdictions which commit to implement the BEPS project, including developing economies, on an equal footing. (G20 Information Centre 2015a)

As is apparent from the language used in the communiqué, the recommendations of the BEPS project were the result of consensus and intended to be flexible, offering solutions to governments in closing the gaps in existing international tax rules. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the inclusive framework in 2016, the OECD proceeded to work with interested countries and jurisdictions to progress the BEPS project, and by the end of 2022 the framework included 142 members. The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (or BEPS Convention for short) was signed in 2017 and came into effect in 2018, providing a multilateral mechanism by which countries can respond to agreed measures while avoiding the time-consuming process of addressing a large number of bilateral treaties.

Thereafter, the focus of BEPS shifted to agreeing a consensus-based, long-term solution to the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy. The G20/OECD agreed a roadmap and programme of work around this issue between 2017 and 2020, within the inclusive framework, and released a 'blueprint' for a two-step approach in October 2020, which was finalized the following year and implemented during 2023. The two steps seek to: (1) 'ensure a fairer distribution of profits and taxing rights among countries

with respect to the largest multinational enterprises (MNEs)'; and (2) 'put a floor on tax competition on corporate income tax through the introduction of a global minimum corporate tax that countries can use to protect their tax bases' (OECD 2021). By the end of 2022, 138 countries had agreed to it.

Within the G20, the EU has highlighted DRM as a pillar of its 'Collect More, Spend Better' approach to supporting developing countries. To this end, it has been supportive of the G20/OECD activities in addressing BEPS while keen to encourage the participation of developing countries in these discussions and decisions. India also has a particular interest in BEPS and its fair and balanced implementation so as not to scare away investment and interest in the projected growth in its economy. It was able to voice its concerns as a member of the ad hoc group that helped develop the BEPS Convention.

4.5 FINANCIAL INCLUSION

Financial inclusion seeks to reach out to the unbanked population of the world so that it can access financial services. This in turn, it is argued, will impact on economic growth and employment as well as financial stability, all of which are of central concern to the G20. In addition, a number of G20 countries lead the world in terms of financial inclusion. According to BBVA Research's Multidimensional Index of Financial Inclusion, Brazil, Canada and South Korea are three of the four leading countries in the world in terms of financial inclusion. So, over time, the G20 has naturally given financial inclusion high priority and defined it as 'a state in which all working age adults have effective access to credit, savings, payments, and insurance from formal service providers'.¹¹

The G20 first highlighted financial inclusion at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit and followed up the following year when the nine principles for innovative financial inclusion were announced at the Toronto summit of June 2010. They included:

1. **Leadership:** Cultivate a broad-based government commitment to financial inclusion to help alleviate poverty.
2. **Diversity:** Implement policy approaches that promote competition and provide market-based incentives for delivery of sustainable financial access and usage of a broad range of affordable services (savings, credit, payments and transfers, insurance) as well as a diversity of service providers.
3. **Innovation:** Promote technological and institutional innovation as a means to expand financial system access and usage, including by addressing infrastructure weaknesses.
4. **Protection:** Encourage a comprehensive approach to consumer protection that recognises the roles of government, providers and consumers.
5. **Empowerment:** Develop financial literacy and financial capability.

6. **Cooperation:** Create an institutional environment with clear lines of accountability and co-ordination within government; and also encourage partnerships and direct consultation across government, business and other stakeholders.
7. **Knowledge:** Utilize improved data to make evidence based policy, measure progress, and consider an incremental “test and learn” approach acceptable to both regulator and service provider.
8. **Proportionality:** Build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate with the risks and benefits involved in such innovative products and services and is based on an understanding of the gaps and barriers in existing regulation.
9. **Framework:** Consider the following in the regulatory framework, reflecting international standards, national circumstances and support for a competitive landscape: an appropriate, flexible, risk-based Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime; conditions for the use of agents as a customer interface; a clear regulatory regime for electronically stored value; and market-based incentives to achieve the long-term goal of broad interoperability and interconnection. (G20 Information Centre 2010f)

Chief Executive Officer Alexia Latortue of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, the independent think tank dedicated to the issue of financial inclusion that worked with the G20, stated:

The G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion encourage policy makers to harness the potential of new approaches such as branchless banking to reach the more than 2.7 billion people globally who are unable to open a bank account, get insurance, or receive loans that would help them save for the future, and invest in their homes or businesses ... The G20 leaders’ backing will go a long way to encourage both policy makers and the private sector to be innovative yet prudent in their approach to reaching poor people around the world.¹²

Later in 2010 at the Seoul summit, the G20 announced a Financial Inclusion Action Plan (FIAP) and a month later launched the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPMI) (G20 Information Centre 2010b). This was intended to provide an inclusive platform for all G20 countries, interested non-G20 countries and a range of international organizations and relevant stakeholders to carry forward work on financial inclusion, including implementation of the FIAP, which was renewed in 2014, 2017 and 2020. It also worked to establish agreed financial inclusion indicators including *inter alia* the density of commercial banks, ATMs, and percentage of people over 15 with bank accounts or loans. The G20’s achievements lie in raising the profile of financial inclusion, shifting debates from why to how, and encouraging countries to develop policy goals to increase financial inclusion.¹³ Furthermore, access to financial services increased after the G20 began to engage the challenge, as seen in the 700 million people across the world who obtained an account for the first time between 2011 and 2014, thereby reducing the world’s unbanked population to 2 billion.

As part of this challenge, the G20 has also worked to reduce the cost of remittances. Under the French presidency, leaders pledged at the 2011 Cannes summit that: ‘We will work to reduce the average cost of transferring remittances from 10% to 5% by 2014, contributing to release an additional 15 billion USD per year for recipient families’ (G20 Information Centre 2011b).

However, it missed this target and had to reaffirm it at the 2014 Brisbane summit. Under the Mexican presidency, the G20 launched a Financial Inclusion Peer Learning Programme to enable countries to share their experiences of developing financial inclusion mechanisms and implementing strategies, and tasked the GPFII to identify the barriers preventing women and youth from gaining access to financial services and financial education.

Under the Chinese presidency the emphasis shifted to digital financial inclusion. As a result, the G20 developed a set of high-level principles to guide both G20 and non-G20 countries in this area. These 66 recommendations covered a range of subjects, from the use of digital technology to the promotion of a basic infrastructure for digital financial services, and were targeted at LICs. The G20 also revised their financial inclusion indicators to include digital financial services. In the Hangzhou communiqué, G20 leaders committed themselves to take ‘concrete actions to accelerate progress on all people’s access to finance’ (G20 Information Centre 2016b).¹⁴ The subsequent German and Argentinian presidencies continued this focus on digital financial inclusion. For example, the Argentinian government worked with the Inter-American Development Bank from 2016 to draft a financial inclusion strategy and promote measures to facilitate access to financial products and to improve financial education levels among the general public.¹⁵

At the outset of its presidency, Saudi Arabia continued the emphasis on digital financial inclusion, but especially with regard to women and young people, within its agenda.¹⁶ Although the advent of Covid-19 derailed the Saudi G20 presidency in many ways, it served to highlight the importance of financial inclusion in driving the post-pandemic recovery. With these factors in mind, the virtual Riyadh summit in November 2020 endorsed and welcomed the G20 High-Level Policy Guidelines on Digital Financial Inclusion for Youth, Women and SMEs (GPFII 2020a), as well as a revised 2020 G20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan to shape the work of the GPFII through to 2023 (GPFII 2020b).

4.6 FOOD SECURITY

After the 2009 Pittsburgh summit highlighted food security for the first time, the G20 established the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program under the administration of the World Bank (Kharas 2014a, 182). The following year’s G20 summit in Seoul then identified it as a priority area in the epony-

ious Development Agenda, calling on various agencies and organizations to explore policy options. However, it was under the French presidency that the issue was given prominence in response to the ongoing global food crisis. In a New Year speech that outlined his G20 priorities, President Nicolas Sarkozy sought to bring the G20 together by predicting that '[i]f we don't do anything we run the risk of food riots in the poorest countries and a very unfavourable effect on global economic growth. The day there are food riots, what country at the G20 table will say this does not concern them? I don't see a single one.'¹⁷ This led to the establishment of the first meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers, in Paris, from 22 to 23 June 2011. The following year's Mexican presidency continued with this innovation but it then fell into abeyance until 2015 and the G20 presidency of Türkiye. Thereafter, it became a regular feature in the calendar of annual G20 ministerial meetings. Thus, the G20's treatment of food security has partly been the result of the interest and commitment of a given year's presidency as well as the immediacy of food prices as an issue. In any case, as Warren (2018) demonstrates, within this process G20 ministers have on occasions 'forged links between agriculture and climate change and between agriculture, water scarcity, migration and political instability. They thus connected the economic, social, environmental and security dimensions of agriculture.'

Returning to their first meeting in Paris, the G20 agriculture ministers adopted an Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture (G20 Information Centre, 2011d), which was welcomed by the G20 leaders later that year at the Cannes summit. The leaders highlighted five specific objectives from the Action Plan that sought to combat food shortages and price volatility: (1) improving agricultural production and productivity; (2) increasing market information and transparency; (3) reducing the effects of price volatility for the most vulnerable; (4) strengthening international policy coordination; and (5) improving the functioning of agricultural commodity derivatives' markets (G20 Information Centre 2011e). Hajkovicz et al. (2012) were relatively optimistic as regards the effectiveness of achieving these objectives but argued that major innovations would be required, first and foremost 'a renewed recognition by the global community about the importance of the agricultural sector'. Some analysts have been much more critical of the G20's approach to food security, accusing it of adopting a narrow focus, ignoring broader structural issues and prioritizing the Eurozone crisis when the issue first appeared on its agenda (McLean-Dreyfus 2012; Edwards 2017).

Within this remit, a range of country-specific approaches to the issue of food security have been in evidence with one major cleavage being over whether rising prices should be addressed by increased food production or regulation.

Engelbrekt (2015, 543) captures the diversity of positions within the G20 and the resulting limitations:

Whereas the US and Brazil argue that price volatility only diminishes when markets produce adequate amounts of foodstuffs, India, China, and Argentina insist on harnessing national food reserves and domestic quota requirements to supply domestic markets. Amidst such disputes, France was in 2011 content to win support for a global database to better measure the level of food staples, along with a prohibition on export restrictions and taxes on World Food Program purchases for humanitarian purposes. In 2011 China put its considerable weight behind the French-led food security initiative ...

Picking up on Engelbrekt's final point, China not only supported the French initiative but has also demonstrated a leadership role in placing the issue of food security on the G20's agenda. Duggan and Naarajärvi (2015) have argued that China's motivations in assuming this role can be understood as an attempt to reclaim its traditional role as a leader of the developing world and to neutralize accusations of neocolonialist land grabbing in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, as China seeks to ensure the food security of its own population. This proactive engagement has shaped the global food security agenda, linking it to global economic recovery and focusing the G20's agenda more on issues of development than finance.

In 2012, Australia, Canada, Italy, the UK, the US and the Gates Foundation were instrumental in funding the AgResults initiative announced at the Los Cabos summit. According to its webpage, this US\$145 million fund 'uses pay-for-results prize competitions to incentivize, or "pull", the private sector to overcome agricultural market barriers by investing in innovative research and delivery solutions that improve the lives of smallholder farmers'. However, despite leading on this initiative both financially and conceptually, Australia failed to progress any concrete measures on food security when it assumed its presidency of the G20 in 2014. In fact, as mentioned above, among the five topic areas within the G20's development agenda of infrastructure, financial inclusion, DRM, food security and HRD, the Australian presidency prioritized the first three over the last two, and continued a review of the issue from the Russian presidency as to whether it should remain on the G20's agenda. The modest outcomes of Brisbane were that food security survived the review and was not removed. At the same time, the leaders established a G20 Food Security and Nutrition Network to support the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), which was launched as part of the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture mentioned above, and sought to make international markets for agricultural commodities more effective by improving market information and transparency.

It has been argued that food and agriculture became important G20 agenda items thanks to Turkish and German leadership during their respective presidencies of 2015 and 2017 (Muhanna no date). On the one hand, the 2015 Antalya summit saw the G20 adopt an Action Plan on Food Security and Sustainable Food Systems that sought to complement the SDGs adopted the same year and stressed responsible investment, market transparency, HRD, sustainable productivity growth and the reduction of food waste (G20 Information Centre 2015b). On the other hand, the 2017 Hamburg summit emphasized the link between food security and water sustainability and called for the strengthening of AMIS (G20 Information Centre 2017a). In similar vein, during the course of its G20 presidency in 2020, the Saudi government highlighted the issue of food security, positioning it on the G20's agenda alongside water scarcity, an issue of immediate concern to the host. It intended to continue the tradition of hosting a meeting of agriculture ministers. However, the Covid-19 pandemic led to its postponement and eventual re-configuration later in the year as a meeting of agriculture and water ministers. The following year's G20, under Italian leadership, began with pledges of further investment in food security, nutrition and sustainable food systems in light of the Covid-19 pandemic. In June 2021, G20 foreign and development ministers released the Matera Declaration, which was endorsed by the leaders later in the year in Rome (G20 Information Centre 2021a). This declaration called on the international community to address the impact of Covid-19 on livelihoods, strengthen food chains and ensure adequate nutrition for all in line with SDG-2 on zero hunger by 2030. India's foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, tweeted his praise for Italy's leadership and believed this declaration reflected India's concerns for small and medium farmers' welfare, the promotion of food cultures and agri-diversity.¹⁸

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 in many ways dominated Indonesia's G20 presidency and is discussed in terms of traditional security in Chapter 6. One corollary was the resultant disruption to supply chains and a spike in food prices. Ahead of the Bali summit, the EU announced an enhanced package of aid totalling 210 million euros for fifteen countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East most impacted by the crisis. The resulting leaders' declaration paid substantial attention to food security and supply chains. At the New Delhi summit in September 2023, under India's presidency, G20 leaders continued to focus on food security and supply chains by seeking to revive the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

4.7 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

HRD is concerned with developing the skills of the workforce, especially in LICs in the context of sustainable development, and because the connection to

economic growth and employment is of clear interest to the overarching goals of the G20. However, the G20's prioritization of HRD has varied over time. Within the development agenda, although the MYAP featured HRD as one of the nine areas of activity under the co-chair of Argentina and South Korea and it remained as one of the five development priorities, it was downgraded under the Australian presidency's 3+2 approach at the Brisbane summit of 2014 (see 3.1 above). It did result in knowledge-sharing activities in the field of HRD but the outcomes in this area have been dismissed as 'painfully process-oriented. It has never been clear what development business the G20 has in this area, and the results suggest none' (Davies 2014).

In terms of employment and training, individual G20 countries have sought to promote initiatives, but again the record is patchy. The 2010 co-chairs of Canada and South Korea were responsible for explicitly placing development on the G20's agenda and in the field of HRD the Toronto summit endorsed the G20 Training Strategy for a Skilled Workforce for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth developed by the ILO. The goal of the strategy was to equip workforces with the skills required for the jobs of today and tomorrow and at the Seoul summit later that year, G20 leaders pledged support for developing countries in implementing national strategies on skills for employment on the basis of this strategy. In 2012 at the Los Cabos summit the G20 announced a Growth and Jobs Action Plan to strengthen the global recovery, but it lacked concrete deadlines and in similar fashion to many issues at this time was overshadowed by the Eurozone crisis (Goodliffe and Sberro 2012, 6). Australia was more successful in making the G20 leaders commit to 'reduce the gender gap in labour force participation rates by 25% by 2025' at the 2014 Brisbane summit.

Sometimes the stimulus to maintain a focus on HRD has come from outside the G20. For example, ASEAN has sought to push engagement with HRD and encourage G20 countries to do the same, as Thailand demonstrated during its chairmanship of ASEAN and attendance at the G20's Osaka summit in June 2019.

The Argentinian presidency demonstrated innovation in G20 governance by convening the first meeting of G20 Education Ministers in Mendoza in September 2018. The resulting declaration frontloaded the importance of education and the SDGs in its preamble:

We ... affirm the unique role of education as a key driver for *sustainable development* for all nations, recognise the need to place education at the centre of the global agenda and call for collective action. In line with the UN 2030 Agenda, we affirm our commitment to *ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all*. (G20 Information Centre 2018a, original emphasis)

At the subsequent Buenos Aires summit, G20 leaders announced the Early Childhood Development Initiative, made the firm political statement that ‘access to education is a human right and a strategic public policy area for the development of more inclusive, prosperous, and peaceful societies’, and underlined the importance of girls’ education (G20 Information Centre 2018b). Although the Japanese government did not convene a second meeting of the education ministers the following year, the Saudi government picked up the opportunity and held a virtual ministerial meeting in September 2020. Both Italian and Indonesian presidencies followed suit with face-to-face meetings in 2021 and 2022 respectively.

4.8 SUMMARY

At the outset of the G20’s engagement with sustainable development, Fues and Wolff (2010, 7) warned that ‘[i]n setting itself up as a relevant actor for global development, the G20 should not get caught up in aspirational declarations or in operational programmes’ and instead argued that the G20 should play a more overarching, strategic role in guiding a coherent, global development policy. This resonates with the EU’s position that the G20 should seek to add value to and complement existing development commitments in other forums, most notably around the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. China’s position has emphasized the interconnected nature of sustainable development and growth, demonstrated particularly well by infrastructure investment, which is an issue for all countries (Chin and Dobson 2016). Over a decade later, the jury would probably conclude that the G20 has done all these things in varying degrees. It has certainly made repeated aspirational declarations while launching concrete operational initiatives. It has also sought to shape the direction of the development agenda and work with other forums. Certainly the debate around development has shifted under the G20 from the aid-giving focus of the G7/8, even though a large number of the emerging economies represented in the G20 are still aid recipients, to a focus on strategic investment and growth. Returning to the central role of the South Korean presidency in placing development on the G20’s agenda, its sherpa, Il SaKong, summarized these shifts:

Development issues so far, at the level of the G7 or the UN, have mostly dealt with providing development aid. We are now stressing the issue of how to stimulate growth through an effective market economy. Public–private partnerships are one way, and we are actively discussing ways to link private capital with public capital. You do that not by just giving them aid. You give them what we call the capacity building capabilities. So, you are talking about education, training, you are talking about a whole set of capabilities of these countries that would allow them to develop

on a more medium to long term, and would really create the type of growth that we really need for the global economy. (Cited in Kampmann 2010, 99–100.)

So, for some, the G20's membership of developed and developing countries, as well as its position as the self-declared premier forum for international economic cooperation, represented a radical shift from the previous development paradigm based on North–South dialogue and represented by the G7/8's engagement with the issue, largely focused on Africa (Kloke-Lesch and Gleichmann 2010). In the specific case of Africa, some would see the G20 as having shifted the perception of development as the issue that defines the continent. Nevertheless, the question of how the G20 engages with the continent remains and is shaped by the fact that its representation has been dominated by one country, South Africa. Ironically, the G7/8's engagement with a number of systemically important African countries appears to have been more representative than the G20's reliance on South Africa as the only permanent African member. Partly to address this issue, the chairs of the AU and of NEPAD were invited as guests to summits from Toronto and London onwards, respectively. This level of engagement will improve with the addition of the AU as a permanent member in September 2023. At the same time, this question should not be viewed solely through the blunt tool of membership; the mechanisms of multistakeholder engagement and the forms of network governance in which the G20 is much more highly developed than the G7/8 are also important.

Sustainable development is also a microcosm of the bigger debate surrounding the G20's position in relation to the UN, with many countries, especially China, regarding the latter as the appropriate home for this issue as the legitimate centre of global governance. However, the reality of the process of moving into the field of development has been that the G20 and UN, alongside a range of countries, institutions and stakeholders, have found a way to coexist and collaborate.

Despite these positive developments, as quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Robin Davies characterized the G20's achievements in development as modest, random and marginal. He has gone further by dismissing them in even more expressive terms as 'invertebrate, flabby and toothless' (Davies 2013, 6). Although development has its own working group, its treatment has suffered from diffusion across a number of G20 working groups, such as health, employment, trade and investment, that have ended up working at cross purposes on occasions. As a result, Fues and Saltzmann (2015) have argued that '[t]he involvement of the G20 in international development cooperation suffers from lack of clarity regarding responsibilities and from insufficient coherence ... The resultant fragmentation of G20 development policies is further enhanced by the separate competencies of the governments involved.' Perhaps now is the time for the G20 to disband the DWG and mainstream the

issue. Susan Harris Rimmer (2015, 58) neatly summarizes the issue at the heart of the G20's engagement with the issue of development: 'The G20 is a site where poverty and wealth exist very close together. It should do more to understand itself and the relationship between development, growth and inequality before the G20 can fulfil its global governance potential.'

NOTES

1. *Xinhua*, 14 November 2008.
2. *Xinhua*, 9 November 2010.
3. *The Guardian*, 1 November 2021.
4. *ABC News*, 3 July 2014.
5. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 November 2014.
6. *International Business Times*, 11 November 2014.
7. *Business Spectator*, 10 November 2014.
8. *Impact News Service*, 30 January 2019.
9. *Africa News*, 17 November 2014.
10. *State News Service*, 27 September 2019.
11. *Financial Express*, 21 April 2013.
12. *PR Newswire*, 28 June 2010.
13. *M2 Press Wire*, 4 May 2015.
14. *Beijing Review*, 20 October 2016.
15. *ENP Newswire*, 28 February 2017.
16. *Eurasia Review*, 23 February 2020.
17. *China Daily*, 25 January 2011.
18. *The Hindu*, 30 June 2021.

5. Climate change and energy transitions

5.1 OVERVIEW

The G20 accounts for over 70 per cent of global energy consumption and 80 per cent of emissions. There is a plethora of other reasons why it is well-positioned to play a role – if not the central role – in addressing the broadly defined issues under examination in this chapter. In terms of membership, the G20 includes the vast majority of leading energy producers,¹ many of the biggest coal producers,² some of the world's most significant oil exporters,³ major energy consumers,⁴ and nearly all of the top ten carbon polluters.⁵ In terms of agenda, these issues underpin the G20's other, more traditional areas of work in the economic and financial spheres. The G20 cannot deliver its overarching goal of promoting 'strong, sustained and balanced growth' without addressing climate change and energy governance. In terms of evolution, these issues are also tied up with the expansion of the G20's remit and development of its role from a crisis committee to a steering committee and beyond. Should the G20 lead in the reform of existing institutions, create new ones, or work with relevant partners to build the momentum towards these reforms? In this light, for some it is an appropriate forum to address energy governance because 'the G20 can be seen as a club at the hub of networks that can play a key role in improving the global governance of energy and China's presidency of the G20 in 2016 provides a unique opportunity for the G20 to prove its worth' (Andrews-Speed and Shi 2016, 198).

Ross Garnaut, Australian academic, former ambassador to China and lead on two reviews of climate change, advocated similar lines ahead of the Australian G20 presidency in 2014:

The G20 is ideally suited as the main forum for overcoming the 'free rider' problem of collective action on climate change. It contains all of the world's main greenhouse gas emitters and all the countries that are most important to effective global effort on climate change, as well as those that have been most active in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the G20 contains the most influential developed and developing countries, it can stand outside the entrenched and stereotypical divisions that have become barriers to effective action within the UNFCCC, with its huge and unwieldy membership and traditions of symbolic posturing. (Garnaut 2014)

Moreover, Garnaut pointed to the G20's track record in this field:

At the 2009 Copenhagen climate convention, the G20 played an important role in establishing the objective of holding the contribution of human-induced climate change to 2 degrees Celsius. It formulated a strong position on removing fossil fuel subsidies, an important position that has seen some domestic reform worldwide, and one which should be reiterated. The G20 meeting in Russia in 2013 agreed to reduce hydrofluorocarbon emissions, under the Montreal Protocol, as a contribution to climate change mitigation. (Garnaut 2014)

It should also be remembered that these challenges have historically existed in a global governance gap with no natural home that could provide a coordinated, formal structure for addressing them. In the case of global energy governance, the existing architecture has been regarded as fragmented and outdated, as typified *inter alia* by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). A number of key energy importing and exporting countries, who are members of the G20, are not members of these organizations. China and India are only associates of the IEA; Russia is a member of neither. All this may well explain why the G20 has been considered an appropriate forum to address these challenges.

However, the G20's engagement with these issues has not been without complication. In fact, Sainsbury and Wurf (2016, 14) have argued that climate change has become 'one of the most controversial aspects of the G20 agenda'. Some G20 countries have been sceptical of the role that it can and should play in addressing climate change, preferring to see more formal and dedicated organizations undertake this work. India, for example, and a number of emerging economies have expressed a preference for the UNFCCC over the G20 (He and Sainsbury 2015, 248). Furthermore, Carin and Mehlenbacher's (2010) analysis raises questions for the G20 that strike at the heart of one of the major challenges it has faced – representation. Producers, consumers, emitters, good global citizens, the vulnerable and others all have a stake in these issues but are not represented within the G20. So, despite the high expectations outlined above, alongside a moral urgency to respond to these pressing existential issues of our time, the G20 has often been seen to have failed; for example, some accused it of fiddling while Rome burns at the time of the Los Cabos summit of 2012 (Carin 2012).

Kokotsis (2017) has expertly outlined the troughs and peaks in the G7/8's championing of global climate governance over four decades from its first meaningful engagement in 1979, in the absence at the time of any intergovernmental mechanism for addressing the issue. The G20's engagement with climate change, as well as the wider context and existing processes, have also evolved slowly but over a shorter time frame. For example, after COP15 (Copenhagen) took place in December 2009, attention turned to the two

G20 summits that immediately followed in 2010: Toronto (June) and Seoul (November). In these early days of the G20's existence at the leaders' level, when it had functioned relatively successfully as a crisis committee in addressing the GFC, discussion was shifting to what kind of role it might metamorphose into. So, engagement with an issue like climate change (or development, as explored in the previous chapter) was not only wrapped up within ongoing work as part of the UNFCCC and COP but also within this specific debate on the G20's future.

Yet, this has failed to build the momentum on climate change that the G20 is capable of or to result in concrete action. In the words of Andrew Elek (2010), 'G20 leaders should look before they leap into negotiation over climate change or anything else.' The issue of climate change financing, in particular, demonstrates the slow progress within the G20. In light of estimates that developing countries would need US\$150 billion a year in support before they could begin to cut emissions, the 2009 London G20 agreed to establish a fund to finance climate mitigation in developing countries. However, firm commitments only came forth slowly.⁶ Little progress had been made on the issue of climate financing; so much so that by the 2021 Rome G20, the Canadian environment minister, Jonathan Wilkinson, and the German state secretary, Jochen Flasbarth, were co-chairing a COP process to encourage developed nations to meet this financial target.

In contrast, the G20 has sought to address energy issues since its establishment at the leaders' level with the issue appearing at every summit. However, Wilson (2015, 98) argues that this has been in the context of vaguely worded statements or non-binding, unenforceable commitments that address low-hanging fruit that are already being targeted. This chapter will outline this curate's egg of G20 engagement with these two issues before identifying country-specific responses to each of them in turn.

5.2 THE G20, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY TRANSITIONS

At the first G20 Washington summit in the midst of the GFC, it is no great surprise that climate change and energy received minimal attention beyond a token effort to namecheck other issues at the end of the final declaration: 'We remain committed to addressing other critical challenges such as energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease' (G20 Information Centre 2008a).

A few months later in London, a difference of opinion emerged between the host, the UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, and some of the emerging economies on placing climate change on the agenda (Kirton 2013, 269–296). Although heralded as the high point of the G20 as a crisis committee, the

leaders' declaration only included two short paragraphs on low-carbon economy and climate change at the very end, with vague and soft commitments:

We agreed to make the best possible use of investment funded by fiscal stimulus programmes towards the goal of building a resilient, sustainable, and green recovery. We will make the transition towards clean, innovative, resource efficient, low carbon technologies and infrastructure. We encourage the MDBs to contribute fully to the achievement of this objective. We will identify and work together on further measures to build sustainable economies.

We reaffirm our commitment to address the threat of irreversible climate change, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and to reach agreement at the UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. (G20 Information Centre 2009c)

The Pittsburgh summit that followed later in the same year treated climate change and energy much more substantially. The preamble to its final declaration included a commitment that would be repeated regularly in future summit documentation: 'We will spare no effort to reach agreement in Copenhagen through the UNFCCC negotiations' (G20 Information Centre 2009a).

Later in the declaration, energy security and climate change were given their own dedicated section with two paragraphs focused on climate change:

As leaders of the world's major economies, we are working for a resilient, sustainable, and green recovery. We underscore anew our resolve to take strong action to address the threat of dangerous climate change. We reaffirm the objective, provisions, and principles of the UNFCCC, including common but differentiated responsibilities. We note the principles endorsed by Leaders at the Major Economies Forum in L'Aquila, Italy. We will intensify our efforts, in cooperation with other parties, to reach agreement in Copenhagen through the UNFCCC negotiation. An agreement must include mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing.

We welcome the work of the Finance Ministers and direct them to report back at their next meeting with a range of possible options for climate change financing to be provided as a resource to be considered in the UNFCCC negotiations at Copenhagen. (G20 Information Centre 2009a)

The majority of this section focused on energy security with commitments summarized in the preamble and the commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies providing the headline:

To phase out and rationalize over the medium-term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support for the poorest. Inefficient fossil fuel subsidies

encourage wasteful consumption, reduce our energy security, impede investment in clean energy sources and undermine efforts to deal with the threat of climate change.

We call on our Energy and Finance Ministers to report to us their implementation strategies and timeline for acting to meet this critical commitment at our next meeting.

We will promote energy market transparency and market stability as part of our broader effort to avoid excessive volatility. (G20 Information Centre 2009a)

This commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies was reiterated at the subsequent Toronto summit but, as at Pittsburgh, the leaders' declaration failed to dedicate a section to these issues and instead made a handful of references to them in passing. Nevertheless, Pittsburgh represented a more substantial treatment than the previous two summits and provided the template for future summits after Toronto, especially under the South Korean co-presidency, as will be outlined below.

In 2011, the Cannes summit declaration included sections entitled 'Improving the Functioning of Energy Markets' and 'Pursuing the Fight against Climate Change' that repeated the G20's commitments on the UNFCCC and fossil fuel subsidies and encouraged a number of measures, for example financing action against climate change from a diverse range of sources. The following year at Los Cabos, the G20 reiterated their pledges to combat climate change and fulfil commitments made at the most recent meetings of COP16 (Cancun) and COP17 (Durbin). Bak (2017) highlights Los Cabos as a watershed in that reference was made to the economic impact of climate change in addition to the regular commitments to the treaty-based system of addressing climate change: 'Climate change will continue to have a significant impact on the world economy, and costs will be higher to the extent we delay additional action' (G20 Information Centre 2012a).

Another innovation was the creation of a G20 study group on mobilizing resources to support climate finance.

The 2013 St Petersburg summit focused heavily on sustainable energy policy and the leaders' declaration included a substantial section on the issue (G20 Information Centre 2013b). It also established the Energy Sustainability Working Group (ESWG) that was co-chaired by India and Australia and submitted a final report to the G20 leaders at the following year's Brisbane summit. The St Petersburg summit leaders' declaration reiterated verbatim the impact of climate change on the world economy made at Los Cabos and previous G20 commitments on climate change as well as welcoming the report of the G20 study group on climate finance established at the previous summit.

The following year's Brisbane summit saw the Australian prime minister, Tony Abbott, seek to narrow the agenda to economic growth, at the expense of other issues including climate change. However, he lost control of the narrative in the face of pressure from the US, some European countries and CSOs

(Slaughter 2017, 287), as well as a rapidly changing context immediately prior to the summit, which is explained in more detail below. In the end, the antepenultimate paragraph in the leaders' communiqué stated:

We support strong and effective action to address climate change. Consistent with the UNFCCC and its agreed outcomes, our actions will support sustainable development, economic growth, and certainty for business and investment. We will work together to adopt successfully a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC that is applicable to all parties at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015. We encourage parties that are ready to communicate their intended nationally determined contributions well in advance of COP21 (by the first quarter of 2015 for those parties ready to do so). We reaffirm our support for mobilising finance for adaptation and mitigation, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF). (G20 Information Centre 2014b)

In contrast, the Brisbane summit included a full session of discussion devoted to the subject of energy for the first time, which resulted in two concrete outcomes (Van de Graaf 2017, 2014). First, the G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan highlighted six priorities in energy efficiency and emissions performance around which the G20 and other countries could collaborate in tandem with the existing institutions of global energy governance: (1) vehicles, (2) networked devices, (3) financing, (4) buildings, (5) industrial energy management, and (6) electricity generation. It described itself as 'a practical plan to strengthen voluntary energy efficiency collaboration in a flexible way [allowing] countries to share knowledge, experiences and resources by choosing, on an opt-in basis, preferred activities that best reflect their domestic priorities' (G20 Information Centre 2014c). The obvious criticisms that were levelled at the action plan related to its voluntary and opt-in nature. Second, the G20 announced nine principles on energy collaboration, by which it pledged to work together to:

1. Ensure access to affordable and reliable energy for all.
2. Make international energy institutions more representative and inclusive of emerging and developing economies.
3. Encourage and facilitate well-functioning, open, competitive, efficient, stable and transparent energy markets that promote energy trade and investment.
4. Encourage and facilitate the collection and dissemination of high-quality energy data and analysis.
5. Enhance energy security through dialogue and cooperation on issues such as emergency response measures.
6. Rationalise and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, over the medium term, while being conscious of the necessity to provide targeted support for the poor.
7. Support sustainable growth and development, consistent with our climate activities and commitments, including by promoting cost-effective energy efficiency, renewables and clean energy.

8. Encourage and facilitate the design, development, demonstration and widespread deployment of innovative energy technologies, including clean energy technologies.
9. Enhance coordination between international energy institutions and minimise duplication where appropriate. (G20 Information Centre 2014d)

Sainsbury and Wurf (2016, 15) regard these principles as having secured the buy-in of Russia and Saudi Arabia and constituting ‘real progress made on the substantive energy governance problem, especially on how to structure global discussions on energy’.

The 2015 Antalya summit took place just before COP21 opened in Paris at the end of November. Under the Turkish presidency, the first meeting of energy ministers took place in Istanbul a month before Antalya. Subsequent G20 presidencies of China, Argentina, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Italy and Indonesia all continued with this new ministerial meeting. The German presidency of 2017 did not hold an energy ministerial in 2017 because of the attention accorded the issue within the leaders’ summit; the Italian presidency organized a joint ministerial meeting of energy and climate change ministers in 2021. In any case, its first meeting in Istanbul resulted in a voluntary toolkit of measures to support countries in adopting renewable energies. Bak (2017) regards the Antalya leaders’ summit that followed as ‘pivotal’ because of the connection the leaders’ declaration drew between climate change and the financial system: ‘We ask the FSB to continue to engage with public- and private-sector participants on how the financial sector can take account of climate change risks’ (G20 Information Centre 2015a).

Despite high expectations that China was in a position to and might be willing to lead under its G20 presidency of 2016, the results disappointed. The Hangzhou summit leaders’ communiqué only referred to climate change in a paragraph that was prefaced by sustainable development, sandwiched between two paragraphs on the UK’s Brexit referendum and the refugee crisis, and all bundled together under a section entitled ‘Further Significant Global Challenges Affecting the World Economy’. The paragraph did little to advance the G20’s engagement with the issue of climate change beyond the usual exhortations to action around the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement alongside loopholes for individual countries. In contrast, the communiqué was more detailed and focused when it came to its treatment of energy (G20 Information Centre 2016b).

When Germany assumed the G20 presidency on 1 December 2016, Donald Trump was already president-elect. In June 2017, a month before the Hamburg summit, he officially announced the intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, thereby raising expectations that this issue would dominate the summit. The result was a ‘near-consensus’ with the G19 signing up to the

Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth, and the US under Trump constituting the outlying ‘plus 1’ (Bak 2017). Under this 19+1 format, the action plan reaffirmed the G19’s intention to move forward together and adopt a range of concrete measures with the goal of facilitating the implementation of UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (G20 Information Centre 2017c). The resulting leaders’ declaration acknowledged the US position and attempted to mitigate the implications. At the same time, the German presidency took the opportunity to reinforce the collective and ‘irreversible’ position of the other G20 leaders in relation to the Paris Agreement:

We take note of the decision of the USA to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The USA announced it will immediately cease the implementation of its current nationally-determined contribution and affirms its strong commitment to an approach that lowers emissions while supporting economic growth and improving energy security needs. The USA states it will endeavour to work closely with other countries to help them access and use fossil fuels more cleanly and efficiently and help deploy renewable and other clean energy sources, given the importance of energy access and security in their nationally-determined contributions.

The leaders of the other G20 members state that the Paris Agreement is irreversible. ... We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Paris Agreement, moving swiftly towards its full implementation in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances and, to this end, we agree to the G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth ... (G20 Information Centre 2017a)

The Argentinian presidency held a meeting of energy ministers in June 2018. Their communiqué continued the German presidency’s emphasis on the importance of energy transition and the G20’s leadership in ‘transform[ing] our energy systems into affordable, reliable, sustainable and low GHG emissions systems as soon as possible’. Yet, at the same time, it highlighted

the approach of Argentina’s G20 Presidency, which recognises that there are different possible national paths to achieve cleaner energy systems — while promoting sustainability, resilience and energy security — under the term ‘transitions’ (in plural). This view reflects the fact that each G20 member — according to its stage of development — has a unique and diverse energy system as starting point, with different energy resources, demand dynamics, technologies, stock of capital, geographies and cultures. (G20 Information Centre 2018c)

The leaders’ declaration that resulted from the Buenos Aires summit later that year largely reiterated much of the energy ministers’ communiqué (G20 Information Centre 2018b). Climate change was treated in three paragraphs that reinforced the link between economic development and climate change, sought to build momentum towards COP24 (Katowice), reiterated the irrevers-

ibility of the Paris Agreement, committed the G20 leaders to its full implementation and acknowledged the position of the US.

As regards the formalization of the G20's structures for addressing these issues, the Argentinian presidency established a climate sustainability working group in 2018. The following year, the Japanese presidency also demonstrated a readiness to innovate in summit design by holding the first-ever G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth, attended by environment and energy ministers in the Japanese Alps in June 2019. It adopted the G20 Karuizawa Innovation Action Plan on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth, but on a voluntary basis, and welcomed

the G20 Japanese Presidency's initiative aimed at spurring innovation in the context of climate change by launching an international conference, called Research and Development 20 for clean energy technologies ('RD20') to promote international collaborative relationships among leading R&D institutes from G20 members. We recognize that R&D collaboration under existing initiatives is also important to advancing innovation. (G20 Information Centre 2019a)

The Osaka summit leaders' declaration included a dedicated section on 'Global Environmental Issues and Challenges' that included two paragraphs on climate change. The first stressed the multi-stakeholder approach and reiterated the G20's support for the existing mechanisms of global governance and the irreversibility of the Paris Agreement. The second was dedicated to outlining both sides of the position of the US, Japan's key bilateral ally, and is outlined in more detail below (G20 Information Centre 2019b).

In a single paragraph on energy, the G20 leaders reiterated elements of the Karuizawa Innovation Action Plan on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth, and acknowledged

the importance of energy transitions that realize the '3E+S' (Energy Security, Economic Efficiency, and Environment + Safety) in order to transform our energy systems into affordable, reliable, sustainable and low GHG emissions systems as soon as possible, recognizing that there are different possible national paths to achieve this goal. Recalling the G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth Communique, we acknowledge the role of all energy sources and technologies in the energy mix and different possible national paths to achieve cleaner energy systems ... In light of recent events highlighting concern about safe flow of energy, we acknowledge the importance of global energy security as one of the guiding principles for the transformation of energy systems, including resilience, safety and development of infrastructure and undisturbed flow of energy from various sources, suppliers, and routes. We recognize the value of international cooperation on a wide range of energy-related issues including energy access, affordability and energy efficiency, and energy storage. We reaffirm our joint commitment on medium term rationalization and phasing-out

of Inefficient Fossil Fuel Subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, while providing targeted support for the poorest. (G20 Information Centre 2019b)

In addition to climate change and energy, the G20 leaders sought to address the marine environment, as discussed in Chapter 6.

The following year's Saudi presidency of the G20 was disrupted and dominated by Covid-19. Nevertheless, one of the three thematic pillars of the Saudi presidency was 'Safeguarding the Planet', organized under six subheadings of: (1) managing emissions for sustainable development; (2) combating land degradation and habitat loss; (3) preserving the oceans; (4) fostering sustainable and resilient water systems globally; (5) promoting food security, and (6) cleaner energy systems for a new era. As was to be expected, the leaders' declaration extended the usual support to the UNFCCC and COP26 (Glasgow), which was eventually postponed to 2021 because of the pandemic. The Saudi presidency promoted the concept of a 'circular carbon economy' to reduce carbon emissions based on the 4Rs of reduce, reuse, recycle and remove. Although this approach was controversial and criticized by many, including the EU, for relying too heavily on unproven carbon capture, reuse and storage, a compromise was reached in the leaders' declaration whereby the G20 leaders endorsed this approach and accorded it a paragraph of its own but reiterated an emphasis on phasing out inefficient fossil fuels, despite Saudi opposition and its omission from the energy ministers' communiqué earlier in the year. Although expectations were low ahead of the Riyadh summit and outcomes were meagre, the show of unity by G20 leaders was regarded by some as hopeful once Italy assumed the G20 presidency and Trump left the White House.⁷

Under the Italian presidency, the Rome summit became a stepping stone to the rescheduled COP26, which took place immediately afterwards, and an opportunity to do some of the heavy lifting ahead of Glasgow by reaching a shared understanding among G20 members. To this end, the leaders' declaration stated that '[w]e remain committed to the Paris Agreement goal to hold the global average temperature increase well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels' (G20 Information Centre 2021a). However, and almost as if the intention was at least to do no harm ahead of Glasgow, a vaguely worded statement was included under a section on energy and climate, 'acknowledging the key relevance of achieving global net zero greenhouse gas emissions or carbon neutrality by or around mid-century and the need to strengthen global efforts required to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement' (G20 Information Centre 2021a). As an aside, the G20 leaders no longer 'endorsed' the circular carbon economy as had been the case under the Saudi presidency but rather *took into account* different approaches. In any case, the leaders headed to Glasgow with an eventual agreement still a possibility.

The Indonesian presidency coincided with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and resulting disruption to energy supplies and prices. On these issues and in light of SDG-7 (ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all), the leaders recognized their leadership role at the Bali summit of November 2022. They committed to seek solutions to achieve energy market stability, transparency and affordability, strengthen energy supply chains and energy security, and diversify energy mixes and systems. In addition, the Indonesian presidency announced its Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with a number of G20 partners at the Bali summit of November 2022. The JETP pledged to raise US\$20 billion over the following three to five years in order to fund Indonesia's energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources, reduce emissions and contribute to limiting global warming to 1.5°C. This was the second JETP; the first, with South Africa, was announced at COP26 in Glasgow, to support South Africa's decarbonization. The G20 Bali leaders' declaration also reiterated the 'commitment to achieve global net zero greenhouse gas emissions/carbon neutrality by or around mid-century, while taking into account the latest scientific developments and different national circumstances', as well as limiting temperature rises to 1.5°C (G20 Information Centre 2022a).

A number of trends have run through both the G20's treatment of these issues since 2008 and their reception at the time. These include support for the existing structures and treaties, for example reiteration of support for the UNFCCC, while seeking to innovate in the G20's internal processes and ways of working. Energy, rather than climate, issues often appear to receive the lion's share of attention, but in both cases the link is often drawn back to the core business of the G20: finance and economy. Some analysts see the G20 as having a potential leadership role in this area, in addition to China being well placed to lead on energy governance through the G20 by dint of the size of its economy and its level of energy consumption. However, it should do so by seeking to work with and reform the existing institutions, rather than creating rival mechanisms (Yu 2017; see also Andrews-Speed and Shi 2016; Sainsbury and Wurf 2016).

5.3 CLIMATE CHANGE

Kim and Chung (2012) have singled out the G20's informality, flexibility and ability to influence others as factors that enable it to play a central role in climate change governance and implementing concrete, related policies. In light of this, G20 members that are comfortable with this format and keen to expand the G20's agenda are likely to play a leading role. However, those that prefer the more formal and legalistic mechanisms of global governance and are keen to keep the G20's agenda focused on its core business will tend to follow

or even obstruct progress on climate change. At the same time, hard-nosed national interest should not be forgotten as a central factor in understanding G20 members' engagement with climate change. And yet, the opportunities and challenges associated with demonstrating international leadership afforded by the assumption of the G20 presidency can turn traditional blockers into enablers and even vice versa at times.

As a result of this complicated picture, a lack of consensus within the G20 on extending the G20's agenda and role beyond the focus on the GFC as a crisis committee to embrace climate change meant that it took some time for the issue to become embedded within the G20's remit. Some G20 members were early and vocal supporters, for example the EU. At Antalya, ahead of COP21 in Paris, the EU's approach emphasized 'raising climate change as a strategic priority in political dialogues, including at G7 and G20 meetings and the UNGA' to secure a post-2020 global climate change agreement (EU 2015a). Similarly, but earlier, UK government officials attempted, but failed, at the 2009 London summit to include a commitment to spend a substantial share of economic stimulus on low-carbon recovery projects.⁸ Among the middle powers of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Türkiye and Australia (MIKTA), South Korea was proactive in dedicating sections to climate change and green growth in the Seoul summit document and built on the treatment at Pittsburgh by reiterating the G20 leaders' commitment to UNFCCC and the phasing out of fossil fuels but with stronger language in terms of the importance of these issues: 'Addressing the threat of global climate change is an urgent priority for all nations. We reiterate our commitment to take strong and action-oriented measures and remain fully dedicated to UN climate change negotiations' (G20 Information Centre 2010a).

Similarly, Indonesia can be included in this category, as demonstrated by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's speeches at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit (Dobson 2011a).⁹ The Mexican government was in favour of placing climate change on the G20 agenda at Toronto, and under its 2012 presidency highlighted six objectives of which the sixth was 'advancing green growth and the fight against climate change'. Although for some this was little more than 'hollow reference' (Goodliffe and Sberro 2012, 4), the resulting leaders' declaration dedicated two paragraphs to the issue (G20 Information Centre 2012a). As mentioned above, under the Mexican presidency, the G20 made explicit reference to the economic impact of climate change and the G20 study group on climate finance was established.

In contrast, and as mentioned above, the Australian government led by Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who had repealed climate change policies at home, sought to contain the discussion of climate change and place the focus on a narrow economic agenda at the 2014 Brisbane summit. Harris Rimmer (2015) relates the narrative whereby 'a recalcitrant host and leader' lost control

of the narrative and became regarded as an obstacle to addressing climate change in the face of mounting pressure from G20 partners, especially the US and China. In the immediate run-up to the Brisbane summit, the US and China made a joint announcement at the APEC meeting in Beijing of their intention to collaborate bilaterally in addressing climate change. The announcement included concrete targets whereby the US, on the one hand, would ‘achieve an economy-wide target of reducing its emissions by 26%–28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%’. On the other hand, China intended ‘to achieve the peaking of CO₂ emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030’. The intention behind the timing of the announcement was to ‘inject momentum into the global climate negotiations and inspire other countries to join in coming forward with ambitious actions as soon as possible’ (White House 2014a). Yet, rather than embracing this momentum, Abbott’s government regarded the joint US–China initiative as ‘unexpected and unwanted’ (Davies 2014), and one EU official was reported to have declared publicly that discussions at Brisbane were akin to ‘trench warfare’ (Carin and Callaghan 2015, 137). Ultimately Abbott met with limited success and the US and EU, as well as China, managed to ‘push Australia much further than it wanted to go on climate change’ (Downie 2017, 1500; Downie and Crump 2017, 689; Crump and Downie 2018, 38).

In addition, the emerging economies of Brazil, China, India and Russia have also been blockers at times, emphasizing the formal mechanism of the UNFCCC over the G20 as the preferred mechanism to address climate change (Carin et al. 2010; Debaere et al. 2014). Admittedly, at the 2016 Hangzhou summit, China demonstrated leadership on climate change through the creation of a ‘green financing system’ and by identifying thirty-five action points as part of a roadmap to develop various green financial instruments and initiatives, including the launch of a national-level green development fund. The leaders’ communiqué committed

to complete our respective domestic procedures in order to join the Paris Agreement as soon as our national procedures allow. We welcome those G20 members who joined the Agreement and efforts to enable the Paris Agreement to enter into force by the end of 2016 and look forward to its timely implementation with all its aspects. (G20 Information Centre 2016b)

So, on occasions, China has collaborated with the US or taken the opportunity afforded by the role of host to demonstrate leadership on climate change. However, for the most part, it has been opposed to the G20 dealing with

climate change and regards the UN as the appropriate place to deal with it (Kirtton 2016).

China and Russia's commitment can also be gauged by their levels of engagement. The Rome G20 of October 2022 was an immediate precursor to the COP26 meeting in Glasgow and demonstrated the informal role the G20 can play in forging a consensus ahead of a formal meeting. However, Russia and China's decision to attend the Rome summit virtually impacted on the ability of the G20 to forge this consensus ahead of Glasgow. To be sure, and as mentioned above, the leaders' declaration reaffirmed commitments to the Paris Agreement and its goal of limiting global warming to 'well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'. On the one hand, the leaders called for 'meaningful and effective actions and commitments by all countries', while acknowledging on the other hand 'differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances'. The G20 also 'acknowledg[ed] the key relevance of achieving global net zero greenhouse gas emissions or carbon neutrality by or around mid-century', thereby avoiding the concrete target of 2050 and remaining in line with the positions of China and Saudi Arabia (G20 Information Centre 2021a). The compromise was clear in UN Secretary-General António Guterres's statement that '[w]hile I welcome the G20's commitment to global solutions, I leave Rome with my hopes unfulfilled but at least not buried forever'.¹⁰

Other G20 members have found the role of host challenging at times, especially the need to balance competing demands so as to ensure a successful summit in relation to the issue of climate change. For example, as mentioned above, the German government accommodated Trump and his declared intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement through unilateralism at the 2017 Hamburg summit. The leaders' declaration noted the US decision before proceeding to reaffirm the commitment of the remaining nineteen to, and the irreversible nature of, this agreement. At the 2019 Osaka summit, the Japanese government went further in accommodating the US, its closest bilateral ally, while seeking to preserve the solidarity of the nineteen.¹¹ It was criticized for the comparatively diluted language in the leaders' declaration that omitted 'global warming' and 'decarbonization', allegedly as a result of pressure from the Trump administration.¹² The order was also flipped from that of the Hamburg summit. First, it consolidated the consensus among the G19 that the Paris Agreement was irreversible and their commitment to its full implementation. This was mediated by the following paragraph, which was an expanded statement outlining the Trump administration's unilateral position and achievements in the field of climate change:

The US reiterates its decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement because it disadvantages American workers and taxpayers. The US reaffirms its strong commit-

ment to promoting economic growth, energy security and access, and environmental protection. The US's balanced approach to energy and environment allows for the delivery of affordable, reliable, and secure energy to all its citizens while utilizing all energy sources and technologies, including clean and advanced fossil fuels and technologies, renewables, and civil nuclear power, while also reducing emissions and promoting economic growth. The US is a world leader in reducing emissions. US energy-related CO₂ emissions fell by 14% between 2005 and 2017 even as its economy grew by 19.4% largely due to the development and deployment of innovative energy technologies. The US remains committed to the development and deployment of advanced technologies to continue to reduce emissions and provide for a cleaner environment. (G20 Information Centre 2019b)

5.4 ENERGY TRANSITIONS

As demonstrated above, the G20 has been more proactive in addressing the challenges around energy transitions than those of climate change. For example, from 2009 to 2011, four G20 energy working groups were established, with the first two groups focused on fossil fuels established within the Finance Track and the latter two within the Sherpa Track: (1) a 'fossil fuel subsidies' working group (chaired by the US); (2) a 'fossil fuel price volatility' working group (chaired by France and Korea); (3) a working group focused on 'global marine environment protection', chaired by Russia; and (4) a 'clean energy and energy efficiency' working group (Van de Graaf and Westphal 2011, 25–26). The G20's focus in these early years was narrow and concerned with addressing price volatility, improving efficiency and access to new technologies, and green growth (Downie 2015, 122). Nevertheless, with the structures in place, this focus evolved thereafter along the lines outlined above.

However, once again, clear divisions among G20 members emerge over the related issue of energy transitions from fossil-based systems of energy production and consumption to renewable energy sources. Sometimes these divisions mirror the extent to which its members are comfortable operating in an informal and flexible forum like the G20. However, as is the case with climate change outlined above, this is not the sole determining factor. Uncompromising national interests among energy producers and consumers on the one hand, and the desire to demonstrate global leadership on the other hand, are also at play. For example, as would be expected under Russia's G20 presidency, as a major exporter of oil and gas, the 2013 St Petersburg summit was heavily focused on sustainable energy policy and the leaders' declaration included a substantial section on the issue.

On the specific issue of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, a fault line has emerged between G20 members on the basis of their level of development. This is understandable as developing countries have higher levels of subsidies and need to make greater efforts to achieve any commitments to phase out

fossil fuel subsidies (Van de Graaf and Westphal 2011, 27). So, at a one-day UN-sponsored climate change summit held on 22 September 2009, the eve of the Pittsburgh G20, Obama pledged to ‘work with my colleagues at the G20 to phase out fossil fuel subsidies so that we can better address our climate challenge’.¹³ Ahead of the Pittsburgh summit, reports suggested that five years might be the time frame for this action and resistance was expected from China, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia as countries that subsidize fossil fuels in order to keep consumer energy prices low, which in turn increases emissions.¹⁴ At the end of the summit, the G20 pledged ‘to *phase out and rationalise* over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while *providing targeted support for the poorest*’ (G20 Information Centre 2009a, emphasis added). Developing countries with coal-based energy demands, such as India, resisted any concrete road map or binding commitments to eliminate subsidies and argued that the G20’s final language be revised to that highlighted above.¹⁵ However, this fault line is not immutable as it was Indonesia, rather than the US, who agreed to lead the summit discussion at Pittsburgh.

The leaders’ declaration also asked their energy and finance ministers to report back at the following year’s summit in Toronto with details of their implementation strategies and timelines. Ahead of Toronto, it was reported that the Canadian government, as G20 host, was trying to balance domestic considerations against a desire to embellish its reputation and exhibit good international citizenship by making progress on commitments made at Pittsburgh. To this latter end, it was supported by the US, the UK and the EU. The Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd, found himself in a similar position to his Canadian counterpart, facing opposition at home from the domestic mining industry, while seeking to demonstrate progress on the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies at Toronto. Specifically, the Canadian government was contemplating a reduction in tax breaks for the oil and gas sectors. At the same time, it sought to make progress on the definition of a fossil fuel subsidy by embracing both consumer and production subsidies.¹⁶ The highest spenders on consumption subsidies among the G20 are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, whereas the richer G20 members tend to provide production subsidies (Van de Graaf and Westphal 2011, 27–28). However, the definitions of fossil fuel subsidies and timescales for their removal were moveable feasts and never defined by the G20. Some countries have sought to nudge the G20 in this direction. For example, at the June 2016 North American leaders’ summit in Ottawa, Canada, Mexico and the US pledged to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025. They also called on other G20 leaders meeting in Hangzhou later in the year to do the same.

The G20 mechanism for acting on fossil fuel subsidies was based on voluntary peer review whereby countries were buddied up and, under the chair

of the OECD, were asked to self-report and review each other. This process began with China and the US, and thereafter included Argentina, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Italy and Mexico. However, at the Osaka G20, the extent of the group's phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies came under scrutiny, as Japan broke with tradition and, as G20 president, did not volunteer for the peer review mechanism. In addition, CSOs, international organizations and the world's media have repeatedly shed light on the increase in fossil fuel subsidies among G20 countries. For example, the IMF highlighted the trillions of dollars still spent by G20 countries despite the pledges made at the Pittsburgh G20 in 2009.¹⁷ Similarly, coinciding with the 2015 Antalya summit, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) released a report that mapped out for the first time the scale of G20 countries' fossil fuel subsidies at US\$444 billion a year in total (ODI 2015). Again, ahead of the Osaka G20, the ODI released a report accusing the G20 governments of increasing funding for coal-fired power plants from US\$17 billion in 2014 to US\$47 billion in 2017.¹⁸

It was not until the Rome G20 in 2021 that leaders committed to 'put an end to the provision of international public finance for new unabated coal power generation abroad by the end of 2021', despite initial objections from Türkiye that were ultimately withdrawn and with China already on board after Xi Jinping's pledge to the UNGA in September not to finance any new overseas coal-fired power projects. As regards the domestic use of coal, the leaders' declaration was less specific and pledged support for 'those countries that commit to phasing out investment in new unabated coal power generation capacity to do so as soon as possible' (G20 Information Centre 2021a).¹⁹

Energy efficiency was the theme of one of the four G20 energy working groups established between 2009 and 2011, as mentioned above. Although flirting with controversy in trying to downgrade the discussion of climate change in the run-up to the 2014 Brisbane summit, the Australian government promoted discussions around the G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, which was focused on two areas of work. One work package headed by the US was focused on 'developing recommendations, for G20 consideration, including for strengthened domestic standards in G20 countries in as many areas as possible related to clean fuels, vehicle emissions and vehicle fuel efficiency, and for green freight programs' (G20 Information Centre 2014c). The other was headed by the UK and was focused on 'the energy efficiency of networked devices ... [and] consideration of options for goals for reducing the global standby mode energy consumption of networked devices' (G20 Information Centre 2014c). Reports ahead of the Brisbane summit suggested that China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa were only tentatively committed to these and other processes.²⁰

Energy prices had also long been a concern of the G20 long before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in a spike that drove

a cost-of-living crisis around the world. For example, at the 2012 Los Cabos summit, China proposed that the G20 oversee the coordination to render the global energy market more ‘secure, stable and sustainable’ (Hirst and Frogatt 2012, 3, cited in Downie 2015, 122). The US used the 2021 Rome summit to place pressure on oil-producing countries to increase their production to bring down prices. The following year, the Indonesian presidency could not ignore this issue but obviously had to negotiate the diplomatic challenge around Russia’s membership of the G20 and ensuring the group continued to hang together. This consideration did not encumber the G7 leaders, who under the German presidency were able to issue a strong statement of support for Ukraine at the Schloß Elmau summit of June 2022.

5.5 SUMMARY

The idea that informal, deliberative forums of the world’s leading states have a potential role to play in climate change and energy transitions is largely accepted. More specifically, Slaughter argues that the G20 demonstrates potential not only because of its smaller membership but also as a result of its operational evolution: ‘... the G20 uniquely includes economically significant states in a form of global summitry which involves institutionalised transnational and transgovernmental webs of formal and informal policy making activity in conjunction with the activity of G20 leaders’ (2017, 285).

As a result, the leaders’ meeting is only the tip of the iceberg and the debate and policy proposals around climate change and energy transitions continue in various other G20-related forums that engage a wide range of formal and informal, state and non-state actors, which all have an important role to play in creating something akin to what has been described as a ‘hybrid focal point’ (Cooper 2019). Although this can encourage individual country responses, or delegate to newly created or already existing mechanisms of global governance, the challenge remains of establishing a systematic process by which this can happen effectively to deliver concrete outcomes and plug the global governance gap outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

NOTES

1. China, the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Canada, India, Australia, Indonesia and Brazil.
2. China, India, the US, Indonesia, Australia, Russia, South Africa, Germany.
3. Saudi Arabia, Russia, the US, Canada.
4. China, the US, India, Russia, Japan, Canada, Germany, Brazil and South Korea.
5. China, the US, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.
6. *The Canadian Press*, 24 September 2009.

7. *Climate Home News*, 23 November 2020.
8. *The Guardian*, 3 April 2009.
9. *Agence France-Presse*, 28 January 2011.
10. *The Guardian*, 31 October 2021.
11. *The Independent*, 29 June 2019.
12. *The Financial Times*, 25 June 2019.
13. *Reuters*, 22 September 2009.
14. *National Post*, 24 September 2009.
15. *Indian Express*, 27 June 2010.
16. *The Hamilton Spectator*, 25 May 2010.
17. *The Guardian*, 4 August 2015.
18. *The Financial Times*, 25 June 2019.
19. *The Guardian*, 31 October 2021.
20. *The Guardian*, 4 November 2014.

6. Security and terrorism

6.1 OVERVIEW

As might be expected at the height of the GFC, the initial focus of the G20's attention, reflected in its agendas and declarations, was firmly placed on financial and economic issues rather than matters of national and international security. As mentioned in other chapters, the G7/8 provides an indicative template for the development of informal summitry and at its early summits in the mid 1970s it also focused almost exclusively on macroeconomic issues. However, it could not ignore a range of pressing geopolitical concerns and at the turn of the decade came to focus on broader Cold War-related security issues as well as the specific threat of terrorism. Since 2008, the G20 has experienced a similar development, as seen most starkly at the Antalya summit of November 2015, which took place days after the Paris shootings, and at the Bali summit of November 2022, which was dominated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This chapter will focus on how the broad and varied membership of the G20 has welcomed or resisted this development in terms of both traditional and newer definitions of security.

6.2 THE G20 AND SECURITY

Returning to 2008 and the height of the GFC, both the Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy issued at the first G20 leaders' meeting in Washington and the G20 Global Plan for Recovery and Reform issued at the second meeting in London understandably focused on identifying the causes of the crisis, diagnosing the appropriate response, supporting global trade against protectionism, reforming international institutions and restoring trust, as well as fostering a return to inclusive, green and sustainable growth (G20 Information Centre 2008a; G20 Information Centre 2009b). Nevertheless, attempts were made to complement the G20's financial crisis management with a focus on broadly defined security issues. The Chinese president, Hu Jintao, addressed the Washington summit and, while acknowledging the maintenance of economic growth as the cornerstone of addressing the financial crisis, argued that '[j]oint efforts should be made to stabilize the international energy and food markets, curb speculation and build an enabling

environment for the growth of the world economy (Hu 2008). Paragraph 15 of the leaders' declaration committed the G20 'to addressing other critical challenges such as energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease (G20 Information Centre 2008a).

Although the G20 leaders' statement that resulted from the Pittsburgh summit of September 2009 maintained the focus of the previous two summits by highlighting strong sustainable and balanced growth, it was the first declaration to dedicate a paragraph to the topic of energy security, committing to the phasing out of inefficient fossil fuels, and demonstrated throughout a strong emphasis on food security, as explored in Chapter 4 (G20 Information Centre 2009a). Although food security remained a background issue that ran through the following G20 Toronto summit declaration, the focus had returned to the core economic and financial issues that had preoccupied the G20 so far. A final paragraph with the catch-all title of 'other issues and forward agenda' namechecked development issues and protecting the marine environment in response to the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (G20 Information Centre 2010c). By the end of the year and the fifth and final biannual summit, the G20 Seoul summit leaders' declaration added development to the core business of the G20 on economic recovery and financial reform. However, the word 'security' was absent from the declaration (G20 Information Centre 2010d), and only appeared in the accompanying Seoul summit document with reference to the existing initiatives on food security and marine environment protection (G20 Information Centre 2010a). The 2011 Cannes summit also released two documents: a final declaration (G20 Information Centre 2011a) and a final communiqué (G20 Information Centre 2011e). Both documents followed a similar pattern of maintaining the focus on the G20's core business with occasional references to food security and marine environment protection. However, as host, President Nicolas Sarkozy promised that the G20 would tame volatility in food prices and achieve greater food security. The leaders' declaration that was released at the end of the 2012 Los Cabos summit continued this pattern but the summit did realize a pledge made at the Seoul summit to trial results-based payments and launched the AgResults initiative discussed in Chapter 4. The Los Cabos summit also emphasized the importance of multilateralism (although in the context of the global economy) and referred to the first informal meeting of G20 foreign ministers that took place in Los Cabos earlier in the year (G20 Information Centre 2012a). Once again, this innovation represented a developmental path similar to the G7/8, which delegated a number of specific issues to the ministerial level at its 1998 Birmingham summit.

The 2013 St Petersburg summit continued to highlight food security, referring to it as a 'top priority', in its final declaration. Energy security was also

mentioned and the Russian presidency established the Energy Sustainability Working Group, which reported to the following year's Brisbane summit. Nuclear safety, security and safeguards/non-proliferation received a passing mention in the declaration for the first time (G20 Information Centre 2013b). Although it was not reflected in the final documentation, discussions on the periphery of the summit, especially between Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin, focused on a complex but comparatively traditional security issue, that of the conflict in Syria. As discussed in Chapter 5, the following year in Brisbane saw the G20 leaders dedicate a working session, for the first time, to discussing global energy issues and releasing a G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan as well as the G20 Principles on Energy Collaboration. Food security also received attention in the leaders' communiqué and a dedicated G20 Food Security and Nutrition Network was established, as discussed in Chapter 4 (G20 Information Centre 2014b).

As discussed in more detail below, the 2015 Antalya summit proved to be a watershed, with a separate G20 Statement on the Fight against Terrorism released in response to the Paris and Ankara terrorist attacks, which took place immediately before the summit. The statement not only condemned the attacks and asserted the unity of the G20 leaders, it also outlined a number of measures that would be taken to combat terrorism and its financing, as well as support the work of the UN (G20 Information Centre 2015c). The leaders' communiqué continued to outline progress in the field of food security but also dedicated a paragraph to security in the context of the internet and information and communications technology (G20 Information Centre 2015a). The Turkish presidency also innovated by establishing the first G20 ministerial meeting of energy ministers in the run-up to Antalya.

The following year's China-hosted Hangzhou summit continued to highlight food and energy security, as in previous years' summits, while picking up on internet and ICT security from the Antalya summit and including terrorism on the leaders' communiqué. The 2017 Hamburg summit saw another but more substantial and dedicated statement on countering terrorism in the leaders' declaration (G20 Information Centre 2017d), alongside an ongoing focus on food and energy security, marine environment protection and the recently added focus on ICT security. Despite some passing references, substantial attention was also accorded for the first time at a G20 summit to migrant smuggling and human trafficking, both in their own right and also through the lens of national security. All of these issues – food and energy security, ICT, terrorism, and human trafficking were also highlighted in the agenda and declaration of the 2018 Buenos Aires summit (G20 Information Centre 2018b).

At the fourteenth G20 summit in Osaka in 2019, one specific aspect of terrorism was given its own document in the form of the Statement on Preventing Exploitation of the Internet for Terrorism and Violent Extremism Conductive

to Terrorism (VECT) that declared ‘the state’s role, first and foremost, [is] to prevent and combat terrorism’ before then bringing the internet and online platforms into its treatment of terrorism in response to the Christchurch, New Zealand, shootings that were livestreamed on Facebook months earlier (G20 Information Centre 2019a). In support of the focus of Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzō, on the cross-border Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), the leaders’ declaration contained references to security within the digital economy alongside the traditional treatment of food and energy security (G20 Information Centre 2019b).

Under the Saudi and Italian presidencies of the G20 in 2020 and 2021 respectively, the focus inevitably turned to the global pandemic and issues around vaccination. In this context, attention was still paid to security but largely continued the work of previous summits on energy, food and digital security. However, during this time and in response to a developing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, an extraordinary meeting of G20 leaders took place online on 12 October 2021, a few weeks before the Rome summit, to discuss the security of the Afghan people and the region in light of the US evacuation and the Taliban assumption of power (G20 Information Centre 2021b).

At the Bali G20 in 2022, attention was dominated by the traditional security issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A strong statement emerged in paragraph 4 of the leaders’ declaration, suggesting that the G20 was asserting its role in traditional security issues:

It is essential to uphold international law and the multilateral system that safeguards peace and stability. This includes defending all the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN and adhering to international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians and infrastructure in armed conflicts. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. The peaceful resolution of conflicts, efforts to address crises, as well as diplomacy and dialogue, are vital. Today’s era must not be of war. (G20 Information Centre 2022a)

However, this was tempered by paragraph 3 in which a clear diversity of opinions among G20 members on the war in Ukraine was evident, in addition to the recognition that security is outside its remit, as highlighted by the following (added) emphases:

We reiterated our national positions as expressed in other fora, including the UNSC and the UNGA, which ... [deplore] in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and [demand] its complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine. *Most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine* and stressed it is causing immense human suffering and exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy – constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity, and elevating financial stability risks. *There were other views and different assessments*

of the situation and sanctions. Recognizing that the G20 is not the forum to resolve security issues, we acknowledge that security issues can have significant consequences for the global economy. (G20 Information Centre 2022a)

Thus, over seventeen summits spanning fifteen years, we can see the G20's treatment of security evolve from the initial position of keeping it at arm's length. The G20 followed the G7/8's lead and soon came to engage in both its traditional and non-traditional forms, as well as responding, inevitably, to the urgency of terrorist attacks. More recently, the narrative has come full circle as the G20 has sought to place some distance between its traditional economic focus and the resolution of security issues.

6.3 TRADITIONAL SECURITY

The G20 has tended to regard traditional forms of security, such as interstate conflict or nuclear weapons, as outside its wheelhouse and to treat them in passing in its agenda, meetings and resulting documentation. For the most part, this position has been supported by countries such as the BRICS group, who want to avoid an expansion of the G20's agenda into areas already having a traditional home, as security does in the UNSC, and so distract from the G20's economic emphasis. However, traditional security issues have occasionally appeared on the G20's agenda or been provided with mechanisms by which they can appear on the agenda. For example, one such vehicle was established by the Mexican presidency, which demonstrated innovation in G20 governance by establishing the first informal meeting of the G20 foreign ministers in February 2012 ahead of the Los Cabos summit. The meeting involved representatives from a range of G20 and non-G20 countries as well as representatives of international organizations and was designed to explore the opportunities for cooperation in key challenges surrounding the global economy, trade liberalization and green growth, but also disaster relief. Even though the Mexican hosts downplayed the emphasis on security issues and emphasized the informality of the meetings, they encountered some resistance among the G20 to this development and the Russian government did not send even a deputy foreign minister. In contrast, the US was vocally supportive of the meeting with Hillary Rodham Clinton arguing that 'foreign relations and economic relations are inseparable' (US Department of State 2012). The meeting ended up agreeing on the need for institutional reform in global governance, particularly in the case of the UN. In the words of Germany's foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle:

Our meeting in Mexico is a first. If it succeeds, it will convince other participants. We do not want to make the G20 a counter-format to the UN. We are just convinced

that the 20 strongest economic nations in the world are linked by more than just economics and fiscal policy but also by a global political approach.¹

At the following year's St Petersburg summit, most of the first evening was taken up with discussion of the war in Syria and the Assad government's use of chemical weapons in a Damascus suburb a fortnight previously (explored below in more detail). In addition, all G20 countries, regardless of their experience and stage of development, committed to 'strive for the highest possible level of nuclear safety, to foster robust nuclear safety and nuclear security cultures and, as called for in the International Atomic Energy Agency Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, ... encourage multilateral cooperation towards achieving a global nuclear liability regime' (G20 Information Centre 2013b).

Traditional security issues have more regularly been the focus of discussion within the numerous bilateral – and sometimes trilateral – meetings that take place on the edges of the summit. For example, bilateral and trilateral meetings have served to manage relations between regional rivals. After both assuming office in 2012, Prime Minister Abe of Japan and President Xi Jinping of China grasped the opportunity provided for direct engagement within global summity. Despite the awkwardness of their first official meeting at the 2013 St Petersburg summit, it was on the sidelines of this summit where the two leaders briefly shook hands and exchanged words directly for the first time. In his post-summit press conference, Abe touched on territorial disputes but stressed a 'mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests' (Kantei 2013). No meeting of the two took place at the following G20 summits held in Brisbane in 2014 and Antalya in 2015, and the G20 itself even served to fuel Sino-Japanese rivalry, with securing its 2016 presidency becoming the focus of ongoing competition. However, in the end, both leaders used the Hangzhou summit of that year to conduct an official bilateral meeting on its second day. The following year in Hamburg, they met once again on the sidelines of the summit on its final day in what proved to be a positive meeting that set the tone for many of the positive developments in the relationship that followed, as exemplified by Japan's understanding of China's One Belt, One Road initiative, and mutual official visits. President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Xi met the day before the summit began for what proved to be a constructive meeting to discuss North Korea, despite the shadow cast by the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea. Abe and Moon met for the first time on the first day of the summit, stressed the future-oriented nature of the relationship and agreed to resume reciprocal visits. In fact, the Abe–Xi meeting on the final day collated the bilaterals that had taken place during the summit by calling for a trilateral meeting between North-East Asia's key partners to take place by the end of 2017, thus seeking to combine these bilateral dialogues into a rejuvenated trilateral process.

However, often these bilaterals and trilaterals eschew internationalism and the provision of global public goods, focusing instead on hard national interests. For example, at the bilateral level, the discussion between Abe and Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian prime minister, on shared security concerns in the South China Sea, took place at the Antalya summit within the context of Japan's ultimately unsuccessful bid to win the contract to provide Australia with its next generation of submarines (Dobson 2017). On a trilateral level, the three-way discussion between Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, Abe and Obama on the sidelines of the first day of the Brisbane summit can be interpreted as part of Abe's efforts to reinforce key regional and democratic allies in an effort to balance against China. The three leaders declared in a thinly veiled reference to China that

this partnership rests on the unshakable foundation of shared interests and values, including a commitment to democracy and open economies, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes ... The three leaders also underscored the strength of their regional cooperation ... ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight and the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance with international law, including through legal mechanisms such as arbitration. (White House 2014b)

Similarly, the trilateral between India, Japan and the US held at the 2018 Buenos Aires summit was the first of its kind and brought together the leaders of three democracies with clear overlapping economic and security interests in relation to China.

As regards the specific security issue of the civil war in Syria, the obvious divide at the 2013 St Petersburg summit was between Russia as host and supporter of the government of President Bashar al-Assad, and the US, which was in favour of military action in response to Syria's use of chemical weapons against its own people in violation of the norms of international society. However, this divide ran through the G20 as a whole: Canada, France, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye supported military action, whereas Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Italy and South Africa opposed action, with a handful of countries hedging their bets because of domestic concerns and constraints. Perhaps aware of the divisions within the G20 and the slim chances of a consensus emerging out of these divisions, Putin was ready as host to include discussion of the situation in Syria within the format of the G20 but was not going to accept it usurping the UN: '... the G20 is not a formal legal authority. It's not a substitute for the UNSC, it can't take decisions on the use of force. But it's a good platform to discuss the problem. Why not take advantage of this?'² Not required constitutionally to put the decision to a parliamentary vote, President François Hollande was ready to commit France to participate alongside the US in military action. However, long-standing US allies like the UK, Germany and Japan, although ready to provide moral support and

condemn the use of chemical weapons, were wary of or unable to commit material support. In the case of the UK, Cameron had lost a parliamentary vote the previous week on military action in Syria. As regards Japan, this came down to long-standing postwar constitutional restrictions. Germany's position on the Syrian conflict was one of distance. German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, cited legal restrictions on Germany's military and summarized its position as follows: 'Our participation has not been requested, nor are we considering it.'³ The South Korean government actively sought to establish the existence of a link between Syria and the North Korean regime through the trade of chemical weapons. China took its traditional position of opposing military intervention by emphasizing sovereignty but adding the resulting disruption to the global economy as an additional factor. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon worked on the margins of the 2013 St Petersburg G20 as part of a two-hander with his UN–Arab League envoy on Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, to get agreement on an international conference on the conflict. At their traditional pre-summit press briefing, EU presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso were supportive of this by declaring that the 'international community cannot remain idle. We have to show that such crimes are unacceptable and will not be tolerated, to show that there can be no impunity' but calling for the crisis to be addressed 'through the UN process'. The Pope has on occasions written to the G20 leaders on the eve of their summits (for example, Seoul 2010, Brisbane 2013 and Hamburg 2017) to wish them a successful outcome and extend his blessings. Pope Francis wrote to G20 leaders on the eve of the 2013 St Petersburg summit with a plea for them to abandon a military solution in favour of a peaceful solution to a 'senseless massacre' (The Vatican 2013). So, although the leaders discussed Syria late into the first night of the summit, no mention of it was made in the final leaders' declaration. Rather, the leaders of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Türkiye, the UK and US issued a joint statement on the summit's margins that condemned the use of chemical weapons, acknowledged the paralysis in the UNSC and called for a strong response (G20 Information Centre 2013c). Once again on the summit's periphery, bilaterals provided a vehicle for attempting to address this conflict. Putin and Obama held an unplanned half-hour meeting on the sidelines of the summit on the final day and agreed to disagree with each other's positions. Putin also met with Cameron.

Parlar Dal (2019, 8) has identified the Syrian conflict as stoking Türkiye's expectations of the role the G20 could play in the field of security '[b]ecause of its flexible decision-making mechanisms', in contrast to the UN. However, she regards Türkiye's efforts in this area as essentially low profile and the attempt at the 2015 Antalya summit to place security issues on the agenda as limited. The limitations may be a result of the continued divide between the US and Russia on the Syrian conflict that was still in evidence despite a half-hour

bilateral between Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin on the first day of the summit. Despite positive White House reports of the meeting that stressed agreement on the need for ‘a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition’ including UN-mediated talks, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov, played down any results: ‘On tactics, the two sides are still diverging.’⁷⁴ While seeking regime change in Syria, the US was wary of any greater commitment of support to moderate Syrian opposition forces in their fight against Daesh and the Assad government such as enforcing no-fly zones and safe havens that might involve the deployment of US ground troops. In contrast, Russia openly supported Assad in the defeat of Daesh before any consideration of political reform in Syria. Furthermore, Putin claimed that terrorists in Syria were being financed from a number of countries, including within the G20.⁵

The G20 leaders sought to discuss the Syrian conflict within the context of the refugee crisis as a planned agenda item rather than one suddenly forced onto the agenda as a result of the Paris shootings. As host, Türkiye requested financial help to house two million refugees and a clear quota for each EU country to take refugees. Nevertheless, the Paris shootings coloured the discussion of the refugee crisis as the open borders of the EU came under scrutiny. The EU’s official position was that ‘[t]he G20 must rise to the challenge and lead a coordinated and innovative response to the crisis that recognizes its global nature and economic consequences and promotes greater international solidarity in protecting refugees’ (EU 2015b). Despite the terrorist attacks in Paris, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated that ‘I would invite those in Europe who try to change the migration agenda we have adopted – I would like to remind them to be serious about this and not to give in to these basic reactions that I do not like. I see the difficulty but I don’t see the need to change our general approach.’⁷⁶ Germany took a similar position in support of the Schengen arrangements as did President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, who similarly emphasized that despite anger over the Paris attacks, migrants must not be confused with terrorists (Zuma 2015). The issues of migrant smuggling and human trafficking were subsequently taken up more substantially at the Hamburg and Buenos Aires summits as another migration crisis threatened in Libya. The EU sought at both summits to pursue a robust response within the G20 (EU 2017; EU 2018). At Hamburg, President of the European Council Donald Tusk called on G20 leaders to be ‘less cynical’ in the fight against human trafficking and support a proposal that would institute targeted UN sanctions against migrant smugglers. The proposal received some support within the G20 but was opposed by China and Russia.⁷⁷ Although inextricably linked, in contrast to the challenges of a complex security issue like the Syrian conflict with both its regional and global rivalries and broader ramifications in the form of the refugee crisis, the G20 has concomitantly

and more consistently responded to the specific issue of global terrorism, as explored below.

Another specific security concern, North Korea, has made its presence felt at the G20 in the form of regular provocation around the time of the summit. For example, it shelled the island of Yeonpyeong two weeks after the 2010 Seoul summit, an act described as a petulant response to the attention that South Korea received as summit host.⁸ With impeccable timing North Korea also conducted ballistic missile tests during the 2016 Hangzhou summit, an act described in turn as an ‘armed protest’,⁹ and ‘Pyongyang’s way of reminding everyone of their existence at a moment when all the parties are together, in a typically defiant, North Korean way’.¹⁰ Once again, days before the 2017 Hamburg summit, the North Korean regime launched an intercontinental ballistic missile in an attempt to gain the world’s attention (Liu 2019). However, the G20 has resisted engaging with the issue on a multilateral level and in a substantive way. As Australia’s Prime Minister Turnbull, who was in favour of a unanimous statement of condemnation, explained in the case of the Hamburg summit, ‘[t]he chair of the G20, Chancellor Merkel, made the point that the G20 has been historically largely an economic conference’.¹¹ China and Russia also opposed a joint G20 statement condemning North Korea and pledging further sanctions, citing a rationale similar to Merkel’s.

G20 members with a vested interest in placing the issue of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development on the agenda of the G20 and securing international support are predominantly the regional neighbours being targeted and with most to lose: South Korea and Japan. As regards the former, ahead of the 2010 Seoul summit and although no mention was made of North Korea in the final summit documentation, the South Korean hosts regarded the event as an opportunity to secure greater leverage with North Korea and, looking ahead to possible reunification, attract assistance from the international community and multilateral bodies (Cherry and Dobson 2012). As regards the latter, although in the midst of the GFC, the Japanese prime minister, Asō Tarō, used the 2009 London summit not only as a vehicle for Japan’s substantial financial contribution to the IMF in resolving the crisis but also to discuss North Korea and its nuclear and missile development with fellow leaders, as his predecessors since Koizumi had done in the G8.¹²

Once again, bilaterals and trilaterals have played a role in discussing North Korea’s nuclear and missile development within the G20 and in immediate response to its summit-oriented provocations. Japan’s Abe met with Obama and President Park Geun-hye of South Korea on the edges of the Hangzhou summit, resulting in declarations of condemnation and cooperation (Kantei 2016). At the Hamburg summit, US, South Korean and Japanese leaders came together for a seventy-five minute trilateral meeting the day before the summit began, which resulted in a Joint Statement underscoring their trilateral

security cooperation and referring in suitably diplomatic language to China's and Russia's roles in managing North Korea and denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula (Jibiki 2017). The G20 has also provided the opportunity for ad hoc diplomacy towards North Korea, as seen at the Osaka summit when, on the evening of the first day of the two-day summit, Trump tweeted his willingness to meet Kim Jong Un in the Demilitarized Zone and two days later became the first incumbent US president to visit North Korea.

As mentioned in the previous section, an extraordinary meeting of G20 leaders took place online a few weeks ahead of the 2021 Rome summit in response to the situation in Afghanistan, the US evacuation and the Taliban's takeover. The Italian prime minister, Mario Draghi, stressed the outcomes of the meeting: 'This was the first multilateral response to the Afghan crisis ... multilateralism is coming back, with difficulty, but it is coming back.'¹³ The resulting G20 statement called on the Taliban to ensure safe passage for refugees, contain military groups and that future humanitarian programmes should focus on women and girls (G20 Information Centre 2021b). However, Xi and Putin did not participate and sent ministers in their place. In fact, China called for an end to economic sanctions on Afghanistan and the unfreezing of Afghan international assets.

The Ukraine conflict has proved to be equally challenging and potentially disruptive. Ahead of the 2022 Bali summit, expectations were low that much could be achieved, especially with Putin not in attendance and Russia represented for only part of the summit, before Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's early departure. However, as mentioned above, a balance was struck in the leaders' declaration with, on the one hand, absolute clarity on the sanctity of international law and multilateralism in the pursuit of security, as well as the rejection of the use of nuclear weapons. It was the words of the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, that concluded paragraph 4 of the Leaders' declaration: 'Today's era must not be of war' (G20 Information Centre 2022a; Niblett 2022). On the other hand, the absence of consensus among G20 members in condemning the war and the limits of the G20 as a forum when dealing with security issues were starkly evident. In response to a missile explosion on Polish territory and the death of two Polish citizens on the first day of the summit, the first reaction of US president, Joe Biden, was to call an emergency meeting of like-minded G7 countries to agree a wait-and-see position until the facts of the incident were established. In contrast, some analysts suggested that China's position on Ukraine was a 'diplomatic dance' of balancing between 'respect for Ukraine's sovereignty' and 'Russia's legitimate security interests' (Korolev 2022).

6.4 TERRORISM

Despite an agenda ostensibly focused on macroeconomic challenges, it took the G7 just four summits before terrorism as a specific issue found its way onto the agenda of the 1978 Bonn summit in the form of a separate and brief statement on air-hijacking (G7 Information Centre 1978). As outlined above, in the case of the G20 it took slightly longer before a similar development came to pass at its tenth summit in 2015 in Antalya. However, as with the G7, the G20's Statement on the Fight against Terrorism was a response to immediate events in the form of the Ankara bombings of 10 October that killed over 100 people, and the Paris shootings on 13 November, just before the summit began, which killed 130 people and for which Daesh took responsibility, suggesting an expansion of their activities beyond northern Syria.

As will be explored in Chapter 7, hosting a summit is a 'mark of prestige' (Çolakoğlu and Hecan 2016, 143) and although Türkiye had considerable experience of organizing and hosting large-scale multilateral meetings, it was eager to ensure that this diplomatic mega-event proceeded smoothly and had concrete outcomes, to burnish its reputation. The original focus of the summit was placed on promoting growth based on inclusiveness, implementation and investment and this formed the basis of preparations from the point that Türkiye assumed the G20 presidency from Australia on 1 December 2014. The Paris shootings threatened to wrest attention away from the original economic focus of the agenda to this urgent issue and for some, a 'combination of negative and unforeseen circumstances sapped Türkiye's power and hindered it from leading a focused Presidency' (Çolakoğlu and Hecan 2016, 157). However, it was clear that the Turkish hosts sought to place the summit's attention on global terrorism, as well as the Syrian conflict and refugee crisis (as discussed above), some time before the Paris shootings. As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Türkiye, stated ahead of Antalya, reflecting the quandary faced by the G7 in the 1970s, it is

now impossible to consider the economy separately from politics, social developments and most importantly security ... and the inclusion of the issues of Iraq and Syria in the G20 agenda was not against the primary objectives of the platform ... [Thus, the Antalya summit would] address both the refugee crisis and the issue of terrorism which threaten global peace and stability. (Aliriza 2015)

As a result, the Turkish hosts performed a successful balancing act. On the one hand, they maintained the planned economic focus of the summit's agenda and introduced a range of institutional reforms to the G20, as discussed in Chapter 2. On the other hand, they were seen to respond rapidly to the Paris shootings and demonstrate unity within a diverse grouping on this issue, while leverag-

ing an immediate crisis to promote a parallel security agenda that had been planned ahead of time. In a speech on the day after the shootings, the UK prime minister, David Cameron, struck this tone by addressing the French people and linking the specific to the general: ‘Your values are our values, your pain is our pain, your fight is our fight.’¹⁴ President of the European Council Donald Tusk echoed this position with direct reference to the G20 by promising Hollande that the EU would demand that world leaders respond to the threats of extremism and terrorism.¹⁵ As host of the following year’s summit and only weeks away from assuming the G20 presidency, Chinese officials reiterated these comments. On the one hand, Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao dubbed terrorism ‘the common enemy of all mankind’ and highlighted the resulting ‘special significance’ placed upon the G20 members to ensure a successful Antalya summit.¹⁶ On the other hand, Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed that ‘joint forces should be formed to fight against terrorism, and that both the symptoms and root causes of the issue should be addressed. Double standards shouldn’t be allowed’, referring to China’s own crackdown on the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and arguing that it should become an important part of the international fight against terrorism.¹⁷

Thus, strategies to combat violent extremism were the topics of discussion at a working dinner on the first night of the summit. Modi highlighted terrorism as a principal global challenge and called for a comprehensive convention on international terrorism and restructuring of the international legal framework to deal with it. He proposed concrete measures such as isolating supporters and sponsors of terrorism by curbing the supply of arms to terrorists, disrupting terrorist movements and criminalizing terror financing.¹⁸ The gravity of the issue prompted the Turkish hosts to an innovation in the design of the summit such that foreign ministers and advisers were present at the working breakfast and working lunch on the first full day of the summit for the first time. In addition, many ceremonial aspects of the summit, such as a concert, were cancelled out of respect for the victims. The Statement on the Fight against Terrorism, like the leaders’ communiqué, was the product of months of negotiation and drafted in advance of the summit for the leaders to tweak and ultimately approve. Events conspired to make the statement more urgent and to foster G20 unity on the issue. It condemned the attacks in Paris and Ankara as ‘unacceptable insults to all humanity’, ensured buy-in from across the G20 by emphasizing that ‘terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group’; it also committed the G20 to

countering violent extremism, combatting radicalization and recruitment, hampering terrorist movements, countering terrorist propaganda and to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to incite terrorist acts, including through the internet. The direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism,

the incitement of terrorist acts and glorification of violence must be prevented. We recognize the need at all levels to work proactively to prevent violent extremism and support civil society in engaging youth and promoting inclusion of all members of society. (G20 Information Centre 2015c)

As a result, Erdoğan was able to claim that ‘[t]he main result in Antalya is the G20 countries taking a tougher stance on terrorism’.¹⁹ It is not surprising that G20 leaders were able to find common cause and rally around a condemnation of a specific and immediate terrorist atrocity. However, it should also be noted that the statement placed the onus for combatting terrorism on the UN, which would secure the support of G20 countries, such as China, Russia and South Africa, that did not want to see the legitimate centre of global governance being usurped or an expansion of the G20’s agenda. Paragraph 5 of the statement exemplified the balance between G20 unity on the issue and couching this resolve within existing and legitimate structures:

The fight against terrorism is a major priority for all of our countries and we reiterate our resolve to work together to prevent and suppress terrorist acts through increased international solidarity and cooperation, in full recognition of the UN’s central role, and in accordance with UN Charter and obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, as well as through the full implementation of the relevant international conventions, UNSR resolutions and the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. (G20 Information Centre 2015c, emphasis added)

However, beyond the rhetoric, divergence was apparent across the G20 in terms of concrete actions. Although Hollande was unable to attend the summit and sent Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in his place, the French position was, understandably, as the victim of the immediate terror attacks, to declare itself to be at war and dispatch a French aircraft carrier to the Middle East to facilitate airstrikes on Daesh. However, the US position, as articulated by Obama at his post-summit press conference, was to extend rhetorical and logistical support for France but resist any further intervention in terms of the deployment of US troops (Stiles 2015).²⁰

The following year’s summit in Hangzhou built on the previous year’s treatment of terrorism by including a condemnation in the leaders’ communiqué:

We strongly condemn terrorism in all forms and manifestations, which poses serious challenges to international peace and security and endangers our ongoing efforts to strengthen the global economy and ensure sustainable growth and development. We reaffirm our solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism in all its forms and wherever it occurs. (G20 Information Centre 2016b)

The EU position was communicated by Tusk and Juncker ahead of the summit to EU governments stressing the ‘need to stand together in combatting the financing of terrorism’ and acknowledged that in a short space of time ‘[t]he G20 has already taken important steps in this direction, and should continue on this path’, specifically through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (EU 2016). During the summit discussions, Modi attempted to shift the focus onto state-sponsored terrorism and in a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan claimed that ‘[t]here are some nations that use terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Indeed, one single nation in South Asia is spreading these agents of terror in countries of our region.’ Modi continued by arguing that ‘those who sponsor and support terrorism must be isolated and sanctioned, not rewarded’ in what was seen to be another thinly veiled reference to China’s refusal to support UN sanctions against Pakistan-based terrorists.²¹ These issues had already been discussed as part of Modi’s bilateral with summit host Xi ahead of the summit. Erdoğan struck a similar tone by continuing to place terrorism firmly on the G20’s agenda and warning against double standards. Ahead of Hangzhou, he stated that ‘[t]hreats to global stability are our main problems now. One of them is terrorism and the other one is refugee crises. There is no good terrorist. All terrorists are bad. Thus, a principled stance against all these terrorist groups is needed.’²² Unsurprisingly, France supported this position, with Hollande stating that ‘[a] priority of the G20 summit is security and fighting terrorism. We should be fighting jointly sources of financing the international terrorism.’²³

In his post-summit press conference, Abe also demonstrated underlying national interest when discussing the G20’s response to terrorism and pledging Japanese leadership under the banner of Japan’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’. This has widely been regarded as part of an emerging and eponymous foreign policy doctrine that seeks to assert Japan’s great power status and overturn long-standing constraints on Japan’s power projection, such as article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, perceived as one of many postwar ‘shackles’ (Hughes 2015; Dobson 2017).

At the 2017 Hamburg summit, the German hosts took Türkiye’s approach and organized the summit to ensure dedicated discussion and a resulting statement on the issue of terrorism. The former was fostered through an informal leaders’ retreat on the morning of the first day of the summit, which was focused on terrorism and lasted two hours. The resulting stand-alone statement was more substantial than the one made in Antalya and ‘condemn[ed] all terrorist attacks worldwide’ stressing that the G20 stood ‘united and firm in the fight against terrorism and its financing’ (G20 Information Centre 2017d). Once again, India played a key role. Earlier in the year at the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Bonn, it had proposed creating a G20 working group on terrorism. At the leaders’ summit, Modi was the lead speaker at the

retreat and presented a multi-point agenda for countering terrorism, arguing that the leaders of countries supporting terrorism should be banned from G20 processes, national lists of designated terrorists should be shared among G20 countries, extradition processes should be simplified and expedited, and the Indian initiative of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism should be adopted by the UNSC.²⁴ Australia also played a proactive role in shaping the G20's treatment of the issue with Prime Minister Turnbull helping to personally draft a section of the G20's statement on counter-terrorism.²⁵ The penultimate paragraph resonated with efforts made by Merkel and May to address ungoverned, online spaces and promised that:

In line with the expectations of our peoples we also encourage collaboration with industry to provide lawful and non-arbitrary access to available information where access is necessary for the protection of national security against terrorist threats. We affirm that the rule of law applies online as well as it does offline. (G20 Information Centre 2017d)

Although not accorded its own document, and with trade dominating discussions, a strong statement on terrorism was included in the leaders' declaration resulting from the 2018 Buenos Aires summit, which supported the previous year's treatment of terrorism:

We reaffirm our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We commit to the full implementation of the Hamburg G20 Leaders' Statement on Countering Terrorism. We will step up our efforts in fighting terrorist and proliferation financing, and money laundering. We urge the digital industry to work together to fight exploitation of the internet and social media for terrorist purposes. (G20 Information Centre 2018b)

In contrast, the 2019 Osaka summit resulted in a very specific statement on preventing exploitation of the internet for terrorism and VECT, which was singled out by Putin as an important outcome and by Lavrov as a positive step, although later that year Lavrov accused the West of not wanting to involve Russia and China in the process of establishing counterterrorism guidelines for IT companies.²⁶ In addition, the G20 leaders made a much weaker statement in their declaration that was focused on 'the essential role of the FATF in setting global standards for preventing and combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing' (G20 Information Centre 2019b). In contrast, Modi used the summit to make a more robust call for a global conference on terrorism in response to what he dubbed 'the biggest threat to humanity'.

6.5 NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY

The G20's engagement with non-traditional security has been as incremental and inevitable as it has been with traditional security issues. Engelbrekt regards paragraph 15 of the 2008 Washington Declaration, quoted at the outset of this chapter, as 'a list of issues featured largely at the margins of G20 summits' (2015, 542–543). At the following year's Pittsburgh summit, a paragraph in the leaders' statement was dedicated to energy security and climate change, and food security also featured strongly throughout the document. Thereafter, subsequent summits have revisited all of these challenges in an iterative fashion. However, the G20 (and previous chapters of this book) has treated them by and large not as non-traditional security issues but as aspects of its development and climate change agenda. For example, Chapter 4 discussed food security as a specific priority in the work of the G20 on development. This issue also demonstrates how the G20's agenda can expand to cannibalize that of the G7/8, for example the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). The AFSI emerged from the eponymous 2009 Italian summit at which G8 and non-G8 countries declared:

We will aim at substantially increasing aid to agriculture and food security including through multiyear resource commitments. In this respect, we welcome the commitments made by countries represented at L'Aquila towards a goal of mobilizing \$20 billion over three years through this coordinated, comprehensive strategy focused on sustainable agriculture development, while keeping a strong commitment to ensure adequate emergency food aid assistance. (G7 Information Centre 2009)

Chapter 5 largely deals with energy as an issue, alongside an overarching response to climate change. However, it has also received treatment as a security issue. As mentioned above, under the Australian presidency, the 2014 Brisbane summit was the first to dedicate time and space to the discussion of energy issues and, although vague, established agreed principles on various aspects of energy collaboration, including energy security, namely to '[e]nhance energy security through dialogue and cooperation on issues such as emergency response measures' (G20 Information Centre 2014d). Since 2015, as a result of the Turkish presidency's initiative, G20 energy ministers have met annually ahead of the leaders' summit. These ministerial meetings have dedicated similarly worded paragraphs to energy security in their communiqués that resonate with the principles set out at Brisbane. The one exception was the German presidency of 2017, which did not convene a meeting of energy ministers but instead released the G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth at the leaders' summit. As mentioned above, and building on the Turkish initiative, the Japanese presidency innovated in summit design

by holding the first-ever G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth in Karuizawa, Japan, in June 2019. Energy security continued to receive its own paragraph at this meeting, slightly more substantial but largely similar to previous ministerials:

In light of recent developments highlighting concern about energy security, the G20 Energy Ministers acknowledge energy security as one of the guiding principles for the transformation of energy systems. The G20 Energy Ministers also emphasize the importance of resilience, protection, and development of reliable energy infrastructure to prevent energy supply disruptions; and stress the importance of diversification of energy sources, suppliers, and routes, facilitation of open, flexible, transparent, competitive, stable, and reliable markets, increasing energy efficiency. They attach importance to promotion of dialogue between consumers and producers as well as global collaboration in the business sector, and the need to facilitate the proper conditions to continue and increase energy investments to ensure ... sustainable, affordable, reliable, resilient and cleaner energy systems. The G20 Energy Ministers recognize the importance of quality infrastructure investment that promotes sustainable growth and enhances the resilience of our energy systems. (G20 Information Centre 2019a)

By acknowledging the importance of energy security and calling for improved infrastructure and diversification of energy sources (with the Japanese presidency placing a particular focus on the role of hydrogen), the G20 ministers were reiterating previous statements but also responding to suspected Iranian attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which took place while Prime Minister Abe was visiting Iran only days before the ministerial meeting.²⁷ In this vein, G20 leaders at the Osaka summit noted the outcomes of the ministerial meeting in Karuizawa and reiterated their concerns over recent events:

In light of recent events highlighting concern about safe flow of energy, we acknowledge the importance of global energy security as one of the guiding principles for the transformation of energy systems, including resilience, safety and development of infrastructure and uninterrupted flow of energy from various sources, suppliers, and routes. (G20 Information Centre 2019b)

Nevertheless, despite incremental progress, one of the major obstacles for the G20 in responding to energy security beyond platitudes is the dichotomy that exists within its membership between energy liberalizers and energy nationalists.

As regards environmental security and protection of the marine environment in particular, the G20 first engaged with the issue in 2010 with a passing and uncontroversial comment towards the end of the Toronto summit declaration that '[f]ollowing the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico we recognize the need to share best practices to protect the marine environment, prevent accidents related to offshore exploration and development, as well as trans-

portation, and deal with their consequences' (G20 Information Centre 2010c). However, by the end of the decade, protecting the marine environment had become a much more salient topic both on the international community's agenda and in the public imagination, with a particular focus on reducing the use of single-use plastics. This was partly due to the decision to prohibit the import of overseas' plastic waste by some countries, most notably China in 2017, and in part due to Sir David Attenborough's BBC programme *Blue Planet II* and the resulting 'Attenborough Effect'. The German presidency led on this issue with the adoption of the G20 Action Plan on Marine Litter at the Hamburg summit in 2017, which recognized the cross-cutting nature of the challenge across the environment, human health, economic development, social well-being, biodiversity and food security, as well as laying the foundations in terms of agreed intent and principles by which the G20 could begin to address the issue (G20 Information Centre 2017e).

As an island nation, the Japanese government sought to ensure that the issues of protecting the marine environment and reducing the use of plastics were placed visibly on the agenda of its presidency and that the G20 made concrete progress on its initial treatment of marine litter at Hamburg. It did this by demonstrating innovation in summit organization by convening the first-ever G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth. The EU was equally keen to shape the global dialogue on marine litter by sharing its experience as the first region in the world to introduce a comprehensive plastic strategy and rules to reduce the impact on the environment of some single-use plastics. It also sought to have its holistic approach pursued through the EU circular economy agenda as well as having its plastic strategy reflected in the summit documentation. It succeeded in this goal, and the ministerial meeting resulted in an agreement to create a new voluntary framework to '[p]romote a comprehensive life-cycle approach to urgently and effectively prevent and reduce plastic litter discharge to the oceans' as well as encourage countries to '[s]hare and update information on relevant policies, plans, and measures taken/to be taken in line with the G20 Action Plan on Marine Litter' (G20 Information Centre 2019c). The main criticism levelled at the framework was its voluntary and non-binding nature and the loophole of 'taking into account our own appropriate policies, approaches, and national circumstances'. It also failed to specify which kind of plastics – in particular single-use plastics – or to provide any timescales, deadlines or robust monitoring. In its defence, the Japanese government stressed the incremental first step within a future process that this agreement represented.²⁸ To this end, this expansion in ministerial meetings was continued at subsequent summits. The G20 leaders endorsed the framework later the same month in Osaka and declared that 'we share, and call on other members of the international community to also share, as a common global vision, the "Osaka Blue Ocean Vision"

that we aim to reduce additional pollution by marine plastic litter to zero by 2050 through a comprehensive life-cycle approach that includes reducing the discharge of mismanaged plastic litter by improved waste management and innovative solutions while recognizing the important role of plastics for society' (G20 Information Centre 2019b). Whether 2050 was an effective and realisable deadline for achieving zero marine plastic litter was the source of as much criticism as the absence of a deadline in the framework. However, even if a relatively diluted approach, this framework and vision did demonstrate Japan's renewed leadership on the issue and ability to keep the US on board when previously both countries had refused to sign up to a similarly phrased Ocean Plastics Charter adopted by the remaining members of the G7 at its Charlevoix summit a year earlier (G7 Information Centre 2018; Kojima and Iwasaki 2019).

Finally, the treatment of the issue of cyber security at the G20 has been both multilateral and bilateral. As regards the former, by placing the emphasis on the digital economy in the agenda, successive G20 presidencies were also highlighting the associated necessity of cyber security. Although the Korean presidency sought to address this issue from an early stage, but gave up trying to build a consensus,²⁹ and a number of US senators urged Obama to raise cyber security at the Hangzhou summit,³⁰ it began to be addressed from Antalya onwards in an incremental but consistent fashion. The leaders' communiqué at Antalya stated, somewhat obviously and belatedly:

We are living in an age of Internet economy that brings both opportunities and challenges to global growth [and acknowledge] that threats to the security of and in the use of ICTs, risk undermining our collective ability to use the Internet to bolster economic growth and development around the world ... we affirm that no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. All states in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should respect and protect the principles of freedom from unlawful and arbitrary interference of privacy, including in the context of digital communications. (G20 Information Centre 2015a)

The following year saw the Chinese presidency incrementally build on this acknowledgment of the importance of the issue with the decision to establish the G20 Digital Economy Task Force to 'propose a common understanding, principles and key areas for the development and cooperation of the digital economy' (G20 Information Centre 2016c). This was realized the following year under the German presidency.

While the German presidency demonstrated innovation in establishing the first ministerial meeting associated with digitization, much of the treatment of it in summit declarations has largely consisted of repetitious platitudes of the

importance of cyber security to the digital economy. The Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration that was issued at the ministerial meeting held in Salta, Argentina, a few months before the Buenos Aires summit, proposed a set of principles around the digital economy. As regards cyber security, the declaration stated in vague terms:

Security

Promote trust and security, as vital for harnessing the potential of digital government, by adopting a risk management approach for appropriate uptake of digital technologies to address security risks, data loss concerns, privacy, threats and vulnerabilities in the use of ICT. Adopt risk management models to identify, assess, monitor, mitigate and manage risks as well as promote resilience and security of systems. Foster the adoption of reliable identity and trust management approaches. Promote international cooperation in regard to this matter. (G20 Information Centre 2018d, original emphasis)

The Japanese presidency sought to highlight its pet policy of DFFT, mentioned above, highlighting on the one hand the contribution that digitization makes to inclusive and sustainable economic growth, while acknowledging the challenges around privacy, data protection, intellectual property rights, and security (G20 Information Centre 2019b). At the beginning of 2019 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Abe advocated the creation of the ‘Osaka Track’, an overarching framework promoting cross-border data flow with enhanced protections (Kantei 2019a). However, the challenge for the Japanese hosts was that a number of G20 countries including China, Russia, India and Vietnam (an invited guest at the Osaka summit) all operated their own restrictive data transfer regulations. In the end, Abe announced the ‘Osaka Track’ on the first day of the leaders’ summit with the support of Japan’s closest bilateral partner, the US, as well as the EU, Australia and Singapore, and managed to secure the signatures of China, Russia and Vietnam. However, Egypt, India, Indonesia and South Africa did not sign up for the initiative, leading the Japanese hosts to downplay what was intended to be a signature policy in order to avoid any diplomatic embarrassment.³¹ India argued that taking the initiative forward within the plurilateral space of the G20 undermined ‘multilateral’ principles of consensus-based decisions in global trade negotiations and that the WTO was a more appropriate forum as data is a form of trade. In addition, the Indian government believed that the initiative would restrict developing countries from developing their own policies that would allow them to bridge the digital divide with developed countries, level the playing field and ultimately benefit from digitization.

Cyber security has also been the subject of bilateral discussions on the edges of the summits. For example, in the context of concerns surrounding possible Russian interference in the UK’s Brexit referendum and US Presidential

election of 2016, Trump claimed to have raised the latter issue in a bilateral with Putin at the Hamburg summit. In typical Trumpian language, he also tweeted that the two leaders had discussed ‘forming an impenetrable Cyber Security unit so that election hacking, and many other negative things, will be guarded and safe’ (Trump 2017).³² Although the plan was ridiculed, with the Republican senator, Marco Rubio, likening the plan to working with Syria’s President Assad on a ‘Chemical Weapons Unit’ in a counter-tweet (Rubio 2017), the idea resurfaced at a later bilateral between the two leaders in Helsinki, prompting further ridicule.³³

6.6 SUMMARY

Security – traditional or non-traditional – has inexorably found its way onto a G20 summit agenda dominated by financial and economic issues. As regards the positions of G20 members on this development, Engelbrekt has suggested that ‘[l]eaders of countries that aspire to gain a permanent seat at the UNSC – primarily India, Brazil, South Africa, Germany, and Japan – are wary that expanding the scope of G20 initiatives could circumscribe the former body’s role’ (2015, 539). However, as demonstrated above, the intersection of security and the G20’s remit does not necessarily correlate with the subgroups within the G20, or desired and actual membership of the UNSC. Some G7 countries, such as the US and Germany on occasion, have been more accepting of an expansion of the agenda into the field of security broadly defined. Some of the BRICS countries, most notably China and Russia, have certainly been sceptical and resisted the development. However, India and Türkiye stand out as countries that have been more vocal in placing issues like the Syrian civil war and global terrorism on the agenda. Thus, a theme that emerges in this chapter, as might be expected in the hard-nosed realist world of security, is that a crisis can be the factor that undercuts the position of any particular government and ultimately encourages it to make use of the G20, often for explicit national interests. If the G20 is too unwieldy, then bilaterals and trilaterals have instead proved to be useful for many countries in addressing any given crisis or promoting national security interests (for the importance of bilaterals, see Dobson 2012d). The next chapter will also highlight the importance of national interest but within the context of the often overlooked domestic impact of G20 summitry.

NOTES

1. *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, 21 February 2012.
2. *The Moscow Times*, 3 September 2013.
3. *Deutsche Welle*, 31 August 2013.

4. *New York Times*, 15 November 2015.
5. *The Guardian*, 15 November 2015.
6. *The Guardian* 15 November 2015.
7. *Agence France-Presse*, 7 July 2017.
8. *BBC News*, 23 November 2010.
9. *The Washington Post*, 5 September 2016.
10. *CNN*, 5 September 2016.
11. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 July 2017.
12. *Asahi Shinbun*, 3 April 2009.
13. *Reuters*, 13 October 2021.
14. *The Telegraph*, 14 November 2015.
15. *Cape Argus*, 16 November 2015.
16. *Xinhua*, 15 November 2015.
17. *The Financial Times*, 17 November 2015.
18. *Times of India*, 17 November 2015.
19. *Sputnik News*, 16 November 2015.
20. *The New York Times* 15 November 2015.
21. *The Times of India*, 6 September 2016.
22. *Andalou Agency*, 3 September 2016.
23. *TASS*, 4 September 2016.
24. *Asian News International*, 7 July 2017.
25. *The Age*, 10 July 2017.
26. *TASS*, 16 October 2019.
27. *The Japan Times*, 16 June 2019.
28. *The Japan Times*, 16 June 2019.
29. *The Korea Times*, 5 August 2010.
30. *Reuters*, 29 August 2016.
31. *The Japan Times*, 28 June 2019.
32. *Reuters*, 9 July 2017.
33. *Politico*, 16 July 2018.

7. G20 summitry beyond global governance

7.1 OVERVIEW

On 11 July 2012, what could only be described as a spat erupted between two cities over who was to secure the opportunity to host Australia's G20 summit in 2014. With Melbourne withdrawing from the competition citing concerns around the possibly negative impact of protest and policing, it had become a two-horse race between Brisbane and Sydney. The decision of Australian prime minister, Julia Gillard, to award Brisbane the opportunity was greeted with jubilation and sour grapes by Brisbane and Sydney, respectively. For Brisbane, this was a chance to step out of the shadow of Sydney and stake a claim to be an upcoming world city. Its lord mayor, Graham Quirk, boasted ebulliently that '[w]e're coming to get them on a whole range of events in this city over the next few years', so its rival should 'get used to it [losing]'.¹ As a result of hosting the G20, Brisbane was expected to receive a boon in terms of its reputation, as well as an estimated AUS\$50 million in economic stimulus.² For Sydney, Gillard's decision was regarded as misguided at best and politically motivated at worst. On the one hand, Brad Hazzard, Planning and Infrastructure Minister of New South Wales, colourfully argued that:

Sydney is the only true world city of Australia. We have the Opera House that can cater for thousands of people, we have the Museum of Contemporary Art; we'd made arrangements and offered them some excellent provisions of services through the Botanic Gardens but, instead, they're going to cop the Convention Centre on the Brisbane River. What the leaders of Russia and Britain will think when they're told they're going to go to Brisbane over Sydney one only can guess. The city of Brisbane is a great city. The people of Queensland are great people, but when it comes down to which city is the gateway from the world to Australia there's no question – Sydney. The G20 leaders really should have been treated to Sydney, not Brisbane.³

On the other hand, Hazzard went as far as to try and occupy the moral high ground, accusing Prime Minister Gillard of engaging in pork-barrel politics: 'She's chosen Brisbane simply to use the leaders of the world as political

pawns in her game to try and win back the votes across Queensland. It's insulting to the 20 leaders.'⁴

This vignette neatly illustrates that for each member the G20 is not just a mechanism of global governance created to address shared challenges. Engaging with, and particularly hosting, a G20 summit has various domestic aspects. As demonstrated above, this can range from a perceived reputational and economic boost to the host city, via possible political manoeuvring behind the scenes, to fears that protests and policing might both get out of hand and thereby negate the benefits. In the case of Brisbane and all other summit host cities, the importance of the choice of venue, facilities, marketing activities and security are amplified and transform a global event into a very local one.

This chapter explores the seventeen summits that have taken place between 2008 and 2022 with attention placed first and foremost on the host country, city, leader and people, and explores how the G20 has impacted upon them. However, the discussion is extended to include other participants where relevant because ultimately all leaders – whether host or invitee – will participate in these multilateral and bilateral meetings with one eye on issues of global governance and another looking beyond these challenges and firmly fixed on the reception back home.

7.2 BUILDING LEGACIES AND BURNISHING REPUTATIONS

Hosting a G20 summit affords the host country and city an opportunity to build their national and civic brands as well as the individual leader's short-term reputation and longer-term legacy. As mentioned at the outset of this book, four months after the G8 met in Japan, the first G20 leaders' summit was held in Washington DC in November 2008 to address the worsening GFC and economic recession. This coincided with the end of his two-term presidency, so President George W. Bush had nothing to lose in terms of re-election. However, he was certainly open to criticisms of being a lame-duck president and also that the successful presidential candidate – either Obama or McCain – should have been present at an event scheduled for ten days after the election. However, who this would be was unclear when the summit was announced towards the end of October 2008. Ultimately, Obama kept a respectful distance (some might argue strategic, in case the summit failed) from this first, hastily convened G20 summit. The Bush administration worked to 'seek the input' of the president-elect and kept Obama's team briefed as part of the transition process. However, as presidential historian Robert Dallek argued, '[i]n some ways, he's [Bush] trying to rescue his reputation, and the last thing Obama or even McCain are going to care about is saving George Bush's reputation'.⁵ Thus, the Washington summit represented an opportunity to create

a legacy that might mitigate some of Bush's previous high-profile failures and controversies.

The consensus is that Bush was by and large successful in doing this. He could have convened a smaller group of participants that simply reinforced the outmoded and discredited forms of global governance. As Bush explained in his final press conference of the summit:

The first decision I had to make was who was coming to the meeting. And obviously I decided that we ought to have the G20 nations, as opposed to the G8 or the G13. But once you make the decision to have the G20, then the fundamental question is, with that many nations, from six different continents, who all represent different stages of economic development – would it be possible to reach agreements, and not only agreements, would it be possible to reach agreements that were substantive? And I'm pleased to report the answer to that question was, absolutely. (G20 Information Centre 2008b)

Despite unsupported rumours that Bush did not know what the G20 was (Postel-Vinay 2014, viii), in the words of Andrew Cooper (2010, 745), 'even as a "lame duck" President, George W. Bush acted as an effective convenor of the G20'.

The legacy of this first summit was that developed countries were firmly brought to the top table of discussion on global economic cooperation, the advanced countries lost not only their elite position but also the moral high ground as blame for the GFC was clearly attributed in the resulting declaration (G20 Information Centre 2008a), and although rewriting the Bretton Woods system of rules regulating financial markets was an ambitious goal, the summit provided immediate and mid-term actions to be taken, agreed common principles and provided the format for future summits as an 'improvised crisis committee' and longer-term premier forum for global economic cooperation. In some ways, Bush secured some kind of legacy by default and by being the convenor of the first G20 summit. In other words, 'whatever happens, the G20 is already a winner. The fact that it has become central to global policymaking may prove a more important legacy of this crisis than any specific agreement it reaches.'⁶ However, the fact that Obama committed to the G20 process at a later stage and contributed to the success of the 2009 London summit retrospectively allowed Bush to salvage a more substantial legacy as host of the first summit.

However, several politicians have vied for the title of progenitor of the G20 and the associated reputational benefits. On the one hand, a number of leaders could make this claim while still in office, including the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, and the Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd. On the other hand, retired

politicians, in particular the former Canadian prime minister, Paul Martin, had long campaigned for a Leaders' 20 (Martin 2005).

Many observers regard the London summit as the most successful in marshalling the G20 members behind a common response to the GFC based on anti-protectionism and generating a rescue package of US\$1 trillion to stabilize the global economy and bolster the work of the IMF – all this despite also having the distinction of being the only one-day summit. As a result, the evaluation of Brown's leadership role was highly positive and his name was touted as a potential head of the IMF or a more formalized G20 (Payne 2018). He received universal praise from his fellow leaders for his role in organizing this summit. Obama described it as 'historic' and a 'turning point'; he went further by highlighting Brown's 'integrity'. Some observers regarded it as 'the peak of Gordon Brown's term as prime minister'.⁷ However, and as explored in 6.3 below, Brown was unable to translate this reputational boost into an electoral advantage.

Although some have identified Obama as the biggest beneficiary of the London summit, his reputation as an innovator in global governance was secured later in the year when he 'orchestrated the major moves on the consolidated design of the G20 prior to the Pittsburgh summit' (Cooper 2010, 745–746). One of the main outcomes of the summit was that the G20 was appointed as the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation'.

For rising powers, the G20 format conferred status and recognition of their position in global economic governance, while offering the opportunity to make an intellectual contribution that any outreach process like Heiligendamm could never satisfy. In the case of China, when it assumed the G20 presidency towards the end of 2015, Xi was eager to shape the G20 itself, its work and direction, to ensure a Chinese contribution to global governance. However, it is important to remember the context of China's engagement with the G20 (Kirton 2016). Traditionally, China was wary of the G20's informal and unofficial role as the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation', preferring to prioritize the UN as the legitimate and legal centre of global governance. Similarly, the Russian presidency sought to shape the organization, functioning and ultimately the legitimacy of the G20 by establishing the C20 at its 2013 summit in St Petersburg: 'The heavy hand of discipline over the G20 process by the government of President Putin went hand in hand with impressive signs of inclusion with Civil Society (C), Business (B), Youth (Y), and Labour (L) 20 components' (Cooper and Pouliot 2015, 347).

As regards Mexico, another rising power, it sought to carve out the role of a bridge between developing and developed members of the G20. This is a role

that hosts often seek to claim as their own but Mexico was in a particularly strong position to do so:

Mexico became the first emerging economy of the G5 to host and preside over a G20 summit, while its second institutional contribution was to repeat, and thus consolidate, the new tradition of rotating the presidency and venue of the summit between an advanced G8 member country and a rising power not a member of the G8. (Villanueva Ulfgard and Alejo Jaime 2014, 1534)

An innovation of the Mexican presidency in terms of G20 governance was holding the first informal meeting of foreign ministers. However, it struggled to play the role of host and burnish its reputation in some ways. Although its G20 presidency was confirmed at the 2010 Toronto summit and preparations began soon thereafter, the Los Cabos summit took place only seven months after the Cannes summit and as a result in many ways similar challenges and outcomes were still evident. In terms of outcomes, Los Cabos consolidated the drift that had emerged in G20 governance and its failure to transition from a crisis committee to a global steering committee, especially in the face of the European sovereign debt crisis that continued to hijack summit agendas. In addition, the Los Cabos summit was immediately followed by the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. However, despite a clear opportunity, little synergy emerged between the two. Goodliffe and Sberro (2012, 1) dismissed the summit in damning language:

The failure of the Los Cabos summit to satisfactorily address the European sovereign debt crisis and ominous world economic outlook, let alone agree on concrete measures to improve the oversight and functioning of the global economy, appears to confirm the diminishing effectiveness and relevance of the G20 as an organ of international governance since its inception in December 2008. While few accomplishments were achieved in the area of global governance during the Mexican presidency, acute collective action problems, made worse by the present economic crisis, paralysed the G20 in the lead-up to and during the Los Cabos summit. These collective action problems and the ensuing failure of global governance are attributable to the absence of leadership evident at both the global and European levels, which in turn testifies to the excessive dispersion of state economic and political power within the international system.

Moreover:

... since those opening conclaves of 2008–9, G20 summits have often degenerated into ritualised exercises in sterile debate, empty grandstanding and vacuous promise-making, bringing the organisation's effectiveness and even relevance increasingly into question ... Los Cabos ... perpetuated this trend towards stalemate and inaction. (Goodliffe and Sberro 2012, 2)

Further,

... there is a legitimate fear that the choice of two trendy seaside resorts for its last two summits [Cannes and Los Cabos] signals the G20's regression from a new mechanism of global economic governance to another glittering but ultimately ineffective forum for world leaders. (Goodliffe and Sberro 2012, 7–8)

In addition to the distinction of having conceived of the G20 or shaping its development, G20 leaders have sought to burnish their country's reputation and their own legacy through specific initiatives or agenda-setting. In securing the co-presidency of the G20 with Canada in 2010 and hosting the fifth summit in November 2010, South Korea became the first Asian country to host a G20 summit – a fact that was not lost on President Lee Myung-bak and the Korean people. The impact that South Korea could have as host upon the G20's agenda, as well as the impact that the G20 could have on South Korean society, were two interconnected strands that ran through South Korea's presidency and beyond.⁸ The concrete outcome of the summit was the adoption of the Seoul Consensus, which sought to present an alternative to the Washington Consensus. In so doing, Korea would draw on its own experience of rapid economic development and provide lessons that, according to one Korean journalist, 'rich countries will never be able to give to poor countries'. The Seoul Consensus was hailed as the first step in the presentation of Korean- or Asian-style development models as new global standards to be tested in Latin America and Africa. If successful, the Seoul Consensus could consign the 'development models used so far' to the rubbish bin.⁹ Six years later, China was provided with a similar opportunity to shape the development agenda in its own direction at the 2016 Hangzhou summit: '... it [was] a big chance to show China's view on global development to the world'.¹⁰

In addition, Lee instrumentalized the G20 to impact on South Korean society so as to feed a sense of national pride as well as burnishing his own personal legacy. As South Korean presidents are constitutionally prohibited from serving more than one term, the pressure to create a legacy in a relatively short time period is considerable. In the 2007 presidential election, Lee campaigned on the '747' plan of an annual increase in GDP of 7 per cent, a doubling of per capita annual income to US\$40,000 within a decade, and the elevation of South Korea from the eleventh to the seventh largest economy in the world. With the GFC that hit the following year threatening to scupper his plan, Lee campaigned aggressively to secure the role of first Asian president of the G20 and with it the perceived associated benefits for both his legacy and enhancing the nation's sense of identity as a leading power. This was clear when he stated that '[t]he success of the G20 summit is the people's success and the country's success. If, at times like this when our national fortunes are on the rise, we

unite and move forward, we will certainly become a first-class nation leading the world.’ Lee’s Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan agreed and portrayed the summit as a ‘chance to upgrade our country’s status in the international community’. The domestic media reaction chimed with the Lee administration. The greatest legacies of the summit were seen to be Korea’s demonstration of leadership and its proven ability to ‘play a central role in global diplomacy’.¹¹ At the same time,

Korea proved itself to be a skillful economic and diplomatic player on the global stage ... Korea is no underdog. It is no longer a small power that can be swayed by bigger or more aggressive neighbors. It is a medium strategic power with the ability to participate in the global agenda, and it should think like one.¹²

The approach of the Australian presidency at the 2014 Brisbane summit was to pursue a tight agenda with the focus placed on economic growth and agreed targets of 2 per cent growth in five years. Its signature policy was the Brisbane Action Plan (BAP), as well as an agreement to reduce the gender participation gap in formal labour markets in G20 economies by 25 per cent by 2025 and provided momentum for the W20 initiative at Antalya the following year.

Although Türkiye has ‘pursued a low-profile inactive G20 policy in the years since its accession’ (Parlar Dal 2019, 592), assuming the G20 presidency for 2014 provided an opportunity, as it had for South Korea in 2010, Mexico in 2012 and Australia the previous year, to stake its claims as a leader in global governance, rather than an oft-cited middle power or rising power. As has been demonstrated elsewhere, ‘for middle or emerging powers like Türkiye with weak institutional attachments to global governance, G20 hosting carries inevitable value’ (Çolakoğlu and Hecan 2016, 144). This value extends to the individual leader. Having attended the first G20 Washington summit as prime minister of Türkiye, volunteered in 2011 to host the G20 in 2015, and then assumed the role of president in 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a G20 veteran and is the only leader to attend the first G20 summit and remain in power at the time of writing. As a result, the 2015 Antalya summit was a tightly organized event that paid attention to legacy and new issues, delivering concrete policy and organizational outcomes that could bolster the G20 and in turn Erdoğan’s position. The signature theme of the summit was the three Is of inclusiveness, investment and implementation. Interestingly, the style of Erdoğan and the Turkish authorities in preparation for the summit was described as ‘nurturing’, ‘consensus-building’, and focused on discussions, articulation and compromise (Vines 2015b). This claim is supported by the number of preparatory meetings held in advance of Antalya, more than any other G20 presidency (Çolakoğlu and Hecan 2016, 150).

Two challenges threatened to derail Erdoğan's approach to hosting: one external and one internal. On the one hand, the summit was overshadowed by the Paris terror attacks that took place two days beforehand. As discussed in Chapter 5, alongside Syria and the migration crisis, it was these more overtly political issues, rather than economic ones, that provided the focus of discussion, both formally and informally. On the other hand, Erdoğan was in a slightly precarious domestic position with his party having just, in the same month as the summit, regained the majority it lost earlier in the year. Thus, Erdoğan was presented with an opportunity to burnish his and Türkiye's reputations on the global stage by making a concrete contribution to global governance, but he needed to have one eye on the domestic situation and another on unexpected external shocks. Nevertheless, through a strategy of balancing between addressing existing issues and adding meaningful new initiatives to the G20's agenda, Antalya resulted in progress on a number of issues, for example promoting the quality of infrastructure on the one hand, and the promotion of new issues and structures, such as the W20 as an official engagement group, which has continued at every subsequent summit, on the other hand (Çolakoğlu and Hecan 2016).

For the Argentinian president, Mauricio Macri, hosting the G20 summit in 2018 conferred a considerable degree of prestige and recognition, considering that Argentina's membership of and contribution to the G20 had from the outset come under question and scrutiny. As a result, hosting a smooth and successful summit was a priority. Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's signature contribution to the G20's agenda of the following year was the establishment of the 'Osaka Track', which he hoped would be long remembered as the starting point of global data governance. As mentioned in the previous chapter, although a number of participants including India, Indonesia and South Africa did not sign up for the initiative, believing it to be a plurilateral initiative in conflict with WTO multilateral principles, it was presented as Japan's intellectual and leadership contribution to the setting of international rules around the digital economy.

One privilege that the host of a summit is afforded is to invite non-G20 leaders to attend the summit. This allows hosts an opportunity to give the summit a regional flavour and input into the issues under discussion, as well as bolstering the host's position as a potential regional leader. Russia invited Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev to the 2013 St Petersburg summit. Australia invited the leaders of Mauritania, Myanmar, New Zealand and Singapore to the 2014 Brisbane summit. At Antalya in 2015, Türkiye demonstrated its regional ambitions by selecting Azerbaijan as a summit guest. The following year saw China invite a number of important regional participants in the BRI to the Hangzhou summit, including the chairs of the AU and ASEAN (Chad and Laos respectively), alongside Egypt and Kazakhstan.

In 2018, in Buenos Aires, Latin America's second G20 summit, Macri sought to realize this by inviting a number of guests, including the Chilean president, Sebastian Pinera, and representatives of the Caribbean Community, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America. The following year in Osaka, the Japanese government sought to do so by inviting the leaders of a number of South East Asian countries, namely Thailand (as chair of ASEAN), Singapore and Vietnam, in addition to the Japanese president of the Asian Development Bank. This role of representative of Asia has been Japan's traditional role in the G7, where it is the only Asian member, but is something it has struggled to establish in the larger G20 (Dobson 2004; Dobson 2012a). In addition, it was worth noting that the invited guests represented a region concerned about China's rise and its increasingly assertive position, and which Japan has sought to embrace within its own diplomatic initiatives such as the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan 2006).

Finally, there is a rarely experienced opportunity to burnish reputations. This has happened on the two occasions when double-header summits have taken place: in 2010 when Canada hosted the G8 and G20 back-to-back, and in 2011 when France held the G8 in the spring and the G20 in the autumn. Both presidencies were provided with an opportunity to foster synergy between the two global governance mechanisms. However, little was achieved to this end as both summits struggled to find a focus and purpose in light of a series of global 'wicked' problems ranging from the Arab Spring to the European sovereign debt crisis.

7.3 LEVERAGING THE SUMMIT

The opportunities and impact of G20 summits can extend beyond coordinating common global action or basking in the reflected glory and reputational benefits associated with hosting these events. Summits also provide venues for leaders to make progress on domestic issues, often seeking to boost electoral prospects, while engaging bilaterally with key partners to address important foreign policy challenges.

As regards instrumentalizing the G20 to progress explicitly domestic issues, as host of the 2010 Seoul summit, South Korea pursued its national interest in a number of ways, ranging from utilizing the summit as a deadline to conclude the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement, which had stagnated at the ratification stage for more than three years due to opposition in both countries' legislatures, to speculatively securing greater leverage with North Korea and, in the event of unification, attracting assistance from multilateral institutions to ease the associated economic burdens, although in the end ultimately no mention was made of North Korea in the final summit documentation.

In the case of Japan, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko arrived at the 2011 Cannes summit at the height of the sovereign debt crisis keen to stress that Europe needs to get its house in order and highlight Japan's best practice in addressing its own accumulated debt through concrete measures such as proposing to raise the consumption tax incrementally from 5 to 10 per cent by 2015. Ahead of Cannes, it was suggested that this pledge would be included in the final summit documentation.¹³ This was then presented at home as an international commitment to stymie any domestic criticisms surrounding this controversial issue (Dobson 2013a). At the 2014 Brisbane summit, Prime Minister Abe pursued a similar approach by seeking and securing fellow summiters' endorsement of Abenomics before returning home, dissolving the Lower House of the Japanese Diet and calling a snap election, in which he lost a handful of seats but maintained his party and ruling coalition's dominant position (Dobson 2017). It has even been suggested that Abe instrumentalized the 2013 St Petersburg summit to pursue an issue wholly unrelated to global summitry: securing the 2020 Summer Olympics for Tokyo:

... for Japan and Abe greatest potential success at the G20 has had nothing to do with the G20 at all. It has been the opportunity for Japan to lobby participating governments to vote for Tokyo as the location of the 2020 Summer Olympics. Whether the lobbying was successful will be judged when the votes are counted in Buenos Aires and the winner between Tokyo, Madrid, and Istanbul, is announced early Sunday morning Tokyo time.¹⁴

Luckhurst has coined the term 'endorsement function' to describe this strategy by which leaders use G20 agreements to justify introducing domestically controversial policies. He cites additional examples of Brown tethering the UK's domestic fiscal stimulus to the G20's collective strategy, and Chinese policymakers instrumentalizing G20 agreements to promote domestic reform in particular sections of the economy (2019b, 103).

As regards leveraging the G20 to benefit a leader's electoral chances, the potential of such linkage is self-evident and examples abound. However, concrete evidence of causation is thin. For example, the reputational impact of a successful summit on the political survival of Brown was clear, although some feared that he was overplaying his hand by ratcheting up expectations around the establishment of a second Bretton Woods system. Immediately before the London summit, political pundit Andrew Grice ruminated on '[w]hy has Gordon Brown apparently gambled his reputation, and based his political survival plan, on a meeting of 20 world leaders in London on 2 April, the outcome of which is beyond his control?'¹⁵ After the summit reached a historic agreement on dealing with the GFC, one British cabinet member said '[t]he scale of this deal will help with Gordon's underlying credibility. It will remind people what he is there for. It will be a slow burn, but the markets have jumped,

and the polls will probably follow.¹⁶ Yet, despite hosting what was perceived to be the most successful G20 summit, Brown was unable to exploit any reputational ‘summit tailwind’ and translate it into electoral success, as New Labour’s time in power came to an end just over a year later at the 2010 general election. The initially positive evaluation of Brown’s role was tempered by a more negative, domestic association with the London summit that resulted from the violent protests outside the summit venue, heavy-handed policing and ultimately the death of Ian Tomlinson, a newspaper vendor not involved with the protests, which is discussed below.¹⁷ Combined with a general mood for change in the country, and a number of gaffes on the part of Brown, including claiming in Parliament that by recapitalizing British banks ‘we not only saved the world’, rapidly corrected to ‘saved the banks’ (Daily Hansard 2008), this summit demonstrates the limited impact a positive performance has on reversing electoral fortunes.

President Nicolas Sarkozy of France lost a closely fought campaign, almost six months after the 2009 Cannes summit, in his bid to be re-elected as president for a second and final term, to the Socialist François Hollande. The election campaign was largely seen as a vote on Sarkozy’s track record since 2007 and his personal failings. Seven years later, he failed in his appeal to avoid trial for illegal financing surrounding this campaign. As regards the German federal elections that followed the 2017 Hamburg summit, Angela Merkel was stymied in any attempt to translate a successful summit into electoral success. Although she secured a fourth term as chancellor and her party was returned as the largest party, it lost 65 seats and entered into negotiations with other parties to establish a grand coalition. This election also saw the rise of the far-right *Alternativ für Deutschland* as the third largest party.

Mexico held a general election eleven days after the 2012 Los Cabos summit. Mexican presidents only serve one six-year term, but President Felipe Calderón’s party’s nominee, Josefina Eugenia Vázquez Mota, fared badly in the presidential election, as did his party in elections for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Seemingly the summit had no positive impact. In Argentina, once again, a summit performance could not balance out negative public opinion, as Macri lost to the left-wing opposition in the August 2019 primary elections for the presidency, ahead of the October 2019 vote, as a result of his austerity policies, having hosted the G20 summit nine months previously.

Having inherited Australia’s G20 presidency when he became prime minister, Tony Abbott lasted less than a year before he lost the Liberal Party leadership election and prime ministership to Malcolm Turnbull in September 2015. Some argued that the Brisbane G20 served as an unnecessary burden and distraction from domestic issues for Abbott and his treasurer Joe Hockey, both of whom might have survived the leadership challenge without it (Kirchner 2016, 499–500). After Turnbull took over as prime minister, it is interesting

to note the ‘lesson learned’ in that ‘Hockey’s successor as treasurer, Scott Morrison, said he would not attend meetings of the G20, IMF or World Bank, deputizing to a junior minister’ (Kirchner 2016, 500).

The only positive example of electoral success following a summit can be seen in the case of Japan. Abe faced elections for the Upper House of the Japanese Diet the month after the 2019 Osaka summit, which proceeded exactly as expected. Although Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner lost the super-majority required for any constitutional revision – a long-held personal ambition – he led his party to its sixth successive victory in national elections and maintained control of the Upper House. It is unlikely that the G20 summit had much impact upon voters one way or the other, especially when considered alongside the weak and fragmented state of the opposition in Japan.

Some leaders have not had elections to worry about. Putin hosted a G20 summit having been elected in March 2012 for a six-year period with 63.6 per cent of the vote. However, perhaps the clearest example of the limited impact of summits is when a leader is faced with a choice between an immediate election and attending a summit. Faced with such a dilemma at St Petersburg in 2013, the Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd, skipped the summit. It would be methodologically challenging to establish the concrete impact of a summit on opinion polls and voting intentions; however, based on the anecdotal and temporal evidence mentioned above, summits are quickly forgotten and their impact is probably limited. The *New Statesman*’s Andrew Grice acknowledged the limited impact of a summit and the overriding importance of domestic issues when he wrote ahead of the 2009 London summit that:

Close allies insist that Brown will focus on the domestic agenda once the G20 show is over, and that he knows the Budget on 22 April will be much more important to his chances of staging another political fightback. ‘He has not staked all his chips on a one-day summit’, one said. ‘He will move on quickly. He has still got a lot of chips left.’¹⁸

Moving beyond leveraging the summit for domestic or perceived electoral gain, global summitry presents all governments with an opportunity or challenges in managing bilateral relations with key partners. For example, at the second G20 summit in London in 2009, Argentina even used the London G20 summit to raise the issue of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.¹⁹ As regards the Sino-Japanese relationship, President Xi Jinping’s visit to Osaka represented the first visit of a Chinese leader to Japan in nine years and an incremental step in an improving bilateral relationship. Xi and Abe pledged to arrange Xi’s first state visit to Japan the following year. However, the same was not true of the relationship with South Korea, for which no bilateral was organized. The

choice of Osaka Castle for an evening performance and leaders' dinner also proved to be controversial as it was the historic base of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the regional lord responsible for Japan's invasions of Korea in the sixteenth century. Equally, Abe's twenty-sixth meeting with Putin demonstrated incremental progress but also the distance left to travel in resolving the territorial dispute between the two countries and signing a peace treaty.

For the UK prime minister, Theresa May, a series of G20 summits provided the opportunity to promote post-Brexit Britain's role, reassure the international community and strike up some trade deals. This was clearly the case at the 2016 Hangzhou summit, the first to be held after the referendum on EU membership. Abe took the summit as an opportunity to deliver an uncharacteristically frank and direct warning in the form of 'Japan's Message to the United Kingdom and the European Union', which outlined Japan's priorities in the withdrawal negotiations, its desired outcomes and warnings as regards potential consequences (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan 2016). The 2018 Buenos Aires summit afforded May a similar opportunity and was also the first time an incumbent UK prime minister had visited Buenos Aires. Both Macri and May managed to keep their bilateral meeting on track by focusing on summit themes and avoiding any reference to the Falkland Islands that might undermine the status quo (*Global Policy* 2018a). Osaka represented May's last G20 summit – she had already announced her intention to resign – and an opportunity to speak frankly with Putin, expressing her displeasure over Russian involvement in the Salisbury nerve agent incident. The darker side of managing bilateral relations can also be seen in allegations that Russian authorities had spied on delegations attending the St Petersburg summit, which were denied and met with counter-allegations.²⁰

Most significantly, G20 summits provide an opportunity to manage the 'most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none' with the US (Dobson 2012b). Sometimes this can be of equal importance to, or even more important than, the core business of the G20. In the case of managing the US–China relationship, G20 summits have regularly provided opportunities for a reset in relations, as seen most recently at the 2022 Bali summit in what was probably its most significant outcome, or a ceasefire in an ongoing trade war, as seen at the 2018 Buenos Aires summit. In the case of the US–Japanese relationship, the 2019 Osaka summit afforded another opportunity for Abe to meet with Donald Trump as part of a series of official visits, regular meetings and phone calls. In fact, organizing bilateral meetings around multilateral gatherings was established as a norm of Japanese diplomacy early in 2017. The overriding concern was to show a united front after typically colourful Trumpian comments surrounding imbalances in the US–Japan Security Treaty made immediately before the summit: 'If Japan is attacked, we will fight World War III. We will go in and protect them with our lives and with our

treasure. We will fight at all costs, right? But if we are attacked, Japan doesn't have to help us at all. They can watch on a Sony television.²¹ In their bilateral meeting on the first day of the summit, Trump clarified that he was calling for the amendment of the treaty, not its abrogation.

This leveraging of the summit can work in the opposite direction. Syria was the issue that forced its way onto the agenda at the 2013 St Petersburg summit in light of failed US attempts in the UNSC to sanction air strikes in the face of China and Russia's veto. The unscripted, ad hoc discussions over dinner demonstrate how multilateral summits can be used to not only handle the hegemon, but allow the US to manage its bilateral relations with key partners on crucial issues. Similarly, Trump used the opportunity of a visit to East Asia for the 2019 Osaka summit to announce an impromptu visit to the Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom, the first by an incumbent US president, and his third meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

7.4 ECONOMIC BOON OR WHITE ELEPHANT?

In similar fashion to sporting mega-events like the Olympics, the rights and responsibilities of hosting a summit are often perceived by, and sold to, host cities with reference to the potential benefits that will result. In contrast, cities can also be wary of hosting these diplomatic mega-events for fear of the possible negative impact, especially in terms of protest and policing.

Probably the most common perception is that hosting a summit provides a city with a marketing opportunity to promote itself internationally and change negative perceptions into positive ones. For example, Obama had originally planned to host the third G20 summit in New York to coincide with the opening of the UNGA. However, faced with a number of logistical challenges, the US authorities abandoned this plan and instead chose Pittsburgh. The publicly declared intention was partly to showcase the city of Pittsburgh and its recovery from the collapse of its steel manufacturing base to become regarded as one of the most liveable cities in the US.²² Pittsburgh was certainly not a global city in the same category as Washington, London or New York, so considerable lobbying took place to secure the summit. In Obama's words, this would allow Pittsburgh to showcase its transition 'from the city of steel to a centre for high-tech innovation – including green technology, education and training, and research and development'.²³ One example of this was that the G20 leaders met in the environmentally sustainable David L. Lawrence Convention Center.

Mayor of Seoul Oh Se-hoon highlighted the summit as an opportunity to make the city better known to the outside world and attract incoming tourism and investment into the city, 'to build a "truly global city" not only a city foreigners want to visit, but also a place where they want to invest and live'. To

this end, ahead of the 2010 Seoul G20 summit, the metropolitan government increased its marketing budget dramatically. Hotels went through substantial renovations and considered the best way to present Korean cuisine in a user-friendly way to an international audience. During the summit, a range of sightseeing tours that showcased the city's achievements were organized for journalists. The G20 reached such a level of ubiquity that '[e]ven non-English-speaking taxi drivers can recognize the sound of "G20"'.²⁴ In his New Year's address to the Korean people, South Korean President Lee connected the international to the domestic by reflecting on the highlights of the year and Korea's future direction, citing first and foremost the G20 summit: 'The Republic of Korea was able to stand tall in the international arena by hosting the G20 Seoul summit. Korea has now emerged as a nation that helps to establish the international order, rather than always having to follow others.' He then dubbed the young people of Korea the 'G20 Generation' (*G-iship Sedae*), who should be nurtured as 'protagonists for building a leading global nation'. An opinion poll conducted in Autumn 2010 was similarly positive: a majority of 41.8 per cent of respondents felt that hosting G20 was an opportunity for Korea to promote its image abroad and that it would increase the nation's standing in international society; 35.3 per cent felt that Korea would benefit in economic terms from hosting the event (Cherry and Dobson 2012). Although no causal link can be established, the following year Pyeongchang was selected to host the 2018 Winter Olympics.

The vignette that opened this chapter demonstrates the importance of hosting the G20 summit to the city of Brisbane as well as what missing out meant to Sydney. Brisbane Marketing described the G20 as a 'once-in-a-generation event', 'the most important gathering of world leaders ever held in Australia' and sought to 'both leverage the G20 itself and create a parallel program of activity that would take advantage of Brisbane's notoriety as a G20 host. Doing so left a valuable and lasting legacy for Brisbane'. 'People around the world read about, heard and saw Brisbane as one of the world's friendliest cities, a serious player in the Asia Pacific, and as a city capable of hosting major events without any problems' (Brisbane Marketing, no date). Although an opinion poll found that 54 per cent of Australians regarded it as a chance to promote the country, 55 per cent believed it to be little more than a 'talk-fest' and only 26 per cent believed it delivered concrete outcomes for Australia and the world. Another poll saw 39 per cent of respondents regard it as a waste of money (Grattan 2015, 178).

Hangzhou was selected as host of China's G20 for a number of reasons (for a wide-ranging exploration of China's G20 presidency, see Chin and Dobson 2016), but local issues were salient. First, by serving as Communist Party Secretary for Zhejiang from 2003 to 2007 and residing during that time in the provincial capital of Hangzhou, Xi Jinping's personal connection with

Zhejiang province was clearly on display. Second, the desire to showcase Zhejiang's achievements and entrepreneurial spirit as the home of 'red capitalists' can be discerned. Zhejiang boasts a range of high-profile success stories including China's leading private automotive company, Geely, and is the birthplace of Jack Ma and the e-commerce firm Alibaba. As a result, '[t]he city of Hangzhou, and Zhejiang province are presented collectively as the "new face" of China' (Chin and Dobson 2016). An example of this campaign landing with the right audience can be seen in the production by BBC World News of a video featuring the iconic sights of Hangzhou from West Lake to Alibaba and screened from August to October either side of the G20 summit.²⁵

The second reason connects to the first in that Xi's time as Party Secretary was regarded as one when Zhejiang Province's private sector boomed, with provincial GDP growing by 14 per cent in this period. China had recent experience of hosting global summits with the 2014 APEC forum held in Beijing and Xi was eager to ensure a successful summit with a local audience in mind. Hangzhou, with a population of approximately 9 million, was reduced to a ghost town as local residents were actively encouraged to leave the city during the two-day summit.²⁶ A state-of-the-art conference centre was constructed, with journalists being smoothly ferried from airport to hotel to media centre and back again. In addition, Hangzhou benefited from billions of pounds in improving the infrastructure and sprucing up the city to be ready for the gaze of the world's media.²⁷ In many ways, this was redolent of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, especially considering that internationally famous Chinese film director Zhang Yimou, who also staged the opening and closing ceremonies for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, led a team that organized a performance for the leaders on the evening of the summit's first day with the famous West Lake as a backdrop.

Having missed out to South Korea on the status of hosting the first Asian G20 in 2010, and having been looked over in favour of China as host in 2016, the Japanese government managed to secure the presidency in 2019. The choice of Osaka as host city was mostly a foregone conclusion. It had demonstrated its ability to host both global mega-events in 1970 when it was the first Asian city to host a world's fair as well as global summits in 1995 when it was selected to host the annual summit of the APEC forum. However, it had lost out to Tokyo and Okinawa respectively in its efforts to secure the 1993 G7 summit and 2000 G8 summit. Thus, it seemed to be Osaka's moment and the obvious choice for Japan's first G20 summit. Security was tight with 32,000 police officers drafted in from across Japan, schools closed and little in the way of protest to derail the summit.

As regards measuring the concrete benefits of hosting a G20 summit, this is a challenging task, as the nature of the benefits and risks are so diffuse, especially when it comes to something as intangible as reputation. In addition,

the appropriate timescales for auditing any benefits are unclear. Nevertheless, attempts have been made based on media reports that suggest the Pittsburgh summit resulted in benefits totalling approximately US\$135 million, while the Toronto summit resulted in benefits totalling approximately US\$95.4 million (Guebert and Tanna 2010). In terms of benefits for the South Korean people, the 2010 Seoul summit was presented as delivering a distinct economic benefit. According to the Samsung Economic Research Institute, the short-term gains associated with hosting a successful G20 summit were seen to be as high as US\$20.6 billion. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Brisbane was estimated to receive AU\$50 million in investment. Brisbane Business Events claimed to have generated AU\$30 million in business leads in the three months following the summit. On the eve of the summit, Brisbane-based economist Gene Tunny toned down expectations with a forecast that the 1988 World Expo held in Brisbane resulted in more economic benefits than the G20 was likely to accrue: ‘There is no comparison. Expo 88 ran longer than the G20, with more than 16 million people coming from around Queensland, interstate and overseas.’²⁸ Ahead of the 2017 Hamburg summit, short-term monetary gain was highlighted based on the numbers of delegates and journalists and the average business visitor spend of US\$268 for an overnight visit. However, these gains are offset by the negative economic impact of closures in anticipation of protests and violence.²⁹ In the case of Hamburg these fears were realized, as outlined below.

Calculating the costs of hosting a summit involve similar risks to estimating the benefits. The added challenge is that they can easily accumulate, especially as they are predominantly related to infrastructure and security. Cannes was thought to have cost 80 million euros. Hosting both G8 and G20 summits back-to-back is estimated to have cost the Canadian taxpayer CA\$1.1 billion, with claims for compensation for damage from the protests still being processed two years after the summits, and totalling more than CA\$11 million for the Toronto G20.³⁰ Toronto was dubbed the ‘most expensive, the most violent and the one with the least benefits’ (Kirton 2012, cited in Villanueva Ulfgard and Alejo Jaime 2014, 1535). The Brisbane G20 was estimated by some to have cost AU\$500 million, although the *Brisbane Times* put it at AU\$400 million (US\$268 million). Antalya was estimated to have cost US\$500 million. Hangzhou was rumoured to have cost US\$24 billion to organize. Hamburg was thought to have cost 72.2 million euros. Buenos Aires was estimated to have cost US\$112 million (Muhanna 2018). The Indonesian government allocated just over 500 billion rupiah (US\$32 million) at the start of its presidency, a similar amount to that allocated for preparing for the 2023 ASEAN summit.

The opportunity to showcase a city can also backfire disastrously. The Mexican government chose the Los Cabos International Convention Centre as

the venue for the 2012 summit. However, it was destroyed by Hurricane Odile in 2014 and the following year was reported as lying ‘forgotten and neglected, yet another testament to wasteful projects’:

The once proud building that hosted world leaders now sports shattered windows, gaping doorways, collapsed ceilings, peeling walls, broken flagpoles – and not a flag in sight. A green wall with 2,000 square meters of indigenous plants, once dubbed the largest of its kind in the world and considered the center’s most attractive feature, is now overrun with rotting vegetation.³¹

The Centre was relaunched in April 2018 and hosted the fifth annual Destination Wedding Planners Congress, one of the key events in the calendar of the wedding industry.

Looking beyond the economic impact, research has also been conducted on the possible increase in demand for mental health support at a local level as a result of hosting a G20 summit and how this can be mitigated: ‘... with detailed planning and extra resources, the G20 [Brisbane] summit passed without any major mental health incidents or major increase for mental health presentations’ (Emmerson et al. 2017).

7.5 POLICING PROTEST

Like many other mechanisms of global governance, G20 summits have attracted a range of demonstrators, both peaceful and violent. Often it will be the protests and inconvenience of related policing measures that are most remembered by local residents. The obvious challenge for a summit host is facilitating the rights to protest and freedom of speech while ensuring a peaceful summit and protecting both locals and visitors. The seventeen G20 summits provide examples of both tragic failure and qualified success (on G20 engagement with civil society generally, see Dobson 2011b; Cooper 2013b).

As regards the failures, the 2009 London and 2010 Toronto summits stand out as the obvious examples. The venue for the second meeting of the G20 leaders was the ExCeL centre in East London’s Docklands, although the focus for protest was the City of London and the Bank of England. In the run-up to the summit a range of peaceful civil society activities were held. Most visibly, on the weekend before the actual summit, 35,000 people participated in the ‘Put People First’ march in Hyde Park, central London, stressing ‘jobs, justice and climate’. This served as an umbrella for over 120 groups and organizations including Christian Aid, Oxfam, the Trades Union Congress and the Campaign

for Nuclear Disarmament. Writing before the summit, *The Economist* captured the mood:

Anti-capitalists are billing it as ‘Financial Fools’ Day’ [coinciding with April Fools’ Day] and climate-change worriers are gearing up to protest against ‘fossil fools’. For London’s police, charged with protecting world leaders at the G20 summit and quelling the crowds who are massing to rail at them, April 1st is going to be a long day. Police are expecting an ‘unprecedented’ coalition of protesters to gather in the city’s financial district the day before the summit, to demonstrate against everything from Iraq to subprime mortgages. Groups last seen in the 1990s are thought to be unfurling their banners again, to take advantage of a force that is already stretched.³²

In total 10,000 police officers were deployed in an operation that cost over US\$10 million and the anti-globalization protests of the kind seen at Seattle in 1999 never materialized. Instead, reportage on the day noted the festive and peaceful nature of the protests. However, in the days that followed, two examples of police brutality emerged. The first and more salient case was the death of Ian Tomlinson, who was hit with a baton and then pushed to the ground. He later died. Tomlinson was not protesting but returning home from his job as a newspaper seller. It was an American fund manager who filmed the incriminating footage of the police assault that led to Ian Tomlinson’s heart attack. An inquest found the policeman responsible guilty of unlawful killing, but a subsequent trial found him innocent of the criminal charge of manslaughter. He was ultimately discharged from the Metropolitan Police. A day after Ian Tomlinson died, a female protestor was struck by police. This case also surfaced as a result of protestors filming the incident.³³

The handling of protests around the 2009 London summit had a long-term impact on police tactics, especially the containment tactic known as ‘kettling’. The House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee published a report two months after the summit that focused on containment tactics, police–media relations, the identification of police officers and their training (Home Affairs Committee 2009). A month later, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) Denis O’Connor published a report entitled *Adapting to Protest*, which reinforced many of the Home Affairs Committee’s findings. The report recommended an immediate review of public order training and examination of tactics to ensure they are subject to medical assessment, the provision of guidance on the confinement and release of peaceful protestors, and the clear identification of police officers (HMIC 2009).

As regards the Toronto summit the following year, the Canadian authorities were faced with the challenge of hosting the G20 in the urban centre of Toronto immediately following the meeting of the G8 in the more rural retreat of Huntsville. However, one factor both summits shared was that they became the target of civil society protest. Again, peaceful marches and a people’s

summit were planned but CSOs were frustrated by being housed in a separate media centre and only allowed into the official media centre when invited by accredited journalists. However, the lasting impression of the Toronto summit was the violent protest that shocked many Canadians and resulted in the largest police operation and number of arrests (1,100) in Canadian history (Monaghan and Walby 2012, 654). In the words of Kitchen and Kim (2014, 201):

The dominant images that emerged from the G20 Meeting in Toronto in June 2010 were not the traditional family photos of world leaders coming together to advance their global initiatives, but rather those of street protests and violence in the context of a massive security operation and allegations of police brutality, unlawful detention, and other breaches of civil liberties.

In a highly critical post-mortem of the policing of this summit, Kitchen and Kim (2014, 212) have argued that:

The provision of security at the G20 in Toronto in June 2010, and at mega-events more generally, is an important illustration of the way in which the lines of provision of domestic security through policing, and of national security through the military, are increasingly becoming blurred, and how privatization facilitates the urbanization and militarization of security ... [In addition,] an important part of this shift is in the way that cities are the 'home front' of new testing grounds for military weaponry and tactics of war.

Furthermore, some have suggested some kind of retribution on the part of the Canadian prime minister, Stephen Harper, against the urban Toronto area, which had not supported him and where he could afford to lose support he never had:

Even before the G20 arrived, it was widely proposed that Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose governing conservative party won not a single parliamentary seat in the Toronto metropolitan area was cynically setting the city up. (Cowen and Smith 2010, 44, cited in Kitchen and Kim 2014, 213)

As was the case in London, it was argued that the impact of the protests could be seen in later policing decisions:

Some activists in both Toronto and Pittsburgh argued that the G20 mobilization affected the way police managed the subsequent Occupy protests and others noted that the controversy surrounding the policing at the G20 contributed to the city's decision not to renew the Chief of Police, and subsequent discussions around the expansion of Taser use and the policing of racialized communities. (Wood et al. 2017, 605)

In contrast, measuring the impact of media exposure on the protest movements is challenging. According to Wood et al. (2017), some protestors felt that the heavy-handed police reaction they encountered resulted in increased support and recruitment for their cause, as well as engendering new campaigns, whereas others felt it created a climate of fear and caution.

At the other extreme, the 2014 Brisbane summit has been touted as an example of successful policing. Australia had more time than previous hosts to prepare for this summit as Julia Gillard was asked at the 2011 Cannes summit to host and Brisbane won out over Sydney in the summer of 2012. In total, more than 6,000 police were recruited from Queensland, Australia and New Zealand as part of Operation Southern Cross, which proved to be the largest ever peacetime police operation in Australian history. In light of Queensland's history of managing protest and the reportage in local media, fears of things getting out of hand and resulting in violence appeared to escalate (Legrand and Bronitt 2015, 3–4). However, the first day of the summit was declared a public holiday – a tactic also employed at the Buenos Aires G20 – and although the city was locked down and heavily restricted, protestors were out in number and only a handful of arrests made. Ultimately, Baker et al. argue that the policing of the Brisbane summit learned the lessons of previous failures and ‘based on extensive dialogue and minimization of coercive public order strategies’, resulted in a peaceful, even successful, summit (2017, 425; Molnar et al. 2019). In addition, protests and policing were observed by independent legal observers. This had been the case at London and Toronto but Brisbane did not experience similar levels of violence.³⁴

Several summits present a more mixed experience, including the 2009 Pittsburgh, 2010 Cannes, 2017 Hamburg and 2018 Buenos Aires summits. The city of Pittsburgh braced itself for protests with the G20 London summit of earlier that year still fresh in the collective memory and the associated fear that protests would detract attention away from the desired narrative of Pittsburgh's transformation. Ahead of the summit, the Pittsburgh G20 Resistance Project (www.resistg20.org) called for disruption of the meeting through a mass march, targeted businesses such as Starbucks and McDonalds and urged a ‘peoples’ uprising’. In response, requests from hundreds of protestors to camp in the city's botanical gardens, in whose Phipps Conservatory the G20 leaders dined on the first night of the summit, were rejected by the local courts ahead of the summit. The city's police force was reinforced by bussing in police forces from New York, Virginia and Kentucky and placing national guard troops and the coastguard on alert. There were even unfounded rumours circulating that prisoners were to be released in order to accommodate the anticipated number of arrests.³⁵ During the actual summit, all was calm within the area cordoned off around the convention centre. The high-profile CSOs grabbed the headlines with Oxfam's ‘Big Head’ leaders and Greenpeace

activists hanging a banner highlighting climate change from Pittsburgh's West End Bridge (Wood et al. 2017). However, not far from the restricted area, riot police were reported to have used sirens, tear gas and rubber bullets to deal with thousands of protesters, resulting in skirmishes and roadblocks on the first day and evening of the summit. Reaction from one protester drew a link with policing techniques at previous summits: 'This kind of force has been used as an option of first resort by cops [at summits] in Italy, London and now Pittsburgh ... We have managed to create a pretty big disturbance without destroying any property.'³⁶

The second day of the summit saw a self-proclaimed and police-authorized 'peoples' march' to protest against the 'war on terror' and the G20's response to climate change and poverty. This event was attended by 10,000 people and was peacefully concluded, in contrast to the previous day's events.³⁷ In total, eighty-three people were arrested during the summit and US\$50,000 of damage was caused.³⁸ In summary, one editorial dubbed the protests as 'lacklustre' and opined that:

At the time of writing, the protests in Pittsburgh ... don't seem to be reaching the peak we saw at the 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999. Even the lowest estimates put that crowd at more than 40,000, all there to decry the evils of globalisation. Ten years on, after the worst financial collapse in living memory, the G20 seems a far less controversial affair.³⁹

As regards the impact on protest itself, the Pittsburgh summit demonstrated the changing nature of protest, especially in response to social media, and Twitter in particular. Protestors were able to share information about themselves and the police, which had previously been the preserve of the latter, and thereby rebalance the traditional information asymmetry. Moreover, this was the first event hosted in the US to see protestors arrested for tweeting about police activities (Earl et al. 2013). Furthermore, the exposure is thought to have rejuvenated some protest groups:

The AWC [Anti-War Committee], formed to protest the Iraq War, had been experiencing difficulty mobilizing people around peace issues in recent years, but the G20 gave the AWC a much-needed boost of confidence and some new members following the protests. Pittsburgh Indymedia was also having difficulty surviving before the G20, but experienced great success in covering the protests and was temporarily revitalized as a result. An anarchist collective called the Pittsburgh Organizing Group (POG) had been planning to disband just before the White House decided to hold the G20 in Pittsburgh, but upon hearing the news decided to remain together to aid the mobilization. They did so and gained new members, prolonging the life of the group for about a year after the G20 demonstrations. (Wood et al. 2017, 600)

As regards the Cannes summit, Cooper and Pouliot (2015, 347) argue that alongside the Los Cabos summit, this summit ‘suggested a move away from exclusionary tactics toward cooptation’. To this end, President Sarkozy engaged with civil society representatives before the summit to discuss substantive issues and strategies around development, as well as extending ‘privileged access’ to some of the higher profile civil society groups. Sarkozy went as far as commissioning ‘Bill Gates ... to write a report on innovative financing for development. In many ways, therefore, Gates’ close involvement at Cannes was an exceptional one-off performance’ (Cooper and Cornut 2019, 313). On the streets, 12,000 police officers largely closed down Cannes and limited any protests and demonstrations to Nice, which also hosted the people’s summit.

Hamburg’s experience in 2017 was similarly mixed. As a city known for its history of radical politics, some have suggested that Merkel hoped to harness some of this spirit of her city of birth to demonstrate Germany’s ability to host a successful summit while maintaining an open and liberal society. Inevitably, the 100,000 protestors who gathered from across Europe targeted individual leaders like Trump and Putin and regarded the G20 as part of the problem in promoting globalization and fostering inequality. Although the mood around Hamburg ahead of the summit was tense, a range of demonstrations were organized in the run-up to and during the summit that were both peaceful and innovative, typified by a ‘Zombie March’ of 1,000 actors silently marching through the streets of Hamburg. However, on the eve of the summit, protest soon escalated into violence and rioting, exemplified by the ‘Welcome to Hell’ demonstrations that degenerated into protestors and riot police exchanging bottles and bricks for water cannons and pepper spray. It is estimated that damage totalling 12 million euros was caused and 400 arrests were made.⁴⁰

In the run-up to the following year’s Buenos Aires summit, security was one of the chief concerns as a result of bomb attacks in Buenos Aires immediately before the summit and the final of the Copa Libertadores. This was being contested for the first time in its history by the two local rivals, River Plate and Boca Juniors but with the second leg of the final descending into violence and farce, concerns were raised about how Argentinian security forces would deal with the upcoming G20 summit (*Global Policy* 2018b). In the end, Buenos Aires and its public transport system were locked down, its residents were given a national holiday in an attempt to empty the city during the summit, and although thousands protested on the streets, these demonstrations passed off peacefully.

There have also been a number of summits where civil society engagement and demonstrations have by and large failed to materialize. Despite the importance of the first G20 in Washington, which brought the relevant leaders

around the same table, civil society activity was limited at best with numbers in the ‘hundreds’ and the mood festive and peaceful.⁴¹

This is not to say that civil society was wholly absent from the event. Ahead of the summit, G20 leaders were the target of civil society campaigns. According to *The Observer*, ‘more than 600 civil society groups from over 100 countries have signed a petition calling for a wider range of countries to be involved, under the auspices of the UN’. The same report quoted Nick Dearden, Director of the Jubilee debt campaign saying, ‘[o]ur worry at the moment is that this will simply be a resuscitation of the existing system’.⁴² In addition, some civil society groups expressed concern about the issue of representation at the summit and the marginalization of the Global South. Finally, as possibly the first official interaction between the G20 and civil society, the G20-created taskforces were tasked with engaging ‘in multi-stakeholder “downreach” with civil society experts, but only on a functional, epistemic community model, rather than a fully democratic one’ (Hajnal and Guebert 2009, 14).

There was also little in the way of protest at the 2012 Los Cabos and 2013 St Petersburg summits. According to Villanueva Ulfgard and Alejo Jaime, although limited and hardly innovative, the Mexican presidency actively sought to engage with civil society, provided opportunities at the Los Cabos summit for CSOs to engage with the G20 and thereby recognized ‘the importance of having spaces and dialogues available to civil society as part of the agenda of the G20 presidency’ (2014, 1531). The Russian presidency built on this momentum the following year by establishing the first C20 summit, as a specific stakeholder group by which the G20 can engage with civil society. The depth of Russia’s commitment to the C20 surprised some (Naylor 2023). As regards protest and demonstration, although Scott McDougall of the Caxton Legal Centre is partly correct in claiming that ‘[i]f you look at Russia last year in St Petersburg in the G20 summit there, there were no protesters to be seen or heard on the streets’, there was a small counter summit held in St Petersburg immediately before the summit to argue the case for an alternative to the Washington Consensus. In addition, small-scale protests attempting to highlight human rights issues and homophobic government policies took place on the first day of summit. Internationally, 3 September 2013 was a day of protest in nineteen cities against rising homophobia and related government policies in Russia ahead of the summit. Within Russia, LGBT protests included a demonstration intended as a ‘thank you’ for demonstrations across the world in solidarity with Russia’s LGBT community as well as an attempt to gain the international attention afforded by the summit.

Protesting during a global pandemic proved difficult but not impossible. The Riyadh G20 process shifted online in early 2020, as did protest against both the summit and the Saudi record on human rights. The Indonesian government temporarily reintroduced some Covid-19 restrictions and limited the move-

ment of people during the Bali G20. In addition, the police urged the public to refrain from demonstrating.

7.6 SUMMARY

As mentioned above, mega-events like the G20 are as much local events as they are global ones. This chapter began with a vignette from the 2014 Brisbane G20 and will end with another that illustrates how the selection of a city as summit host can throw local and historical issues into relief. The summit venue was the Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre in South Brisbane and Aboriginal people used nearby Musgrave Park to stage protests during the summit despite disputes surrounding the function of the park and Aboriginal rights to its use. Obama's visit to Brisbane provided a different perspective on segregation as seventy years earlier, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur, stationed his General Headquarters in Brisbane during World War 2. South Brisbane was where African American soldiers were garrisoned in line with the US armed forces' policy of segregation during World War 2.⁴³

This chapter has only skimmed the surface of the multiple ways and the extent to which these local issues surface as a result of the G20 coming to town. The domestic impact, whether it be political, economic, reputational or cultural, of global mega-events, whether they be diplomatic, like the G20, or sporting, like the Olympics, requires further research based on a rigorous methodology. However, it is possible to glean some initial hypotheses that future research can demonstrate or debunk. First of all, there appears to be a perception among G20 countries that participation in and hosting a summit of this elite grouping confers status, and their leaders have sought to enhance and benefit from this status both in terms of national and individual reputations. Second, leveraging the G20 has been a common practice among leaders with one eye on specific issues related to national interest at home or abroad. Third, despite the perceived status associated with membership of this elite club, the chances of translating this status, or the hosting of a successful summit, into electoral success appear slim at best. More perilously, an unsuccessful summit performance can compound an already negative reputation. Fourth, the seductive belief in the economic benefits of hosting a summit persist despite being them being difficult to measure. Finally, striking the balance between facilitating protesters' rights and ensuring a peaceful and secure summit is a fine one, but the lessons of G20 summits have informed a wider body of knowledge and practice on policing mega-events.

NOTES

1. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 July 2012.
2. *The Brisbane Times*, 11 July 2012.
3. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 July 2012.
4. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 July 2012.
5. *The New York Times*, 22 October 2008.
6. *The Financial Times*, 23 September 2009.
7. *The Guardian*, 16 June 2013.
8. For a detailed analysis of the Seoul summit, see Cherry and Dobson 2012.
9. *Chosun Ilbo*, 16 November 2010.
10. *China Daily*, 6 August 2016.
11. *Chosun Ilbo*, 13 November 2010.
12. *The Korea Times*, 13 November 2010.
13. *The Japan Times*, 28 October 2011.
14. *Forbes*, 6 September 2013.
15. *New Statesman*, 26 March 2009.
16. *The Guardian*, 3 April 2009.
17. *The Guardian*, 16 June 2013.
18. *New Statesman*, 26 March 2009.
19. *The Sunday Times*, 29 March 2009.
20. *The Guardian*, 29 October 2013.
21. *The Washington Post*, 26 June 2019.
22. *Reuters*, 10 July 2009.
23. *The Economist*, 19 September 2009.
24. *Korea Herald*, 5 November 2010; *Xinhua*, 9 November 2010.
25. *China Daily*, 9 August 2016.
26. *BBC News*, 2 September 2016.
27. *The Guardian*, 31 August 2016.
28. *ABC News*, 14 November 2014.
29. *China Daily*, 7 July 2017.
30. *National Post*, 31 October 2012.
31. *Mexico News Daily*, 4 November 2015.
32. *The Economist*, 26 March 2009.
33. *The Economist*, 16 April 2009.
34. *ABC News*, 14 November 2014.
35. *Daily Telegraph*, 22 September 2009; *The Guardian*, 24 September 2009.
36. *The Financial Times*, 25 September 2009.
37. *The Herald*, 26 September 2009.
38. *Associated Press*, 25 September 2009.
39. *The Sunday Times*, 27 September 2009.
40. *Deutsche Welle*, 29 May 2018.
41. *BBC News*, 16 November 2008.
42. *The Observer*, 2 November 2008.
43. *Brisbane Times*, 13 November 2014.

8. Conclusions

8.1 OVERVIEW

This final chapter brings together the previous thematic chapters in the form of a series of individual profiles that answer the original question posed at the outset of this book regarding how nineteen countries and one intergovernmental organization have engaged with the G20 over seventeen summits between 2008 and 2022. To avoid the tedium of slavishly going through each country and summarizing its position within the G20, this chapter will arrange like-minded countries into subgroups. This will also provide an opportunity to tease out a range of common positions, identities and behaviours within these subgroups, in addition to the points at which, and reasons why, they might diverge.

There are many ways of cutting the G20 cake into subgroups. It could be on the basis of geography. Europe's presence is clearly dominant as a result of its over-representation within the G20, as discussed in Chapter 2. The emergence of an Asian identity with the G20 has been touted and critiqued in equal measure (Dobson 2011a; Dobson 2012c). In the case of Latin America, Luckhurst (2015) explored the identity – endogenous and exogenous – of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico within the G20 from 2008 through to the mid 2010s. He argued that during this period Brazil and Mexico had become G20 insiders to a greater degree than Argentina as a result of their respective policy positions and levels of compliance with G20 commitments. This was even though the ultimate indicator of being an insider – hosting a summit – was variable with Brazil yet to assume the G20 presidency (it will in 2024), whereas Mexico had (in 2012) and Argentina would (in 2018). It appeared that Brazil and Mexico's identities were based less on geography and more on the subgroups of similarly positioned countries to which they belong, namely G5/O5, BRICS, MIKTA. As a postscript, by the 2020s, Mexico's average levels of compliance between 2008 and 2021 had declined and were more similar to Argentina's than Brazil's.

Historic landmark events have resulted in the restructuring of subgroups. For example, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has led to the splintering of the G20 into three groups:

One group consists of Russia and China with a shared goal of replacing the international order led by the West. Another group consists of the US and democratic market-oriented countries in Europe and Asia, which have an interest in preserving the liberal rules-based international order. And the last group consists of a number of non-aligned countries – Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye – that avoid siding with either the authoritarian camp led by Russia and China or the democratic camp led by the US and Europe (Kang 2022).

In terms of identity, emerging economies have received a considerable amount of attention, for good reason. Cooper and Stolte (2019, 703) argue that they 'have pursued a dualistic strategy that allows them to be simultaneously institutional "insiders" and "outsiders"'. However, the pursuit of this strategy varies among the emerging powers. In the case of the middle powers, Cooper and Mo have argued that '[t]he G20 demonstrates that middle powers can make a difference and share the burden of leadership with great powers' (2013, 11). Nevertheless, within this common contribution to global governance, secondary powers 'have been required to weave multiple roles' (Alexandroff 2015, 261). Even within the G7, which has like-mindedness written into its DNA in the absence of concrete membership criteria (Morin et al. 2019), Chapter 3 demonstrated occasions when divisions emerged over the G20's response to the GFC.

It goes without saying that individual countries can hold multiple and conflicting identities concomitantly, which only adds to the complication. This chapter notes this complex picture but also needs to start somewhere in providing country-specific profiles while highlighting the similarities and divisions within groups. So, this chapter is organized on the basis of the established subgroups within the G20; namely, the G7, BRICS countries, the middle powers of MIKTA, as well as Argentina and Saudi Arabia, which did not belong to any specific grouping between 2008 and 2022, the period under examination in this book.

The chapter will profile each country's role in the G20 by outlining the nature of their representation and leadership style, their concrete contributions over time, the levels of compliance with commitments, and the underlying motivating factors. On the one hand, these factors can be rooted in domestic policies and can even be historical in nature; for example, the nature of capitalism in member countries (Kalinowski 2019). On the other hand, they can be found in foreign policy and diplomatic considerations. For example, Alexandroff has argued in relation to secondary powers that 'most of these

states have struggled with the constraints imposed by bilateral or multilateral security alliances with the US' (2015, 261). Dobson (2012b) has explored Japan's behaviour in G7 and G20 summits through this lens of managing its bilateral relationship with the US hegemon. Each section will end with an evaluation of the commonality and divergence within the subgroup.

8.2 THE G7

The G7 presidency rotates in an order that developed organically over time and provides as good a structure as any to explore each member. So, to begin with France, its own presidency currently lasts five years and can be renewed once. Between 2008 and 2022, three presidents have represented France at G20 summits: Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron (see Appendix 2). Regardless of president, French foreign policy has traditionally and regularly projected a self-perception as the stalwart of liberty, fraternity and equality in its domestic and international politics. Within the G7, this was clearly on display when it hosted the 1989 summit of the Arch, scheduled deliberately with Bastille Day and the bicentennial celebrations of the French Revolution. Within the G20, whether represented by Sarkozy or Macron, France has consistently presented itself as the defender of multilateralism. This can be seen as a consistent characteristic of France's engagement with the G20 regardless of the incumbent administration. For example, as seen in Chapter 2, although French officials expressed concerns around the representation, legitimacy and efficiency of the original G20, Sarkozy played an active and key role in advocating an upgrade of the G20 to the leaders' level in 2008 and his boosterism is captured in his claim that: 'The G20 foreshadows the planetary governance of the 21st century.'¹ As seen in Chapter 3, Sarkozy's objectives in response to the GFC were a radical overhaul of what was regarded as a failed system and 'the moralisation of financial capitalism' and 'the refoundation of a better regulated capitalism'. Ten years later, Macron demonstrated similar bolstering of the G20's position when he declared France's position on the agenda set ahead of the Buenos Aires summit and in response to the disruption to the rules-based liberal international order caused by the Trump administration.² In 2018, the US was seen as a blocker and spoiler but previously it had been a partner and enabler, as seen when Sarkozy played a leadership role alongside Obama in creating the MAP as the mechanism by which G20 countries would work with the IMF to monitor national growth policies.

France's multilateralism in the G20 can be described as robust, not only in its words but in its actions. Sarkozy's demands for radical measures in response to the GFC were backed up by threats at more than one summit to walk out if he did not get what he wanted. More constructively, in terms of the G20's development, France has supported the expansion of the G20's

agenda to address the pressing issues of the day, as seen in Chapter 3 in the case of food security. It has also sought to address concerns around the G20's legitimacy by nurturing engagement with civil society, as was evident when it hosted the 2011 Cannes summit, and to enhance the G20's effectiveness by arguing in favour of establishing a secretariat to support its work. France's levels of compliance with G20 commitments also pay testament to its faith in multilateralism. A comparison of levels of compliance between 2008 and 2021 places France towards the higher end of the scale overall but behind the joint most-compliant G20 members, the UK and the EU, who are not far ahead of Germany, Canada and Australia, before we get to France (G20 Information Centre 2023). However, they also hint at a willingness to prioritize national interests, as was seen when Sarkozy encouraged French car makers in receipt of government funds to firewall domestic jobs. Domestically, when France hosted the G20 summit in 2011, it coincided with its hosting of the G7 earlier in the year and much was made of the connection between the two, although mostly in terms of the optics (Naylor and Dobson forthcoming). However, at the same time, the choice of 'trendy seaside resorts' rendered the G20 in the eyes of some observers as 'another glittering but ultimately ineffective forum for world leaders' (Goodliffe and Sberro 2014, 7–8).

The US presidency is based on a four-year term that can be extended once. So, within the G20, US representation has transitioned through four presidencies: George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden. The Bush and Biden presidencies provide the bookends to the period under examination in this book, while Obama and Trump provide the substantial engagement with the G20. These two forms of engagement often contrasted starkly, as will come as no surprise. Nevertheless, for the US, informal global summitry has always been about shared and cooperative leadership going back to the original G20 of finance ministers and central bank governors created in 1999 and whose membership was shaped by US treasury secretary, Larry Summers. Almost a decade later, Bush played a central role in the upgrading of the G20 at the 2008 Washington summit to create a more inclusive mechanism of developed and developing countries than the G7 and to address a shared challenge in the form of the GFC that originated in the US. In other words: 'The US has produced institutional, material, and policy leadership but never sought a privileged place nor led alone in these informal institutions governing today's intensely globalized world' (Kirton 2020, 103).

Ünay (2014, 142) captures the response of the Bush administration in the specific context of the establishment of the G20 and in line with traditional US

foreign policy as a (declining) hegemon seeking to share the responsibilities of global governance, but on its own terms:

By creating an umbrella organization at the leaders' level and enhancing the restrictive club of G7 by including rising powers led by China, India and Brazil in the heart of the governance framework, the US administration successfully created a sense of 'complex interdependence' and shared responsibility for the future of the world economy, while deliberately paving the way for debates of multipolarity in the global system. On the other hand, as the institutional design and control of the whole G20 process was carefully completed under an Anglo-American compact, the image of participative multilateralism was conceived politically useful for the White House.

The Obama administration continued this approach of sharing responsibility for the future of the world economy. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Obama declared his support early in his presidency for the updating, refreshing and renewing of international institutions. Once the GFC had abated and any initial misgivings about the G20 were overcome, Obama provided further leadership as host of the 2009 Pittsburgh summit at which the G20 was declared 'the premier forum for international economic cooperation'. However, these reforms would not amount to the overhaul on a planetary scale advocated by Sarkozy. With similar forms of capitalism, Obama found more of a bedfellow in the UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, and supported his leadership within the G20 and his specific approach to the GFC based on fiscal stimulus. The instrumentalization of the G20 to promote a shared response to the more pressing collective action problem of climate change was seen ahead of the 2014 Brisbane summit when Obama, in collaboration with Xi Jinping, forced discussion of the challenge onto the agenda despite the different priorities of host Tony Abbott.³

Trump's infamous speech to the UNGA in September 2018 captured the nature of US involvement in the G20 during his administration, at least on the surface: 'America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the doctrine of patriotism. Around the world, responsible nations must defend against threats to sovereignty not just from global governance, but also from other, new forms of coercion and domination' (White House 2018).

So, the US position fundamentally changed with the Trump administration from the tradition of 'a leader seeking consensus' to one that 'put it at odds with other G7 and G20 members', particularly over the issues of climate change, symbolized by US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, as well as free trade, captured by withdrawal from the TPP (Nelson 2020: 8). As

discussed in Chapter 4, the leaders' declaration that came out of the 2017 Hamburg summit epitomized these divisions:

We take note of the decision of the USA to withdraw from the Paris Agreement ...
The leaders of the other G20 members state that the Paris Agreement is irreversible. (G20 Information Centre 2017a)

An uptick in the consideration and adoption of unilateralism was evident during this time as a way to navigate this turbulent period and departure from traditional US foreign policy until normal service was resumed with the attendance of Biden at the 2021 Rome summit. The G20's handling of climate change at the 2017 Hamburg summit exemplified this approach. Nevertheless, Trump did put reform of the informal mechanisms of global governance up for discussion with proposals for the return of Russia to the G8, as well as the addition of Australia, India, South Korea and Russia to the G7 to form a G11 (Nelson 2020).

The US levels of compliance with G20 commitments capture this complicated relationship with the G20 over time from 2008 to 2021. The US finds itself separated from fellow G7 and Quad members of the UK, the EU, Canada, Germany, France and Australia with the highest levels of compliance, and behind its key Asian allies of Japan and South Korea, but just ahead of its great power rival China (G20 Information Centre 2023). Domestically, the US has hosted two G20 summits (Washington in 2008 and Pittsburgh in 2009), representative of its influence in the genesis of the G20 at the leaders' level.

In the case of the UK, engagement with the G20 coincided with a period of global leadership under Brown at the height of the GFC until 2010, relative stability under David Cameron from 2010 to 2016, followed by a revolving door of prime ministers thereafter in the shape of Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak, who struggled to manage, and even triggered, ongoing domestic crises and scandals. Although Brown was domestically in a fragile position for most of his prime ministership, he appeared on the global stage of the G20 as leader with a plan, which was focused on fiscal stimulus. The 2009 London summit was the high point of Brown's global statesmanship and his 'integrity' and 'leadership' were singled out by Obama.⁴ Under Brown, but also his successor Cameron, attempts were made to leverage the perceived legitimacy of the G20 to justify domestic aspects of their response to the GFC. This is not a strategy exclusive to the UK, as mentioned below in the case of Japan, but it has been argued that:

British politicians ... have used [the G20] as a platform from which to reiterate the position that there is no alternative to prudence. In combination, the G20's technocratic approach to the diagnosis and treatment of the crisis and the gradual shift in emphasis to fiscal sustainability provided international endorsement of a domestic

growth strategy that was based on the twin pillars of financialisation and fiscal austerity. (Rogers 2015: 318)

The opportunities presented by a G20 summit to pursue national interest were also evident at the 2012 Los Cabos summit when Cameron was accompanied by a trade delegation of UK companies to Mexico, seeking alternative markets and partners outside the Eurozone. In similar fashion, May sought to reassure concerned partners at G20 summits from Hangzhou onwards around the impact of the 2016 Brexit referendum and process of withdrawal from the EU, as seen in Chapter 6.

Nevertheless, the UK has contributed to debates around the future shape of global summitry. Brown can legitimately be regarded as one of the architects of the G20. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2 and *passim*, Cameron was tasked ahead of the 2011 Cannes summit with drafting ‘Governance for growth: building consensus for the future’, which called for a better coordinated, more accountable and ultimately more effective forum. Although the report was silent on the issue of membership, the UK government acknowledged that ‘[w]e have moved irreversibly from a G8 world to a G20-plus world’. As regards the expansion of its agenda, a number of other objectives emerged for the UK government within the G20 that demonstrated its willingness to expand the remit of the G20’s activities. For example, Cameron was supportive of responding to the Syrian conflict within the G20 although he was limited by what he could agree to in the absence of a parliamentary mandate for intervention, as seen in Chapter 5.

In terms of bilateral relations, the UK has used the G20 to manage a difficult relationship with Russia. At the 2014 Brisbane summit, Cameron announced that Russia was ‘ripping up the rulebook’ through its actions in Ukraine.⁵ From that point on, the UK led on coordinating the G20’s response to Russia’s incursions into and ultimate invasion of Ukraine, as well as domestic issues, most notably the Salisbury Novichok poisonings in 2018. Within this context, May appeared in a most awkward photo-shoot with Putin, both stony-faced and barely shaking hands, at the 2019 Osaka summit.

Levels of compliance with G20 commitments between the 2008 Washington summit and the 2021 Rome summit demonstrate that on average the UK holds the position of most compliant country with the same score as the EU (G20 Information Centre 2023). On the domestic level, the London summit is probably better known for heavy-handed policing, the death of Ian Tomlinson, or even the visit of Michelle Obama, than for addressing the GFC.

As regards Germany, its representation is one of the most consistent, with Angela Merkel attending every summit between Washington in 2008 and her farewell at Rome in 2021. Merkel’s dominant position stands out among G7 partners with only Canada coming close, and within the G20 is only bettered

by the president of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In addition, Germany can in many ways be seen as an innovator in G20 governance. Finance Minister Hans Eichel hosted the first G20 meeting at the finance ministers' level in Berlin in 1999. Eight years later, when it hosted a G20 summit at the leaders' level, the German government worked to

shift the focus of the G20 beyond international financial and growth toward broader socioeconomic challenges. Furthermore, the German government had proposed new topics that had not yet been discussed within the G20 process, but were covered at other fora, such as global health, which was covered by the G7. The initial German G20 agenda can thus be seen as a continuation of the German G7 presidency in 2015, which focused heavily on such issues as climate change mitigation, global health, and sustainability. (Berger et al. 2017, 113)

It also established the S20 as an official engagement group of scientific researchers as part of its presidency in 2017, and the first-ever ministerial meeting of health ministers that has continued at subsequent summits. However, this was not an uncritical position and German officials were concerned about issues of representation, legitimacy and efficiency surrounding the first G20 at the leaders' level (Kirton 2013, 64–65).

As regards expansion of the G20's remit, as mentioned above, Germany proposed new topics for discussion. It led under its presidency on the adoption of the G20 Action Plan on Marine Litter, gave global health greater prominence, embedded Africa in discussions around the global tax agenda, placed food and agriculture on the agenda and supported a stand-alone statement on terrorism.

As regards specific issues, Germany worked closely with France in taking a common approach to the GFC based on strict regulation and opposed to the US and UK emphasis on stimulation, as outlined in Chapter 3. It also supported, with France, an FTT to pay for the damage caused by the crisis. Alongside the UK, it supported the Mexican presidency in placing BEPS on the G20's agenda. Germany has also adopted a pragmatic approach, as seen at the Hamburg summit when it sought as host to manage Trump as the disrupter-in-chief. Its approach was the adoption of a minilateral approach of G19+1 on climate change, as outlined in Chapter 4, that acknowledged the US position but reinforced the collective and 'irreversible' position of the other G20 leaders in relation to the Paris Agreement.

Levels of compliance with G20 commitments between 2008 and 2021 demonstrate Germany's role within the G7. It sits at the top end of the scale, marginally behind the most compliant members of the UK and EU, and marginally ahead of Canada (G20 Information Centre 2023). An aspect of G20 summit-hosting that Germany shares with its democratic G7 partners is the association with protest and policing. The 2017 Hamburg summit saw some

of the most violent protests in summit history with ‘Welcome to Hell’ prominently graffitied across the city.

Turning to Japan, it has been represented by seven prime ministers, who between them capture both the ‘revolving door’ of Japanese politics experienced between 2006 and 2012, the stability of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s record-breaking tenure as prime minister, followed by a possible return to the traditional transience of Japanese prime ministers. At the 2009 Pittsburgh summit, the Brazilian president, Inácio Lula da Silva, captured the challenges faced by Japan within these informal gatherings of leaders in typically colourful language: ‘in Japan ... you say “good morning” to one prime minister and “good afternoon” to a different one’ (Soble and Dickie, 2010).

The norms of bilateralism, Asianism and internationalism have been instrumental in shaping Japan’s postwar foreign policy. These norms also shaped its approach to and behaviour within the G7 where Japan sought to manage the ‘most important relationship in the world, bar none’ with the US, give Asia a voice as its sole representative, and demonstrate its credentials as a recognized great power of the day and responsible member of the international community (Dobson 2004). This approach was in evidence in its initial response to the early G20 summits. However, the increased levels of Asian representation in the G20 made it more challenging for Japan to play the role of regional representative. An expanded G20 also diluted the more exclusive great power status accorded through membership of the G7. As a result, although Japan’s initial engagement with the G20 was proactive, as seen in its financial contributions to the G20’s response to the GFC outlined in Chapter 3, its advocacy for the G20 as the ‘premier forum for international economic cooperation’ was muted and it sought to ensure the continuation of the G7 (Dobson 2012a). Japan’s representation within the G20 during this time was complicated by the ‘revolving door’ of short-lived Japanese prime ministers. However, under the long-serving Abe and with its G20 presidency in 2019, Japan became more comfortable with the co-existence of both summit processes and no longer saw them as a zero-sum game. To this end, it began to innovate in G20 governance, as seen in Chapter 4, when it convened the first-ever climate G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth in Karuizawa, and the first-ever combined G20 Trade and Digital Economy Ministerial Meeting in Tsukuba.

Another role that Japan adopted within the G7 that transferred over to the G20 is that of a bridge or honest broker who is able to find a compromise between divergent partners. This was clear at the 2019 Osaka G20 when divisions between G20 members on trade, security and climate change were not far from the surface. Abe was keen to stress ‘unity’ and ‘shared views’ at every opportunity.⁶ At his final press conference, Abe captured his approach for the world’s media: ‘In this world where emphasis tends to be overly placed on

confrontations, we look for common grounds and points of agreement. Under an approach unique to Japan, at this Osaka summit, the G20 unites and sends a strong message regarding global issues' (Kantei 2019b).

Faced with US–China trade tensions that threatened to (and eventually did, according to some) derail the 2019 G20 Osaka summit, the Japanese hosts tried incrementally to seek a compromise between its two most important bilateral partners. In the words of one Japanese government official involved in pre-summit ministerial talks at Tsukuba, '[r]ather than papering over the differences, we decided to make them clear. The G20 is a process of peer pressure. The essence of what we agreed in Tsukuba will be incorporated in Osaka.'⁷⁷ The compromise in language on trade reached at Tsukuba that was repeated in the Osaka leaders' declaration did not explicitly mention anti-protectionism but instead declared that '[w]e strive to realise a free, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and investment environment to keep our markets open' (G20 Information Centre 2019b).

Levels of compliance with G20 commitments demonstrate that Japan has responded solidly to the norm of internationalism and provided more than lip service with an average level of compliance from 2008 to 2021, similar to but slightly better than South Korea and the US. However, its levels of compliance do not match the big hitters of Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Germany and the UK (G20 Information Centre 2023). Japan has also sought to provide concrete outcomes, especially in its role as G20 president. At the 2019 Osaka G20, the launch of the eponymous Osaka Track, outlined in Chapter 5, as a framework to promote international governance of the cross-border flow of data, as well as the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision to reduce marine plastic waste, were Japan's signature contributions. In the case of the former, the Japanese government worked with the US, the EU, Australia and Singapore on a plurilateral approach to which India, Indonesia and South Africa did not sign up, instead claiming that it did not conform to multilateral principles of consensus-based decision-making in global trade negotiations. This instance demonstrated that the traditional role of honest broker was more challenging for Japan in a diverse forum like the G20, rather than in a more like-minded group such as the G7.

As regards domestic considerations, when Japan hosted the G20 in Osaka in 2019, it was embraced very much as G7 summits had been as an opportunity to showcase the city and wider region as well. Osaka had bid unsuccessfully to host a G7 summit but was successful in securing the status associated with hosting a diplomatic mega-event. In concrete domestic policy terms, and similar to the UK situation mentioned above, the G20 was used to legitimize a controversial domestic policy, in this case the increase in consumption tax (Dobson 2013a).

Known for its high turnover rate of technocratic leaders, Italy has been represented by eight prime ministers over seventeen summits, from Silvio Berlusconi at the early summits during the GFC and Eurozone crisis through to its first female leader, Giorgia Meloni, at Bali in 2022. Italy presents an interesting case. Despite being an original member of the G7 from 1975 as well as the G20 at the finance ministers' and leaders' levels, and holding the G20 presidency in 2021, it is probably one of the least researched members of the G20, certainly compared to its G7 partners and the BRICS countries. This may have something to do with its high turnover of leaders, although a country like Australia with similar levels of turnover in its leadership has received more attention. Within the G7, Italy has historically been grouped with Canada and Japan as the non-core members, as was most starkly seen at the 1979 Guadeloupe summit of core G7 countries, France, the UK, the US and West Germany, focused on political and security issues. Almost thirty years later, along with Canada and Japan, Italy did not demonstrate complete buy-in as a core member to the upgrading of the G20 to the leaders' level in response to the GFC. However, this also does not wholly explain the lack of attention accorded to Italy, as its Canadian and Japanese counterparts have been the subject of research.

Nevertheless, we can trace aspects of G20 leadership. For example, during the Italian G20 presidency of 2021, global summitry began to edge towards business as usual after the virtual meetings of 2020. As seen in Chapter 3, the Italian government placed recovery from the pandemic at the heart of its agenda with an emphasis on food security, nutrition and sustainable food systems in light of the Covid-19 pandemic. The concrete outcome took the form of the Matera Declaration, which called on the international community to address the impact of Covid-19 on livelihoods, strengthen food chains and ensure adequate nutrition for all in line with SDG-2 on zero hunger by 2030. The Italian presidency also sought to leverage the G20's flexibility by convening a special summit on the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan after the US completed its withdrawal in August 2021. The Italian presidency also managed to keep the G20 together as they headed directly from Rome to Glasgow for COP26. Leadership often becomes more visible when a G20 country hosts the summit. Nevertheless, isolated examples prior to this can be seen. As discussed in Chapter 3, Italy played a key role alongside Australia, Canada, the UK, the US and the Gates Foundation in funding the AgResults initiative announced at the Los Cabos summit.

Levels of compliance with G20 commitments between 2008 and 2021 suggest middling levels of performance. Italy is ranked well behind its G7 partners, and is more at home among BRICS countries such as Brazil and India, but ahead of the poorest performers, in ascending order, of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Indonesia (G20 Information Centre 2023). Domestically,

as mentioned above, the Rome G20 summit took place as the world continued to emerge from lockdown and reaccustom itself to face-to-face meetings. As a result, its domestic impact was probably less felt by the Italian people than would have been the case in different times.

Canada has been represented at G20 summits by only two leaders, a consistency in representation that is only bettered by Germany by virtue of Merkel's dominant position in German politics. Canada stands alongside Italy and Japan as countries that cherished the status associated with their G7 membership, even if at times regarded as non-core members, and feared its dilution with the rise of the G20. Thus, the G20's elevation to 'the premier forum for international economic cooperation' was greeted with wariness but ultimately 'a sense of the inevitable' (Kirton 2013, 237). This may partly explain how the Canadian government failed to generate synergy between the G8 and G20 when it hosted back-to-back summits in 2010. Canada also stood in contrast to partners such as France when engaging with civil society. The Toronto summit was organized in a way that excluded and frustrated CSOs, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 6.

On occasions, Canada has found itself on one side of deeply divisive issues that cut across the subgrouping distinctions that provide the structure of this chapter. As explored in Chapter 3, Canada found itself alongside a collection of G7, BRICS and MIKTA partners opposed to the idea of an FTT as host of the Toronto summit. In the case of security and the Syrian conflict, as seen in Chapter 5, Canada was on the side of the debate that supported collective action against the government of President Bashar al-Assad in response to its use of chemical weapons against its own people in violation of the norms of international society. Again, this issue cut across subgrouping divides within the G20.

Nevertheless, Canada has played a leadership role in the G20. In the form of Paul Martin, it was a key innovator in its creation and development (Cooper 2013a, 972). As regards providing leadership within the G20, Canada's main task was keeping it focused on the most pressing task, the continued recovery from the GFC (Christie 2010). At the height of the GFC, as outlined in Chapter 3, Prime Minister Stephen Harper sought to find a middle path between the extreme positions of the US and Europe at the 2008 Washington summit, showcased Canada's relatively successful navigation through the crisis and advocated selective regulation. As seen in Chapter 4 on sustainable development, alongside its co-chair, South Korea, Canada was instrumental in placing the issue on the G20 agenda and funding the AgResults initiative announced at the 2012 Los Cabos summit.

Levels of compliance with G20 commitments between 2008 and 2021 reinforce Canada's role as a true believer in multilateralism. It sits at the higher end of the spectrum and nested among fellow G7 members and middle powers.

So, just behind the most compliant member of the UK and EU, but just ahead of Germany and Australia (G20 Information Centre 2023). Domestically, the G20 is probably better remembered, as explored in Chapter 6, for the violence and policing, the damage and costs associated with hosting the 2010 Toronto summit.

Prior to the announcement of the AU's permanent membership of the G20 in September 2023, the EU was the only G20 member to be an intergovernmental organization, not a country, and its representation is decided by the organs of the organization. Thus, the EU has been represented at the G20 by presidents of both the European Commission and the European Council, as it has at G7 summits. Although it is not part of the country-based rotation of G20 presidencies, it is effectively a full member in most aspects. Its main challenge has been to speak with a single voice on behalf of its members. Rommerskirchen (2013) has explored the EU's ability to do this in the specific case of macroeconomic policy, arguing that in its initial engagement with the G20, 'the EU has failed to create a consistent system of external representation that might enable it to play a more prominent role on the global stage, considering its overall economic might and the competences that supranational bodies have acquired in the European policy process' (2013, 348).

For example, as highlighted in Chapter 3, the EU could not establish a single position on the FTT with the Commission strongly in favour but the UK, in particular, opposed.

In contrast, Moschella and Quaglia have argued that at least in the case of the G20's most salient economic agenda items, 'a single voice can be developed and publicly articulated even if the preferences of the large member states are heterogeneous, provided that the issues under negotiations are not politically salient' (2016, 907). For example, as seen in Chapter 3, the EU has supported a strong G20 statement in support of anti-protectionism and advocated strict regulation of executive pay and bonuses. Since the first G20 summit, the EU has traditionally caucused before the leaders' summit to establish a common position that is then communicated to the world's media ahead of the summit. A summit tradition of sorts has developed by which the presidents of the European Commission and Council give the first press conference before the leaders' summit begins. As a result of this high level of public and media engagement, the EU's position within the G20 is relatively easy to trace and in some ways is also more stable over time. Inevitably collective action is a repeated theme that is salient in the EU's communications, whether it be the traditional G20 issues such as economic growth, free trade, financial regulation and tax transparency, or newer issues for which the G20 was not created, as discussed below. More specifically, Kalinowski (2019) highlights how the EU's position on responses to the GFC and its preference for austerity, as opposed to the US emphasis on stimulus packages (described by Czech prime

minister, and president of the European Council, Mirek Topolánek as ‘a road to hell’), are rooted in the historical origins of the EU’s model of capitalism.

In terms of the G20’s development, as highlighted in Chapter 2, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso is one of many who can lay claim to be an architect of the G20. As regards the G20’s agenda, the EU has been willing to support its expansion to include security issues such as sustainable development, as seen in Chapter 4, climate change, as seen in Chapter 5, and terrorism, as seen in Chapter 6. In the case of terrorism, this has been in response to specific crises such as the Syrian conflict. Ahead of the 2013 St Petersburg G20, EU presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso were supportive of the convening of an international conference on the conflict, stating that the international community could not remain idle and should address it through the UN. In the context of the refugee crisis, at the 2015 Antalya summit, the EU’s official position was that ‘[t]he G20 must rise to the challenge and lead a coordinated and innovative response to the crisis that recognises its global nature and economic consequences and promotes greater international solidarity in protecting refugees’ (EU 2015b). A few years later at the Hamburg and Buenos Aires summits, the EU pursued a robust response within the G20 to the issues of migrant smuggling and human trafficking (EU 2017; EU 2018). This included supporting a proposal that would institute targeted UN sanctions against migrant smugglers.

As regards levels of compliance, the EU holds the position of most compliant member, alongside the UK, across commitments made at G20 summits from Washington to Rome (G20 Information Centre 2023). As regards hosting a G20 summit, although the EU is an original and effectively full member of the G20, it is not part of the country-based rotation of G20 presidencies as mentioned above. However, as the G7 demonstrated in 2014 when Russia’s membership was suspended and Brussels stepped in to provide an alternative summit chair and venue, the EU would be capable of taking on this role if necessary.

So, within the G7, cohesion and diversity are in evidence. In the absence of official membership criteria, the G7 is bound together through shared values. Within the more diverse G20, the G7 thus stands in contrast to many, but not all, members of the wider group, thereby strengthening these commonalities. The G7’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as discussed in Chapter 6, has provided a lightning conductor to reinforce these bonds within the forums of both the G7 and the G20. Compliance with summit commitments is another commonality within the G7, with generally good to high levels of compliance, especially when contrasted with the wider membership of the G20, as will be discussed below. Divergence can be seen in particular in the early summits and the response to the GFC. As mentioned above, Kalinowski (2019) highlights how the US, Asian and EU positions on responses to the

GFC, based around the choice between austerity and stimulus, cut across the G7 subgroup and can be explained by the historical origins of the different variants of capitalism. Schirm has also demonstrated how responses to economic issues undercut and transgressed traditional distinctions within the G7. For example, US demands that the G20 continue large-scale economic stimulus packages were aimed as much as at fellow G7 members, Germany and Japan, as at China. Both Germany and Brazil were critical of the loose fiscal position of the US because of domestic factors and traditional attitudes and economic practices (2013, 698–699). Schirm has also explored currency manipulation and the impact of undervaluation on trade competitiveness, demonstrating how the US was critical of China’s policies but in turn found itself criticized by Germany and Brazil (2013, 701–702). These two countries were allied in their criticisms of the US as well as China as a result of domestic factors, as had been the case in their concerns over US stimulus packages. Again, it appears that the coherence of traditional and newly formed subgroups can easily be undermined by domestic politics.

8.3 BRICS

At the cusp of a new millennium, Jim O’Neill famously coined the acronym BRIC to identify the rising economic powers that were expected to challenge the central position of the G7 in global economic governance. The acronym became reality in 2009 when Brazil, Russia, India and China met at their first summit in Yekaterinburg. South Africa was invited as a guest to the second BRIC summit in Brasília in 2010 before BRIC became BRICS the following year in Sanya, China. From 2014, with the Fortaleza summit, the rotation of BRICS summits began in line with the acronym. The third cycle of summits was completed in 2023 with the Durban summit at which Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were invited to join the bloc. As is the case with the G7, this order provides a logical structure to explore each member of this subgroup.

In terms of representation at the G20, Brazil has experienced a journey that began with Lula da Silva in 2008 and ended with him returning to the presidency at the beginning of 2023. In the intervening period, Brazil was represented at the G20 by three other leaders – Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro, although ministerial alternates have been delegated on occasion. Regardless of leader, Brazil regards its G20 membership as overdue recognition, although it has been much more vocal than others in its criticisms of the old order. This can be seen in Lula da Silva’s placing blame for the GFC firmly on white men with blue eyes, as seen in Chapter 3. In addition, he declared that ‘[w]e are talking about the G20 because the G8 doesn’t have any more reason to exist’.⁸ So, Brazil has been a vocal supporter of the G20

from its outset. It chaired the forum at the finance minister's level in 2008 as the GFC erupted and, as seen in Chapter 2, argued for its upgrade to the leaders' level in order to create a more 'agile' group. It supported the elevation of the G20 to the 'premier forum of global economic cooperation' at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit. As regards G20 reform, 'Brazil was comfortable with the gradual shift in the G20's focus from that of "crisis breaker" to "steering committee" for global economic and financial governance' (Doctor 2015, 295). At various times, Brazil has argued for a greater institutionalization of the G20. According to de Freitas Barbosa and Mendes (2010, 67),

the ultimate interest of Brazil in the G20 is to institutionalize its role as a decision maker in all arenas of the international economy, alongside other BRIC countries. Once that is consolidated, Brazil will most likely try to combine a strategy that strengthens its political position as leader of the developing world with a pragmatic approach that defends the economic interests of its increasingly internationalized business community.

So, alongside the status and prestige that comes with G20 membership, claiming the role of leader of the developing world is also a common reaction that has emerged among BRICS countries. In other words, as Doctor (2015) has argued, Brazil has begun to supplement its previous foreign policy priority of national economic development with a quest for status and prestige as a leader of the developing world within the G20 and other institutions of global governance. In this light, and like other BRICS countries, Brazil has used its position to argue for IFI reform and a breakthrough on stalled trade negotiations in the WTO.

However, Brazil's support for the G20 is not unconditional. It has been concerned that the G20 should not undermine the position of the UN as the legitimate and legal centre of global governance. This is a position Brazil shares with other countries seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC. So, similar to fellow BRICS countries, Brazil has enjoyed the status and opportunities presented by its inclusion in the G20 but has balanced this by continuing to emphasize the central position of the formal and legal centres of global governance within the UN system (Doctor 2015, 297).

As regards levels of compliance across the commitments made at G20 summits from Washington to Rome, BRICS compliance is noticeably lower than G7 compliance on average for reasons that will be discussed below. Within BRICS, Brazil is the second most compliant country, behind China but comparable with India and ahead of Russia and South Africa (G20 Information Centre 2023). As regards the domestic reception, Brazil has yet to host a summit but will assume the G20 presidency on 1 December 2023.

As regards Russia, it has been represented by two leaders over seventeen summits, with Dmitry Medvedev attending the first six summits between 2008

and 2011 and Vladimir Putin attended ten summits between 2012 and 2021. This gives Russia a high degree of consistency in its representation at the G20. However, Putin has been willing not to attend in person, as was the case at the 2021 Rome summit where he attended online, and at the 2022 Bali summit, where Russia was represented by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who left the summit a day earlier than scheduled. Putin has also been willing to leave the summit early, as seen in Brisbane when he complained that ‘[i]t’s nine hours by plane to Vladivostok, then nine hours to Moscow. I have to get home on Monday to get to work and I need four to five hours sleep.’⁹ Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine raises the question of when/if Putin will attend another G20 leaders’ summit.

The lack of engagement seen in Putin’s participation is mirrored in the levels of compliance with the commitments made at the sixteen summits that took place between 2008 and 2021. Russia ranks towards the lower end of any scale. Within BRICS, Russia is the second least compliant country, on a par with South Africa. Within the G20, it is the fifth least compliant country. Even hosting the G20 did not appear to result in an uptick in Russia’s levels of compliance (G20 Information Centre 2023). As regards the domestic reception, Russia assumed the G20 presidency in 2013 and hosted the leaders’ summit in St Petersburg. As seen in Chapter 7, the accompanying international popular and media attention focused on human rights’ issues within Russia, particularly LGBT+ rights, accusations that the Russian government spied on other countries’ delegations, and the low levels of protest ahead of and during what proved to be a closely stage-managed event.

Nevertheless, looking back over seventeen summits, Russia’s contribution to G20 governance can be discerned. In response to the GFC, as seen in Chapter 3, Russia under Medvedev was for the most part supportive of many of the measures adopted by the G20, including reform of the IMF at Washington and Brown’s position on stimulus at London. On specific issues, the 2013 St Petersburg summit saw the adoption of the G20/OECD BEPS Action Plan. As regards the place of development on the G20’s agenda, as seen in Chapter 4, Russia contributed through the expansion of the G20’s remit on the issue through the St Petersburg Development Outlook, and a review of the G20’s treatment of the issue up to that point and a reprioritization of the G20’s efforts. Sustainable energy policy is another issue that Russia has been ready to engage with in the G20, as seen in Chapter 5, and as evidenced by the establishment of the Energy Sustainability Working Group (ESWG), co-chaired by India and Australia, at St Petersburg. As outlined in Chapter 6, Russia was willing to use the G20 as a forum for the informal discussion of conflict in Syria through multilateral and bilateral meetings, while continuing to prioritize the position of the UNSC. Finally, despite the tight control of protest at the St Petersburg summit and within Russia generally, it has ironically contributed to

the G20's evolving legitimacy through the establishment of the C20 as an official engagement group at the 2013 St Petersburg summit (Cooper and Pouliot 2015; Naylor 2023).

India has been represented by only two prime ministers since the 2008 Washington summit: Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi. India's position towards the G20 in general is that 'existing institutional structures of global governance do not reflect current international realities' (Sachdeva 2022, 85) and thus it has welcomed the opportunity presented by the upgrading of the G20 to have its voice heard on a range of issues. Terrorism represents a particularly salient example, as seen in Chapter 6. Similarly, it was Modi's words that concluded paragraph 4 of the Leaders' declaration: 'Today's era must not be of war' (G20 Information Centre 2022a; Niblett 2022). India hosted the 2002 meeting of the G20 at the finance ministers' level and was meant to host the leaders in 2022 to coincide with the 75th anniversary of its independence. However, the decision was made in 2020 to move it to 2023.

However, the tension for India and other countries that aspire to a permanent seat on the UNSC, whether they be members of the G7 or BRICS, has lain in the difference between an informal grouping like the G20, struggling with legitimacy and effectiveness, and a formal, legitimate centre of global governance in the form of the UN. In this light, India has been more wary of the G20 than some of its other BRICS partners. Cooper and Stolte outline the hedging strategy by which it initially 'carefully balanced joining the informal G20 by robustly asserting its commitment to the formal UN' (2019, 707). So, India was also ready to accept the status associated with G20 membership but gave a lukewarm response to and engagement with the preparations for the first Washington summit (Cooper and Farooq 2016, 92). Since then, it has displayed some resistance to the expansion of the G20's role and agenda and has stressed the position of the UN over the G20 on several issues, including sustainable development (Chapter 4), climate change (Chapter 5) and security (Chapter 6).

Nevertheless, in the lead-up to its assumption of the G20 presidency on 1 December 2022, India began to take a more visible and proactive role in raising its leadership profile under the wide-ranging slogan of *One Earth, One Family, One Future*. India has also regarded itself as a voice for the voiceless within the G20, as was seen at the first Washington summit and particularly on the issues of sustainable development and food security.

Over seventeen G20 summits, India has taken a robust position on specific issues. For example, as seen in Chapter 6, at the 2019 Osaka summit, India refused to sign up to Prime Minister Abe's DFFT initiative. As seen in Chapter 3, Herman and Cooper (2013, 403) single out India among several other countries as 'the worst offenders' for introducing discriminatory trade measures despite G20 commitments. So, as regards levels of compliance

across the commitments made at sixteen summits from Washington to Rome, India has a below-average level of compliance that is comparable with Brazil, both behind China as the most compliant BRICS country, but ahead of Russia and South Africa (G20 Information Centre 2023). As regards the domestic reception, India hosted its first G20 in September 2023. However, in the run up to the summit, it was clear that the G20 coming to India was regarded at the popular level as recognition for India's growing status in the world.

As regards China's participation in the G20, it has been represented by two leaders: Hu Jintao at the first seven summits from Washington to Los Cabos in 2012, and Xi Jinping from St Petersburg in 2013 onwards. Clearly this represents a high degree of consistency across seventeen G20 summits. Yet, the trajectory of China and Xi's engagement with the G20 was impacted severely by Covid-19. As a result of the pandemic, Xi did not physically leave China for over two years until his state visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in September 2022, followed by his attendance at the Bali summit in November. For a process that relies heavily on informal, in-person and interpersonal interactions, this was a substantial and potentially damaging disengagement and one that Xi sought to address by proactively and visibly making his presence felt at the G20 in Bali (Agrawal 2022).

Kirton neatly sifts the literature into competing schools of thought on China's role in the G20, including 'passive self-interested status seeker', 'emerging country caucus leader', 'BRICS leader', 'failed Asian leader', 'balancer and bridge builder', 'cooperative reformer', 'flexible inter-vulnerable equal', 'G2 duopolist', 'major power in a constraining club', 'proactive reinforcer, reformer and replacer', 'successful system reformer', and 'global governance co-leader' (2016, 1–8). Of course, these roles are not mutually exclusive and China has displayed one or more of them at any given time over fifteen years of G20 summitry.

As demonstrated in the previous chapters of this book, a steady pattern of development in China's role is discernible. Its approach to the early summits at the height of the GFC was one characterized by initial caution and suspicion towards the G20, wary of expanding its agenda and reinforced by a preference for the UN. However, at the same time, it welcomed and luxuriated in the de facto recognition and status as a great power that membership of the G20 accorded, as well as the specific attention given to China as the first among equals within the new additions to an expanded summit table. This ultimately resulted in a more instrumentalist approach to G20 leadership (Kirton 2016), which also reassured the world that China sought to operate within the status quo rather than promote a revisionist agenda (Cooper and Farooq 2016, 86–90). Certainly, China sought to address obvious injustices and anomalies, such as World Bank and IMF reform, but within given structures and processes, making it 'a reform-minded status quo power' (Ren 2015).

This cautious approach changed with China's G20 presidency and the 2016 Hangzhou summit, by which it 'recast its engagement as leadership' (McKinney 2018, 710). The epiphanic role of summit host is not unique to China and can be seen in established and rising powers alike. This development should also be seen as part of a continuum that includes hosting other international mega-events such as the 2008 Olympics and 2014 APEC summit in Beijing.¹⁰ In the words of Gregory Chin in relation to China and the World Bank, this is 'remaking, not breaking' (2010b, 91). Ultimately, the relationship between China and the G20 is mutually beneficial and reinforcing (Bo 2021, 117–119). The G20 benefits from its recognition of China and its position in the global economy in that it can justify its claim to be the premier forum for international global cooperation – the legitimacy that is absent in more exclusive groups like the G7. China benefits from membership of the G20 in several ways that might appear contradictory but reflect China's recent history and current position in the world. It provides both status and recognition as a contemporary great power, as well as providing a central conduit to pursue its various national economic interests, give fellow developing countries a voice in a central mechanism of global governance, and provide global public goods as befits its position.

China has also adopted a strategy of working in coalition with other G20 countries. Kirton and Wang (2023) provide the example of the China–UK coalition on green finance, which resulted in wider acceptance among the G20 of the Green Finance Study Group's recommendations, as outlined in the G20 leaders' communiqué that resulted from the 2016 Hangzhou summit. In contrast, Kirton and Wang also highlight the contrasting unsuccessful attempt by China to build a coalition with the US and EU on the Enhanced Structural Reform Agenda.

China's evolving relationship with the G20 is also captured by its levels of compliance with commitments made at summits between 2008 and 2021, which place it at the head of the BRICS countries and in the middle of the wider G20 (G20 Information Centre 2023). As regards the domestic reception, as discussed in Chapter 7, China hosted the G20 leaders' summit in Hangzhou in September 2016, in what proved to be a closely stage-managed event. Hangzhou was carefully chosen as the summit venue to showcase local, regional and national achievements to the outside world, residents were actively encouraged to leave the city during the summit, and journalists were ferried to and from the airport, hotel and media centre. It was also rumoured to be one of the most expensive summits in G20 history as Hangzhou benefited from a considerable amount of investment in infrastructure.

South Africa has been represented by three presidents at the seventeen G20 summits between 2008 and 2022. Kgalema Motlanthe attended the first two summits at Washington and London, before Jacob Zuma then assumed the

presidency for a decade between 2009 and 2018. Cyril Ramaphosa became president and has represented South Africa from the 2018 Buenos Aires summit onwards, although he delegated the 2021 Rome summit to Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, in order to campaign in domestic elections. As outlined in Chapter 4, South Africa's participation at the G20 is guided by its four strategic foreign policy pillars, focused on domestic objectives and national interest; the promotion of issues of interest to Africa and its development; shaping the architecture of global governance; and the advancement of the Global South's agenda through South–South cooperation and North–South dialogue. It has probably been most successful in the second and fourth objectives by seeking to mainstream sustainable development within the G20's agenda and bring the attention of the wider group to African issues. To this end, South Africa was closely involved in developing the 2010 Seoul Development Consensus, and welcomed the establishment of the G20 Global Infrastructure Hub at the 2014 Brisbane summit as well as the G20 Africa Partnership at the 2017 Hamburg summit. At the same time, although the chairs of the AU and NEPAD have attended the G20 as guests and the former was finally recognized as a permanent member in September 2023, South Africa is the only African country to be represented. As a result, it has assumed the mantle of regional leadership. As mentioned in Chapter 2, South Africa sought to amplify the region's voice in the G20 by using several regional mechanisms (Cooper 2011a, 207).

As regards shaping the architecture of global governance, South Africa hosted a meeting of the G20 at the finance ministers' level in 2007 and was supportive of the upgrading to the leader's level in 2008 to create 'a new space for dialogue and a springboard for new ideas in the international sphere' (Postel-Vinay 2014, 2). However, like several other G7 and BRICS countries, South Africa has maintained the position of the UN as the central mechanism of global governance especially when it comes to issues outside the G20's traditional remit.

South Africa is often perceived to have a marginal role within the G20 (Obi 2015). This is most starkly reflected in its levels of compliance with commitments made at the sixteen summits that took place between 2008 and 2021, and which are similar to those of Russia. Within BRICS, South Africa is the least compliant country; within the G20, it is the fourth least compliant country. South Africa has yet to assume the G20 presidency and host a leader's summit. This is all set to change in 2025, although whether it will respond to the responsibilities of hosting the G20 with higher levels of compliance remains to be seen.

In summary, it is clear that several commonalities emerge that make BRICS more than an acronym. First and foremost, the status and recognition associated with joining an elite club represents one of the key aspects of their mem-

bership within the G20 and has enabled them to move beyond their position as outreach partners in a semi-permanent state of liminality. This narrative has been framed as one of justice as the voices of emerging powers are brought into global governance alongside the G7. Building on this, BRICS countries have also used their position within the G20 as a driver to increase the attention given to the concerns of the Global South in global governance. However, there is a tension between these two positions of insider and outsider that has resulted in some BRICS countries adopting cautious approaches or ‘hedging strategies’ (Ünay 2014). Cooper points out, in the case of China and India, how both identities can coexist, creating a dualistic mindset that results in an ambivalence towards global governance, which China has been able to manage but India has struggled to reconcile. On the one hand, China has kept ‘options open and not over-committ[ed] in terms of either status seeking or solidarity’ within the G20 as it moves to a leadership role at its own pace and on its own terms (2021, 1952). However, India has been unable to resolve the apparent contradictions of this mindset, resulting in a hesitant and cautious approach to G20 leadership. This may change with India’s G20 presidency acting as a catalyst during 2023 (and by extension in the cases of Brazil and South Africa in 2024 and 2025 respectively). The responsibility associated with hosting the G20 may also address one of the negative commonalities shared by BRICS countries in the form of noticeably lower levels of compliance with G20 commitments.

Since the first BRIC summit in 2008 held in Russia, a sense of cohesion and mutual support among BRICS countries has emerged within the G20 and in opposition to the G7. This has been fostered by pre-summit meetings of BRICS countries to share information and compare positions on the key agenda items, which have become the norm over time. In the slightly mangled words of Russian presidential aide, Yuri Ushakov, ‘BRICS is a good floor for the joint protection of interests of member countries with dynamic economies on the world scene’.¹¹ More concretely, at the 2013 St Petersburg summit, Putin specifically praised Zuma for having done a ‘remarkable thing’ by highlighting the unintended consequences of attacking Syria, and acting ‘as a champion of small nations opposing US-led Western plans to attack Syria militarily’.¹² With future expansion of the bloc and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, this level of coherence may or may not survive. It was China, India and South Africa who abstained in the UNGA votes calling on Russian to end its aggression and refusing to recognize Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukraine. However, Brazil, India and South Africa also fit into the non-aligned camp, identified by Kang (2022), who wish to avoid taking sides.

8.4 MIKTA

From 2010, non-G7 countries began to assume the G20 presidency, as seen first with South Korea and the Seoul summit of November of that year, followed by Mexico in 2012, Australia in 2014 and Türkiye in 2015. Although it would not host a G20 summit until 2022, Indonesia also fitted into this category of traditional middle powers, leading to the emergence of a new acronym of MIKTA. The idea of this subgroup was first discussed at the first G20 foreign ministers' meeting held under the Mexican presidency in February 2012, with the first meeting of MIKTA foreign ministers realized on the sidelines of the UNGA the following year. According to its own webpages, MIKTA was intended to be 'a cross-regional and flexible consultative platform among five democracies that benefit from open economies with significant global and regional influences'. Since then the chair of MIKTA has rotated on an annual basis and regular meetings of foreign ministers and senior officials have taken place throughout the year. However, leaders of the MIKTA countries have resisted the impulse to meet and formalize the subgroup, although they did meet on the sidelines of the 2022 Bali summit. The acronym provides a logical order by which to explore the role and leadership of each member of this subgroup within the G20.

Mexican presidents serve non-extendable six-year terms. So, three presidents have represented Mexico at seventeen G20 summits between 2008 and 2022: Felipe Calderón at the early summits at the height of the GFC through to the Los Cabos summit of 2012; Enrique Peña Nieto represented Mexico through to the 2018 Buenos Aires summit; and Andrés Manuel López Obrador won a landslide election in July 2019 a few days after the Osaka summit, but chose not to attend the Rome and Bali G20 summits, instead sending Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard as head of Mexico's delegation at these three summits.

Despite López Obrador's apparent shunning of the G20, Mexico had previously taken its role in the G20 seriously. It was the first G5 country to host a G20 summit and ahead of the 2012 Los Cabos summit it was eager to ensure a successful summit, especially in light of the disruption caused by the sovereign debt crisis at the previous year's Cannes summit. To this end, a 'broad agenda with specific deliverables' was promoted as part of its preparations, which were described as thorough, transparent and inclusive, involving regular meetings of G20 ministers, engagement groups and non-G20 countries. The Mexican government petitioned the EU to try to coordinate efforts to resolve the sovereign debt crisis ahead of Los Cabos to avoid the summit becoming a casualty of the ongoing crisis.¹³ In terms of G20 governance, as outlined in Chapter 2, it contributed by establishing the first informal meeting of the

G20 foreign ministers in February 2012, ahead of the leaders' summit. It innovated by formally establishing the T20 official engagement group of think tankers and academics, and proactively brought the voices of civil society into discussions at an early stage, ahead of Los Cabos, in a constructive way that was widely praised. In terms of agenda, and as seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the Mexican presidency also played a leadership role by placing climate change and development issues on the agenda of the Los Cabos summit. This was in line with Mexico's hosting of the G20 finance ministers in 2003 when the focus was placed on poverty reduction, development assistance and the MDGs (Cooper and Thakur 2013, 45). Thereafter, Mexico continued to contribute to the G20, and in innovative ways, as seen in the part played by the Mexican Agency of International Cooperation for Development in the German presidency's development and adoption of the VPLM to foster knowledge-sharing around the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Villanueva Ulfgard and Vega 2019, 635–636). However, in many ways, Los Cabos represents the high point of Mexican leadership within the G20.

In terms of compliance with G20 commitments across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021, Mexico finds itself in the middle of MIKTA in terms of compliance and sixth lowest, just ahead of Russia, within the wider G20 (G20 Information Centre 2023). As regards domestic reception, Mexico's general election, held eleven days after the 2012 Los Cabos summit, demonstrated that there are no votes in summits.

The Indonesian presidency is based on a five-year term that can be renewed once. As a result, its representation at the seventeen G20 summits between 2008 and 2022 has been remarkably consistent with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono attending the first eight summits up to and including the 2013 St Petersburg summit, and Joko Widodo attending from the 2014 Brisbane summit onwards and hosting the 2022 Bali summit. As explored in Chapter 2, Indonesia was selected to be part of the original G20 because of its regional status in South East Asia, instead of Malaysia and Thailand. Alongside Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, it also contributed to the Muslim world's levels of representation. Its membership has been described as 'a surprising moment' and 'not only an honour but also a responsibility towards the international community' (Salim 2011, 98). So, since 2008, Indonesia has advocated on behalf of developing countries more broadly, as seen in Chapter 3 at the time of the GFC, and has adopted a regional leadership role on behalf of ASEAN within the G20. However, this role is not one way and immutable. Alexandroff (2015, 261) has highlighted ASEAN's 'tug' on Indonesian policy, while referring to Wihardja's (2014) discussion of a more balanced 'post-ASEAN foreign policy' under Yudhoyono, whereby ASEAN, the G20 and other forums occupy an equal status.

In terms of leadership, within the G20, Indonesia has been vocal on a number of issues. Yudhoyono was supportive of including climate change on an expanded agenda. Armstrong (2019) has highlighted Indonesia's willingness to take a robust position in defending multilateral principles of trade at the 2019 Osaka G20, as discussed in Chapter 6 with reference to Japan's Prime Minister Abe's signature policy of the 'Osaka Track'. During its G20 presidency, expectations were low that the Indonesian hosts would be able to navigate the turbulence caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine, as well as the energy and cost-of-living crises. However, summit observers were pleasantly surprised with the outcomes and the fact that a leaders' declaration was agreed by emphasizing the G20's economic remit. As part of this effort, Widodo's role was praised:

[He] laid the groundwork for this constructive outcome with his pre-summit global shuttle diplomacy, which included trips to Washington DC, Moscow and Beijing. His plausibility as a neutral convenor at a time of sharp international tensions was buttressed by the fact that while Indonesia has condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine at the UN, it has not imposed sanctions on Russia in response. (Niblett 2022)

However, as regards compliance with G20 commitments, across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021, Indonesia has the lowest level among MIKTA countries and the third lowest within the wider G20, only slightly better than Türkiye and Saudi Arabia (G20 Information Centre 2023). It remains to be seen if this will change after Indonesia's G20 presidency. In terms of the G20's domestic reception, the Indonesian government has accorded the Bali summit and the 2023 ASEAN summit similar amounts of funds. To ensure a smooth summit, the authorities temporarily reintroduced some Covid-19 restrictions, limited the movement of people, and urged the public to refrain from demonstrating.

Similar to the Mexican presidency, South Korean presidents serve a single non-extendable five-year term. So, four presidents in total have represented South Korea across seventeen G20 summits between 2008 and 2022: Lee Myung-bak at the first five summits between Washington in 2008 and Los Cabos in 2012; Park Geun-hye from St Petersburg in 2013 to Hangzhou in 2016 and her impeachment later the same year; Moon Jae-in from Hamburg in 2017 to Rome in 2021; and Yoon Suk Yeol from the 2022 Bali summit onwards.

South Korea grasped the opportunity of its G20 presidency to record several firsts: the first non-G7 country to hold the presidency and the first G20 summit to be hosted in Asia. As seen in Chapter 7, the South Korean presidency and 2010 Seoul summit were woven into a narrative of South Korea's arrival on the international stage, an objective that would later be articulated as becom-

ing a ‘global pivotal state’. To this end, South Korea took the opportunity to showcase its own model of development and recovery from World War 2 and the Cold War. President Lee described the Seoul summit as instrumental in his country moving from being a follower to a leader that stands tall in the international community, and the young people of Korea as the ‘G20 Generation’ who will be at the forefront of their country’s global presence.

Despite the various firsts and rhetoric, South Korea assumed the G20 presidency at a challenging time as the urgency of the GFC was beginning to dissipate. In this context, the South Korean presidency approached its G20 in a pragmatic way. In Lee’s words,

it is unrealistic to expect that countries will have uniform positions on every key issue because each of them has a different economic situation and policy background. What really counts is to demonstrate a spirit of concession and compromise through concerted efforts. As a matter of fact, the strength of the G20 lies in the fact that even though the process of reaching a consensus is difficult, the impact and ripple effect of any agreement will be enormous.¹⁴

South Korea’s identity as a middle power meant it was predisposed to play the role of arbiter in finding a compromise. Hence, it sought to strike a cooperative balance between developed and developing countries, place an emphasis on outreach activities to non-G20 countries and take an inclusive approach to an agenda that placed development firmly on the agenda through the Seoul Development Consensus, as seen in Chapter 4. The South Korean presidency also took an innovative approach to G20 governance by establishing a summit of business leaders that would become the official engagement group of the B20, as seen in Chapter 2. Thus, South Korea was able to demonstrate G20 leadership while engaging in national branding activities, prompting one summit observer to describe its style as ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ (Cooper 2013a, 977).

Like all G20 countries, South Korea has taken the opportunity afforded by the G20 summit to pursue bilateral discussions with its key partners. In the case of the Seoul summit, discussions between Lee and Obama were focused on the Korea–US free trade agreement and the stalled six-party talks on North Korea’s denuclearization.¹⁵ In the case of the Hamburg summit, Moon met with his Chinese and Japanese counterparts to improve the state of their bilateral relations and regional security issues.

In terms of compliance with G20 commitments across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021, South Korea is the second most compliant MIKTA country, behind Australia, but with a similar level of compliance to the G7 countries of Japan and the US (G20 Information Centre 2023). As regards domestic reception, the South Korean government launched an awareness-raising campaign four months ahead of the Seoul summit and

appointed goodwill ambassadors to support its work: Olympic figure skating champion Kim Yuna, Manchester United striker Park Ji-sung and actress Han Hyo-joo.¹⁶ As seen in Chapter 7, the Seoul summit was generally regarded positively by the Korean people as part of a coordinated effort to demonstrate their country's growing importance on the international stage.

In terms of representation at G20 summits between 2008 and 2022, Türkiye stands alongside Germany in having a single leader, for the most part, attending all the G20 summits between 2008 and 2022. Either as prime minister or president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan represented Türkiye at sixteen summits, only missing out on the 2014 Brisbane summit, which was attended by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Ünay (2014, 138) neatly summarizes Türkiye's position within and towards the G20:

As an emerging power located in the midst of strategically important regions of the Balkans, Caucasia, the Middle East and North Africa, Türkiye greatly has valued the G20 since its inception as a crucial platform of global economic governance. Given Türkiye's growing diplomatic activism and expanding economic relations with regions such as Latin America, East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa over the course of the last decade, the rotating presidency of the G20 in 2015 was seen as a great opportunity to improve the country's global profile even further. The political leadership also perceived this presidency as an opportunity to reflect Türkiye's main emphasis in diplomatic relations on development issues by trying to form linkages between the members of the G20 and the least developed countries in different geographies.

This pursuit of a global profile is slightly complicated by Türkiye's history, as demonstrated by Parlar Dal (2019) who points to the tension behind its past position as a great power but its current status of a middle power. Nevertheless, Türkiye has demonstrated G20 leadership. In terms of the agenda, it has supported a 'comprehensive agenda' that recognizes the interconnected nature of global challenges and extends from addressing the GFC, to macroeconomic cooperation, to embracing development, climate change and energy transitions, and security, in particular terrorism. In the case of the latter issue, this was partly a result of the issue of being thrust onto the agenda at Antalya through the Paris shooting on the eve of the summit, but also reflects Türkiye's regional concerns in the Middle East, particularly over Syria. The ability to keep the G20 on track and together in the face of unexpected events was evident under the Turkish presidency, which worked towards a well-prepared agenda focused on promoting growth based on inclusiveness, implementation and investment but had to respond to the demands of sudden and unanticipated events. As regards membership, Türkiye has acted as a regional leader, as reflected in its guests invited to Antalya, as well as the role it has assumed as a bridge builder between developed and developing countries within the G20 (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2018). As regards G20 governance, it welcomed the

upgrading of the G20 to the leaders' level in 2008 and has contributed to the development of G20 governance over time, for example by establishing the W20 as an official engagement group during its G20 presidency.

As regards domestic reception, as mentioned in Chapter 7, ahead of the 2015 Antalya summit, Erdoğan was in a slightly precarious domestic position so the G20 summit presented him with an opportunity to burnish Türkiye's reputation on the global stage and by association his own. However, this engagement with the G20 has not translated into compliance with G20 commitments. Across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021, Türkiye has the lowest level among MIKTA countries and the second lowest within the wider G20, only slightly better than Saudi Arabia (G20 Information Centre 2023).

Finally, as regards Australia, a turbulent period in its political history has inevitably been reflected in its representation within the seventeen summits between 2008 and 2022. Kevin Rudd was prime minister at the height of the GFC through to his resignation in 2010. Thereafter, Julia Gillard became leader of the Labor Party and Australia's first female prime minister until Rudd returned in 2013 for a short while, before losing a federal election to a Liberal–National coalition headed by Tony Abbott. Abbott was replaced as Liberal Party leader by Malcolm Turnbull, who in turn was replaced by Scott Morrison. In 2022, the Labor Party led by Anthony Albanese returned to power after a federal election victory. Within this turbulence, deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers have attended the G20 in place of prime ministers at some G20 summits. Despite a revolving door of prime ministers, Australia has demonstrated sustained engagement with and contribution to the G20. Melissa Conley Taylor describes the G20 as 'a high priority' for Australia as part of a 6+2+N foreign policy (the six key bilateral relationships – the US, China, Japan, India, Indonesia and South Korea) – the two key multilateral organizations – the G20 and East Asia summit – and the immediate neighbourhood of the Pacific (Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies Renmin University of China 2016, 101).

Rudd can lay claim to being one of the architects of the G20, having lobbied Bush to upgrade the G20 to the leaders' level in 2008. In his speech to the UNGA in September 2008, Rudd advocated an overhaul of the global financial regulatory system that increased the roles of the FSF and IMF. The role of the G20 within this was to provide the political authority to promote urgent and comprehensive implementation. He was also eager to increase the voice of rising powers through an iterative G20 process: 'I believe China and India do deserve a greater place at the international table. One of the ways in which that can be secured is through the continuation of the G20 into the future.'¹⁷ Unsurprisingly, Rudd supported the G20's self-appointment as the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation' at Pittsburgh in 2009. In terms of shaping the G20's agenda, Australia used its G20 presidency to dedicate

time and space to the discussion of energy issues for the first time, promoted the targets of increasing growth by 2 per cent in five years and reducing the gender participation gap in G20 labour markets by 25 per cent by 2025. In terms of delivering concrete outcomes, the Australian presidency can point to the creation of the G20 Infrastructure Hub.

At the same time, the pursuit of status and recognition for the growing importance of Australia as a middle-ranking trading power have been evident alongside the promotion of an enhanced role for the G20.¹⁸ The significance attached to its presidency of the G20 was evident when Abbott described the 2014 Brisbane summit as ‘the most influential and significant gathering that’s ever been held in our country’ (G20 Information Centre 2014e). To this end, ‘koala diplomacy’ was on display at the Brisbane summit, with Abbott posing for photo opportunities with the world’s leaders and a koala (Harris Rimmer 2014).¹⁹ However, a degree of status anxiety is also discernible. For example, Australia opposed Spain’s membership of the G20 on the rationale that it would open a Pandora’s Box of membership claims from countries and run the risk of diluting the status associated with membership of the G20 (Naylor 2019b, 81, 92).

Australia’s internationalist credentials have thus come under scrutiny. For example, Rudd chose to skip the 2013 St Petersburg summit in order to fight a federal election campaign at home. Under its G20 presidency the following year, Australia’s government pursued a ‘mean and lean’ agenda (Downie and Crump 2017, 684), with a tight economic focus that it found difficult to maintain in the face of pressure from the US and China, as outlined in Chapter 5. In particular, the issue of climate change and Australia’s continued reliance on fossil fuels have been the foci of criticism internationally and within the G20. Abbott was seen to have tried unsuccessfully to resist the issue at the Brisbane summit, and other leaders have been active in using the G20 to defend the country’s climate policies. Morrison withdrew support from the GCF in 2018, resisted any unambiguous and explicit commitments to phase out coal at the 2021 Rome summit and ahead of COP26 in Glasgow, and defended Australia’s record on emissions reduction.²⁰

Nevertheless, Australia has the highest level of compliance with G20 commitments among MIKTA countries across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021. Within the wider G20, its levels of compliance surpass those of the G7 countries of France, Japan and the US and are not far behind Canada and Germany (G20 Information Centre 2023). As explored in Chapter 7, hosting the G20 contributed to the reputation of the city of Brisbane. Over 2,000 tourism and hospitality workers, taxi drivers and volunteers completed a training programme with the objective of communicating the city’s image as a friendly city. According to Tourism Australia Managing Director John O’Sullivan: ‘Brisbane is not just hosting a meeting of some of the world’s most

important leaders, it has created a total G20 city experience for all summit attendees that is simultaneously showcasing some of the exceptional food, facilities and culture we have on offer here in Australia' (ASE 2014).

In summary, within MIKTA, convergence and diversity are both in evidence across seventeen G20 summits. The common aspects of MIKTA countries' behaviour within the G20 revolve around status and recognition, much as is the case within BRICS, if not more. National branding is clearly evident among MIKTA countries, especially when hosting a G20. All MIKTA countries have gone to great lengths, more so than G7 and BRICS countries, to ensure successful summits, while at the same time using the opportunity presented by a summit to showcase their respective histories, cultures and achievements.

In terms of summit performance, Ünay has argued that one shared characteristic among MIKTA countries is that 'middle powers acting as insiders in the G20 showed a high degree of commitment to the activities of the forum. More often than not, they were able to increase their policy effectiveness by focusing on specific and targeted activities within the G20 and forming coalitions through various working groups' (2014, 150). So, in this context, the role of a bridge builder has emerged as a shared role among MIKTA countries. At the same time, another commonality is that they have attempted to assume the role of representative of their immediate regions or the Global South, which can provide a tension with the objective of seeking status within the G20 and commitment to the forum. In other words, the dualistic mindset that Cooper refers to within BRICS on the part of China and India, as outlined above, is equally applicable to MIKTA countries, as demonstrated by Indonesia and its dual roles in the G20 and ASEAN.

However, divergence is also evident. For example, Türkiye has been in favour of broadening the G20's agenda to include security for example, whereas Australia sought to keep it focused on economic issues. In terms of compliance across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021, the diversity across MIKTA countries comes most starkly into relief. On the one hand, Australia is more at home among the G7, whereas Indonesia and Türkiye exhibit some of the lowest levels of compliance among G20 members (G20 Information Centre 2023). In this regard, MIKTA appears to be little more than an acronym.

8.5 ARGENTINA AND SAUDI ARABIA

In August 2023 at the BRICS summit held in Durban, Argentina and Saudi Arabia were invited to join the bloc alongside Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. This invitation will take effect from 2024 and is still being considered at the time of writing. However, for the purposes of this

book and its focus on the period between 2008 and 2022, Argentina and Saudi Arabia are treated as not belonging to any subgroup.

Argentina's presidency is based on a four-year term that can be renewed once. In this context, Argentina was represented by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner from the 2008 Washington summit to the 2013 St Petersburg summit. She was unable to attend the 2014 Brisbane summit due to illness, nor the 2015 Antalya summit, in light of an impending election that signalled the end of her second term. So, Argentina was represented by Economic Minister Axel Kicillof and Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman at these two summits. Thereafter, Mauricio Macri served a single presidential term and represented Argentina at the G20 summits between the 2016 Hangzhou summit and 2019 Osaka summit that bookended Argentina's G20 presidency in 2018. Macri lost the following year's election and was replaced by Alberto Fernández, who attended the G20 summits from Riyadh in 2020 (albeit virtually) to New Delhi in September 2023, but will not seek re-election in the poll scheduled for October 2023.

Akin to the experience of BRICS and MIKTA countries, G20 membership conferred a considerable degree of status and recognition on Argentina. This was all the more significant as its membership had been questioned, but in the end it won out over regional competitors like Chile. Assuming the G20 presidency was an opportunity to add to this status and recognition, Argentina's presidency was built around the slogan of *Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Development* and as might be expected of a first-time host whose membership of the G20 has been questioned, Macri stressed the central role of the G20, calling it 'the world's preeminent forum' not only for economic but political cooperation. Argentina's priorities supported the expansion of the G20's agenda by including infrastructure for development and a sustainable food future. In terms of G20 governance, a climate sustainability working group was established under the Argentinian presidency.

In line with BRICS and MIKTA countries, Argentina has also sought to play a regional leadership role. This was seen at the Buenos Aires summit by inviting several guests, including the Chilean president, Sebastian Pinera, and representatives of the Caribbean Community, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America. At the same time, like G7, BRICS and MIKTA countries, Argentina has sought to instrumentalize the multilateral forum of the G20 to pursue issues of national interest, particularly in the case of the Falkland Islands.

As regards compliance with G20 commitments, Argentina has been identified as one of the G20 members that introduced the highest number of discriminatory trade measures (Herman and Cooper 2013, 403). Across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021, Argentina has been at the lower end of the scale with an average level of compliance similar to Mexico, Russia and South

Africa (G20 Information Centre 2023). In terms of domestic reception, as seen in Chapter 7, Macri's experience provides another example of how there are no votes in summits.

Established as an absolute monarchy, Saudi Arabia occupies a unique position among G20 members. It has been represented at the seventeen summits between 2008 and 2022 by King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, and his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On occasions, finance and foreign ministers have attended in their place: Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud at Seoul, Ibrahim Abdulaziz Al-Assaf at Cannes, Los Cabos, St Petersburg and Hamburg, and Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud at Rome (see Appendix 2).

In the context of its political system, questions have been raised around the rationale for Saudi Arabia's inclusion in the forum. Concerns have been reinforced by international issues, such as the war in Yemen, and domestic affairs, particularly its human rights policies. In the run-up to the Riyadh summit, a number of protests against and boycotts of the Saudi G20 were staged across the world. For example, the European Parliament called upon the EU and its member states to downgrade their representation to 'avoid legitimising impunity for human rights violations and ongoing illegal and arbitrary detentions in Saudi Arabia'.²¹ In this light, the G20 was seen by some as complicit in showcasing the kingdom to the outside world and even serving to rehabilitate Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after the Khashoggi affair.²²

As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, at the outset of its G20 presidency, Saudi Arabia continued to place the emphasis in the agenda on 'safeguarding the planet', food security, particularly water scarcity, as well as digital financial inclusion, with specific regard to women and young people. However, despite its assumption of the presidency on 1 December 2019 as the first Arab nation to do so and its slogan of *Realizing Opportunities of the 21st Century for All*, the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic impact inevitably overshadowed Saudi Arabia's G20 in terms of organization and the agenda. In terms of organization, the leaders' summit itself, ministerial and sherpa meetings, as well as engagement groups, were all moved online. An extraordinary summit was held on 26 March 2020 in response to the pandemic at which G20 leaders pledged to 'spare no effort, both individually and collectively, to protect lives; safeguard people's jobs and incomes; restore confidence, preserve financial stability, revive growth and recover stronger; minimize disruptions to trade and global supply chains; provide help to all countries in need of assistance; coordinate on public health and financial measures' (G20 Information Centre 2020a). The leaders' summit was similarly held online from 21 to 22 November of the same year.²³ In terms of the agenda, King Salman bin Abdulaziz called for greater accessibility to vaccines at his address on the opening day of the virtual summit. However, Saudi Arabia also sought to make

progress on economic issues with which it was more comfortable, such as the future of the WTO (G20 Information Centre 2020b). King Salman called for coordinated efforts to boost trade and revive global economic growth. In terms of function, the Saudi hosts were eager to stress the G20's continuing role as a crisis committee despite its evolution since the GFC. As King Salman said in his opening speech: 'The G20 leaders met for the first time 12 years ago in response to the financial crisis. The outcomes achieved are ample proof that the G20 is the most prominent forum for international cooperation and for tackling global crises.'²⁴ In fact, Crown Prince Mohammed proposed that the G20 meet on a biannual basis – a virtual mid-year meeting and an end-of-year in-person meeting – a hybrid version of the frequency with which it had met at the height of the GFC.²⁵

Outside the pandemic, the Saudi presidency secured an endorsement from fellow G20 members of the circular carbon economy, its pet project to reduce the carbon footprint. However, this endorsement was dropped the following year at the Rome summit. As regards compliance with G20 commitments, across the sixteen summits between 2008 and 2021, Saudi Arabia has on average the lowest level of compliance (G20 Information Centre 2023).

8.6 BEYOND THE G20

Over a period of seventeen summits and fifteen years, the G20 has gone from crisis committee and 'premier forum for international economic cooperation' to a potentially endangered species or irrelevance for some summit watchers (Shaw 2018; Sobel 2021). The Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have only amplified this pessimistic evaluation. Nevertheless, any predictions of the G20's demise would be premature and misplaced, as they were in the case of the G7/8 at the height of the GFC. Once these forums are established, they tend to linger, adding to the messy nature of contemporary multilateralism. Looking at its future from a country-specific perspective, the G20 will continue to engage with stakeholders and evolve in terms of its membership, as seen in the decision at the 2023 Delhi summit to include the AU. This provides both a rationale and basis for future research on its members' perspectives, positions and behaviours. From 2022 to 2025, the G20 presidency is in the hands of a series of BRICS and MIKTA countries for the first time: Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa. This book has demonstrated how the responsibility associated with hosting a summit can impact on a country's perspective on and approach to the G20, as seen most notably in the case of China, but also across a number of G7, BRICS and MIKTA countries. From 2026, a new cycle of G20 summitry will begin and all members will host the G20 for a second (or third) time. This provides a new factor to consider in

country-specific studies as members begin to build up a longitudinal profile of summit-hosting.

NOTES

1. *Financial Times*, 8 November 2010.
2. *BBC News*, 29 November 2018.
3. *The Age*, 17 November 2014.
4. *BBC News*, 1 April 2009; *Financial Times*, 1 April 2009.
5. *The Telegraph*, 13 November 2014.
6. *The Japan News*, 30 June 2019.
7. *Financial Times*, 21 June 2019.
8. *BBC News*, 16 November 2008.
9. *The Age*, 17 November 2014.
10. *China Daily*, 6 September 2016.
11. *TASS*, 17 June 2012.
12. *Pretoria News*, 13 September 2013.
13. *Cape Times*, 15 June 2012.
14. *Xinhua*, 8 November 2010.
15. *Korea Times*, 10 November 2010.
16. *Korea Herald*, 8 November 2010.
17. *AAP*, 13 November 2008.
18. *Australian Financial Review*, 16 March 2009.
19. *The Guardian*, 14 November 2014.
20. *The Guardian*, 31 October 2021.
21. *The Independent*, 21 November 2020.
22. *The Guardian*, 20 November 2020.
23. See Naylor 2020 on the pitfalls of virtual versus in-person summitry.
24. *The National*, 21 November 2020.
25. *The Arab Weekly*, 23 November 2020.

Appendix 1: G20 summits, 2008–2025

Table A.1 G20 summits, 2008–2025

Date	Location	Host
14–15 November 2008	Washington DC, US	George W. Bush
2 April 2009	London, UK	Gordon Brown
24–25 September 2009	Pittsburgh, US	Barack Obama
26–27 June 2010	Toronto, Canada	Stephen Harper
11–12 November 2010	Seoul, South Korea	Lee Myung-bak
3–4 November 2011	Cannes, France	Nicolas Sarkozy
18–19 June 2012	Los Cabos, Mexico	Felipe Calderón
5–6 September 2013	St Petersburg, Russia	Vladimir Putin
15–16 November 2014	Brisbane, Australia	Tony Abbott
15–16 November 2015	Antalya, Türkiye	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
4–5 September 2016	Hangzhou, China	Xi Jinping
7–8 July 2017	Hamburg, Germany	Angela Merkel
30 November–1 December 2018	Buenos Aires, Argentina	Mauricio Macri
28–29 June 2019	Osaka, Japan	Abe Shinzō
21–22 November 2020	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
30–31 October 2021	Rome, Italy	Mario Draghi
15–16 November 2022	Bali, Indonesia	Joko Widodo
9–10 September 2023	New Delhi, India	Narendra Modi
18–19 November 2024	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	TBD
TBD, 2025	South Africa	TBD

Appendix 2: Attendance at G20 summits, 2008–2022

Table A.2 Attendance at G20 summits, 2008–2022

	Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	France	Germany
Washington 2008	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Kevin Rudd	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	Stephen Harper	Hu Jintao	Nicolas Sarkozy	Angela Merkel
London 2009	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Kevin Rudd	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	Stephen Harper	Hu Jintao	Nicolas Sarkozy	Angela Merkel
Pittsburgh 2009	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Kevin Rudd	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	Stephen Harper	Hu Jintao	Nicolas Sarkozy	Angela Merkel
Toronto 2010	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Wayne Swan*	Guido Mantega*	Stephen Harper	Hu Jintao	Nicolas Sarkozy	Angela Merkel
Seoul 2010	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Julia Gillard	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	Stephen Harper	Hu Jintao	Nicolas Sarkozy	Angela Merkel
Cannes 2011	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Julia Gillard	Dilma Rousseff	Stephen Harper	Hu Jintao	Nicolas Sarkozy	Angela Merkel
Los Cabos 2012	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Julia Gillard	Dilma Rousseff	Stephen Harper	Hu Jintao	François Hollande	Angela Merkel
St Petersburg 2013	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Bob Carr*	Dilma Rousseff	Stephen Harper	Xi Jinping	François Hollande	Angela Merkel
Brisbane 2014	Axel Kicillof Héctor Timerman*	Tony Abbott	Dilma Rousseff	Stephen Harper	Xi Jinping	François Hollande	Angela Merkel

	Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	France	Germany
Antalya 2015	Axel Kicillof Héctor Timerman*	Malcolm Turnbull	Dilma Rousseff	Justin Trudeau	Xi Jinping	François Hollande	Angela Merkel
Hangzhou 2016	Mauricio Macri	Malcolm Turnbull	Michel Temer	Justin Trudeau	Xi Jinping	François Hollande	Angela Merkel
Hamburg 2017	Mauricio Macri	Malcolm Turnbull	Michel Temer	Justin Trudeau	Xi Jinping	Emmanuel Macron	Angela Merkel
Buenos Aires 2018	Mauricio Macri	Scott Morrison	Michel Temer	Justin Trudeau	Xi Jinping	Emmanuel Macron	Angela Merkel
Osaka 2019	Mauricio Macri	Scott Morrison	Jair Bolsonaro	Justin Trudeau	Xi Jinping	Emmanuel Macron	Angela Merkel
Riyadh 2020	<i>Alberto Fernández</i>	<i>Scott Morrison</i>	<i>Jair Bolsonaro</i>	<i>Justin Trudeau</i>	<i>Xi Jinping</i>	<i>Emmanuel Macron</i>	<i>Angela Merkel</i>
Rome 2021	Alberto Fernández	Scott Morrison	Jair Bolsonaro	Justin Trudeau	<i>Xi Jinping</i> Wang Yi*	Emmanuel Macron	Angela Merkel
Bali 2022	Alberto Fernández	Anthony Albanese	Carlos França*	Justin Trudeau	Xi Jinping	Emmanuel Macron	Olaf Scholz

Notes: Host in bold; online attendance in italics; ministerial alternate(s) with asterisk.

Table A.2 Attendance at G20 summits, 2008–2022 (continued)

	India	Indonesia	Italy	Japan	Mexico	Russia	Saudi Arabia
Washington 2008	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Silvio Berlusconi	Asō Tarō	Felipe Calderón	Dmitry Medvedev	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
London 2009	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Silvio Berlusconi	Asō Tarō	Felipe Calderón	Dmitry Medvedev	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
Pittsburgh 2009	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Silvio Berlusconi	Hatoyama Yukio	Felipe Calderón	Dmitry Medvedev	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
Toronto 2010	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Silvio Berlusconi	Kan Naoto	Felipe Calderón	Dmitry Medvedev	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
Seoul 2010	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Silvio Berlusconi	Kan Naoto	Felipe Calderón	Dmitry Medvedev	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud*
Cannes 2011	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Silvio Berlusconi	Noda Yoshihiko	Felipe Calderón	Dmitry Medvedev	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf*
Los Cabos 2012	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Mario Monti	Noda Yoshihiko	Felipe Calderón	Vladimir Putin	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf*
St Petersburg 2013	Manmohan Singh	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Enrico Letta	Abe Shinzō	Enrique Peña Nieto	Vladimir Putin	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf*
Brisbane 2014	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Matteo Renzi	Abe Shinzō	Enrique Peña Nieto	Vladimir Putin	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
Antalya 2015	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Matteo Renzi	Abe Shinzō	Enrique Peña Nieto	Vladimir Putin	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
Hangzhou 2016	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Matteo Renzi	Abe Shinzō	Enrique Peña Nieto	Vladimir Putin	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud

	India	Indonesia	Italy	Japan	Mexico	Russia	Saudi Arabia
Hamburg 2017	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Paolo Gentiloni	Abe Shinzō	Enrique Peña Nieto	Vladimir Putin	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf*
Buenos Aires 2018	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Giuseppe Conte	Abe Shinzō	Enrique Peña Nieto	Vladimir Putin	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud
Osaka 2019	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Giuseppe Conte	Abe Shinzō	<i>Marcelo Ebrard Carlos Urzúa*</i>	Vladimir Putin	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud
Riyadh 2020	<i>Narendra Modi</i>	<i>Joko Widodo</i>	<i>Giuseppe Conte</i>	<i>Suga Yoshihide</i>	<i>Andrés Manuel López Obrador</i>	<i>Vladimir Putin</i>	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
Rome 2021	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Mario Draghi	<i>Kishida Fumio</i>	Marcelo Ebrard*	<i>Vladimir Putin</i>	Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud*
Bali 2022	Narendra Modi	Joko Widodo	Giorgia Meloni	Kishida Fumio	Marcelo Ebrard*	Sergey Lavrov*	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud

Notes: Host in bold; online attendance in italics; ministerial alternate(s) with asterisk.

Table A.2 Attendance at G20 summits, 2008–2022 (continued)

	South Africa	South Korea	Türkiye	UK	US	EU
Washington 2008	Kgalema Motlanthe	Lee Myung-bak	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Gordon Brown	George W. Bush	José Manuel Barroso
London 2009	Kgalema Motlanthe	Lee Myung-bak	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Gordon Brown	Barack Obama	José Manuel Barroso Mirek Topolánek
Pittsburgh 2009	Jacob Zuma	Lee Myung-bak	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Gordon Brown	Barack Obama	José Manuel Barroso Fredrik Reinfeldt
Toronto 2010	Jacob Zuma	Lee Myung-bak	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	David Cameron	Barack Obama	José Manuel Barroso Herman Van Rompuy
Seoul 2010	Jacob Zuma	Lee Myung-bak	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	David Cameron	Barack Obama	José Manuel Barroso Herman Van Rompuy
Cannes 2011	Jacob Zuma	Lee Myung-bak	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	David Cameron	Barack Obama	José Manuel Barroso Herman Van Rompuy
Los Cabos 2012	Jacob Zuma	Lee Myung-bak	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	David Cameron	Barack Obama	José Manuel Barroso Herman Van Rompuy
St Petersburg 2013	Jacob Zuma	Park Geun-hye	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	David Cameron	Barack Obama	José Manuel Barroso Herman Van Rompuy
Brisbane 2014	Jacob Zuma	Park Geun-hye	Ahmet Davutoglu	David Cameron	Barack Obama	Jean-Claude Juncker Herman Van Rompuy
Antalya 2015	Jacob Zuma	Park Geun-hye	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	David Cameron	Barack Obama	Jean-Claude Juncker Donald Tusk
Hangzhou 2016	Jacob Zuma	Park Geun-hye	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Theresa May	Barack Obama	Jean-Claude Juncker Donald Tusk
Hamburg 2017	Jacob Zuma	Moon Jae-in	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Theresa May	Donald Trump	Jean-Claude Juncker Donald Tusk

	South Africa	South Korea	Türkiye	UK	US	EU
Buenos Aires 2018	Cyril Ramaphosa	Moon Jae-in	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Theresa May	Donald Trump	Jean-Claude Juncker Donald Tusk
Osaka 2019	Cyril Ramaphosa	Moon Jae-in	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Theresa May	Donald Trump	Jean-Claude Juncker Donald Tusk
Riyadh 2020	<i>Cyril Ramaphosa</i>	<i>Moon Jae-in</i>	<i>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</i>	<i>Boris Johnson</i>	<i>Donald Trump</i>	<i>Ursula von der Leyen</i> <i>Charles Michel</i>
Rome 2021	Naledi Pandoor*	Moon Jae-in	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Boris Johnson	Joe Biden	Ursula von der Leyen Charles Michel
Bali 2022	Cyril Ramaphosa	Yoon Suk Yeol	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Rishi Sunak	Joe Biden	Ursula von der Leyen Charles Michel

Notes: Host in bold; online attendance in italics; ministerial alternate(s) with asterisk.

References

- Agrawal, R. (2022), 'Will the G20 lead to more engagement with China?', *Foreign Policy*, 18 November, accessed 23 November 2022 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/18/g-20-summit-china-engagement>.
- Aizawa, M. (2020), 'Sustainable development through quality infrastructure: emerging focus on quality over quantity', *Journal of Mega Infrastructure and Sustainable Development*, 1(2), 171–187.
- Alexandroff, A. (2015), 'South Africa in a complex global order: how and where to fit in?', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 22(2), 249–268.
- Aliriza, B. (2015), 'The G20 summit in Antalya: economics and diplomacy', *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 13 November, accessed 8 January 2020 at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/g20-summit-antalya-economics-and-diplomacy>.
- Andrews-Speed, P. and X. Shi (2016), 'What role can the G20 play in global energy governance? Implications for China's presidency', *Global Policy*, 7(2), 198–206.
- Armstrong, S. (2019), 'The rules based economic disorder after Osaka G20', *East Asia Forum*, 30 June, accessed 27 September 2022 at <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/06/30/the-rules-based-economic-disorder-after-osaka-g20>.
- ASE (2014), 'Brisbane puts best of Australia on show for historic G20 Leaders summit', *Australasian Special Events*, 12 November, accessed 22 September 2022 at <http://www.ozevents.net.au/news/brisbane-puts-best-of-australia-on-show-for-historic-g20-leaders-summit-2711>.
- Bak, C. (2017), 'Do G20 leaders need to put on their own emergency oxygen masks first? A look at Germany's G20 presidency and climate policy', *Global Summitry*, 3(2), 176–192.
- Baker, D., S. Bronitt and P. Stenning (2017), 'Policing protest, security and freedom: the 2014 G20 experience', *Police Practice and Research*, 18(5), 425–448.
- Bayne, N. (2011), 'The diplomacy of the financial crisis in context', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 6(1–2), 187–201.
- Beeson, M. and S. Bell (2009), 'The G20 and international economic governance: hegemony, collectivism, or both?', *Global Governance*, 15(1), 67–86.
- Benson, R. and M. Zürn (2019), 'Untapped potential: how the G20 can strengthen global governance', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 549–562.
- Berger, A. and S.J. Evenett (2017), 'The Trump-induced G20 stress test on trade: did the German presidency pass?', *Global Summitry*, 3(2), 124–140.
- Berger, A., J. Leininger and D. Messner (2017), 'The G20 in 2017: born in a financial crisis—lost in a global crisis?', *Global Summitry*, 3(2), 110–123.
- Berger, A., A.F. Cooper and S. Grimm (2019), 'A decade of G20 summitry: assessing the benefits, limitations, and future of global club governance in turbulent times', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 493–504.
- Blom, J. (2022), 'G-group legitimacy in global governance: rightful membership of rising powers?', *Third World Quarterly*, 43(9), 2149–2168.
- Bo, P. (2021), *China and Global Governance: A New Leader?*, New York: Springer.

- Bradford, C.I. (2011), 'The culture foundations for the new dynamics of summitry' in C.I. Bradford and W. Lim (eds), *Global Leadership in Transition: Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Brandi, C. (2019), 'Club governance and legitimacy: the perspective of old and rising powers on the G7 and G20', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 685–702.
- Brisbane Marketing (no date), 'The G20 legacy', *Choose Brisbane*, accessed 7 October 2019 at http://www.choosebrisbane.com.au/corporate/brisbane-marketing/what-we-do/g20?sc_lang=en-au.
- Callaghan, M. and T. Sainsbury (eds) (2015), *The G20 and the Future of International Economic Governance*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Cammack, P. (2012), 'The G20, the crisis, and the rise of global developmental liberalism', *Third World Quarterly*, 33(1), 1–16.
- Carin, B. (2012), 'G20 rapid response: the G20 and climate change', *CIGI Online*, 20 June, accessed 12 March 2020 at <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/g20-rapid-response-g20-and-climate-change>.
- Carin, B. and M. Callaghan (2015), 'Climate change: can the G20 address it?' in M. Callaghan and T. Sainsbury (eds), *The G20 and the Future of International Economic Governance*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Carin, B. and A. Mehlenbacher (2010), 'Constituting global leadership: which countries need to be around the summit table for climate change and energy security?', *Global Governance*, 16(1), 21–37.
- Carin, B., P. Heinbecker, G. Smith and R. Thakur (2010), 'Making the G20 summit process work: some proposals for improving effectiveness and legitimacy', *CIGI G20 Papers*, 2(June), accessed 5 August 2022 at https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/g20_no2_1.pdf.
- Cherry, J. and H. Dobson (2012), 'Seoul-searching: the 2010 G20 Seoul summit', *Global Governance*, 18(3), 363–381.
- Chin, G.T. (2010a), 'How to help rather than hinder: the G20 in global development' in T. Fues and P. Wolff (eds), *G20 and Global Development: How Can the New Summit Architecture Promote Pro-Poor Growth and Sustainability?*, Bonn: German Development Institute.
- Chin, G.T. (2010b), 'China's rising institutional influence' in A.S. Alexandroff and A.F. Cooper (eds), *Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance*, Waterloo, Ontario: The Center for International Governance Innovation.
- Chin, G.T. and H. Dobson (2016), 'China's presidency of the G20 Hangzhou: on global leadership and strategy', *Global Summitry*, 1(2), 151–170.
- Chin, G.T. and J. Zhu (2022), 'Infrastructure at the G20' in D. Lesage and J. Wouters (eds), *The G20, Development and the UN Agenda 2030*, London: Routledge.
- Chodor, T. (2017), 'The G20 since the global financial crisis: neither hegemony nor collectivism', *Global Governance*, 23(2), 205–223.
- Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies Renmin University of China (eds) (2016), *Who Will Govern the New World: The Present and Future of the G20*, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.
- Christie, K.H. (2010), 'Setting a new high-water mark for Canadian multilateralism: Canada's 2010 G8 and G20 summits', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 16(2), 143–148.
- Cihon, P., M.M. Maas and L. Kemp (2020), 'Fragmentation and the future: investigating architectures for future AI governance', *Global Policy*, 11(5), 545–556.

- Çolakoglu, S. and M. Hecan (2016), 'Turkey in global governance: an evaluation of Turkey's G20 presidency and the Antalya summit 2015', *Global Summitry*, 2(2), 143–160.
- Cooper, A.F. (2010), 'The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested "steering committee" for the world', *International Affairs*, 86(3), 741–757.
- Cooper, A.F. (2011a), 'The G20 and its regional critics: the search for inclusion', *Global Policy*, 2(2), 203–209.
- Cooper, A.F. (2011b), 'The G20 and regional dynamics' in C.I. Bradford and W. Lim (eds), *Global Leadership in Transition: Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cooper, A.F. (2013a), 'Squeezed or revitalised? Middle powers, the G20 and the evolution of global governance', *Third World Quarterly*, 34(6), 963–984.
- Cooper, A.F. (2013b), 'Civil society relationships with the G20: an extension of the G8 template or distinctive pattern of engagement?', *Global Society*, 27(2), 179–200.
- Cooper, A.F. (2019), 'The G20 is dead as a crisis or steering committee: long live the G20 as hybrid focal point', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 505–520.
- Cooper, A.F. (2021), 'China, India and the pattern of G20/BRICS engagement: differentiated ambivalence between "rising" power status and solidarity with the Global South', *Third World Quarterly*, 42(9), 1945–1962.
- Cooper, A.F. and A. Alexandroff (2019), 'Assessing the variation of "leader-focused status" in contemporary global governance', *Contemporary Politics*, 25(5), 532–548.
- Cooper, A. and J. Cornut (2019), 'The changing practices of frontline diplomacy: new directions for inquiry', *Review of International Studies*, 45(2), 300–319.
- Cooper, A.F. and A.B. Farooq (2016), 'The role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: commonalities or competitive behaviour?', *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 45(3), 73–106.
- Cooper, A.F. and J. Mo (2013), 'Middle power leadership and the evolution of the G20', *Global Summitry*, 1(1), 1–14.
- Cooper, A.F. and V. Pouliot (2015), 'How much is global governance changing? The G20 as international practice', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(3), 334–350.
- Cooper, A.F. and C. Stolte (2019), 'Insider and outsider strategies of influence: the BRICS' dualistic approach towards informal institutions', *New Political Economy*, 25(5) 703–714.
- Cooper, A.F. and R. Thakur (2013), *The Group of Twenty (G20)*, London: Routledge.
- Cowen, D. and N. Smith (2010), "'Martial law in the streets of Toronto": G20', *Security and State Violence*, 3(3), 29–49.
- Crump, L. and C. Downie (2018), 'The G20 chair and the case of the global economic steering committee', *Global Society*, 32(1), 23–46.
- Daily Hansard (2008), 'House of Commons debates, 10 December', 485(5), accessed 24 September 2019 at <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm081210/debtext/81210-0002.htm>.
- Davies, R. (2013), 'What plot? Rationalising the G20's development agenda', *G20 Monitor*, 5(August), 6–18.
- Davies, R. (2014), 'Adrift in a Brisbane fog: The G20's development agenda', *DevPolicyBlog*, 12 December, accessed 9 March 2020 at <https://devpolicy.org/fog-over-brisbane-the-g20s-development-agenda-runs-aground-20141212>.
- Davies, R. (2015), 'The indivisibility of prosperity: how can the G20 address development?' in M. Callaghan and T. Sainsbury (eds), *The G20 and the Future of*

- International Economic Governance*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- de Freitas Barbosa, A. and R. Mendes (2010), 'Is there a Brazilian strategy for the G20?' in T. Fues and P. Wolff (eds), *G20 and Global Development: How Can the New Summit Architecture Promote Pro-Poor Growth and Sustainability?*, Bonn: German Development Institute.
- Debaere, P. (2010), 'The output and input dimension of the European representation in the G20', *Studia Diplomatica*, 57(2), 141–154.
- Debaere, P. (2014), 'The EU's role and performance within the G20 in the area of finance and development' in J. Kooops and G. Macaj (eds), *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Debaere, P. and Orbie, J. (2012), 'The European Union in the Gx System' in K.E. Jørgensen and K.V. Laatikainen (eds), *Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power*, London: Routledge.
- Debaere, P., D. Lesage and J. Orbie (2014), 'Effective "minilateralism": the European Union's pragmatic embracement of the G20' in E. Drieskens and L. Van Schaik (eds), *The EU and Effective Multilateralism: External and Internal Reform in the First Decade*, London: Routledge.
- Della Croce, R. (2011), 'Pension funds investment in infrastructure: policy actions', *OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions*, 13, 1–45, accessed 14 February 2020 at <http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/49049712.pdf>.
- Derviş, K. and P. Drysdale (eds) (2014), *The G20 summit at Five: Time for Strategic Leadership*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
- Dobson, H. (2004), *Japan and the G7/8, 1975 to 2002*, London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Dobson, H. (2011a), 'The G20: Engine of Asian Regionalism', GIGA Working Papers Series, No. 179. Available online at: <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-working-papers/the-g20-engine-of-asian-regionalism>.
- Dobson, H. (2011b), 'The G8, the G20 and Civil Society' in P. Savona, J.J. Kirton and C. Oldani (eds), *Global Financial Crises: Global Impact and Solutions*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Dobson, H. (2012a), 'Japan's response to the changing global order: the case of a "gaggle of Gs"', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 12(2), 229–257.
- Dobson, H. (2012b), 'Managing the Medusa: Japan–US relations in GX summitry', *Pacific Review*, 25(2), 175–198.
- Dobson, H. (2012c), 'Asia shaping the Group of 20 or the Group of 20 shaping Asia?' in C.M. Dent and J. Dosch (eds), *The Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and the Global System*, Cheltenham and Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Dobson, H. (2012d), 'Managing the Medusa: Japan–US relations in GX summitry', *Pacific Review*, 25(2), 175–198.
- Dobson, H. (2013a), 'Japan und der G20-Gipfel: Von Kan nach Cannes' ['Japan and the G20 summit: from Kan to Cannes'] in G. Vogt and P. Holgrün (eds), *Modernisierungsprozesse in Japan [Modernization Processes in Japan]*, Berlin and Tokyo: Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien.
- Dobson, H. (2013b), 'The Cameron government and GX leadership', *Global Summitry Journal*, May, accessed 7 February 2017 at <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/89040>.
- Dobson, H. (2016), 'Sino-Japanese rivalry and a potential battle of the "Gs"', *Global Policy Journal*, accessed 14 February 2020 at <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/global-leadership-initiative/g7>.

- Dobson, H. (2017), 'Is Japan really back?: the "Abe Doctrine" and Global Governance', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47(2), 199–224.
- Doctor, M. (2015), 'Brazil's role in institutions of global economic governance: the WTO and G20', *Global Society*, 29(3), 286–300.
- Downie, C. (2015), 'Energy governance: can the G20 drive reform?' in M. Callaghan and T. Sainsbury (eds), *The G20 and the Future of International Economic Governance*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Downie, C. (2017), 'One in 20: the G20, middle powers and global governance reform', *Third World Quarterly*, 38(7), 1493–1510.
- Downie, C. and L. Crump (2017), 'The role of the chair in informal international organisations: Australia's Group of Twenty presidency', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 71(6), 678–693.
- Duggan, N. and T. Naarajärvi (2015), 'China in global food security governance', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24(95), 943–960.
- Earl, J., H. McKee Hurwitz, A. Mejia Mesinas, M. Tolan and A. Arlotti (2013), 'This protest will be Tweeted', *Information, Communication and Society*, 16(4), 459–478.
- Edwards, R. (2017), 'Feeding the G20's ego: food security and negligence at the Hamburg summit', *Global Policy Journal*, accessed 3 February 2020 at <https://tinyurl.com/28sp4fh6>.
- Elek, A. (2010), 'The G20: principles for meeting the global challenge of climate change', *East Asia Forum*, 7 January, accessed 9 February 2017 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/07/the-g20-principles-for-meeting-the-global-challenge-of-climate-change>.
- Elek, A. (2011), 'How can Asia help fix the global economy', *East Asia Forum*, 2 October, accessed 14 February 2020 at <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/02/how-can-asia-help-fix-the-global-economy>.
- Emmerson, B., A. Praskova, L. Fawcett, D. Crompton and E. Heffernan (2017), 'Mental health services planning for G20 summit in Brisbane and assessment of impact', *Australasian Psychiatry*, 25(1), 60–65.
- Engelbrekt, K. (2015), 'Mission creep? The non-traditional security agenda of the G7/8 and the nascent role of the G20', *Global Governance*, 21(4), 537–556.
- English, J., R. Thakur and A.F. Cooper (eds) (2005), *Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 summit*, Tokyo: United Nations University.
- EU (2015a), 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The Paris Protocol – a blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020', 25 February, accessed 9 March 2020 at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0081>.
- EU (2015b), 'Joint Letter sent to EU Heads of State or Government', 3 November, accessed 28 January 2020 at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/letter-to-g20-leaders_en.pdf.
- EU (2016), 'The EU at the G20 summit in Hangzhou: joint letter of Presidents Juncker and Tusk', 30 August, accessed 10 January 2020 at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/STATEMENT_16_2922.
- EU (2017), 'Joint letter of Presidents Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker on the upcoming G20 summit', 5 July, accessed 28 January 2020 at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/05/tusk-juncker-joint-letter-g20>.
- EU (2018), 'Joint letter of Presidents Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker on the upcoming G20 summit', 27 November, accessed 28 January 2020 at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/11/27/joint-letter-of-presidents-donald-tusk-and-jean-claude-juncker-on-the-upcoming-g20-summit>.

- Fioretos, O. (2010), 'Capitalist diversity and the international regulation of hedge funds', *Review of International Political Economy*, 17(4), 696–723.
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2012), 'Diplomatic excellence in the 21st century', 9 July, accessed 25 May 2023 at <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/diplomatic-excellence-in-the-21st-century>.
- Fues, T. and M. Saltzmann (2015), 'What can the G20 contribute to international development cooperation?', *The Current Column*, 7 December, accessed 9 February 2020 at https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/German_Development_Institute_Fues_Saltzmann_07.12.2015.pdf.
- Fues, T. and P. Wolff (2010), 'Introduction' in T. Fues and P. Wolff (eds), *G20 and Global Development: How Can the New Summit Architecture Promote Pro-Poor Growth and Sustainability?*, Bonn: German Development Institute.
- G7 Information Centre (1978), 'Statement on air-hijacking', 17 July, accessed 8 January 2020 at <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1978bonn/hijacking.html>.
- G7 Information Centre (1999), 'Statement of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors', 25 September, accessed 6 December 2019 at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm992509state.htm>.
- G7 Information Centre (2009), 'L'Aquila joint statement on global food security', 9 July, accessed 3 February 2020 at <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2009laquila/2009-food.pdf>.
- G7 Information Centre (2018), 'G7 ocean plastics charter', 9 June, accessed 4 February 2020 at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/oceans-blueprint.html#annex>.
- G20 Information Centre (2008a), 'Declaration of the summit on financial markets and the world economy', 15 November, accessed 7 October 2019 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2008b), 'President Bush attends summit on financial markets and the world economy', 15 November, accessed 7 October 2019 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008bush.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2009a), 'G20 leaders' statement: the Pittsburgh summit', 24–25 September, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2009b), 'Pittsburgh: bridging the Washington–London G20 summits and beyond', accessed 9 February 2020 at <http://www.g7g20.utoronto.ca/books/pittsburgh/lee.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2009c), 'Global Plan for Recovery and Reform', 2 April, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2010a), 'The Seoul summit document', 12 November, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-doc.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2010b), 'Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors', 5 June, accessed 14 June 2022 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20finance100605.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2010c), 'The G20 Toronto summit declaration', 27 June, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communique.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2010d), 'The G20 Seoul summit leaders' declaration', 12 November, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.html>.

- G20 Information Centre (2010e), 'Seoul development consensus for shared growth', 12 November, accessed 5 March 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-doc.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2010f), 'Principles for innovative financial inclusion', 27 June, accessed 19 January 2023 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-principles.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2011a), 'Governance for growth: building consensus for the future', accessed 16 October 2019 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cameron-report.pdf>.
- G20 Information Centre (2011b), 'Cannes summit final declaration – building our common future: renewed collective action for the benefit of all', 4 November, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2011c), '2011 report of the development working group', 28 October, accessed 9 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-dwg-111028-en.pdf>.
- G20 Information Centre (2011d), 'Ministerial declaration: action plan on food price volatility and agriculture', 22–23 June, accessed 3 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-agriculture-plan-en.pdf>.
- G20 Information Centre (2011e), 'Communiqué: G20 leaders' summit', 4 November, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-communique-111104-en.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2012a), 'G20 leaders' declaration', 19 June, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2012loscabos.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2012b), '2012 progress report of the development working group', 19 June, accessed 11 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-dwg.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2013a), 'St Petersburg development outlook', 5 September, accessed 11 February 2020 at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Development_Outlook.pdf.
- G20 Information Centre (2013b), 'G20 leaders' declaration', 6 September, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2013c), 'Joint statement on Syria', 6 September, accessed 26 May 2023 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-syria.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2014a), 'G20 leaders' Brisbane statement on Ebola', 15 November, accessed 10 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1115-ebola.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2014b), 'G20 leaders' communiqué', 16 November, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1116-communique.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2014c), 'G20 energy efficiency action plan', 16 November, accessed 13 March 2020 at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/g20_energy_efficiency_action_plan.pdf.
- G20 Information Centre (2014d), 'G20 principles on energy collaboration', 16 November, accessed 13 March 2020 at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/g20_principles_energy_collaboration.pdf.
- G20 Information Centre (2014e), 'Press Conference: Australia's Prime Minister Tony Abbott', 16 November, accessed 22 September 2022 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1116-abbott.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2015a), 'G20 leaders' communiqué', 16 November, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html>.

- G20 Information Centre (2015b), 'G20 action plan on food security and sustainable food systems', 16 November, accessed 20 January 2022 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/G20-Action-Plan-on-Food-Security-and-Sustainable-Food-Systems.pdf>.
- G20 Information Centre (2015c), 'G20 statement on the fight against terrorism', 16 November, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-terrorism.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2016a), 'G20 action plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development', 8 September, accessed 9 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/g20-action-plan-on-2030-agenda.pdf>.
- G20 Information Centre (2016b), 'G20 leaders' communiqué', 5 September, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-communiqué.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2016c), 'G20 digital economy development and cooperation initiative', 5 September, accessed 5 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-digital.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2017a), 'G20 leaders' declaration: shaping an interconnected world', 7 July, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-leaders-declaration.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2017b), 'Hamburg update: taking forward the G20 action plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development', 8 July, accessed 9 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-hamburg-update.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2017c), 'G20 Hamburg climate and energy action plan for growth', 8 July, accessed 9 March 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-climate-and-energy.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2017d), 'The Hamburg G20 leaders' statement on countering terrorism', 7 July, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/170707-counterterrorism.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2017e), 'G20 action plan on marine litter', 8 July, accessed 4 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-marine-litter.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2018a), 'G20 education ministers' declaration 2018', 5 September, accessed 10 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-09-05-education.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2018b), 'G20 leaders' declaration: building consensus for fair and sustainable development', 1 December, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-leaders-declaration.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2018c), 'G20 energy ministers communiqué', 15 June, accessed 11 March 2020 at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-06-15-energy_communique.html.
- G20 Information Centre (2018d), 'G20 digital economy ministerial declaration', 24 August, accessed 5 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-08-24-digital.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2019a), 'Ministerial meeting on energy transitions and the global environment for sustainable growth: communiqué', 16 June, accessed 6 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-energy-environment-communique.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2019b), 'G20 Osaka leaders' declaration', 29 June, accessed 7 January 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-osaka-leaders-declaration.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2019c), 'G20 implementation framework for actions on marine plastic litter', 26 June, accessed 4 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.utoronto>

- .ca/2019/2019-G20-Implementation-Framework-for-Actions-on-Marine-Plastic-Litter.html.
- G20 Information Centre (2020a), 'Extraordinary G20 leaders' summit: statement on COVID-19', 26 March, accessed 26 September 2022 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2020/2020-g20-statement-0326.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2020b), 'Presidency speech of His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud', 22 November, accessed 25 September 2024 at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2020/g20-riyadh-summit_presidency-speech_en.pdf.
- G20 Information Centre (2021a), 'G20 Rome leaders' declaration', 31 October, accessed 25 July 2022 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/211031-declaration.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2021b), 'G20 extraordinary leaders' meeting on Afghanistan: chair's summary', 12 October, accessed 28 November 2022 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/211012-chairs-summary.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2022a), 'G20 Bali leaders' declaration', 16 November, accessed 23 November 2022 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2022/221116-declaration.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2022b), 'G20 presidency chair's summary: the second G20 joint finance and health ministers' meeting', 12 November, accessed 9 February 2023 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2022/221112-health-finance.html>.
- G20 Information Centre (2023), 'G20 Analysis', accessed 26 May 2023 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/index.html#compliance>.
- Gao, W. and J. Wouters (2022), 'The G20's contribution to sustainable development: a perspective from China' in D. Lesage and J. Wouters (eds), *The G20, Development and the UN Agenda 2030*, London: Routledge.
- Garnaut, R. (2014), 'G20 should facilitate international cooperation on climate change', *East Asia Forum*, 21 July, accessed 7 February 2017 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/21/g20-should-facilitate-international-cooperation-on-climate-change>.
- Global Policy* (2018a), 'Don't mention the war: Britain's loosening grip on the Malvinas?', 30 November, accessed 7 October 2019 at <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/30/11/2018/dont-mention-war-britains-loosening-grip-malvinas>.
- Global Policy* (2018b), 'Argentina's G20 presidency: a series of unfortunate events', 30 November, accessed 7 October 2019 at <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/30/11/2018/argentinas-g20-presidency-series-unfortunate-events>.
- Goodliffe, G. and S. Sberro (2012), 'The G20 after Los Cabos: illusions of global economic governance', *The International Spectator*, 47(4), 1–16.
- GPFI (2020a), 'G20 high-level policy guidelines on digital financial inclusion for youth, women and SMEs', accessed 15 September 2023 at https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/saudiG20_youth_women_SME.pdf.
- GPFI (2020b), 'G20 2020 Financial Inclusion Action Plan', accessed 4 May 2023 at <https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/sites/default/files/G20%202020%20Financial%20Inclusion%20Action%20Plan.pdf>.
- Grattan, M. (2015), 'G20 communications: are they effective?' in M. Callaghan and T. Sainsbury (eds), *The G20 and the Future of International Economic Governance*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Guebert, J. and S. Tanna (2010), 'Economic benefits of hosting G8 and G20 summits', G8 Information Centre, 14 June, accessed 30 September 2012 at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet_ecobenefits.pdf.

- Hajkowicz, S., C. Negra, P. Barnett, M. Clark, B. Harch and B. Keating (2012), 'Food price volatility and hunger alleviation – can Cannes work?', *Agriculture and Food Security*, 1(8), 1–12.
- Hajnal, P.I. (2007), *The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hajnal, P.I. (2014), *The G20: Evolution, Interrelationships and Documentation*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hajnal, P. and J. Guebert (2009), 'A civil society' in J. Kirton and M. Koch (eds), *The G8: From Maddalena to L'Aquila*, London: Newsdesk.
- Harris Rimmer, S. (2014), 'Koala diplomacy: Australian soft power saves the day at the G20', *The Conversation*, 17 November, accessed 26 May 2023 at <https://theconversation.com/koala-diplomacy-australian-soft-power-saves-the-day-at-g20-34147>.
- Harris Rimmer, S. (2015), 'A critique of Australia's G20 presidency and the Brisbane summit 2014', *Global Summity*, 1(1), 41–63.
- Harris Rimmer, S. and C. Byrne (2019), 'Feminist approaches to global economic governance: the G20 as a platform for step change?' in S. Slaughter (ed.), *The G20 and International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Global Summity*, Cheltenham and Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar Publishing.
- He, A. (2019), 'Interaction between the G20 agenda and members' national-level policy: a theoretical model for increasing G20 effectiveness', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 601–620.
- He, F. and T. Sainsbury (2015), 'The G20 in 2016: how can China contribute?' in M. Callaghan and T. Sainsbury (eds), *The G20 and the Future of International Economic Governance*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Kirton, P. (2011), 'The United Nations and the G20: synergy or dissonance?' in C.I. Bradford and W. Lim (eds), *Global Leadership in Transition: Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Heinbecker, P. (2011), 'The United Nations and the G20: synergy or dissonance?' in C.I. Bradford and W. Lim (eds), *Global Leadership in Transition: Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Heine, J. (2010), 'Will they have table manners? The G20, emerging powers and global responsibility', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 17(1), 1–11.
- Helleiner, E. and S. Pagliari (2009), 'Towards a new Bretton Woods? The first G20 leaders summit and the regulation of global finance', *New Political Economy*, 14(2), 275–287.
- Herman, D. and A.F. Cooper (2013), 'Between collective action and a fragmented political economy: the G20 and the return of protectionist impulses', *Contemporary Politics*, 19(4), 399–410.
- Hirst, N. and Frogatt A. (2012), *The Reform of Global Energy Governance*, London: Grantham Institute for Climate Change.
- HMIC (2009), *Adapting to Protest*, July, accessed 26 September 2019 at <https://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf>.
- Home Affairs Committee (2009), *Policing of the G20 Protests*, 23 June, accessed 26 September 2009 at <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmhaff/418/41802.htm>.
- Hu, J. (2008), 'Hu Jintao addresses the G20 summit on financial markets and the world economy in Washington', 16 November, accessed 6 February 2020 at <http://sk.chineseembassy.org/slo/xwtd/t523232.htm>.

- Hughes, C.W. (2015) *Japan's Foreign and Security Policy under the 'Abe Doctrine': New Dynamism or New Dead End?*, London: Palgrave.
- Jelinek, T., W. Wallach and D. Kerimi (2021), 'Policy brief: the creation of a G20 coordinating committee for the governance of artificial intelligence', *AI Ethics*, 1, 141–150.
- Jibiki, K. (2017), 'Abe, Trump and Moon agree to tighten pressure on North Korea', 7 July, accessed 27 January 2020 at <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Abe-Trump-and-Moon-agree-to-tighten-pressure-on-North-Korea2>.
- Kalinowski, T. (2010), 'Can Korea be a bridge between developing and developed countries in the G20 and beyond?' in T. Fues and P. Wolff (eds), *G20 and Global Development: How Can the New Summit Architecture Promote Pro-Poor Growth and Sustainability?*, Bonn: German Development Institute.
- Kalinowski, T. (2019), *Why International Cooperation Is Failing: How the Clash of Capitalisms Undermines the Regulation of Finance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kampmann, M. (2010), 'G20 and a new era for "development"' in T. Fues and P. Wolff (eds), *G20 and Global Development: How Can the New Summit Architecture Promote Pro-Poor Growth and Sustainability?*, Bonn: German Development Institute.
- Kang, S. (2022), 'The G20 Bali Summit: Coping with Geopolitical Crisis and Saving Global Governance', *IFANS Focus*, 15 December, accessed 13 April 2023 at <https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?menuCl=P11&pblctDtaSn=14102&clCode=P11>.
- Kantei (2008), 'Press conference by Prime Minister Taro Aso following his visit to the United States of America', 15 November, accessed 6 April 2023 at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/asospeech/2008/11/15naigai_e.html.
- Kantei (2009), 'Press conference by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama following his attendance at meetings at the United Nations and the Pittsburgh G20 Summit', 25 September, accessed 14 December 2022 at https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200909/25naigai_e.html.
- Kantei (2013), 'Press conference by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe following his attendance at the G20 summit meeting in Saint Petersburg and the 125th International Olympic Committee session', 7 September, accessed 27 January 2020 at https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/07argentine_naigai_e.html.
- Kantei (2016), 'Press conference by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe following the G20 Hangzhou summit', 5 September, accessed 5 February 2020 at https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201609/1219127_11015.html.
- Kantei (2019a), 'Speech by Prime Minister Abe at the World Economic Forum annual meeting. toward a new era of "hope-driven economy"', 23 January, accessed 5 February 2020 at https://www.mofa.go.jp/ecm/ec/page4e_000973.html.
- Kantei (2019b), 'Presidency Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following the G20 Osaka summit', 29 June, accessed 27 September 2022 at https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201906/00002.html.
- Kaul, I. (2019), 'The G20@10: Time to shift gears', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 563–582.
- Kharas, H. (2011), 'Bringing development into the G20: overarching themes' in C.I. Bradford and W. Lim (eds), *Global Leadership in Transition: Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

- Kharas, H. (2014a), 'The G20 and sustainable development' in K. Derviş and P. Drysdale (eds), *The G20 Summit at Five: Time for Strategic Leadership*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
- Kharas, H. (2014b), 'Scope for an ambitious development agenda in the G20', *East Asia Forum*, 25 June, accessed 7 February 2017 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/06/25/scope-for-an-ambitious-development-agenda-in-the-g20>.
- Kim, J.A. and S.-Y. Chung (2012), 'The role of the G20 in governing the climate change regime', *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 12(4), 361–374.
- Kirchner, S. (2016), 'The G20 and global governance', *Cato Journal*, 36(3), 485–506.
- Kirton, J. (2011), 'Brazil's contribution to G20 and global governance', paper prepared for keynote address to the 16th ENERI conference, Brasilia, 18 May, accessed 28 November 2019 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/kirton-eneri-110518.html>.
- Kirton, J. (2012), 'El G20, el G8, el G5 y el papel de las potencias en ascenso', *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, 94, 163–200.
- Kirton, J. (2013), *G20 Governance for a Globalized World*, Farnham: Ashgate.
- Kirton, J. (2015), 'The United Nations, Global Economic Governance and the G20', 11 December, accessed 23 May 2023 at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/kirton-un-g20-151210.html>.
- Kirton, J. (2016), *China's G20 Leadership*, London: Routledge.
- Kirton, J. (2017), 'Governing together: the Gx future', *Studia Diplomatica*, 68(3), 7–27.
- Kirton, J. (2020), 'The United States' cooperative leadership in G7 and G20 governance', *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 40(1), 103–116.
- Kirton, J. and A.X. Wang (2023), 'China's complex leadership in G20 and global governance: from Hangzhou 2016 to Kunming 2021', *Chinese Political Science Review*, 8, 331–380.
- Kirton, J., J. Kulik and C. Bracht (2014), 'Generating global health governance through BRICS summitty', *Contemporary Politics*, 20(2), 146–162.
- Kitchen, V. and R. Kim (2014), 'Privatizing security, securitizing policing: the case of the G20 in Toronto, Canada', *International Political Sociology*, 8(2), 201–217.
- Kloke-Lesch, A. and C. Gleichmann (2010), 'Global development beyond the North–South paradigm' in T. Fues and P. Wolff (eds), *G20 and Global Development: How Can the New Summit Architecture Promote Pro-Poor Growth and Sustainability?*, Bonn: German Development Institute.
- Kojima, M. and F. Iwasaki (2019), 'Sea change: Japan leads on marine plastic litter', *East Asia Forum*, 26 October, accessed 4 February 2020 at <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/10/26/sea-change-japanese-leads-on-marine-plastic-litter>.
- Kokotsis, E. (2017), 'The Gx contribution to global climate governance', *Studia Diplomatica*, 68(3), 79–95.
- Korolev, A. (2022), 'Why China won't condemn Putin's Ukraine war', *East Asia Forum*, 20 April, accessed 29 November 2022 at <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/04/20/why-china-wont-condemn-putins-ukraine-war>.
- Larionova, M. (2022), 'A brief history of the G20 institutional dynamics(2008–21)', *International Organisations Research Journal*, 17(12), 250–274.
- Légrand, T. and S. Bronitt (2015), 'Policing the G20 protests: "too much order with too little law" revisited', *Queensland Review*, 22(1), 3–14.
- Leininger, J. (2017), "'On the table or at the table?" G20 and its cooperation with Africa', *Global Summitry*, 3(2), 193–205.

- Lesage, D. and J. Wouters (2022), 'Introduction: The G20, development and the UN agenda 2030' in D. Lesage and J. Wouters (eds), *The G20, Development and the UN Agenda 2030*, London: Routledge.
- Liu, G. (2019), 'Another North Korean provocation ahead of the G20 summit? Don't count on it', *The Diplomat*, 26 June, accessed 28 January 2020 at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/another-north-korean-provocation-ahead-of-the-g20-summit-dont-count-on-it>.
- Louis, M. (2016), 'The ILO, social partners and the G20: new prospects for social dialogue at the global level?', *Global Social Policy*, 16(3), 235–252.
- Luckhurst, J. (2012), 'The G20 and *ad hoc* embedded liberalism: economic governance amid crisis and dissensus', *Politics & Policy*, 40(5), 740–782.
- Luckhurst, J. (2015), 'Latin America in the G20: insiders or outsiders?', *Latin American Policy*, 6(1), 19–40.
- Luckhurst, J. (2016), *G20 Since the Global Crisis*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Luckhurst, J. (2019a), 'Governance networks shaping the G20 through inclusivity practices', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 521–547.
- Luckhurst, J. (2019b), 'A constructivist approach to the G20' in S. Slaughter (ed.), *The G20 and International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Global Summitry*, Cheltenham and Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Mabera, F. (2019), 'Africa in the G20: a relational view of African agency in global governance', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 583–599.
- Mahrenbach, L.C. (2019), 'How shared ideas may hinder lobbying success: British preference formation in the G20', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 33(2), 252–273.
- Martin, P. (2005), 'A global answer to global problems: the case for a new leaders' forum', *Foreign Affairs*, 84(3), 2–6.
- McBride, B., S. Hawkes and K. Buse (2019), 'Soft power and global health: the sustainable development goals (SDGs) era health agendas of the G7, G20 and BRICS', *BMC Public Health*, 19(815), 1–4.
- McConnell, P. (2010), 'Seoul development consensus: break from Washington consensus or same song, new singers?', Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, 18 November, accessed 20 February 2020 at <http://modernizeaid.net/2010/11/seoul-development-consensus-break-from-washington-consensus-or-same-song-new-singers>.
- McKinney, J. (2018), 'How stalled global reform is fueling regionalism: China's engagement with the G20', *Third World Quarterly*, 39(4), 709–726.
- McLean-Dreyfus, M.A. (2012), 'Food security: assessing the G20's approach', *East Asia Forum*, 1 July, accessed 7 February 2017 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/01/food-security-assessing-the-g20-s-approach>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore (2010), 'Statement by Ambassador Vanu Gopala Menon Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations on behalf of the Global Governance Group (3G)', accessed 29 September 2022 at https://www.mfa.gov.sg/overseas-mission/new-york/mission-updates/global_governance_group/2019/01/press_201006_4.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2006), 'Arc of freedom and prosperity: Japan's expanding diplomatic horizons', 30 November, accessed 25 September 2019 at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2008a), 'Interim report on the Heiligendam Process at the G8 summit in Hokkaido Toyako 7 to 9 July 2008', accessed 26

- October 2022 at https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/pdf/0709_01_en.pdf.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2008b), 'Promoting the global agenda', accessed 26 October 2022 at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2009/declaration2.pdf>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2009), 'A Japan–Europe partnership to surmount global challenges: policy speech by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan', 5 May, accessed 22 December 2022 at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/speech0905.html>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2016), 'Japan's message to the United Kingdom and the European Union', accessed 23 September 2019 at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000185466.pdf>.
- Molnar, A., C. Whelan and P.J. Boyle (2019), 'Securing the Brisbane 2014 G20 in the wake of the Toronto 2010 G20: "failure-inspired" learning in public order policing', *The British Journal of Criminology*, 59(1), 107–125.
- Monaghan, J. and K. Walby (2012), "'They attacked the city": security intelligence, the sociology of protest policing and the anarchist threat at the 2010 Toronto G20 summit', *Current Sociology*, 60(5), 653–671.
- Morgan, M. (2012), 'Consensus formation in the global economy: the success of the G7 and the failure of the G20', *Studies in Political Economy*, 90(1), 115–136.
- Morin, J.F. et al. (2019), 'How informality can address emerging issues: making the most of the G7', *Global Policy*, 10(2), 267–273.
- Moschella, M. and L. Quaglia (2016), 'To agree or not to agree? Explaining the cohesiveness of the European Union in the Group of Twenty', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(6), 906–924.
- Motala, M.F. (2019), 'The G20–OECD contribution to a new global tax governance', *International Organisations Research Journal*, 14(2), 52–79.
- Muhanna, D. (no date), 'G20 performance on food and agriculture', *Global Governance Project*, accessed 20 January 2022 at <https://www.globalgovernanceproject.org/g20-performance-on-food-and-agriculture-2/duja-muhanna>.
- Muhanna, D. (2018), 'G20 summit costs, 2010–2018', 18 November, accessed 25 September 2022 at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/factsheets/factsheet_costs-g20.html.
- Naim, M. (2009), 'Minilateralism: the magic number to get real international action', *Foreign Policy*, 21 June, accessed 25 May 2023 at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism>.
- Nasra, S. and P. Debaere (2016), 'The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(1), 209–230.
- Naylor, T. (2019a), 'The G20 and the English school' in S. Slaughter (ed.), *The G20 and International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Global Summitry*, Cheltenham and Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Naylor, T. (2019b), *Social Closure and International Society: Status Groups from the Family of Civilised Nations to the G20*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Naylor, T. (2020), 'All that's lost: the hollowing of summit diplomacy in a socially distanced world', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15(4), 583–598.
- Naylor, T. (2023), 'The spread of informal governance practices in G-summitry', *International Politics*, 60(1), 107–127.
- Naylor T. and H. Dobson (forthcoming), 'Logos in global summitry'.
- Nelson, R.M. (2020), 'International economic policy coordination at the G7 and the G20', *Congressional Research Service*, R40977, 14 October, accessed 16 May 2022 at <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R40977.pdf>.

- Niblett, R. (2022), 'The G20 Bali summit showcases a more diverse world', *Chatham House*, 22 November, accessed 9 January 2023 at <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/11/g20-bali-summit-showcases-more-diverse-world>.
- Nordberg, D. (2012), 'Return of the state? The G20, the financial crisis and power in the world economy', *Review of Political Economy*, 24(2), 289–302.
- Obi, C. (2015), 'Repositioning South Africa in global economic governance: a perspective from Nigeria', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 22(2), 165–184.
- ODI (2015), 'Empty promises: G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production', accessed 5 August 2022 at <https://odi.org/en/publications/empty-promises-g20-subsidies-to-oil-gas-and-coal-production>.
- OECD (2013) *Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting*, accessed 16 January 2023 at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en>.
- OECD (2019), *G20 Contribution to the 2030 Agenda: progress and way forward*, accessed 9 February 2020 at <http://www.oecd.org/dev/OECD-UNDP-G20-SDG-Contribution-Report.pdf>.
- OECD (2021), *Addressing the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy*, accessed 16 January 2023 at <https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochure-addressing-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf>.
- Panova, V.P. (2017), 'Russia and the future of the Gx system', *Studia Diplomatica*, 68(3), 29–44.
- Parlar Dal, E. (2019), 'Status-seeking policies of middle powers in status clubs: the case of Turkey in the G20', *Contemporary Politics*, 25(5), 586–602.
- Parlar Dal, E. and S. Dipama (2019), 'G20 rising powers' status seeking through social creativity: the case of South–South development cooperation', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 663–684.
- Parlar Dal, E. and A.M. Kurşun (2018), 'Assessing Turkey's new global governance strategies: the G20 example' in E. Parlar Dal (ed.), *Middle Powers in Global Governance: The Rise of Turkey*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Payne, A. (2018), 'The G20 in Argentina needs to address its own failings as well as the many problems facing the global economy', 23 November, accessed 7 October 2019 at <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2018/11/23/the-g20-in-argentina-needs-to-address-its-own-failings-as-well-as-the-many-problems-facing-the-global-economy>.
- Postel-Vinay, K. (2014), *The G20: A New Geopolitical World Order*, London: Palgrave Pivot.
- Ren, X. (2015), 'A reform-minded status quo power? China, the G20, and reform of the international financial system', *Third World Quarterly*, 36(11), 2023–2043.
- Rhee, C and A. Sheel (2014), 'The Role of Emerging Economies in Major G20 Initiatives' in K. Derviş and P. Drysdale (eds), *The G20 Summit at Five: Time for Strategic Leadership*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
- Rogers, C. (2015), 'Global economic governance and the British economy: from the gold standard to the G20', *Global Society*, 29(3), 301–320.
- Rommerskirchen, C. (2013), 'Keeping the agents leashed: the EU's external economic governance in the G20', *Journal of European Integration*, 35(3), 347–360.
- Rommerskirchen, C. and H. Snaith (2018), 'Bringing balance to the force? A comparative analysis of institutionalisation processes in the G20's mutual assessment process and the EU's macroeconomic imbalances procedure', *New Political Economy*, 23(4), 391–406.

- Rubio, M. (2017), Tweet, 9 July, accessed 5 February 2020 at <https://twitter.com/marcorubio/status/884022979004428289?lang=en>.
- Sachdeva, G. (2022), 'The Indian approach to the G20 development policy track' in D. Lesage and J. Wouters (eds), *The G20, Development and the UN Agenda 2030*, London: Routledge.
- Sainsbury, T. (2015a), 'Policies for the Turkish 2015 G20 Presidency: walking a tight-rope of G20 relevancy' in T. Sainsbury (ed.), *The G20 at the End of 2014, G20 Monitor*, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, accessed 23 May 2022 at <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/g20-at-the-end-of-2014.pdf>.
- Sainsbury, T. and H. Wurf (2016), 'The G20 and the future of energy governance', *International Organization Research Journal*, 11(1), 7–21.
- Salim, Z. (2011), 'Indonesia in the G20: benefits and challenges amidst national interests and priorities' in W. Hofmeister and S. Vogt (eds), *G20: Perceptions and Perspectives for Global Governance*, Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Schirm, S.A. (2013), 'Global politics are domestic politics: A societal approach to divergence in the G20', *Review of International Studies*, 39(3), 685–706
- Scholz, I. and C. Brandi (2017), 'Implementing the 2030 agenda for sustainable development: achievements and limitations of the G20 presidency in 2017', *Global Summitry*, 3(2), 156–175.
- Shaw, T. (2018), 'Is the G20, like the G7, an endangered species?', *The Round Table*, 107(5), 601–611.
- Slaughter, S. (2015a), 'Building G20 outreach: the role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry', *Global Summitry*, 1(2), 171–186.
- Slaughter, S. (2015b), 'The G20's role in legitimating global capitalism: beyond crisis diplomacy?', *Contemporary Politics*, 21(4), 384–398.
- Slaughter, S. (2017), 'The G20 and climate change: the transnational contribution of global summitry', *Global Policy*, 8(3), 285–293.
- Slaughter, S. (ed.) (2019a), *The G20 and International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Global Summitry*, Cheltenham and Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Slaughter, S. (2019b), 'Introduction: theorizing the G20' in S. Slaughter (ed.), *The G20 and International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Global Summitry*, Cheltenham and Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Slaughter, S. (2020), 'Global informalism and the G20', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 24(3), 533–554.
- Sobel, M. (2021), 'G20 is not up to today's policy challenges', Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, 27 October, accessed 28 April at <https://www.omfif.org/2021/10/g20-is-not-up-to-todays-policy-challenges>.
- Soble J. and M. Dickie (2010), 'Revolving door keeps turning in Japan'. *Financial Times*, 2 June, accessed 19 October 2022 at <https://www.ft.com/content/4a401eb8-6e2c-11df-ab79-00144feabdc0>.
- Soederberg, S. (2010), 'The politics of representation and financial fetishism: the case of the G20 summits', *Third World Quarterly*, 31(4), 523–540.
- Stiles, G. (2015), 'The G20 and regional stability: a summit failure or an impossible vortex of violence?', *Global Policy Journal*, accessed 8 January 2020 at <https://tinyurl.com/yfgumrfg>.
- Subacchi, P. (2015), 'The world economy: is international economic governance out of sync with reality?' in M. Callaghan and T. Sainsbury (eds), *The G20 and the Future of International Economic Governance*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

- Subacchi, P. (2019), 'Evaluating the G20 at 20 years', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 703–707.
- Trump, D.J. (2017), Tweet, 9 July, accessed 5 February 2020 at <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/884016887692234753?lang=en>.
- Ünay, S. (2014), 'Transformation trajectory of the G20 and Turkey's presidency: middle powers in global governance', *Perceptions*, 19(4), 137–167.
- UNGA (2021), 'Secretary-General's address to the General Assembly', 21 September, accessed 26 May 2023 at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2021-09-21/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-address-the-general-assembly>.
- US Department of State (2012), 'Remarks at the G20 ministerial', 19 February, accessed 29 November at <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/184623.htm>.
- Van de Graaf, T. (2017), 'Energy governance in the G7 and G20 after the Ukraine Crisis', *Studia Diplomatica*, 68(3), 97–107.
- Van de Graaf, T. and K. Westphal (2011), 'The G8 and G20 as global steering committees for energy: opportunities and constraints', *Global Policy*, 2(S1), 19–30.
- The Vatican (2013), 'Letter of Pope Francis to H.E. Mr Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation on the occasion of the G20 St Petersburg summit', 4 September, accessed 1 August 2022 at https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130904_putin-g20.html.
- Vestergaard, J. and R. Wade (2012), 'Establishing a new global economic council: governance reform at the G20, the IMF and World Bank', *Global Policy*, 3(3), 257–269.
- Villanueva Ulfgard, R. and A. Alejo Jaime (2014), 'New multilateralism and governmental mechanisms for including civil society during Mexico's presidency of the G20 in 2012', *Third World Quarterly*, 35(8), 1529–1546.
- Villanueva Ulfgard, R. and B. Vega (2019), 'The effectiveness–legitimacy nexus in the G20's Development Working Group: a view from Mexico', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 621–641.
- Vines, D. (2015a), 'Cooperation between countries to ensure global economic growth: a role for the G20', *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature*, 29(1), 1–24.
- Vines, D. (2015b), 'Evaluating Turkey's G20 leadership', *East Asia Forum*, 10 November, accessed 7 February, 2017 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/10/evaluating-turkeys-g20-leadership>.
- von Haldenwang, C. and J. Schwab (2017), 'Pathways to international tax governance: has the German G20 presidency made a difference?', *Global Summitry*, 3(2), 141–155.
- Warren, B. (2018), 'How G20 agriculture ministers' meetings influence leaders' commitments and compliance', 13 July, accessed 3 February 2020 at <http://www.g20.toronto.ca/analysis/180713-how-agmins-influence-leaders.html#fnA>.
- Wendt, A. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White House (2014a), 'US-China Joint announcement on climate change', 11 November, accessed 10 March 2020 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change>.
- White House (2014b), 'Australia-Japan-United States trilateral leaders meeting Joint Media Release', 15 November, accessed 27 January 2020 at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/australia-japan-united-states-trilateral-leaders-meeting-joint-media-rel>.
- White House (2018), 'Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly', 25 September, accessed 25 May 2023 at <https://>

- trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.
- Wihardja, M.M. (2014), 'Chasing the chimera of coordinated monetary policy at the G20', *East Asia Forum*, 23 February, accessed 7 February 2017 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/23/chasing-the-chimera-of-coordinated-monetary-policy-at-the-g20>.
- Wilson, J.D. (2015), 'Multilateral organisations and the limits to international energy cooperation', *New Political Economy*, 20(1), 85–106.
- Wood, L.J., D. Staggenborg, G.J. Stalker and R. Kutz-Flamenbaum (2017), 'Eventful events: local outcomes of G20 summit protests in Pittsburgh and Toronto', *Social Movement Studies*, 16(5), 595–609.
- Wouters, J. and S. Van Kerckhoven (2011), 'The OECD and the G20: an ever closer relationship?', *The George Washington International Law Review*, 43(2), 345–374.
- Yu, H. (2017), 'G20 and the reform of global energy governance', *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 3(2), 227–242.
- Zeng, J. (2019), 'Chinese views of global economic governance', *Third World Quarterly*, 40(3), 578–594.
- Zhu, J. (2016), 'G20 institutional transition and global tax governance', *The Pacific Review*, 29(3), 465–471.
- Zondi, S. (2013), 'The G20 development consensus: an African perspective', *Africa Review*, 5(10), 73–86.
- Zuma, J. (2015), 'Statement by President Jacob Zuma at the conclusion of the G20 summit of leaders, Antalya, Turkey', 16 November, accessed 28 January 2020 at <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-jacob-zuma-conclusion-g20-summit-leaders%2C-antalya%2C-turkey>.

Index

- 3G *see* Global Governance Group
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 60, 66–7, 81, 91, 175
- Abbas, M. 72
Abbott, T. 70, 88, 95–6, 109, 136, 156, 179–80, 186–7
Abe, S. 46, 106, 108–9, 117, 120, 123, 133, 135, 137–8, 160–61, 169, 176, 186, 189–90
Action Plan on Marine Litter 121, 159
Afghanistan 106, 113, 162
African Development Bank 31
African Union 3, 5, 7, 19, 31, 65, 70, 82, 133, 164, 172
AgResults 78, 104, 162–3
Agricultural Market Information System 78–9
agriculture 24, 60, 76–9, 119, 159
Aizawa, M. 71
Al Saud, S. bin A. 186
al-Assad, B. 108–9, 111, 124, 163
Albanese, A. 179, 188
Albright, M. 37
Alexandroff, A.S. 153–4, 175
Alibaba 141
Amazon 55
Ankara terrorist attack 105, 114–15
Antalya 2015 summit 8, 14, 26, 29, 35, 73, 79, 90, 95, 100, 103, 105, 108–10, 114–17, 122, 132–3, 142, 178, 182, 186, 188–9, 191
Apple 55
Arab League 110
Arab Spring 134
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 134
architects of G20 15, 158, 165, 179, *see also* individuals
Argentina 3–5, 11, 22, 50, 52
Buenos Aires 2018 summit 13–14, 35, 53, 81, 91, 105, 109, 111, 118, 123, 133–4, 138, 142, 146, 148, 165, 174, 186, 188, 190, 192
and climate change/energy transitions 91–2, 99–100
domestic impact 133–4, 136–7, 142, 148, 183
in G20 subgroups 152–3, 166, 181–3
presidency of G20 18, 35, 71, 76, 80–81, 90–92, 133–4, 152, 182
and security issues 109
and sustainable development 59, 63, 71, 76, 78, 80
Armstrong, S. 176
artificial intelligence 19
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 10, 31, 53, 96, 141, 171
Asian Development Bank 46, 134
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 70–71
Asō, T. 31–2, 38–9, 46, 112
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 31, 39, 80, 133–4, 175, 181
Attenborough, D. 121
austerity 41, 44, 50, 136, 158, 164, 166
Australia 5, 11, 16, 20, 23–5, 33, 40, 50
Brisbane 2014 summit 2, 14, 50, 68, 70–71, 73, 76, 78, 80, 88–9, 95–6, 100, 105, 108–9, 119, 126–7, 132–3, 135–6, 140, 142–3, 146, 150, 156, 158, 168, 172, 180, 182, 186–7, 189, 191
and climate change/energy transitions 88, 95, 99–100, 168
domestic impact 126–7, 132–3, 136–7, 140, 142–3, 146, 150

- in G20 subgroups 155, 157, 161–2, 164, 174, 177, 179–81, *see also* MIKTA
- and human resource development 80
- presidency of G20 18, 25, 33, 50, 69, 73, 80, 84, 114, 126–7, 132–3, 136, 174, 179–80
- and security issues 109–10, 112, 118, 123
- and sustainable development 63, 69–70, 78
- Azerbaijan 133
- B20 2, 25–7, 69, 177
- Bak, C. 88, 90
- Baker, D. 146
- Bali 2022 summit 7, 13–14, 36, 69, 79, 94, 103, 106, 113, 138, 142, 149, 162, 168, 170, 174, 176, 186, 188, 190, 192
- Ban, K.-m. 24, 28–9, 110
- Bank of Japan 46
- Barroso, J.M. 15, 44, 110, 128, 165, 191
- base erosion and profit shifting 54–5, 72–4, 159, 168
- Basel III code 44
- Bayne, N. 30, 54
- Belgium 29
- Belt and Road Initiative 71, 108, 133
- Berlusconi, S. 162, 189
- Biden, J. 13, 67, 113, 155, 157, 192
- bilateral meetings 22, 41, 54, 56, 73, 92, 96–7, 102–12, 117, 122–4, 127, 134, 137–9, 154, 158, 160–68, 177, 179
- Black Sea Grain Initiative 79
- Bolsonaro, J. 166, 188
- Bradford, C.I. 6
- Brahimi, L. 110
- Brazil 5, 11–12, 15, 20, 24, 29, 39, 47–8, 50–51, 54, 56, 59
 - and climate change/energy transitions 96, 99–100
 - in G20 subgroups 152–3, 156, 162, 166–7, 173, 184, *see also* BRICS
 - presidency of G20 14, 152
 - Rio de Janeiro 2024 summit 186
 - and security issues 109, 124
 - and sustainable development 63, 69, 71, 74, 78
- Bretton Woods system 10, 39–40, 45–6, 128, 135
- Brexity 9, 21, 90, 123, 138, 158
- BRICS 8, 12, 19–20, 24, 33, 39–40, 42, 46, 56, 71–2, 107, 124, 152–3, 162–3, 166–73, 181–2, 184, *see also individual countries*
- Brisbane 2014 summit 2, 14, 50, 68, 70–71, 73, 76, 78, 80, 88–9, 95–6, 100, 105, 108–9, 119, 126–7, 132–3, 135–6, 140, 142–3, 146, 150, 156, 158, 168, 172, 180, 182, 186–7, 189, 191
- Brisbane Action Plan 50
- Brown, G. 8, 15, 38, 41, 43, 45, 51–2, 55, 59, 86, 128–9, 135–7, 156–8, 168, 186, 191
- Buenos Aires 2018 summit 13–14, 35, 53, 81, 91, 105, 109, 111, 118, 123, 133–4, 138, 142, 146, 148, 165, 174, 186, 188, 190, 192
- Bush, G.W. 1, 15, 17, 21, 36, 51–2, 127–8, 155–6, 179, 186, 191
- Business 20 *see* B20
- C20 26, 149, 169
- Calderón, N. 40, 136, 174, 186, 189
- Callaghan, M. 2
- Cameron, D. 8, 110, 115, 157–8, 191
 - ‘Governance for growth’ 15–16, 20, 24–5, 32, 158
- Canada 5, 11, 16–17, 19, 38, 44, 48, 50, 54
 - and climate change/energy transitions 99–100
 - domestic impact 134, 142, 145–6
 - in G20 subgroups 155, 157–9, 161–4, 180
 - presidency of G20 62, 131, 134
 - and security issues 109–10
 - and sustainable development 63, 74, 78, 80
 - Toronto 2010 summit 14, 21–2, 24, 27, 35, 44, 47, 49, 54, 62, 74, 80, 82, 86, 88, 99, 104, 120–21, 130, 134, 142–6, 163–4, 186–7, 191

- Cannes 2011 summit 13–16, 26–7, 35, 45, 53, 65, 76–7, 88, 104, 130–31, 134–6, 146–8, 155, 158, 174, 186–7, 189, 191
- Caribbean Community 31
- Carin, B. 85
- Carr, B. 187
- Chad 133
- Changyong, R. 15
- chemical weapons 108–10, 124, 163
- Cherry, J. 64
- Chile 4
- Chin, G.T. 17, 50, 72, 171
- China 2, 5–6, 11–12, 16–20, 25, 29, 33, 39–40, 42, 44–50, 53–4, 56
and climate change/energy transitions 85, 90, 94, 96–7, 99–101, 104
domestic impact 129, 131, 133, 135, 137–8, 140–42
in G20 subgroups 153, 156, 161, 166–7, 170–71, 173, 179–81, 184, *see also* BRICS
Hangzhou 2016 summit 14, 35, 76, 90, 96, 99, 105, 108, 112, 116–17, 122, 131, 133, 138, 140–42, 158, 171, 182, 186, 188, 191
presidency of G20 2, 16–18, 29, 50, 66, 71, 76, 84, 90, 115, 122, 129, 131, 133, 171
and security issues 103–4, 108–13, 115–18, 121, 123–4, 134, 139, 177
at Seoul summit 50
and sustainable development 69, 71–2, 78
US–China trade war 14, 68, 161
- Chodor, T. 49
- Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies 2
- Christchurch shootings 106
- Chung, S.-Y. 94
- Civil Society 20 *see* C20
- civil society organizations 27–8, 53, 88, 100, 145–6, 163
- climate change 2, 8, 13, 18–19, 24, 50, 64, 69, 77, 84–101, 104, 119, 147, 156–7, 159–60, 165, 169, 176
Paris Agreement 13, 90–93, 96–7, 156–7, 159
- Clinton, H.R. 107
- Cold War 8, 103, 177
- Compact with Africa 67, 71
- Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 118
- Conte, G. 190
- Cooper, A.F. 1, 5, 31, 51–2, 128, 147, 153, 169, 173, 181
- cost-of-living crisis 14, 101, 176
- COVAX programme 68
- Covid-19 pandemic 9, 14, 35–6, 51, 55, 67–8, 76, 79, 93, 106, 149, 162, 170, 183–4
- credit-rating agencies 37, 39–40, 44
- currency war 44–5
- cyber security 105–6, 118, 122–4, 133
- Daesh 111, 114, 116
- Dal, P. 110, 178
- Dallek, R. 127
- Data Free Flow with Trust 106, 123, 169
- Davies, R. 59, 82
- Davutoğlu, A. 178, 191
- de Freitas Barbosa, A. 167
- Dearden, N. 148–9
- Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy 103
- Deepwater Horizon oil spill 104, 120–21
- Derviş, K. 2
- Development Bank of Latin America 134, 182
- development issues 18, *see also* sustainable development
food security 18, 60, 63, 65, 67–8, 76–9, 86, 93, 104–6, 119, 121, 155, 162, 169, 183
poverty eradication 3, 18, 59–62, 66, 74, 83, 86, 104, 147, 175
- Development Working Group 49, 62, 65, 67, 82–3
- Digital Economy Task Force 122
- digital security 105–6, 118, 122–4, 133
- Dobson, H. 17, 50, 64, 154
- Doctor, M. 167
- Doha Round 23, 51–2, 65
- domestic resource mobilization 63, 65, 67, 72–4, 78

- Downie, C. 33
 Draghi, M. 113, 186, 190
 Drysdale, P. 2
 Duggan, N. 78
- early warning mechanism 38, 40, 46, 68
 East Asian Financial Crisis 10, 22
 Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement 115
 Ebola 68
 Ebrard, M. 174
 Economic Commission for Africa 31
 education 24, 81
 Egypt 123, 133, 166, 181
 Eichel, H. 11, 159
 Elek, A. 69, 86
 Energy Efficiency Action Plan 89, 100, 105
 energy security 14, 18, 69, 86–9, 91–2, 94, 98, 104–6, 119–20
 Energy Sustainability Working Group 88, 105, 168
 energy transitions 8, 86–94, 98–101
 engagement groups 26–7, *see also individual groups*
 Engelbrekt, K. 78, 119, 124
 Enhanced Structural Reform Agenda 171
 Erdoğan, R.T. 9, 27, 114, 116–17, 132–3, 159, 178–9, 186, 191–2
 Ethiopia 166
 EU4 21, *see also individual countries*
 Eurocentrism 11, 20–22, 152
 European Commission 15, 44, 54, 111, 128, 164–5
 European Community 20
 European Council 21, 37–8, 42–4, 164–5
 European Parliament 183
 European sovereign debt crisis 14, 35–6, 44–5, 49, 65, 77, 130, 134–5, 162, 174
 European Union 5–6, 15, 18, 20–21, 30–31, 38, 41–4, 52, 54, 56–7, 61
 Brexit 9, 21, 90, 123, 138, 158
 and climate change/energy transitions 93, 95–6, 99
 in G20 subgroups 155, 157–8, 161, 164–5, 171, 183
 and security issues 110–11, 115, 117, 121, 123
 and sustainable development 63, 74, 79, 81
- exchange rate stability 40, 44–5, 53
 executive pay and bonuses 37, 43
- Fabius, L. 116
 Facebook 55, 106
 feminism 27
 Fernández, A. 182, 188
 Financial Action Task Force 117–18
 financial crises 38
 East Asian Financial Crisis 10, 22
 European sovereign debt crisis 14, 35–6, 44–5, 49, 65, 77, 130, 134–5, 162, 174
 Global Financial Crisis *see* Global Financial Crisis
 financial inclusion 74–6, 78
 Financial Inclusion Action Plan 75–6
 Financial Inclusion Peer Learning Programme 76
 Financial Stability Board 30, 41
 Financial Stability Forum 41, 179
 financial transactions tax 53–4, 71, 159, 163–4
 Flasbarth, J. 86
 food security 18, 60, 63, 65, 67–8, 76–9, 86, 93, 104–6, 119, 121, 155, 162, 169, 183
 Food Security and Nutrition Network 78, 105
 formalization of G20 24–6, 28, 92, 129
 fossil fuels 85, 87–9, 91, 93–6, 98–100, 104, 180
 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth 48–9, 62
 França, V. 188
 France 5, 11, 17, 20–22, 37, 42, 52, 54
 Cannes 2011 summit 13–16, 26–7, 35, 45, 53, 65, 76–7, 88, 104, 130–31, 134–6, 146–8, 155, 158, 174, 186–7, 189, 191
 and climate change/energy transitions 98
 domestic impact 134, 136, 147–8
 in G20 subgroups 154–7, 159, 161–3, 180
 Paris shootings 8, 103, 105, 111, 114–16, 133, 178
 presidency of G20 26, 53, 65, 76–7, 134
 and security issues 109–10, 116–17

- and sustainable development 63, 70–71, 77–8, 104
- Francis, Pope 110
- free rider problem 84
- free trade 13, 156
- Fues, T. 81–2
- Fukuda doctrine 46

- G5 12
- G7 1, 3, 8, 10–11, 13–15, 17, 20, 26, 30–33, 37, 40–41, 43–4, 49, 51, 56, 59, 72, 81–2, 95, 101, 103–4, 107, 114, 122, 124, 134, 141, 153–66, 169, 172–3, 181, 184, *see also individual countries*
- G8 1, 8, 12, 14–17, 20, 24, 30–32, 42, 48–9, 59, 65, 81–2, 103–4, 107, 119, 127–8, 141–2, 157–8, 163, 166, 184, *see also individual countries*
- G20
 - architects of 15, 158, 165, 179, *see also individuals*
 - beyond global governance 8, 126–49
 - and climate change 2, 8, 13, 18–19, 24, 50, 64, 69, 77, 84–101, 104, 119, 147, 156–7, 159–60, 165, 169, 176
 - and development 18, *see also food security; poverty eradication*
 - and energy transitions 8, 86–94, 98–101
 - engagement groups 26–7, *see also individual groups*
 - formalization of 24–6, 28, 92, 129
 - and the GFC *see* Global Financial Crisis
 - managing the global economy 35–57
 - member countries of 4–5, 11, *see also individual countries*
 - membership 19–23
 - organization 23–8
 - origins of 4, 7, 10–14
 - position within global governance 28–33
 - presidency of *see* presidency of G20
 - role and agenda 14–19
 - scholarship on 1–6
 - and security issues 8, 18, 32, 50, 77, 79, 103–24, 160, 163, 165, 169, *see also security issues subgroups* within 8, 31, 57, 152–85, *see also individual subgroups*
 - summits *see* summits of G20
 - and sustainable development 7, 24, 29, 59–83, 90, 169
- G22 10
- G33 10, 20
- G77 72
- Garnaut, R. 84–5
- Gates, B. 148, 162
- Gates Foundation 78
- Geely 141
- gender equality 80
- Gentiloni, P. 190
- Germany 5, 9, 11, 20–21, 42, 45, 49–50, 52–4, 56
 - and climate change/energy transitions 91, 100
 - domestic impact 136, 142, 148
 - in G20 subgroups 155, 157–9, 161, 163–4, 166, 178, 180
 - Hamburg 2017 summit 13–14, 26–7, 53, 55, 67, 90–91, 97, 105, 111–12, 117–19, 121, 124, 136, 142, 146, 148, 157, 159–60, 165, 177, 186, 188, 190–91
 - presidency of G20 26, 53, 55, 67–8, 72, 76, 79, 90–91, 119, 121–3, 175
 - and security issues 109–11, 117, 124
 - and sustainable development 63, 71–2, 79
 - West Germany 20, 162
- Gibbs, R. 41
- Gillard, J. 126–7, 146, 179, 187
- G(irls) 20 26
- Global Agriculture and Food Security Program 76
- Global Financial Crisis 1–3, 7, 9, 11–15, 18, 24, 26, 28–9, 35–46, 53–4, 56, 59–62, 67, 69, 103, 112, 127–9, 131, 135, 154, 156–9, 162–4, 166–8, 170, 174–5, 177–9
- Global Governance Group 24, 28
- Global Infrastructure Facility 70
- Global Infrastructure Hub 69–71

- Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion 75–6
- Global Plan for Recovery and Reform 103
- globalization 16, 18, 144, 147–8, 155
- Goodliffe, G. 130
- Google 55
- ‘Governance for growth’ (Cameron) 15–16, 20, 24–5, 32, 158
- Greece 45
- Green Climate Fund 89, 180
- Greenpeace 146
- Grice, A. 135, 137
- Group of 7, 8, etc. *see* G7, G8, etc.
- Gulf Cooperation Council 31
- Guterres, A. 68, 97
- Hague, W. 20
- Hajkowicz, S. 77
- Hajnal, P.I. 1
- Hamburg 2017 summit 13–14, 26–7, 53, 55, 67, 90–91, 97, 105, 111–12, 117–19, 121, 124, 136, 142, 146, 148, 157, 159–60, 165, 177, 186, 188, 190–91
- Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth 91
- Hangzhou 2016 summit 14, 35, 76, 90, 96, 99, 105, 108, 112, 116–17, 122, 131, 133, 138, 140–42, 158, 171, 182, 186, 188, 191
- Harper, S. 16, 32, 38, 145, 163, 186–7
- Hatoyama, Y. 17, 189
- Hazzard, B. 126–7
- health 50, 67–9, 159
mental health 68, 143
- hedge funds 37, 39, 42, 44
- Heiligendamm Dialogue Process 12, 129
- Heiligendamm–L’Aquila Process 12
- Herman, D. 51–2, 169
- Hockey, J. 136–7
- Hollande, F. 109, 115–17, 136, 154, 187–8
- Hong Kong 54
- Hu, J. 12, 42–3, 45, 103–4, 170, 187
- human resource development 63, 65–7, 78–81
- human rights 60, 116, 149, 168, 183
- human trafficking 105, 111, 165
- Ibrahim, A. 4
- IFI reform 36, 42–3, 45–9, 55, 167–8, 170
- Il, S. 15, 25, 63, 81–2
- India 5–6, 11–12, 16, 20, 40, 47–8, 51–2, 59, 61
and climate change/energy transitions 85, 88, 96, 99, 168–9
in G20 subgroups 153, 156–7, 161–2, 166–7, 169–70, 173, 179, 181, 184, *see also* BRICS
New Delhi 2023 summit 3, 31, 36, 79, 170, 182, 184, 186
presidency of G20 7, 14, 36, 48, 169, 173
and security issues 109, 113, 115, 117–18, 123–4, 133, 169
and sustainable development 70–71, 78–9, 169
- Indonesia 4–5, 11, 16, 20, 40
Bali 2022 summit 7, 13–14, 36, 69, 79, 94, 103, 106, 113, 138, 142, 149, 162, 168, 170, 174, 176, 186, 188, 190, 192
and climate change/energy transitions 95, 99–101
domestic impact 142, 149
in G20 subgroups 153, 161–2, 175–6, 179, 181, 184, *see also* MIKTA
presidency of G20 7, 18, 22, 69, 79, 81, 90, 94, 101, 176
and security issues 109, 123, 133
and sustainable development 63, 69, 81
- inflation 51, 106
- infrastructure investment 69–72
- intellectual property rights 12, 123
- Inter-American Development Bank 76, 134, 182
- International Atomic Energy Agency
Action Plan on Nuclear Safety 108
- International Energy Agency 85
- International Labour Organization 27, 30, 80
- international media centre 7, 27

- International Monetary Fund 18–19, 21, 28–30, 32–3, 38, 40, 43, 45–8, 54, 67, 100, 112, 129, 137, 168, 170, 179
- internationalism 16, 38, 52, 55, 109, 160–61, 180
- Iran 120, 166, 181
- Iraq 114
- Iskan, E. 18
- Italy 5, 11, 16, 20–21
 and climate change/energy transitions 100
 in G20 subgroups 162–3
 presidency of G20 22, 26, 35–6, 79, 81, 90, 93, 106, 162
 Rome 2021 summit 13–14, 26, 35–6, 51, 55, 67–8, 79, 86, 93, 97, 100–101, 106, 157–8, 162–3, 165, 168, 172, 174, 186, 188, 190, 192
 and security issues 109–10, 113
 and sustainable development 63, 78–9, 81
- Jaime, A. 149
- Jaishankar, S. 79
- Japan 3, 5–6, 11, 16–17, 24, 31–3, 38–40, 46, 48, 50, 54, 56, 63, 69–72
 and climate change/energy transitions 92, 97, 100, 119–20
 domestic impact 133–4, 137–8, 141
 in G20 subgroups 154, 157, 160–63, 166, 177, 179–80
 Osaka 2019 summit 13–14, 17, 71, 80, 92, 97, 100, 105–6, 113, 118, 120–22, 133–4, 137–8, 141, 160–61, 169, 174, 176, 182, 186, 188, 190, 192
 presidency of G20 71–2, 90, 92, 119–20, 123, 134
 and security issues 108–10, 112–13, 117, 119–24, 133, 138–9, 177
 and sustainable development 81
- Johnson, B. 9, 157, 192
- Juncker, J.-C. 111, 117, 191–2
- Just Energy Transition Partnership 94
- Kalinowski, T. 5, 164–6
- Kan, N. 189
- Kang, S. 173
- Karuzawa Innovation Action Plan 92–3
- Kazakhstan 133, 170
- Kharas, H. 59, 66
- Kicillof, A. 182
- Kim, J.A. 94
- Kim, J.U. 113, 139
- Kim, R. 145
- Kirchner, C.F. de 182, 187
- Kirton, J. 1, 6, 29, 40, 170–71
- Kishida, F. 190
- Kitchen, V. 145
- Kokotsis, E. 85
- Kuroda, H. 46
- L20 26–7
- Labour 20 *see* L20
- Landers, L. 70
- Laos 133
- L’Aquila Food Security Initiative 119
- Larionova, M. 14
- Latin America 6
- Latortue, A. 75
- Lavrov, S. 113, 118, 168, 190
- Leach, J. 37
- Lee, M.-b. 44–5, 62–3, 131–2, 140, 176–7, 186, 191
- Lesage, D. 66
- Letta, E. 189
- LGBT community 149, 168
- Libya 111
- London 2009 summit 14, 21, 26, 35, 40–43, 46, 52, 61, 82, 86, 103, 128–9, 136–7, 143–4, 146, 158, 168, 186–7, 189, 191
- López Obrador, A.M. 174
- Los Cabos 2012 summit 14, 27–8, 45, 54, 78, 80, 85, 88, 101, 104, 107, 130–31, 136, 142–3, 149, 158, 163, 174–5, 186–7, 189, 191
- Louis, M. 27
- Luckhurst, J. 2, 41, 56, 135
- Lula da Silva, L.I. 31, 39, 42, 51, 160, 166, 187
- Ma, J. 141
- Mabera, F. 3

- MacArthur, D. 150
 Macau 54
 Macri, M. 133–4, 136, 138, 182–3, 186, 188
 Macron, E. 154, 188
 Malaysia 4, 22, 175
 Malet, J. 21
 Manila Framework Group 10
 Mantega, G. 187
 marine environment security 104, 120–22, 159, 161
 Martin, P. 4, 11, 19, 129, 163
 Matera Declaration 79, 162
 Mauritania 133
 May, T. 8, 118, 138, 157–8, 191–2
 McCain, J. 127
 McDougall, S. 149
 Medvedev, D. 14, 40, 42, 167–8, 189
 Mehlenbacher, A. 85
 Meloni, G. 162, 190
 Mendes, R. 167
 mental health 68, 148
 Merkel, A. 9, 27, 37, 41, 43, 45, 112, 118, 136, 148, 158, 163, 186–8
 Mexican Agency of International Cooperation for Development 67, 175
 Mexico 5, 11–12, 15, 20, 40, 53–4, 59
 and climate change/energy transitions 95, 99–100
 domestic impact 129–31, 136, 142–3, 149, 175
 in G20 subgroups 152–3, 158–9, 174–5, 182, *see also* MIKTA
 Los Cabos 2012 summit 14, 27–8, 45, 54, 78, 80, 85, 88, 101, 104, 107, 130–31, 136, 142–3, 149, 158, 163, 174–5, 186–7, 189, 191
 presidency of G20 27–8, 54, 72, 76–7, 95, 107, 129–30, 149, 152, 159, 174–6
 and sustainable development 65, 67
 Michel, C. 192
 Michel, L. 61
 migrant smuggling 105, 111, 165
 MIKTA 95, 152–3, 163, 174–82, 184, *see also individual countries*
 Millennium Development Goals 24, 60–62, 64–5, 67, 175
 unilateralism 19, 97
 Mo, J. 153
 Modi, N. 29, 113, 115, 117–18, 169, 186, 190
 money laundering 118
 Monti, M. 189
 Moon, J.-i. 108, 176–7, 191–2
 Morgan, M. 29
 Morrison, S. 137, 179–80, 188
 Moschella, M. 164
 Mota, J.E.V. 136
 Motlanthe, K. 171, 191
 multilateralism 13, 29, 49, 69–70, 108, 113, 123, 133, 163, 168
 multi-year action plan 49, 62–3, 65–6, 80
 Mutual Assessment Process 48–50
 Myanmar 133
 Naarajärvi, T. 78
 Nakao, T. 46
 nativism 13
 Naylor, T. 4, 26, 68
 Nazarbayev, N. 133
 Netherlands 20–22, 40
 New Arrangements to Borrow 47
 New Delhi 2023 summit 3, 31, 36, 79, 170, 182, 184, 186
 New Development Bank 71
 New Partnership for Africa's Development 31, 82, 172
 New Zealand 133, 146
 Christchurch shootings 106
 Nieto, E.P. 174, 190
 Nigeria 22, 31
 Noda, Y. 135, 189
 non-state actors 3–4, *see also individual organizations*
 non-traditional security 119–24, *see also climate change; energy security; food security*
 Nordic Council 31
 North Korea 108, 110, 112–13, 134, 139, 177
 Norway 31
 nuclear safety 105, 107–8, 112–13, 177

- Obama, B. 26, 31, 36–7, 41, 48, 51–2, 54, 99, 105, 109–12, 116, 122, 127–9, 139, 150, 155–7, 177, 186, 191
- Obama, M. 158
- O'Connor, D. 144
- Oh, S.-h. 139–40
- Olympic Games 135, 139–41, 150, 171
- O'Neill, J. 166
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 29–30, 50, 54–5, 62–3, 65, 69, 72–4, 100, 168
- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 22, 85
- Osaka 2019 summit 13–14, 17, 71, 80, 92, 97, 100, 105–6, 113, 118, 120–22, 133–4, 137–8, 141, 160–61, 169, 174, 176, 182, 186, 188, 190, 192
- Osaka Track 123, 133, 161, 176
- O'Sullivan, J. 180–81
- Outreach 5 *see* G5
- Overseas Development Institute 100
- Oxfam 146
- Pacific Islands Forum 31
- Pakistan 117
- Palestine 72
- Pandoor, N. 172, 192
- Paris Agreement 13, 90–93, 96–7, 156–7, 159
- Paris shootings 8, 103, 105, 111, 114–16, 133, 178
- Park, G.-h. 112, 176, 191
- Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment 72
- Paulson, H. 21
- Pinera, S. 134, 182
- Pittsburgh 2009 summit 7, 12, 14, 21, 24, 27, 30, 35, 41–3, 46–9, 53, 62, 74, 76, 87–8, 95, 99–100, 104, 119, 129, 139, 142, 145–7, 156–7, 160, 167, 186–7, 189, 191
- Poland 113
- Postel-Vinay, K. 1, 32–3
- Pouliot, V. 147
- poverty eradication 3, 18, 59–62, 66, 74, 83, 86, 104, 147, 175
- presidency of G20 13, 24, *see also* summits of G20
- Argentina 18, 35, 71, 76, 80–81, 90–92, 133–4, 152, 182
- Australia 18, 25, 33, 50, 69, 73, 80, 84, 114, 126–7, 132–3, 136, 174, 179–80
- Brazil 14, 152
- Canada 62, 131, 134
- China 2, 16–18, 29, 50, 66, 71, 76, 84, 90, 115, 122, 129, 131, 133, 171
- France 26, 53, 65, 76–7, 134
- Germany 26, 53, 55, 67–8, 72, 76, 79, 90–91, 119, 121–3, 175
- India 7, 14, 36, 48, 169, 173
- Indonesia 7, 18, 22, 69, 79, 81, 90, 94, 101, 176
- Italy 22, 26, 35–6, 79, 81, 90, 93, 106, 162
- Japan 71–2, 90, 92, 119–20, 123, 134
- Mexico 27–8, 54, 72, 76–7, 95, 107, 129–30, 149, 152, 159, 174–6
- Russia 26, 105, 129, 133, 149
- Saudi Arabia 2, 13, 22, 25, 67–8, 76, 79, 90, 93, 106, 183
- South Korea 6, 16, 26, 44, 47, 62, 69, 81, 88, 122, 131–2, 174, 176–7
- Türkiye 25–7, 66, 77, 79, 90, 105, 114, 119, 132–3, 174, 178
- Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 74–5
- protectionism 13, 24, 38–9, 50–53, 129, 164
- protests 136, 143–9, 158, 160, 164, 168
- Putin, V. 26, 32, 55, 105, 109–11, 113, 118, 124, 129, 137–8, 148, 158, 168, 173, 186, 189–90
- Quaglia, L. 164
- Quirk, G. 126
- Ramaphosa, C. 172, 192
- refugee crisis 90, 111, 114, 117, 133, 165
- Reinfeldt, F. 191
- Renzi, M. 189
- Rimmer, S.H. 83, 95

- Rio de Janeiro 2024 summit 186
- Riyadh 2020 summit 14, 22, 25, 35, 68, 76, 93, 182–4, 186, 188, 190, 192
- Rome 2021 summit 13–14, 26, 35–6, 51, 55, 67–8, 79, 86, 93, 97, 100–101, 106, 157–8, 162–3, 165, 168, 172, 174, 186, 188, 190, 192
- Rommerskirchen, C. 48, 164
- Rousseff, D. 166, 187–8
- Rubio, M. 124
- Rudd, K. 15, 22–3, 50, 99, 128, 137, 179–80, 187
- Russia 5–6, 11, 20, 24, 40, 46–7, 52
 and climate change/energy transitions 85, 90, 96–100, 105, 168
 domestic impact 129, 133, 137, 149
 in G20 subgroups 153, 157–8, 165–70, 172–3, 175, 182, *see also* BRICS
 presidency of G20 26, 105, 129, 133, 149
 and security issues 109–13, 116, 118, 123–4, 138–9, 158
 St Petersburg 2013 summit 14, 26, 54–5, 65, 88, 98, 104–5, 108–10, 129, 133, 135, 137–9, 149, 165, 168–9, 173, 180, 186–7, 189, 191
 and sustainable development 69, 71
 Ukraine conflict 13–14, 18, 32, 69, 79, 94, 100–101, 103, 106–7, 113, 153, 158, 165, 168, 173, 176, 184
- S20 26, 159
- Sainsbury, T. 2, 85, 90
- Saltzmann, M. 82
- Sarkozy, N. 15, 17, 24, 27, 37–41, 43, 48, 52, 54, 77, 104, 128, 136, 147–8, 154–6, 186–7
- Saudi Arabia 4–5, 11, 22
 and climate change/energy transitions 90, 97, 99
 in G20 subgroups 153, 162, 166, 175–6, 179, 181–4
 and human rights 149
 presidency of G20 2, 13, 22, 25, 67–8, 76, 79, 90, 93, 106, 183
- Riyadh 2020 summit 14, 22, 25, 35, 68, 76, 93, 182–4, 186, 188, 190, 192
 and security issues 109–10
 and sustainable development 63, 79, 81
- Sberro, S. 130
- Schengen arrangements 111
- Schirm, S.A. 5, 56, 166
- Scholz, O. 188
- Science 20 *see* S20
- security issues 8, 18, 32, 50, 77, 79, 103–24, 160, 163, 165, 169
 Cold War 8, 103, 177
 digital security 105–6, 118, 122–4, 133
 energy security 14, 18, 69, 86–9, 91–2, 94, 98, 104–6, 119–20
 food security 18, 60, 63, 65, 67–8, 76–9, 86, 93, 104–6, 119, 121, 155, 162, 169, 183
 non-traditional security 119–24
 and protests 136, 143–9, 158, 160, 164, 168
 terrorism 8, 29, 75, 86, 104–6, 111–12, 114–18, 124, 147, 165, 169, 178
 traditional security 105–13
- Seoul 2010 summit 13–14, 22, 25–6, 31, 35, 44–5, 47, 49–50, 54, 62–5, 69, 75–7, 86, 104, 112, 131–2, 134, 139–40, 142, 174, 176–8, 186–7, 189, 191
- Seoul Development Consensus 62–6, 131, 172, 177
- sherpas 3, 5, 15, 24–5, 63, 81, 98, 183
- Sherry, N. 40
- Singapore 24, 28, 123, 133–4, 161
- Singh, M. 40, 61, 69, 169, 189
- single-use plastics 121–2, 161
- Slaughter, S. 2–4, 27, 101
- Snaith, H. 48
- social media 118, 147
 Facebook 55, 106
 Twitter 79, 113, 124, 147
- Soederberg, S. 41
- Somavia, J. 27
- Sommaruga, S. 22
- South Africa 3, 5, 11–12, 20, 22, 31, 54, 59, 62–4, 69, 71

- and climate change/energy transitions 94, 99–100
- in G20 subgroups 153, 161, 166, 168, 170–73, 182–4, *see also* BRICS
- and security issues 109, 111, 116, 123–4, 133
- South Korea 5, 11, 15–16, 20, 22, 31, 33, 44, 49, 53, 56
- and climate change/energy transitions 95, 98
- domestic impact 131–2, 134, 137–40, 142
- in G20 subgroups 157, 161, 163, 167, 174, 176–9, *see also* MIKTA
- presidency of G20 6, 16, 26, 44, 47, 62, 69, 81, 88, 122, 131–2, 174, 176–7
- and security issues 108, 110, 112–13, 122, 177
- Seoul 2010 summit 13–14, 22, 25–6, 31, 35, 44–5, 47, 49–50, 54, 62–5, 69, 75–7, 86, 104, 112, 131–2, 134, 139–40, 142, 174, 176–8, 186–7, 189, 191
- and sustainable development 62–5, 70–71, 74, 80
- Spain 20–21, 40, 63, 110, 180
- special drawing rights 45, 67
- St Petersburg 2013 summit 14, 26, 54–5, 65, 88, 98, 104–5, 108–10, 129, 133, 135, 137–9, 149, 165, 168–9, 173, 180, 186–7, 189, 191
- Statement on Preventing Exploitation of the Internet for Terrorism and Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism 105–6
- Statement on the Fight against Terrorism 105, 114–16, 118
- Stolte, C. 153, 169
- Strauss-Kahn, D. 43, 47
- Subacchi, P. 2
- subgroups within G20 8, 31, 57, 152–85
 - BRICS 8, 12, 19–20, 24, 33, 39–40, 42, 46, 56, 71–2, 107, 124, 152–3, 162–3, 166–73, 181–2, 184, *see also individual countries*
- G7 *see* G7
- MIKTA 95, 152–3, 163, 174–82, 184, *see also individual countries*
- Summers, L. 4, 11, 155
- summits of G20 6, 13, 24, 29, *see also individual summits*
- Sunak, R. 9, 157, 192
- supply chains 51, 79, 94, 106, 183
- sustainable development 7, 24, 29, 59–83, 90, 169
- Sustainable Development Goals 7, 24, 60, 66, 68, 79–80, 94, 162
- sustainable growth 48–51, 59, 103–4, 116, 123, 165
- Swan, W. 187
- Sweden 19–21
- Switzerland 22
- Syria 14, 26, 105, 108–11, 114, 124, 133, 139, 158, 163, 165, 168, 173, 178
- T20 2, 26, 175
- Taliban 106, 113
- tax havens 37, 41, 43, 54
- taxation 53–5, 73–4, 161
 - financial transactions tax 53–4, 71, 159, 163–4
- Taylor, M.C. 179
- Temer, M. 166, 188
- terrorism 8, 29, 75, 86, 104–6, 111–12, 114–18, 124, 147, 165, 169, 178
 - Ankara attack 105, 114–15
 - Christchurch shootings 106
 - Paris shootings 8, 103, 105, 111, 114–16, 133, 178
 - Syrian conflict 14, 26, 105, 108–11, 114, 124, 133, 139, 158, 163, 165, 168, 173, 178
- Thailand 4, 80, 134, 175
- Thakur, R. 1, 5
- think tanks 1–2, 26, 75, *see also* Think 20
- Timerman, H. 182, 187–8
- Tobin, J. 53
- Tobin Tax *see* financial transactions tax
- Tomlinson, I. 136, 144, 158
- Topolánek, M. 42, 165, 191
- Toronto 2010 summit 14, 21–2, 24, 27, 35, 44, 47, 49, 54, 62, 74, 80, 82, 86, 88, 99, 104, 120–21, 130, 134, 142–6, 163–4, 186–7, 191

- tourism 180
- trade 51–3, 55, 63
 protectionism 13, 24, 38–9, 50–53,
 129, 164
 US–China trade war 14, 68, 161
- traditional security 105–13
- Trans-Pacific Partnership 53, 156
- transparency 25, 36–7, 39–40, 44, 46, 73,
 77–9, 88, 94, 164, 174
- trilateral meetings 108–9, 112, 124
- Trudeau, J. 188
- Trump, D. 13–14, 53, 66, 68, 90, 93,
 97–8, 113, 124, 138–9, 148,
 154–5, 157, 159, 191–2
- Truss, L. 9, 157
- Tunny, G. 142
- Türkiye 5–6, 9, 11, 18, 20, 50
 Ankara terrorist attack 105, 114–15
 Antalya 2015 summit 8, 14, 26, 29,
 35, 73, 79, 90, 95, 100, 103,
 105, 108–10, 114–17, 122,
 132–3, 142, 178, 182, 186,
 188–9, 191
 and climate change/energy
 transitions 95, 105
 domestic impact 132–3, 142, 179
 in G20 subgroups 153, 159, 162,
 174–6, 178–9, 181, *see also*
 MIKTA
 presidency of G20 25–7, 66, 77, 79,
 90, 105, 114, 119, 132–3,
 174, 178
 and security issues 109–11, 114–16,
 124
 and sustainable development 64, 79
- Turnbull, M. 109, 112, 118, 136–7, 179,
 188
- Tusk, D. 111, 115, 117, 191–2
- Ukraine conflict 13–14, 18, 32, 69, 79,
 94, 100–101, 103, 106–7, 113,
 153, 158, 165, 168, 173, 176, 184
- Ulfgard, V. 149
- Ünay, S. 155–6, 181
- United Arab Emirates 166, 181
- United Kingdom 5, 8–9, 11, 15–16,
 20–21, 33, 37–8, 42–3, 51, 54
 Brexit 9, 21, 90, 123, 138, 158
 and climate change/energy
 transitions 86, 99–100
 domestic impact 129, 135–8, 144,
 146
 in G20 subgroups 155–9, 161–2,
 164
 London 2009 summit 14, 21, 26,
 35, 40–43, 46, 52, 61, 82, 86,
 103, 128–9, 136–7, 143–4,
 146, 158, 168, 186–7, 189,
 191
 and security issues 109–10, 115, 138
 and sustainable development 63, 70,
 72, 78
- United Nations 8, 17, 19, 24, 26, 28–30,
 32, 48, 68, 72, 81–2, 97, 99–100,
 106–7, 109–11, 116–17, 129,
 139, 148, 156, 165, 167, 169–70,
 172–4, 176
- Conference on Sustainable
 Development 130
- Development Programme 65
- Framework Convention on Climate
 Change 84–91, 93–5
- General Assembly 66
- Millennium Development Goals 24,
 60–62, 64–5, 67, 175
- Security Council 19, 106–7, 109–10,
 116, 118, 124, 139, 167–9
- Sustainable Development Goals 7,
 24, 60, 66, 68, 79–80, 94, 162
- United States 4–5, 11, 13, 33, 36–7,
 43–4, 47–50, 52–4, 56
 and climate change/energy
 transitions 88, 90–92, 96–101
 domestic impact 127–8, 138–9, 142,
 146–9
 in G20 subgroups 153–4, 156–7,
 159–62, 166, 171, 177,
 179–80
- Pittsburgh 2009 summit 7, 12, 14,
 21, 24, 27, 30, 35, 41–3,
 46–9, 53, 62, 74, 76, 87–8,
 95, 99–100, 104, 119, 129,
 139, 142, 145–7, 156–7, 160,
 167, 186–7, 189, 191
 and security issues 109–13, 116,
 122–4, 138–9, 177
 and sustainable development 63, 67,
 70, 78
- US–China trade war 14, 68, 161

- Washington, DC 2008 summit 1, 11, 14–16, 19, 21–2, 36–41, 43, 45, 50–52, 61, 69, 86, 103, 127–8, 132, 148–9, 157–8, 163, 165, 168–9, 186–7, 189, 191
- Urban 20 26
- Urzúa, M.E.C. 190
- Ushakov, Y. 111, 173
- Uzbekistan 170
- vaccines 68–9, 106
- Van Kerckhoven, S. 30
- Van Rompuy, H. 44, 110, 165, 191
- Vestergaard, J. 11
- Vietnam 123, 134
- Vines, D. 48
- virtual summit *see* Riyadh 2020 summit
- Voluntary Peer Learning Mechanism 67, 175
- von der Leyen, U. 192
- W20 2, 26–7, 132–3
- Wade, R. 11
- Wang, A.X. 40, 171
- Wang, Y. 115
- Warren, B. 77
- Washington, DC 2008 summit 1, 11, 14–16, 19, 21–2, 36–41, 43, 45, 50–52, 61, 69, 86, 103, 127–8, 132, 148–9, 157–8, 163, 165, 168–9, 186–7, 189, 191
- Washington Consensus 64–5, 131, 149
- West Germany 20, 162
- Westerwelle, G. 107–8, 110
- Widodo, J. 175–6, 186, 189–90
- Wihardja, M.M. 175
- Wilkinson, J. 86
- Willard Group *see* G22
- Wilson, J.S. 86
- Wolff, P. 81
- Women 20 *see* W20
- Wood, L.J. 145
- World Bank 18, 28–30, 46–8, 52, 70, 76, 137, 171
- World Economic Forum 123
- World Expo 142
- World Health Organization 69
- World Trade Organization 18, 24, 30, 32, 51–3, 123, 133, 167, 170
Doha Round 23, 51–2, 65
- Wouters, J. 30, 66
- Wurf, H. 85, 90
- Xi, J. 17–18, 100, 108, 113, 117, 129, 137, 140–41, 156, 170, 186, 188
- Yi, W. 188
- Yoon, S.Y. 176, 192
- Yoshida doctrine 46
- Youth 20 26
- Yu, M.-h. 132
- Yudhoyono, S.B. 95, 175–6, 189
- Zapatero, J.L.R. 21
- Zeng, J. 18
- Zhang, Y. 141
- Zhu, G. 115
- Zhu, J. 30, 55, 72
- Zondi, S. 64
- Zuma, J. 71, 111, 171–3, 191

