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Informal Envoys:

German Cold War cultural diplomacy along the Bamboo Curtain

During the Cold War, even student illness could turn into a diplomatic affair. In 1976, the Chinese embassy in Bonn informed the West German authorities that three German exchange students currently studying in the People's Republic of China (PRC) had syphilis. The students, all three of them male, came from very different parts of Germany and had met for the first time in September 1975 on the plane that carried them and the rest of that year's crop of German exchange students to China. Upon arrival they, like all foreign students, had been given a medical check-up and the Chinese authorities had certified them a clean bill of health without conducting specific STD tests. They first heard of the allegation in early June 1976, through the West German embassy in Beijing. Dr Lapper, the embassy official informing them about the matter, seemed convinced that all of them had somehow contracted the illness.

The Federal Republic of Germany had only opened a diplomatic outpost in Mao's China three years earlier. Dr Lapper, a member of the first diplomatic corps sent to Beijing, took the official Chinese claim at face value and was, so the three young men sensed, prepared to believe it. A caveat such as three sick students, rightfully accused or not, could quickly turn into a major problem for the West German presence in the PRC in the volatile political climate of the late Cultural Revolution. The three students ardently protested and agreed to an immediate medical exam at a Chinese hospital, arranged by the embassy, where Kahn and Wassermann tests would be conducted to prove to all parties involved that they were healthy. Angered by the lack of trust of their own embassy and eager to also hear the opinion of a qualified third party, the students went to consult a physician working in the French embassy who examined them and confirmed in writing that all three looked healthy and that none of them showed any outward signs of having syphilis. After the Chinese

medical checks, the PRC Ministry of Education confirmed that the West German authorities would be officially told about the outcome of the medical exams “in the same way” as the original claim had been transmitted. The West German embassy in Beijing now let the matter rest.¹

After the Federal Republic had breached the Bamboo Curtain in 1973, West German students and academics, sent as informal cultural envoys, operated in a tense political environment. Their contacts with Chinese students were closely monitored as was their correspondence: by China’s public security organs if handled by the ordinary post, and by West Germany’s security services if forwarded for them through diplomatic mail. It remained unclear where the accusations against the students had originated, as they were never approached by their Chinese university hosts or had it explained to them by their embassy why the West German authorities had accepted the accusations without any substantiating evidence at hand. However, the reaction of the West German embassy shows that nothing would be allowed to endanger the nascent official diplomatic relationship between Bonn and Beijing as the Federal Republic for the first time had breached the Bamboo Curtain with its PRC presence. Certainly not three allegedly ill exchange students.

While swiftly resolved, this episode showcases only one of many obstacles and the importance of foreign cultural diplomacy for the Bonn government during the Cold War. In the endeavour of rebuilding diplomatic channels with Asian countries after the Second World War, both German governments faced many difficulties. Deprived of their official diplomatic representations in 1945, the emerging Cold War divide structured the first wave of renewed German presence across Asia. The fear of coming second and losing out against the other German government drove both states in their desire to be the only German presence abroad. Diplomatic conflicts surrounding this so-called *Deutschlandpolitik* have attracted intense attention in historical scholarship.² The cultural channels that often preceded the

establishment of renewed official ties to foreign governments have attracted less attention. This is all the more surprising as German governments used foreign cultural diplomacy (*auswärtige Kulturpolitik*) throughout the twentieth century as a substitute for official diplomatic channels. With the isolation of Germany after the end of the First World War, language teaching, cultural contacts, and academic exchanges already served the Weimar government as a way back into the international arena. The *Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst* (DAAD/German Academic Exchange Service), that had grown out of a private initiative between 1922-25, the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* (Alexander von Humboldt Foundation), and the *Deutsche Akademie* (German Academy, re-founded after the war as the Goethe-Institute) established cultural diplomacy as an important component of German foreign policy in the interwar period.³ With the disastrous end of the Second World War, foreign cultural diplomacy once again became a substitute for official foreign policy making. Only this time for two rivalling governments.

Cultural ambassadors sent to Asia to make the Bonn and East Berlin governments' case to foreign audiences have not been given much attention.⁴ Their histories can tell us much about the anxious and often improvised strategies of both German states in the Cold War outside Europe. Research on US public diplomacy seen as Cold War propaganda efforts in the cultural sphere has long dominated scholarship on cultural diplomacy.⁵ In recent years, scholars of international relations have developed a renewed interest in cultural diplomacy as part of their studies in public diplomacy in response to Islamic terrorism.⁶ Since then, scholars have suggested the terms "cultural diplomacy" and "cultural relations" in an effort to structure research. In this framework, cultural diplomacy denotes conscious efforts of governments to exploit informal cultural links for policy making. Cultural relations, on the other hand, describes "ideals-driven" activities of non-state actors.⁷ In contrast, the history of German efforts of reconnecting to Asian countries after 1945 suggests that the boundaries

between state-sponsored activities and private initiatives were often blurred. Both German governments hoped to develop “soft power,” in Joseph Nye’s often cited terminology, very much alongside of economic, military, and foreign policy relations.⁸ In these endeavours, there often existed no clear dividing lines between state and non-state actors and initiatives.⁹

This article traces the travels of languages teachers, exchange students, academics, and diplomats of both German states to Asian countries along the Bamboo Curtain and Asian visitors to divided Germany after 1945. The ideological division of Europe initially left little room for making inroads into European countries allied with the other German state. The situation in Asia, where decolonization fundamentally transformed regional politics, appeared much more fluid to many bureaucrats in Bonn and East Berlin. Both German governments were especially anxious to set up a presence in “divided countries” such as China, Korea, and Vietnam along the Bamboo Curtain. The PRC soon became a major battleground. Yet, it would take almost three decades until the Federal Republic managed to breach the Bamboo Curtain and establish cultural relations to the PRC. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) conversely never managed to break out of the ideological front lines in Asia. Instead, the PRC presented the GDR leadership with an ideological challenge after the Sino-Soviet split. In the eyes of East German bureaucrats, their dependency on the Soviet Union made PRC attacks on Moscow during the Cultural Revolution appear a serious threat for the GDR’s internal stability.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the issue of universal representation of sovereign states captivated United Nations (UN) debates in the 1960s. Once the PRC secured a UN Security Council seat, Beijing’s “one China” policy reflected directly on German division.¹¹ Both German states thus could only move to détente in their competing cultural diplomacy efforts towards the PRC after the separation of the Chinese and German case of national division in UN politics and Mao’s death in 1976.

Underneath the diplomatic battle over *Deutschlandpolitik*, a constant conflict over the cultural sovereignty of Germany raged.¹² Next to attempts of dominating the news coming in and going out of the divided Germany via news agencies, teaching foreigners about Germany, its language, culture, and history, became a central battleground in the cultural Cold War between Bonn and East Berlin.¹³ The command of each other's language was seen as the most basic precondition for the engagement with other countries and cultures. Language teachers and exchange students thus formed a crucial first wave in the cultural diplomacy of both German states entering into foreign relations after 1945. Training foreign students in German and Germans in foreign languages formed a cornerstone in governmental strategies of rallying foreign audiences behind claims to German sovereignty. Over time, both German governments also had to negotiate conflicts brought to East and West German university campuses. Especially Chinese and Korean students repeatedly carried domestic political conflicts into the Federal Republic and GDR on their study abroad visits in the 1960s and 70s. This everyday history of the cultural Cold War shaped the experience of many ordinary people as much as the recurring diplomatic and military crises along the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

Economic interests in many cases drove German desires to re-establish ties to Asian states. Yet, both German governments always had to consider their position towards their opposing government in the cultural and political representation of Germany abroad. In countries such as Burma, which remained open to West German cultural institutions even when its military leadership embarked on its Burmese Way to Socialism in the 1960s, both German states vied for direct influence with the Burmese leadership through cultural envoys. Despite the symbolic capital at stake for bureaucrats at home, as the Burmese and Vietnamese cases illustrate, the everyday realities of East and West Germans sent to Asia often looked quite different. The difficulties in finding suitable candidates for postings in

Asia, frequent problems of communication, and the often-isolated position of many cultural ambassadors provided many of them with unexpected agency. The rebuilding of cultural channels to Asia therefore hinged not only on policies devised in Bonn or East Berlin, but also on circumstance and the ingenuity of Germans sent abroad.¹⁴ This could also go wrong. Sent to advocate the Cold War case of their governments, older stereotypes of race and culture shaped by the colonial era guided many of the early cultural envoys and bureaucrats at home much more than ideology. This would only change when a younger generation of Germans embarked on their cultural missions from the 1970s onwards. After both German states had moved to détente in Ostpolitik negotiations, countries along the Bamboo curtain in the 1980s also became spaces in which cultural envoys could approach their counterparts more freely than in Europe until the Berlin Wall unexpectedly fell in 1989.

Reviving Old Strategies: cultural exchanges and foreign policy

Foreign cultural policy was not a new form of foreign policy after 1945. From its beginnings in the Weimar Republic, Germans developed a different tradition to British cultural diplomacy or French *politique culturelle extérieure*. While French policies were designed to export French values to the world, British cultural diplomacy aimed at informing foreign audiences about Britain's current affairs. The German approach always centred on exchange. From its origins in the interwar period, German cultural diplomacy efforts aimed as much at bringing foreigners to Germany as sending Germans abroad to foster relationships and mutual understanding. The National Socialist regime transformed the Weimar Republic's cultural diplomacy centred on exchanges into a claim to a distinct nationalist European identity. Yet, this fascist project of cultural policies soon ended in failure.¹⁵ After 1945, the central premise of cultural exchange rather than export of German culture returned.¹⁶ American re-education efforts, the opening of *Amerika-Häuser* in West German towns for

example, and US academic exchange schemes in some ways matched this approach after 1945. The slow return of sovereign rights under the control of the Allied powers initially limited independent foreign policy making of both German governments. If the Bonn and East Berlin leaderships wanted to reopened channels beyond their immediate European neighbours, foreign cultural diplomacy promised some success. Academics and artists as well as language teachers and exchange students could arrange travel and accommodation much easier than official governmental envoys. The return to cultural exchanges as a form of German presence abroad had another advantage: sending cultural ambassadors abroad came with relatively low costs attached.

The fast economic revival of the Federal Republic after 1945 allowed for a quick return to foreign cultural diplomacy and exchange schemes. In 1950-51, the West German state re-founded the DAAD and the Goethe-Institute replaced the German Academy. Together with the *Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen* (Institute for Foreign Relations), *Inter Nationes*, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, these institutions rebuilt West German cultural diplomacy at home and abroad. Former diplomats and cultural managers of the Third Reich such as Fritz von Twardowski and Franz Thierfelder played an instrumental role in rebuilding a particular German mix of state-funded, but semi-independent cultural institutions. This institutional plurality in the organisation of West German cultural diplomacy would allow for a multi-layered strategy of reengaging with international audiences.¹⁷ Alongside this reconstruction of cultural institutions, West German businessmen reopened Asian trade routes already in the early 1950s. To underpin these nascent trade ties, calls for intensifying cultural relations to secure long-term access to Asian economies soon emerged. Entering the PRC's market formed a central goal of West German businessmen from the very beginning. Cultural efforts therefore focused on China.¹⁸

Yet, the only immediate road back to a West German presence in Asia was through new Cold War alliances. The British Colonial Office had reclassified holders of “German Federal Passports” as “friendly aliens” in 1952.¹⁹ This change allowed for a West German presence in Hong Kong. When German and Austrian citizens who had not been deported as part of the forced repatriation policies at the end of the Second World War suffered under campaigns against “reactionaries” in the PRC, British officials in Beijing and Hong Kong allowed the German East Asiatic Society to organise another wave of repatriations of Germans.²⁰ The British official in charge remarked, “I should like to be able to help these unfortunates to whom, as an occupation power, I feel we have a certain moral responsibility.” Efforts by East German representatives to instigate harassment of Germans in Beijing, who had been identified as opponents of the socialist Germany, soon triggered further British assistance to West German activities.²¹ Under the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) principle “using the foreign to serve China” (*yang wei Zhong yong*), only a small group of committed communists from the West and socialist states remained in the PRC from the early 1950s onwards.²² The wartime front lines now gave way to new Cold War alliances.

Progress thus was slow at first. The West German *Chinesisch-Deutscher Kulturbund* (Chinese-German Culture League) and the DAAD revived scholarly exchanges with Japan and Taiwan in 1952 and 1955. The official return of West German diplomats to Asia soon followed. The Federal Republic reopened a consulate in Hong Kong as a first step to reengage with the Pacific region, through which official diplomatic relations in the region could be organised. In November 1956, the West German consulate in Hong Kong urged the Bonn government to increase funding for exchanges with China. The DAAD only funded eleven scholarships for the entire “Chinese cultural sector.” The consul suggested that Hong Kong could serve as a central hub to administer cultural exchange in the region. He focused on ethnic Chinese students in particular, who should apply centrally at the Hong Kong

consulate regardless whether they lived in “Formosa,” Hong Kong, Macao, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, US or British territories. This was an ever more pressing issue as the GDR had attracted more than three hundred Chinese students mostly from the PRC who had taken up their places at East German universities by 1956.²³

East German ambitions indeed focussed on the PRC. In 1951, a friendship month brought Mao portraits to East German town squares celebrating the signature of a trade and cultural agreement between the two states. In the following years, leading writers, journalists, orchestras, theatre artists, painters, photographers, sport teams, and other cultural workers went on exchange visits and organised exhibitions in the PRC and the GDR.²⁴ A first Chinese delegation visited the GDR in 1951. This was the beginning of a phase of intense cultural exchanges with the PRC, which was seen as a very important socialist brother state at the time.²⁵ Both governments viewed each other as important partners in building socialism through trade and technological exchange.²⁶ At the Karl-Marx-University Leipzig, the academic assistant Erika Claus organised first delegation visits of members of the economics department of the Chinese State University Beijing (*Staatliche Chinesische Universität Peking*), where the Workers and Peasant Faculty hosted the Chinese guests. A second delegation followed in November 1952. This time, members of the state administration for people’s education (*Volksbildung*) exchanged ideas with their East German colleagues.²⁷ Cultural exchanges and scientific cooperation were meant to pave the way to an increase in future trade and political cooperation.

Exchanges with the Chinese comrades soon expanded to the fields of journalism, the training of interpreters, and sport.²⁸ The National People’s Army (NVA) seconded two to three officers per year to Leipzig for Chinese language training to enhance military cooperation with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).²⁹ This expansion of activities triggered tighter political supervision. The political cleansing of universities from non-party

members who might undermine the “positive political influence” (*positive politische Einflussnahme*) on foreigners became a central concern of senior university leaderships by the late 1950s. Nothing should jeopardise the opportunity to influence international guests, especially not lax party control over personnel at home.³⁰ Academics defecting while abroad also forced the SED leadership to control foreign travel tightly. Soon, only “party travel cadres” received permission to leave the GDR and academics, students, and artists sent on cultural missions abroad had to undergo a strict political vetting process. These restrictions should permanently impede the expansion of GDR cultural diplomacy.

The geographical fault lines of the Cold War had left all major pre-war German foreign academic institutes under the Federal Republic’s control. The Bonn government repossessed the archaeological and cultural institutes in Rome and Cairo.³¹ East German bureaucrats hoped that the privileged access to the PRC could be used to counter this West German advantage. To match the Federal Republic’s control over cultural institutes abroad, the GDR in direct response planned to open an academic institute in Beijing.³² Since 1953, several study trips of archaeologists from the Karl-Marx-University prepared the ground for more ambitious plans.³³ The prolific archaeologist Eduard Erkes, who was instrumental in rebuilding the academic field of sinology in the GDR, used his longstanding contacts to Chinese colleagues and facilitated a quick revival of academic contacts. By 1956, Erkes outlined plans for a permanent academic office in Beijing. With the help of the German Academy of Science, this office should then be turned into a German Scientific Institute in Beijing to rival the West German institutes in Rome and Cairo.³⁴ First visiting professorships were instituted in the late 1950s in preparation of the official cultural treaty to be signed between the GDR and PRC.³⁵

Socialist solidarity first outstripped West German efforts in Asia. East German authorities expanded their position in socialist countries once West German representatives

were driven out as in the case of Beijing. In exchange, student numbers at East German universities rose steadily.³⁶ The GDR used its Beijing embassy effectively to attract Chinese students throughout the 1950s. North Korean and Vietnamese ideological brethren soon joined their Chinese comrades. The GDR leadership thus decided that socialist cooperation needed a firm institutional structure. Yet, the difficulties of rebuilding the East German higher education sector and the efforts of the SED government to cleanse universities from old Nazis and “counterrevolutionary” influences delayed the foundation of a proper academic centre for academic exchange and the training of foreigners.³⁷

In 1956, the central bureaucracy in East Berlin eventually declared that foreign academic exchanges should be centred at the newly founded *Institut für Ausländerstudium* (Institute of Study for Foreigners) at Leipzig. East German academics and students now began to regularly visit the PRC, North Korea, and Vietnam. Those three countries also sent the most students to the GDR.³⁸ Yet, the Federal Republic had already outrun the GDR in total numbers and welcomed 10,000 foreign students from all over the world by 1958. In response, the SED announced in 1958 a target of ten percent of all students at East German universities should be foreigners in the future. This forced the East Berlin government to step up efforts especially in Africa and Asia. The leadership now even pondered a bureaucratic decentralisation of student exchanges, resulting in a lesser grip of the party on exchanges, that would allow for direct exchanges between East German and foreign universities.³⁹ When An Gang, the dean of the Faculty of Journalism in Beijing visited Leipzig, the East German hosts minuted with some jealousy that their Chinese colleagues had “five times as many lecturers for the same amount of students.”⁴⁰ Something clearly needed to change if the SED leadership did not want to fall behind permanently in the competition with the Federal Republic.

Since 1956, foreign students from Asia and Africa dominated at East German faculties as the GDR now also sent lecturers to India, Indonesia, Guinea, Cuba, and Iraq.⁴¹ But the need for almost doubling the staff from 1956 to 1957 at the new central institution in Leipzig already in the first year after opening its doors also caused concerns. The party above all feared that academic staff might lack in ideological conviction. “The institute and party leadership did not in all cases of new appointments have a chance to exert its influence,” a report alerted the central leadership. “In the current situation, it has to be said, it cannot be guaranteed in all cases [of newly appointed personnel] that a positive political influence exists.” In other words, not all new lecturers at Leipzig adhered closely enough to the party line. Some made no effort to prohibit foreign students from listening to Radio Free Europe or traveling regularly to West Berlin.⁴² At the same time, GDR students encountered hostilities of fellow socialist brethren abroad. One East German exchange student to the PRC recalled how a Polish reprimanded him for behaving like a “German guard” when the student made a remark about low class attendance. Nationalist sentiment, legacies of the Second World War, and uprising such as in Hungary in 1956 reflected directly on conflicts within international student communities in the PRC.⁴³

By the late 1950s, SED leaders doubled their efforts of breaking the Bonn government’s isolation policies against the GDR in international affairs. GDR cadres looked fearfully to other Eastern European countries such as Romania where the West Germans seemed to make inroads.⁴⁴ West German foreign policy experts, legal scholars, and jurists had formed an effective bar clause to East German efforts of engaging with the world outside the socialist bloc. The so-called Hallstein Doctrine, named after the State Secretary at the Foreign Office Walter Hallstein, threatened any country that acknowledged the GDR as a sovereign state with the withdrawal of West German economic and political cooperation.⁴⁵ By the late 19650s, West German bureaucrats sensed first signs of cracks in their international campaign

against the GDR triggered by decolonization.⁴⁶ Anxieties over losing influence over the cultural representation of Germany abroad thus plagued bureaucrats within both German governments in the late 1950s.

The GDR regime now moved to a new strategy in international affairs. The SED leadership coupled its rhetoric of international socialist solidarity with a new focus on Third World anti-imperialism.⁴⁷ By 1957, these East German efforts showed first successes with Arab and African states.⁴⁸ The GDR's Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl toured the Middle East and Asia from Cairo to Baghdad and New Delhi to Rangoon. In response, West German politicians demanded a more uniform and centralised response to counter what they perceived as an East German cultural policy offensive.⁴⁹ West German foreign policy experts hoped to take the fight to the GDR in Asia in light of the Federal Republic's seemingly weakening position in Africa where decolonisation transformed African states' perspective on West Germany.⁵⁰

Unnoticed by West German eyes, however, SED attempts of winning over foreign students created frequent conflicts at home. Next to rallying support for the GDR's international recognition, East German officials hoped to persuade students and academics from developing countries of the political superiority of socialism. During the early years of cultural exchange programmes, foreign students often clashed with local East German authorities. Complaints ranged from Indian students protesting against not being offered en suite accommodation in the still war-torn city of Dresden, annoyance over frequent requests by SED political officers to join international appeals for the recognition of GDR sovereignty, and growing political conflicts between students from non-aligned African and Asian countries with their fellow students from socialist states.⁵¹ These problems led to a renewed centralisation of study programmes for foreigners in the GDR.

By 1960, the East Berlin leadership decided to limit the access of foreign students to the universities in Leipzig and Dresden, the Mining Academy Freiberg, the College for Electrical Engineering in Ilmenau, and the College for Economics in Berlin-Karlshorst. These institutions were chosen for their “beneficial conditions” in exerting political influence on foreign students.⁵² The Institute of Study for Foreigners, renamed into Herder-Institute on the Day of the Teacher on 12 June 1961, became the first point of contact for foreign students. The change in name on the annual day, on which the SED celebrated the state’s role in the education of its youth and awarded medals to exemplary teachers, signalled the inclusion of the Herder Institute in this educational mission. The institute was tasked with teaching foreigners enough German language skills to progress to specialised courses.⁵³ With the growing ideological conflicts between the PRC and the Soviet Union, however, the relations to students from the PRC, North Korea, and Albania began to deteriorate and threatened the initial expansion of GDR foreign cultural diplomacy to Asia by the early 1960s just when institutional problems at home seemed resolved.

West German authorities meanwhile relied on old personal and institutional links in rebuilding their Asian presence. The close proximity between the new West German Foreign Office, located at the left Rhine bank in Bonn since 1954, and the headquarters of the catholic Steyler Mission, only a short car ride away on the other river bank in Sankt Augustin, played a central institutional role in the early days of West German cultural exchanges with Asia. The missionaries had been a constant German religious presence in Asia, and in China in particular, since the late nineteenth century.⁵⁴ This close connection between foreign policy and Christian missionaries was revived after the end of the war. The Cold War in Europe quickly turned into an anti-communist Christian mobilisation effort. The trial against the Hungarian cardinal József Mindszenty rallied Catholics across the world behind the Western Cold War cause. Pope Pius XII acted swiftly and declared the excommunication of all

persons involved in Mindszenty's arrest, trial, and imprisonment in February 1949.⁵⁵ The first West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer used this officially sanctioned anti-communist agenda of the Vatican to integrate catholic milieus further into new Cold War alliances. Outside of Europe, the close connections of Christian missionary organisations and the Bonn Foreign Office enabled an early reactivation of old cultural links. The Steyler Mission served as a central financial node in transferring West German governmental funds to Asia in absence of official channels. The mission was instrumental in arranging first contacts via the catholic Sophia University in Tokyo to Japanese and other Asian partners. This connection to the private Jesuit university, located in Tokyo's Chiyoda Ward since its founder Hermann Hofmann had overseen the opening of German literature, philosophy, and commerce departments in 1913, allowed for setting up scholarship schemes with Taiwan in 1956 and Japan in 1958.⁵⁶ Yet, West German progress in Asia remained slower than officials back home had hoped for.

The East German concentration on the PRC did not discourage the West German government from trying to reconnect to Beijing. In 1957, the Foreign Office inquired with the DAAD whether the organisation would consider secretly funding West Germans interested in studying in the PRC. For the government, making inroads behind the Bamboo Curtain promised putting pressure on their East Berlin counterpart. This political agenda coincided with academic interest. The Hamburg sinologist Wolfgang Franke lobbied for Foreign Office support to establish academic exchanges to the PRC as "it seemed of extreme importance to the Federal Republic to educate young academics" who had experienced life in the PRC first hand. Due to political concerns, a proxy-organisation needed to be found to administer the funding for Chinese students in turn coming to the Federal Republic. In May 1957, the *Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Chinesisch-Deutschen Freundschaft e.V., Wuppertal-Barmen* (Association for the Promotion of Chinese-German Friendship e.V.) agreed to award

scholarships funded through the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Ministry for Culture. A representative of the association, Mr Tacke, assured the DAAD that he and his colleagues were perfectly capable to control “communist-infiltrated” Chinese students. The University of Freiburg joined forces with Tacke’s association to provide the academic platform for planned exchanges with the PRC, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.⁵⁷

In the anti-communist atmosphere of the 1950s, the Foreign Office supported Franke’s initiative, but insisted that the DAAD had to ensure that students sent to the PRC had to be ideologically trustworthy (*charakterlich und weltanschaulich gefestigte Persönlichkeiten*). They should not be told that their funding came from governmental sources, instead a proxy organisation needed to be found here as well. When it came to the question of hosting “red-Chinese” students at West German universities, however, the Foreign Office raised concerns. The diplomats feared ideological subversion. French authorities had reported that “students from Red China” studying at French universities “had had a go at racially-related students to influence them ideologically” (*an rassenverwandte Studierende herangemacht um diese in kommunistischem Sinne zu beeinflussen*).⁵⁸ The Foreign Office’s language revealed anti-communist concerns of the era still framed in the racial language of the Third Reich. When West German-Chinese trade negotiations abruptly broke down in the late 1950s, these first attempts to reconnect with the PRC resulted in no more than very limited, sporadic, unofficial exchanges.

These first links to Asian countries accelerated debates on what image of “Germany” the East and West German governments actually wanted to transport abroad. Germany as the “country of poets and thinkers” (*Land der Dichter und Denker*) underpinned by regional folklore shaped West German approaches. Yet, the Asia tour of a Bavarian folklore dance troupe raised concerns over outdated “traditionalist” views of cultural diplomacy’s content by 1960.⁵⁹ Roundtrips of folk groups stood in sharp contrast to the Bonn

government's attempt to present the Federal Republic as a modern country at international fairs. The West German pavilion at the Brussels Fair in 1958 had just earned much international acclaim by architects for its modernist design.⁶⁰ The GDR government in turn successfully attracted Asian visitors to the annual Leipzig Fair, which was meant to present to the world a modern industrial image of East Germany.⁶¹ In the midst of these East and West German efforts, the clashes between the Allies and both German states during the Second Berlin Crisis from 1958 onwards, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962 hardened Cold War front lines in Europe and paused attempts of both German governments to breach the ideological divide in Asia.

Establishing German Presence in Asia

In the early years of cultural diplomacy, Germans sent abroad also suddenly encountered unexpected freedoms. Vietnam had turned into a country of interest for the GDR after the end of the Indochina War in 1954. Since 1960, GDR lecturers sent to Hanoi were paid through (DIA)INVEST EXPORT. Economic interests played an important part in the attempt to establish closer contacts to Vietnam.⁶² The first two German language teachers sent to Hanoi in 1960 taught German language and grammar to groups of up to one hundred students with the help of Vietnamese auxiliary teachers. Once their stint in Hanoi came to an end, one of the lecturers hoped to take up a post in Beijing. Personnel was still in short supply. Himself being a natural scientist, and thus not necessarily qualified to teach German language, he had already expressed an interest in moving to an assignment in the PRC when he passed through the city on his way to Vietnam.⁶³ Language teachers were often moved on from country to country in these years. The shortage of qualified personnel sometimes allowed East Germans like him to extend their absence from the GDR once they had been appointed to an assignment abroad.

The offer to take up a post in the PRC had been welcome. The current East German lecturers in Beijing had already inquired about their successors several times as they wanted to go home. From 1959 to 1961, four East Germans were stationed in Beijing as cultural workers. They had to navigate the uneasy atmosphere of the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In January 1961, the academic coordinator in Leipzig suggested that the group should be assigned an official head of delegation. A member of the GDR lecturer team, who had served as a senior member of the institute and party secretary in Leipzig, should speak on behalf of the whole delegation to avoid mixed political messages.⁶⁴ Stricter leadership seemed also necessary as one member of the East German delegation had secretly agreed to give the Polish ambassador language lessons for some cash on the side. Such unauthorised work was strictly forbidden.

East German plans to make the PRC the centre of its Asian presence had been repeatedly called into question long before the escalation of tensions between the CCP and the Soviet leadership around 1960.⁶⁵ After the uprising of 1953, Walter Ulbricht feared the CCP's Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1956 might encourage dissident voices in the GDR.⁶⁶ The delegation of the Herder-Institute nonetheless remained in Beijing and continued to gift equipment to the language department at Beijing University.⁶⁷ Yet, relations with their Chinese hosts turned sour. At the five-year celebration of the friendship treaty with the PRC Ministry for People's Education, the minister for people's education refused to commit to the reappointment of GDR lecturers. The East German delegation reminded the minister of his student days in Germany in the 1930s and his recent visit in 1958, but to no avail. The CCP turned into an uneasy partner and Mao and his party were soon fought as "revisionists" by the GDR following the Soviet Union's lead. With the escalation of the military conflict in Vietnam to open war in the 1960s, the country became the new special focus of East German cultural work in Asia.⁶⁸ During the Vietnam War, the contingent of Vietnamese students

steadily rose and soon outstripped all other foreign student groups at East German universities. The North Vietnamese contingent eventually had to be capped at 260 students per year to allow for the increased demand from African countries.⁶⁹ The Sino-Soviet split thus rechannelled East German cultural diplomacy efforts in crucial ways.

Asian states soon discovered that the two German governments could be played against each other. The clashes over the West German non-recognition policy against the GDR had come to a head in 1957, when the Bonn government renounced relations with Yugoslavia after Marshal Tito recognised the GDR's sovereignty.⁷⁰ When the Burmese regime decided it needed German language training, the German-German conflict became leverage to extract funding for this endeavour from German sources. The two German states clashed in 1963, when the Burmese government announced plans to open an Institute for Modern Languages in Rangoon. The institute should serve as a central language training centre for students, teachers, trades- and businessmen, and government officials. The new centralized structure should ensure tighter Burmese control over foreign cultural activities. The DAAD even feared the regime planned a crackdown on any foreign activities outside the newly founded institute as the Burmese Foreign Office pressured foreign governments into indirectly funding this new institution by sending qualified teachers.

The Burmese Foreign Office invited both German governments to make proposals of how they planned to retain Burma's official status of neutrality. Unofficially, the Burmese communicated that the two first positions for German studies would not be divided between the GDR and the Federal Republic. They would either invite two cultural representatives from West or East Germany. The DAAD immediately made a substantial offer to outbid the East German language institute in Leipzig. "If the SBZ should succeed, [...] this would be a severe political backlash," a West German embassy official urged in a letter to the Foreign Office in Bonn. Whoever won Burmese first approval for their cultural programme would

dominate German cultural activity in Burma in the future. A success would also secure the already existing Goethe-Institute in Rangoon.⁷¹

Shifts in international politics made such otherwise insignificant developments into diplomatic problems. Five years later, in 1968, the Burmese authorities put renewed pressure on the West Germans who had successfully outbid the GDR in 1963. The DAAD lecturer had taken on the German language teaching of the wife of the military leader and head of state Ne Win. As he came to the end of his stint in Burma, a replacement needed to be found and sent immediately. Otherwise, the GDR might take over West Germany's privileged position. Even worse, the local authorities had already approached the East Germans. The Herder-Institute had a suitable candidate in place in case the DAAD would not act swiftly enough. On 16 August, the embassy complained after not having heard back from the DAAD for several days. In the eyes of the embassy, this tardiness jeopardised direct West German channels to the ruling family and might erode the West German privileged position against the GDR over time.⁷² By the late 1960s, the SED had begun a large-scale international campaign for GDR self-determination and independent East German sovereignty. In bilateral relations and at the UN, SED diplomats appealed to developing countries such as Burma in a language of self-determination shaped by decolonisation to help break the GDR's diplomatic isolation through UN recognition. This strategy threatened to circumvent the West German foreign policy of isolating the GDR internationally.⁷³ The embassy in Rangoon urged the DAAD in this context to act more swiftly in providing a replacement.

This sudden urgency of comparatively minor incidents showcased how important cultural representatives were in the perception of German bureaucrats in maintaining influence in Asian countries. West German ministries feared to be blindsided by the GDR. In 1966, the new Foreign Minister Willy Brandt had declared cultural policy the "third pillar" of West German foreign policy.⁷⁴ It was in the same year that the GDR regime had stepped up

its foreign policy attacks. The Council of Ministers issued a decree on 8 September 1966 that demanded the streamlining of German language teaching for foreigners as a cornerstone of deepening cultural and economic ties with foreign countries.⁷⁵ This renewed effort in foreign cultural policy was meant to prepare international audiences for the release and public debate of a new GDR constitution. With the proclamation of the new constitution in 1968, the SED declared the GDR a sovereign socialist country with no special ties to the Federal Republic. Given this seismic shift in severing German-German constitutional ties, the GDR constitution attracted much international attention. In December 1968, the West German embassy in Rangoon urgently requested a copy. The Burmese regime, itself embarking on its Burmese Way to Socialism, had discovered the GDR constitution as a potential blue print for its own legal reform efforts. The West German diplomats feared they might be confronted with questions about GDR legal developments. To effectively rebut East German arguments, they now thought they had to study the GDR constitution in detail.⁷⁶ West German cultural diplomacy was now forced to engage with GDR foreign policy and domestic politics, something early Cold War West German international cultural efforts had refused to do.

Yet, German-German competition remained not the only battlefield. Shifts in domestic politics and West German debates on university reform and democratic representation of students impacted South Korean-West German cooperation in higher education. The push towards a liberalisation of domestic politics in the Federal Republic, that triggered a debate on equal representation of students and academics at universities in the higher education sector, seemed less and less attractive to the South Korean regime by the late 1960s. Over time, the West German embassy saw itself in direct competition with the US in vying for influence after years of promising cooperation. Since 1962, a German department at the Sogang College had been established with West German help.⁷⁷ The Wisconsin Province of the Society of Jesus had founded Sogang College (today's Sogang

University) in 1960. It followed the Jesuit model of education. Sister institutions of Sogang included Sophia University in Tokyo, which had served as an important contact for the DAAD in establishing funding channels to Asia through the Steyler Mission. As part of the announced educational reforms of the South Korean government, the West German Foreign Office hoped to capitalise on the fact that the German Jesuit Pater Geppert had helped founding Sogang College. The embassy official, a Mr Lehr, reported to Bonn that the college leadership planned to transform the institution into a full university. Yet, the DAAD had been reassured that the college would retain its Christian roots. The expansion to a full university nonetheless came with an official change in identity from a missionary to a Korean institution. As an inherently catholic institute, however, the college would not tolerate any atheist or communist theories and thus fit the anti-communist bill of West German foreign policy. The DAAD was asked to continue in supplying literature on teaching technical and business German next to stern anti-communist readings.⁷⁸ The West German cultural links to South Korea seemed on a good way to flourish in the future.

This positive outlook soon changed. The West German government primarily envisaged its ties to South Korea as an economic and trade relationship with a focus on a guest worker programme. When more and more miners and nurses applied for permanent residency in the Federal Republic, the government re-evaluated the cultural links with South Korea. In July 1966, the DAAD received a warning that of 4,000 Korean miners, who had spent time in the Ruhr area for training, an estimated 1,000 remained in the Federal Republic. Next to these West German concerns about unwanted immigration, the coup under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee now showed its effects on West German-South Korean cultural relations. Park Chung-hee first controlled South Korea as the head of a military junta from 1961 and then as president from 1963 until his assassination in 1979. By the mid-1960s, the selection procedures for student exchanges became problematic: South Korean university

leaderships seemed deeply entangled in corruption and bi-national selection committees regularly ended up selecting not the most able candidates, but favourites of the Korean committee members. Mrs Schmitz, the local West German official in charge, suggested that the DAAD should move to a direct offer scheme for scholarships at the University of Seoul to avoid that the university president and his friends could immediately “snatch up all of them.”⁷⁹ This misuse of scholarships sparked continued conflict over the question which side would exercise control over the selection of candidates. Censorship and a ban on the import of German literature, which was now deemed politically dangerous for the South Korean regime, exacerbated these conflicts over time. Kidnappings of South Korean students and academics working at the universities Heidelberg, Bonn, Frankfurt, Munich, and West Berlin orchestrated by the South Korean secret service in 1967 further worsened political relations between Bonn and Seoul and drove student protesters to the streets across the Federal Republic.⁸⁰

By 1971, the South Korean government openly threatened West German influence at home. The South Korean military leadership planned to use the economic boom to establish an internationally competitive higher education sector. In October, the government hosted representatives from Europe (Universities Sussex and Bochum), the US (Universities of Michigan, Washington, and Yale), and the Middle East and Asia (Hebrew University Jerusalem, Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, National University and University of Malaysia, Hiroshima University, University of Tokyo, Fu Jen Catholic University Taipei, University of Singapore, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong). At the large gathering in Seoul, the future development of the South Korean university sector was at stake. The South Korean hosts acknowledged the importance of the Humboldtian university model for the Pacific region in their opening remarks. In recent years, however, social and political developments within the Federal Republic had cast doubts on the continued endorsement of

the German university model. The South Korean hosts referred to calls for fundamental reforms and democratic representation of students and staff that had shaped conflict-ridden debates on university reform in the Federal Republic since the mid-1960s.

US representatives pitched their model of private universities against the German model of the public state university to expand their cultural hold in South Korea. They cautioned their South Korean hosts against the rising tide of demands for social and cultural change they had faced at home since the mid-1960s. The Americans urged the Koreans not to inflict an “unnecessary” democratisation onto their universities, which they argued was “foreign” to the idea of the university in principle. West German “overemphasised tendencies of democratisation,” unnecessarily exacerbated by recent legislation passed by the West German parliament, set an unwelcome new standard and did nothing else than bleeding university budgets in favour of unnecessary employee and student representation. A new generation of West German cultural ambassadors had indeed begun to include left-wing artists and cultural products into their portrayal of a progressive West German society in Asia.⁸¹ The Asian representatives agreed with these US voices that more democratic rights at universities would only open the door for communist subversion.⁸² In the eyes of South Korean representatives, universities had turned into a seedbed for communist subversion. They saw this proven by recent waves of radical student unrest in Western Europe and North America around 1968. Against this wave of left-wing activism and calls for student representation, the Yale representative pointed out, Koreans should perceive of university administration as “benign despotism.”⁸³ Professor Faillard, who attended the Seoul meeting as representative of Bochum University, concluded that the Foreign Office and the DAAD had to renew their cultural diplomacy efforts towards South Korea.

US representatives clearly made inroads into Korean educational affairs under the new South Korean leadership.⁸⁴ In response, the Federal Republic made Korea a focus of its

operations (*Schwerpunktland*) in connection with the new Far East Policies developed in context of Ostpolitik that was free from the shackles of the non-recognition policy towards the GDR. By 1972, the two German states had moved to détente in their diplomatic relations with each other.⁸⁵ Conflicts over the dominance over exchange programmes and West German cultural activities in South Korea continued. Despite efforts to avoid what DAAD internal reports called a “donor-country dictatorship” (*Geberland-Diktatur*), West German officials got annoyed with corruption. They saw their own scholarship selection standards and exchange criteria seriously endangered and called for an exclusion of South Koreans from selection committees. The work of other West German scholarship foundations had come almost to a standstill because of corruption. The two churches now regained importance in their support for colleges in Pusan and Suwon.⁸⁶ In 1973, West German embassy officials and representatives of the Goethe-Institute and DAAD complained that South Korea was increasingly side-lined by the Bonn government despite the pledge to make it a focal point only a year earlier. This happened despite a continued interest among South Korean society in German culture.⁸⁷

Ostpolitik had put a renewed West German focus on the PRC and Japan.⁸⁸ This shift in foreign affairs resulted in the opening of a permanent DAAD regional office in Tokyo in 1978, which took over much of the organisational duties for cultural diplomacy for the Pacific region from the Hong Kong consulate. Embassy officials in South Korea soon became so desperate that they demanded that all state-funded West German travellers to Japan should be forced to include a mandatory stopover in South Korea into their itineraries. In the eyes of the embassy, only such compulsory detours could reinvigorate West German academic and cultural engagement with South Korea.⁸⁹ Two years after the gathering of international university representatives, the DAAD reported that South Koreans grew to be “resistant to Western-decadent and Eastern-socialist cultural influences” alike (*westlich-*

“dekadenter” und östlich-sozialistischer kultureller Strömungen). While the DAAD still saw certain “utilitarian motives” behind South Korean interest in the Federal Republic, the most important fact remained that the South Koreans kept holding the line against the communist North despite the cooling in relations.⁹⁰

Other Asian partners had also grown wary of West German democratisation. While the GDR made inroads into Vietnam with technical assistance initiatives since the early 1970s, West German representatives were sent out of the country shortly before South Vietnam’s defeat.⁹¹ The West German embassy in Saigon reported on 20 September 1973 that the Federal Republic together with Japan, Italy, and Belgium had been put on a black list by the Vietnamese government. When the embassy inquired with the Ministry of Education, the official answer stated that the Vietnamese government hoped for more variety in the choices of Vietnamese experts and students willing to go abroad. As many Vietnamese were already residing in Belgium and West Germany, the government hoped to encourage alternative choices. In unofficial background conversations, Vietnamese officials gave radical left-wing tendencies in the banned countries as the reason for the ban. On his visit to Bonn on 10 April 1973, the South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Thieu had witnessed radical left-wing protests first hand. Amidst protests of an estimated 4,000 anti-Vietnam War activists, 40 protesters stormed the Bonn city hall, locked in civil servants in their offices, vandalised offices and threw chairs and tables out of windows, while spraying the slogan “Thieu murderer, Brandt accomplice” on the walls of the building.⁹² West German Maoist protesters and anti-imperialist groups had left a lasting impression with the South Vietnamese president. Fixed images of the two German states along Cold War lines had become fluid among Asian audiences from the late 1960s onwards.

The Ideological Challenge of the “Spiritual Atomic Bomb”

The Sino-Soviet split transformed Cold War politics along the Bamboo Curtain. The PRC remained a source of constant worry for German bureaucrats in charge of cultural foreign diplomacy during the Cold War. The leadership in Beijing tried to retain good economic and trade relations with the Federal Republic despite its ideological alliance with the GDR in the 1950s.⁹³ After the Sino-Soviet split, Mao's aspirations of claiming the revolutionary mantle for the CCP in opposition to both the US and the Soviet Union turned the PRC into a constant problem for German diplomats and bureaucrats at home and abroad.⁹⁴ East German members of Radio Beijing and East German embassy staff clashed repeatedly with their Chinese hosts over policy questions since the early 1960s. The GDR government had begun to restrict the import of CCP publications through the Xinhua Bookstore since 1960 as East Germans listened in great numbers to Radio Beijing. After broadcasting was launched, 150 out of 191 listeners letters reaching Radio Beijing came from East Germany already in 1960.⁹⁵ In 1963, internal reports reached the GDR leadership, which gave cause for even graver concern.

While the inner SED leadership circle still tried to figure out whether only Mao himself or the whole CCP leadership presented a threat, "old SED party members" were recorded saying that "the Chinese are at least real men, they don't let themselves be pushed around by Moscow." While Walter Ulbricht still had not achieved a peace treaty and secured the socialist revolution in the GDR, the CCP was seen as truly independent from Moscow. Party members claimed that China had a population three-times larger than the Soviet Union. Why should such a huge country be listening to orders from Moscow? In the SED's internal reports, old National Socialist language crept back into recorded voices from within the party. China was seen as a "*Volk* without space" (*Volk ohne Raum*) and its aggressive foreign policy thus justified. The SED leadership consequently ordered that the CCP delegate Wu Xiuquan's speech on the SED's VI. Party Congress in 1963 was shouted down by SED members.⁹⁶ CCP mouthpieces such as *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) or *Beijing Zhoubao* (Beijing Review)

were now censored in the GDR.⁹⁷ All in all, the divisive new policies emanating from Beijing had the potential to unsettle domestic politics in the eyes of the SED leadership.⁹⁸

By 1966, the SED had reigned in party members. In response to the official proclamation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, concerned voices from within the party now warned of the “yellow peril,” compared the PRC to the Nazi regime, and questioned whether Maoist China was still a socialist country.⁹⁹ The PRC had become an official nuclear power in the meantime. Mao had rocked global publics with his reported agnostic stance on nuclear warfare. The embassy in East Berlin was put under constant secret service surveillance and the SED propaganda machinery stepped up its efforts against the “revisionists” in Beijing. In 1967, members of the security service attacked the Chinese embassy in East Berlin to intimidate the embassy personnel.¹⁰⁰ This action sent a clear message to the embassy staff that the Chinese were not welcome in East Berlin. The Cultural Revolution presented the SED with a fundamental ideological threat that had already been foreshadowed since the Sino-Soviet split.¹⁰¹

At the same time, the SED tried to use clandestine contacts to the radical left in the Federal Republic to discredit Maoism. Yet, in a meeting of the SED’s West Commission, the assembled party cadres had to conclude that it remained difficult to “clarify the China problem with left-wing forces.”¹⁰² The SED indeed lost influence in West German left-wing circles in the late 1960s.¹⁰³ With the turn of radical left-wingers to Third World revolutionary movements and their ideology, the Cultural Revolution and Mao as a new revolutionary icon had a rapid career within West German radical subcultures.¹⁰⁴ Mao’s voice as a revolutionary leader soon after framed left-wing militancy when small circles of student protesters tipped into left-wing terrorism.¹⁰⁵ The SED feared that this radicalism could spill over into the GDR from West Germany. For foreigners in the PRC and abroad, fervent supporters of Cultural Revolution mobilisation became a threat as radicalised Chinese attacked “revisionist”

opponents in unpredictable ways.¹⁰⁶ It was precisely this newly invigorated “revolutionary radicalism,” however, that attracted many in East and West Germany to the Maoist cause.

Lin Biao’s endorsement of Mao Zedong Thought as the “spiritual atomic bomb” of the twentieth century and the international distribution of Mao’s quotations through the Little Red Book transformed the PRC’s cultural relations with the world.¹⁰⁷ Mao’s intention to stylise the PRC as the leader of Third World revolution against the “social imperialist” socialist bloc and capitalist countries lent enormous prominence to Maoist iconography and ideology in student protests across Europe.¹⁰⁸ The transformation of the diplomatic relationship between the Federal Republic and the GDR in Ostpolitik negotiations, the appeal of Maoism for radical left-wing militant groups, and the PRC’s global aspirations as an ideological leader shaped uneasy partnerships between German institutions and the PRC during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁰⁹ The Maoist challenge to the global Cold War balance of power upset domestic politics within the two German states.¹¹⁰ Soon, it was no longer clear whether both German governments only had to address criticism and dissident voices at home or whether they had to confront the Beijing government’s radicalism directly.

The Beijing government made active use of the uncertainties that came with the reconfiguration of bilateral relations between the two German states during Ostpolitik. In diplomatic exchanges with the Bonn and East Berlin government, the CCP pursued an ambivalent policy. With border conflicts between the PRC and Soviet Union escalating into military clashes in the late 1960s, the weakening of the Soviet leadership governed CCP foreign policy. Interventions into the ongoing Ostpolitik negotiations thus favoured at times West German positions when cautioning the GDR against moving away from the “one Germany” paradigm.¹¹¹ At the same time, the CCP opened channels to Maoist groups within the West German student movement. Soon, the ideological fervour of radical student groups for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution underway in the PRC alerted West German

politicians and security services. Three main cadre parties, the KPD/ML, the KPD, and the KBW rivalled for being officially credited as a brother party by the CCP.¹¹² This went not unnoticed by the West German security services. They watched closely how the CCP tried to force rivaling parties to unite to strengthen their national significance. Yet, personal animosities and the struggles for the correct party line within the CCP itself between the circle around Hua Guofeng and the Gang of Four at the end of the Cultural Revolution prevented this.¹¹³ These direct links between the CCP and West German Maoists were only made public when a KPD party delegation officially travelled to Beijing from 8-30 November 1976.¹¹⁴ Despite this political elevation, Mao's death a month earlier spelled a quick demise of the KPD and other West German Maoist groups in the following years.

In the eyes of the GDR security services, Maoism posed a potential threat to internal political stability within the GDR. Endorsing Mao as a revolutionary leader turned into a dissident argument to undermine the SED's leadership. There were already pressing problems at home. The remaining Chinese students at East German universities tried to carry the teachings of the Cultural Revolution into the GDR. Chinese students of German literature at the Karl-Marx-University in Leipzig for example demanded the abandoning of the academic curriculum and an exclusive focus on German colloquial languages. They also requested to be sent to the countryside to help the peasants bringing in the harvest. When these requests were denied, Chinese students started "passive resistance." They stopped studying for classes while trying to rally other foreign students for the Maoist cause. The Chinese student cohorts introduced Red Guard routines to student life by wearing Mao badges, studying the Little Red Book, and reciting Mao's quotations in public university spaces such as their student quarters in Nürnberger Strasse and Fockestrasse. The East German university authorities soon came to believe "that all Chinese students are fanatic disciples of the Mao cult."¹¹⁵

From autumn 1966 onwards, the number of Chinese students sharply decreased. The responsible section head at Leipzig reported that the Chinese students so far had had little impact on their fellow students from Asia and Africa “except the Vietnamese students.”¹¹⁶ Yet, the East Germans worried about African students and their growing interest in Maoist ideology.¹¹⁷ So far, no propaganda material sent from Beijing’s Foreign Language Press had been detected.¹¹⁸ The mail surveillance at the university had merely confiscated an issue of *China Pictorial* sent to a student from Latin America. The university was quite relieved when the Chinese students asked for permission to return to the PRC to participate in the Cultural Revolution first-hand. Officially, the Prorektor Dr Porz declared the university’s irritation over the decision that students would like to leave in the middle of the semester.¹¹⁹ Yet, the departure of the disruptive group of students certainly was no unwelcome development as they appeared to be acting under direct CCP orders to disrupt student life. After this crackdown on Chinese students, the CCP would move to mobilise West German KPD/ML to form a “Section GDR” in 1975 to take the fight against the “Honecker clique” and “Soviet social imperialism” into the GDR.¹²⁰ The SED had kept a watchful eye on these groups and traced financial support emanating from Beijing to West German Maoists. Only Deng Xiaoping’s turn to reform and opening policies would end this CCP agenda. The SED was relieved when such Chinese funding finally dried up in the late 1970s.¹²¹

In response to the upheaval caused by the Cultural Revolution, the SED decided to form a Committee for Foreign Student Matters in 1967. Local Commissions for Foreign Students brought together academics, party officials, and Free German Youth (FdJ) members to allow for a tighter supervision of foreign students. Ultimately, the SED hoped this streamlining in the administration of foreign student matters would also allow more ideological influence among foreign students.¹²² In February 1967, another group of eight Chinese students were stripped of their scholarships.¹²³ Academic institutions should now

also help the government to evaluate the nature of the ideological threat. In East Berlin, the Academy for Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED under guidance of the sinologist Professor Helmut Peters coordinated work with party organs. A regular colloquium on the development of the CCP's ideology was set up at the East Asia Institute in Leipzig. Yet, the difficulties in obtaining information about the Cultural Revolution meant that East German academics reverted to a discussion of official ideological statements much like their colleagues in many other countries.¹²⁴ While Peters' group with its close ties to Soviet academic institutions would remain critical towards the PRC for a long time, the deputy head of the Section International Relations Bruno Mahlow, also a sinologist and member of the GDR's diplomatic corps in the PRC in the 1960s, already cautiously began to advocate a renewed rapprochement with the CCP in the 1970s. Yet, the SED leadership remained sceptical until renewed trade interests and irritations over Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika triggered a GDR-PRC rapprochement in the 1980s.¹²⁵

Cultural Diplomacy Across Cold War Front Lines

Ostpolitik fundamentally reshaped diplomatic relations between the two German states and the PRC. In 1971, the PRC succeeded in driving Republic of China (ROC) out of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and General Assembly. The Bonn government conversely had to concede to the international recognition of the GDR.¹²⁶ The Federal Republic and the PRC met in their desire to retain "two states in one nation" and "one China" paradigms in international relations which helped a swift establishment of diplomatic relations. Economic and trade interests now superseded Cold War politics.¹²⁷ In 1973, the Federal Republic breached Cold War lines in Asia officially when the West German embassy in Beijing opened its doors. While the GDR had been politically marginalised in the PRC since the Sino-Soviet split despite retaining an embassy in Beijing, the Federal Republic hoped to capitalise on the

ideological differences between the CCP and SED. On 7 August 1973, the PRC government had unexpectedly quickly called on the newly-opened West German embassy in Beijing to organise a student exchange starting with ten scholarships. The DAAD hastily pulled current scholarship holders out of Taiwan and Singapore to fill places in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. To facilitate this cultural exchange and invite future expansion in trade relations, West Germany now rescinded all official ties to Taiwan.¹²⁸

The fundamental changes in the conflict over German cultural sovereignty triggered by Ostpolitik came at a difficult time for GDR cultural work. In 1965, the Herder-Institute had been restructured and taken over the department of German as a Foreign Language. In December 1969, conflicts over the central institute for language teaching for foreigners escalated. In June 1969, the Council of Ministers had demanded more authority for the institute. In August, plans for the transition of the Working Group Comparative Pedagogy directly tasked with several research plans by the Ministry of People's Education to the Herder-Institute were announced.¹²⁹ The director of the institute, Professor Rößler, had repeatedly complained about insufficient resources, inadequate facilities, and pest-ridden student housing. In his eyes, it was “unfathomable to house and educate foreigners under the current conditions by the mid-1970s if we don't want to risk serious political disturbances and actions directed against us.”¹³⁰ He predicted that foreign student would grow disillusioned with the “first German socialist state.” This would inevitably taint the GDR's image in their home countries and have a “negative propagandistic effect” (*negative auslandsinformativische Wirkung*).

The institute still was in no position to implement the SED leadership's expectations specified in the Council of Ministers' decree from 8 September 1966. Even worse, the GDR was in danger of losing “the scientific superiority in parts of the discipline ‘German as a Foreign Language’”. The Second International Meeting of German Language

Teachers had drawn eight hundred teachers from thirty-one countries to the GDR in 1969. But if the dilapidated infrastructure in Leipzig was not immediately improved, foreigners might stop coming to East Germany. Already now, Rößler warned, foreigners ended up taking courses in the Federal Republic instead coming to the GDR against the initial intention of their home institutions and governments as the Herder-Institute lacked the capacity to meet the demand. The GDR lost a lot of income in fees that could be charged for such specialist courses.¹³¹ These institutional difficulties resulted in a short, but intense conflict between the Herder-Institute, the Karl-Marx-University, and the central government in East Berlin about how to best “curtail West German influence” and organise language teaching as an “integral part of the battle between capitalism and socialism.”¹³²

The Federal Republic now departed from early Cold War alliances in Asia. National division remained a guiding factor for PRC officials in their engagement with the two German states. Until 1972, the German Press Agency (dpa) correspondent Hans-Joachim Bargeman fulfilled diplomatic functions for the Bonn government.¹³³ When a first PRC delegation visited the DAAD on 30 July 1973 in Bonn, the new deputy ambassador Wang Shu inquired whether academic institutions would maintain contacts to Taiwan. Wang stressed that in contrast to Korea, Vietnam, and Germany, which had been divided as result of the Second World War, there would only be one China. The PRC had notified the French and British authorities, and would now also do so in case of the Federal Republic, that the PRC could not engage in any academic exchanges with organisations that had any contacts to Taiwan. This expressly included the DAAD.¹³⁴

On 5 October, the CCP rescinded the agreement for exchanges stating that the PRC could not tolerate that the DAAD retained links to the “Taiwan Clique.” The first three West German students travelling from Bonn to Beijing had been sent officially by the Foreign Office as West German bureaucrats hoped the DAAD could retain its exchange programmes

with Taiwan. This arrangement seemed possible as West Germany had never established official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. After the CCP's threat, the DAAD officially transferred back all its Taiwan operations to the Steyler Mission. This met PRC demands of cutting official ties to the ROC.¹³⁵ Scholarship holders in Taiwan were asked to correspond no longer with the DAAD directly, but received the private mailing address of a DAAD official as point of contact.¹³⁶ By 1980, the organisation of the Taiwan exchange raised eyebrows by a younger generation of West German bureaucrats. A missionary society acting as an exchange organisation in the higher education sector seemed prone to “create an image that differs from the intended purpose” of the programme.¹³⁷

Since 1968, the FRG had resisted renewed Taiwanese attempts to turn cultural relations into semi-official diplomatic relations on a consulate level. With the PRC rising to ever-more international influence, the Foreign Office insisted that all contacts had to be conducted via missionary channels.¹³⁸ Taiwanese representatives of the ROC information service at Bad Godesberg had repeatedly tried to be recognised as Chinese officials.¹³⁹ West German officials stationed in Taipei meanwhile tried to turn the diminished importance of Taiwan into an asset. Given the new international focus on the PRC, they argued, the Federal Republic could easily become the second most important Taiwanese partner behind the US as France, the UK, and Japan now concentrated on Beijing.¹⁴⁰ Yet, their calls went unheard. To outrun the GDR's presence in the PRC, the DAAD entered into an exchange framework, which did not meet its academic standards. West German students were first taught at the language centre of Beijing University and then went on to a Cultural Revolution-inspired education of “learning with an open door.” This meant light field or factory work along university studies; a type of education that was only discontinued in 1978.

The Bonn government firmly reversed course in the 1970s. In the Asian theatre of the Cold War, economic interests and opportunities for trade with the mainland Chinese

market overtook ideological concerns. This new relationship should not be upset by problems at home. The DAAD tried its utmost to limit contact between PRC and Taiwanese students during their time in West Germany. This was extremely difficult as all Chinese students arrived first at the language centre of the University of Heidelberg, the only institution providing a language training centre for German as a foreign language at the time. Tutors had to battle PRC students' demands to translate only from the Beijing Review to learn German. Eventually, the university had to accommodate for visits to Mannesmann steel works at Mannheim to meet the demand of PRC education models of the mid-1970s. PRC students sought contact with West German workers to teach them about the blessings of Maoism. Only by 1977, Bochum University offered a similar programme which eased some of the tensions between the PRC exchange students and the DAAD.¹⁴¹ The shift from the conservative small university town of Heidelberg to the heartland of West German industry and workers culture helped to better accommodate the Chinese students' expectations. This tense situation only eased after the official announcement of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening policies in 1978. Now, first West German professors were invited to teach in the PRC and the Beijing government constantly sent students in great numbers to train them for the economic shifts envisaged in Deng's reform policies.¹⁴²

From Competition to Coexistence

The battle over the representation of German cultural sovereignty entered a new phase after both German states had joined UN in 1973. For East and West German industry, the acceptance of GDR statehood allowed to refocus attention away from political and cultural concerns over the representation of "Germany" in Asia to economic interests.¹⁴³ This coincided with a shift in international debates to an emphasis on economic development.¹⁴⁴ However, political pressures on both German governments still remained. In 1979, the Bonn

government recognised the Khmer Rouge regime in the UN for geostrategic reasons and to retain its Asian presence over the GDR.¹⁴⁵ By 1980, cultural diplomacy had created a strong enough West German foothold in the PRC, South Korea, and Japan. This encouraged increased investments of West German companies. Foreign cultural diplomacy, as Martin Albers has argued, had helped pave the way for such trade and economic initiatives.¹⁴⁶ The state government of Baden-Württemberg under Lothar Späth made the first bid and offered a total of 190,000 DM for university equipment financed through the employers' federation.¹⁴⁷ The state government of Baden-Württemberg also helped to expand cooperation into new Chinese regions and academic subjects.¹⁴⁸ This initiative went hand-in-hand with attempts by conservative-governed West German state governments to establish direct trade relations to the PRC.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, the Asian hubs of German cultural diplomacy shifted. In 1978, the West German government opened a permanent DAAD office in Tokyo. In turn, the GDR remained confined in its cultural diplomacy efforts. East German authorities kept sending experts to North Korea and Vietnam, but could never establish a significant presence outside socialist states in Asia.

The PRC remained exceptional terrain. The CCP continued in its close monitoring of foreign guests to present the PRC along the party line. Julia Lovell has pointed to the CCP's elaborate system of cultural propaganda at home throughout the Maoist period.¹⁵⁰ When a group of West German sinologists went on a visit to the PRC in 1977, this system provided them with a carefully choreographed picture of life in the PRC. This started already before the group departed. The academics met at the Chinese embassy in Bonn and watched the film *The East is Red* before they flew to Beijing via Paris.¹⁵¹ Once they arrived, one party cadre and two interpreters chaperoned them for their entire trip. Their handlers insisted on sticking to the agreed travel programme in an "often almost inhibited manner."¹⁵² The West German delegation presented the Chinese handlers with a particular challenge. Wolfgang

Franke, now professor at Hamburg, had lived for thirteen years in China between 1937 and 1950. He had family in the PRC and intimate knowledge of the country. Yet, even he only managed to escape the protocol of the visit intermittently.¹⁵³

The Chinese hosts rather amended the programme slightly than letting their guests explore Chinese cities on their own. Wolfgang Lippert, who had grown up in the GDR, was impressed as he felt he could “openly” talk to his Chinese hosts.¹⁵⁴ No real deviation from the planned programme was possible. Inquiries about the fate of former colleagues remained unanswered, the places the group visited were carefully selected, and questions for academics and writers had to be submitted in advance before the West Germans met them.¹⁵⁵ Meetings of the group with CCP officials such as the deputy minister for education Yong Wentao, although often inconsequential in their content, in turn made their way into the *Remin Ribao* (People’s Daily). The tour included visits of schools, universities, factories, historical sites, and housing projects to show off the achievements of Chinese socialism.

Despite the at times obvious choreography, the visit did the trick. The West Germans returned impressed by the CCP’s accomplishments. Franke wrote in his report that “the current political system is a magnificent attempt to solve” the country’s problems. He was impressed by the improvements in housing and living standards since he last lived in China.¹⁵⁶ Yet, a sense of being handled remained. In Wolfgang Bauer’s words: “To be fair, it has to be said [...] that one is seen as alien (*Fremdkörper*) as a European by the Chinese.” They were “guided through the body China in a way which doesn’t harm him [the traveller] nor the body China.”¹⁵⁷ The ritual choreography even reinforced a sense of representing the Federal Republic abroad in the minds of the West German guests who had approached the trip initially as a semi-private journey at best.¹⁵⁸

West German institutions had to make many concessions to please the PRC leadership in this period. West Germans accepted living with very little contact to the outside

world when they stayed in the PRC. They conceded to demands of striking current social, political, and cultural developments in the Federal Republic from their curriculum, which their PRC handlers feared might transport ideas of “feudal morality.”¹⁵⁹ By 1980, the Federal Republic had become such a trustworthy partner, that Radio Beijing and the state publishing house for foreign languages invited applications of German translators administered by the DAAD.¹⁶⁰ Such self-restrictions invited criticism by students sent to the PRC, who commented that their fellow US students had much better options to push for the opportunity to do research in China than West Germans, for whom their Chinese hosts often did not meet the initial exchange agreements.¹⁶¹ Since both governments had signed an official agreement about cultural exchanges in 1979, the West Germans hoped that researchers from the humanities would finally be allowed to conduct archival research in the PRC.¹⁶² The Federal Republic now helped to rebuild the Tongji University in Shanghai, financed a Study College for Language Learning as well as fourteen lecturers in a variety of subjects. Until 1982, this number should be increased from twenty to thirty-four. The two West German TV channels ARD and ZDF now sent films and other programmes to the PRC, while the Springer Publishing House was the first publisher to be allowed hosting a book exhibition. These extensive contacts were supported by an increasing number of scholarships funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, and Franz-Seidel-Foundation.¹⁶³ Yet, West German institutions continued to criticise Chinese efforts to keep visiting scholars and students separated from their Chinese peers.

In defying Moscow’s continued reservations against the CCP, the GDR renewed contacts to Beijing in the phase from 1979 onwards. In 1984, the PRC and GDR signed a new agreement for cultural exchange that the SED hoped would increase trade relations as the GDR suffered ever more overtly from economic problems.¹⁶⁴ These efforts were closely watched and at times openly criticised by the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁵ The CCP in turn hoped to

revive cooperation in the field of media and TV.¹⁶⁶ East German attempts started with regular film screenings in the East German embassy in 1979 to which Chinese German language teachers were invited to regain a foothold in language teaching. The DAAD immediately tried to counter these efforts with similar initiatives. But the atmosphere of this German-German competition had changed. By the mid-1980s, academic conferences in Asia became occasions for informal contact between GDR academics and their West German colleagues.¹⁶⁷ On the “Germanists’ Meeting” at the Foreign Languages Institute Beijing in 1986, West German academics put out their feelers to facilitate more research visits for their colleagues and themselves to the GDR.¹⁶⁸ The GDR German lecturer in Beijing in turn kept close watch over his West German colleagues’ travel arrangements and funding. He argued that alumni work among Chinese linguists who had studied at Leipzig and other East German universities in the 1950s and 60s could be vital in regaining an edge over West German cultural influence.¹⁶⁹ Yet, the East Germans were increasingly outspent by the DAAD donating technical equipment for joint-seminars in China involving dpa representatives, embassy personnel, and journalists of leading newspapers. This attracted more and more PRC academics for visits to the Federal Republic.¹⁷⁰

By the mid-1980s, cautious attempts to mend the bridges burnt during the Sino-Soviet split emerged.¹⁷¹ Yet, this renewed interest in sending students and academics to the GDR first had to be denied for lack of funding. From 1986 onwards, the cultural and scientific exchanges between the PRC and the GDR regained speed.¹⁷² After years of East German-Chinese rapprochement, high-level academic exchanges emerged again with Beijing University and the Foreign Languages University. A Chinese delegation visiting Leipzig in 1988 showed “great interest in the ML [Marxism-Leninism] education and the training of students.”¹⁷³ The frequent ideological clashes between socialist governments had led to a withdrawal of foreign students from ML classes in the past.¹⁷⁴ By the late 1980s, numbers

eventually picked up as North Korean and Chinese students returned in greater numbers.¹⁷⁵ The Herder-Institute thus discussed renewed co-operations with Beijing University and Tonji University in 1987-88.¹⁷⁶

Yet, the Herder-Institute had been long outgunned by West German financial power. The GDR always lacked the economic means to meet the interest of foreign students in higher education. Places at the Herder-Institute had to remain restricted due to the lack of rooms and student housing. The SED abandoned plans for a new extended Central Department for Studies Abroad and the Study of Foreigners (*Zentralstelle für das Auslands- und Ausländerstudium*) in Gera for a lack of funding in 1982.¹⁷⁷ The GDR thus struggled to defend ground against the Federal Republic within the socialist bloc and in Africa and Asia in the 1980s. An expansion into “capitalist countries” in response to the West German presence in socialist states also never really materialised. When the University of Maynooth in Ireland for example needed a new German lecturer in 1989 when the DAAD had withdrawn from the university, the East German lecturer sent to Maynooth was rather blunt in her assessment of her new post. While the Herder-Institute lecturer in Dublin cooperated with the group of DAAD lecturers—and complained that they all only taught West German grammar as another sign of West German cultural dominance—, the language department at Maynooth had only decided to cooperate with the Herder-Institute “because we do it so cheaply.”¹⁷⁸ Since the 1970s, linguists had traced the separation of German grammar and vocabulary.¹⁷⁹ In course of the debate on a “binationalisation” of Germany, West German conservative politicians had warned that this linguistic division might cement the cultural division of Germany.¹⁸⁰ Such debates on separate East and West German grammar came to an abrupt end once the DAAD incorporated the Herder-Institute’s personnel soon after the Berlin Wall fell.

Conclusion

Foreign cultural diplomacy, often seen as a field of “soft power” and of minor importance, became a vital part of divided Germany’s presence in Asia. Taking seriously the attempt of both German governments and their cultural institutions to shape the debate on what Germany was after 1945 contextualises classic periodisations along official diplomatic watershed dates, highlights the importance of non-governmental proxy organisations, and draws out alternative geographies in pointing to important hubs of cultural exchange such as Hong Kong. In a situation, in which ideological conflict often made official political contacts impossible, foreign cultural diplomacy proved to be an effective tool in maintaining relations underneath the radar of Cold War diplomacy. Cultural contacts also formed a crucial part in preparing formal diplomatic relations in many instances. The struggle over the cultural self-representation of Germany and the ideological competition between the two German governments over what German culture, language, and identity actually constituted, shaped this reengagement of Germans with the world after 1945.¹⁸¹ The attempts to place cultural ambassadors abroad was aimed at shaping the parameters and the environment of the very debate what Germany was after 1945.

Cultural foreign policy during the Cold War heavily relied on people being sent abroad. Many scholars of US public diplomacy have argued that American efforts to influence foreign audiences have been all the more effective if foreigners were not aware of the US governments role in sending Americans around the world as cultural ambassadors.¹⁸² Yet, West and East German cultural work could never be construed as fully independent from the state as its central goal remained to occupy the place of the ‘rightful’ Germany in the hearts and minds of foreign audiences. Cultural envoys sent by both German governments brought readings in German to foreign audiences (often given as gifts), wrote regular reports home, encouraged foreigners to visit their respective country, and promoted their state’s vision of Germany after Nazism abroad. Until the conclusion of Ostpolitik, they formed an

integral part of shaping international public opinion on German cultural and political sovereignty. This German-German struggle for hegemony in defining the parameters of the debate on national division, ideological division, and sovereignty was driven by the fear of coming second to the other German state in reaching out to the world. Along the Bamboo Curtain, this anxiety-driven race for cultural representation often turned against German institutions. The imperative of representing Germany in Asian countries could easily render German institutions hostage to foreign demands as winning the fight over the international representation of German cultural sovereignty was seen as part and parcel of gaining international diplomatic and political recognition over the other Germany. While German cultural envoys engaged with each other more and more on their missions abroad from the 1970s onwards, national division meant that they could never fully move to détente and an exclusive focus on supporting economic and trade relations of their governments.

In the post-Cold War world, foreign cultural diplomacy struggles continue. The united Germany continues in its established forms of foreign cultural diplomacy after the inclusion of former GDR institutions into West German frameworks.¹⁸³ While the ideological edge and competition between two German governments is history, fears of foreign political subversion have resurfaced in recent years in Europe and North America. The PRC's turn to foreign cultural policy after the end of the Maoist era has fuelled fears of the CCP's attempt to control the international image of the PRC using similar institutional tools as the two German states deployed during the Cold War.¹⁸⁴ Since 2004, the CCP has begun funding Confucius-Institutes around the world much like the divided German states promoted Goethe and Herder-Institutes internationally. These institutes are funded by Hanban, the PRC equivalent of the DAAD and Herder-Institute, and promote Chinese language and culture. In a recent hearing of the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, historian Glenn Tiffert characterised the CCP's notion of "public opinion as a 'battlefield' (舆论战场) upon

which a highly disciplined political struggle must be waged and won.”¹⁸⁵ He argued that the PRC is developing a “distinctly Leninist path to soft power” leveraging its economic might and the technologies of the information age.¹⁸⁶ In the attempt to marginalise Taiwan’s international cultural impact, the PRC government now invests in a similar network of culture and language centres across the world, that the two German states had built in their competition over cultural sovereignty during the Cold War. The impact of this PRC foreign cultural diplomacy on the international image of what China constitutes in the twenty-first century remains to be seen.

¹ I would like to thank Michael Schoenhals for pointing me to this incident. Letter Dr M. Lapper, Embassy of Federal Republik of Germany, Ku 625.11, 11 June 1976; Letter Service Médical, Ambassade de France en Chine, 1 June 1976; “Übersetzung: Blutuntersuchung auf Syphilis durch das Krankenhaus Nr. 3 der Medizinischen Akademie, Peking”, 21 June 1976.

² Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und DDR 1955-1973: Aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Außenministerien* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 2001); Mathias Stein, *Der Konflikt um Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO: die deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen zu den Vereinten Nationen von 1949 bis 1973* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Joachim Scholtyseck, “Im Schatten der Hallstein-Doktrin: Die globale Konkurrenz zwischen Bundesrepublik und DDR,” in Eckhart Bonze, ed., *Die Herausforderung des Globalen in der Ära Adenauer* (Bonn: Bouvier-Verlag, 2010), pp. 79-97. For Ostpolitik see: Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (eds), *Ostpolitik 1969-1974. European and Global Responses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); M.E. Sarotti, *Dealing with the Devil. East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Andreas Grau, *Gegen den Strom: Die Reaktion der CDU/CSU-Opposition auf die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der sozial-liberalen Koalition 1969-1973* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005). More recently, studies have pointed to the importance of the developing world for the German-German Cold War. See: William G. Gray, *Germany’s Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany 1949-1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Christian Jetzlsperger, “Die Emanzipation der Entwicklungspolitik von der Hallstein-Doktrin. Die Krise der deutschen Nahostpolitik von 1965, die Entwicklungspolitik und der Ost-West-Konflikt,” *Historisches Jahrbuch*, vol. 121 (2001), pp. 320-366; Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Amit Das Gupta, *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin: Die deutsche Südasienpolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard 1949-1966* (Husum: Verlagsgruppe Husum, 1966); Hans-Joachim Döring, “Es geht um unsere Existenz.” *Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Mosambik und Äthiopien* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2000); Ulf Engel and Hans-Georg Schleicher, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika. Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz 1949-1990* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1998); Alexander Troche, *Ulbricht und die Dritte Welt. Ost-Berlins “Kampf” gegen die Bonner “Alleinvertretungsanmaßung”* (Erlangen: Palm und Enke, 1996); Bastian Hein, *Die Westdeutschen und die Dritte Welt. Entwicklungspolitik und Entwicklungsdienste zwischen Reform und Revolte 1959-1974* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005). A comprehensive overview of this literature and how it relates to German cultural diplomacy can be found in: Johannes Paulmann, “Auswärtige Repräsentationen nach 1945: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Selbstdarstellung im Ausland,” in Johannes Paulmann, ed., *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005), pp. 1-32, here: pp. 4-13.

³ Volkhardt Laitenberger, “Der DAAD von seinen Anfängen bis 1945,” in Peter Alter, ed., *Spuren in die Zukunft. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst 1925-2000. Band 1: Der DAAD in der Zeit. Geschichte, Gegenwart und zukünftige Aufgaben - vierzehn Essays* (Bonn: DAAD, 2000), pp. 20-49; Eckard Michels, *Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut. Sprach- und auswärtige Politik 1923-1960* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), pp. 189-238.

⁴ The role of leading intellectuals in the war effort and post-war European reconstruction has been studied in detail. There exists a wealth of scholarship on transatlantic cultural diplomacy and influences. For some leading studies see: Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 26-51 and pp. 108-142; Tim B. Müller, *Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2010); Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen* (Munich: Oldenburg, 1998); Anne Hartmann and Wolfgang Eggeling, *Sowjetische Präsenz im kulturellen Leben der SBZ und frühen DDR 1945-1953* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998). Historians have also looked at Soviet influence on GDR politics and culture: See: Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, eds., *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945-1970* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1997).

⁵ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, "The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance, and the Promise of Civil Society", in Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, eds., *Searching for Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 13-29.

⁶ Nancy Snow, Nancy E. Snow, Philip M. Taylor, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 2008); James Pamment, *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2013).

⁷ See: Ian Ang, Yudhishtir Raj Isar, Philip Mar, "Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the national interest?," *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2015), pp. 365-381. See also: Jan Melissen, ed., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁸ Joseph S. Nye, *Born To Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

⁹ Despite trying to delineate three different approaches to cultural diplomacy, Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht has hinted at this blurring of clear distinctions between state and private initiatives. See: Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "What are we searching for? Culture, diplomacy, agents, and the state", in Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, eds., *Searching for Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 1-12, here p. 10.

¹⁰ Bernd Schaefer, "Ostpolitik, 'Fernostpolitik', and Sino-Soviet Rivalry," in Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer, eds., *Ostpolitik 1969-1974. European and Global Responses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 129-47.

¹¹ Sebastian Gehrig, "Reaching Out to the Third World. East Germany's anti-Apartheid and socialist human rights campaign," *German History*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2018), forthcoming.

¹² For a discussion of the concept of 'cultural sovereignty' see: Gregor Feindt, Bernhard Gißibl, and Johannes Paulmann, "Kulturelle Souveränität. Zur historische Analyse von Deutungs- und Handlungsmacht jenseits des Staates," in Gregor Feindt, Bernhard Gißibl, and Johannes Paulmann, eds., *Kulturelle Souveränität. Politische Deutungs- und Handlungsmacht jenseits des Staates im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), pp. 9-46.

¹³ For the media diplomacy of both German governments see: Bernhard Gißibl, "Deutsch-deutsche Nachrichtenwelten. Die Mediendiplomatie von ADN und dpa im frühen Kalten Krieg," in Gregor Feindt, Bernhard Gißibl, and Johannes Paulmann, eds., *Kulturelle Souveränität. Politische Deutungs- und Handlungsmacht jenseits des Staates im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), pp. 227-256; Anke Hagedorn, *Die Deutsche Welle und die Politik. Deutsche Auslandsrundfunk 1953-2013* (Kontanz: UVK Verlagsanstalt, 2016).

¹⁴ Biographical accounts such as Yale Richmond's memoir of a US cultural diplomat that allow a window into the agency of an individual do not exist for the history of divided Germany. See: Yale Richmond, *Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey* (New York: Berghahn, 2008).

¹⁵ See: Benjamin G. Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order For European Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

¹⁶ Paulmann, "Auswärtige Repräsentationen nach 1945", pp. 1-2.

¹⁷ Eckard Michels, "Zwischen Zurückhaltung, Tradition und Reform: Anfänge westdeutscher Auswärtiger Kulturpolitik in den 1950er Jahren am Beispiel der Kulturinstitute," in Johannes Paulmann, ed., *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005), pp. 241-258, here: pp. 242-246.

¹⁸ Leutner, ed., *Bundesrepublik Deutschland und China 1949 bis 1995*, 41-88.

¹⁹ Public Record Office Hong Kong (PRO), HKRS N. 41, dispatch Colonial Office, London, 4 January 1952.

²⁰ PRO, HKRS N. 41.

²¹ PRO, HKRS N. 41, letter from Beijing to Hong Kong, 6 April 1951.

²² See: Beverly Hooper, *Foreigners under Mao. Western Lives in China 1949-1976* (Hong Kong: HKU Press, 2016), pp. 11-21; Anne-Mary Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), pp. 79-116.

²³ BArch, B212/22593, letter Generalkonsulat Hong Kong to DAAD, 23 November 1956.

- ²⁴ Martina Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949-1990. Kulturelle Diversität und politische Positionierung* (Muenster: LIT-Verlag, 2004), pp. 29-36 and pp. 107-231.
- ²⁵ Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949-1990*, pp. 26-42.
- ²⁶ Ge Jun, "Early Trade Agreements between the GDR and the PRC, 1950-1953" (unpublished paper).
- ²⁷ UAL, R. 268 (Rektorat), Bd. 4, letters dated 25 June 1951 and 4 November 1952.
- ²⁸ See: UAL, Philol. Fak. - Dolmetscher Institut, 57; UAL, Journ. Fak., 069; UAL, DHfK VWA R09-03g
- ²⁹ UAL, Philol. Fak. - Dolmetscher Institut, 57.
- ³⁰ Lecturers without party membership were singled out for dissident behaviour of students such as listening to Radio Free Europe. See: UAL, Pror. Stud 18.
- ³¹ See: Reineremann, "Die Aussenstellen des DAAD in London und Kairo," pp. 20-49; Eckard Michels, *Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut. Sprach- und auswärtige Politik 1923-1960* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), pp. 164-195.
- ³² UAL, R.113, Bd. 2, "Memorandum über die Errichtung eines Deutsche Wissenschaftlichen Institutes in Peking."
- ³³ See: UAL, R. 113, Bd. 2.
- ³⁴ UAL, R. 113, Bd. 2, "Memorandum über die Errichtung eines Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Instituts in Peking."
- ³⁵ See: UAL, R. 268, Bd. 4.
- ³⁶ By the mid-1950s, the Karl-Marx-University guaranteed funded places for Asian countries (for 1956: PRC: 80 confirmed places; North Korea: 35 confirmed places; Vietnam: 35 confirmed places, Burma: 10 places). See: University Archive Leipzig (UAL), DIB 263. In 1956, 167 Vietnamese students had matriculated in Leipzig alone. See: UAL, Pror. Stud. 18 and UAL, Herder-Institut, 047.
- ³⁷ John Connelly, *Captive University. The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945-1956* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 106-41.
- ³⁸ Of 1,155 students from 39 countries, North Korea sent 349, the PRC 202, and Vietnam 78. See: Gerd Geissler, "Der akademische Austausch der DDR und sein Epilog durch den DAAD", in Peter Alter, ed., *Spuren in die Zukunft. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst 1925-2000. Band 1: Der DAAD in der Zeit. Geschichte, Gegenwart und zukünftige Aufgaben - vierzehn Essays* (Bonn: DAAD, 2000), pp. 331-47, here: p. 331f. See also: UAL, Pror. Stud. 18, "Aktennotiz über die Aussprache zwischen den Kollegen Rummel und Koppelman."
- ³⁹ Geissler, "Der akademische Austausch der DDR und sein Epilog durch den DAAD," p. 332.
- ⁴⁰ UAL, Journ. Fak., 069, "Notiz Prof. Teuber," 8 January 1959.
- ⁴¹ UAL, Herder-Institut, 047, "Rosemarie Arnold, Herder-Institut an der Karl-Marx-Universität. Eine Chronologie von 1950/51 bis 1980/81," June 1981.
- ⁴² UAL, Pror. Stud. 18, report Leipzig, 12 March 1957.
- ⁴³ Hooper, *Foreigners under Mao*, p. 216f.
- ⁴⁴ Peter Ulrich Weiss, "Nicht begnadet: Zur kulturellen Selbstdarstellung und Außenwirkung der DDR in Rumänien bis Mitte der 1960er Jahre," in Johannes Paulmann, ed., *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945* (Cologne: Boehlau, 2005), pp. 259-278.
- ⁴⁵ Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*; Stein, *Der Konflikt um Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO*. For the legal dimension of claiming German sovereignty see: Sebastian Gehrig, "Recht im Kalten Krieg. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die deutsche Teilung und die politische Kultur der frühen Bundesrepublik," *Historische Zeitschrift* Vol. 303, No. 1 (2016), pp. 64-97, here: pp. 66-73.
- ⁴⁶ For the cultural sector see: Lothar Reineremann, "Die Aussenstellen des DAAD in London und Kairo," in Peter Alter, ed., *Spuren in die Zukunft. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst 1925-2000. Band 1: Der DAAD in der Zeit. Geschichte, Gegenwart und zukünftige Aufgaben - vierzehn Essays* (Bonn: DAAD, 2000), pp. 164-195, here: 178-185.
- ⁴⁷ Gehrig, "Reaching Out to the Third World."
- ⁴⁸ For the German-German rivalry in Africa in context of the second Berlin crisis see: Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, pp. 87-115. See also: Gareth M. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 206; Ulrich van der Heyden, *GDR Development Policy in Africa: Doctrine and Strategies between Illusions and Reality, 1960-1990. The Example (South) Africa* (Münster, 2013); Engel and Schleicher, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika*; Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime*.
- ⁴⁹ Michels, "Zwischen Zurückhaltung, Tradition und Reform," p. 254.
- ⁵⁰ Gehrig, "Reaching Out to the Third World."
- ⁵¹ Michels, "Zwischen Zurückhaltung, Tradition und Reform," p. 333.
- ⁵² Geissler, "Der akademische Austausch der DDR und sein Epilog durch den DAAD," p. 333.

⁵³ For the name change of the institute and the inauguration of the Herder Institute as the central node for foreign students arriving in the GDR see: UAL, R. 67, Bd. 2, letter Mayer, 3 March 1961 and letter Grins, 12 June 1961.

⁵⁴ For an extensive multi-volume history of the Steyler mission in China see: Richard Harwich, *Steyler Missionare in China: Beiträge zu einer Geschichte* (St. Augustin: Steyler Verlag, 1983). For a history of German missionaries in China see: Klaus Mühlhahn, *Herrschaft und Widerstand in der "Musterkolonie Kiautschou": Interaktionen zwischen China und Deutschland 1897-1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 285-403; Albert Wu, *From Christ to Confucius: German Missionaries, Chinese Christians, and the Globalisation of Christianity, 1860-1950* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). For a source collection showing the close connection between German foreign policy, educational policies, and Christian mission in China see: Andreas Steen (ed.), *Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen 1911-1927. Vom Kolonialismus zur "Gleichberechtigung." Eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2006) and Bernd Martin (ed.), *Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen 1928-1937. "Gleiche Partner" unter "ungleichen" Bedingungen. Eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2003).

⁵⁵ Paul Betts, "Religion, Science and Cold War Anti-Communism: The 1949 Cardinal Mindszenty Show Trial," in Paul Betts and Stephen A. Smith, eds., *Science, Religion and Communism in Cold War Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 275-307.

⁵⁶ BArch, B212/35943.

⁵⁷ BArch, B212/22593, Minutes DAAD, Bonn, 20 May 1957.

⁵⁸ BArch, B212/22593, letter Foreign Office to DAAD, "Betr. Studentenaustausch mit Rotchina," 13 March 1957.

⁵⁹ Ulrike Stoll, "Das Bayrische Trachtenballett auf Asientournee: Ein Fallbeispiel zur auswärtigen Kulturpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland um 1960," in Johannes Paulmann, ed., *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005), pp. 279-288.

⁶⁰ Paul Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects. A Cultural History of West German Design* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 195-196.

⁶¹ Katherine Pence, "'A World in Miniature': The Leipzig Trade Fairs in the 1950s and East German Consumer Citizenship," in David Crew, ed., *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (London: Berg, 2003), pp. 21-50; Jennifer Altehenger, "Chinese Lanterns at Leipzig: looking into local archives of the former German Democratic Republic," *PRC History Review* Vol. 2, No. 3 (2017), pp. 4-6.

⁶² UAL, Herder-Institut, 054.

⁶³ UAL, Herder-Institut, 053, letter to Beijing, 4 January 1961.

⁶⁴ UAL, Herder-Institut, 053, letter to Beijing, 13 January 1961.

⁶⁵ Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949-1990*, pp. 40-45.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁶⁷ UAL, Herder-Institut, letter to Beijing, 29 January 1961.

⁶⁸ Vietnamese students took degrees in a wider range of subjects ranging from engineering and natural sciences to the humanities and law in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See: UAL, DIB 263.

⁶⁹ Geissler, "Der akademische Austausch der DDR und sein Epilog durch den DAAD," p. 335. After the end of the war, the GDR government entered an official cooperation with the University of Ho-Chi-Minh City deepening the special focus on Vietnamese students. See: UAL, R. 947, Bd. 2 (1976-1978).

⁷⁰ Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, pp. 58-86.

⁷¹ BArch, B212/36440/1, letter from Dr Bottler, Embassy Rangoon to Foreign Office, 22 July 1963.

⁷² BArch, B212/36440/1, letter Mr Weil, Embassy Rangoon to Foreign Office, 16 August 1968.

⁷³ For this GDR campaign see: Gehrig, "Reaching Out to the Third World"; Stein, *Der Konflikt um Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO*.

⁷⁴ Peter Alter, "Der DAAD seit seiner Wiedergründung 1950," in Peter Alter, ed., *Spuren in die Zukunft. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst 1925-2000. Band 1: Der DAAD in der Zeit. Geschichte, Gegenwart und zukünftige Aufgaben - vierzehn Essays*, (Bonn: DAAD, 2000), pp. 50-105, here: pp. 78-87.

⁷⁵ UAL, R. 67, Bd. 2, "Geplante Neuausrichtung (Entwurf Gen. Dr. Schmidt)."

⁷⁶ Political Archive/Foreign Office (PA/AA), B82/913, letter West German embassy Rangoon to Foreign Office Bonn, 4 December 1968.

⁷⁷ BArch, B212/36449/1, letter Mr Lehr, Embassy Seoul to Foreign Office, 9 April 1962.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ BArch, B212/34120, letter Marga Schmitz to Prof Lehnartz/Dr Scheibe (DAAD), 7 July 1966.

⁸⁰ "Abduction of South Korean Students and Teachers from West Germany," *Minerva*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1967), pp. 144-147.

⁸¹ For example, this change from a focus on folk culture to critical left-wing works is showcased in the 1969 German film festival in Hong Kong. The West German consul von Heyden officially opened the viewing of

- films by Johannes Schaaf, Alexander Kluge, Franz Josef Spieker, Wolfgang Urchs, Ursula and Franz Winzentsen, and Werner Herzog at Studio One of the Film Society Hong Kong. See: PRO, HKMS No. 119.
- ⁸² BArch, B212/36449/1, report on the International Conference on University Planning and Development, 10-15 October 1971, Seoul, Korea, pp. 5-6.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ⁸⁵ BArch, B212/36449/1, report to DAAD head office (Prof Schulte), 27 June 1972. The relationship with the PRC most clearly showcased the complications for West German foreign policy initiatives in Asia until Ostpolitik was concluded. See: Martin Albers, "All Paths Leading to Beijing? Western Europe and Détente in East Asia, 1969-72," *The International History Review*, Vol. 37, No.2 (2015), pp. 219-239, here: pp. 230-234. Schaefer, "Ostpolitik, 'Fernostpolitik,' and Sino-Soviet Rivalry."
- ⁸⁶ BArch, B212/36449/1, "Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1973, Land Südkorea."
- ⁸⁷ Despite the fact that South Korea was declared a "country of special interest" (*Schwerpunktland*) by the DAAD in the early 1970s, DAAD positions remained vacant for unduly long periods given the renewed focus on the PRC. See: B212/36449, letter to DAAD Schulte, 27 June 1972.
- ⁸⁸ For the global dimension of Ostpolitik see: Fink and Schaefer, eds., *Ostpolitik, 1969-1974*.
- ⁸⁹ BArch, B212/36449/1, draft agenda for the 1st Meeting of the Permanent Joint German-Korean Cultural Committee, Bonn, 10 October 1974, p. 10.
- ⁹⁰ BArch, B212/36449/1, "Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1973, Land Südkorea."
- ⁹¹ BArch, B212/24526, letter Embassy Saigon (Dr von Rom) to Foreign Office, 20 September 1973.
- ⁹² "103: Gespräch des Bundespräsidenten Heinemann mit Präsident Nguyen Van Thieu, 10. April 1973," in Hans-Peter Schwarz, et al., eds., *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik: 1973* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), pp. 493-498, p. 493fn5.
- ⁹³ Mechthild Leutner, ed., *Bundesrepublik Deutschland und China 1949 bis 1995. Politik–Wirtschaft–Wissenschaft–Kultur* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995), pp. 41-49.
- ⁹⁴ This became most obvious to domestic and international observers during Ostpolitik negotiations. See: Schaefer, "Ostpolitik, 'Fernostpolitik,' and Sino-Soviet Rivalry," pp. 129-147.
- ⁹⁵ Cagas Ungor, "Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda Abroad (1949-1976)", PhD-diss., Binghamton University, 2009, p. 293, FN888.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63f.
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 59f.
- ⁹⁸ BArch DY 30/IV A 2/5/22, report from 2 October 1963 and "Information über die ersten Stimmen zu den Erklärungen der KPdSU und des ZK unserer Partei zu der Spalterpolitik der Führer der KP Chinas," 9 April 1964.
- ⁹⁹ BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/5/22, "Information über die ersten Mitgliederversammlungen zur Spaltertätigkeiten der KP Chinas," 23 February 1966.
- ¹⁰⁰ Quinn Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy: China's Challenge in 1960s East Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2016), pp. 635-659, here: p. 635.
- ¹⁰¹ For differences in the field of cultural policy and diplomacy see: Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949-1990*, pp. 45-83.
- ¹⁰² DY 30/IV A 2/10.02/1, "Protokoll der Diskussion der Sitzung der Westkommission," 31 January 1967.
- ¹⁰³ The leading left-wing journal *konkret* relied on GDR funding throughout the 1960s and allowed some influence on left-wing opinion within the Federal Republic. *Konkret* reached a circulation of 100,000 copies in the early 1970s and excluded SED-critical voices at the height of Ostpolitik negotiations. See: John Christian Schmiedel, *Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 145.
- ¹⁰⁴ Gehrig, "(Re-)configuring Mao."
- ¹⁰⁵ For the PRC's interference with Ostpolitik negotiations see: Schaefer, "Ostpolitik, 'Fernostpolitik,' and Sino-Soviet rivalry." For the importance of Maoist rhetoric of the early Red Army Faction see: Sebastian Gehrig, "'Zwischen uns und dem Feind einen klaren Trennungsstrich ziehen': Linksterroristische Gruppen und maoistische Ideologie in der Bundesrepublik der 1960er und 1970er Jahre," in Sebastian Gehrig, Barbara Mittler and Felix Wemheuer, eds., *Kulturrevolution als Vorbild? Maoisten im deutschsprachigen Raum* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2008), pp. 153-178.
- ¹⁰⁶ Elizabeth McGuire, "The Book that bombed: Mao's Little Red Thing in the Soviet Union," in Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao's Little Red Book. A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 147-164.
- ¹⁰⁷ Alexander C. Cook, "Introduction: The Spiritual Atomic Bomb and Its Global Fallout," in Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao's Little Red Book. A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 1-22; Alexander C. Cook, "Third World Maoism," in Timothy Cheek, *A Critical Introduction to Mao* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 288-312.

- ¹⁰⁸ Sebastian Gehrig, "(Re-)configuring Mao: Trajectories of a culture-political trend in West Germany," *Transcultural Studies*, No. 2 (2011), pp. 189-231; Sebastian Gehrig, "Friend or foe? The People's Republic of China in West German Cold War politics," in David Crowe und Joanne Miyang Cho, eds., *Germany and China: Transnational Encounters since the Eighteenth Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 233-248; Julia Lovell, "The Cultural Revolution and Its Legacies in International Perspective," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 227 (2016), pp. 632-652; Quinn Slobodian, "Badge Books and Brand Books: the Mao-Bible in East and West Germany," in Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao's Little Red Book. A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 206-224. For the wider Western context see: Charles W. Hayford, "Mao's Journey to the West: Meanings made of Mao," in Timothy Cheek, *A Critical Introduction to Mao* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 313-331; Christopher Leigh Connery, "The World Sixties," in Rob Wilson and Christopher Leigh Connery, eds., *The Worlding Project. Doing Cultural Studies in the Era of Globalization* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2007), pp. 77-108.
- ¹⁰⁹ Bernd Schaefer, "Ostpolitik, 'Fernostpolitik,' and Sino-Soviet rivalry," pp. 129-147.
- ¹¹⁰ The CCP devised a comprehensive foreign propaganda machinery to challenge the Soviet Union's leadership of the communist camp. See: Çağdaş Üngör, "Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda Abroad (1949-1976)," PhD-diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2009.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹¹² For a history of these cadre parties see: Andreas Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne. Die Lebenswelt der K-Gruppen in der Bundesrepublik der 70er Jahre* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2005).
- ¹¹³ Archiv Soziale Demokratie (ASD), 1/WsAA000037, Nachlass Walter Seuffert, "Verfassungsschutzbericht 1976," p. 58.
- ¹¹⁴ The PhD-dissertation of Mascha Jacoby (Hamburg) titled "Die Suche nach dem 'Dritten Weg': Neue Linke und chinesische Kulturrevolution" promises to unearth more detail on CCP-West German connections in the 1960s and 70s.
- ¹¹⁵ UAL, Herder-Institut, 277, "Situationsbericht über das Auftreten der chinesischen Studierenden," 17 December 1966.
- ¹¹⁶ UAL, Herder-Institut, 277, "Bericht über das Auftreten chinesischer Studenten an der KMU," 30 January 1967. See also: letter Dr Schubert to Prorektor Dr Porz, 4 October 1966. See also: "Bericht: Vorfall mit chinesischen Studenten," 2 December 1966.
- ¹¹⁷ UAL, Herder-Institut, 277, "Situationsbericht über das Auftreten der chinesischen Studierenden", 17 December 1966.
- ¹¹⁸ The CCP networks that facilitated the global reach of PRC propaganda material are described in: Üngör, "Reaching the Distant Comrade."
- ¹¹⁹ UAL, Herder-Institut, 277, "Aktentnotiz," 26 January 1967.
- ¹²⁰ Archiv Soziale Demokratie (ASD), 1/WsAA000037, Nachlass Walter Seuffert, "Verfassungsschutzbericht 1976," p. 63.
- ¹²¹ DY 30/14626, Westabteilung, letter Häber to Verner, 27 July 1979.
- ¹²² Geissler, "Der akademische Austausch der DDR und sein Epilog durch den DAAD," p. 335.
- ¹²³ UAL, DIB, 277.
- ¹²⁴ UAL, ZM 8464/50.4, On their fourth meeting on 25 April 1968, Leipzig academics debated the raging controversy over the "two lines" in the PRC. Paper titles included: Karin Westphal, "Die gegenwärtige Auseinandersetzung in der VR China über die sogenannten 'zwei Linien' in der KPCh"; Richard Oberländer, "Gibt es 'zwei Linien' in der KP Chinas?"; Ralf Moritz, "Über die Spaltung des Einheitlichen oder der Einheit des Gegensätzlichen"; Roland Felber, "Zur Position Liu-Shao-qis in der Neuauflage des Schrift 'Wie man ein guter Kommunist wird,' Peking 1962"; Fritz Gruner, "Zhou Yang und die 'zwei Linien' in der KPCh."
- ¹²⁵ Zhong Zhong Chen, "Defying Moscow: East German-Chinese relations during the Andropov-Chernenko interregnum, 1982-1985," *Cold War History*, Vol. 14, 2No. (2014), pp. 259-280.
- ¹²⁶ See: Schaefer, "Ostpolitik, 'Fernostpolitik,' and Sino-Soviet rivalry" and Gehrig, "Friend or Foe?," pp. 233-248.
- ¹²⁷ Leutner (ed.), *Bundesrepublik Deutschland und China 1945-1995*, p. 145.
- ¹²⁸ BArch, B212/75289, DAAD report "Volksrepublik China: Rückblick auf fünf Jahre akademischen Austausch und Ausblick auf die Zukunft," 1978.
- ¹²⁹ UAL, R. 67, Bd. 2, letter Gießmann, 25 June 1969.
- ¹³⁰ UAL, R. 67, Bd. 2, letter Rößler to Prof Hans Rosenberg (Member of the SED's Central Committee and the GDR State Council), 18 November 1969.
- ¹³¹ Ibid.
- ¹³² Ibid.; UAL, R 67, Bd. 2, "Stellungnahme zum Verbleib des Herder-Instituts im Verbund der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig," 8 December 1969; UAL, R. 67, Bd. 2, letter Rößler to Prof Rodenberg (member of the SED's Central Committee and Council of Ministers), 18 November 1969.

- ¹³³ Gißibl, "Deutsch-deutsche Nachrichtenwelten," p. 254.
- ¹³⁴ BArch, B212/24496, Minutes regarding the exchange of academics and students with the People's Republic of China, report by Mr Dohrn, August 1973, pp. 3-4.
- ¹³⁵ BArch B212/59220, "Ergebnisprotokoll über die Sitzung des Ausschusses zur Koordinierung der Auslandsbeziehungen am Freitag, dem 23. September 1977 in der Generalverwaltung der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, München." From 1978 onwards, the Foreign Office transferred money directly to the Steyler Mission and the DAAD acted no longer as proxy Institution. BArch B212/58993, "Vermerk: Betr.: Abwicklung der Stipendien für Deutsche in Taiwan," 27 July 1977 and "Vermerk: Betr. Taiwan hier: Fördermaßnahmen des DAAD," 14 July 1977.
- ¹³⁶ B212/58993, "Vermerk für den Grundsatzausschuss," 22 February 1977.
- ¹³⁷ BArch, B212/75229, "Vermerk (vertraulich) für Grundsatzausschuss betr. Austausch mit Taiwan," 8 February 1980.
- ¹³⁸ BArch, B212/36451, letter exchanges Foreign Office and Embassy Taipei, 1968-73.
- ¹³⁹ BArch, B212/36451, letter German Cultural Centre Taipei "1. Halbjahresbericht 1968," 15 July 1968.
- ¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 5.
- ¹⁴¹ BArch B212/75229, "Vermerk für den Grundsatzausschuss," 8 February 1980.
- ¹⁴² The PRC government targeted the US, the UK, Japan, Scandinavia, Benelux countries, Switzerland, Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran. The Beijing government now asked whether five hundred Chinese students could be sent each year to the Federal Republic. Ibid, p. 13.
- ¹⁴³ See: Martin Albers, *Britain, France, West Germany and the People's Republic of China, 1969-1982. The European Dimension of China's Great Transition* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 143-200; Zhong Zhong Chen, "Defying Moscow."
- ¹⁴⁴ Most notably, the debate on a human right of development within UN signalled this shift. See: Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN. The Political History of Universal Justice* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2008), pp. 289-315.
- ¹⁴⁵ Tim Szatkowski, "Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Relations between the Federal Republic and Cambodia, 1967-1979," in Agnes Bresselau von Bressendorf, Elke Seefried, and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., *German Yearbook of Contemporary History. Vol. 2: West Germany, the Global South and the Cold War* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), pp. 25-62.
- ¹⁴⁶ Albers, *Britain, France, West Germany and the People's Republic of China, 1969-1982*, p. 114.
- ¹⁴⁷ BArch, B212/24526, "Hansgünther Schmidt: Bericht über eine Dienstreise in the VR China, 7.-23 Januar 1980."
- ¹⁴⁸ Cooperation efforts now focused on medicine, natural sciences, and mechanical engineering. See: BArch B212/24526, "Deutsch-Chinesisches Kulturaustauschprogramm 1980, hier: Liste der von chinesischer Seite gewünschten deutschen Kurzzeit-Gastdozenten."
- ¹⁴⁹ Albers, *Britain, France, West Germany and the People's Republic of China, 1969-1982*, pp. 61-86.
- ¹⁵⁰ Julia Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and the International Image-Building in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1976," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* Vol. 25 (2015), pp. 135-158.
- ¹⁵¹ BArch B212/59220, "Bericht über eine China Reise im Mai/Juni 1977 von Wolfgang Franke," 1977.
- ¹⁵² BArch B212/59220, "Wolfgang Bauer, Persönliche Eindrücke von der Reise deutscher China-Wissenschaftler durch die VR China zwischen dem 23.5. und 18.6.1977," 22 August 1977.
- ¹⁵³ BArch B212/59220, "Bericht über eine China Reise im Mai/Juni 1977 von Wolfgang Franke," 1977. Franke had worked at the German Institute until 1945 and then taught at universities in Sichuan, Chengdu, and Beijing before he had to leave the PRC in 1950s.
- ¹⁵⁴ BArch B212/59220, "Wolfgang Lippert: Bericht über meine Erfahrungen als Teilnehmer der Reisegruppe deutscher Sinnlosen in der Volksrepublik China vom 26. Mai-13. Juni 1977."
- ¹⁵⁵ BArch B212/59220, "Wolfgang Bauer, Persönliche Eindrücke von der Reise deutscher China-Wissenschaftler durch die VR China zwischen dem 23.5. und 18.6.1977," 22 August 1977.
- ¹⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁹ BArch, B212/24526, "Bericht über eine Dienstreise in the VR China, 7.-23 Januar 1980 von Hansgünther Schmidt," p. 16.
- ¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 22.
- ¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 29.
- ¹⁶² BArch, B212/24526, Cultural-political Annual Report 1979, Country: China.
- ¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 8.
- ¹⁶⁴ Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949-1990*, pp. 88-97.

- ¹⁶⁵ BArch, B212/24526, Cultural-political Annual Report 1979, Country: China, p. 11; Chen, “Defying Moscow.”
- ¹⁶⁶ Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949-1990*, p. 85.
- ¹⁶⁷ The number rose from 52 cooperation partners with 89 lecturers in 1967 to 96 cooperation partners with 177 lecturers in 1983. UAL, Herder-Institut, 20, “Vorläufige Ordnung für die Kontaktarbeit mit ausländischen Partners des Herder-Instituts der Karl-Marx-Universität,” 1983. The DAAD sent 200 lecturers abroad in 1964 and 375 by 1974. See: Alter, “Der DAAD seit seiner Wiedergründung 1950,” p. 80.
- ¹⁶⁸ UAL, Herder-Institut, 87, “Zusatzinformationen zum ‘Germanistentreffen 1986’,” 18 October 1986.
- ¹⁶⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁰ UAL, Herder-Institut, 87, “Kurzinformation zu BRD-Aktivitäten an der 1. Fremdsprachenhochschule Beijing,” 19 October 1986.
- ¹⁷¹ For the field of law and legal exchanges between the PRC and the GDR see: Jennifer Altehenger, “Unlikely Heirs: Communist China and the Transnational Socialist Search for Law, 1972-1989,” conference paper delivered at the conference “Law, (Inter-)Nationalism, and the Global Cold War,” Oxford, June 2015 (cited with the author’s permission).
- ¹⁷² Wobst, *Die Kulturbeziehungen zwischen der DDR und der VR China 1949-1990*, pp. 97-103.
- ¹⁷³ UAL, DIB 504, “Überblick Internationale Kooperation.”
- ¹⁷⁴ This applied to students from the PRC, Albania, North Korea, and Romania in particular. See: Geissler, “Der akademische Austausch der DDR und sein Epilog durch den DAAD,” p. 333. See also: UAL, DIB 504, “Entwurf Jahresanalyse 1988/89 an der Karl Marx-Universität Leipzig, 1.2 Bereitschaft und Fähigkeit zur Diskussionsführung”; UAL, Herder-Institut, 070.
- ¹⁷⁵ UAL, DIB, 329; UAL, DIB 277.
- ¹⁷⁶ UAL, Herder-Institut, 087.
- ¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 335f.
- ¹⁷⁸ UAL, Herder-Institut, 240.
- ¹⁷⁹ Gottthart Lerchner, “Nation und Sprache im Spannungsfeld zwischen Sprachwissenschaft und Politik in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR bis 1989,” in Andreas Gardt, ed., *Nation und Sprache. Die Diskussion ihres Verhältnisses in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 273-302.
- ¹⁸⁰ E.g. the warning of the leading CDU politician Kurt Biedenkopf in: Kurt Biedenkopf, “Verantwortung für die nationale Einheit,” *Deutschland Magazin*, 5 (1974): 46. See also: Florian Roth, *Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen neuer Ostpolitik und Wiedervereinigung (1969-1990)* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 119-32.
- ¹⁸¹ Paulmann, “Auswärtige Prääsentationen nach 1945,” pp. 1-34.
- ¹⁸² See: Gienow-Hecht, “What are we searching for?”; Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy”.
- ¹⁸³ Geissler, “Der akademische Austausch der DDR und sein Epilog durch den DAAD,” pp. 344-346.
- ¹⁸⁴ There is a growing literature on this subject see: Falk Hartig, *Chinese Public Diplomacy. The Rise of the Confucius Institute* (London: Routledge, 2016); Jeffrey Gil, *Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning. The Confucius Institute Project* (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2017); Wei Ye, *Taking Chinese to the World: Language, Culture, and Identity in Confucius Institute Teachers* (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2017); Amy Stambach, *Confucius and Crisis in American Universities: Culture, Capital, and Diplomacy in US Public Higher Education* (Routledge: London, 2014).
- ¹⁸⁵ Statement of Glenn Tiffert, Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China “The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism With Chinese Characteristics”, Wednesday, 13 December 2017, Russell Senate Office Building, Room 301, <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20-%202013%20Dec%202017%20-%20Long%20Arm%20of%20China%20-%20Tiffert.pdf> (last accessed: 30 January 2018). See also: Ingrid d’Hooghe, *China’s Public Diplomacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
- ¹⁸⁶ “Hearing on The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism With Chinese Characteristics,” 44:46min, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stGDPxy00iI> (last accessed: 30 January 2018). For the role of global media in the twenty-first century in Sino-Western cultural relations see: Jia Gao, Catherine Ingram, Pookong Kee, eds., *Global Media and Public Diplomacy in Sino-Western Relations* (London: Routledge, 2016).