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The camp as market frontier: Refugees and the spatial imaginaries of capitalist prospecting in Kenya

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ABSTRACT

This article critically interrogates the ambitions of humanitarians, policymakers, and their corporate partners to fundamentally remake both camp economies and the refugees who inhabit them. It draws on a unique set of elite interviews with key actors from a network of organisations driving 'innovative' humanitarian projects in the Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei settlement in Kenya. We identify their shared spatial imaginaries which, first, reconfigure camps from spaces of dependency to capitalist frontiers of the market and, second, produce a normative construction of refugee personhood that corresponds to this space. We show that the camp as market frontier is imagined as an enabling environment that both redeems and creates the otherwise 'subdued' humanity of refugees through allowing their flourishing as rational capitalist subjects. Against popular depictions of refugees as 'burdens', we find that our interlocutors present camp refugees as entrepreneurial capitalists-in-the-making who are only inhibited by their own lack of training, humanitarian welfarism, and the deficiency of a proto-capitalist environment. And yet this latent surplus population is thought to live alongside camp paupers whose value cannot easily be made legible within market logics geared towards 'productivity'. The stratification of camp inhabitants in this way signals the (re)production of an authorised version of refugee 'being' that resonates with the objectives of exclusionary marketisation agendas. While the optimism expressed in imaginaries of economic potential and thriving may appear seductive, in that these spatial stories promise to restore the 'dignity' of refugees, we argue that they ultimately enable less virtuous economic practices and conceal the complicity of global corporations and financial institutions in perpetuating the exploitative operations of capital.

1. Introduction

On 9 May 2023, the Government of Kenya announced the formation of an Inter-governmental Steering Committee to develop the country's 'Refugee Marshall Plan'. Speaking to members of the press, Principal Secretary for Immigration and Citizen Services, Julius Bitok, asserted that 'some of the [refugees] are really talented. We should look for a way to convert the crises into opportunities' (Makong 2023). Kenya hosts nearly 590,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, 80% of whom reside in the Kakuma refugee camp and Kalobeyei settlement in north-western Turkana County as well as the Dadaab camps in north-eastern Garissa County. The Marshall Plan follows on the heels of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and Kenya's new 2021 Refugee Act, both of which promise to depart from the country's 'hostile' refugee policies that have long upheld mandatory encampment, bans on

economic integration, militarised policing, and mobility restrictions since the 1990s (Maina 2019; Brankamp 2019; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). The changes are said to transform camps into settlements, enable 'dignified' repatriations, co-develop refugee and local 'host' economies, reduce dependency on donor funding, and ultimately promote refugee 'self-reliance' (Owiso 2022; GoK 2020).

In fact, these approaches have already been well underway over the last few years. Since 2014, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has collaborated with Turkana's County Government and Kenya's National Government to reform the country's ailing refugee management system from a 'care-and-maintenance' model of camps to a 'development-oriented' model that hinges on socio-economic integration. This has led to the formulation of a Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (KISEDIP) in 2016, which made provisions for strengthening local markets and the private sector. The Kalobeyei integrated settlement at

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the centre of this plan is located only a few kilometres from Kakuma and was designed as a counter approach to standard encampment by promoting the co-housing of Turkana residents and refugees, moving from in-kind to cash assistance, and supporting self-sufficiency (Betts, Omata, and Sterck 2020).

In the same year that KISED P was launched, a study commissioned by the World Bank and UNHCR showed that even the presence of refugees in the more established Kakuma camp has had overall positive effects on development in Turkana (Sanghi, Onder, and Vemuru 2016). A 2018 report by the World Bank-affiliated International Finance Corporation (IFC) was later lauded as ‘the first [...] of its kind to provide data on the market potential in a refugee-populated area’ (Wang, Cakmak, and Hagemann 2021, 5) and explicitly quantified the economic benefits of the camp, estimating the size of its markets at a staggering \$56 million (IFC 2018). Based on these findings, facilitating ‘market access’ in Kakuma and Kalobeyei settlement was touted as a rehabilitative process by which investors, philanthropists, and economic experts could finally seize the ‘enormous, yet untapped, potential to improve the lives and livelihoods of both the displaced and the hosts’ (Zetter 2014, 3). Indeed, neoliberal market ‘fixes’ to costly humanitarian aid, which propose to divest from public services, place economic responsibilities onto refugees, and financialise aid, are now sometimes portrayed as virtually ‘the only game in town’ for addressing displacement globally (Betts 2021, 10; Hilhorst 2018; Ilcan and Rygiel 2015). In contrast to such assertions of inevitability, this article understands these approaches to refugee economies as deliberate ideological choices to remake both camp spaces and those who inhabit them according to the needs of neoliberal markets. Contributing to existing work on the political economy of migration control and racialised refugee governance (Martin, 2021; Martin and Tazzioli 2023; Bhagat and Roderick 2020; Rajaram 2018), we examine how ‘spatial imaginaries’ among aid officials, policymakers, and business stakeholders materially shape this capitalist encroachment in the context of humanitarianism in Kenya. We argue that institutional scripts of marketisation, economic thriving, and personal choice not only refashion refugees from erstwhile dependent subjects of aid to now valuable economic resources, but that camp spaces themselves are in this way rendered new ‘frontiers’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 2019) for the extractive operations of capitalism writ large. Based on interviews with elite actors, we argue that Kakuma and Kalobeyei settlement have become the objects of new ‘prospecting logics’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 2017, 194). Such logics are aimed at gauging the exploitability of public resources, humanitarian spaces, and aid activities into which processes of accumulation, expropriation, and capitalist revalorisation can insert themselves to derive present or future profit. Refugee encampment is thus turned into a market opportunity, a fortuity from which to reorganise existing economic relations of refugees to conform to the supposed requirements of neoliberal capitalist rationales. The thrust of this kind of prospecting with the aim to restructure refugee economies has been an almost religious belief in the enchanting powers of ‘the market’ (Harvey 2005; Brown 2015). And yet we know from economic geographers that ‘the market’ is in fact hardly a natural or self-evident entity but is best understood as a constantly evolving process of marketisation by which ‘actually existing markets’ and lived economic practices are subjected to particular ideological principles (Berndt and Boeckler 2023; Peck, Berndt, and Rantisi 2020; Birch and Siemiatycki 2016). It has, Bhattacharyya (2005, 8) notes, therefore gained almost ‘talismanic status’ in contemporary economic debates whereby market forces are thought to magically solve complex social and political problems. Economists, experts, and policymakers are in this regard not influential due to their exceptional powers of persuasion alone but, crucially, because of their privileged position to put theory into practice and make it material (Berndt and Boeckler 2020, 70; Ossandón 2020; Callon 2007).

In this article, we expand critical research on the political economies of refugee aid and argue that ‘spatial imaginaries’ as expressed by powerful actors and institutions are a key means through which these

material interventions are practically formulated, negotiated, and shaped. We view spatial imaginaries, following Watkins, as ‘socially held stories, ways of representing and talking about places and spaces’ (Watkins 2015, 509; see Gregory 1995; Driver 2014). The capitalist expropriation/appropriation of refugee spaces and bodies is contingent on mobilising such imaginaries as ideological drivers of marketisation which at once legitimise and materially engender the geographies they prefigure. Second, we contend that the imaginative reframing of camps, from stagnant economies of ‘dependency’ to promising frontiers of capitalist expansion, also reformulates the grounds of refugee personhood and its undesirable devalued ‘other’. Empirically, we draw on a unique set of interviews with elite interlocutors, representing the increasingly consolidated partnerships between aid agencies, international companies, and political actors. Through these partnerships, Kalobeyei and KISED P have become ‘flagship’ operations for the UNHCR which, as a former UNHCR Head of Kakuma told us in July 2021, could be seen as ‘the Global Compact on Refugees in action’ (Interview, 14 July 2021). The Global Compact on Refugees envisions future humanitarianism as a ‘multi-stakeholder and partnership approach’ in which UNHCR—once the epicentre of refugee management—increasingly assumes a ‘supportive and catalytic role’ (UN, 2018, 14). Hence, while our study is grounded in a particular site, we suggest that our analysis is indicative of broader developments in the sector.

The article proceeds as follows: we first present our methodology, the context of refugee humanitarianism in Kenya and the data upon which our arguments rest. We then explicate how our focus on ‘spatial imaginaries’ adds to existing work on the political economy of migration and refugee governance, especially the ways in which these discourses among elite actors are not simply representations but have tangible policy effects. We develop this argument over the next four sections in which we trace both the imaginative shift from camps as spaces of dependency to capitalist frontiers of the market as well as the normative construction of refugee personhood that corresponds to this space. Finally, we conclude that despite the appeal that ideas of economic optimism may have in the face of protracted displacement, they serve to conceal the appropriations and exclusions enabled through capital’s extractive operations.

2. Methodology

This article draws on sixteen semi-structured elite interviews with key actors associated with the Kakuma refugee camp and Kalobeyei settlement, which were conducted in June–July 2021 by a team of four researchers for a collaborative project on the marketisation of refugee camps. Interlocutors were approached through targeted recruitment and snowball sampling, after which each interview was conducted by at least two team members. Participants were selected because they represented pivotal nodes in a dense network of policymakers and practitioners driving ‘innovative’ humanitarian projects in Kenya. Many of them were either in regular contact with one another or had moved seamlessly between jobs in the private sector, the World Bank, and the UN. In the past few years, UNHCR has expended considerable energy to build partnerships with global financial institutions, investors, and companies to capitalise on the value-generating economic practices of refugees. This built on former UN High Commissioner Sadako Ogata’s (2000, 170) pronouncement of an ‘era of experimentation in partnerships’ two decades earlier through which UNHCR was to bring for-profit businesses into the humanitarian fold. Kenya has since become a hub of scholarly and policy proposals on refugee economies, entrepreneurship, self-reliance, and financial inclusion that pursue a similar vision today.

Research participants agreed for their organisations and the roles they held within them to be used in publications while their individual names were omitted. Eight interviewees were senior UNHCR officials, with four occupying fundraising roles in the Geneva head office and another four with extensive experience in the ‘field’. The latter included a former UNHCR country representative in Kenya, two former Heads of

Sub-Office (HSO) in Kakuma and the camp's former senior operations manager. We also interviewed three key Kenyan stakeholders: the Chairperson of Kenya's National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KNCCI) in Turkana, the Camp Manager of Kakuma/Kalobeyei at the Department of Refugee Services (DRS), and the former Turkana Governor. The remaining five interviews comprised high-status individuals who were either partners of UNHCR or otherwise invested in corporate social responsibility, such as the IKEA Foundation, Safaricom (Kenya's largest telecommunication company), the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF), a non-profit launched at the World Economic Forum in 2008 with the purpose of 'catalysing' private sector innovation and business growth across Africa.¹ The Kakuma Kalobeyei Challenge Fund (KKCF), a five-year programme set up in 2020, is IFC's first refugee and host community focused programme in Africa. Implemented together with AECF, Turkana's County Government and UNHCR, KKCF invites companies, social enterprises and local businesses to bid for start-up investments and offers entrepreneurial trainings.² Safaricom is contracted by the World Food Programme (WFP) to provide a mobile money e-voucher product (Bamba Chakula—'get your food' in Swahili) with which refugees can purchase food rather than receive food donations in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. The IKEA Foundation is engaged in a wide range of projects and partnerships in the country, including the Refugee Agricultural Value Chains for Economic Self-reliance (RAVES) programme that turns refugees into agricultural suppliers of groundnuts for Insta Products, a Kenyan business that specialises in food aid.³ As diverse as these initiatives are, we analyse them as part of an onslaught of neoliberal marketisation through technological 'fixes', financial incentives, and the production of expert knowledge that generally 'prepare the ground for further extraction' (Mezzadra and Neilson 2019, 141).

To better understand how this capitalist prospecting operates, we asked our interlocutors about the developing relationships between humanitarians and the private sector as well as their own understandings of 'the market' and 'marketisation' in Kenya and beyond. Taking our cues from Berndt and Boeckler's call 'to engage with the process [of marketisation] as it realizes itself practically', especially its 'incomplete, contradictory, and ambivalent' nature' (Berndt and Boeckler 2023, 125), we were interested in the stories interviewees shared about the need to let market forces 'fix' problems of dependency and how these were rooted in recognisable spatial imaginaries about the trajectory of capitalist development among refugees. By focusing on decision-makers involved in planning, financing, and managing humanitarian operations, our study is aligned with ambitions of 'studying up' as a way to excavate and challenge circuits of institutional power and logics that often remain inaccessible to the public (Billo and Mountz 2016; Farah 2020; Nader 1972).

3. Refugee economies: race, spatial imaginaries, and surplus populations

In recent years there has been a surge in scholarship exploring the geographies of markets and the political economy of refugee humanitarianism. Several bodies of work have sought to shed light on the economic lives of refugees in camps and cities (Boeyink and Falisse 2022; Betts et al. 2017; Alloush et al. 2017; Werker 2007; Jacobsen 2005), prospects of refugee self-reliance (Toivonen 2023; Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018; Omata 2017), neoliberal responsabilisation of refugees as 'entrepreneurs' (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015), and humanitarian-business partnerships (Pascucci 2021; Weiss 2013). A

subset of this work focuses on racial economies of migration governance, humanitarianism, displacement, and corporate profiteering (Walia 2021; Rajaram 2018; Gahman and Hjalmarson 2019; Rodríguez 2018; Turner 2020; Frydenlund and Dunn 2022). As a result of their precarity as racialised non-citizens, subjects of aid, undocumented persons, or illegalised life-seekers, refugees and migrants are frequently pressed into economic niches, exploited as cheap labourers, or simply excluded from lawful employment altogether. Migration scholars have sought to understand this contradictory position of racialised refugees and migrants as both *disposable* and *essential* for capital accumulation (Bhagat 2020; Danewid, 2019; Soederberg 2021). As the burgeoning literature on racial capitalism shows, capitalism mobilises racial registers to create differential disposability and life chances in the interest of deriving profit from inequality and dehumanisation (Bhattacharyya 2018; Rajaram 2018; Tilley and Shilliam 2018, 537). In this article we follow those who have especially argued for more sustained attention to be paid to the spatiality inherent to maintaining 'relative surplus populations' and exploiting racialised migrant lives (see Dalakoglou 2016; Scott 2013; Bernards and Soederberg 2021). Bird and Schmid (2023) develop the notion of the 'migration fix' by which contradictions of global capitalism are channelled through, and become entangled with, practices of bordering, refugee protection, and migration management. Like Harvey's original concept of the 'spatial fix', this 'migration fix' arises from 'capitalism's insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring' (Harvey 2001, 24). However, it answers to social, economic, and political imperatives not necessarily with spatial expansion but may instead reconfigure existing governmental technologies to regulate, contain, or derive surpluses from migrants and refugees in other ways. We add to this work by showing how the efficacy of these fixes pivots on 'spatial imaginaries' that help to prescribe and ideologically underpin particular actions towards further marketisation and justify the economic transformation of refugee camps as common-sensical or 'inevitable' policies called for by the nature of the space itself. As socially held 'spatial stories', imaginaries of markets hold sway over institutions and people alike by circulating ideas about the economy, nature, society, and politics, thus creating shared imaginative vocabularies and foils through which the world is being made intelligible (Watkins 2015; Kothari 2006; Gregory 1995; Massey 2005). Yet spatial imaginaries are not reducible to the realm of discourse but underpin 'the material enforcement of certain ways of organising space and the relationship between society and space' (Massey 2005, 65). They materialise in concrete form 'into geographies when people act in relation to, and through [them]' (Watkins 2015, 509). Some scholars have specifically argued for recognising the 'performative' character of imaginaries and their ability to bring into being or *embody* the object of discourse rather than simply representing it (Gregory 2004; Gregson and Rose 2000). Doreen Massey has asserted that spatial imaginaries are not descriptions of the world, but 'image[s] in which the world is being made' (Massey 2005, 84). Bialasiewicz et al. (2007, 406) highlight in the context of the US 'War on Terror' how discursive imaginings of terrorism and threat are never only a medium to display an existing social reality, but they help to set in motion the creation of distinct geographies of militarisation, enmity, and conquest which ultimately 'produce the effect they name' through the 'performance of security'. We contend that something similar is at work in contemporary refugee humanitarianism in Kenya with regard to marketisation. Discourses and spatial imaginaries typically first appear in the growing number of reports that are published and referenced by organisations and academics alike and which then become 'implementable' by this self-propelled thickening of evidence. Camps and settlements are viewed as 'frontiers of capital', which are imagined to be not-yet fully integrated into the circuits of the global economy due to social, political, and geographical obstacles that need to be first overcome before capitalists can extract value and facilitate accumulation (Mezzadra and Neilson 2019). After all, capitalism relies on the constant reproduction of its multiple 'outsides' that comprise new areas into

¹ Website: <https://www.aecfafrica.org/about-us/our-story/> (accessed: 20 May 2023).

² Website: <https://kkcfke.org/> (accessed: 19 May 2023).

³ Website: <https://instaproducts.co/story/sustainable-action-project-in-turkana/> (accessed: 20 May 2023).

which it may constantly expand through processes of prospecting, speculation, and material extraction (Luxemburg 2003; Harvey 2001). Aid operations are envisioned as archetypical outsides of capitalist relations, seemingly exempted from competitive markets and instead rooted in moral ideas of equality, compassion, and equalising human welfare. Camps have often been loaded with stigma as sites of stasis, limbo, unproductive labour, or as holding spaces in which life is indefinitely suspended. Refugees who are contained within them are denigrated as differently valued economic subjects. We thus draw on Charles Mills' (1997) observation that *spatial* imaginaries are also *racial* imaginaries interlaced with colonial views of the world ordered according to hierarchies of humanity. As such, imaginaries 'stick' to the bodies of those who reside within a particular location, producing 'a circular indictment' (Mills 1997, 42): the moral properties of a certain space 'taint' its residents and, in turn, spaces are increasingly maligned because of the racial 'others' who dwell within them. Mills (Mills 1997, 41–42) calls this twofold process the 'racing of space' and the spacing of race, respectively. By interrogating the imaginaries projected onto Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei settlement, we can examine links between spaces of refuge and the kinds of macroeconomic rationalities and restructurings thought to be desirable, acceptable, or beneficial for the operations of capital. At the same time, the refugees who are contained in camps are denigrated as differently valued economic subjects whose very personhood is put in question (see Cacho 2012).

Rajaram posits that migrants and refugees embody what Marx calls 'relative surplus populations': a reserve army of labour that hovers at the edge of employability and production, being called upon when needed but also made expendable at will (Rajaram 2018; Marx 1976). Different surplus populations can be distinguished by their 'articulation in space' (Bernards and Soederberg 2021, 414). For instance, Marx refers to agrarian populations in rural areas as 'latent' surplus populations, spatially separated from urban proletarian workers, but threatened with displacement by forced movement to cities (Bernards 2021). While Marx's insights were temporally and geographically distinct, we find them useful to highlight how imaginaries shape the availability of surplus populations for accumulation. Latent surplus populations are not solely defined by their circumstantial relevance to the needs of capitalist production but 'the temporary and liminal nature of their status as "surplus"' (Bernards 2021, 442). They can either be brought within reach of capital through displacement to urban centres or the encroachment of capital itself into the rural peripheries. In the following analysis, we show first that refugee camps in Kenya are imagined likewise as exploitable peripheries where extractive opportunities are abundant and waiting to be 'utilised', and second that the result of these imaginaries is the creation of new social grammars of value and normative personhood to which refugees are expected to conform.

4. The camp as 'unproductive' space

Before delving into the details of how Kenya's camps are forged into 'frontiers' of capitalism, it is imperative to first understand their imagining as sites of *unproductivity*. Camps have long occupied a central place in debates on the economic lives of refugees. In the 1980s, protracted encampment began to be conceived in terms of the growing 'dependency' of forced migrants on the largesse of international agencies and northern donors. Drawing causal links between humanitarian aid and the psycho-social state of affected subject populations, this 'dependency syndrome' or 'mentality' marked out camps not only as emergency relief measures but catalysts in the creation of economic 'lethargy' (Mazur 1987; Harrell-Bond 1986). Critics countered that dependency narratives were not only empirically false, as refugees have always engaged in unregistered income-generating activities, but furthered legal disenfranchisement and precarity in relation to 'host' societies and their citizens (Kibreab 1994). Later observers reiterate that dependency discourses are at once politically motivated to justify cuts in aid provision and analytically misplaced because they 'blame the

symptom, rather than the cause' (Harvey and Lind 2005, 6; Reid and Al-Khalil 2013). Easton-Calabria and Herson (2020) even reject the negative connotations of the term altogether and suggest that people are inevitably entwined in an array of social, economic, physical, and emotional 'dispersed dependencies' that *define* our existence as social beings.

And yet, dependency remained a popular concern in policy and some academic circles, especially with respect to African refugees whose fate was thought to reflect the continent's marginality in the global economy (Taylor 2016). On 14 December 2001, UNHCR's then-Africa Bureau Director, Kolude Doherty, concluded a meeting on African displacement with a remark that 'refugees often develop a dependency syndrome as passive recipients of assistance' and that insecurities and protection problems in fact emerge from 'situations of enforced idleness.'⁴ Writing about the Kakuma camp around the same time, Jamal (2000, 23) cited the deficiency of loan schemes available to refugees as evidence that through encampment 'any moves towards partial independence are nipped in the bud'. Even after dependency as a frame slowly lost its original appeal, its newer iterations continued to depict refugees in camps as 'wasted lives' (Agier 2011), 'abandoned' (Vu 2007), or 'lives in storage' (USCRI 2019) with little economically productive use.

The camp space became the foil for this unproductivity. Although camps historically played a key role in transforming 'subjects into governable subjectivities for capital' (Welsh 2020, 107) by directly extracting labour, this was not necessarily the case for refugee camps which increasingly resembled welfare institutions of carceral control. If displacement disrupted economic productivity by tearing apart existing social and commercial networks, subsequent encampment was envisaged to cement this disruption through geographical isolation, hand-outs, and the stymieing of incentives for employment or investments. Agamben famously saw in the camp not only a physical site of control, but a metaphor for the workings of sovereign power in modernity: a 'space of exception' in which prevailing laws are suspended and substituted for alternative logics (Ek 2006; Agamben 1998). In the wake of this suspension, the encamped are supposedly reduced to biological beings, or what Agamben called 'bare life' (Agamben 1998). While this argument has been rightly criticised as reductive and at risk of denying openings for agency, counter-conducts, or claims-making 'from below' (Bousfield 2005; Martin et al., 2019; Woroniecka-krzyzanowska 2017), camps are indeed somewhat exceptional in that they produce special administrative arrangements and become spaces of economic exception. The charge of unproductivity itself hinges on the assumption that logics of market competition, accumulation, and supply-and-demand pricing systems are replaced with no-cost provision of food, healthcare, shelter, and material assistance within camp perimeters.

However, a growing body of scholarship has argued that this focus on individualised productivity masks the forms of labour and value that are already constantly being extracted through migration and refugee governance (Martin and Tazzioli 2023; Achtnich 2022; Martin, 2021). Coddington et al. (2020, 1426) describe carceral forms of migration control, including camps, as 'destitution economies' in which refugees produce value not necessarily through the conversion of labour power into surplus but simply through their lingering poverty and dependence. For instance, companies and governments extract material value from destitute refugees with insecure legal status by gaining profit from the provision of surveillance technologies or by collecting data from cashless transactions. They also gain affective symbolic value by producing destitute refugees as living deterrents for other (potential) migrants. Viewed in this way, the aid sector actually animates circuits of value as a feature of protracted encampment while simultaneously 'forsaking [...] migrants as economic subjects' (Coddington, Conlon, and Martin 2020, 1427).

⁴ See: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/african-ministers-review-refugee-problems> (accessed: 10 April 2023).

For many of our interviewees even the partial restriction of market forces as a function of providing aid was met with deep scepticism. Though often successful at preserving life, they saw in humanitarianism a source of ‘market distortions’ (Werker 2007) that seemed to inhibit rather than promote socio-economic prosperity. For example, a former UNHCR country representative in Kenya (2013–2018) explained to us that in his view in the early 2010s the Refugee Agency had effectively reached a ‘dead end’ with its care-and-maintenance models. As he noted, these ‘last forever and become a problem for the host community, a problem for security, a problem for people’s protection, [and] a problem for people’s self-esteem’ (Interview, 15 June 2021).

In another interview, UNHCR’s Livelihoods Officer and Head of Corporate and Shared Value Engagement was adamant that supplying in-kind goods, as humanitarian programmes usually do, ‘destroy[s] and kill[s] the incentives for private sector to come in and supply whatever goods and services [it] can’. For them, the root cause of the camp’s unproductivity essentially lay in its ‘bloated’ bureaucracy:

I think the best way to describe the refugee camp economy is a planned economy or a communist, socialist economy where you’ve got people [but] a dearth of private industry. You’ve got a government—the humanitarian sector—that controls, sometimes with the local government, [...] salaries, sometimes limits, puts a cap on how much you can make. Sometimes, you make as much money, regardless of what your job is. Whether you’re a medical doctor or a garbage man, you get the same salary, and it’s called an incentive payment. (Interview, 4 June 2021)

The trope of inefficient and ‘unproductive’ humanitarian economies resurfaces throughout our interviews and some academic literature. Betts (2021, 82), for example, suggests that encamped refugees languish ‘in a state of Soviet kolkhoz-like minimalism’ and advocates for the sector to move beyond basic survival and facilitate a ‘progressive expansion of entitlements and capabilities.’ Though humanitarian programmes are meant to defuse economic uncertainty and inequality by making aid available regardless of market dynamics, their critics draw hyperbolic parallels between refugees and supposedly disincorporated and ‘idle’ subjectivities associated with planned economies in post-Soviet space (see Dzarasov 2014; Åslund 2007). Camps are folded into received wisdom about other ‘unproductive’ spaces thought to lie outside the logics of capitalist markets, and which are neither considered beneficial for development nor ‘tasked with productive aims’ (Welsh 2020, 100). Besides analogies of socialist economies as negative models of inefficiency, these sentiments also reflect colonial modernity’s wider concern with quantifying and measuring the value of land and labour exclusively along the lines of capitalist logics. Thus, camps and their racialised residents in the global south in particular tend to be defined as ‘unproductive’ and ‘disposable’, especially if they exclusively rely on aid or fail to proactively embrace a life based on ‘commercial trade and marketized exchange’ (Bhandar 2018, 35; Brankamp and Daley 2020).

5. The camp as ‘frontier’ of the market

In 2013, one of our interlocutors was appointed as UNHCR Kenya country chief at a politically sensitive time. After a series of deadly ‘terrorist’ attacks shook the Dadaab camps and the capital Nairobi in years prior, Kenya invaded neighbouring Somalia in late 2011 in hot pursuit of Al-Shabaab militants who had claimed responsibility for the violence. Refugee camps on Kenyan territory, although sites of long-standing securitisation, were consequently subjected to further waves of popular suspicion and militarisation (Brankamp and Glück 2022). On top of being perceived as economically unproductive spaces that stifle market forces, the camps were also increasingly depicted as harmful to Kenya’s security and social cohesion. In this hostile climate, UNHCR was keen to move popular narratives away from centring ‘security’ to recognising the continued benefits of hosting refugees who were otherwise

thought of as a ‘burden’ (Zetter 2021). During our informant’s tenure as UNHCR Kenya representative (2013–2018), the agency began to pioneer market solutions to displacement that could ostensibly turn camps into motors of economic development.

The first approach was to create the earlier mentioned Kalobeyei integrated settlement and push for a ‘third way’ between camps and urban refugee policies. Second, UNHCR Kenya doubled down on its efforts to depict refugees as ‘resources’ that do not pose a threat to national security, but positively contribute to Kenya’s economy, as exemplified by two reports entitled “Yes” *In My Backyard?* (Sanghi, Onder, and Vemuru 2016) and *Kakuma as Marketplace* (IFC 2018). The authors of the latter expressed their astonishment and excitement when they travelled ‘to Kakuma camp at UNHCR’s invitation, [and] discovered a vibrant though informal market’ which, as they add, ‘had yet to be measured or monetized’ (IFC 2018, 5). The camp as a proto-capitalist space thus marked the spot where ‘material practices of prospecting and extraction’, to invoke Mezzadra and Neilson, is ‘hitting the ground’ (2019, 3–4).

Originally the embodiment of care-and-maintenance humanitarianism, Kakuma camp was refashioned—at pace—into a ‘frontier’ that had hitherto defied the onslaught of imposed market reforms, which Kenya had long undergone via the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) decades earlier. As the camp manager working for Kenya’s Department of Refugee Services proudly emphasised, ‘it is no longer the Kalobeyei of temporary shelters you saw in 2016. They have stone-built houses and the material is given through the banks’ (Interview 8 July 2021). ‘Frontiers’, writes anthropologist Anna Tsing, mark the ‘edge of space and time: a zone of not yet—not yet mapped, “not yet” regulated’ (Tsing 2003, 5100). More than simply a geographical place or process, the frontier is also an ‘imaginative project capable of moulding both places and processes’ (Tsing 2003, 5102). While Turkana County and Kenya’s northern periphery constituted literal frontiers of state control during the colonial and postcolonial eras (Lind 2017), refugee camps specifically have been rediscovered as liminal spaces marked by low penetration of private capital and rife with opportunities for investments and profiteering. In an ironic twist, the political technology of the camp, once deployed to ‘tame’ and subdued frontier spaces (Katz 2015), had itself become part of what Mezzadra and Neilson call ‘frontiers of extraction’ or ‘frontiers of capital’ in late modern capitalism where not only natural resources are exploited or appropriated, but also ‘forms of human cooperation and social activity’ (2017, 194; 2019). Accordingly, a recent IFC note (2021, 1) quite literally portrayed private sector development as ‘a new frontier in refugee contexts’. Within the pioneering logic of opening up such frontiers, the IKEA Foundation’s Head of Refugee Livelihoods underlined to us the necessity to make the economic activities of refugees less dependent on the safety net of humanitarianism to fully valorise their productive socialities:

Maybe the design of those [traditional humanitarian] programmes wasn’t such that it would allow for longer-term impacts. We’ve seen so many subsidised, artisan supply chains, and as soon as the donor funding leaves, it falls apart. Whereas [we are] making sure that people go beyond just subsistence with asset-building market engagements (7 July 2022).

Related narratives of refugee self-reliance, entrepreneurialism, and ‘shrewd’ sense of business fell on fertile ground in Kenya, which has long seen itself as a ‘hustler nation’ whose lifeblood is its youth’s incessant striving for economic opportunities against all odds (Mwaura 2017; Thieme, Ference, and Van Stapele 2021). Having first emerged in Kenya’s precarious urban worlds, Thieme (2018, 537) notes that the concept of ‘the “hustle” infers a constant pragmatic search for alternative structures of opportunity outside formal education, employment, and service provision’. By romanticising uncertainty and informality, ‘hustling’ became a way of coping for many precarious citizens after the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed far-

reaching reform packages that defunded large swaths of the Kenyan state economy and systematically immiserated the poorest and most vulnerable (Bhagat 2020). Officially ‘rationalising’ government expenditure, SAPs ravaged development prospects in Kenya and across the continent, withdrawing subsidies from public services that were providing necessities like food, sanitation, education, housing, and healthcare (Kang’ara, 1998; Rono 2002; Kabubo-Mariara and Kiriti 2002). Cassandra Veney (2007) observes that SAPs also hampered Kenya’s capacity to respond to disasters and refugee arrivals as they tied funding for social policies to ever more drastic rounds of privatisation and liberalisation. Because Kenya’s public social spending was systematically eroded during this time, further normalising cultures of ‘hustling’, the economic exceptionalism of humanitarian welfare in camps could easily be branded as out of touch with Kenyan realities and as representing a ‘last frontier’ of market reforms. The CEO of the IKEA Foundation expressed this sentiment when discussing the future of humanitarianism in the country:

It needs to be profitable. It needs to be set up in a way that you can make a profit every year, because otherwise, at least it needs to be self-carrying. [...] You can’t make it dependent on constant aid money every year. You have to do it in the way that any business is developed in the rest of that country where the refugees reside. It’s not like everyone lives off aid in Kenya. Most people are setting up their own businesses, [there are] lots of entrepreneurs. (Interview, 20 July 2022)

The camp frontier seemed to offer possibilities of aligning the aid landscape with the precarity-driven logics of Kenya’s neoliberal economy. AECF, which manages the Kakuma Kalobeyei Challenge Fund, for instance, prides itself as ‘committed to working in frontier markets, fragile contexts, and high-risk economies where few mainstream financing institutions dare to go’.⁵ The complementary roll-out of MasterCard and Western Union schemes to increase financial literacy among refugees in anticipation of future profitable transactions are further examples of this frontier imaginary of the camp and its material effects.

Following Mezzadra and Neilson, today’s destruction of ‘institutional arrangements’ in which profit-making is *not* the primary driving logic, such as humanitarian relief, ‘has opened up spaces for the further expansion of capital’s frontiers by means of the intensification and exploitation of forms of social cooperation’ (2019, 183). The powerful actors who advance this expansion across multiple frontiers perpetually reimagine both the spaces in which it unfolds and the subjects of potential future accumulation. Mezzadra and Neilson (2019, 166) argue that while ‘traditional’ figures such as miners, dock workers, or traders have loomed large in our collective analyses of capitalist environments, ‘it is [now] perhaps more necessary to map and interrogate the ways in which the operations of capital involve extractive logics that affect other figures of labor and life’. Through prospecting at the humanitarian frontiers of capital, the once compassionate mission to ‘save lives’ becomes inextricably linked to ‘economic rationales of growth, value and accumulation’, which are producing new logics of delivering aid through a ‘dual imperative of protection and productivity’ (Ramsay 2020, 9). As performative acts, spatial imaginaries about refugee camps are at the forefront of creating a new social reality emanating from within elite circles in aid agencies, financial institutions, and corporations. These circles.

aim to convert existing camp markets in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, thought to be ‘external’ to the global circuits of capital, into more legibly profitable, productive, or monetised economies. In so doing, they also produce the conditions for the reformulation of refugee personhood in

these reconfigured markets, as we will show in the next section.

6. Becoming ‘human’ at the frontier

Within the spatial imaginaries of market-based humanitarianism, creating favourable market conditions at frontiers is a precondition for revalorising refugee lives. We take Soederberg and Bernard’s (2021, 416) observation that ‘creating and maintaining surplus populations is as much about generating links between places where surplus labour is created and places where it can be valorized’ one step further, arguing that through marketisation of refugee aid, a specific type of normative humanity emerges in which the market is thought to *precede* and, indeed, *make* the human. Following the spatial imaginaries described in the previous sections, as long as the camp is perceived to be outside global circuits of capital—and its supposed merits in the form of investments, financial inclusion, and job opportunities—the transformation into *hominis oeconomici* remains largely out of reach for refugees who live there. We argue that our research participants’ spatial imaginaries of the camp as unproductive space, which needs to be transformed into the refugee settlement as the last frontier of ‘the market’, shapes their understanding of the refugees residing in those spaces. In the words of the CEO of the IKEA foundation,

[Refugees] in camps [...] have no purpose in life, because they’re not allowed to work, they’re not allowed to do anything, but sitting there and waiting for a time to go back, and time to go back can be never or in 20 years. It’s undignified and it’s a lost opportunity. (Interview, 20 July 2021)

In this spatial imaginary, the suffering of refugees is no longer attributed to their displacement but to idleness and lack of ‘productivity’. Moreover, the desire to be productive and integrated in the market is deemed a universal principle of human existence which, as Rajaram notes, ‘must be shared [even] by the non-labouring surplus population’ (2018, 633). And yet, in the eyes of both humanitarian and private sector actors, to be reliant on the productivity of others is considered the ultimate dehumanising experience. In their understanding, it was often only ‘old-fashioned’ humanitarians who had not yet acknowledged this essential human desire. As one corporate executive explained accordingly:

I’ll tell the humanitarian, “The Somali guy does not want you to give him that \$2, that \$4, that \$5. He wants you to give him that \$10,000 and he will show you how it will be \$100,000 in another two years, three years” (Interview, 30 June 2021).

This remark is steeped in racialised ideas about Somalis’ ‘natural’ entrepreneurial disposition and potentially creates a discourse of difference between ‘passive’ aid recipients versus refugees who are proactively striving for comprehensive inclusion into global capitalism and signal their virtue as deserving economic actors. Most importantly, aid itself is reinterpreted as the source of dehumanisation. In lieu of political or humanitarian support, refugee protection is hence construed, as Turner also found in Jordan, as a matter of being ‘allowed to embrace the forces of free-market capitalism’ (Turner 2020, 139). As we will show, the transformation of refugees from what Mills would call ‘question-mark humans’ (1997, 23), with at most ‘raw’ entrepreneurial skills, to ‘full’ human (market) beings is imagined as requiring a generative environment.

The Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (KISEDIP) illustrates this primacy of the market before the production of the refugee as human (market) being. According to the UNHCR, KISEDIP relies on two building blocks: first to ‘create an enabling environment’ including local capabilities, amenable legal frameworks, resilient communities, and ‘a conducive environment for investment and job creation’. The second is to ‘build people’s skills and capabilities to *successfully function in this new environment* and to enhance the overall local economy’ (UNHCR, 2018, x, italics added). The first building block

⁵ Website: <https://www.aecfafrica.org/approach/how-we-invest/> (accessed: 25 May 2023).

represents a spatial imaginary in which the refugee resettlement as capitalist market is considered the ultimate enabling factor for those inhabiting the frontier, consolidating market-based logics and mentalities. Echoing a presumed shift from the camp as unproductive space to the matured circuits of global capital offered by the reconfigured refugee resettlement, Kakuma's Camp Manager explained: 'In Kakuma it's hawking, peddling your wares here and there, but in Kalobeyei we have a *formal market*, a *modern market* that you'll find in towns or even Nairobi [Kenya's economic centre]' (Interview, 8 July 2021). Here Kakuma embodies the market as a tangible, physical location of trade and exchange imbued with thick social relations based on need, while Kalobeyei showcases the ideal of a 'modern' market with greater potential for accumulation, growth, and investment. While the former may help in ensuring the survival of refugees, only the latter is perceived to provide a suitable environment for them to fulfil their full 'human' potential.

However, to gain the capacity to thrive and not just 'survive' in this environment, camp dwellers are thought to require professional guidance and 'training' under the second building block of KISED. Humanitarian organisations in liaison with private companies play a key role in this training, as a former UNHCR Head of the Kakuma operation explains:

We have a number of programmes now that are geared towards people who have to have the digital skills, so they can then do an online marketing test. There are a number of refugees who are actually doing that which is really remarkable. Some are sitting in Kakuma, have never left Kakuma, and are working for Mastercard, or whatever, in their online system and are dealing with clients online. (Interview 14 July 2021)

Through marketisation, refugee settlements can ostensibly be turned into global 'call centres', where refugees are trained to become modern 'tech workers' who convert their human capital into globally recognised services or commodities. In pursuing the 'lifting up' of existing local capacity, these imaginaries also echo colonial attempts to educate colonised subjects into being modern 'almost Europeans' (White 1996; Mudimbe 1988). In Kenya's contemporary camps, this racial logic of a development ladder was more subdued but nonetheless present. Refugees are simultaneously idealised as harbingers of a 'raw' and yet unpolished entrepreneurial spirit that is treated as almost synonymous with humanness. Once trained as full capitalist human (market) beings, refugees are expected to facilitate global money flows while they themselves are kept stationary and controlled as latent relative surplus populations or a 'captive labour force' (Coddington, Conlon, and Martin 2020, 1432) within Kenya's borders and the camp. The CEO of the IKEA Foundation sketched an idealised linear path on which refugees could 'graduate' from basic survival, to self-employed entrepreneur, to small business manager:

People are used to setting up their own small businesses in the informal sector. If you can commercialise that and formalise that by giving people the necessary education to set it up at a different level than they otherwise could do, that's the kind of work we do in our entrepreneurship work. (Interview, 20 July 2021)

Crucially, however, integration into 'markets' is only partially done through productive labour. Equally key is refugees assuming roles as borrowers and consumers, enabled by the fact that 'the camp is transformed into a marketplace while simultaneously transforming the aid industry into the loan industry' (Baghat 2021, 501). Obtaining credit for business investments is hereby also recast as a skill to be developed and trained. In May 2022, the IFC announced the first 40 winners of a business competition it had organised together with Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) (IFC 2022). As AECF's CEO explained 'we don't give grants; we give returnable capital' which, as a former UNHCR Head of Kakuma Office argued, helps to train refugees to be 'in a better position to take advantage' of the transformed camp environment (Interviews, 30 June 2021 and 14 July 2021). Key to this opportunity for

refugees to remake themselves was their ability to exercise 'choice' as an element of modern consumerism that departed from more traditional systems of humanitarian welfare. To become human is therefore understood as 'graduating' from being a mere *recipient* of aid to being a *consumer* of products. A former UNHCR official responsible for fundraising echoed this sentiment and alleged that refugees could alter this subject position until they regained full control over their economic choices and decision-making (Interview, 2 July 2021). In the camp economies, this ideological fixation on personal choice was best exemplified by the 2015 roll-out of *Bamba Chakula*—a food voucher system that allows refugees to purchase food at local vendors rather than agency-run food distribution centres. The former Head of Corporate Responsibility at *Safaricom*, the Kenyan telecommunication company facilitating this mobile money-based system, emphasised the scheme's key role in giving back to refugees the 'dignity of being able to hold your money, save your money, make choices' (Interview, 7 July 2021). While more choice for refugees in their consumption of food and other basic items is desirable, the discursive reduction of dignity to individualistic neoliberal dispositions for handling money is not. Despite liberal pretensions, such normative ideas around what constitutes a desirable refugee consumer ultimately reaffirm, rather than dispel, the distinction between the 'human' and the 'nonhuman'.

7. Camp paupers and the 'value' of refugee personhood

If we take seriously Lisa Marie Cacho's (2012, 18) argument that social value is 'ascribed through explicitly or implicitly disavowing relationships to the already devalued and disciplined categories of deviance and nonnormativity', then the imaginaries of transformative economic reforms that render once 'dependent' refugees into 'entrepreneurial' market actors are rooted in the devaluation of alternative forms of personhood that operations of capital seek to negate. Turner (2020) has illustrated how this relationality of value works to set 'self-driven' Syrian refugees against supposedly 'lazy' African refugees in a global humanitarian imaginary.

Race acts here not only as 'a methodology of 'social value' (Cacho 2012, 17) but, importantly, also 'spatial' value with which certain groups and geographical locations are depreciated. There is a growing recognition among scholars that ideas around the 'proper' economic and political subject are rooted in the overrepresentation of white bourgeois 'Man' as the default biocentric referent 'conception of the human' which, by definition, devalues 'other' forms of personhood (Pallister-Wilkins 2022; Benton 2016). While our interlocutors considered most refugees in Kenya potentially redeemable as full human (market) beings, given appropriate 'guidance' to fit the logics of late capitalism, they hinted at a subaltern group which to them was irrecoverably locked outside of global circuits of labour, finance, and knowledge. As Rajaram notes, alongside available surplus populations, there is a 'pauperised population of [...] individuals and groups without the wherewithal, the attributed value, to be recognised and move from conditions of surplus' (2018, 636). According to many of our interviewees it is for this group that the limited 'pure' humanitarian aid should be reserved, as they are presumed unable to escape their undignified life of economic unproductivity and lethargy. Ironically, this 'pure' humanitarian approach is thus shifted to those populations who are themselves considered not fully human within the biocentric hierarchies that underpin humanitarianism. The imagined inability, or disinterest, of this residual *lumpenproletariat* of the displaced to convert their basic 'human capital' into what is deemed legitimate economic 'value' ultimately attests to their eligibility for aid, but necessary exclusion from capitalist modernity and its aspirational horizon of what it means to be human.

The capitalist 'value' of refugees is also disaggregated by gender, ability, and age, with women and youth being imagined as furthest removed from the supposedly universal model of a male, able-bodied human (market) being. Several interviewees referred to women or mothers and children as archetypal vulnerable figures, though with a

shifting narrative about their needs and the most appropriate form of support. As the former UNHCR Kenya country representative explained to us:

If I tell my mother that we're doing business in the refugee camp, she will, of course, say: "What is this? You were sent to go and support the widow and the orphan, not to go and do business," but then you realise that the widow needs business because she [would not like] to be seen as a victim for the rest of her life. (Interview 15 June 2021)

His metaphorical 'mother' is here a stand in for the older generation of humanitarians who hold on to 'outdated' notions of charity and dignity. His quote echoes widely used humanitarian tropes of the vulnerable widow and orphan in need of care. The UNHCR official's implicit critique of viewing refugees as victims undoubtedly aligns with perspectives offered by many critical scholars who have, time and again, highlighted the agency of refugees (Bousfield 2005; Kallio, Häkli, and Pascucci 2019), but deviates where, for him, the solution to the plight of refugees lies in their propensity for 'business'. But the classic trope of 'feminised' vulnerability also gets subverted in this marketisation logic, in which the widow is now presented as able to escape victimhood not through structural change in the conditions that led to her encampment, but her own personal economic empowerment. Differentiations by age, gender, and ability are further reinforced in the *Global Compact on Refugee* (UN, 2018, 27), which outlines that labour market skills and qualifications need to be strengthened 'linked to market opportunities, in particular for women, persons with disabilities, and youth'. In this labour-focused narrative, the old moniker 'womenandchildren', denoting vulnerability and paternalistic care relations (Enloe 1993), has been adapted to become 'womenand youth'—a category that both indicates a harder to reach group, but also further untapped potential.

But while certain groups within the refugee surplus population of camps are singled out due to social characteristics, such as gender (Rajaram 2018), under the normative assumptions underpinning the imaginary of the camp as a frontier market, every refugee remains at risk of ultimately failing to be made 'productive'. As Bernhards notes, 'the 'latent surplus population' is an aggregate of ongoing patterns of practice, not a label for a discrete group of people' (2021, 442). The refugee, who is viewed as a subject who must develop the 'skills and capabilities to successfully function in this new environment' (UNHCR, 2018, x) moves 'between different modes of existence and between the "surplus" and "working" population' (Bernhards 2021, 442). Our participants' optimistic imaginaries of refugees' potential waiting to be unlocked by the transformative power of refugee settlements, contained slippages in which the unproductive refugee reappeared as the shadowy 'other' of the refugee who is successfully remade as human (market) being.

The spatial imaginaries of market-based humanitarianism seem to intervene positively against disempowering anti-asylum narratives, and reinforce that refugees are much more than suffering bodies ('bare life') or financial 'burdens', but can be productive members of society, resources, and indeed 'normal people like you and me', as one author of IFC's *Kakuma as a Marketplace* report reiterated. As she added, 'they are refugees, which puts them in a very vulnerable position, but can we have them *actually use* [...] their human capital to *make* something out of it?' (Interview, 16 June 2021). Taking Bhagat's (2022, 957) observation that refugees 'as racialized bodies in capitalism' must translate their lives into social value 'in order to survive' to its extreme, they must be productive to be considered human. This is ironic, not least because narratives of refugees as resources themselves are based on distinctions between the 'human' and 'nonhuman' to determine the commodities that warrant extraction (Weima 2021, 21). And yet this slippage speaks to the fraught workings of race in discourses of marketisation in which 'humanness' is expressed as a shifting category that racialised refugee subjects must constantly pursue.

In the eyes of many interlocutors, market-based approaches aim to re-create a sense of normalcy in refugee livelihoods, against frameworks of 'emergency' and 'exception' that have dominated the aid industry for

long. The former UNHCR representative in Kenya explained in this context:

We humanitarians, we should realise that the end of our objective is not to keep people in a situation of dependency. Our objective is to get people back to *normal*. To get somebody who used to be a mechanic, a farmer or a... I don't know what—but get the person to be able to continue to do what he or she was, and that's *to live normally, be in the market, sell his or her products, and that's private sector*. So how do you make sure that this person is in the position of doing that? The humanitarian assistance is, and should be a short-term thing, leading to *normalcy*, and that *normalcy has to happen*. (Interview, 15 June 2021)

By insisting that refugees must become 'normal', or return to normalcy through interpellation into frontier capitalism, those unwilling or unable to meet this norm are cast outside humanity. It is this 'violence of value', its reliance on constituting itself against the backdrop of an object of devaluation, that works only if one 'accepts that discrimination against non-valued others is legitimate and necessary' (Cacho 2012, 18). Because the operations of capital not only depend on encroaching on material resources that lie outside its remit but also exterior social relations, value also becomes a weapon in the usurpation of normative refugee 'personhood'. One private sector representative argued that 'refugees and displaced people do (and aspire to do) the same things as anybody else. [...] you want to be able to be economically empowered' (Interview 17 June 2021). This signals the (re)production of an authorised version of 'being' a refugee that resonates with the objectives of marketisation agendas. In the laboratory of humanitarianism in Kenya, refugees can ultimately only prove their worth as humans by learning the skills deemed necessary to find their place at the capitalist camp frontier. But rather than fulfilling the promise of self-driven empowerment and prosperity, that policymakers and their corporate partners make, refugees are often reduced to perennial 'apprenticeship' in a raced market that is stacked against them, pursuing the fiction of eventual inclusion that may never materialise.

8. Conclusion

The Kalobeyei integrated settlement and Kakuma camp in Kenya are globally significant sites where new spatial imaginaries of economic thriving and refugee personhood are being forged, disseminated, and tested. As we have shown, since the 2010 s, aid and corporate actors in the country have fostered a 'thick' network of those who believe that marketisation will eventually, as Permanent Secretary Julius Bitok recently suggested, benefit refugees, businesses, and 'host' governments alike in the pursuit to 'convert the crises into opportunities.' The rebranding of Kakuma as a 'marketplace', and the promotion of KISEDIP as a showcase for putting the Global Compact on Refugees into practice, are further indicative of the prospecting logics that seek to break up 'unprofitable' humanitarian economies, explore ways of restructuring camp markets according to neoliberal principles, and ensure future profits feed more easily into global circuits of capital.

This article has drawn on interviews with key members of this thick network to show that shared 'spatial imaginaries' among elite decision- and policymakers in the aid industry, alongside their corporate partners, both prefigure and set into motion the extractive operations of capital that increasingly encroach on spaces of refugee aid. These powerful actors reimagine humanitarianism from being a flawed, but necessary, stop-gap measure to help the world's displaced and dispossessed to being a 'last bastion' of central planning that is a drain on public resources and ultimately harms the productivity, and therefore humanity, of its 'beneficiaries'. We suggest there is a chain of imaginaries at work, beginning with the camp being reimagined from a locus of socio-economic 'dependency' to a new 'frontier' where capitalist prospectors, investors, and private businesses make common cause with humanitarians in the interest of the wider 'public good'. But this capitalist

prospecting simultaneously alters the terms of refugee personhood as the frontier is thought of as an enabling environment from which an improved economic refugee personhood can emerge. Against popular depictions of refugees as ‘burdens’, our interlocutors viewed most encamped refugees as entrepreneurial capitalists-in-the-making who are only inhibited by their lack of training, humanitarian welfarism, and the deficiency of the proto-capitalist camp environment. And yet this potentiality of the latent surplus population of refugees excluded certain sections of camp dwellers essentially depicted as paupers, whose ‘value’ could not easily be made legible within market logics. Examining this chain of spatial imaginaries allows us not only to parse out ways in which market-based approaches are justified in places previously ‘shielded’ from unrestrained market forces but illustrates how they are also made material by bringing into existence the very spatial formations that they aim to transform. This offers new insights on the imaginative geographies that underpin the relationship between refugee governance and capitalist accumulation in its ‘context-specific configurations’ (Martin and Tazzioli 2023, 204).

As Khalili (2020, 267) poignantly observed, ‘unwarranted optimism is the magical ingredient in capital accumulation.’ In light of this, finally, we argue that while the optimism expressed through the spatial imaginaries presented in this article may first appear seductive, in that they promise to restore the dignity of refugees who are often systematically criminalised, dehumanised, and excluded, these spatial stories ultimately enable less virtuous economic practices and help to materialise new forms of exploitation. The imaginary of the camp as frontier, where markets and subjectivities are open for negotiation and ‘moulding’ (Tsing 2003, 5102), bears significant risks. While it seems to provide an avenue for reclaiming a ‘normal’ life of employment, consumption, and socio-economic self-worth, this kind of normalcy itself privileges the self-driven capitalist actor whose empowerment correlates with the simultaneous devaluation of ‘others’ who fail to conform to this ideal. It also serves to keep out of sight the root causes of displacement and injustice, as refugee suffering is primarily attributed to idleness and humanitarian handouts, while artfully concealing the complicity of global corporations and financial institutions in perpetuating the exploitative operations of capital.

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