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1 **Placing a value on increased flexible vaccine manufacturing capacity for future pandemics**

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31 manufacturing; Health Technology Assessment.

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33

34

35 The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the enormous health, social and economic costs that can
36 result from a global pandemic. It has also illustrated that even when vaccines can be rapidly
37 developed for a novel pandemic-causing infection there are substantial challenges to rapidly mass-
38 manufacturing vaccines to meet global demands. Many of these challenges to the rapid mass-
39 production of vaccines are not unique to a pandemic vaccine but COVID-19 has demonstrated the
40 substantial health and economic costs of delays in a pandemic situation. In the case of COVID-19 the
41 lack of capacity in many countries to make novel vaccines was a significant bottleneck in the
42 manufacturing process. The faster that safe and effective vaccines can be mass-manufactured for an
43 emergent infectious threat, the greater the potential to reduce the global health and economic
44 burden. This raises the question of what steps can be taken to help make rapid mass-production of
45 vaccines easier in the event of future pandemics.

46
47 The existing resources in place to manufacture non-pandemic vaccines (including equipment,
48 facilities, and human capital) can play a critically important role in the ability to respond to an
49 emerging pandemic. This is because it takes significant time to create new capacity, so the use of
50 existing resources forms a key element in tackling emerging threats. For example, constructing,
51 equipping, validating and starting up a new vaccine manufacturing facility takes several years [1].
52 Moreover, the training of specialised manufacturing and quality control staff, and manufacturing of
53 the required equipment cannot be done rapidly at scale. While there are important challenges to the
54 adaption of existing manufacturing resources to develop and produce a new vaccine, the long lead
55 times to create and expand production capacity mean that the magnitude and type of existing
56 vaccine manufacturing capacity can be critical.

57
58 An important issue when discussing vaccine manufacturing capacity is the technology utilised. In
59 planning for a future pandemic, benefits may emerge from trying to ensure that there is flexibility of
60 vaccine manufacturing capacity. Vaccine production platform technologies (e.g. the RNA platform)
61 offer the possibility to rapidly develop new candidate vaccines and mass-produce these vaccines
62 once approved by the regulatory authorities. By definition, platform technologies allow the
63 production of multiple vaccine products against multiple diseases using the same production
64 process, raw materials, personnel, facilities and quality control methodologies. This disease-agnostic
65 nature of platforms is a substantial advantage compared to conventional disease-specific vaccine
66 production modalities. The development and mass-production of new vaccines can be further
67 accelerated by re-using the manufacturing platform *knowledge* being generated, which can serve as
68 prior knowledge when producing new vaccines [2]. In the case of RNA vaccines, production is
69 associated with high variable costs (due to expensive raw materials) and relatively low fixed costs
70 (due to small scale facilities)[3], thus the RNA vaccine platform is likely to be more cost-effective for
71 maintaining surge or slack capacity for future pandemic response. Other platform technologies may
72 also be potentially useful in the future, for example, the DNA vaccine platform, if the intra-cellular
73 DNA delivery challenges are solved [4].

74
75 Maintaining and funding pandemic-response vaccine manufacturing capacity during non-pandemic
76 times is a challenge yet to be solved. Keeping outbreak-response vaccine manufacturing facilities
77 entirely idle during non-pandemic times is difficult as workforce skills will be lost, and capital goods
78 will depreciate. A more feasible option is to increase flexible vaccine manufacturing capacity. In the
79 case of RNA platform technology, flexible capacity could be utilised during non-pandemic times to
80 produce RNA-based candidates for clinical trials and routine RNA-based vaccines and therapeutics
81 (after approval by regulatory authorities). These flexible facilities could have parallel RNA production
82 lines which could then be redeployed for outbreak-response manufacturing when needed. However,
83 it will be essential to limit disruption in manufacturing other life-saving vaccines/therapeutics if
84 these flexible production facilities are redeployed for outbreak-response manufacturing. This might
85 potentially be achieved by, for example: 1) managing strategic buffer stockpiles of routine vaccines,

86 2) maintaining extra capacity in non-outbreak times by over-scaling a proportion of manufacturing
87 facilities and using this excess capacity/scale for outbreak-response manufacturing. In an extreme
88 situation of a very severe emergent pandemic then consideration may need to be given to
89 prioritisation in manufacturing (e.g. reduction in production of some other products to allow greater
90 production of a pandemic vaccine).

91
92 One way to increase flexible vaccine manufacturing capacity is to recognise and place a value on
93 flexible non-pandemic manufacturing capacity as insurance for a future pandemic. That is, to
94 recognise that the funding of flexible non-pandemic vaccines may not only bring benefits from the
95 disease being prevented, but also has an additional benefit in increasing the resting stock of
96 resources that could potentially be used in a pandemic. At present, all else being equal, the financial
97 incentives to produce conventional vaccines are the same as those to produce more flexible
98 platform-based vaccines, as the potential spill over benefits from more flexible vaccines are not
99 currently valued [5]. While global pandemics of the magnitude of COVID-19 have not been common
100 over the last century, the sheer scale of costs involved, which have been estimated in the trillions of
101 dollars for COVID-19 [6], means that insurance is likely to have significant value. The social value of
102 accelerating vaccine supply in a pandemic has been estimated to be in the trillions of dollars [6].
103

104 Methods have been proposed to estimate the potential future value (i.e. ex ante value, most notably
105 so called “option value”, including insurance value [7, 8]) of medical innovations. The benefits of
106 having flexible vaccine production platforms available that can be quickly repurposed for pandemic
107 vaccine production, can be potentially valued using techniques that try to estimate how much
108 society should be willing to pay (e.g. using contingent valuation) for this benefit or estimate by
109 macroeconomic model-based scenario analysis the value (benefits) of faster deployment of a
110 pandemic vaccine. For instance, if COVID-19 pandemic vaccine production had been faster after
111 regulatory approval reaching more populations around the globe, the value of that faster pace
112 would be large, as it relates to worldwide improved wellbeing, economic activity, and disease
113 prevention [6]. At the same time more rapid manufacturing of a pandemic vaccine may reduce
114 inequities in global vaccine distribution and population health.
115

116 The decision making around the funding of non-pandemic vaccines in many countries is heavily
117 influenced by economic assessment [9]. However, the creation of additional flexible manufacturing
118 capacity as insurance for a future pandemic is not currently formally valued as part of this evaluation
119 process. Recognition of this value could potentially involve countries with the greatest financial
120 means paying more for non-pandemic vaccines (or funding vaccines for sub-populations who would
121 otherwise not be cost-effective), where their production provides pandemic insurance value that
122 enables more rapid roll out of pandemic vaccines should the need arise. It will be important, when
123 expanding the economic assessment to include option value to avoid double counting benefits [10],
124 and contractual arrangements would need to be in place to ensure that any additional
125 manufacturing capacity could be utilised in an emergency. Through the inclusion of this option value,
126 these vaccines would be more likely to be cost-effective and funded (or funded for a wider
127 population), and consequently increase flexible vaccine manufacturing capacity for a future
128 pandemic emergency.
129

130 It may be that the insurance value varies substantially depending on the manufacturing method
131 used and the probability that adding capacity to a given platform will be helpful for future pandemic
132 vaccines. For example, the insurance value of funding vaccines using rapid-response platforms (e.g.
133 the RNA platform) may be greater as compared to more conventional and slower vaccine production
134 processes. However, given the uncertainty of a future threat, there may also be benefits to having
135 diversity in manufacturing capacity, for example, maintaining capacity for outbreak-response
136 manufacturing of whole inactivated viral vaccines, bacterial vaccine production modalities,

137 recombinant protein vaccines and adenoviral vectored vaccines. Consideration could also be given
138 to the potential biosecurity risks of different vaccine technologies [11].

139

140 Placing an appropriate value on different forms of vaccine manufacturing to help combat a future
141 emergent threat is a complex challenge. However, it is a challenge worth addressing given the
142 importance of increasing future pandemic preparedness. To date there has been very limited
143 research on how to determine what this value would be for pandemics or for other infectious
144 disease emergencies. As indicated above, conceptual methods exist that can be built upon to focus
145 on the specific issue of valuing the speed of global vaccine deployment in times of crisis. This may at
146 least partly imply revisiting the valuation and funding (e.g. through drug reimbursement
147 committees) of non-pandemic vaccines, if this could lead to expansion and/or innovation of flexible
148 vaccine production platforms. We hope this commentary can inspire research in this regard.

149 **Conflicts of interest**

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153 The Office of Health Economics is a not-for-profit which receives research and consulting income
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157

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