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## Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?

My aim in this paper is to consider one of Peirce's criticisms of Hegel, namely, that Hegel was a nominalist.<sup>1</sup> Of the various criticisms of Hegel that Peirce offers, this has been little discussed, perhaps because it is puzzling to find Peirce making it at all. For, Peirce also criticises Hegel for his overzealous enthusiasm for Thirdness, where it is then hard to see how Hegel *can* have both faults: how can anyone who acknowledges the significance of Thirdness in Peirce's sense also fail to be a realist? I will begin by setting out this difficulty and showing how it can be resolved, and will then consider the justice of Peirce's criticism once we have a clear idea of what it amounts to. I will suggest that this criticism is unwarranted, and that in some respects it is curious to find Peirce making it, when he could just as easily have treated Hegel as an ally in the struggle with nominalism. The issue therefore takes us to the heart of Peircean and Hegelian metaphysics, and in a way that relates to questions that are central to contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature of realism, idealism, and anti-realism.<sup>2</sup>

### I

Whereas in the case of Peirce's other criticisms of Hegel,<sup>3</sup> there is no internal difficulty in seeing how Peirce might have thought (rightly or wrongly) that Hegel could have been guilty of the mistake of which he is accused, in the case of his criticism of Hegel as a nominalist, there is an apparent tension to be overcome, between this criticism and Peirce's claim that Hegel was also overcommitted to Thirdness:<sup>4</sup> how *can* Peirce make *both* these claims about Hegel, when on his understanding of each position, it would seem that each excludes the other?<sup>5</sup> I will begin by exploring the context in which Peirce makes both of these criticisms, and why their juxtaposition is *prima facie* surprising, before offering a solution to the puzzle.

The criticism of Hegel as a nominalist that I am concerned with is made at its clearest in the paper "On Phenomenology", which forms the text of his second Harvard lecture delivered on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1903; and it is here where the juxtaposition of the criticism with claims about Hegel's commitment to Thirdness is also at its sharpest. In this text, Peirce offers a phenomenological

approach to the investigation of the categories as “an element of phenomena of the first rank of generality”: “The business of phenomenology is to draw up a catalogue and prove its sufficiency and freedom from redundancies, to make out the characteristics of each category, and to show the relations of each to the others”.<sup>6</sup> Peirce says he will focus on the “universal order” of the categories, which form a “short list”, and notes the similarity between his list and Hegel’s, while denying any direct influence: “My intention this evening is to limit myself to the Universal, or Short List of Categories, and I may say, at once, that I consider Hegel’s three stages [of thought] as being, roughly speaking, the correct list of Universal Categories.<sup>7</sup> I regard the fact that I reached the same result as he did by a process as unlike his as possible, at a time when my attitude toward him was rather one of contempt than of awe,<sup>8</sup> and without being influenced by him in any discernible way however slightly, as being a not inconsiderable argument in favor of the correctness of the list. For if I am mistaken in thinking that my thought was uninfluenced by his, it would seem to follow that that thought was of a quality which gave it a secret power, that would in itself argue pretty strongly for its truth”.<sup>9</sup>

In Peirce’s terminology, the “short list” comprises the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although he does not introduce that terminology until the next lecture. Here, he offers a characterisation of the first two categories in phenomenological terms, beginning with Firstness, which he identifies with *presentness*.

Go out under the blue dome of heaven and look at what is present as it appears to the artist’s eye. The poetic mood approaches the state in which the present appears as it is present. Is poetry so abstract and colorless? The present is just what it is regardless of the absent, regardless of past and future. It is such as it is, utterly ignoring anything else... Qualities of feeling show myriad-fold variety, far beyond what the psychologists admit. This variety however is in them only in so far as they are compared and gathered together into collections. But as they are in their presentness, each is sole and unique; and all the others are absolute nothingness to it, — or rather much less than nothingness, for not even recognition as absent things or as fictions is accorded to them. The first category, then, is Quality of Feeling, or whatever is such as it is positively and regardless of aught else.<sup>10</sup>

Peirce then turns to Secondness, which he characterises in terms of “*Struggle*”, by which he means the resistance of the world to the self and vice versa,

illustrating this with the examples of pushing against a door; being hit on the back of the head by a ladder someone is carrying; and seeing a flash of lightning in pitch darkness.<sup>11</sup> He also argues that this resistance can be felt in the case of images drawn in the imagination, and other “inner objects”, though this is felt less strongly. Then, at the beginning of the next section of the text,<sup>12</sup> Peirce comes to the category of Thirdness; but here we do not get any phenomenological analysis of the category, but an account of why “no modern writer of any stripe, unless it be some obscure student like myself, has ever done [it] anything approaching justice”.<sup>13</sup>

Now, Hegel has already been brought into the discussion several times by Peirce prior to this point. Thus, in relation to Firstness (or “presentness”), we have been told that Hegel was right to begin with “immediacy” or “Pure Being”, but wrong to treat this as an “abstraction”, as if such presentness could not be a genuine aspect of experience in itself, but only something arrived at by the “negation” of something more complex: “[Presentness] cannot be *abstracted* (which is what Hegel means by the abstract) for the abstracted is what the concrete, which gives it whatever being it has, makes it to be. The present, being such as it is while utterly ignoring everything else, is *positively* such as it is”.<sup>14</sup> Peirce here offers an example of immediate “apprehension” without “comprehension”, of “immediacy” without “mediation” of just the kind that he thinks Hegel (in his discussion of sense-certainty and elsewhere)<sup>15</sup> denied was coherent: “Imagine, if you please, a consciousness in which there is no comparison, no relation, no recognized multiplicity (since parts would be other than the whole), no change, no imagination of any modification of what is positively there, no reflexion, — nothing but a simple positive character. Such a consciousness might be just an odor, say a smell of attar; or it might be one infinite dead ache; it might be the hearing of [a] <sup>16</sup> piercing eternal whistle. In short, any simple and positive quality of feeling would be something which our description fits, — that it is such as it is quite regardless of anything else. The quality of feeling is the true psychical representation of the first category of the immediate as it is in its immediacy, of the present in its direct positive presentness”.<sup>17</sup> Taking himself to be arguing against the Hegelian (and Spinozistic)<sup>18</sup> dictum that “all determination is negation”,<sup>19</sup> Peirce is claiming here that Firstness is determination *without* negation, just as Pure Being is distinct from Nothing even though it isn’t yet *Dasein*.

Hegel also figures in Peirce’s discussion of Secondness (or “struggle”), in connection with one of two objections that Peirce considers to his position. This objection (the other is “anthropomorphism”), is that struggle is reducible, either to feeling or Firstness on the one hand, or to a lawlike relation and hence something general on the other. Peirce associates the latter position with Hegelianism, and because his own position allows for realism about laws, acknowledges that there is an affinity here too with pragmatism (or “pragmaticism”):

The other doubt is whether the idea of Struggle is a simple and irresolvable element of the phenomenon; and in opposition to its being so, two contrary parties will enter into a sort of [alliance] without remarking how deeply they are at variance with one another... The [second] party will be composed of those philosophers who say that there can be only one absolute and only one irreducible element [i.e. the Hegelians], and since *Nóús* is such an element, *Nóús* is really the only thoroughly clear idea there is. These philosophers will take a sort of pragmatistic stand. They will maintain that to say that one thing acts upon another, absolutely the only thing that can be meant is that there is a *law* according to which under all circumstances of a certain general description certain phenomena will result; and therefore to speak of one thing acting upon another *hic et nunc* regardless of uniformity, regardless of what will happen on all occasions, is simple nonsense.<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps because he recognizes here “a sort of pragmatistic stand”, Peirce seems to have some difficulty in refuting this position; for while he wants to resist the reduction of the direct and immediate sense of “otherness” experienced in “struggle”, which draws us into relation with the individual as such, he also believes in the laws governing these individuals, making the relation general and so an instance of Thirdness rather than Secondness. Nonetheless, just as Peirce had argued against Royce in his review of Royce’s *Religious Aspect of Philosophy* of 1885, to reduce Secondness to Thirdness in this way would be to fail to take into account the experience of “the Outward Clash”: “Besides the lower consciousness of feeling and the higher consciousness of nutrition, this direct consciousness of hitting and getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to make it mean something real”, where “[t]he capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it”, is that it is something “he almost altogether ignores”.<sup>21</sup> In the Harvard lecture, therefore, Peirce argues that the element of *surprise* involved in experience shows that it is not as an instance of a general law that we recognize an individual that resists us, but as something unique, so Secondness cannot be eliminated in favour of Thirdness: “I ask you whether at that instant of surprise there is not a double consciousness, on the one hand of an Ego, which is simply the expected idea suddenly broken off, on the other of the Non-Ego, which is the Strange Intruder, in his abrupt entrance”.<sup>22</sup> This emphasis on the “Outward Clash” is vital to Peirce in the development of his notion of indexical representations, which stands opposed to Royce’s view that the subject of a proposition is picked out by a general description,<sup>23</sup> where Peirce may well have thought that this was a position Royce had taken from

Hegel’s discussion of sense-certainty.

Now, given that the discussion thus far has treated Hegel and Hegelianism as a potential opponent of both Firstness (or “presentness”) and Secondness (or “struggle”),<sup>24</sup> it is no surprise that when Peirce moves to introduce the category of Thirdness, it is this category that Peirce sees as the one which is central to Hegel, rather than the other two: “Thus far, gentlemen, I have been insisting very strenuously upon what most vulgar common sense has every disposition to assent to and only ingenious philosophers have been able to deceive themselves about. But now I come to a category which only a more refined form of common sense is prepared willingly to allow, the category which of the three is the chief burden of Hegel’s song...”.<sup>25</sup> There is nothing at all surprising in finding that Peirce makes this claim: as we have seen, in the Harvard lecture itself it has already been implicit, and it is a claim Peirce makes frequently and clearly elsewhere.<sup>26</sup>

What *is* surprising, perhaps, is that having made it, Peirce goes on to explain why “no modern writer of any stripe, unless it be some obscure student like myself, has ever done [Thirdness] anything approaching to justice”, by arguing that a misguided use of Ockham’s razor has led philosophy into nominalism, and it is just such a position we find in Hegel. As Peirce puts it: “all modern philosophy is built upon Ockhamism, by which I mean it is all nominalistic and that it adopts nominalism because of Ockham’s razor. And there is no form of modern philosophy of which this is more essentially true than the philosophy of Hegel”.<sup>27</sup> But, if Peirce thinks Hegel is a nominalist, how can he *also* think that Thirdness is “the chief burden of Hegel’s song”, where Thirdness is predominantly associated with realism about “generals” (such as laws and universals), and hence would seem to be essentially an *anti*-nominalist position — as Peirce himself would seem to recognize not only elsewhere,<sup>28</sup> but also just a little earlier in the lecture, where he took “scholastic realism” about laws to be part of the Hegelian argument for the priority of Thirdness over Secondness?<sup>29</sup> This, then, is a puzzle that needs to be resolved, in understanding Peirce’s reading of Hegel as a nominalist.

## II

A first, and most obvious, way out of the puzzle, is to say that perhaps Peirce didn’t really say what the text contains, as the text may be misleading or corrupted in some way, based as it is on an amalgam of documents that were only drafts, and that were probably superseded by a further, final, version which has since been lost.<sup>30</sup> However, Peirce’s remarks concerning Hegel’s nominalism here are not unique, and similar remarks can be found elsewhere; these only differ from Peirce’s comments in the Harvard lecture in signalling that Peirce recognized the somewhat surprising nature of the claim. So, for example, in a letter of 1908, Peirce writes that “all the intelligible philosophers, *even* Hegel, have been more or less nominalistic”,<sup>31</sup> and in characterising modern philosophy

as swept up in “a tidal wave of nominalism”, Peirce speaks of Hegel as “a nominalist of realistic yearnings”;<sup>32</sup> and in a letter of 1904 he observes that “Notwithstanding what Royce says, Hegel appears to me to be on the whole a nominalist with patches of realism rather than a real realist”.<sup>33</sup> He also writes that Hegel “gave [phenomenology] the nominalistic ... character in which the worst of the Hegelian errors have their origin”.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, Peirce elsewhere also attributes to Hegel the kind of Ockhamism that in the Harvard lecture he uses to explain the source of nominalism: “Aristotelianism admitted two modes of being. This position was attacked by William Ockham, on the ground that one kind sufficed to account for all the phenomena. The host of modern philosophers, to the very Hegels, have sided with Ockham in this matter”.<sup>35</sup>

A second response to the puzzle might be to admit that Peirce did actually say that Hegel was a nominalist, but that he didn’t really mean it. After all, Peirce does also say that “Hegel first advocated realism”;<sup>36</sup> so perhaps in the passages we have been considering, Peirce was simply carried away by his determination to stress his own historical uniqueness, when in more restrained and critical moments he would have acknowledged that Hegel was as much of a realist as himself. This seems unlikely, however: for while the Harvard lecture is unusual in not seeking to qualify Peirce’s claim that Hegel was a nominalist in any way, the most that Peirce would seem inclined to allow is that Hegel might be a forerunner to realism in some degree, just as were Duns Scotus and Kant (according to Peirce).<sup>37</sup> In their case, however, we are given some explanation of where ultimately their realism fell short; so to resolve the puzzle in relation to Hegel, this explanation is something we must also find. To do this, we need to do two things: explain how it is conceptually possible to privilege Thirdness while still being a nominalist, and explain how Peirce could have taken Hegel to occupy this position. We will consider answers Peirce might give to the conceptual question first, and then consider if the answers to that question fit Peirce’s reading of Hegel.

I think we can find three possible answers in Peirce’s writings to the question of how someone might recognize Thirdness, and yet remain a nominalist: (i) one can recognize Thirdness, but in a rather inadequate or limited form; (ii) one can have limited grounds for recognizing Thirdness; (iii) one can recognize Thirdness as a category of thought, but not as something real. Let me consider each in turn.

The first idea is suggested by the fourth of the Harvard lectures, immediately after Peirce’s enumeration of his “seven systems of metaphysics”, where once again “Hegelianism of all shades” is classified under Thirdness. Here, Peirce famously labels himself as “an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism”; but he also draws a contrast between Hegel and the Aristotelian position which suggests why Hegel might not be a fully-fledged realist, in so far as Hegel’s Thirdness does not encompass as much as Aristotle’s:

The doctrine of Aristotle is distinguished from substantially all modern philosophy by its recognition of at least two grades of being. That is, besides *actual reactive existence*, Aristotle recognizes a germinal being, an *esse in potentia* or I like to call it an *esse in futuro*. In places Aristotle has glimpses of a distinction between *ενέργεια* and *εντελέχεια*.

Hegel’s whole doctrine of *Wesen*, the most labored and the most unsuccessful part of his work, is an attempt to work out something similar. But the truth is that Hegel agrees with all other modern philosophers in recognizing no other mode of being than being *in actu*.<sup>38</sup>

This may be read as suggesting that while Hegel approximated to an Aristotelian realism in parts (“on the strength of special agreements”),<sup>39</sup> he remained a nominalist in other respects, in failing to recognize potentiality as well as actuality as being real. Peirce, by contrast, can think of himself as a complete realist in this respect, as he is prepared to say that “the true idealism, the pragmatistic idealism, is that reality consists in the *future*”.<sup>40</sup>

A second way to be a nominalist while still acknowledging Thirdness, on Peirce’s view of these matters, is suggested by Peirce’s theory of perception: for, it seems clear that Peirce held that (along with Firstness and Secondness), Thirdness is present in perceptual experience, and that formed an important part of his realism. Thus, in the seventh Harvard lecture, Peirce distinguishes between three positions on the relation between Thirdness and perception: first, that Thirdness is not perceptible, and so is not real; second, that it is not perceptible, but can be admitted on inductive grounds; and third that it is directly perceived — where Peirce makes it clear that he holds to the last position,<sup>41</sup> and that only those who adopt it “will have no difficulty with Thirdness”.<sup>42</sup> Anything less than this, it could be argued, amounts to a slide towards nominalism, as the epistemological basis for believing in Thirdness becomes more inferential and indirect, and correspondingly weaker. Peirce seems to have held that because of this neglect of Secondness, and thus the “Outward Clash”, an Hegelian such as Royce lacked a proper conception of experience,<sup>43</sup> so might be supposed to lack a perceptual awareness of Thirdness in this way.

A final way in which a recognition of Thirdness might still leave room for nominalism, is if Thirdness is treated as a category of thought, but not as a feature of the world. Peirce himself makes clear his commitment to a form of realism that goes against the latter position in the fifth Harvard lecture:

Now Reality is an affair of Thirdness as Thirdness, that is, in its mediation between Secondness and Firstness.

Most, if not all [of] you, are, I doubt not, Nominalists; and I beg that you will not take offense at a truth which is just as plain and undeniable to me as is the truth that children do not understand human life. To be a nominalist consists in the undeveloped state in one's mind of the apprehension of Thirdness as Thirdness. The remedy for it consists in allowing ideas of human life to play a greater part in one's philosophy. Metaphysics is the science of Reality. Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness. Reasonable reasonableness is Thirdness as Thirdness.<sup>44</sup>

Peirce takes himself to have argued for this realism in the previous lecture,<sup>45</sup> where he claims to have shown that "*Thirdness* is operative in Nature" in an "experimental" fashion, on the grounds that we can predict what will happen, and these predictions are made true by the fact that general principles or laws hold in the world.<sup>46</sup> Peirce noted at the end of the third lecture that such an argument was needed, because a philosopher might say "Oh, *Thirdness* merely exists in thought. There is no such thing in reality", and he (reluctantly) admits that such a philosopher needs an answer, which he provides in the fourth lecture: "You do know I am enough of a sceptic to be unwilling to believe in the miraculous power he attributes to the mind of originating a category the like of which God could not put into the realities, and which the Divine Mind would seem not to have been able to conceive. Still those philosophers will reply that this may be fine talk but it certainly is not argument; and I must confess that it is not. So in the next lecture [i.e. the fourth] the categories must be defended as realities".<sup>47</sup> Thus, until the arguments of lecture four, Peirce takes himself merely to have established that Thirdness "exists in thought", but not that there is any "such thing in reality"; and he comes back to a brief consideration of such a position in lecture seven: "I shall take it for granted that, as far as *thought* goes, I have sufficiently shown that Thirdness is an element not reducible to Secondness and Firstness. But even if so much be granted [it might be said] that Thirdness, though an element of the mental phenomenon, ought not to be admitted into a theory of the real, because it is not experimentally verifiable".<sup>48</sup> Peirce's response here reflects the arguments of lecture four: "The man who takes [this] position ought to admit no general law as really operative. Above all, therefore, he ought not to admit the law of laws, the law of the uniformity of nature. He ought to abstain from all prediction, however qualified by a confession of fallibility. But the position can practically not be maintained".<sup>49</sup> Thus, we can see how Peirce may have considered that it was possible for a philosopher to acknowledge the significance of Thirdness, and yet still be a nominalist: namely, by allowing that

Thirdness as a category is as necessary to our experience of the world as Firstness and Secondness, while at the same time holding (in a Kantian fashion) that this does not correspond to anything in the world independently of our experience or thought of it.<sup>50</sup> We can therefore understand what Peirce might mean when he says in lecture three of the Harvard series that "The third category of which I come now to speak is precisely that whose reality is denied by nominalism": he does not mean that the nominalist recognizes only Firstness and Secondness, but rather than the nominalist has such an "extraordinarily lofty appreciation of the powers of the human soul" that "it attributes to it a power of originating a kind of ideas the like of which Omnipotence has failed to create as objects",<sup>51</sup> by confining Thirdness to a category we use in experiencing the world, without it being inherent in reality as such.

Now, in arguing against this position, there is a sense in which Peirce was arguing against his former self. For, although from his early writings onwards (such as "On a New List of Categories" (1867)), Peirce had a triadic categorial system, in later work he moved away from thinking of Thirdness as merely one of the categories, towards the view that there was real Thirdness in the external world. As is well known, Peirce's encounter with the work of F. E. Abbot had a major influence in changing his outlook, where Abbot saw the idealist turn of Kantian philosophy as just the latest expression of the nominalism that had dominated philosophical thought since the fifteenth century.<sup>52</sup> This no doubt made Peirce sensitive to the gap that might exist between a Kantian conception of the categories on the one hand, in which Thirdness might be given a central place, and the realism espoused by Abbot on the other, for whom this merely categorial story would have been inadequate, as a sign of residual nominalism.

We have seen, therefore, that there are three ways in which Peirce might have thought of a philosopher as a nominalist, despite their commitment to Thirdness. And there are of course connections between them. Thus, for example, the more one thinks of Thirdness as not directly perceptible, the more one may be inclined to think it is a category we use to think about the world, rather than having reality in itself. Likewise, the less one's metaphysical picture leaves room for potentialities, the more one will be inclined to see this aspect of Thirdness as merely a function of our way of viewing reality. It is thus possible to see how Peirce may have come to believe that there is room on the conceptual map for someone to be committed to Thirdness in some sense, while still being a nominalist.

### III

Having identified this conceptual space, our next question is therefore to ask why Peirce thought that Hegel occupied it, and how far he was right to do so.

It is certainly easy to see why Peirce might have come to understand Hegel's position as having each of the features of nominalism that we have discussed. Thus, on the question of Thirdness as involving potentiality, Peirce's position is

that this requires a recognition that possibilities may be unactualized: “A quality is a mere abstract potentiality; and the error of those [nominalist] schools lies in holding that the potential, or possible, is nothing but what the actual makes it be... You forget perhaps that a realist fully admits that a sense-quality is only a possibility of sensation; but he thinks a possibility remains possible when it is not actual”.<sup>53</sup> Peirce clearly felt, however, that while Hegel adopted something of the Aristotelian framework of actuality as a realization of potentiality, he could not ultimately accept this idea of unactualized potentiality, of possibilities that could remain unrealised. Thus, in the discussion of possibility in the Doctrine of Essence in the *Logic* to which Peirce refers, Hegel does write as if he thinks a *real* possibility is one that will be actualised: “The notion of possibility appears initially to be the richer and more comprehensive determination, and actuality, in contrast, as the poorer and more restricted one. So we say, ‘Everything is possible, but not everything that is possible is on that account actual too.’ But, in fact, i.e., in thought, actuality is what is more comprehensive, because, being the concrete thought, it contains possibility within itself as an abstract moment”.<sup>54</sup> There is also a more general issue here, which has been identified by some commentators on Peirce: namely, that Peirce’s emphasis on the openness of the future as a realm of possibility is meant to be contrasted with the “closure” implicit in Hegel’s conception of an end to history, where contingency will be overcome and potentialities fully actualised. Apel adopts this way of contrasting Peirce’s position with Hegel when he writes: “Peirce ... wants to rescue possible experience as experience of *esse in futuro* from Hegel’s standpoint, in which such being is *aufgehoben* at the end of world history”.<sup>55</sup> Such a view of Hegel is hardly uncommon, so it would not be surprising if it were to inform Peirce’s position.

It is also perfectly comprehensible why Peirce might have taken Hegel to be a nominalist in the second manner we identified: namely, as a result of holding that Thirdness is not perceptible. There are many places where it could appear that Hegel prioritises thought over experience as the basis for our knowledge of natural kinds and laws, such as the following passage:

Nature offers us an infinite mass of singular shapes and appearances. We feel the need to bring unity into this manifold; therefore, we compare them and seek to [re]cognize what is universal in each of them. Individuals are born and pass away; in them their kind is what abides, what recurs in all of them; and it is only present for us when we think about them. This is where laws, e.g., the laws of the motion of heavenly bodies, belong too. We see the stars in one place today and in another tomorrow; this disorder is for the spirit something incongruous, and not to be trusted, since the spirit believes in an order, a simple, constant, and universal

determination [of things]. This is the faith in which the spirit has directed its [reflective] thinking upon the phenomena, and has come to know their laws, establishing the motion of the heavenly bodies in a universal manner, so that every change of position can be determined and [re]cognised on the basis of this law... From all these examples we may gather how, in thinking about things, we always seek what is fixed, persisting, and inwardly determined, and what governs the particular. This universal cannot be grasped by means of the senses, and it counts as what is essential and true.<sup>56</sup>

In passages such as this, it might appear that Hegel’s way of accounting for our grasp of laws or kinds as forms of Thirdness is somehow less direct than Peirce’s, in so far as he claims that laws or kinds “cannot be grasped by the senses”; so although Peirce does not mention Hegel explicitly in the seventh Harvard lecture, this might nonetheless suggest that we could treat this as a reason Peirce might give for thinking that in the end, Hegel must succumb to nominalism.

Finally, it is also intelligible why Peirce might have thought Hegel was a nominalist in the third way, whereby (as Peirce puts it) “Hegel degrades [Thirdness] to a mere stage of thinking”,<sup>57</sup> and treats it as a mere category, rather than as present in the world. In doing so, Peirce would have been following a familiar tradition of Hegel interpretation, which treats Hegel as the most radical proponent of post-Kantian idealism: taking our concepts to be responsible for structuring our experience and thus as not themselves part of the mind-independent world, Hegel attempts to save us from Kantian scepticism regarding “things in themselves” by denying that there is any reality beyond our awareness of it. It is this view of Hegel that Peirce would have found in Abbot’s *Scientific Theism*, where Abbot had no difficulty in labelling Hegel as a nominalist:

By Kant’s masterly development of Nominalism into a great philosophical system, it has exercised upon subsequent speculation a constantly increasing power. In truth, all modern philosophy, by tacit agreement, rests upon the Nominalistic theory of universals... Nominalism logically reduces all experience, actual or possible, to a mere subjective affection of the individual Ego, and does not permit even the Ego to know itself as a noumenon. The historical development of the Critical Philosophy into the subjective idealism of Fichte, the objective idealism of Schelling, and the absolute idealism of Hegel, only shows how impossible it is for that

philosophy to overstep the magic circle of Egoism with which Nominalism logically environed itself.<sup>58</sup>

Though Peirce occasionally in his early work spoke of Kant as a realist,<sup>59</sup> he also came to share Abbot's view of him as an idealist, remarking for example that "I believe Time to be a reality, and not the figment which Kant's nominalism proposes to explain it as being";<sup>60</sup> and he also said the same of Hegel and Hegelianism, commenting that "[Hegel] has committed the trifling oversight of forgetting that there is a real world with real actions and reactions";<sup>61</sup> and writing in a review of Royce's *The World and the Individual*, "The truth is, that Professor Royce is blind to the fact which ordinary people see plainly enough; that the essence of the realist's opinion is that it is one thing to *be* and other thing to *be represented*; and the cause of this cecity is that the Professor is completely immersed in his absolute idealism, which precisely consists in denying that distinction".<sup>62</sup> Given this view of Hegel's idealism, it is therefore not surprising that Peirce may have felt that Hegel's treatment of Thirdness was in the end nominalistic.

Moreover, it could be argued that in his critique of Hegel's nominalism, Peirce saw a conceptual link between this nominalism and the priority he takes Hegel to give to Thirdness over Firstness and Secondness. Thus, regarding the first form of nominalism, Carl Hausman has argued that Peirce's "futurism" arises out of his objection to this Hegelian emphasis on Thirdness at the expense of the other two categories: "[Peirce] differentiates himself from Hegel by pointing out his own conviction that freshness (under the category of Firstness) and resistance (under the category of Secondness) will not be overcome in some final end. The universe will always have some irregularity — will inevitably bear the mark of freshness and brute fact".<sup>63</sup> Secondly, in giving priority to Thirdness, Peirce holds that Hegel is led into an overly intellectualist epistemology.<sup>64</sup> Finally, Peirce believes that it is by ignoring the "Outward Clash" of Secondness that the idealist manages to overlook the fact that reality is mind-independent,<sup>65</sup> with the result that he may come to think that generality and laws are real even though they are not instantiated in anything outside us, which is to think of them as "real" in a merely nominalist manner. In treating Hegel as a nominalist, therefore, Peirce seems to have believed that this nominalism was not only *compatible* with what he saw as Hegel's overly strong commitment to Thirdness, but even that the former arose from the latter, where for "the idea of a *genuine* Thirdness" what is required is "an independent solid Secondness and not a Secondness that is a mere corollary of an unfounded and inconceivable Thirdness; and a similar remark may be made in reference to Firstness".<sup>66</sup>

#### IV

Having seen what Peirce may have meant in calling Hegel a nominalist, and why there is no tension between this and what he says regarding Hegel's

commitment to Thirdness, we may now ask whether Peirce was *right* to categorise Hegel in this way, and thus whether the grounds on which he did so were correct.

This is, of course, a profoundly difficult question to answer with finality, as any reading of Hegel is bound to prove controversial; and, as we have seen, Peirce's approach has both *prima facie* textual support, and (at least until recently) a kind of orthodoxy about it. Nonetheless, I will suggest that Peirce's criticism is flawed, and that Hegel deserves to be seen by Peirce as an exception to those nominalistic tendencies which he (and Abbot) saw as engulfing "modern philosophy"; indeed, I will suggest, the position Hegel occupies is closer to Peirce's own than he realizes.

The first issue, then, concerns Hegel's treatment of "*esse in potentia*", and Peirce's claim that "the truth is that Hegel agrees with all other modern philosophers in recognizing no other mode of being than being *in actu*". It is certainly true that Hegel has a higher regard for what is actual than what is merely possible: "Rational, practical people do not let themselves be impressed by what is possible, precisely because it is only possible; instead they hold onto what is actual".<sup>67</sup> And he also clearly thinks that the more one understands about the world, the less one will think of certain possibilities as "real" or "genuine" possibilities, that is, as possibilities that are actually likely to happen: "The more uneducated a person is, the less he knows about the determinate relations in which the objects that he is considering stand and the more inclined he tends to be to indulge in all manner of empty possibilities; we see this, for example, with so-called public politicians in the political domain".<sup>68</sup> This may then fuel the suspicion that Hegel's position is ultimately Spinozistic, leaving no room for possibility or contingency, and making everything necessary, so that (as Apel suggested) all future development is ultimately "*aufgehoben* at the end of world history". As several commentators have argued recently, however,<sup>69</sup> this would be a mistaken picture of Hegel's position, for (as Hegel puts it), "Although it follows from the discussion so far that contingency is only a one-sided moment of actuality, and must therefore not be confused with it, still as a form of the Idea as a whole it does deserve its due on the world of objects".<sup>70</sup> Here it is important to remember Hegel's distinction between what is actual and what exists or what is "immediately there" (*das unmittelbar Daseiende*),<sup>71</sup> where the actual is necessary but the existent is not, and where Hegel is quite happy to accept that (for example) the natural world is not fully "actual" in this sense, though it does of course exist. Thus, while Peirce might have been right to say that Hegel took a greater philosophical interest in actuality and thus necessity than in possibility and contingency, he was far from denying the reality of the latter: "It is quite correct to say that the task of science and, more precisely, of philosophy, consists generally in coming to know the necessity that is hidden under the semblance of contingency; but this must not be understood to mean that contingency pertains only to our subjective views and that it must therefore be set aside totally if we

wish to attain the truth. Scientific endeavours which one-sidedly push in this direction will not escape the justified reproach of being an empty game and a strained pedantry".<sup>72</sup>

Turning now to the second issue, of whether it could be argued that Hegel was a nominalist in a way that Peirce was not, because he did not hold that Thirdness is "directly perceived", the issue is greatly complicated by the difficulty in establishing exactly what Peirce meant by this claim. If Peirce had held that Thirdness is part of the non-conceptual "given" of "immediate experience", then he would certainly have been right to contrast his position with Hegel's, for Hegel would not have believed that "sensuous consciousness" (*das sinnliche Bewußtsein*)<sup>73</sup> could be sufficiently contentful in this respect; but it is far from clear that this is what Peirce *does* mean, so that grounds for disagreement with Hegel are harder to find. For, it is only at the level of *perceptual judgments* that Thirdness is experiential for Peirce; and in this, it seems, Hegel would have agreed. Thus, Peirce comments in the fifth Harvard lecture: "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in our very perceptual judgments..."<sup>74</sup> Similarly, Hegel characterises perception (*das Wahrnehmen*), as distinct from sensuous consciousness, as follows:

Although perception starts from observation of sensuous materials it does not stop short at these, does not confine itself simply to smelling, tasting, seeing, hearing, and feeling (touch), but necessarily goes on to relate the sensuous to a universal which is not observable in an immediate manner, to cognize each individual thing as an internally coherent whole: in force, for example, to comprehend all its manifestations; and to seek out the connections and mediations that exist between separate individual things. While the bare sensuous consciousness merely *shows* things, that is to say, only exhibits them in their immediacy, perception, on the other hand, apprehends the connectedness of things, demonstrates that where such and such circumstances are present such and such a thing follows, and thus begins to demonstrate the truth of things.<sup>75</sup>

Given the apparent similarity between this position and his own, Peirce would surely not take this essentially Kantian conception of experience (which holds that "intuitions without concepts are blind")<sup>76</sup> as evidence of nominalism. In fact, the issue of nominalism would seem to arise for Peirce at a *later* point, where the grounds for Thirdness become purely *inferential*, precisely because

perceptual judgments are not seen as experiential, so that "Thirdness is experimentally verifiable, that is, is inferable by induction, though it cannot be directly perceived".<sup>77</sup> It is by no means clear, however, that when Hegel comments in the passage cited earlier that "[t]he universal cannot be grasped by means of the senses [*den Sinnen*]", it is this sort of inferentialist picture he has in mind, or instead the more Peircean one, that what is required is perceptual judgment and not mere sensuous consciousness. So, for example, in the following passage, while Hegel clearly questions the capacities of this sensuous consciousness to give us experience of laws, it is not obvious that he is denying that we have experience of laws altogether, in the richer sense of experience which Peirce also has in mind when he speaks about perceptual judgments:

The question of whether a completed sensuousness [*Sinnlichkeit*] or the Notion is the higher may ... be easily decided. For the laws of the heavens are not immediately perceived, but merely the change in position on the part of the stars. It is only when this object of immediate perception is laid hold of and brought under universal thought-determinations that experience arises therefrom, which has a claim to validity for all time. The category which brings the unity of thought into the content of feeling is thus the objective element in experience, which receives thereby universality and necessity, while that which is perceived is rather the subjective and contingent. Our finding both these elements in experience demonstrates indeed that a correct analysis has been made.<sup>78</sup>

Finally, we can look at the third way in which Peirce may have taken Hegel to have been a nominalist, which is perhaps the most important, namely, that Hegel "degrades [Thirdness] to a mere stage of thinking". Is Peirce right to have adopted this way of reading Hegel?

Now, as readings of Hegel as a mentalistic idealist are far from uncommon, then as now, it is not surprising to find Peirce adopting this view.<sup>79</sup> But it seems plausible to think that Peirce's encounter with Abbot's *Scientific Theism* was particularly significant in this respect; for, as we have seen, it was Abbot who had an important role in focusing the nominalism/realism issue for Peirce, and who discusses Hegel explicitly in this context, putting him clearly on the nominalist and therefore idealist side of the debate. In *Scientific Theism*, Abbot treats all modern philosophy as nominalistic in this way, and thus idealistic in a mentalistic or subjectivist sense, so that for modern philosophy, nominalism is "its root" and idealism "its flower":<sup>80</sup> "If all the general and special relations of things, conceived by the mind and expressed by general terms, exist in the mind alone,

nothing is known of things themselves; for knowledge of things is knowledge of their relations. Nominalism, therefore, is the original source of the definition of knowledge adopted by Idealism, as shown above: that is, the contents of consciousness alone”.<sup>81</sup> It may have seemed to Peirce, as it seemed to Abbot, that Hegel’s nominalism is apparent in the way he is also an idealist.

Peirce would have done well to have mistrusted Abbot’s judgment here, however, and if he had done so, he would arguably have found Hegel’s position to be much closer to Abbot’s and his own. Abbot cites only two statements by Hegel in support of his reading of Hegel as a mentalistic idealist, giving his own translations of each:

Hegel, the greatest of the post-Kantian Idealists, says: “Thought, by its own free act, seizes a standpoint where it exists for itself, and generates its own object;” and again: “This ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every true philosophy is Idealism.” This is the absolute sacrifice of the objective factor in human experience. Hegel sublimely disregards the distinction between Finite Thought and Infinite Thought: the latter, indeed, *creates*, while the former *finds*, its object. And, since human philosophy is only finite, it follows that *no* true philosophy is Idealism, except the Infinite Philosophy or Self-thinking of God.<sup>82</sup>

While plausibly read as statements of mentalistic idealism when taken out of context in this way, it is not clear on closer inspection that the remarks Abbot cites here can bear the interpretative weight he places upon them. The first statement might be translated more accurately as follows: “Only what we have here is the free act of thought, that puts itself at the standpoint where it is for itself and where hereby it produces and gives to itself its object”.<sup>83</sup> This comes in the Introduction to the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, where Hegel is discussing the difference between philosophy and other forms of inquiry. Other inquiries, Hegel suggests, must presuppose their objects (such as space, or numbers), but philosophy need not do so, because philosophy investigates thought and the adequacy of our categories and so produces its own object simply through the process of inquiry itself, as this already employs thought and the categories. Thus, in saying here that (in Abbot’s translation) “Thought ... generates its own object”, Hegel is not making the subjective idealist claim, that the world is created by the mind, but rather saying that in the *Logic*, thinking is not simply taken for granted as an object for philosophy to investigate, as thinking is inherent in the process of investigation itself.

Likewise, Abbot’s second quoted statement is not best read as a declaration of subjective idealism. For, although Hegel does indeed say in the *Encyclopaedia*

*Logic* that “This ideality of the finite is the most important proposition of philosophy, and for that reason every genuine philosophy is *Idealism*,”<sup>84</sup> the context is again important here, as the corresponding passage from the *Science of Logic* makes clear:

The proposition that the finite is ideal [*ideell*] constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being [*wahrhaft Seiendes*]. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is how far this principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally does not recognize finitude as a veritable being [*ein wahrhaftes Sein*], as something ultimate and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, eternal. Consequently the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existences as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms are *thoughts*, universals, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality — not even the water of Thales. For although this is also empirical water, it is at the same time also the *in-itself* or *essence* of all other things, too, and these other things are not self-subsistent or grounded in themselves, but are *posited* by, are *derived* from, an *other*, from water, that is they are ideal entities.<sup>85</sup>

When looked at in detail, it is clear that Hegel is not conceiving of idealism here in mentalistic terms: for if he was, he could hardly claim that “[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism”, as mentalistic idealism is a position held by few philosophers, and not by those classical philosophers directly and indirectly referred to here, such as Thales, Leucippus, Democritus and Empedocles, not to mention Plato and Aristotle — as Hegel clearly recognized.<sup>86</sup> A better reading of the passage is to see Hegel as offering a picture of idealism not as mentalistic, but as *holistic*.<sup>87</sup> On this account, Hegel claims that finite entities do not have “veritable, ultimate, absolute being” because they are dependent on other entities for their existence in the way that parts are dependent on other parts within a whole; and idealism consists in recognizing this relatedness between things, in a way that ordinary consciousness fails to do.<sup>88</sup> The idealist thus sees

the world differently from the realist, not as a plurality of separate entities that are “self-subsistent or grounded in themselves”, but as parts of an interconnected totality in which these entities are dependent on their place within the whole. It turns out, then, that idealism for Hegel is primarily an ontological position which holds that the things of ordinary experience are ideal in the sense that they have no being in their own right, and so lack the self-sufficiency and self-subsistence required to be fully real. Once again, therefore, Abbot would seem to lack adequate textual support for his account of Hegel’s idealism.

As a result of misreading Hegel in this way, Abbot failed to recognize how much Hegel’s trajectory away from Kantian idealism resembled his own; and in following Abbot here, Peirce did the same. Much like Abbot (and later Peirce), Hegel complains that for Kant “the categories are to be regarded as belonging only to *us* (or as ‘subjective’);”<sup>89</sup> giving rise to the spectre of “things-in-themselves” lying beyond the categorial framework we impose on the world; to dispel this spectre, Hegel argues (again like Abbot and Peirce) that we must see the world as conceptually structured in itself: “Now, although the categories (e.g. unity, cause and effect, etc.) pertain to our thinking as such, it does not at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of objects themselves.”<sup>90</sup> Like Abbot (and Peirce), Hegel sees himself as reviving here a vital insight of classical philosophy, which the subjective idealism of modern thought has submerged: “It has most notably been only in modern times... that doubts have been raised and the distinction between the products of our thinking and what things are in themselves has been insisted on. It has been said that the In-itself of things is quite different from what we make of them. This separateness is the standpoint that has been maintained especially by the Critical Philosophy, against the conviction of the whole world previously in which the agreement between the matter [itself] and thought was taken for granted. The central concern of modern philosophy turns on this antithesis. But it is the natural belief of mankind that this antithesis has no truth.”<sup>91</sup> No less than Abbot and Peirce, therefore, Hegel was a realist concerning the relation between mind and world, where that relation is mediated by the conceptual structures inherent in reality, in a way that the nominalist and subjective idealist denies.

In the earlier part of his career, Peirce perhaps knew this about Hegel himself.<sup>92</sup> For, in his exchange with the leading American Hegelian W. T. Harris, carried out in 1868 in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* which Harris founded and edited, Harris labels the Hegelian position as realist in the title he gave to their correspondence, in contrast to Peirce’s nominalism.<sup>93</sup> Harris explains the distinction he has in mind in one of his replies to Peirce, which echoes (consciously or unconsciously) the passage from Hegel on idealism that we cited earlier, but where he makes plain that idealism in this broadly Platonic and non-subjectivist sense might equally well be characterised as a form of realism:

The whole question of the validity of formal logic and of common sense *vs.* speculative philosophy, can be reduced to this: Do you believe that there are any finite or dependent beings? In other words, Are you a nominalist [who does not] or a realist [who does]?

*This is the gist of all philosophizing:* If one holds [with the nominalist] that things are not interdependent, but that each is for itself [and so is not finite or dependent], he will hold that general terms correspond to no object, and may get along with formal logic; and if he holds that he knows things directly in their essence, he needs no philosophy — common sense is sufficient.

But if he holds [with the realist] that any particular thing is dependent upon what lies beyond its immediate limits, he holds, virtually, that its true being lies beyond it, or, more precisely, that its immediate being is not identical with its total being, and hence, that it is in contradiction with itself, and is therefore *changeable, transitory, and evanescent*, regarded from the *immediate* point of view. But regarding the entire or total being (The Generic), we cannot call it changeable or contradictory, for that perpetually abides. It is the “Form of Eternity”.<sup>94</sup>

Harris here presents Peirce with a clearly anti-nominalist conception of Hegelianism,<sup>95</sup> and it is one that Peirce saw as offering a challenge regarding “the rationale of the objective validity of logical laws”.<sup>96</sup> This was not the challenge identified by Max Fisch, however, of showing “how on [Peirce’s] nominalistic principles the validity of the laws of logic would be other than inexplicable”,<sup>97</sup> as if Harris were saying that the laws of logic are valid, but that Peirce cannot show they are unless he moves from nominalism to realism; for (as we have seen) Harris did not think they *are* valid, so this is not likely to be the “challenge” he set for Peirce. Rather, Harris was presumably saying the opposite: namely, that the laws of logic are *not* valid, so all Peirce as a nominalist can do is “get along” with them, without being able to offer any grounds for their validity. Peirce’s response to Harris<sup>98</sup> in the article “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic” which appeared in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in the following year is thus to respond to the kind of Hegelian challenge offered to formal logic by Harris, and to show that formal logic has no such limitations,<sup>99</sup> so that if (as Harris suggests), Peirce’s position involves a commitment to formal logic, Peirce has nothing to fear in this respect.

We have seen, then, that Peirce might have come to view Hegel as an ally in his later anti-nominalism, if his encounter with Abbot had not led him to read

Hegel in a different light; and we have seen how far Abbot's treatment of Hegel involves a distortion of the latter's position. In this respect, Peirce's criticism of Hegel as a nominalist should be rejected.<sup>100</sup>

There is, however, a final point to consider. It might be argued that Peirce's conception of Hegel as a nominalist is not dependent on taking Hegel to be a subjective idealist, and thus is not effected by Abbot's misreading of Hegel; for Peirce also takes Platonism to lead to nominalism, so a Platonic reading of Hegel is also consistent with the nominalistic charge. This seems to be Apel's view, when he writes: "...when Hegel, in contrast to the British sensationists, allows the validity of general concepts to triumph over the immediate particular nature and *hic et nunc* of sense perception, he does not thereby prove their validity *in rebus*; instead, he absolutizes the arbitrary action of subjectivity, which has a nominalistic origin. Platonism and Nominalism generally stand for Peirce in a secret alliance".<sup>101</sup> Apel's idea seems to be that Peirce saw a connection between Platonism and nominalism, because the Platonist questions the reality of the things in which general concepts might inhere, and so does not treat these concepts as instantiated in the world, and so is not a realist in this (Aristotelian) sense; and the same is true of Hegel's idealism. There are three points to be made in response to this view. First, while Peirce does suggest a way in which nominalism might lead to Platonism,<sup>102</sup> I have found no passage which links Platonism to nominalism, in the way Apel suggests. Second, in the Harvard lectures, the kind of nominalism Peirce has in mind seems clearly to have a subjective idealist rather than a Platonistic provenance, where his target is the opponent who says: "Oh, *Thirdness* merely exists in thought".<sup>103</sup> And thirdly, Apel's criticism of Hegel raises the question of whether Hegel's idealism was any less Aristotelian than Peirce's, which could certainly be denied;<sup>104</sup> but given the complexity of this question, perhaps the first two points are sufficient on their own to thankfully mean we do not have to address it here.

There is another large question which we must also leave aside for now: namely, if (as we suggested earlier) Peirce conceived of some conceptual link between Hegel's neglect of Firstness and Secondness on the one hand, and his nominalism on the other, is there some argument the Peircean might give to show that Hegel should have been driven to nominalism *malgré lui*? Or, conversely, might the Hegelian argue that his realism about Thirdness shows rather than Peirce's claims about Hegel's neglect for Firstness and Secondness are as flawed as his treatment of Hegel on Thirdness? The question this raises, concerning Peirce's critique of Hegel on Firstness and Secondness may therefore be relevant to the final resolution of the issue we have discussed here; but that must be a matter for another occasion.<sup>105</sup>

#### V

In a paper dealing with the question of Peirce's relation to idealism and realism, Christopher Hookway has summarized what he sees as Peirce's "non-

Kantian realism" in the following theses:<sup>106</sup>

1. There is an external world of "things in themselves".<sup>107</sup>
2. The fundamental constituents of this world correspond to the categories of experience and thought.
3. The mode of development of this world corresponds to the mode of development of our thoughts or inquiries.
4. This reality can be immediately perceived.
5. We are attuned to the explanatory principles operative in this world, not least because we are part of it.
6. Although the nature of the world is not supervenient upon the cognitive states of inquirers, still it is a mental substance best thought of as analogous to the human mind.<sup>108</sup>

My suggestion in this paper is that when suitably understood, Hegel would have subscribed to all these theses, and that to this extent, he deserved to be seen by Peirce as a fellow "post-Kantian realist"; in so far as he was not, Peirce's ill-founded conception of Hegel as a nominalist is unfortunately to blame.<sup>109</sup>

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#### NOTES

1. For reasons of space, it is not possible in this paper to consider Peirce's criticisms of Hegel in full. In particular, in two other papers that are both forthcoming, I consider Peirce's related criticisms of Hegel in connection with Firstness and Secondness, which I can only outline briefly here (see section I); and because these criticisms *are* related, a full discussion of Peirce's treatment of Hegel must take them into account.

2. References to the works of Peirce are given in the following form:

CP: *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols 1-6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), 1931-35, vols 7 and 8, A. W. Burks (ed.), 1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press); references to volume and paragraph number

EP: *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, 2 vols, Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds.), (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); references to volume and page number

MS: *The Charles S. Peirce Papers*, microfilm edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Photograph Service, 1966); reference numbers are those used by Richard Robin, *Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967)

WP: *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, Max Fisch,

Edward Moore, Christian Kloesel et al. (eds.), currently 6 vols (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982-); references to volume and page number.

Unless specified otherwise, references are given to the following German edition of Hegel's works, and to the relevant translations:

*Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. and index (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969-71); references to volume and page number.

3. Peirce's response to Hegel was not of course *only* critical, but also contained positive elements: see e.g. "My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume" (CP 1.42 [c 1892]), and "In the more metaphysical part of logic the philosophy of Hegel, though it cannot be accepted on the whole, was the work of a great man" (*Selected Writings*, Philip P. Wiener (ed.), (New York: Dover, 1966), p. 271 [1901]). For further general discussion of Peirce's relation to Hegel, see Joseph Anthony Petrick, "Peirce on Hegel", unpublished PhD dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972, and Max H. Fisch, "Hegel and Peirce", in J. T. O'Malley, K. W. Algozin and F. G. Weiss (eds.), *Hegel and the History of Philosophy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 172-93; reprinted in his *Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 261-82. In the Appendix to his dissertation, Petrick provides an almost complete list of Peirce's references to Hegel, classified into "positive" and "negative": see pp. 181-2.

4. Cf. EP II, 177 (CP 5.90 [1903]): "Not only does Thirdness suppose and involve the ideas of Secondness and Firstness, but never will it be possible to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomenon that is not accompanied by Thirdness. If the Hegelians confined themselves to that position, they would find a hearty friend in my doctrine. But they do not. Hegel is possessed with the idea that the Absolute is One. Three absolutes he would regard as a ludicrous contradiction *in adjecto*. Consequently, he wishes to make out that the three categories have not their several independent and irrefutable standings in thought. *Firstness* and *Secondness* must somehow be *aufgehoben*. But it is not true"; and EP II, 345 (CP 5.436 [1905]): "The truth is that pragmatism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category ... suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient. Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmatists might have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their truth... For pragmatism belongs essentially to the triadic class of philosophical doctrines, and is much more essentially so than Hegelianism is". Cf. also CP 4.318 [1902]: "To recognize the triad is a step out of the bounds of mere dualism; but to attempt [to deny] independent being to the dyad and monad, Hegel-wise, is only another one-sidedness"; CP 8.268 [1903]: "[T]he one fatal disease of [Hegel's] philosophy is that, seeing that the Begriff in a sense implies Secondness and Firstness, he failed to see that nevertheless they are elements of the phenomenon not to be *aufgehoben*, but as real and able to stand their ground as the Begriff itself"; and MS L75 Version 2 Draft A, 28 [Carnegie Institution Application 1902]: "In my view, there are seven conceivable types of philosophy. Three greatly exaggerate the importance of some one of my three categories and more or less underrate the others. Three more somewhat overrate two and almost utterly neglect the third. The seventh type does nearly equal justice to all three. Hegelianism is one of the first three. But the category which it exaggerates [i.e. Thirdness] is the one most commonly overlooked; and for that reason there is a relative wholesomeness in it".

5. Cf. Petrick, "Peirce on Hegel", p. 73, note 18: "The questions of Peirce's nominalism and Peirce's reaction to what he regarded as Hegel's nominalism are admittedly hazy".

6. EP II, 148 (CP 5.43).

7. Cf. also CP 8.213 [c 1905]: "My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of thinking", and CP 8.267 [1903]: "Anything familiar gains a peculiar positive quality of feeling of its own; and that I think is the connection between Firstness and Hegel's first stage of thought. The second stage agrees better with Secondness". It is not immediately clear what Peirce meant by Hegel's "stages of thought", and thus what in Hegel he took to correspond to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. The editors of EP suggest in one note (EP II, 517, note 13), that "Hegel's 'three stages of thought' consist of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis"; but as Hegel scholars often point out (e.g. G. E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 19 (1958), pp. 411-14), this terminology is not Hegel's. In connection with the passage we are discussing here, the editors refer to §79 of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, where Hegel distinguishes between three "sides" of the logical: the understanding which treats each category as distinct (e.g. freedom *or* determinism); the dialectical side where the need for *both* categories is seen to lead to contradiction (e.g. freedom without determinism is mere arbitrariness); and the overcoming of these contradictions where reason sees that categories can form a differentiated unity (e.g. freedom is compatible with determinism). In other contexts, it does seem that it is understanding, dialectic and reason that Peirce has in mind, e.g. EP I, 237 (CP 8.45/WP 5:230 [1885]): "When Hegel tells me that thought has three stages, that of naïve acceptance, that of reaction and criticism, and that of rational conviction; in a general sense, I agree to it". But the difficulty is to see how understanding, dialectic and reason can correspond to Peirce's list of categories, when they seem more to be different ways of *conceiving* the categories. A better match would seem to be §83 of the *Encyclopaedia*, where Hegel himself talks about the *Logic* as the "doctrine of thought" having three parts, in terms of the categories of Being, Essence and Concept, or immediacy, mediation, and mediated immediacy; and this is the terminology Peirce himself uses in making the comparison (see e.g. EP II, 149 (CP 5.44 [1903])). But for further discussion of some of the complexities here, see Martin Suhr, "On the Relation of Peirce's 'Universal Categories' to Hegel's 'Stages of Thought'", *Graduate Studies Texas Tech University*, 23 (1981), pp. 275-9.

8. Peirce's attempt to draw up a list of categories is a feature of his thought from the beginning, and in his early works he was hostile to the Hegelian way of dealing with this issue, partly because Peirce wanted to use formal logic in this enterprise in a way he thought Hegel did not: cf. MS 895/WP 5: 237 [1885]: "Hegel thought there was no need of studying the categories through the medium of formal logic and preferred to evoke them by means of their own organic connections... But there is nothing in Hegel's method to guard against mistakes, confusions, misconceptions; and the list of categories given by him has the coherence of a dream".

9. EP II, 148 (CP 5.43). Cf. also CP 8.329 [1904].

10. EP II 149-50 (CP 5.44).

11. EP II, 150-1 (CP 5.45).

12. Because it is made up from different unpublished manuscripts (which do not form a final draft), this section actually marks a break between manuscripts: see the editors' explanation in EP II, 517 note 1. For more on the provenance of the text, see

Charles Sanders Peirce, *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard "Lectures on Pragmatism"*, Patricia Ann Turrisi (ed.), (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).

13. EP II, 155-6 (CP 5.59).
14. EP II, 150 (CP 5.44).
15. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A. V. Miller (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 58-66 [*Werke* III, pp. 82-92]. Hegel's characterisation of sense-certainty, which Peirce seems to consciously echo in his characterisation of "presentness", is given on pp. 58-9 [*Werke* III, pp. 82-3]. Peirce's way of arguing against Hegel here may be compared to Bradley's similar injunction of a preconceptual "feeling" as also involving the kind of direct and unanalysable immediacy that Bradley also takes Hegel to reject: see e.g. F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914), pp. 174-6. For further discussion of Bradley's position, see James Bradley, "F. H. Bradley's Metaphysics of Feeling and its Place in the History of Philosophy", in Anthony Manser and Guy Stock (eds.), *The Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 227-42.
16. Words appearing in italic brackets have been supplied or reconstructed by the editors of EP.
17. EP II, 150 (CP 5.44).
18. At least, this is how Hegel thought of it, taking the doctrine from Spinoza's Epistola 50 (to Jarig Jelles, 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1674), and misquoting it: Spinoza writes "determinatio negatio est", whereas Hegel re-phrases this as "omnis determinatio est negatio". See "*On the Improvement of the Understanding*", "*The Ethics*", *Correspondence*, R. H. M. Elwes (trans.), (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 370: "This determination [i.e. figure] therefore does not appertain to the thing according to its being, but, on the contrary, is its non-being. As then figure is nothing else than determination, and determination is negation, figure, as has been said, can be nothing but negation".
19. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris (trans.), (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §91 and Addition, p. 147 [*Werke* VIII, pp. 196-7].
20. EP II, 151-2 (CP 5.46).
21. EP I, 233 (CP 8.41/WP 5: 225 [1885]).
22. EP II, 154 (CP 5.53). Cf. also EP II, 177-8 (CP 5.92): "Let the Universe be an evolution of Pure Reason if you will. Yet if while you are walking in the street reflecting upon how everything is the pure distillate of Reason, a man carrying a heavy pole suddenly pokes you in the small of the back, you may think there is something in the Universe that Pure Reason fails to account for; and when you look at the color *red* and ask yourself how Pure Reason could make *red* to have that utterly inexpressible and irrational positive quality it has, you will be perhaps disposed to think that Quality and Reaction have their independent standings in the Universe".
23. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Christopher Hookway, "Truth and Reference: Peirce versus Royce", in his *Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 108-34.
24. For the purposes of this paper, I will accept this characterisation, although in fact I think it is open to challenge. For further critical discussion of Peirce's position, see my "Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Firstness" and "Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness", both forthcoming.

25. EP II, 155 (CP 5.59).
26. See the references in note 4 above.
27. EP II, 156-7 (CP 5.61).
28. Cf. EP II, 197 (CP 5.121 [1903]): "To be a nominalist consists in the undeveloped state in one's mind of the apprehension of Thirdness as Thirdness". Moreover, although the issue is too complex to deal with satisfactorily here, Peirce also seems to have felt that Hegel was on his side when it came to the treatment of continuity (albeit with an insufficient respect for the importance of mathematics), where Peirce links this with the issue of Thirdness and realism — so again it is surprising to see that Peirce also comes to accuse Hegel of nominalism, despite this common ground. (For remarks on the relation between Hegel and Hegelianism and continuity, see CP 1.41 [c 1892]; EP I, 296 (CP 6.31 [1891]); EP II, 520 note 5 (CP 5.71 note p. 49 [1903]); CP 8.109 [1900].)
29. Cf. EP II, 153 (CP 5.97).
30. See above, note 12.
31. Peirce to Cassius J. Keyser, 10 April 1908, Cassius Jackson Keyser papers, Columbia University; cited in Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 71. My emphasis.
32. CP 1.19 [1903].
33. CP 8.258.
34. EP II, 143 (CP 5.37) [1903].
35. CP 2.116 [1902-3]. Cf. also EP II, 70 [1901]: "all modern philosophy is more or less tainted with this malady [of Ockhamism]".
36. CP 4.50 [1893].
37. Cf. CP 1.19 [1903] and EP I, 90-1 (CP 8.15/WP 2: 470-1 [1871]).
38. EP II, 180. Cf. also CP 8, p. 292 [1901-2]: "Nominalism, up to that of Hegel, looks at reality retrospectively. What all modern philosophy does is to deny that there is any *esse in futuro*"; and CP 2.157 [1902-3]: "If Peirce's exposition of the English doctrine is to be accepted", they might say, 'and it is perhaps the only one which goes to the bottom of its philosophy, then that doctrine requires us to go back to the Aristotelian nonsense of *esse in futuro*, a conception too metaphysical for Hegel himself, which only such clouded intellects as the James Harrises and Monboddos have put up with. Something smacking very strongly of the extravagances of Wilhemus Campallensis, who endowed abstract ideas with life, will have to be resuscitated in order to hold the parts of this doctrine together..."; and CP 8.126 [1902]: "This makes an apparent difficulty for [Hegel's] idealism. For if all reality is of the nature of an actual idea, there seems to be no room for possibility or for any lower mode than actuality, among the categories of being. (Hegel includes modality only in his Subjective Logic)".
39. EP II, 180 (CP note to 5.77).
40. CP 8.284 [1902]. Cf. also EP II, 354 (CP 5.453 [1905]): "Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism as an essential consequence of it ... is the scholastic doctrine of realism. This is usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general, among the number being the modes of determination of existent singulars, if, indeed, these be not the only such objects. But the belief in this can hardly escape being accompanied by the acknowledgement that there are, besides, real *vagues*, and especially real *possibilities*... Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon", and CP 8.208 [c 1905]: "[A] nominalist ... must say that all future events are the total of all that will have happened and therefore

that the future is not endless; and therefore, that there will be an event not followed by any event. This *may* be, inconceivable as it is; but the nominalist must say that it *will* be, else he will make the future to be endless, that is, to have a mode of being consisting in the truth of a general law". This aspect of Peirce's critique of Hegel's nominalism is noted by Petrick, "Peirce on Hegel", p. 12: "Peirce's rejection of Hegel's nominalism [is] evidenced in what Peirce saw as Hegel's stress on the sole reality of the actual present rather than Peirce's stress on the additional reality of the potential future"; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 14, pp. 56-7, p. 73 note 18, pp. 169-70 and pp. 174-6.

41. EP II, 240 (CP 5.209-212 [1903]). Cf. also EP II, 211 (CP 5.150 [1903]): "Thirdness pours in upon us through every avenue of sense", and CP 1.23 [1903]: "My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, the being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the future".

42. EP II, 241 (CP 5.212).

43. Cf. EP I, 234 (CP 8.43/WP 5:226 [1885]): "Dr Royce and his school ... say they rest entirely on experience. This is because they so overlook the Outward Clash, that they do not know what experience is. They are like Roger Bacon, who after stating in eloquent terms that all knowledge comes from experience, goes on to mention spiritual illumination from on high as one of the most valuable kinds of experiences".

44. EP II, 197 (CP 5.121).

45. EP II, 181-6 (CP 5.93-107).

46. Cf. also EP II, 269: "Nobody can doubt that we know laws upon which we can base predictions to which actual events still in the womb of the future will conform to a marked extent, if not perfectly. To deny reality to such laws is to quibble about words. Many philosophers say they are 'mere symbols'. Take away the word *mere* and this is true. They are symbols; and symbols being the only things in the universe that have any importance, the word 'mere' is a great impertinence".

47. EP II, 178.

48. EP II, 240 (CP 5.209).

49. EP II, 240 (CP 5.210). (I here follow CP in not putting a comma after "qualified" in the 3<sup>rd</sup> sentence; adding this comma as the editors of EP have done distorts the sense from "he should abstain from all prediction, no matter how much he qualifies his prediction with claims about its fallibility" to "a confession of fallibility ought to get him to abstain from all prediction". I think the first sense is to be preferred, as otherwise it is hard to see how Peirce could allow that a realist who was also a fallibilist (such as Peirce himself) could make any predictions. In the original ms, the sentence has no punctuation, and is given none in the edition of the lectures produced by Patricia Ann Turrissi (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking*, p. 255).)

50. Cf. EP II, 143 (CP 5.37), where Peirce writes that in contrast to the nominalist, he will not restrict phenomenology "to the observation and analysis of *experience* but extend it to describing all the features that are common to whatever is *experienced* or might conceivably be experienced or become an object of study in any way direct or indirect".

51. EP II, 157 (CP 5.62).

52. Cf. Peirce's letter to *The Nation* on Abbot's death in 1903, where he describes Abbot's *Scientific Theism* as the text "wherein he puts his finger unerringly (as the present writer thinks) upon the one great blunder of all modern

philosophy" ("Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to *The Nation*, Part Three: 1901-08", compiled and annotated by Kenneth Laine Ketner and James Edward Cook, *Graduate Studies Texas Tech University*, 19 (1979), p. 148). Helpful discussions of the influence of Abbot on Peirce in relation to this issue can be found in Daniel D. O'Connor, "Peirce's Debt to F. E. Abbot", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 25 (1964), pp. 543-64; Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's Progress from Nominalism Toward Realism", *Monist* 51 (1967), pp. 159-77; Christopher Hookway, *Peirce* (London: Routledge, 1985), pp. 113-6. For biographical details on Peirce's connections with Abbot, see Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce*.

53. CP 1.422 [c 1896]. Cf. also CP 1.420: "No collection of facts can constitute a law; for the law goes beyond any accomplished facts and determines how facts that *maybe*, but *all* of which never can have happened, shall be characterised. There is no objection to saying that a law is a general fact, provided it be understood that the general has an admixture of potentiality in it, so that no congeries of actions here and now can ever make a general fact. As *general*, the law, or general fact, concerns the potential world of quality, while as *fact*, it concerns the actual world of actuality"; and CP 2.148 [1902-3]: "Whatever is truly general refers to the indefinite future; for the past contains only a certain collection of such cases that have occurred. The past is actual fact. But a general (fact) cannot be realized. It is a potentiality; and its mode of being is *esse in futuro*. The future is potential, not actual".

54. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §143 Addition, p. 216 [*Werke* VIII, p. 282]. According to the editors of the Chronological Edition (WP, II, 558), Peirce owned the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of the *Encyclopaedia* (1827), and also the edition of Hegel's *Werke* put together by "an association of friends" after Hegel's death (1832-40, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1840-44), which first included the student notes that form the Additions (*Zusätze*) to the text of the sort quoted from here.

55. Karl-Otto Apel, *Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism*, John Michael Krois (trans.), (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), p. 120. Cf. EP I, 310 (CP 6.63 [1892]), CP 6.218 [1898] and CP 6.305 [1893], where Peirce objects to Hegel's perceived necessitarianism.

56. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §21 Addition, p. 53 [*Werke* VIII, pp. 77-8]. Cf. also *ibid.*, §42 Addition, pp. 85-6 [*Werke* VIII, pp. 118-9], where Hegel defends the reality of causal relations, but also says that "that one [event] is the cause and the other the effect (the causal nexus between them) is not perceived; on the contrary, it is present merely for our thinking".

57. EP II, 345 (CP 5.436).

58. Francis Ellingwood Abbot, *Scientific Theism* (London: Macmillan, 1885; reprinted New York: AMS Press, 1979), p. 5.

59. Cf. EP I, pp. 90-1 (CP 8.15), from the review of "Fraser's *The Works of George Berkeley*" of 1871: "Indeed, what Kant called his Copernican step was precisely the passage from the nominalistic to the realistic view of reality".

60. CP 6.590 ("Reply to the Necessitarians: Rejoinder to Dr Carus", 1893).

61. EP I, 256 (CP 1.368/WP 6: 179 [1887-8]). Cf. also "Hegel is a vast intellect... But...the study of Hegelianism tends too much toward subjectivism" ("Contributions to *The Nation*, Part Three: 1901-08", p. 104 [1902]).

62. CP 8.129 [1902].

63. Carl R. Hausman, *Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 17. Cf. also Apel, *Charles S. Peirce*, p.

109: “[I]n contrast to Hegel, [Peirce] visualized the absolute point of convergence in his system as residing not in the logos-mystical perfection of reflection, but rather in the infinite future... For Pragmatism the relationship to the future is constitutive even for meaning (*Sinn*). But as long as there is a relationship to the future and it is constitutive for our understanding of something as something it will remain impossible, at least in empirical science and in our common-sense understanding of the praxis of life, to subsume (*aufheben*) the qualities of experience and the facticity of events under the generality of the concept... In his mature thought Peirce even conceived the normatively postulated goal of the development of the world, which he takes to be really possible, as only a ‘would be,’ and he thereby made the *esse in futuro* of Thirdness dependent upon contingent facts (Secondness) and upon spontaneous freedom (Firstness)”. Cf. CP 6.218 [1898]: “It is true that the whole universe and every feature of it must be regarded as rational, that is as brought about by the logic of events. But it does not follow that it is *constrained* to be as it is by the logic of events; for the logic of evolution and of life need not be supposed to be of that wooden kind that absolutely constrains a given conclusion. The logic may be that of the inductive or hypothetic inference... The effect of this error of Hegel is that he is forced to deny the fundamental character of two elements of experience [i.e. Firstness and Secondness] which cannot result from deductive logic”.

64. Cf. CP 8.118 [c 1902]: “The metaphysician is a worshipper of his own prepossessions... The Absolute Knowledge of Hegel is nothing but G. W. F. Hegel’s idea of himself... Inquiry must react against experience in order that the ship may be propelled through the ocean of thought”.

65. Cf. CP 6.95 [1903]: “Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our ideas. That is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome of all falsity. Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented... These things are utterly unintelligible as long as your thoughts are mere dreams. But as soon as you take into account that Secondness that jabs you repeatedly in the ribs, you become awake to their truth”.

66. EP II, 177 (CP 5.91) (my emphasis). Cf. also MS L75 392-5 (“Parts of Carnegie Application” [1902], in *The New Elements of Mathematics*, edited by Carolyn Eisele, 4 vols (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1976), IV, pp. 30-1): “The term ‘objective logic’ is Hegel’s; but since I reject Absolute Idealism as false, ‘objective logic’ necessarily means *more* for me than it did for him. Let me explain. In saying that *to be* and *to be represented* were the same, Hegel ignored the category of Reaction (that is, he imagined he reduced it to a mode of being represented) thus failing to do justice to *being*, and at the same time he was obliged to strain the nature of *thought*, and fail to do justice to that side also. Having thus distorted both sides of the truth, it was a small thing for him to say that *Begriffe* were concrete and had their part in the activity of the world; since that activity, for him, was merely represented activity. But when I, with my scientific appreciation of objectivity and the brute nature of reaction, maintain, nevertheless, that ideas really influence the physical world, and in doing so carry their logic with them, I give to objective logic a waking life which was absent from Hegel’s dreamland”.

67. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §143 Addition, p. 216 [Werke VIII, p. 283].

68. *Ibid.*, (where the translators use “ob-ject” as their rendering of “Gegenstand” as opposed to “Objekt”).

69. Cf. Dieter Henrich, “Hegels Theorie über den Zufall”, *Kant-Studien*,

1959, pp. 131-48, reprinted in his *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), pp. 157-86; George di Giovanni, “The Category of Contingency in Hegel’s Logic”, in Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth I. Schmitz (eds.), *Art and Logic in Hegel’s Philosophy* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), pp. 179-200; John Burbidge, “The Necessity of Contingency”, in Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth I. Schmitz (eds.), *Art and Logic in Hegel’s Philosophy* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), pp. 201-18.

70. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §145 Addition, p. 219 [Werke VIII, p. 286].

71. *Ibid.*, §142 Addition, pp. 214-5 [Werke VIII, pp. 280-1]. Cf. also *ibid.*, §6, pp. 29-30 [Werke VIII, p. 48]: “In common life people may happen to call every brain wave, error, evil, and suchlike ‘actual’, as well as every existence, however wilted and transient it may be. But even for our ordinary feeling, a contingent existence does not deserve to be called something-actual in the emphatic sense of the word; what contingently exists has no greater value than that which something-*possible* has; it is an existence which (although it is) can just as well *not be*. But when I speak of actuality, one should, of course, think about the sense in which I use this expression, given the fact that I dealt with actuality too in a quite elaborate *Logic*, and I distinguished it quite clearly and directly, not just from what is contingent, even though it has existence too, but also, more precisely, from being-there, from existence, and from other determinations”. In the Hegel literature, this point has often been made in relation to Hegel’s notorious *Doppelsatz* from the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* (“What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational”): see for example Michael O. Hardimon, *Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 52-6.

72. *Ibid.*, §145 Addition, p. 219 [Werke VIII, pp. 286-7].

73. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, William Wallace and A. V. Miller (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), §§418-9, pp. 158-61 [Werke X, pp. 205-8].

74. EP II, 207 (CP 5.150). Cf. also EP II, 223-4: “I do not think it is possible fully to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing these three truths: *first*, that there are no conceptions which are not given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas are perceptual ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to maintain this position, it is necessary to recognize, *second*, that perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived; and finally, I think it of great importance to recognize, *third*, that the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in its higher perfection we call perception”.

75. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §420 Addition, pp. 161-2 [Werke X, p. 209], translation modified. The final remark involves a pun on *Wahrnehmen* and ‘true’ (*wahr*). Cf. also *ibid.*, §418 Addition, p. 159 [Werke X, p. 206], translation modified: “When the essence of things becomes the object of consciousness, this consciousness is no longer merely *sensuous*, but *perceptual*. From this standpoint, *individual* things are referred to the *universal*, but only *referred* to it”.

76. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75.

77. EP II, 240 (CP 5.209).

78. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (trans.), 3 vols (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1892-1896; reissued Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), III, p. 440

[“Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie”, vol 3, Karl Ludwig Michelet (ed.), in *G. W. F. Hegels Werke*, edited by Philip Marheineke et al, 18 vols., 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (1840-44), 15, p. 515].

79. Of course, sources for Peirce’s reading of Hegel include not only Royce and Abbot, but also Augusto Vera (cf. CP 4.2 [1898]), as well as the various Hegelians who published in the early volumes of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (such as W. T. Harris and J. H. Stirling (cf. CP 1.40 [c 1892], where Peirce uses the phrase “The Secret of Hegel”, which was the title of Stirling’s main work)), and those whose work Peirce reviewed (such as David G. Ritchie and James B. Baillie). Another less direct influence may have been F. H. Bradley (who Peirce never mentions explicitly in this connection, but who Royce criticised in his “Supplementary Essay” to *The World and the Individual*, which Peirce reviewed for *The Nation* in 1900 (see CP 8.100-116)). As we shall see later in the discussion of Harris, not all of these writers defended an idealistic view of Hegel, though Peirce clearly seems to have in the end sided with those who did: cf. his comment made in a letter to William James of 1904: “Notwithstanding what Royce says, Hegel appears to me to be on the whole a nominalist with patches of realism rather than a real realist” (CP 8.258).

80. Abbot, *Scientific Theism*, p. 9.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

83. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §17, p. 41 [*Werke*, VIII, p. 63], translation modified. The original is as follows: “Allein es ist dies der freie Akt des Denkens, sich auf den Standpunkt zu stellen, wo es für sich selber ist und *sich* hiermit *seinen Gegenstand selbst erzeugt und gibt*”.

84. *Ibid.*, §95 Addition, p. 152 [*Werke* VIII, p. 203].

85. G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, A. V. Miller (trans.), (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1969), pp. 154-5 [*Werke* V, p. 172].

86. Cf. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, II, pp. 43-4 [*Werke* XIX, pp. 54-5]: “[T]he idealism of Plato must not be thought of as being subjective idealism, and as that false idealism which has made its appearance in modern times, and which maintains that we do not learn anything, are not influenced from without, but that all conceptions are derived from out of the subject. It is often said that idealism means that the individual produces from himself all his ideas, even the most immediate. But this is an unhistoric, and quite false conception; if we take this rude definition of idealism, there have been no idealists amongst the philosophers, and Platonic idealism is certainly far removed from anything of this kind”.

87. Cf. Kenneth R. Westphal, *Hegel’s Epistemological Realism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), p. 143: “Hegel’s idealism is thus an ontological thesis, a thesis concerning the interdependence of everything there is, and thus is quite rightly contrasted with epistemologically based subjective idealism”, and his “Hegel’s Attitude Toward Jacobi in ‘The Third Attitude of Thought Toward Objectivity’”, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 27 (1989), pp. 135-56, p. 146: “The basic model of Hegel’s ontology is a radical ontological holism”. Cf. also Thomas E. Wartenberg, “Hegel’s Idealism: The Logic of Conceptuality”, in Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 107: “[Hegel’s] manner of characterizing his idealism emphasizes that it is a form of holism. According to this view, individuals are mere parts and thus are not fully real or independent”. For further discussion of the issues raised here, see Robert Stern, “Hegel’s Idealism”, in Frederick C.

Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

88. Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §45 Addition, p. 88 [*Werke* VIII, p. 122]: “For our ordinary consciousness (i.e., the consciousness at the level of sense-perception and understanding) the ob-jects that it knows count as self-standing and as self-founded in their isolation from one another; and when they prove to be related to each other, and conditioned by one another, their mutual dependence upon one another is regarded as something external to the ob-ject, and not as belonging to their nature. It must certainly be maintained against this that the ob-jects of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, i.e., they do not have the ground of their being within themselves, but within something else”.

89. *Ibid.*, §42 Addition, p. 85 [*Werke* VIII, pp. 118-9].

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-6 [*Werke* VIII, p. 119].

91. *Ibid.*, §22 Addition, p. 54 [*Werke* VIII, p. 79]. Cf. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 45-6 [*Werke* V, p. 38]: “Ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher conception of thinking than is current today. For it based itself on the fact that the knowledge of things obtained through thinking is alone what is really true in them, that is, things not in their immediacy but as first raised into the form of thought, as things *thought*. Thus this metaphysics believed that thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to the object, but rather its essential nature, or that things and the thinking of them — our language too expresses their kinship — are explicitly in full agreement, thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things forming one and the same content.

But *reflective* understanding took possession of philosophy... Directed against reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on sensuous reality, that thoughts are *only* thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception which first gives them filling and reality and that reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain. In this self-renunciation on the part of reason, the Notion of truth is lost; it is limited to knowing only subjective truth, phenomena, appearances, only something to which the nature of the object itself does not correspond: knowing has lapsed into opinion”.

Cf. also G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 90 [*Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1940), p. 121]: “Thinking does belong to man alone but not merely to man as a single individual, a subject; we must take thought essentially in an objective sense. A thought is the universal as such; even in nature we find thoughts present as its species and laws, and thus they are not merely present in the form of consciousness, but absolutely and therefore objectively. The reason of the world is not subjective reason”.

92. If Abbot was responsible for convincing Peirce that Hegel was a nominalist, this effect was not immediate. Writing in 1893, Peirce seems to put Hegel alongside himself and Abbot on the realist side of the debate: “Hegel first advocated realism; and Hegel unfortunately was about at the average degree of German correctness in logic. The author of the present treatise [i.e. Peirce] is a Scotistic realist. He entirely approved of the brief statement of Dr. F. E. Abbott [sic] in his *Scientific Theism* that Realism is implied in modern science. In calling himself a Scotist, the writer does not mean that he is going back to the general views of 600 years back; he merely means that the point of metaphysics on which Scotus chiefly insisted and which has since passed out

of mind, is a very important point, inseparably bound up with the *most* important point to be insisted upon today. The author might with more reason, call himself an Hegelian; but that would be to appear to place himself among a known band of thinkers to which he does not in fact at all belong, although he is strongly drawn to them” (CP 4.50). A passage that is harder to interpret from the Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898 may also be relevant, as perhaps suggesting that Hegel could have called himself a realist if this term had not been misappropriated; although the passage could just be saying that Hegel (like everyone else since 1800) used the terminology wrongly, without any suggestion that Hegel was himself a realist: “*Rule IV*. As far as practicable, let the terms of philosophy be modelled after those of scholasticism. You are aware that the whole of the Kantian language was formed in this way. Nor does Hegel himself, in my judgment, violate this principle... However, the abuse of the word *Realism* can certainly be charged to Hegel’s account; for it began about 1800 when in consequent of Bardilis introducing a system of realism distinguished from idealistic realism, which it somewhat resembled, by being dualistic, *realism* came to be applicable to that sect of philosophy which has long been called by the unexceptionable name of *dualism*” (*Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898*, Kenneth Laine Ketner (ed.), (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 230-1). (“Bardilis” is a reference to Christoph Gottfried Bardili (or Bardilli), who defended a position of “rational realism”, which was dualistic in the sense of holding that rational reflection on the categories can only yield a science of nature when applied to a matter that must be presupposed independently of all thought. Bardili’s thinking and terminology had a large influence on Reinhold around 1800, and thus (Peirce may have thought) on German idealism more generally.)

93. Hegel himself did not use the label “nominalist” to characterise his opponents, generally calling them “subjective idealists” instead. Bruce Kuklick has suggested that J. S. Mill was responsible for introducing the position of nominalism into the American debate in his *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy* (1865), in a way that may have led Harris to pick up the terminology and use it in this Hegelian context. See Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 96. Harris continued to talk of Hegel as a critic of nominalism in his later works: see William T. Harris, *Hegel’s Logic: A Book on the Genesis and Categories of the Mind* (Chicago: S. G. Griggs, 1890; reprinted New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970), Chapter II.

94. WP 2:153-4. Cf. also Harris, in *ibid.*, pp. 148-9: “For it is evident that the doctrine enunciated by our querist [i.e. Peirce] implies that general terms as well as abstract terms are only “*flatus vocis*” — in short that individual things compose the universe, and that these are true and valid in themselves. On the contrary, we must hold that true actualities must be self-determined totalities, and not mere *things*, for these are always dependent on somewhats, and are separated from their true selves... That which abides in the process of origination and decay, which *things* are always undergoing, is the generic; the generic is the total comprehension, the true actuality, or the Universal, and its identity is always preserved, while the mere “thing”, which is not self-contained, loses its identity perpetually. The loss of identity of the *thing*, is the very process that manifests the identity of the total. Hence, to pre-suppose such a doctrine as formal logic pre-supposes, is to set up the doctrine of immediateness as the only true”; and Editor [W. T. Harris], “Introduction to Philosophy: Chapter IX”, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 2 (1868), pp. 51-6, p. 53: “When the mind rises out of the sensuous habit of viewing things as true in their isolated independence, and comes to see that interdependence obtains among

such things — then it is that a suspicion of the inadequacy of these forms [the laws of thought] gains strength, and formal logic falls into disrepute”.

95. That Harris may have led Peirce to adopt this reading of Hegel as a realist at this stage, prior to the influence of Abbot, is suggested by a lecture on Ockham given at Harvard in 1869, shortly after his exchanges with Harris, where Peirce remarks that “[t]he difference between Nominalism and Realism has a relation not remote from that between the Idealism of Berkeley and Mill and the Idealisms of Kant and Hegel” (MS160/WP 2:336).

96. WP 2:158-9. According to the editors of WP, the letters to which Peirce was replying in which Harris raised this question have been lost (see WP 2:522).

97. Fisch, “Hegel and Peirce”, in *Hegel and the History of Philosophy*, p. 191; reprinted in his *Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism*, p. 278. Amongst others, Brent follows Fisch here: “[The] correspondence [between Harris and Peirce] began as a challenge by Harris to Peirce to defend the nominalism of the “Cambridge Metaphysics”, and more particularly to show how on nominalist grounds the laws of logic could be anything other than inexplicable. In the process of responding to Harris in two letters and three articles, the last and most important of which was called “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities”, Peirce found himself forced by his examination of the matter to recognize that generals, such as the laws of science, are real and to examine the meaning of his doctrine of signs” (Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce*, p. 72).

98. That Peirce is responding to Harris here is clear from the beginning of the article (EP I, 57 (CP 5.318/WP 2:243)), where Peirce tells us he is addressing “readers...who deny that those laws of logic which men generally admit have universal validity” (a reference to Hegelians in general), and the person who has presented Peirce with “a challenge ... to show how upon my principles the validity of the laws of logic are other than inexplicable” (a reference to Harris in particular, as Peirce’s letter to Harris of April 9<sup>th</sup> 1868 shows: see WP 2:158-9, where almost the same wording is used). However, although Harris provides the spur for this article (and while he may have prompted Peirce to include a discussion of Hegel within it), it would be wrong to claim that Harris forced Peirce to face this issue for the first time: for, Peirce says in his letter of April 9<sup>th</sup> that “I have already devoted some attention to that subject” (WP 2:159) prior to Harris’ challenge.

99. Cf. EP I, 60-82 (CP 5.327-357/WP 2:247-72). Specific Hegelian objections to formal logic are considered at EP I, 63, 64-5 (CP 5.330/WP 2:250, 5.332/WP 2:252). For a helpful discussion of Hegel’s own position on this issue, see Robert Hanna, “From an Ontological Point of View: Hegel’s Critique of the Common Logic”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 40 (1986), pp. 305-38; reprinted in Jon Stewart (ed.), *The Hegel Myths and Legends* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), pp. 253-81.

100. Paul Forster has made a suggestion of how that criticism should be taken which we have not considered, namely that “It is the commitment to noumena that qualifies writers such as Plato, Hegel and Leibniz as Nominalists in Peirce’s eyes, despite their rejection of many of the theses attributed to Nominalism” (Paul D. Forster, “Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism”, *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 28 (1992), pp. 691-724, p. 716 note 12). Given Hegel’s repeated objections to Kant’s attempts to confine knowledge to the phenomenal as against “things in themselves”, this looks like an exceedingly unpromising basis on which to try to convict Hegel of nominalism (see e.g. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §44, p. 87); but fortunately I have found no textual evidence

to suggest that this was part of Peirce's view.

101. Apel, *Charles S. Peirce*, p. 24.

102. Cf. EP I, 99-100 (CP 8.30/WP2:480-1 [1871]): "In the usual sense of the word *reality*, therefore, Berkeley's doctrine is that the reality of sensible things resides only in their archetypes in the divine mind. This is Platonistic, but it is not realistic. On the contrary, since it places reality wholly out of the mind in the cause of sensation, and since it denies reality (in the true sense of the word) to sensible things in so far as they are sensible, it is distinctly nominalistic. Historically there have been prominent examples of an alliance between nominalism and Platonism. Abélard and John of Salisbury, the only two defenders of nominalism of the time of the great controversy whose work remains to us, are both Platonists; and Roscellin, to the famous author of the *sententia de flatu vocis*, the first man in the Middle Ages who carried attention to nominalism, is said and believed (all his writings are lost) to have been a follower of Scotus Erigena, the great Platonist of the ninth century. The reasons of this odd conjunction of doctrines may perhaps be guessed at. The nominalist, by isolating his reality so entirely from mental influence as he has done, has made it something which the mind cannot conceive; he has created the so often talked of 'improportion between the mind and the thing in itself'. And it is to overcome the various difficulties to which this gives rise, that he supposes this *noumenon*, which, being totally unknown, the imagination can play about as it pleases, to be the emanation of archetypal ideas. The reality thus receives an intelligible nature again, and the peculiar inconveniences of nominalism are to some degree avoided". In this and related passages (e.g. CP 5.470 [c 1907], 5.503 [c 1905], MS 158/WP 2:310-17 [1869]), what seems to interest Peirce here, is how nominalism can tend towards Platonism, rather than the other way round — where the figure of Roscelin (spelt by Peirce as "Roscellin") is a recurring example, who was the "extremest nominalist", but also a follower of the "extreme realist" Scotus Erigena (MS 158/WP II, 317). For a helpful brief discussion of Roscelin's position, see Eike-Henner W. Kluge, "Roscelin and the Medieval Problem of Universals", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 14 (1976), pp. 405-14.

103. EP II, 178.

104. Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §24 Addition, pp. 56-7 [*Werke* VIII, p. 82]: "Animal as such' cannot be pointed out; only a definite animal can ever be pointed at. 'The animal' does not exist; on the contrary, this expression refers to the universal nature of single animals, and each existing animal is something that is much more concretely determinate, something particularised. But 'to be an animal', the kind considered as the universal, pertains to the determinate animal and constitutes its determinate essentiality". For further discussion of this broadly Aristotelian reading of Hegel, see Robert Stern, *Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object* (London: Routledge, 1990).

105. This question is taken up further in my forthcoming papers on Peirce's treatment of Hegel's position on Firstness and Secondness, referred to in note 24. In these papers I argue that Peirce's claim that Hegel's extreme view of Thirdness means he cannot give Firstness and Secondness its due is mistaken; if that is right, it would therefore follow that this way of arguing for Hegel's nominalism is also misguided.

106. Christopher Hookway, "Pragmaticism and 'Kantian Realism'", *Versus*, 49 (1988), M. A. Bonfantini and C. J. W. Kloesel (eds.), pp. 103-12, pp. 108-9. I have re-numbered Hookway's propositions, which begin with 5 in the text.

107. "Things in themselves" is of course a Kantian term of art; all Hookway

means by it here, I believe, is a mind-independent world.

108. Cf. Peirce's remark that "what we call matter ... is merely mind hidebound with habits" (CP 6.158 [1892]), and Hegel's comment in the *Encyclopaedia*: "If we say that thought, *qua* objective, is the inwardness of the world, it may seem as if consciousness is being ascribed to natural things. But we feel a repugnance against conceiving the inner activity of things to be thinking, since we say that man is distinguished from what is merely natural by virtue of thinking. We would therefore have to talk about nature as a system of thought without consciousness, or an intelligence which, as Schelling says, is petrified" (Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 24 Addition, p. 56 [*Werke* VIII, p. 81], translation modified). As Hookway's comment makes clear, while this view attributes a mind-like structure to the world, it should not be confused with a mentalistic idealism, for there is no claim that this structure is the result of the activity of minds *on* the world, or that this is "supervenient upon the cognitive states of inquirers".

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