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Rethinking the "crisis of expertise": A relational approach

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abstract

Concerns about a "crisis of expertise" have been raised recently in both scholarship and public debate. This article asks why there is such a widespread perception that expertise is in crisis, and why this "crisis" has posed such a difficult puzzle for sociology to explain. It argues that what has been interpreted as a *crisis* is better understood as a *transformation*: the dissolution of a regime of expertise organized around practices of social integration, and its displacement by a new regime organized around practices of expulsion. This article introduces a new framework that envisages expertise as an historically constituted phenomenon, which is the outcome of relational networks (which I call *alliances*). It argues that this approach, in which expertise(s) are understood as the historically contingent outcome of alliances between knowledge producers, problems, and modes of intervention, can better account for recent shifts. It does this by enabling us to reinterpret what has been described as a general crisis of expertise as, instead, the observed effects of the dissolution of specific alliances of knowledge and practice. This article demonstrates the power of this relational approach through two case studies: the dissolution of the expert alliances organized around the rehabilitative approach to crime and the counterinsurgency approach to irregular political violence. In each these cases, it finds that, as alliances of social expertise, characterized by policies and interventions that attempted to discipline problem actors and *integrate* them into society, unraveled, they were displaced by new alliances that sought to manage problems through practices of *exclusion*. The paper concludes with a theory of why the field of sociology has had such difficulty explaining the crisis of expertise.

Keywords: crime, expertise, networks, relational sociology, sociology of knowledge, terrorism

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Introduction: the crisis of expertise

It is widely argued that we are undergoing a "crisis of expertise". This crisis has been identified as a concern in both scholarship (Collins & Evans, 2002; Eyal, 2019; Gluckman & Wilsdon, 2016; Lynch, 2007; Stehr & Grundman, 2011; Yearly, 2000) and public debate (Cottle, 2017; Davies, 2018; Drezner, 2017; Hohmann, 2017; Nichols, 2017; Nye, 2009; Rocco, 2017). This apprehension of crisis, and the difficulties scholars have faced in explaining it, form the starting point for this article. It asks why there has been a widespread perception that expertise is in crisis, and why this "crisis" has posed such a difficult puzzle for sociology to explain. I suggest that a key reason is that dominant framings *misdiagnose* the core problem to be explained.

I argue that although there have indeed been shifts in the workings of expertise in recent decades, these have been refracted through a flawed lens of "crisis"[1] which implies that experts and expertise, as a whole, have lost their power. Building on recent work in science and technology studies and the sociology of knowledge, I conceptualize expertise as the outcome of relationships, rather than a substance or quality in and of itself. Knowledge only becomes "expertise" when it is made applicable to a particular set of problems, and expertise is therefore always the product of socially and historically specific relations. As these networks form and dissolve, so do various forms of "expertise". I argue that what has been understood as a "crisis of expertise" is better understood as the outcome of the gradual dissolution of one particular, historically specific, set of relations between knowledge production and policymaking, which I call the "social regime".

Analyses of the crisis of expertise usually begin with an observation that expertise has somehow lost its authority, power, or influence. Yet there is a central problem with this approach: not *all* forms of expertise are in crisis (Eyal, 2019). In fact, some modes of expertise --particularly those relating to economics and markets (Berman, 2014; Marion Fourcade, 2009; Hirschman & Berman, 2014)), and those linked to security and surveillance (Aradau, 2017; Bigo, 2008; Guzik, 2013; Lakoff & Klinenberg, 2010; Machold, 2020; Valverde, 2011)-- have surged in recent years. This seeming paradox is further reflected within the sociology of knowledge, in the form of the dual nature of the "trouble with experts", which incorporates two opposing concerns: the fear that experts hold too much power (Schudson, 2006; Turner, 2001) and the concern that they have lost their authority (Eyal, 2019; Fischer, 2015; Gauchat, 2012).

I identify several weaknesses in prevailing theories of expertise, which hinder the analysis of this "crisis". First, they tend to conceptualize expertise as singular, rather than something that may take multiple forms. Second is a tendency to conceptualize expertise as a substance inherent in groups, individuals, or bodies of knowledge, rather than an emergent phenomenon activated through networks of relations (Latour, 1987). Finally, the phenomenon of expertise is often treated ahistorically: while it is acknowledged that specific groups of experts may rise and fall in prominence, the phenomenon of expertise as *itself* a product of social and historical developments is rarely considered to be of central importance. This paper develops a framework for the study of expertise that counters these three lacunae. It envisages "expertise" as multiple rather than singular, heterogeneous rather than homogenous, and as an historically constituted phenomenon which is the outcome of relational networks (which I call *alliances*). This approach enables us to reinterpret what has been described as a general crisis of expertise

[1] A number of recent works have also highlighted the constructed nature of "crises" and the discourse around them, e.g. (Krzyżanowski, 2019; Roitman, 2013; Rycker & Don, 2013).

as, instead, the observed effects of the dissolution of specific alliances of knowledge and practice.

The framework proposed here requires the introduction of several key concepts. An *alliance of expertise* describes a particular assemblage of knowledge, problems, and interventions. Multiple alliances of expertise may co-exist at any given time, and may form and dissolve over time. *Expertise*, understood as specialized knowledge applied to some problem or phenomenon in the form of specific practices/interventions, is thus the *outcome* of such an alliance. Within this framework, there is no such thing as expertise without such alliances: as these relationships form and dissolve over time, so too do various forms of expertise.

I introduce the concept of a *regime of expertise*[2] to describe when multiple alliances align in a patterned way, usually by applying similar practices of intervention and modes of knowledge to distinct problems. A regime of expertise is distinguished not by any essential character of the problems it addresses, but by similarities in the forms of knowledge and intervention through which problems are made knowable and subject to intervention. This paper focuses upon the rise and decline of one particular regime of expertise, characterized by the governance of problems through knowledge of, and interventions into, "society." Just as expertise is produced through the system of alliances, so too are problems. "Social" problems, for example, are such not because of any essential feature, but because of the way they have been incorporated into alliances of social expertise, and henceforth understood as problems of social dysfunction which can be managed through interventions into social relations. Through such incorporation, an alliance of expertise can actively reshape our understanding of the nature of a problem and how it should be managed.[3]

By "the social," I refer not simply to its commonplace meaning of relations between people, but to a historically specific mode of conceptualizing and intervening into such relations. "The social" emerged as a mode of understanding and governing human relations in the 19th and 20th century West, in concert with the rise of a "social regime of expertise" of which the discipline of sociology was itself a part. This approach builds on the work of theorists such as Rose, who introduces the idea of "the social" as a set of historically specific relations, rather than a timeless phenomenon or plane of existence (1996, p. 329) and Owens, who argues that the concept of a distinct "social" realm emerged following the rise of capitalism and "territorial states" in modern Europe (2011, p. 4). There is also resonance here with Foucault's conceptualization of civil society as a historically specific formation, in his analysis of the rise of modern liberal states under capitalism (Foucault, 2008, p. 145). This formation frequently entailed an understanding of society as an organism, or a "collective entity with emergent properties that could not be reduced to the individual constituents" (O'Malley, 1996, p. 26). I thus use the terms "society" and "the social" to refer to a historically mode of conceptualizing and governing human relations.

This conceptualization of the social emerged in concert with a regime of expertise: a patterned set of alliances between knowledge-producers, concepts, and interventions. This "social" regime was assembled in concert with the emergence of the modern state and the contemporary social sciences and came to dominate broad swathes of American policymaking

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[2] Thanks to Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche for suggesting the name "regimes of expertise".

[3] Examples of such a process can be seen in Eyal's (2013) analysis of the emergence of the autism epidemic in concert with the emergence of a new network of expertise, and Stampnitzky's (2013) analysis of the emergence of "terrorism" as a problem together with the construction of the field of "terrorism expertise".

through much of the 19th and 20th centuries. Since the 1970s, however, this regime of expertise has increasingly come under pressure, and many of its component alliances, have been subject to dissolution or displacement.

The paper first situates this argument within the literature on sociology of expertise. It then traces, briefly, the rise and decline of the regime of social expertise. The second half of the paper analyzes the unraveling of this regime of expertise via two illustrative case studies: the alliances of expertise organized around the problems of crime and irregular political violence. Through these case studies, this paper aims to demonstrate that, while there has indeed been a significant transformation in the role of experts in governance and policymaking, this is not best explained as a general crisis of expertise, but rather, the dissolution of one, highly influential, regime of expertise and its displacement by another. As these alliances, characterized by policies and interventions that attempted to discipline problem actors and *integrate* them into society, unraveled, they were displaced by new alliances that sought to manage problems through practices of *exclusion*. The paper concludes with a theory of why the field of sociology has had such difficulty analyzing the crisis of expertise.

The sociology of knowledge and the trouble(s) with experts

In its earliest forms, the study of expertise was often framed around the tension between expert knowledge and popular decision-making, and the attendant fear that rising expert power was detrimental to democracy (Amadae, 2003; Brint, 1994; Chomsky, 2002 (1967); Collins & Evans, 2002; Derber, Schwartz, & Magrass, 1990; Schudson, 2006; Smith, 1991; Turner, 2001). This concern reached its apogee at mid-twentieth century with the rise of "a discourse on the dangers of scientific experts in government. . . featuring concepts such as 'scientific power elite', 'new priesthood', 'scientific estate', and 'new mandarins'" (Weingart, 1999, p. 153:153). More recently, a second form of "trouble with experts" has come to the fore, centering on fears of the declining authority of experts (Collins & Evans, 2002; Eyal, 2019; Lynch, 2007; Mehta, 2013; Rittel & Webber, 1973).[4] Yet there is no agreement on why this shift occurred, or even what exactly this shift is describing. The solution proposed in this article is to view the current situation not as a crisis of (singular) *expertise*, but rather, a moment in which we can analyze shifting (plural) *alliances of expertise.* Following theorists who suggest that moments of transformation can make structures more visible (e.g. Swidler, 1986), I suggest that we might also view this moment of "crisis" as an opportunity for theoretical insight.

Prevailing explanations for the crisis of expertise can be grouped into three main approaches, corresponding to levels of analysis upon which they focus: individual, institutional, or macro-societal. The crisis has been understood at the individual level as a loss of confidence in those who possess specialized knowledge and training. At the organizational or institutional level, it has been understood as a decline in influence and power of traditional sites of expert authority. A third approach conceptualizes an overall collapse of experts' authority in politics and society resulting from a macro-level shift such that social organization and governance no longer require expert advice to function (e.g. Beck, 1992; Collins & Evans, 2002; Dommett & Pearce, 2019; Weingart, 1999; Yearly, 2000).

[4] The spread of a seeming disregard for not just expertise, but even "facts" has led some to proclaim that we are not just in a crisis of expertise, but a full-blown "post-truth" era (for examples of this claim, see (Baron, 2018; Mcintyre, 2018), or for a more skeptical view (Jasanoff & Simmet, 2017; Sismondo, 2017)).

These three approaches draw upon different kinds of evidence. Explanations that focus on the relationship between experts and the public often analyze individual level measures such as trust in science and experts. Approaches that focus on institutional-level shifts often look to the rise of think tanks and the media, at the expense of credentialed, especially university-based, forms of expertise. Finally, explanations that center macro-level shifts, such as the rise of "risk society" or "neoliberalism," describe the rise of a new form of society that is either less amenable to, or less requiring of, expert intervention and advice. This article takes an alternate approach that views expertise as the outcome of a network which cuts across all three of these levels—and consequently develops an explanation that is centered on the transformation of these networks, rather than changes affecting one of these levels alone.

The crisis of expertise has been analyzed as a problem of popular attitudes towards expertise, particularly declining levels of trust in experts (Dommett & Pearce, 2019; Eyal, 2019),[5] and as a result of the spread of ideologies such as populism that reject the influence of experts and intellectuals. Others have pointed to the rise of sociology of knowledge itself as an attack on scientific authority, and as encouragement of a popular skepticism towards academic "elites" (e.g. Collins & Evans, 2002; Latour, 2004; Sismondo, 2017). A key difficulty with such framings, however, is that they aim to explain a *general* turn away from expertise. Further, they often collapse "experts" as a type of person with the process of expertise. Moreover, while opinion surveys can measure shifting levels of trust in experts, or the levels of credibility that experts and professionals retain with the general population, such shifts in trust or belief do not necessarily track with the levels of influence which expertise enacts through being embedded in practices of governance and management. And so, if we understand expertise as not just the most visible sorts of *advisory* practices, but also those forms of expertise that are embedded in routine practices of governance and management, looking primarily at measures of trust and opinion are unlikely to provide us with a full picture.

A second set of explanations focuses on institutional shifts, particularly the rise of think tanks (e.g. Medvetz, 2012; Rich, 2009; Weaver, 1989), and a decline in influence and power of traditional sites of expert authority, such as professions and universities. For example, Medvetz (2012) traces the "nullification of expertise" resulting from the rise of right-wing think tanks, which successfully displaced university-based experts in providing policy guidance in a number of areas, while Arnoldi (2007, p. 49:49) argues that "new sites of knowledge production. . . are threatening the role of academics and universities as traditional sources of expertise." There is insight here, but these approaches tend to collapse the empirical and the normative, arguing that the problem is one of the decline of the true, or proper, experts. This paper also differs from such frameworks in taking a purely *empirical* approach to expertise, as a relationship of knowledge and interventions, while remaining purposefully neutral as to their quality or validity. Like the advocates of the "strong program" in the sociology of knowledge (Bloor, 1991), my aim here is to trace the processes through which knowledge comes to have effects in the world, rather than to act as an arbiter of "true" or "false" expertise.

A third approach diagnoses the crisis as the result of a shift to a new type of society, conceptualized in ways ranging from postmodernism (Baudrillard, 2007 (1978)), to risk society (Beck, 1992), to managerialism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007), in which expertise is no longer as significant, relevant, or necessary. One particularly prominent version of this approach points to the rise of "neoliberalism," which has entailed a turn away from expert-driven solutions in favor

[5] Note, however, that Dommett and Pearce (2019:676) cast some doubt on these claims, arguing that recent survey data suggest "broadly positive attitudes towards experts".

of market-based approaches to policy problems. Theories of neoliberalism get it partly right- governance in and through markets, and via individualizing forms of expert intervention*, did* occur and *did* displace some previously dominant modes of expertise and governance. But the rise of neoliberalism is at best a partial explanation for the shifts that have come to be understood as a crisis of expertise. Although theories of neoliberalism are largely compatible with the analysis put forth here of the decline of "social" forms of expertise, they neither explain *how* this dissolution occurred, nor do they account for the rise of new varieties of expertise which came to take its place.

"Neoliberalism" is a heterogeneous and sometimes even incoherent concept (Mudge, 2008; Rogers, 2018). It is not surprising, therefore, that there are multiple explanations to be found under this heading. Despite this plethora of approaches, "neoliberalism" is at best an incomplete explanation for what has come to be understood as the crisis of expertise**.** It is often assumed that neoliberalism automatically eliminates the need for expertise through a shift to self-governing systems. However, as sociological critiques of neoliberalism have shown, markets are not actually self-governing, but themselves require various forms of expert intervention (Davies, 2014; M. Fourcade, 2006; Harvey, 2007a; Mudge, 2008).

Other analyses centering neoliberalism generally propose that there has been a shift towards modes of governance that individualize management of problems, and subjectify individuals as rational economic actors.[6] A somewhat more developed explanation here argues that with the rise of neoliberalism previous forms of expertise-based governance are replaced by environmental or risk-based forms of control, which can run fairly autonomously, according to a market-based logic (e.g. Foucault, 2008; Harcourt, 2001). But this approach does not satisfactorily explain the rise of a mode of governance which conceptualizes problem actors as NOT wholly rational, and/or not subject to governance via rational individual incentives, as demonstrated in the two case studies presented in the second half of this paper.[7]

As the social integrationist regime of expertise began to dissolve, *some* of its component alliances did indeed come to be displaced by new alliances which centered governance by and through market mechanisms, but others were displaced by a set of expert alliances structured around the identification and exclusion of those deemed threats. The key here, as we will see, is a distinction between those deemed *rational* (what the neoliberal discourse calls *homo economicus*), and thus subject to governance through individualizing market logics, and those deemed irrational- and thus incapable of responding to such logics- and who must therefore be excluded from society, from the economy, or even from life itself (Agamben, 2005; Foucault, 2003; Young, 2007 (1999)). What unites these two approaches is that both reject the possibility of understanding and managing problems through forms of expertise that center "society" as a

[6] Perhaps ironically, Foucault's discussion of neoliberalism is one of the strongest examples of this, relying for its analysis of crime policy under neoliberalism on the economistic takes of authors such as Stigler, Ehrlich, and Becker (Foucault, 2008, p. 248).

[7] In most discussions of neoliberalism and its effects upon expertise the governance of actors conceptualized as "nonrational/noneconomic" is either ignored, or treated as a mere byproduct of other developments (as in the work of Wacquant, where the rise of overly punitive crime control is explained through either a way to manage the disorder created by the those discarded in the new economy (Wacquant, 2012) or an almost functionalist need for the state to ritually reassert its sovereignty (Wacquant, 2010), or in analyses of the role of the "loser" under neoliberalism who serves primarily as a negative example to others (George, 1999)).

complex organism, and individuals (pathological or not) as formed (and potentially re-formable) through an inherent relation to this structure.

Another variation argues that, with the rise of neoliberalism, governance informed by expert knowledge is superseded, with all forms of governance now having primarily economic motivations such as the control of surplus populations (Wacquant, 2010) or the spread of neoliberalism itself (Harvey, 2007b; Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall, & Jarvis, 2015; Lister, 2019). Wacquant (2010, 2012) argues that, with the rise of neoliberalism, almost all forms of governance are discredited *except* for punitive crime control measures, which then take on a special significance as a site for the state to perform its sovereignty.[8] Theories which suggest that neoliberalism, or "global economic shifts" more broadly, can be understood as the cause of recent shifts in the governance of violence, crime, and punishment (Garland, 2001; Haggerty, 2004; Wacquant, 2010, 2012), thus largely rely upon placing these problems in a subordinate relation to economic forces. And while this primacy of the economy might be seen as a plausible (although contested (e.g. Campbell & Schoenfeld, 2013; Jenness, 2004; Murakawa, 2014; Simon, 2007)) explanation for shifts in the governance of domestic disorder, it falls short when applied to the management of *international* conflict, which, as this paper demonstrates, has been subject to much the same shifts. Although economic forces can plausibly be arrayed as a motive for shifts in the governance of crime at the domestic level, there is no clear mechanism for how or why this would explain the reorganization of security governance at the international level. Insofar as the phenomenon of neoliberalism has been applied to analyses of counterterrorism, this has largely entailed presuming the subjugation of policies and practices of international security to economic interests (Heath-Kelly et al., 2015; Lister, 2019). While there are some clear examples where the concept of "terrorism" and practices of counterterrorism can be seen to have been applied in the service of U.S. economic interests, this fails to explain the specific shifts in the practice of counter-terrorism discussed in the second half of this paper.

This paper argues instead that the rejection of *social* approaches to intervention and the "social integrationist" regime of expertise is the key that binds together both the rise of "market" based and "exclusionary" governance. I build upon recent works in science and technology studies and the sociology of knowledge which shift away from thinking of "expertise" as a property inherent in knowledge or individuals, and instead as a product of networks or relations (Callon, 1986; Eyal, 2013; Eyal & Bucholtz, 2010; Eyal & Pok, 2011; Grundman, 2017; Latour, 1987, 1993). A relational approach to the study of expertise allows us to analyze how influential forms of expertise rise and fall through the assembling and disassembling of "alliances," or sets of relations. This model is particularly influenced by the work of Eyal and Bucholz (2010), who argue for moving from a sociology of "experts" to a sociology of "interventions", but where the approach here differs is in arguing that the key to analyzing the phenomenon commonly understood as "expertise" is to focus upon not just discrete acts of intervention, but interventions as part of ongoing, patterned networks of expertise.

Existing relational approaches to the study of expertise tend to focus more on the *construction* than the *dissolution* of networks. While there is some resonance here with work that others have done on "network breakdown" (Margocsy, 2017) or "fragile assemblages" (Lakoff, 2017), these concepts refer to structures that are more both localized and less robust than the alliances and regimes of expertise discussed here. The framework of alignments and regimes further permits a way to analyze patterned shifts in the rise and fall of alliances of

[8] Lister (2019) applies a similar argument to the case of counterterrorism.

expertise. Following from this approach, our core task, if we wish to understand the shifting role of expertise in politics and society, is to analyze the construction (and dissolution) of these alliances.

The body of this paper analyzes the rise and decline of what I call the "social integrationist" regime of expertise. This is followed by two case studies of dissolution of social alliances of expertise: those organized around the (social) management of (domestic) crime and (international) irregular political violence. In each of these cases, I trace how an alliance of expertise, organized around governance through integration of problem actors into society, was displaced by an alliance organized around the exclusion of those deemed threats. I argue that these cases are illustrative examples of a broader pattern of dissolution and displacement affecting a range of "social integrationist" alliances of expertise: recent work has observed a similar pattern of dispossession of "social" expertise in areas including schooling (Mehta, 2013), immigration (Massey, 2020), poverty, and crime and punishment (Garland, 2001; Hinton, 2016; Kohler-Hausmann, 2015; Murakawa, 2014). In sum, where previously a wide variety of problems had been managed through social-scientific techniques of knowledge production, classification, and rationalization, these issues were now reconfigured, and the policies designed to manage them displaced by alternate approaches advocated by different sets of experts that instead aimed to manage problems through techniques of exclusion, seemingly without needing to understand the key actors, who were increasingly seen not as social subjects to be managed, but simply threats to be eliminated.

The rise and fall of the "social integrationist" regime of expertise

The preceding sections have argued that there is no singular "expertise", but a multitude of expertises, each the product of a specific network of relations, and that, consequently, we can analyze the rise (and decline) of specific expertises by tracing the assemblage (and dissolution) of their associated alliances. This section uses this relational framework to analyze the rise and decline of the "social integrationist" regime of expertise, a patterned set of alliances which made sense of and provided means of intervening into problems through their relation to "society". I first describe the rise of this regime of expertise in the 19th century, and then analyze, as illustrative case studies, how two of its component alliances—those organized around the problems of "crime" (or domestic disorder) and insurgency/ terrorism (or international political violence)— *dis*assembled in the late 20th century.

These two cases were not selected randomly, but rather because they are exemplary. Both serve as "master" cases or "model systems" within the discipline of sociology (Guggenheim & Krause, 2012; Krause, 2016). The management of social order and disorder has been central to classical sociological thinking (e.g. Durkheim, 1984; Parsons, 1991 (1951)), and the question of order, particularly understood through the question of crime, continues to occupy a central role in the discipline. The management of political violence, while receiving less attention within contemporary sociology, was also a central motivation in the rise of social theory in the 19th century: Patricia Owens (2015) has argued that the rise of the "social" was motivated by a need to counter and tame "insurgencies" both domestic (here, the rising specter of class warfare) and international (colonial rebellions). These two cases also illustrate how the social integrationist regime of expertise spanned the boundary between domestic and international policy and knowledge. While contemporary American sociology has tended to focus on *domestic* policy arenas, and rarely incorporates foreign policy into the core of its

analysis, the management of empire was a central topic in the early development of the discipline (Go, 2013; Steinmetz, 2017).

The emergence of a "social integrationist" regime of expertise

Research into the history of the social sciences has highlighted the symbiotic development of expertise and the modern state in the 19th century (e.g. Bourdieu & de Saint Martin, 1996; Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Desroieres, 2002; Foucault, 1970, 1979; Hacking, 1999; Mukerji, 2011; Porter, 1996). Foucault's (1979) theory of disciplinary power argued that governance in the modern era is based upon the creation of knowledge about problematic (and ordinary) populations, from criminals to soldiers, to sexual deviants, in minute detail. Others have described how the emergence of a new configuration of relations between states and expertise made individuals and populations "legible," and thus governable (Scott, 1998:2). This has taken a variety of forms, ranging from censuses to mapmaking (Scott, 1998), racial classification (Bowker & Star, 1999; Haney Lopez, 1996; Marx, 1998), the rise of intelligence testing and standardized exams (Lemann, 1999), the application of modernization theory to international economic development (Ferguson, 1994; Latham, 2011; Mitchell, 2002), and the medicalization of various forms of "madness" and "badness" (Conrad & Schneider, 1992; Foucault, 2006 (1961)). This section argues that these "new" modern forms of expertise can be understood as the product of the assemblage of a series of *alliances,* comprising a new regime of expertise (that is, a patterned set of alliances), characterized by a tendency to understand problems, and propose interventions, predicated upon reintegration into "society."

Although the birth of sociology as a discipline is generally linked to the emergence of modern society, the historically specific nature of the concept has faded over time, with contemporary sociologists and political scientists tending to treat "society" as a general signifier for connections between people, groups, and human structure (Owens, 2015). Rather than thinking of society as simply a descriptive term, or a level of analysis, I argue that we must re-historicize the concept as the product of a historically specific alliance of governance and expertise.[9] It was no accident that the study of society emerged at the particular historical moment that it did. Many of the classical social theorists, from Smith to Marx to Weber*,* focused on analyzing and explaining the emergence of the seemingly new phenomenon of modern society. But these theorists were not merely *describing* the emergence of modern society, they were also helping to *constitute* it (Owens, 2015:69; Wagner, 2000:137), by way of what Bourdieu (1991, p. 106) calls a "theory effect". Furthermore, they helped to constitute it in a particular way: as a phenomenon characterized by its unity of purpose and structure, with distinct parts that worked together and all had a specific function, akin to a biological organism (Wagner, 2000: 142); such that if one part broke down, the entire unit would suffer (Durkheim, 1984; Offer, 2019). With the "rise of the social," (Owens, 2011:13), society took on causal force, and became a problem subject to particular forms of management and intervention. The emergence of society, of sociological expertise, and of "social" forms of governance, must therefore all be

[9] I say here *re*-historicize because the historically specific nature of society was, of course, a central proposition of those who have come to be understood as the founders of sociology. Although the study of social connections, more generally, predated this, previously 'society' had been used only to refer to the private sphere, whereas in the 19th century it emerged as a new kind of phenomenon, "neither state nor household" (Wagner, 2000:134).

understood as fundamentally interconnected (Law & Urry, 2004:298; Neocleus, 1995:402; Rose, 1996; Wagner, 2000:132).

In the U.S., this mode of governance reached a high point at mid-twentieth century, characterized by a widespread belief in rational, knowledge-based, solutions to social and political problems. In arenas ranging from crime control, where according to Simon (2000:295) "it seemed possible to govern through society as a structure of knowledge and a target of intervention" to international relations, where the cold war "became a social scientists' war" (Rohde, 2013:10), in the U.S. in the 1950s and 60s, "many social scientists came to think of politics- or better yet, policy and planning- as a subject of almost boundless possibilities" (Migdal, 1988, p. 10). Others have described the mid-twentieth century as characterized by "lavish government funding" for social research (Erickson et al., 2013:5) or as a time characterized by faith in "social engineering" (Lemov, 2005:3).

If "society" and societal expertise are not ahistorical phenomena, but the product of alliances between constructions of political problems, modes of knowledge production, and policy approaches, it follows that they may also dissolve through the weakening of these bonds. And if the mid-twentieth century represents the high point of the alliance of sociological expertise and governance, the period just following appears as a time of crisis for that approach. From the failure of the war in Vietnam, to the urban riots of the inner cities, events of the late 1960s and early 1970s resulted in a significant destruction of the previous faith in the ability to solve problems through social interventions.

Over the course of the 1970s, a number of seemingly distinct policy arenas in the United States underwent dramatic, and strikingly parallel, transformations. Where previously each had been characterized by the central role played by social science experts—in framing and understanding the problem, and in shaping policies in response, in each of these areas a new approach emerged, that minimized, or even seemed to actively reject, the role of such expert advice. The uncoupling of the social-integrationist alliance of expertise and governance resulted in its displacement by an approach which, rather than re-integration, relies upon exclusion. This can be characterized as a logic of removal—whether via incarceration, killing, or mere neglect—that re-conceptualizes problem actors not as in need of reform, rehabilitation, or reintroduction into society, but rather as a threat to society itself, with the solution therefore to remove those deemed problems wholesale. The next section describes how this shift unfolded in the dissolution of two expert alliances, those focused upon crime and irregular political violence.

Governing crime: from disciplinary subjects to social expulsion

This section analyzes the post-1970 crisis of criminological expertise as the dissolution of one alliance of expertise, organized around a central logic of crime as a *social* problem, and the re-formation of a new alliance, organized around a core logic of *exclusion*. While this shift has sometimes been characterized as a rejection of expertise, I argue that this only tells half the story. As the "social" alliance of expertise dissolved, it gave way to the construction of a new alliance organized around the problem of the "career criminal" as an essentially pathological agent who must be excluded from legitimate society. This section traces the fracturing of the "social" alliance of crime expertise, in which crime is a product of various social pathologies, made concrete through interventions which aimed to reform and re-integrate such problem actors back into society, and its displacement by a new alliance of expertise, organized around a logic of *exclusion* from mainstream society.

During the 1960s, under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, crime control policies were developed in consultation with criminologists, sociologists, and social workers. These analysts understood crime through approaches such as labeling theory, which focused upon the negative impact that labeling individuals as "criminals" could have on their future development, and opportunity theory, which viewed social conditions as the root cause of crime, and criminal behavior as developing when children were not provided with adequate care and material resources (Hinton, 2016, pp. 20, 36). Their policies were characterized by a "correctionalist commitment to rehabilitation, welfare, and criminological expertise" (Garland, 2001, p. 27), and predicated upon an understanding of crime having causes and solutions in the broader social order (O'Malley, 1996, p. 26). We can view the mid-century alliance of criminological expertise as a network of people (including sociologists, social workers, and criminologists), understandings of the problem of crime as a produce of social relations, and techniques and interventions that included both social rehabilitation aimed to reintegrate offenders back into society, as well as preventive measures that aimed to reform society to remove the presumed (social) causes of crime.

Under its sway, domestic crime policy was largely organized around the goal of rehabilitation, enacted through a set of practices that produced the criminal as an individual subject to be known and acted upon, towards their ultimate reintegration into society (Foucault, 1979; Garland, 2001; Simon, 2000). Interventions prescribed preventing crime by addressing pathologies of groups and families that prevented them from properly integrating in to mainstream society, along with programs aimed at enabling individual offenders to reintegrate into economy and society after serving their time. For social groups deemed at risk of criminality, this could take the form of interventions aimed reforming these groups and their members so as to better fit in with the dominant society (Kohler-Hausmann, 2015, p. 93).

By the end of the 1970s, however, this social alliance of crime expertise had been displaced by a new network organized around a logic of social exclusion. This new alliance of expertise produced "the criminal" as an intractable object to be managed, rather than an individualized subject to be known and rehabilitated (Garland 2001). It linked together this new understanding of crime with advisers and commentators such as James Q. Wilson, who put forth a moralizing view of the criminal as essentially *other*, along with new interventions that aimed to identify, surveil, and segregate those deemed "criminal." Academic criminologists whose approach to crime was based upon knowledge of "society" were displaced from the network, with a turn to analyses of crime as potentially innate to certain actors and populations, paired with policies aimed as identifying, surveilling, and separating these problem actors from the "mainstream" of society (Haggerty, 2004, p. 218; O'Malley, 1996:27). Where prisons had once been organized around the goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society, they now became "warehouses" for prisoners who were "defined through and through as unchangeable and dangerous" (Simon 2000: 287) and "a quarantine zone in which purportedly dangerous individuals are segregated in the name of public safety" (Garland 2001:178). And where the social alliance produced forms of expertise that enabled knowledge of the inner workings of "criminal" individuals and their situatedness in society, the exclusionary alliance instead produced forms of expertise centered on the identification of dangerous actors, with little need to delve into their psychic or social lives.

How did this happen? As the new, "exclusionary" alliance of crime expertise took shape, ideas about "pathology" and its relation to poverty and crime were transformed—from supporting programs to reform and reintegrate pathologized individuals and groups, to justifying

a need for exclusion and predictive interventions aimed at separating dangerous individuals from the rest of society (O'Connor, 2001). Insofar as President Kennedy framed and justified many of his antipoverty policies as anti-crime policies, this also set the scene for a backlash when they did not (seem) to work as promised. Framing social pathologies as producing crime (with poverty as an intervening step) opened the way for a backlash against social logics of causation more generally. This turn can also be viewed in the responses of both conservative intellectuals, but also some of the "liberal" architects of social policies, to the riots of the late 1960s (Hinton, 2016; Murakawa, 2014). And so, the earlier network of expertise, which produced interventions aimed as *including or incorporating* "deviant" groups and individuals into society as a means to an end—addressing crime/social disorder—thus enabled a reinterpretation and reform, through a new "exclusionary" alliance, in which crime was seen to be caused by an innate pathology, and consequently, criminals became subject to intervention only via separating these pathological individuals from the rest of society.

The two alliances were not composed of entirely disparate components: there was some overlap of both experts and ideas, which became polyvalent, taking on new meanings and applications once they were integrated into new alliances. This highlights the significance of focusing upon networks of expertise as the core site of change, rather than simply individual experts. The perceived failings of the social integrationist alliance set the scene for not just a backlash against its core theories and policies, but also for a re-interpretation of its core theory, by simplifying it--- that if crime was caused by pathologies, but could not be fixed via social interventions, then maybe these were simply innate. We can view the career of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a central actor in both the social and the exclusionary crime alliances, as a symbolic hinge between these shifting expert alliances, and a quintessential example of this polyvalence. Over the course of the 1960s and 70s, Moynihan's views shifted from a view of crime as caused by social forces, to a view of crime as caused by innate pathologies. His influential 1965 "Moynihan report" built upon the work of Gunnar Myrdal, who viewed the poverty of African-Americans as "a 'vicious circle' perpetuated by economic inequality, cultural exclusion, and the psychological impact of racism", arguing that "what he called the 'tangle of pathology' could be alleviated through planned interventions in black communities" (Hinton, 2016, p. 58). Eventually, however, both Moynihan the individual and his ideas would shift and take on new meanings in support of the exclusionary approach to the governance of crime.

The urban uprisings of the late 1960s were a key moment of inflection for Moynihan (and others). Following the 1967 riots,

> "Moynihan joined conservative political scientists Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson in advocating divestment from community action programs and other social welfare initiatives. . . all three came to see black poverty as somehow innate among African Americans. With Moynihan serving as special advisor to Nixon on urban affairs, and with Banfield and Wilson working as consultants on various presidential task forces, their ideas helped push the Nixon administration toward an understanding of black cultural pathology, rather than poverty, as the root cause of crime" (Hinton, 2016, p. 21).

What happened here was not just a shift in the understanding of criminals, but the emergence of a new sub-category of intractable offenders. What we see here is not simply the rise of different individual experts, but the reconfiguration of a new network, or alliance, or expertise, linking together individuals with a particular understanding of the problem and a new set of solutions.

This newly reconfigured alliance was organized around a racialized category of unfixable offenders, who could not be reintegrated, only identified and excluded, in a move from a "policy

rhetorically committed to reintegration to a policy of social expulsion" (Kohler-Hausmann, 2015, p. 99). The turn away from the idea that policies could eliminate or even reduce problems of poverty and crime, and only could contain them was undergirded by an increasingly racialized view of crime and disorder. The shift towards focus on individual pathology as cause of crime came as much of the U.S. prison population to be majority Black and Latino in late 1960s and early 1970s, who were seen to comprise a "new class of inmates" who were "incapable of responding to rehabilitative attempts" (Hinton, 2016, p. 169). Interventions consequently focused upon methods of identifying and excluding bad actors from the rest of the population. This included not only the rise of mass incarceration as "warehousing" and the turn away from rehabilitation, but also inflicting other forms of "social death" (Cacho, 2012) which excluded both the formerly incarcerated, and those identified as *potentially* criminal from core aspects social, civil, and political life in the U.S., bolstered by a belief "that dysfunction within marginalized individuals and groups inhibited their incorporation into a predominantly righteous society" (Kohler-Hausmann, 2015, p. 89).

The interventions produced by this new alliance aimed to *preempt* crime and disorder, not through disciplining or rehabilitation, but by identifying those deemed susceptible to criminality and removing them from society. This occurred through two key modes of intervention, both with a preemptive logic: *exclusion*, to separate "bad" actors from the rest of the population, and *surveillance,* to monitor suspicious groups and identify potentially dangerous actors. A logic of exclusion was enacted through both the rise of mass incarceration (including the rise of what became known as "preventive detention": the arrest and imprisonment of suspects—with this practice largely targeting young Black men- justified primarily not as a *response* to a specific crime, but as a means of keeping suspect individuals off the streets, and thus unable to *potentially* commit crimes (Hinton, 2016, pp. 22, 157) along with spread of policies that can be classed as enacting a form of "social death" upon its targets through targeted exclusion from key aspects of ordinary life (such as public housing and higher education), the economy (such as certain jobs), and the polity (via felon disenfranchisement laws).[10] Other specific interventions through which the exclusionary approach took shape were guided by the application of new types of knowledge, including more funding and resources for new types of applied knowledge projects in police departments and the criminal justice arms of the state, which increasingly aimed to *predict* and pre-empt future crime (Hinton, 2016, pp. 22-23). These included the development and adoption of algorithmic computer programs to predict crime*,* with police forces in cities such as Cleveland and Philadelphia receiving funding to apply such programs to guide police surveillance and patrols, as well as programs that make use of new forms of technological surveillance such as "spotshotter" and algorithmic predictions to track gang activity (Brayne, 2017; Hinton, 2016, pp. 23, 91).

What we have seen in this case study is the dominance of the social integrationist alliance of crime expertise through the 1960s, followed by a backlash against "social" explanations for crime, made manifest by a crisis in which the social integrationist alliance of crime expertise ultimately fails to hold together as the bonds between certain alliances of experts, understandings of the problem, and prescribed interventions and policies begins to weaken. Simultaneously, we see a new alliance begin to emerge, linking together experts (sometimes the same, sometimes different) with new conceptions of the problem and new types of interventions. The new alliance brought together an understanding of the problem of crime as caused by intractable problem of

[10] On exclusion from public housing, student loans, and other aspects of the welfare state see (Kohler-Hausmann, 2015, p. 98); on felon disenfranchisement see (Hinton, 2016, p. 335).

individuals and groups, while the associated interventions were aimed not at reintegrating offenders (or problem groups) back into society but rather excluding them from society altogether- not just through the rise of mass incarceration but also through policies which imposed social death on offenders, and the rise of interventions focused on surveillance and identification of potential offenders. As we will see, there are many parallels to this story in the case of the crisis and dissolution of the social alliance focused on the problem of international political violence.

Countering international political violence: from "armed social work" to the war on terror

This section presents a second case study. It traces the dissolution of an alliance of expertise organized around understanding and managing the problem of irregular political violence through the lens of counterinsurgency, and the emergence of a new alliance of expertise which conceptualized the problem of irregular political violence as "terrorism," which could be dealt with only by eliminating those deemed a threat. Consistent with my broader argument, neither "insurgency" not "terrorism" describes a phenomenon that simply exists in the world: rather these are concepts that make certain types of violence comprehensible and subject to certain types of intervention/management.

Bringing together modernization theory, Parsonian theories of conflict, and the earlier writings of French and British colonial officers, a specific diagnosis and "treatment" for the problem of sub-state political violence was developed by twentieth-century American anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and military planners. They explained such violence as driven by societies which experienced pathological maladaptations on the route to political and economic modernity, and which could therefore be rectified or managed by interventions *into* society. The "counterinsurgency" alliance produced an approach to combating political violence which combined targeted violence along with social and economic interventions aimed at manipulating societies and populations in ways that would (supposedly) make them less hospitable to insurgency. It was thus reliant upon the ability to develop knowledge which helped counterinsurgents to understand insurgents' "minds, their mentality and their motives" (Paget, 1967, p. 162). This can be called a "social integrationist" alliance insofar as it approached the problem as one that had both causes, and solutions, in the relationship of violent actors to "society", as was evident in these proceedings from a 1962 U.S. Army symposium on "limited war", which declared that:

> "Whether one is concerned with programs to alleviate political, social, or economic sources of discontent, with techniques of indirect influence, with the social environment in which actions, occur, or with the social and political factors which are targets of action, the kind of underlying knowledge required is the understanding and prediction of human behavior at the individual, political and social group, and society levels" (Lybrand, 1962, p. x).

American counterinsurgency policies were oriented around a logic that conceptualized violence as emerging from social conflict and dysfunction, and thus required solutions that took society into account. The practices of social engineering that ensued, such as the development of "strategic hamlets" during the Vietnam War, were often brutally violent, but they were constructed via a framework that analyzed political violence as emerging for social reasons and removing insurgents' social bases of support as key to defeating it (Belcher, 2012; Herman, 1998; Khalili, 2009; McClintock, 1992; Owens, 2015).

Although counterinsurgency has a much longer history, the American state developed particular interest in the decades following World War II. Research funded by the Department of Defense in the 1960s brought some of the most prestigious institutions in the academic world together with individuals from "think tanks" and the military and civilian branches of the government (Blumstein & Orlansky, 1965; Herman, 1998; Horowitz, 1967; Solovey, 2001). The early 1960s marked a high point of state interest in the approach: just before taking office, President Kennedy established a new Special Group on Counterinsurgency. Four months later, the army published a report on "Operations against irregular forces", which "opened with the premise that guerrilla warfare was merely the 'outward manifestation' of public disenchantment with certain political, social, and economic conditions," and emphasized that guerrilla movements relied on the support of the population and that insurgencies could be ended only by addressing their causes" (Birtle, 2006, as cited in Stampnitzky, 2013:66). By 1966, the Department of Defense was spending $6 million annually on social science research on counterinsurgency taking place at new hybrid organizations that brought together state and academic researchers such as the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) and Project Agile of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (Solovey, 2001, p. 180). Counterinsurgency would also come to be taught at the war colleges and enshrined in military field manuals (Maechling, 1988, p. 30).

However, by the late 1960s, the bonds holding the counterinsurgency alliance together began to fray. Although the causes were complex, two specific factors were the 1965 controversy over Project Camelot, and the developing consensus that the American intervention in Vietnam had failed, with counterinsurgency sometimes taken as a synecdoche for that failure. Project Camelot, one of the largest government funded social science projects in the U.S. to date with a projected budget of up to $6 million, was to incorporate a number of contemporary luminaries of the social sciences, including Jessie Bernard, Lewis Coser, Neil Smelser, and S. N. Eisenstadt, who were tasked with identifying the root causes of insurgency (Horowitz, 1967, p. 4; Solovey, 2001, p. 181; Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 68). However, the promise of "veritable Manhattan Project for the behavioral sciences" (Herman, 1998, p. 103) was blown apart with the project's cancellation in July 1965, following leaks of the project's intended applications and military ties by researcher Johan Galtung (Horowitz, 1967).

The cancellation of Project Camelot strained the previously the close ties between the military and academic social science researchers, with foreign policy and defense research increasingly shifting to think tanks and private contract research agencies from this point onward (Shafer, 1988, p. 127). While the bonds tying together social scientists with the state in the counterinsurgency alliance were already beginning to fray by the second half of the 1960s, the failure of the U.S. war in Vietnam and the central role attributed to counterinsurgency in that failure, was final nail in the coffin (McClintock, 1992; Spjut, 1978). By 1987, a former instructor looking for teaching materials on counterinsurgency at the JFL Special Warfare Center and School in Fort Bragg "was told that all material on counterinsurgency and Vietnam had been discarded in 1975 on direct order from the senior Army command" (Hoffman, 1991, p. 2).

As the counterinsurgency alliance began to disassemble, a new network of expertise, was coming into being, organized around an understanding of irregular political violence as "terrorism" (a problem which this expert alliance also helped to constitute). While the term "terrorism" had been used relatively rarely, and generally then only as a label for a *tactic*, or a type of violence which might be used by both states and insurgents, and both friends, and enemies, over the course of the 1970s, the signature tactics of "bombings, hijackings,

kidnappings, and hostage-takings were melded together, conceptualized not simply as tactics but as identifying activities, and joined to a new and highly threatening sort of actor: the "terrorist."" (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 3). This occurred with and through the emergence of a new network of expertise, eventually coming to be described as the "terrorism mafia" (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 39).

The identification of "terrorism" as a new type of problem was triggered by the spread of violence "out of place": specifically, the spread of insurgent nationalist and anti-colonial violence into the "international" sphere, where it often targeted Americans and other "Westerners", rather than remaining confined to the "local" colonial/post-colonial space, with an incident of hostage-taking at the Munich Olympics leading President Nixon to establish the "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism" in 1972 (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 7). The state department and the CCCT funded and organized some of the earliest networks of terrorism researchers, with a quarter-million dollars in federal research funding being directed to the subject by 1976 (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 29).

The "counterterrorism" approach conceptualized the problem as located not in societal pathology, but within pathological individuals who could thus only be contained or eliminated While "insurgents" had been analyzed as amendable to all sorts of psychological, sociological, and political/ economic analysis, and understanding their motivations, goals, and worldviews seen as central to defeating them, with the rise of "terrorism," understanding the causes of terrorism come to be seen as not just unnecessary but even potentially dangerous. The social-science based theorists of modernization and development, who had informed the counterinsurgency based approach of the 1960s and early 1970s, were displaced by a new network of academics and media-based pundits who decried terrorists as irrational, pathological agents who could only be countered with overwhelming force (Stampnitzky, 2013). Like the transformation of the "criminal", this new object of the "terrorist" was also racialized (Abu-Bakare, 2020; Kapoor, 2018; Kumar, 2020; Kundnani, 2014; Selod, 2015). And while there was some overlap with the experts of the counterinsurgency alliance, with individuals such as Walter Laqueur, Brian Crozier, and Richard Clutterbuck making the transition, as the new object of "terrorism" took shape even these individuals' work turned away from some of the core aspects of counterinsurgency theory (Clutterbuck, 1977; Laqueur, 1974, 1978; Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 50).

While counterinsurgency was premised upon the feasibility and efficacy of "societal" interventions, with the new "terrorism" framework, which understood political violence as caused by evil, irrational actors, the only sensible response would seem to be to eliminate those actors. Whereas counterinsurgency sought to forestall political violence by remaking entire societies (thus the fondness of some of its proponents for calling it "armed social work" (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 8)), counterterrorism aims, more simply, to eliminate those identified as "terrorists." With the turn to pre-emptive action (including targeted killings, indefinite detention, and legal and financial counter-terrorist strategies) in the post-9/11 war on terror, this occurs sometimes even before those identified as threats have committed any acts of violence (de Goede, 2008; Finkelstein, Ohlin, & Altman, 2012; Said, 2015; Suskind, 2006). As Husain (2021, p. 208) writes, we now see a "material governance of terrorism that is characterized by disappearance". This exclusion can take the form of physical exclusion from the state through immigration refusals and hardening of borders (Bigo, 2008; Kapoor, 2018; Newell, 2019), but also but also through detention (Khalili, 2013; Sanders, 2018) and assassination/ 'targeted killings' (Grayson, 2012; Gunneflo, 2016; Kessler & Werner, 2008). At the level of *preventive*

policy, for those individuals and populations deemed potential terrorists, we have largely pre-emptive policies such as indefinite detention, interrogation, torture (which has largely been justified through its supposed ability to pre-empt terrorist attacks) (Del Rosso, 2015; Gordon, 2014; Hajjar, 2013; Luban, 2014)), and even pre-emptive warfare—interventions that do not seek to change, to shape, or to manipulate at the level of the individual or the society, but only to eliminate those deemed threats.

Discussion

The preceding section, with its two case studies, aimed to demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical framework presented in this paper: that we should understand expertise as a series of alliances (of knowledge, problems, and interventions) and that the crisis of expertise should be understood as the breakup of one regime of expert alliances and the assemblage of a new one. In both cases, the dissolution of a prior alliance, organized around a "social" understanding of problems and the means to intervene in them, led to the assemblage of a new alliance, organized around the logic of exclusion. In each of these cases, a backlash against social methods of understanding and addressing problems through intervention into society, was precipitated by the breakthrough of violence past boundaries to keep the problem in its "proper" location.

In both cases, we see the disenfranchisement of certain experts as a new understanding of the problem takes hold, and their replacement by new types of experts and interventions. In the case of the management of (domestic) crime and disorder, we saw the breakdown of a previously dominant "social" alliance of expertise, and its displacement by a new alliance organized around a logic of exclusion of those deemed criminal. In the case of irregular (international) political violence, we saw the displacement of a network of expertise organized around the conceptualization of such violence as "insurgency", which could be combatted through social interventions, and the rise of a new alliance of expertise organized around a conceptualization of violence as produced by "terrorists", who could only be eliminated. In each case, the newly constructed alliance of expertise produced a new, often racialized, category of *irredeemable* offenders. And in each of these cases the new category did not simply replace the prior one, but subdivides it: the "terrorist" marks a particular (particularly irrational and undeterrable) enactor of political violence, while the new super-offender is a particularly dangerous and unreformable type of criminal. While both of these transformations have sometimes been articulated as a rejection of expertise altogether, this paper demonstrates instead that we should interpret this shift as the rejection of one particular mode of expertise, and the rise of another.

Within the new exclusionary framework, there was no longer any value in understanding the minds and motivations of offenders. Instead what was required were new types of expertise-primarily those organized around identifying and excluding the problem actors. The core types of knowledge we see arising with the new exclusionary alliances focus upon the identification and surveillance of potentially dangerous individuals and groups. In the case of crime, we see the rise of technologies for surveillance and identification of potential criminals, and rise of preventive detention and mass incarceration. In the case of terrorism, we see the rise of technologies for surveilling and tracking dangerous actors: financial surveillance, the no-fly list, drone strikes and indefinite detention.

Conclusion

This article has argued that we should reinterpret the "crisis of expertise" not as a crisis of (singular) *expertise*, but rather, the result of transformations of (plural) *alliances of expertise*. It has traced how what has been named a "crisis of expertise" is better understood as the decline of one particular (yet naturalized as universal) alliance of policy and expertise, one which was organized around understanding and governing problems through the lens of "society." The social integrationist regime of expertise was not replaced by one single coherent alternative. However, in looking at the case studies presented here, we can see that one form of commonality in the newly emerging alliances is that of the management of problems through techniques of *exclusion*. Those identified as "problems" or threats have increasingly come to be conceptualized, analyzed, and treated, not as subjects to be governed through knowledge, but as objects, to be contained, controlled, or eliminated: terrorists, criminals, sex offenders, recalcitrant students, failing cities, immigrants. In other words, we have seen the "othering" of problems, in which rather than problem actors being seen as an integral part of society as a whole, they are instead viewed as a threat to society itself.

I have argued that we can better explain what has been labelled as a "crisis of expertise" as the effect of the gradual dissolution of a particular historically grounded *regime* of knowledge and policymaking. This regime largely manifested in the governance of problems through the reform and reintegration of problematic actors into "society," and was the dominant (although not completely hegemonic) mode of analysis and governance in the U.S. and much of modern world throughout the 19th and 20th century. The apparent "crisis" or "decline" of expertise in the U.S. in the late-twentieth century is better understood as the uncoupling of a particular alliance of expertise and governance—one characterized by a "social integrationist" approach to understanding and managing social problems—which exerted a significant influence over policy making over much of the twentieth century.

This paper has introduced a new conceptual framework which enables us to reinterpret the "crisis of expertise" as the gradual dissolution of a previously dominant "social" regime of expertise. However, this does raise the question of *why* the social regime of expertise dissolved in the 1970s, and why its component alliances were vulnerable to such an erosion. Although this paper does not have as its primary aim to establish a causal explanation for the "crisis of expertise," this section puts forth one possible explanation for why the social regime of expertise may have been vulnerable to dissolution at this moment.

As Collins and Evans (2002, p. 236), among others, have suggested, expert decision-making is more likely to be questioned when it becomes "of visible reference to the public". What this article adds is that this "becoming visible" is not a feature inherent in any particular type of problem, but is itself a social and political process. In the U.S. in the 1970s, we see the politicization--that is, making into a "political" concern--of a number of alliances of expertise, particularly those organized around the notion of governing problems through 'society'. I suggest here that one possible cause of this may be found in the erosion of certain boundaries maintaining systems of power, inequality, and violence. In the case of "terrorism," the boundaries delimiting those places (primarily in the poor and post-colonial parts of the globe) where political violence was "expected," while in the case of (domestic) crime and punishment, these were (primarily) the boundaries separating the worlds of Black and white Americans.

In the international sphere, the late 1960s and early 1970s were a time in which irregular political violence, soon to be referred to as "terrorism", attracted increasing concern from the U.S. government and other wealthy western powers. This increased attention was not because the problem of irregular (here referring specifically to attacks by non-state actors) political

violence was *new*, but because such violence increasingly began to cross social and political boundaries in new ways: as Stampnitzky (2017) has argued, "terrorism" fundamentally came to be understood as violence out of place. Attacks on "international" sites such as airports, and targeting "Westerners" spurred the state to pay focused attention to the problem and assemble new alliances of expertise (Stampnitzky, 2013). While these new alliances of "terrorism" expertise initially drew upon existing alliances of expertise organized around the government of "insurgency," this approach soon proved inadequate. The paradigm of counterinsurgency was already coming under attack, both from within the state and the military, where it came to be seen as a failure in light of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam (Shafer, 1988), and from academic and political critics who came to see it as representative of U.S. brutality and empire (Gendzier, 1985; Horowitz, 1967; Rangil, 2010; Solovey, 2001).

In the domestic policy sphere, increased democratization, including particularly the formal recognition of civil rights for African-Americans, began to break down established boundaries of place, power, and order (Hinton, 2016; Kohler-Hausmann, 2015). Both the rise of "war on crime" and the political rhetoric of being "tough on crime" can be seen as political maneuvers, which transformed "crime" into a newly specific and highlighted object of public concern. As shown in the preceding sections, one form that this then took, was the disassembling and reassembling of the alliances of expertise through which the problem of crime and punishment was understood and managed, characterized by increased public focus with the specific techniques through which "criminals" were governed. And in both the cases, of "terrorism" and "crime", we see the rejection of a specific form of expert management which required a kind of sympathetic knowledge of its object (even insofar as this knowledge was used in the purpose of control and repression) and a shift to "exclusionary" management, which required less knowledge of the motivations of those it sought to govern, so as to attempt to transform them, but only knowledge of how to identify those deemed threats so as to exclude them from society altogether.

I conclude by returning to the puzzle of why the crisis of expertise proved such a difficult problem for sociology. I suggest that sociology misrecognized the "crisis" of expertise largely as a result of its own embeddedness in the history, rise, and decline of a particular form of expertise. The historical emergence of the discipline of sociology itself through the rise of the regime of social integrationist expertise may have led to a somewhat blinkered view of expertise within the discipline, one in which this particular (historically and socially contingent) structure has been reified to stand in for applied specialized knowledge more generally. Insofar as the dominance of this particular alliance of governance and expertise was so naturalized within sociology (and within the social sciences more generally), its weakening could easily be (mis)read as a displacement of expertise altogether. Sociology has therefore not simply been analyzing an external shift, the changing role of expertise in society--it has also been a central actor in these developments. Yet this tends to be misrecognized, or not clearly addressed/ taken into account in our analyses. In other words, it is not just that the "societal" mode of expertise has uncoupled since the 1970s, but that, precisely because our very concept of the "expert" arose in concert with the emergence of society as an object of knowledge and governance, the sociology of expertise has been ill-equipped to analyze or explain this transformation.

This has implications not just for the sociology of expertise, but also for the social sciences' reflections on their role in the world, and in particular, for the recent calls for a "public sociology" (Burawoy, 2005), and for a more "sociological" approach the study of politics and international relations (Joseph, 2015; Weber, 2015). Policy impact cannot be conceptualized

merely, or even primarily, as the outcome of qualities of the outputs (e.g. clearer writing or a more direct focus on policy questions), or on specific acts of scholars (such as calls for "outreach" to policymakers). Rather, the changing historical context within which policy knowledge is assembled, used, and applied, and in particular, the existing alliances of expert knowledge and policymaking, must be acknowledged as crucial factors in shaping whether specific approaches might be taken up, or ignored, and whether social scientists' analysis attains the sort of "impact" to which we might aspire.

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