

Relationism about Memory?

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Relationism about perception comes in two forms although recent usage usually has the first in mind: naïve realism and representational relationism. Naïve realists take perception to involve relations of *non-representational* awareness to the objects and properties we experience. Representational relationists take the awareness to be the result of representations of the objects and properties we experience but insist that some of these representational properties involve relations to these objects or properties. Similarly, one might expect, relationism about memory could come in two forms. Recent usage usually has the first in mind involving a non-representational awareness of the past. I will argue that relationism in this form is indefensible and threatens some of the arguments in favour of naïve realism about perception. A representational relationism about memory is much more plausible. The argument of the paper will proceed as follows.

In the first section, I will identify the particular kind of memory for which relationism is plausible and the motivations cited in favour of a non-representationalist version of it. As we will see, the scope for a relationist theory is quite limited. Recognition of this is an important part of its assessment. In the second section, I shall consider two arguments against relationism about memory each of which is partly responsible for the tendency to see representational accounts of memory in non-relational terms. In answering these arguments, I create room for a relational theory of either type. In the third section, I identify considerations against the non-representational version of relationism before, in the final section, developing the representational alternative in more detail, explaining how it deals with the motivations in favour of non-representational relationism, contrasting it with other approaches, and noting its implications for the question of whether memory should be understood as part of a general faculty of mental time travel.

1. Types of Memory and Relationism

One way of distinguishing between types of memory is in terms of the character of their content. The content of some memories is similar, or identical, to the content of beliefs, judgements or thoughts. I leave it open whether memories of this type are appropriately characterised in terms of these states, for example, whether they are always beliefs is debatable (Martin and Deutscher (1966), pp. 166-71). Psychologists often call this form of memory 'semantic memory' and philosophers have coined the name 'factual memory' (Malcolm (1963), p. 223). By contrast, the content of other memories are phenomenally similar to the perceptions which often, perhaps always, are the basis for these memories being formed. Here it is natural to draw a parallel with certain kinds of imagination. Just as, corresponding to visual perception, there is visual imagination, so there is also visual memory. Sometimes this second type of memory is called perceptual, experiential or episodic memory (*Perceptual*: Broad (1925), p. 223; Malcolm (1963), pp. 204-205; *Experiential*: Owens (1996), p. 320; Campbell (2002), p. 177; *Episodic*: Tulving (1972), pp. 385-386). I prefer the term sensuous memory because it emphasises their phenomenal similarity in sensory content without presuming that they are memories of perceptions, experiences or episodes. If I have a sensuous memory of your face at dinner yesterday, I may have no memory of a particular experience of your face as such nor even a memory of one experience or another of your face without knowing which. My sensuous memory of your face may derive from experiences I had during dinner without being a memory of any of them. It is this second type of memory with which relationism is primarily concerned although it is plausible that representational relationism may be true of some cases of factual memory. I set the application to factual memory aside here.

There are at least three kinds of sensuous memory. The first we may call *general sensuous memory*. As a boy, I walked up my parents' front garden path to the porch with the honeysuckle around it day in day out after school. I have a sensuous memory of all kinds of details of that walk. But, this sensuous memory is not about any particular event of walking up the path or experience of

so doing. So we have sensuous memory which is not of a particular event or experience: general sensuous memory. There is no need to think of such general sensuous memories as involving the revival of any, or all, of these previous experiences (as Owens does (1996), p. 324). In contrast, there is the kind of sensuous memory most people have in mind when talking of perceptual or experiential memory: remembering from the inside a particular event, for example, the mortifying moment of the look on your face at dinner last night when I dunked my bread in the finger bowl and was about to eat it. Call that *particular sensuous memory*. It is likely that many sensuous memories are mixed. They are memories of events whose details are a combination of particular sensuous memories and sensuous imaginings based upon a subject's particular or general information about that event or the internal logic of the scene. For example, I imagine the knife and fork in your place setting in the dinner last night as I am looking at you. I have the information that those are present but perhaps I'm using visual material related to my experience of my own knife and fork. Call this last kind of sensuous memories *mixed sensuous memories*.

Particular sensuous memories are the paradigm case for non-representational relationists about memory. These memories are taken to have features that only non-representational relationism can capture. The first is the *epistemological authority of memory*. Although fallible, when we sensuously remember from the inside O being F we need a reason to disbelieve that O was F/believe that the memory is faulty for this not to be good independent grounds for believing that O was F (cf. Debus (2018b), pp. 121-3). This has the merit of being endorsed by those who are not non-representational relationists about memory and thus supplies a neutral premise (e.g. Smith (1966), pp. 13-16; Gregory (2013), pp. 199-203). Non-representational relationists argue that only if particular sensuous memories involve a relation of awareness to O being F in the past will memory have epistemological authority. In this respect, a parallel is drawn with the consideration in favour of relationism about perception and its success in capturing the epistemological authority of perception.

The second reason for being a relationist about memory concerns the *capacity for demonstrative thought about the past*. If we have a particular sensuous memory of O being F, we can use ‘that’ to refer to O, or the event of O being F, in much the same way as our perception of O being F is a basis for having a demonstrative thought about O being F in the present. The basis for this is that particular sensuous memory, like perception, involves a relation of non-representational awareness to O being F. Suppose that particular sensuous memory involved an awareness of something distinct from O being F (e.g. a memory image) in virtue of which a subject was aware of O being F in the past. Then the subject would think of O being F through its relation to the distinct thing (e.g. the source of the memory image) and not as *that* event of O being F. If the relation of awareness was representational, then it wouldn’t provide an explanation of demonstrative thought because it would need to appeal to demonstrative representations itself.

These two motivations can come together. It is sometimes held that S’s particular sensuous memory of O being F is only knowledge if S can, in virtue of S’s particular sensuous memory, know which object is F (where ‘O’ is picked out by memory demonstrative). Relationism about memory is way to secure the demonstrative thought required for knowledge (Debus (2008), p. 407).

My principal aim is not to defend the claim that only some form of relationism about memory can capture these features. It is rather to argue that, if relationism about memory is to be preferred for these, or other reasons, there are good grounds for being a representational relationist rather than a non-representational relationist. In the next section, we shall consider in more detail these two forms of relationism about memory and two general problems they face.

2. Two Forms of Relationism and the Problems They Face

Early expressions of relationism about particular sensuous memory talk of the memory providing ‘immediate knowledge of things past’ or ‘having immediately before the mind an object that is

recognised as past (Reid (1785), p. 324, Russell (1912), p. 66). These articulations of relationism about memory don't rule out a representationalist interpretation. What they reject is the idea that particular sensuous memory involves a relation to a mental image as an immediate object of acquaintance which represents objects and properties in the past. Modern representationalists will not recognise that they are committed to such a view any more than they will allow that they are committed to the idea that, in perception, the immediate object of acquaintance are the representations involved in perception as opposed to what is represented by these representations.

By contrast, modern proponents of relationism make clear that they reject representational relationism. Non-representational relationism in memory, like naïve realism in perception, is a view about the nature of the phenomenal content of memory states and perceptual states respectively. Talk of phenomenal content – others speak in terms of phenomenal character – is a way of characterising what it is like to undergo the mental states or events which are possessed of this phenomenal content. Naïve realists don't have to deny that it may be legitimate to characterise part of the nature of somebody's perceptual experience in terms of the sentence that *there is a grey elephant to their left*. They will just insist that this does not imply that the proper characterisation of what it is like to undergo a state is in terms of representational contents that the state possesses.

Let the phenomenal properties of mental states and events be those perhaps relational properties possessed by these states and events which fix their phenomenal content. Let the manifest objects and properties of mental states and events be constituents of the phenomenal content used to characterise what undergoing a mental state or event is like. Thus, the manifest objects and properties of a perception of a grey elephant might be the elephant and the grey colour respectively (amongst other things). With this terminology in place, we can say that non-representational relationists about particular sensuous memory hold the following or an equivalent formulation.

A subject S has a particular sensuous memory of O being F if and only if S stands in a relation of non-representational recollective awareness to O being F in virtue of which O and an

instance of being F are the manifest object and property respectively of S's particular sensuous memory (for a comparable formulation, see Debus (2008), p. 406).

Non-representational relationism about particular sensuous memory concerns the phenomenal properties of particular sensuous memory in the same way that naïve realism concerns the phenomenal properties of perception. Both postulate a target relation of awareness that is psychologically fundamental, meaning that it is not to be explained either in representational terms or in terms of a relation of awareness to something else – a memory image – that is psychologically fundamental (for further discussion of their commitments, see Noordhof (2021a), pp. 195-204).

Non-representational relationism is explicitly defined in terms of a rejection of representationalism. But how should we understand representationalism? Let representational properties be the kind of properties that determine the truth conditions of beliefs and the satisfaction conditions of desires. A representational relationist about particular sensuous memory will hold that

If a subject S has a particular sensuous memory of O being F, then S's particular sensuous memory has a singular representational property of O or O being F e.g. a singular representation of O (or O being F) or a demonstrative representational property of O (or O being F).

A plausible necessary condition for either of these representational properties is that there will be a causal relation between O (or O being F) and the instantiation of the means of representation, M, that represents it. In which case, both non-representational and representational versions of relationism about particular sensuous memory are committed to the content of particular sensuous memories depending upon a relation to past events in virtue of which the subject is aware of them. It is this commitment that brings with it a potential problem more familiar from discussions about perception under the heading of the 'time-lag' argument.

Both perception and particular sensuous memory involve *current* awareness of something in the past. In the case of perception, this is because there is a time-lag due to the finite velocity of light travelling from the past object to the perceiver (e.g. Russell (1927), p. 155). Particular sensuous memory compounds this because it occurs later than the perception upon which it is based but the nature of the problem is no different (contrary to the impression sometimes given e.g. Furlong (1951), p. 20). It is just more obvious that, if relationism is true, particular sensuous memory involves a relation to something in the past. This is one reason why people are so quick to start talking about memory images. Relationists about memory will be inclined to characterise this move as involving the same type of mistake as those who take perception to involve awareness of a present mental object: a sense datum.

In response, relationists should insist that perception and particular sensuous memory are temporally extended processes involving a present awareness whose phenomenal content is configured by objects and properties in the past. Naïve realists are familiar with the idea that perception is *spatially* extended to include its manifest objects and properties. They should just extend this lesson to temporal extent (versions of this move on their behalf include C. D. Broad (1925), pp. 252-62, distinguishing presentation from being present; Ayer (1956), pp. 94-5, Suchting (1969); Pitcher (1971), pp. 46-50; Snowdon (1992), p. 77). Objects which don't exist now can still partly constitute the phenomenal content of a subject's experience by their previous existence (contrary to Moran (2019), pp. 207-9). Subjects can, demonstratively identifying a star, utter a true sentence of the form 'That does not exist now' (Snowdon (1992), p. 77).

That still leaves some concerns about the nature of perception and memory. First, it implies that the perception of distant objects like stars involve processes that may begin prior to the subject perceiving the thing in question and, indeed, processes that may begin prior to the subject's birth (Dretske (1969), pp. 72-73; Moran (2019), pp. 221-2). My perception of the stars that I saw looking up at the sky in Joshua Tree National Park are of those objects having properties many years prior to my

birth that are responsible for the journey of a particular pattern of photons hitting my eyes in virtue of which my perception is partly constituted by the presence of the stars. The processes constituting my particular sensuous memory of those stars started at the same time, include my state of perceiving the stars, and later states running up to my memory.

A second concern is that subjects do not have particular sensuous memories about all they perceive but only, as it is usually put, those earlier perceptions of events that leave a *trace* in the subject's present state. That makes it seem like a subject's present state must determine the content of their particular sensuous memory rather than the relation of awareness to past events that relational accounts of particular sensuous memory emphasise.

To deal with these concerns, it is helpful to distinguish between the process of *perceiving* or *remembering* sensuously and the complex partly relational state of perception or particular sensuous memory. Perception or particular sensuous memory involves perceiving or remembering and a constitutive relation to their manifest objects and properties. When a subject looks at a distant object, the process of perceiving begins. They are looking to instantiate various relational properties that are the basis for the relation of perceptual awareness of the object. For example, if you are perceiving a distant tree, one of the relational properties may be the visual processes in the brain relating to the movement of the branches. The instantiation of these relational properties depends upon the existence of the causal chain that starts from the tree's moving branches and involves the transmission of information about the tree by light waves through the air. However, the dependence of the process involved in *perception* on the causal chain from the tree does not mean that the causal chain from the tree is part of the *perceiving*. The causal chain upon which a subject's *perception* of an object depends may begin before they started to look, or indeed were born, but the causal processes involved in the subject's *perceiving* of a tree begin with the look and involves the instantiation of relational properties as a result. It is possible to see something that no longer exists because your perceiving involves

relational properties whose instantiation depend upon the prior existence of the object in question and the causal chain from it.

Particular sensuous remembering occurs after the relevant perceiving and the relational properties that that the subject looks to instantiate will be more complex. They will include not just a relation to the manifest objects and properties of the perception but, in addition, a relation to the causal processes subsequent to the perception that are responsible for a memory trace. The error behind the second concern identified is the failure to recognise that the present state of the subject only settles the content of the particular sensuous memory in virtue of these relational properties rather than the intrinsic properties of a memory image (see 4. 1. 5. for details)

The second general objection to the relational position focuses on similarities between particular sensuous memory and sensuous imagining. One similarity that is often emphasised is a similarity between the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memories and sensuous imaginings. The implications of this similarity for the proper development of the relationist position will be discussed in the next two sections. Another alleged similarity is Paul Snowdon's suggestion that we have the 'same sort' of control over the content of our particular sensuous memories as we have over the content of what we imagine. He argues that this makes it part of our pre-theoretic understanding of particular sensuous memory that it involves a mental image, contrasting it with the case of perception and hallucination (Snowdon (1990), pp. 135-6).

This is overstated. Our difficulty in having a particular sensuous memory of an event, and lack of control over how the content is organised when it does come back, is of a different order to difficulties we have forming complex images in our sensuous imaginings, especially if we haven't come across the same kind of thing before. Snowdon is certainly right that our particular sensuous memories don't depend upon the current existence of the objects and properties that constitute their manifest content nor upon the current instantiation of the properties that constitute the process of perceiving. To that extent, particular sensuous memory displays the independence of imagination. But,

independence from the current existence of objects and properties is compatible with relationism about memory. If mental images are incompatible with relationism, they are not part of our pre-theoretical commitments.

In the first section we identified two general motivations for being a relationist about memory. In the second section, we have considered some general objections to relationism. In the next section we shall consider which form of relationism is more defensible.

3. Problems for Non-Representational Relationism about Particular Sensuous Memory

In this section, we shall consider some objections to a non-representationalist version of relationism over a representationalist approach.

The first objection concerns the explanatory role that appeal to non-representational relations of awareness are supposed to play in the case of perception and particular sensuous memory respectively. Naïve realists hold that perception involves a relation of non-representational awareness to objects and properties in the subject's environment to account for the following three things: the epistemological authority of perception, the capacity for demonstrative thought on the basis of perception and, finally, the phenomenal difference between belief, thought, and imagination on the one hand, and perception on the other (authority of experience (Martin (2002), pp. 389-90, 399-400; demonstrative thought, Campbell (2002), p. 45; Allen (2019), p. 3; phenomenal difference Martin (2002), pp. 387-8, Soteriou (2016), p. 85; Allen (2019), p. 2). The phenomenal difference just adverted to we might dub the *presentational character of perception*. In perception, but not in these other states, the phenomenal content is presented to the subject.

There are, at least, two different issues that arise with respect to the explanation of this third element. The first concerns the explanatory advantages of naïve realism over representationalism with regard to the difference between representational states more generally and presentational

states like perception (e.g. Martin (2002), pp. 387-9). The suspicion of naïve realists is that representationalists cannot accommodate the difference because they deny themselves the resources of a non-representational relation in the case of perception. The second allows that, on their own terms, representationalists may be able to capture the difference. Nevertheless, within the development of relationist theories, a particular explanatory role is assigned to non-representational relations (e.g. Campbell (2002), p. 120; Martin (2002), pp. 397-402). These relations capture the difference between perception on the one hand, and sensuous imagination on the other. Sensuous imagination is said to be representational rather than presentational, where perception is not (Martin (2002), pp. 406-7).

Attribution of a relation of non-representational awareness to particular sensuous memory gives rise to problems for both of these issues. Our particular sensuous memories don't seem to have a presentational character. The phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory is far closer, in this respect, to sensuous imaginings with similar phenomenal content. The combination of phenomenal similarity with sensuous imagination and phenomenal dissimilarity with respect to perception underlines the explanatory deficit in the appeal made by naïve realists, and the corresponding proponents of relationist accounts of memory, to relations of non-representational awareness. Either more detail is needed about the difference between these relations of non-representational awareness relevant for the phenomena they seek to characterise, or their proponents must be more selective in what they take these relations to explain. For example, it might be conceded that appeal to relations of non-representational awareness are not well placed to capture the phenomenological differences mentioned but can account for the epistemic authority of the states involving the relations and their role in the explanation of demonstrative thought.

There is no easy resolution of this problem. One danger of making the concession just canvassed is that it removes a central explanatory attraction of naïve realism which, arguably, is related to the epistemological authority of perception and its basis for demonstrative thought. Many

naïve realists may want to reject the characterisation of particular sensuous memory in terms of a relation of non-representational awareness as a result. However, the motivations for being a non-representational relationist about memory are similar to those for being a naïve realist. So there is the danger that what they offer in the case of particular sensuous memory can be used as the basis of a non-naïve realist explanation of the features of perception identified.

The second objection starts by noting that both naïve realists and non-representational relationists about memory face a similar problem. There are two kinds of states that seem phenomenally similar, if not identical, and yet they must deny that they fall under the same mental kind. But their ability to make the denial convincing is rather different. In the case of naïve realism, the two kinds of states are perceptions and their corresponding hallucinations. In the case of non-representational relationism about memory, the two kinds of states are particular sensuous memories and sensuous imaginings.

Consider the case of naïve realism first. A familiar problem for naïve realists is that, where perception involves a relation of non-representational awareness to objects and properties, a corresponding hallucination in the same sense modality does not. Naïve realists are wary of allowing that there is a substantial shared mental kind under which perceptions and their corresponding hallucinations fall. The perceived problem is that the distinctive features of the naïve realist picture threaten to become redundant (e.g. Martin (2004), p. 46). For example, perceptions and hallucinations both seem have a significant epistemic authority over what a subject believes. My hallucination of a pig is as likely to entitle me to believe that there is a pig there as my perception of it, if the reason why I cannot tell the difference between them is that there is a common mental kind under which they both fall.

The main naïve realist response to this concern has been to argue that all that should be said about the relationship between perceptions and the corresponding hallucinations is that the hallucinations are subjectively indiscriminable from the perceptions. It is natural to wonder why they

are subjectively indiscriminable if they are of very different mental kinds. It is one thing to question whether how things appear to a subject relating to their own mental life should always be understood ontologically. It is another to give some justification for what is at work in the situation at hand.

A natural response for the naïve realist to make is that when a subject is hallucinating, their mind is disturbed. There is no reason why, in such a state, they should be in a position to distinguish between the state they are in and perception (see e.g. Martin (2006), pp. 389). This does not have to cover every case of hallucination but it does provide good grounds for resisting the claim that if a hallucination is indiscriminable from the corresponding perception, then the hallucination must have the same nature as the perception.

The situation with regard to particular sensuous memory and sensuous imagination is not quite the same as that between perception and hallucination. On the one side, subjects will mostly be able to distinguish their particular sensuous rememberings from their sensuous imaginings. The phenomenal content of the former may include that the manifest objects and properties are in the past and/or familiar whereas sensuous imaginings will not have this feature in the same way. Moreover, many sensuous imaginings involve the subject being active in their production whereas, while a subject may try to remember, the production of the particular sensuous memory will seem to be out of the subject's control and depend upon the extent to which a past experience has been retained in some way. These differences may seem to help the non-representational relationist about memory.

However, there is an important way in which they do not. In terms of the manifest objects and properties of sensuous imagination and particular sensuous memory, there seems to be no phenomenal difference from the subject's point of view. But, in this case, the subject's mind is not disturbed. Indeed, they are involved in the generation of sensuous imaginings. So the subjective indiscriminability of these two types of states in this respect is puzzling. It is plausible that these aspects of sensuous imagining and particular sensuous memory are subjectively indiscriminable

because they have the same phenomenal content. Yet, this is what the proponent of non-representational relationism about particular sensuous memory must deny.

The reason why they must deny this may not be obvious. Couldn't there just be two distinct ways of obtaining similar phenomenal contents: by non-representational relations and representational properties? However, similar explanatory concerns would arise for non-representational relationism about particular sensuous memory as about naïve realism if non-representational relationists about particular sensuous memory were to accept that particular sensuous memories and the corresponding sensory imaginings had the same phenomenal content in this regard. The representational properties that would determine the phenomenal content of sensuous imagining would also be present in the case of particular sensuous memory. So these representational properties would plausibly determine the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory too. In which case, the epistemological authority of particular sensuous memory would plausibly derive from the way in which it is formed rather than from non-representational relations.

A third objection to non-representational relationism about particular sensuous memory derives from the observation about the various kind of sensuous memories I identified at the outset. Particular sensuous memories are the only clear case involving relations of non-representational awareness with objects and properties in the past. However, there are no substantial phenomenal differences between these kind of cases and general sensuous memories and mixed sensuous memories. So there are no grounds for supposing – at least as far as the phenomenal content is concerned – that particular sensuous memories must involve relations of non-representational awareness. In addition, the continuum of cases from particular sensuous memories on the one hand to mixed cases with increasing proportions of reconstructed sensuous elements, to finally general sensuous memories on the other makes it much less plausible that we should identify one case – particular sensuous memory – as involving something distinctively different from the rest. It is as if,

when considering the range of types of perceptual experience from the good case of perception to the bad case of hallucination, most cases involved varying proportions of good and bad elements. The idea that the good case would be of particular significance and demand a certain characterisation would be much less plausible.

These problems are avoided if a representationalist version of relationism about particular sensuous memory is plausible. I will develop such an account in the next section.

4. Representational Relationism and the Motivations for Relationism

In the present section I shall discuss each feature of particular sensuous memory that was cited as grounds for being a non-representational relationist and explain how a particular representational relationism can accommodate them better, or at least as well.

4.1. Epistemological Authority of Particular Sensuous Memory

The epistemological authority of particular sensuous memory of O being F is explained by providing a characterisation of the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory that accounts for why it is epistemically compelling to believe that O was F. Talk of epistemic compulsion bundles together two ideas. The first is that, in the absence of a reason to suppose that the apparent particular sensuous memory is mistaken, the experience provides an epistemic entitlement for the subject to believe that O was F. The second is that the subject finds it hard to resist believing that O was F. The difficulty that non-representationalist relationist accounts of memory have with accounting for the epistemological authority of particular sensuous memory is explaining how the non-representational relation of awareness to O being F in the past provides epistemic entitlement for believing that O *was* F rather than O *is* F. As we noted earlier, perception is a relation to something in the past. Yet the epistemic

authority it provides concerns present tense beliefs. What's the non-representational relationist's account of past tense authority? I shall discuss the two options available to them shortly. However, before I do, I want to characterise in more detail the phenomenal basis of the epistemological authority.

There are two components of the phenomenal contents of particular sensuous memories that seem to be the basis for their epistemological authority. We have already touched upon the first: the sense that what is presented occurred in the past. However, there is a specific way in which this presentation of something past is given. It is generally experienced as some *particular* with which we are already familiar (Russell (1921), p. 161). This component of phenomenal content is meant to reflect a requirement on particular sensuous memory that has been given a number of more specific, and problematic, characterisations. It is also questionable whether the requirement itself must show up in the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory and whether, if it is an independent condition on memory, it has its own epistemological implications.

The requirement is that

if a subject has a particular sensuous memory of O being F, then the subject was previously aware of, experienced, perceived or represented O to be F (e.g. previous awareness: Shoemaker (1970), pp. 19-20; Owens (1996); experience: James (1890), pp. 648-51, Martin and Deutscher (1966), pp. 163, 166; perception: Malcolm (1963), p. 208; representation: Michaelian (2016), pp. 65-66).

Naïve Realists would reject characterisation in terms of representation to capture the idea that the rememberer has previously experienced the particular in question. Appeal to experience and awareness raise questions of whether the experience is necessarily conscious, whether what is remembered must have previously been attended to in the experience, or whether the awareness involves taking the object of awareness in a certain way or whether one may be aware of something

without registering it as a particular dog (say) (see e.g. Debus (2018b), pp. 121, 125-8). As some might say, there is the question of whether the awareness is extensional or intensional. Resolutions of these issues give rise to different versions of the second component. The characterisation in terms of familiarity is intended to bracket these by talking of the envisaged effect of the correct more specific characterisation of the second component. It also respects Russell's observation that *the judgement that something has been experienced* before is a reflection derived from the feeling of familiarity rather than part of the content of particular sensuous memory (Russell (1921), p. 169). This will become relevant in discussing the application of the dependency thesis and self-reflexive accounts below.

The appeal to familiarity is essential to the characterisation of our past sensuous memory. The feeling of pastness is insufficient by itself. We noted earlier that perception always involves a time lag. Even if you were struck by this fact and started being disposed to judge that what you were seeing was a little earlier than now, perception would not have the character of particular sensuous memory. Now you might reply that being disposed to judge that what is presented occurred in the past is not sufficient to give a presentation of the past (contrary to what Anscombe seems to presume (1974), pp. 126-7). So consider an alternative case where it is much more plausible that perception will involve a presentation of something as past (reported by David Owens as due to Rob Hopkins (1996), p. 322). A subject wears goggles which, rather than inverting what he or she experiences, delays the light so that what a subject sees as present nearby is some time in the past. In the case of a subject putting on inverting lenses, the subject adjusts to things being presented upside down over time so that they are able to respond fluently as if things were the right way up. Indeed, the question of whether their adjusted experience feels as if things are the right way up again is an open question. Corresponding, the time-lag goggles seem to be something that a subject might be able to adjust to and, in this case, the adjustment would be that what is presented happens a little earlier, in the past. This would not make such visual perceptions particular visual sensuous memories (Owens (1996), p. 322). A sense of familiarity captures the difference.

It should be noted, though, that talk of familiarity assumes the requirement has an impact on the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory. But, as we shall see, there are cases of particular sensuous memory where the feeling of familiarity is absent and yet the requirement is met and vice versa. When the latter is the case, we have a memory hallucination that may be veridical and, potentially, even entitle a subject to form a belief about the past. That would depend upon the proper characterisation of the requirement and whether its failure to hold undermines the epistemic credentials of causal process from past events to the present experience. When the feeling of familiarity is absent, then one dimension of the epistemic authority of particular sensuous memory is absent but whether this removes a subject's entitlement to form beliefs will depend upon whether they can be justified in believing something without taking themselves to be so.

I emphasised that the familiarity should attach to a *particular* because, for example, a colour may be familiar without any particular sensuous memory being involved. We must have just come across it before on some occasion or other. Likewise the familiarity is non-comparative. The particular is not experienced as familiar because it is like something else you have already come across (Holland (1954), p. 468). Instead, it is familiar in itself. Taking these two components together, we may suppose that particular sensuous memories have, as part of their phenomenal content, *past familiarity*. This does not have to be taken to be sensuous itself but just part of the manifest content of a particular sensuous memory that includes sensuous phenomenal content.

The two components work together in the following way. The content of a particular sensuous memory presents something as having occurred in the past and it presents this fact as something that we already have some epistemic entitlement to believe by its familiarity. The fact that the content of particular sensuous memory presents something as occurring in the past means that there doesn't have to be an inference to get to the proposition that such and such occurred in the past. Our entitlement is not contingent upon the epistemic standing of a principle of inference. The familiarity component suggests that we already have some entitlement to believe which, if we no longer had it,

would have to have been undermined in some way. That's why we only lose our entitlement if there is a reason for questioning it. The question is how can the relationist accommodate this fact.

The two components are not intended to be sufficient to capture the epistemological authority of memory. Instead, they point to a subject matter requiring further development. The theories below should be assessed as a contribution to this project and the respective merits of non-representationalist and representationalist relational accounts of memory identified accordingly.

4. 1. 1. Narrative and Past Familiarity

Debus's preferred non-representationalist relationist account of memory takes the past familiarity of particular sensuous memory to be derived from the subject's beliefs in virtue of which she would be able to tell a reasonably detailed autobiographical story that would include the content of the particular sensuous memory as something previously experienced (Debus (2016), p. 140; Debus (2018a), pp. 74, 77). These beliefs provide a context in which the subject's particular sensuous memory is taken to concern events in the past. A subject takes a particular sensuous memory to concern events in the past if, in virtue of the context, the subject has a reason to take it that the particular sensuous memory presents them with how things were (Debus (2018a), p. 81). Thus, the subject has a reason to believe what is presented in particular sensuous memory unless there are considerations against so doing.

There is no doubt that a context of this kind may be the basis for taking a particular sensuous memory to be a correct claim about how things were. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this kind of account provides a satisfactory basis for the epistemic authority of every particular sensuous memory. Some particular sensuous memories present something as the case in one's past and are the basis for the *search* for a particular reasonably detailed autobiographical story in order to confirm them. They have the authority, by no means indefeasible, prior to the finding of the story. A subject

has a nagging memory of a scene that they cannot fit into their life but seems very real to them as something that happened in the past. This is rather like Debus's case of Helen plagued by certain experiences – of a house with a roof in flames – but perplexed over what these experiences are (Debus (2018a), pp. 86-7). But there is an important difference. The kind of case I'm mentioning is one where a subject feels themselves to be remembering something but wonders whether this is deceptive.

Another way to see this possibility is to consider a subject who quite consciously sensuously imagines something that fits well with their past autobiographical story but they don't take as a presentation of the past because they know what they're up to. Over time, they might lose the sense that this is an imagining and, indeed, it could turn into a 'false memory' but prior to that point, they won't take it in that way. By 'false memory', I mean something that a subject takes to be a particular sensuous memory but, in fact, is not. The problem for Debus's picture is noticing now that one is sensuously imagining a particular scene is not the kind of fact that can discredit what is imagined from being a presentation of the past by Debus's lights. It was the fit with the autobiographical story that was supposed to do that. In the case envisaged, the fact that the subject later takes it to be a particular sensuous memory although, in fact, it was initially imagined, shows that the fit was good enough even in the present.

Of course Debus could supplement her account by a no-active imagination condition and, indeed, she emphasises that the passivity of particular sensuous memory is a source of its epistemic credentials. The problem is that, if this is the case, it is hard to see the role for her narrative structure. If the past impinges on us through particular sensuous memory, we don't need narrative to know that something happened (see Debus (2018b), p. 122). This is one lesson I apply in developing my own approach.

4. 1. 2. Mode of Awareness

In the case of perception, naïve realists have suggested that different modes of awareness may capture phenomenological features that cannot be accounted for in terms of that of which a subject is aware. Examples of modes of awareness include the spatio-temporal position of the subject, the sensory mode by which they are aware of objects and properties in the environment, the state of the sensory system or organs (e.g. seeing blurrily), the perceptual conditions in which a subject is aware of the objects and properties in the environment (e.g. illumination under red or white light), and, finally, the conceptual or attentional resources devoted to the objects of awareness (e.g. in the case of change blindness) (illumination, spatio-temporal position relative to sense modality – Campbell (2009), pp. 657-8, position, sense modality, perceptual conditions - Brewer (2011), p. 96; spatio-temporal position, state of sensory system, sensory mode, and perceptual conditions - French (2014), pp. 399-401, spatiotemporal position, state of sensory organs and attentional resources - Fish (2009), pp. 54-61). A natural extension to this approach would be to argue that the non-representational awareness involved in particular sensuous memory is a different mode of awareness to perception of past events. Campbell suggests that the distinctive feature of this mode of awareness is that it involves the capacity to take the content of particular sensuous memories as possible perceptions of the particular objects or events which they concern (Campbell (2002), p. 191).

The characterisation of the mode proposed by Campbell is rather more sophisticated than one might expect someone to have simply by having particular sensuous memories. An additional problem with this approach is to explain how this would relate to the following elements in terms of which the mode would have to be characterised and integrated together. The first is that the mode of awareness is, in many respects, similar to sensuous imagination and yet the latter doesn't involve a mode of non-representational awareness of objects and properties in the past. The second is that the mode of non-representational awareness of these objects and properties contrasts with perception in being awareness of them as past rather than present. This is a rather different characterisation of a mode of awareness than some selection from, or alteration of, present awareness of a sensory scene. The third is that the particulars in the past are familiar. The latter two are supposed to be the basis for

the epistemic authority of memory experience while, at the same time, the first detracts from the epistemic credentials of the state. I'm not saying that this task cannot be completed but it involves considerable explanatory work and plausibly would draw on some of the material that is the basis for my preferred account.

Before I introduce my preferred approach, I will discuss two other representationalist approaches that I think are unpromising as a basis for a representationalist relationism about memory.

4. 1. 3. Representation of Particular Experience

A natural way to elucidate the phenomenal content of past familiarity, and its relationship to the requirement, is to endorse a version of the Dependency Thesis for particular sensuous memory.

S has a particular sensuous memory of O being F if and only if S has a particular sensuous memory of perceiving O being F (Martin (2001), pp. 273, 276-9; Owens (1996), pp. 328-9).

The difference between this dependency thesis for particular sensuous memory and the one of sensuous imagination is that the former involves a sensuous imagining that has particular prior perceiving as its content whereas the dependency thesis for imagination involves imagining a non-specific experience (Peacocke (1985), Martin (2001), pp. 279-80, for further discussion, see Noordhof (2002), Noordhof (2018), pp. 102-11)). The dependency thesis promises to capture the plausible idea that particular sensuous memory is a case of retained acquaintance by combining part of the content of a prior experience with the sense of past familiarity.

Unfortunately the proposal faces a number of problems. The first is to explain how a particular experience (as opposed to an experience of a particular type) figures as part of the representational content of the memory experience. For example, if one reason for being a naïve realist about perception was that it provided a non-representational basis for demonstrative thought about

particular things, then either that is a reason for being a non-representational relationist about memory too, or the story that is provided of how our memory experiences may represent particular experiences may be the basis for a similar story for perceptual representation of particulars.

In addressing this issue, David Owens proposes that our subsequent memory experience involves retained acquaintance because the token representation produced in perception is stored like a film that may be seen again in particular sensuous memory (Owens (1996), pp. 325-326). Each reviewing, would be a reviewing of the same perception. It is a substantial empirical commitment to suggest that, corresponding to the perception or perceptions that gave rise to a particular sensuous memory, there will be token representations in the head retained for subsequent reviewing. But Owens might say that this commitment should be taken on because it is the only plausible way to capture the idea of retained acquaintance. The proposal I develop below will be a response to that particular claim. Nevertheless, there are also problems of detail with Owens' suggestion.

If we understand his proposal as involving persisting, and thus retained, acquaintance, then, when we are not recalling a particular episode in the past, either we have isolated conscious acquaintances of which we are not aware or unconscious acquaintances. Neither is an attractive way of understanding what is going on. Of course, Owens might say that what persists is not acquaintance but simply the content of the state. But, in that case, we don't seem to have a retained acquaintance account. Moreover, if what is retained are the representations involved in a perceptual state, it is unclear how this makes the memory have the additional content of being about a particular perceptual state as opposed to sharing the perceptual state's content.

There are more general issues that arise with appeal to the dependency thesis for memory as a basis for retained acquaintance. First, if the content of the particular sensuous memory – a particular perception of O being F – is the basis of the feeling of past familiarity, then the feeling should show up in other states than that of memory with the very same content, for example, a particular sensuous

imagining, thought, belief or, for that matter, the factual memory concerning that particular perception formed (perhaps) on the basis of the particular sensuous memory. But it does not.

It might be argued that a special kind of representation is involved in particular sensuous memory or sensuous imagination more generally (e.g. Martin (2001), p. 272). The problem is that if appeal is made to a special kind of representation, it is unclear what role the identified content remains to play in capturing the feeling of past familiarity. This point is underlined when it is remembered that the same kind of representation is likely to be involved in particular sensuous memory and particular sensuous imagination. Some may argue that particular sensuous imaginings are not possible because sensuous imaginings can only involve imagining a certain type of episode and not a particular token episode. The latter requires a causal connection with the episode in question distinctive of particular sensuous memory. However this claim is implausible. We can have particular sensuous imaginings about the episode that was the content of a particular sensuous memory. In that case, there is no sense of past familiarity but the two elements – a particular kind of representation and the content – are present.

Second, there are cases of particular sensuous memory which would, given the dependency thesis, have the same content and involve the same type of representation and yet there is no sense of past familiarity. Consider Martin and Deutscher's case of a painter who paints a scene which they take themselves to be imagining but is really taken from their childhood (Martin and Deutscher (1966), p. 168; see also Owens (1996), pp. 323-4). The imagining involved may reproduce the content of a particular experience they had of the scene. In that case, the act of imagining seems to be of a particular experience and not simply an experience of a particular type. Yet, there is no sense of past familiarity otherwise the particular sensuous memory would be recognised. Even if you, as David Owens does, reject the claim that the case is one of an unrecognised particular sensuous memory, it remains the case that it satisfies the conditions that were supposed to account for the feeling of past familiarity.

4. 1. 4. Reflexive Content

Reflexive accounts seek to embed information about the process in the content of particular sensuous memories. The most sophisticated proposal of this type is due to Jordi Fernandez. His analysis of the content of particular sensuous memory is as follows.

{W: In W, M is caused by S having perceived that q through P} (Fernandez (2019), pp. 75, 79).

The characterisation following the ‘:’ is the condition that has to hold in a possible world W for the memory, M, to be true of it. If the condition fails in W, then M is false. P is the perceptual experience that S would express by saying that they perceive that q. The content of the memory is the set of all W of which M is true.

There are a number of problems with the proposal. First, the characterisation provided by the content doesn’t capture the distinctive phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory. I could have a belief or thought about the causation of a particular sensuous memory M given by the condition without the belief being a particular sensuous memory of q in the past. Perhaps it will be denied I could have such a belief unless the belief were the memory M but there is no reason why this should be so. Either M is indexical or stands for a particular sensuous memory M. If the latter, then the content can be that of a belief or a thought without being a memory. If M is indexical, then it refers to the very state that has M as its content. This too can be a belief or a thought without being a memory. Matters are not improved if M is a descriptive indexical: *this memory*. The reference would still be to the state in which it figures even if the state isn’t a memory. The descriptive material would misdescribe the referent but reference would not fail.

Second, the proper characterisation of the content of a particular sensuous memory should be given in terms of what it is correct to say that we remember. I don’t remember that my current particular sensuous memory is caused in a particular way by a prior perception with the content that

q. The latter is part of the conditions required for something to be a particular sensuous memory that we can take our current memory state to reflect but this is distinct from the content of memory. One acknowledged consequence of taking these conditions as part of the content is that particular sensuous memories would be taken as supporting new beliefs (Fernandez (2019), p. 172). This is open to question and not a straightforward consequence of taking past familiarity as part of the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory. For example, a subject's later awareness that they were previously aware of what is experienced is not the basis of a new belief if they previously had the belief that they had the experience in question.

Third, the reflexive content involves the specification of a causal relationship between a perceptual state and the particular sensuous memory but it is quite unclear how this causal relationship, as opposed to the particular sensuous memory in some sense having a content that a prior perception had, is presented in a particular sensuous memory. This seems more the result of reflection on the nature of particular sensuous memory. In itself, this doesn't mean that the attribution of the reflexive content is illegitimate. Nevertheless, it raises questions concerning how this content relates to the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory that it is supposed to explain. This issue arises as well with regard to unrecognised particular sensuous memories. If they have the character indicated, then why aren't they recognised as such. Since it is clear that Fernandez looks to the reflexive character of the content of particular sensuous memories to explain aspects of their phenomenal content such as the feeling of past familiarity, he cannot resist these questions by embracing the divorce between the reflexive content of particular sensuous memory and its phenomenal content (Fernandez (2019), p. 108).

Putting these points together, the current proposal shares a problem with the previous proposal involving the dependency thesis. If they are taken as straightforward characterisations of the distinctive content of memory necessary to capture its phenomenal content in various respects, it falls short. If the emphasis is placed upon special features of the representational character of particular

sensuous memory to avoid these concerns, then it may turn out that the special features do all the work. My own proposal takes up this issue.

4. 1. 5. Activation Routines as Representational Properties

In previous work, I have defended the claim that the phenomenal similarities between perception and the corresponding sensuous imaginings and memories are to be explained in terms of the similar representational contents these states possess. This may be due to the particular character of the representational properties involved or because particular sensuous memories (for example), with one qualification, have a subset of the manifest objects and properties of the corresponding perceptual states. Appeal to the dependency thesis or reflexive content has no clear explanatory utility. There are matters to be explained, of course, such as the way in which particular sensuous memories fail to present their manifest objects and properties in the way that occurs in perceptual experience. However, these are to be explained by conditions required for successful representation, relative richness of representation, and, potentially, the way in which subjects are conscious of these properties (For some suggestions in this line, see Noordhof (2002), Noordhof (2018), Noordhof (2021b))). I will not go into these issues in general here.

Instead, my focus is upon the way in which a particular sensuous memory represents a particular event as something with which one is familiar from one's past. If the content of a subject's previous experience is a content of a particular sensuous memory, then the experience is responsible for a certain kind of dispositional property of the subject's brain that I dub an *activation routine* (Noordhof (2018), p. 125). Its general characterisation is that when the subject seeks to recollect the episode that is the content of the original experience, or relevant triggers are a part of their mental life either fortuitously without the subject seeking to recollect the episode or through a subject seeking to jog their memory with imaginative prompts, a subset of the representational properties

that are part of the original experience are reinstantiated, similarly organised, due to the presence of the disposition previously set up rather than the subject's control over what they imagine. The connection is not invariable and, thus, there will be a further specification of the circumstances in which disposition is triggered but the general form of the proposal is clear.

The crucial point is that the representational properties in terms of which the disposition is defined do not exhaust the representational content of the disposition. My proposal is that the fact that the disposition is responsible for the organisation of the representational properties in question, rather than sensory stimulation, is the basis for the difference between the objects and properties represented being represented as something in the past with which we are familiar as opposed to present to experience. The activation routine being triggered is responsible for the sense of 'aha, now I remember'. The fact that the subject is not involved in the production of the content – in contrast to sensuous imagining – conveys the reality of what is represented. There are conditions in which one's sense of agency is much diminished and, with it, the sense of reality. But with an appreciation of one's own agency, the organisation of representational properties unresponsive to our control, although perhaps triggered by us, represents the sensuous objects existence as manifested in that experience (for further detail, see Noordhof (2018), pp. 123-5).

The fact that the presence of the disposition is causally related to particular objects and properties in the environment perceived by the subject is the basis for attributing to the disposition the organisation of representational properties concerning particular events – particular objects and instances of properties – rather than types of objects and properties generally. When we engage in the process of remembering I described in section 2, the dispositional property organises representational properties that sets up a representational relation of awareness to particular objects and properties in the subjects past as a result of which the subject has a particular sensuous memory.

It is important to distinguish my appeal to the dispositional properties characterised by the activation routine and the attempt to analyse particular sensuous memory partly in terms of the

presence of a so-called memory trace. For one thing, there are plausible cases of particular sensuous memories that lack the sense of past familiarity and don't have the dispositional properties mentioned yet presumably involve some kind of memory trace. Consider Martin and Deutscher's case of unrecognised remembering again. It is plausible that we have the key elements of our imagining being guided by past experience in some way through a present memory trace rather than an activation routine being triggered. The guidance is mediated via our mental agency rather than being independent of it subsequent to the disposition being activated. Thus there are two kinds of particular sensuous memory. There is the type involving the activation routine and there is the type which involves the guiding of sensuous imagination by past experience. Only the former presents things as manifesting their existence in the past and conveys a sense of familiarity.

Appeal to a particular kind of disposition avoids the empirical commitments that have typically arisen with more substantial accounts of a memory trace. Aside from Owens' account discussed earlier, there is Martin and Deutscher's idea of a structural analogue of what is experienced (Martin and Deutscher (1966), p. 189). There seems no need to require this, let alone make empirical sense of it with regard to the neuroscience of memory, to capture the idea that memory involves retained acquaintance. My characterisation is closer to the characterisation offered of a memory trace compatible with the understanding of the brain provided by connectionist networks (Sutton (1998), pp. 301-4; Bernecker (2010), pp. 134-6). But my disposition needn't satisfy the conditions that are required for something to be a memory trace. So the story I have provided of the representational character of particular sensuous memory is independent of a full analysis of particular sensuous memory involving a memory trace.

An illustration of the present point would be a subject who had a particular sensuous memory of some event in the past, told a friend about it, forgot about the event, later was told by the friend what had happened in the same level of detail, imagined accurately the original event and, over time, became convinced that they had a particular sensuous memory of it. The conviction would arise

because of the generation of a second disposition characterised by the activation routine as a result of the friend's retelling of the story. The subject would have a sense of past familiarity because of the account I have given. The subject would also successfully imagine the particular objects and properties involved. Nevertheless, they would not have a particular sensuous memory of the original event because the second disposition was a distinct disposition from the first, although caused by it through the mediation of the friend.

The proposed analysis of the representational properties involved provides a basis for the epistemological authority of particular sensuous memory because its content presents what is remembered as in the past, real, and something with which we are familiar. The last component takes the epistemological authority of perception – the means by which the content would naturally have epistemological authority – and takes it over to memory. So we have a relationist representationalist account of epistemological authority.

4. 2. Memory Demonstratives

The second motivation for non-representational relationism about memory was that it had an explanation of how representational states, in particular demonstrative thought and judgment, may concern particular objects we came across in the past. Moreover, if particular sensuous memories are a source of knowledge, then this will rely on us knowing which object we are thinking about in thinking *that* object was F (Debus (2008), p. 407). The appeal to a non-representational relation of awareness was said to be the basis of this knowledge.

In fact, the explanatory advantages of non-representational relationism are illusory. It has to appeal to an explanatory relation of the same kind it prosecutes representational relationism of requiring and requires a second kind of explanatory relation too. Suppose that I have a particular sensuous memory of a suspicious man watching a house under a lamp post. The particular sensuous

memory only makes my demonstrative thought 'That man looked suspicious' concern the man in question if two further elements are in play.

The first is that the demonstrative thought stands in the right relationship to the *particular* sensuous memory (as opposed to a particular type of sensuous memory of which the particular sensuous memory is token). It is in virtue of this relationship that the demonstrative thought will have the representational properties to pick out the particular man. Taking particular sensuous memory to be a non-representational relation does not deal with this explanatory question which concerns the connection between the representational relational properties of the demonstrative thought and the particular sensuous memory which enable those representational relational properties to refer to that of which the particular sensuous memory is an awareness. If the non-representational relationist needs a reference-conferring relation in virtue of a relationship to a particular (the particular sensuous memory) in any event, there seems no explanatory advantage over the representational relationist who is going to need a similar such relation between the particular sensuous memory and the suspicious looking man at the outset. The explanatory issues these two positions face occur at different places but they are of the same form.

The representational relationist would also need an explanation of how demonstrative thoughts about what we remember might be based on particular sensuous memories. However, this explanatory task would be considerably assisted by the fact that the same explanatory relation that they need to account for how a particular sensuous memory is of the suspicious looking man can be used to explain the content of the demonstrative thought based upon the particular sensuous memory. It will probably be suggested that the non-representational relationist has an easier explanatory task explaining how the demonstrative thought refers to the suspicious looking man because it goes *via* a relation of non-representational awareness of the man in question. However, this only appears an advantage if no explanation is attempted of the nature of this non-representational awareness of the thing remembered. Otherwise, the non-representational

relationist has to appeal to a distinct explanatory relation in addition to the one I have already mentioned.

This second element of the non-representational relationists account has an additional explanatory issue. How does the subject pick out a particular man as opposed to the material object from which the man is constituted? Both are possible targets of the demonstrative but have different persistence conditions. This will involve the subject in grasping the relevant sortal. A relation of non-representational awareness by itself does not succeed in explaining the success of demonstrative reference. Adding grasp of the relevant sortal to the characterisation of the awareness undermines its non-representational credentials.

While non-representational relationism has little support, a representational relationism that merely insists that a relation to a particular object must exist for the successful application of memory demonstratives is more plausible. According to the envisaged representational relationist about particular sensuous memory, a particular sensuous memory involves a relation to some event in the past from which the disposition characterised by an activation routine derives its representational properties. There are grounds for supposing that the successful application of memory demonstratives require states with this kind of relational representational structure.

Suppose I have a number of sensuous memories regarding a particular individual I knew when I was a student. Some may be particular sensuous memories of scenes where we were together. Some may be general or mixed sensuous memories of, for example, approaching the place where they used to live and them answering the door, how they walked etc. Setting aside the case of unrecognised sensuous memories, the particular sensuous memories only represent the individual if the activation routine by which a representation of them is generated is a causal consequence of, typically, prior perception of the individual. General or mixed sensuous memories, if they concern that particular individual, do so in virtue of the fact that they are related to the particular sensuous memories of that individual. They can be related in a number of ways. Their generation may integrated with the

particular sensuous memory, they might have representational properties that are the result of connection with the activation routine, or, as particular sensuous memories fade, they are causally connected with what was an activation routine but is no longer available. Because of the imaginative element involved, general or mixed sensuous memories may also fail to refer to a particular individual if the subject fails demonstratively to identify bundles of sensory properties relating to an individual as sensory properties of one particular individual (e.g. *that individual* I knew as a student). Successful demonstrative identification in this case depends upon there being an individual from whom the sensory material of the memories derives but in a way that falls short of giving the sensuous material particular representational content without the demonstrative identification. It is debatable whether this requires the subject to think of the phenomenal content involving these sensory properties to be possible perceptual experiences of the individual in question. Apart from the concern about sophistication I mentioned in 4. 1. 2., one might think that although the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memories resemble that of the corresponding perceptions from which it derives, no possible perception could have the phenomenal content of particular sensuous memory, for instance the reduced content and element of past familiarity (cf. Campbell (2002), pp. 189-91).

4. 3. Implications for the Continuity Between Sensuous Memory and Imagination

Support for some form of relationism about particular sensuous memory potentially has implications for those who take sensuous memories to be part of a general faculty of mental time travel – those whom we may dub *Continuity theorists* (Michaelian (2016), pp. 97, 105, Perrin and Michaelian (2017), p. 219). According to continuity theorists, particular sensuous memories are the products of a properly functioning faculty of mental time travel focused on sensuously imagining a past event. The same faculty is responsible for sensuous imaginings about what would happen in the future if the subject acted in a certain way and, indeed, reasoning about how the future may be different with a different sensuously imagined past.

The empirical evidence in favour of continuity is equivocal. Although there is evidence of deficits that affect both sensuous imagining and memory – suggesting a common faculty – this may concern a distinct element, a failure of awareness of the subjective time in which events occur, upon which two significantly distinct faculties draw (dubbed ‘autonoetic consciousness’ or ‘chronesthesia’ Tulving (2002), pp. 3-5; Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, Spreng, and Szpunar (2012), pp. 679-680). For example, KC, a severe amnesiac, who also could not have particular sensuous imaginings of the future, retained the capacity for sensuous imagining *in general*.

Some neurophysiological evidence supports the significance of the difference I have identified. First, as Schacter et al note, in imagining future events there is greater activity in the left anterior hippocampus. An explanation of this difference is that greater constructive activity is required for imagining future events (see Schacter and Addis (2007), Schacter and Addis (2009), Schacter et al (2012), p. 681). Thus, we might take particular sensuous memories to involve less construction because of the causal contribution of the earlier experience of the event and the way it was stored. Second, in the case of retrieval of memories, there is forgetting of related information, in a way that is not present for the corresponding imagination of future events. This would suggest again that there are different kinds of processes at work both in construction and in comparison with those elements involved in retrieval (Schacter et al (2012), p. 682). Third, there is more sensuous detail in particular sensuous memories than in the imagining of future events. If we just have constructive processes at work in both, we lack an explanation why (Schacter et al (2012), p. 682). The greater detail suggests that, even if there is construction involved, there is another factor which we have identified as disposition characterised by an activation routine.

The different ways in which sensuous imaginings and particular sensuous memories are formed points to one moderate discontinuity. Apart from the fact that past familiarity attaches to central cases of the latter, such particular sensuous memories also seem *non-neutral* about that which they concern in a way that is similar to the case of perception. By that I mean that part of what both

are like is that what perceive or remember in this way seems real, although we can reject this subsequently as mistaken. By contrast, even when we have a particular sensuous imagining about something in the future, the imaginative state is neutral about whether or not the content is real.

The difference in how these states are formed also has an impact upon the source of the content they possess. The content of imaginings is often the result of the intention behind the imagining whereas the contents of particular sensuous memories don't have this element (Martin (2001), p. 275). However, where there is no intention relating to a certain part of the sensory imagining, it may have a content derived from the source of the representational properties.

Although a moderate discontinuity seems well supported, there are qualifications to this. First, as we noted, not all cases of particular sensuous memory involve the disposition described in terms of an activation routine. There are cases of imagination controlled by previous experience such as the painter. Second, as we noted at the outset, particular sensuous memory is not the only kind of sensuous memory. General sensuous memory and mixed sensuous memory seem closely linked to the capacity for sensuous imagination.

One argument for a substantial discontinuity points to an asymmetry between sensuous imagination and particular sensuous memory. Sensuous memories can concern particular episodes or events whereas sensuous imaginings about the future cannot. In brief, there are particular sensuous memories but no future particular sensuous imaginings (Debus (2014), pp. 336-8). However, the argument is ineffective.

One problem with the argument is that it assumes what it hopes to establish. If sensuous memory and sensuous imagination are part of a single capacity, then sensuous imagination can be of particular events. Indeed, we saw earlier that there can be particular sensuous imaginings relating to past events. In which case, even if it were true that there are no future particular sensuous imaginings, that wouldn't stem from the different character of sensuous imagining and memory but rather from

the conditions in which settle when a sensory content can be of a particular event. Suppose that only beliefs about the past could be beliefs concerning particular events, beliefs about the future cannot have this content. One wouldn't conclude from this that there were two kinds of mental state involving belief.

Two considerations are offered in favour of the asymmetry. First, from the subject's perspective, a future event is merely a possible event. Second, if, from the subject's perspective, a future event is merely possible, then the subject is related to a type of event rather than a token event. I shall accept the first, for the sake of argument, as a characterisation of how things seem to a subject even if, in fact, determinism is true or eternalism about time is true. The main problem is with the second claim.

Particular sensuous memories concern token events because these events are (perhaps piecemeal) causes of the particular sensuous memories. In the absence of backward causation, events in the future can't cause a subject to have a particular sensuous imagining of them. However, our sensuous imaginings can concern a particular event in the future in virtue of the fact that we can cause the event to happen. Suppose I sensuously imagine putting the mug from which I am drinking down on the desk. The fact that I can cause the mug to be put down on the desk enables me to imagine *that* putting down of the mug.

It may be argued that the content of the sensuous imagining behind the intention to put down the mug is indeterminate between different possible puttings down of the mug. That is, presumably, behind Debus's idea that the subject is related to a particular type of event rather than a token event. But this way of describing the matter is not mandatory. The alternative is that the subject is indeterminately related to a number of different tokens of putting down the mug and, in putting down the mug in a certain way, the imaginary state that causes this action is related to a particular token. The spatio-temporal and causal relations that are the basis of particular sensuous memories are present in the case of particular sensuous imaginings about the future with one difference, the

direction of causation. There is no reason to suppose the capacity to single out a particular event should depend upon the event being a cause of the relevant mental state concerning it rather than an effect. Either way there seems the basis for a relationship to something particular. Any scepticism about whether a sensuous imagining of some future event is genuinely about a token event in the future can be carried over into scepticism about whether a particular sensuous memory is sufficiently determinate to pick out a token past event as opposed to an event of a certain type that, as things turned out, relates to a particular token event.

There is a weaker asymmetry given the point I have made. There are far fewer particular sensuous imaginings about the future than particular sensuous memories about the past. But this underlines the point that the difference results from how the contents of these states are determined rather than a substantial difference in the types of states involved.

5. Concluding Remarks

Non-representational relationism about memory is unmotivated, the standard moves made by naïve realists to defend their position regarding perception don't transfer easily to non-representational relationism about memory and, indeed, this approach to memory generates theoretical tensions for those who would be naïve realists about perception. It opens up an explanatory deficit in the naïve realist's position. Representational relationism, on the other hand, avoids these difficulties and is in a good position to accommodate the various ways in which we may have sensuous memories. In developing our understanding of representational properties further we saw how we might have the basis for capturing the epistemological authority of memory, demonstrative thought about objects and events remembered, and an account of two aspects of the phenomenal content of one type of particular sensuous memories: the manifestation of something as occurring in the past and being in

some way familiar. The fecundity of a representational relationist approach is a further consideration in its favour.

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