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***“The little murmur of unconsenting man”<sup>1</sup>:***  
***on time and the miracle***

Jessica Dubow

The power to say no, this most natural expression of the continuously changing, renewing, dying, reviving, human fighting-organism, is something we always have, but not the courage; all the same while to live is to say no, it follows that to say no is to say yes.

– Franz Kafka, *Aphorisms*

What, today, is not “theology” (apart from theological claptrap)?

– Jacob Taubes, *To Carl Schmitt*

The miracle is at first glance an outlandish, unfathomable, inexplicable thing: either a malfunction in the ordinary course of events (a deviation from the indefatigable rules of nature) or something audacious enough to dwarf them (testament to an invisible power, the act of a God or the runes and lures of some numinous diviner). In this, the miracle must have an uneasy claim on all we include within the sweep of secular reason: the concreteness of material existence, the recognition of nature’s universal conformity to law, the schemas that measure the world’s phenomena by degrees of probability or grasps them by levels of credibility. On this account, the miracle is freakish, fraudulent. It is a mere caprice of the senses. What would it mean, then, to revalue the miracle? To see in its mendacity the validity of a philosophical and political event? How might the miracle be released from the preserve of religion (as from the spells of magic, of demonology) and return us to the actualities, and inadequacies, of the day to day? In what ways can the very deficiencies of the miracle – that

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<sup>1</sup> Samuel Beckett, “The Unnamable”, *Three Novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable* (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 319

it happens by surprise, only once, and always inconclusively – action a politics, or name the possibility of a politics enjoined to the unbidden, the perishable, or the impossible, as such?

A framing is in order, from the start. Current and gaining geographic studies have turned to the real and virtual powers of religious faith in its various institutional, embodied and affective arrangements (Brace et al 2001; Holloway and Valins 2002; Stump 2008; Hopkins, Kong and Olsen 2012). Where some have provided rich empirical insights into communities of religious ceremony and belief (Nagar 1997; Kong 1990, 1993, 2001, 2010), others have mapped the specifics of its spatial location (Knott 2005; Olsen and Silver 2006). Outside the binds of formalized religion, still others have embraced the esoteria of alternative spiritual practices – the occult, the supernatural, the otherworldly, the extrasensory – insisting on the enchantments secreted in the knowledges of modern social life (Holloway 2006, 2010; Finlayson 2012; MacKian 2012; Bartolini et al 2013, 2017, 2019; Pile, Bartolini and MacKian, 2018, 2019).

In this chapter, the miracle is not the emanation of any metaphysics. Nor, strictly speaking, is it a re-description of the forms and experience of secular modernity: the resurrection of ancient ghosts skulking in well-oiled machines, a resurrection of modernity's dusty, disavowed spirits. Rather, in line with recent returns to much older conversations between politics and theology, I focus on the miracle as a political act: an occurrence, an occasion, that breaks up and breaks into the midst of things; an opening that usually arises when time is critical and its character most indeterminate. Indeed, my argument will be that such a "miraculous" politics turns on a reconsideration of temporal process: stopping its flows, arresting its rhythms, exceeding or falling short of sequence, series, aim, or end. Corresponding to a specific reading of Judaic theology, what I come to describe as the miracle's *negative temporality* initiates a different sort of worldly commitment: an activity that has no basis in power, might even be impotent, or one whose claimant is not always equal to the demand placed on it. We might see this as a minimal activity – *at once, most essential and least possible* – which refuses to be traded for any calculation, composure or peace of mind; which carries no remote or final payoff, and asks only that we live in the weakest, most woundable, of presents. As we shall see, it is Judaism's re-thinking of the divine miracle that allows us to inhabit the unsteadiness of this experience; only *from* it can we invite new and unpredictable futures, in both temporal and political terms.

In *Welcome to the Real*, written in 2002 as a response to the first anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, Slavoj Žižek cites another event in January of the same year: the refusal of 51 officers and reservists of the Israeli Defence Force to fight beyond the ‘Green Line’ of Israel’s pre-1967 border. While not the first example of selective non-participation in the IDF’s policy of mandated conscription – in the late 1960s individual Israeli soldiers declined to serve in the occupied Palestinian territories, in 1982 *Yesh-Gvul*<sup>2</sup> launched its campaign against the Lebanon War and remained active throughout the first *intifada* – the event of January 2002, for Žižek, represents the ethical event, *par excellence*. On this account, what the *refuseniks* accomplished was not only a collapsing of the legal divisions separating citizen from non-citizen; enacting, in their dissent, that borderline or “zone of indifference” which Giorgio Agamben names for the subject both bound and abandoned to the force of the law (Agamben 2005a).<sup>3</sup> More than this, for Žižek, the *refuseniks*’ action amounts to a derailing of secular defences; instantiating a movement towards that more immaterial, illimitable dimension that we might call the theological. Indeed, in its very exceptionality, the erroneous action delivers the structure of the divine miracle. As Žižek has it:

It is here, in such acts that – as Saint Paul would have put it – there actually are no longer Jews or Palestinians, full members of the polity and *Homo sacer*... We should be unashamedly Platonic here: this ‘No!’ designates the miraculous moment in which eternal Justice momentarily appears in the temporary sphere of empirical reality.... Our duty today is to keep track of such acts, of such ethical moments.<sup>4</sup>

Invoking the “miraculous moment,” Žižek’s description clearly participates in those inherited and ongoing debates over whether radical political action is best understood as extraordinary or ordinary, ruptural or decisively-ruled, transcendent or immanent – or, more precisely, the Gordian knot that intractably shackles the one to the other. Certainly, too, Žižek’s “eternal Justice”, like his petitioning of the apostle Paul, registers the peculiar archaicizing of the age at which we have arrived: the sacralization of philosophical questions;

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<sup>2</sup> Literally translated as “there is a limit” or “there is a border”.

<sup>3</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005)

<sup>4</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates* (London and New York: Verso, 2002), 116-117

the scripturalizing of emancipatory struggles and, in the face of repeated secular deadlock, intuiting the strange, indistinct stirrings of messianic hope.<sup>5</sup> In particular, Žižek's reading of the *refusenik's* extraordinary act alludes to Carl Schmitt's early twentieth-century theorisation of the theological derivation of political claims. Specifically, it bears on the assertion in Schmitt's *Political Theology* (1922) that just as the miracle waives the given laws of nature, so the earthly sovereign suspends the laws of the state; exceeding the juridical norm without the securities of principle or precedent but "on the basis of [the state's] right to self-preservation."<sup>6</sup>

"The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology", is how Schmitt formulates the knot of the paradox; that is, the capacity of sovereign authority to deactivate, disable, and at the same time fulfil the orders of natural or normal lawfulness.<sup>7</sup> For Schmitt, in short, the originary source of juridical regulation – and the space where the orders of law are most vitally in effect – always includes the facility to decide on a state of exception. "Belong[ing] to the very concept of the miracle"<sup>8</sup> in its singular and salvational powers, it is precisely this extra- or illegal inscription *within* the law – the "*outlaw dimension*

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<sup>5</sup> Recent probings of the postsecular as a political concept include, William Connelly, *Why I am not a Secularist* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Charles Taylor, *A Catholic Modernity?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Philip Blond, (ed.), *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology* (New York: Routledge, 1998); Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays*, trans. Ciaran Cronin, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008). On the marked 'return to religion' in the humanities, inaugurated by Hent de Vries in the 1990s but pursued by a host of others see, Hent de Vries, *Philosophy and the Turn to Religion* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) and Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, eds., *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-secular World* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006). For a broad-ranging collection of contemporary 'neo-Pauline' perspectives see, *St Paul and the Philosophers*, ed. Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013)

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 12

<sup>7</sup> "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology." Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 36. Schmitt uses the analogy of the miracle on at least two other occasions: in a 1934 revised edition of the *Political Theology* published after he had joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party and in his final work, *Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology* (1970), his polemical self-exculpation from Nazi allegiance.

<sup>8</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 43

*internal to [it]*”<sup>9</sup> – that, for Schmitt, “reveals the essence of State authority most clearly.”<sup>10</sup> Thus, the sovereign decision not only transgresses a normally valid juridical order; it does so in the name of legality, creating a suspended state of affairs to which the law indiscriminately can then apply. “*Being-outside and yet belonging*”:<sup>11</sup> this is the uncanny topology that Agamben, in his leading account of Schmitt, gives to the sovereign’s ‘miraculous’ violation on which all lawful activity depends. This is why Schmitt can say: “The exception is more interesting than the regular case... The exception does not only confirm the rule; the rule as such lives off the exception alone.”<sup>12</sup>

But if Schmitt’s miracle is conceived on the side of sovereignty and the violence of its continued survival, in what ways might Žižek’s *refuseniks* reformulate its powers? How might their “No!” – this exceptional, excessive suspension – speak of the impotence, the essential powerlessness, of the ethical act? Can this “miraculous moment” be seen less as any definitive decision than as an unending and *unexceptional* – in Žižek’s words, “eternal” – indetermination? Further, insofar as the *refuseniks*’ action – or better, the miracle of their *inaction* – is directed against the sovereign state, how does it relate to the exception at all?

My answer will be that although the miracle of Žižek’s description calls up Schmitt’s transfer of theological into political categories, it pertains to a related but far less familiar line of inquiry. I refer to Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), the German-Jewish philosopher and theologian who, although contemporary with the early years of Schmitt’s (soon-to-be-lapsed) Catholic conservatism, offers us a very different account of the miracle and the meaning of the miraculous suspension. Although not as frequently cited as Schmitt in recent literatures that seek to renew a theological or messianic potential to radical secular action, Rosenzweig offers an important counterpoint.<sup>13</sup> What emerges with him, I hope to show, is a twofold alternative: a theology no longer analogous to a juridical order and, accordingly, a miracle that suspends those very state-securities that the Schmittian exception seeks to vouchsafe. From this perspective, the instant of the *refusenik*’s “No!” diverges from Schmitt’s model in

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<sup>9</sup> Eric L. Santner, *On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 22

<sup>10</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 19

<sup>11</sup> Agamben, *The State of Exception*, 35

<sup>12</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 15.

<sup>13</sup> On the inherently non-national and non-territorial spatialities of Rosenzweig’s theology see my “Judaism’s Other Geographies: Franz Rosenzweig and the State of Exile”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 34:3 (2016): 528–544 and chapter 2 of *In Exile: Philosophy, Geography and Judaic Thought* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).

working against anything resembling the force of an ultimate or executive decision. It is a “No!” that is as unpredictable as it is incomplete, as anguished as it is unwilling. Its pressure isn’t the heroic rapture of change – and much less its juridical containment – but to precipitate crisis; it proclaims itself in a situation of struggle. Above all, it as a “No!” that we can call miraculous precisely because *it takes exception to the very idea of the exception*: demoting sovereign power, untying the miracle from the ligatures of the law/nonlaw, overturning what is taken as the miracle’s decisive state, and giving it over to the excesses and obscurities of an ethical act.<sup>14</sup>

Crucially, as we shall see, all of this turns on Rosenzweig’s particular conception of time in which a specifically Judaic account of the miracle possesses the tension of what I term a ‘negative temporality’. What I intend by this is less a time that cancels or retracts the processes of historical time; the negative is not an abandonment of history but an interruption which brings to light its hidden structure. This also means that while it is distinguished from the (sovereign) flows of persistence or perseverance, a ‘negative temporality’ is not quite equivalent to the inactivity of prolepsis, post-dating, or other forms of ‘timeless’ awaiting on the other. Indeed, one of its strains is that another, concealed, time and another, concealed, action makes itself present in the instant of *this* time and *this* action. As such, while my formulation of the negative relates to recent work in cultural geography which re-values passivity and privation as a corrective to the positivities of time, at issue here is less a reversal of action or actuality than the task of ‘redeeming’ – which is also to say, ‘*refusing*’ – them differently.<sup>15</sup> In short, it is a time that proposes nothing, projects nothing, carries no content, and yet brings the distant, the far side, into the extremity and facticity of a *now*. Its negativity consists not in the suspension of time but in the present and ungraspable surplus of it. In this

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<sup>14</sup> I take my cue here from various readings of Schmitt that similarly call for suspending the state of exception itself. See, Samuel Weber, “Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt”, *diacritics* 22:3-4 (1992): 5-19; Eric L. Santner, “Miracles Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud, and the Matter of the Neighbour”, *The Neighbour: Three Inquiries in Political Theology*, eds. Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, Kenneth Reinhard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 102-103; Bonnie Honig, “The Miracle of Metaphor: Rethinking the State of Exception with Rosenzweig and Schmitt”, *diacritics* 37:2-3 (2007): 78-102.

<sup>15</sup> Amongst other geographical writings, I have in mind Paul Harrison’s wonderful account of sleep as it works against the signifying priorities given to doings, actions, and energies in social scientific, and specifically geographic, accounts of practice and embodiment. See Harrison, “The Absence of Practice”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27 (2009): 987-1009. Framed in part by Agamben’s ideas of impotentiality as the potentiality “to not-be”, Harrison’s argument has various similarities to my own here, except that my task is to show how ‘impotentiality’ might testify to the ongoing importance of theological thinking.

present, the past is unbound from its immobility – *it is a past able to appear and justly claim its incompletions* – and a future faintly imaged but never brought to fulfilment. Indeed, contra Schmitt, we may see it as a temporality which is non-sovereign yet deserves to be called miraculous insofar as it intervenes on behalf of the indigent, the un-preserved, the ‘*un-excepted*.’ In the end, we might not need to see Rozenzweig’s theology of time and the miracle in religious or messianic terms. Like the *refusenik*’s “No!” the quality of negativity is not the expression of despair; the cry of an exhausted, disheartened world and the vision of a (political and temporal) state before or beyond it. Weaker than the commitments of a promise but perhaps strong enough to be released from the captivity of the ‘what-is’ and ‘already-known’, it is a time immersed in the openness of the present, and a miracle that makes a space for itself in the midst of the impossible.

## 2

Published a year before Schmitt’s *Political Theology*, Rosenzweig’s magnum opus, *The Star of Redemption* (1921), can be taken as its prescient critique. Although contextualised by the same Weimar-era crises around the legitimacy of liberal democracy and the limits of the constitutional state, Rosenzweig travels a very different route through the co-existing insides and outsides of religion and philosophy alike. Part of what enables this is not just contemporary debates over the relative attributes of a Christian and Judaic tradition in an era of post-Enlightenment secularity. It is also prepared, as I’ve suggested, by the ways in which Rosenzweig implicitly undoes the Schmittian miracle by substituting the question of a ‘negative temporality’ for the question of sovereign efficiency. That is to say, seeing the miracle as it occurs *in* and *as time* and so perforating, or awakening us to the possible perforations of, what is taken to be a full, completed or, in Schmitt’s sense, *decisionist* state. On this account, the miracle emerges as a sudden and eccentric event, a temporary moment cut out of the relentless succession and consumption of moments. It is a *this-wordly* irruption that in-completes or ‘un-fulfils’ time, that saves a moment but without subsuming or preserving it.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, such a time requires us to invert the usual metaphors of the “miraculous moment” and insist on the darkened, weakened – negative – qualities of its illumination. For in taking the instant as its object, Rosenzweig’s miracle not only lights up a present but must grapple with the obscurities that shroud and shadow it – not to end or outshine the chiaroscuro of the lived moment but to intensify, quicken, and rouse us to them. Here, the

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<sup>16</sup> To ‘unfulfil’ is the verb form that Jean François Lyotard uses to describe the Judaic law against representability. See, Lyotard, “Jewish Oedipus,” trans. S Hanson, *Genre* 10:3 (1977): 395-411.



very inability to dispel a (dense, disconsolate) present is no longer of a piece with political cynicism or the sober gloom of pragmatic rationality; it is the sole form that hope is allowed to retain.<sup>17</sup> Since it lacks the bliss of final salvation, here too, the miracle is always only doubtful. It transpires in the proximity of possibility and the implausible, expectation and disappointment, preparation and misadventure. And it must fail to discharge; the miracle, in Gershom Scholem's words, "possesses a tension that never finds true release."<sup>18</sup> Indeed, that the light it emits shows the recesses of the world to be finite, defenceless, undecidable, entangled, is not only the most plausible of revelations; it is the most emphatic one.

"Revelation", Rosenzweig writes in 'The *Urzelle*' to *The Star of Redemption*, "pushes itself into the world as a wedge; the This struggles against the This."<sup>19</sup> Which is to say, it is a divine incursion angled in relation to, not set apart from, the limits of the everyday and kindles the precarities found there.

Put another way, if the exception analogises the miracle, but in Rosenzweig's rather than Schmitt's version, then it does not attempt to compose the differences between the actual and ideal, the human and divine; it isn't the juridical conjoining of "an omnipotent God and an omnipotent lawgiver."<sup>20</sup> What it irradiates is neither an exception that might (triumphantly) be sustained nor the lineation of a path, a stage along the way, a future cleared ahead of time, and in advance of its experience. Instead, we might see Rosenzweig's miracle as an exegesis of the present, as an interpretation of particular dimension of time. It exposes at and within any moment a constitutive excess, a certain excitation, and its consequence depends on the subject's readiness to respond – and correspond – to the anxieties it

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<sup>17</sup> The structure of this perception is by no means unique to Rosenzweig. Together with the apophatic speculations of much anti-or post Hegelian thought, it speaks to a specifically German-Jewish tradition that understands the messianic as contained in the most seemingly diminished, devalued states. To this belongs the "darkness of the lived moment" which Ernst Bloch elaborates in *Spirit of Utopia* (1918); the "weak messianic force" of Walter Benjamin's "now-time" (*Jetztzeit*) in "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940); and the "negative political theology" of Jacob Taubes' *The Political Theology of Paul* (1993) who reclaims the founding father of the Christian Church as a radical Jew. In their different vocabularies and directions, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek, are the contemporary inheritors of this German-Jewish intellectual history.

<sup>18</sup> Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality* (New York: Schocken, 1971), 35

<sup>19</sup> Rosenzweig, "'*Urzelle*' to *The Star of Redemption*", *Franz Rosenzweig: Philosophical and Theological Writings*, trans. Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000), 65. The "*Urzelle*" ('Cell') refers to the Rosenzweig's 1917 letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg in which he first formulates his philosophical system central to *The Star*.

<sup>20</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 36

discloses.<sup>21</sup> In short, this theology of the miracle refuses sovereign interdiction as it simultaneously entreats us to risk the unprepared, to break the bounds of the normative laws of time. With Rosenzweig, as Bonnie Honig puts it, “we are invited to think about how sovereignty postulates not just power or imposition or governance but also, subtly, receptivity, openness and a future.”<sup>22</sup>

Perhaps, this is the post-secular miracle that Žižek’s *refusenik* represents. A rigorous “No!” that might turn into a reversible ‘Yes’, a sudden exhortation uncoupled from repetition and duration: not a reply to an obligatory command but the weight and exertion of an unexpected solicitation. If the force of the *refuseniks*’ negation is anticipatory – the miraculous glimpse of a future, a “better world or with the world that has to be ‘bettered’”<sup>23</sup> – it can never be final. For an exorbitance has been unplugged, a singularity stands out, an uncontrollable break has occurred. Indeed, it is a miracle precisely because it arises when it is no longer possible, or fundamentally impossible to cleave to (secular, juridical) fantasies of consistency and completeness.<sup>24</sup> What matters, then, is not mastering the miracle’s interruption; it is the singular way in which the *refuseniks* apprehend their ‘impossible’, even impotent, politics together. Or we may say, theirs is a strange sort of miracle, realized in response to a kind of double negativity: both the negativity of present – discontinuous, indeterminate – time, and the negativity of refusing any sovereign solution.

### 3

“On the Possibility of Experiencing Miracle” introduces Part 2 of *The Star of Redemption*, the vast philosophical-theological treatise that Rosenzweig began while serving in the Balkan Campaign in World War 1 and completed in the ruins of that catastrophe. At a time when Central European political structures had definitively failed and a once-solid (German) Idealist version of faith had culminated in the death of Europe’s millions – a faith abandoned in a “front-line trench, very weakly manned, risking surrender at the first assault”<sup>25</sup> – the concept of the miracle counted amongst the casualties of the war. Theology,

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<sup>21</sup> For a brilliant psychoanalytic reading of the miracle as an ‘ex-citation’ of what he conceives as the subject’s ‘creaturely’ energies see, Santner, “Miracles Happen,” 76-133.

<sup>22</sup> Bonnie Honig, “The Miracle of Metaphor,” 80.

<sup>23</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, “Forward” to Stéphane Mosès, *System and Revelation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 21

<sup>24</sup> On this see, Reiner Wiel, “Experience in Rosenzweig’s New Thinking”, *The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig* ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr, (Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press with the University of New England Press, 1988), 63-68.

<sup>25</sup> Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, p 103

as Rosenzweig writes, “saw itself forced to carry out, higher up, the evacuation of the line it had held for thousands of years and to take refuge in a new position in further retreat.”<sup>26</sup> But while 1914-1918 confirmed the crises of theology, the decline of the miracle has its origin in the longer story of what Rosenzweig calls the “historical Enlightenment”. By this he means the Hegelian (and implicitly, Christianizing) attempt to find God in history; a mission which takes as its object of faith “the objective, thinkable All and the thinking of this objectivity.”<sup>27</sup>

In Hegel, then in Marx, history is certainly the medium that ultimately determines the meaning of events. Endowed with an unequivocal judgement and a clearly intelligible signification, it is history that assesses which event is adequate to the unfolding commands of Reason.<sup>28</sup> So conceived, the miracle is indeed incompatible with modernity. Its very fabric – its non-objectivity, its errancy, its impermanence – renders the miracle unthinkable: neither real nor possible. What had once been “theology’s strongest and surest companion” is now its most awkward opponent.<sup>29</sup>

If the miracle really is the favourite child of faith, then, at least for some time, faith has seriously been neglecting its parental duties. For at least a century, the child has been only a source of embarrassment for the wet nurse dispatched by its parent, theology: she would have gladly have got rid of it somehow or other, if only – yes, if only – a certain consideration for the parent had not held her back while the child was alive. But time brings counsel. The old parent cannot live forever. And the wet nurse [theology] will know what to

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 103-104.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>28</sup> To be sure, Schmitt’s miracle is also the expression of a fundamental anti-Hegelianism and, like Rosenzweig’s, it is premised on Hegel’s metaphorical death. In Schmitt’s case, however, it is Hegel conceived as a philosopher of (bourgeois) normalcy and legal-bureaucratic rationality that forms the basis of his attack and, accordingly, of his arguments in favour of authoritarian decisionism. The famous words with which Schmitt greeted Hitler’s accession to power – “[on this day, January 30, 1933] one can say that ‘Hegel died’” – has been understood in just this sense. Namely, the triumph of Nazism as the surpassing of Hegel’s *Rechtsphilosophie* as a way of life based on universal principles and norms. The fundamental distinction between Schmitt’s conservative revolutionary anti-Hegelianism and Rosenzweig’s Judaic variant, is just one of the many ways in which their conceptions of the miracle differ. For a very clear account of Schmitt’s critique of Hegel as part of a general anti-democratic intellectual and political climate see, Richard Wolin, “The Conservative Revolutionary: Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror, *Political Theory*, 20:3 (1992): 424-477

<sup>29</sup> Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, 103

do with her poor worm [miracle], incapable as it is of living or dying on its own. She has, moreover, already begun making the preparations.<sup>30</sup>

With *The Star*, Rosenzweig, acting as wet nurse, was also preparing to reconstruct the miracle, venturing less to establish its explanatory content than to rethink the structure of its experience in enlightened modernity. But on what could a faith in miracles now depend? In its singularity and subjectivism, how might it re-enter a world dominated by the objectivist epic or the Idealists maximal “All”? Conversely, how to support the miraculous without forfeiting the merits of modernity or rejecting reason as the ground of philosophical meaning? Such questions form part of what Rosenzweig called ‘The New Thinking’ (*Das neue Denken*, 1925), a novel methodological synthesis of religious faith and secular reason able to counter Enlightenment’s deadening, and deadly, rationalisms and so engage more directly with the facticity of lived, circumstantial existence.<sup>31</sup> Thus, against a Hegelian and Christianising logic of dialectic ascent – the historicist idea of temporal progress itself a secular eschatology, a profane argument of divine Necessity – ‘The New Thinking’ annuls the movement towards all uttermost or endmost things. A “redemption-in-the-world”,<sup>32</sup> a combination of belief *and* knowledge (*Glauben und Wissen*), or the materialist intrigues of what he calls an “Absolute empiricism”<sup>33</sup> – for Rosenzweig, the world exploded by the War demanded both:

Philosophy today requires, in order to be free of its aphorisms, and hence

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. Rosenzweig’s extended metaphor, here, alludes to Part 1 of Goethe’s *Faust*. In response to a choir of angels singing the Easter message of Christ’s resurrection, Faust declares, “I hear your message, my faith it is that lags behind; and miracle is the favourite child of belief.”

<sup>31</sup> For the full text of ‘The New Thinking’, written to redress the stylistic difficulties of *The Star of Redemption* see Rosenzweig, “‘The New Thinking’: A Few Supplementary Remarks to *The Star*,” *Franz Rosenzweig’s New Thinking*, ed. A. Udoff and B. E. Galli (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 67-102. On the striking and complex resemblances between the Rosenzweig’s ‘New Thinking’ and similar departures made by Martin Heidegger (evident especially in Heidegger’s 1964 essay ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thought’) see, Peter Eli Gordon’s major study, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). For the first account (1942-3) of the parallels in Rosenzweig and Heidegger’s understanding of temporal existence, see Karl Löwith, “M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig: A Postscript to *Being and Time*”, *Nature, History, and Existentialism*, trans. Arnold Levison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966)

<sup>32</sup> Gordon, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger*, 192

<sup>33</sup> See Rosenzweig’s “Glauben und Wissen”, based on lecture notes on the subject in 1926 in *Zweistromland: Kleine Schriften zur Religion und Philosophie*, ed. R. and A. Mayer (Dortrecht, 1985), 581-95. The coinage “absolute empiricism” – one of the few slogans or “Isms” that Rosenzweig allows himself – appears at the end of “The New Thinking.” See, Rosenzweig, *New Thinking*, 101.

precisely for its scientific character, that “theologians” do philosophy. But theologians in a different sense, of course. For...the theologian whom philosophy requires for the sake of its scientific character is himself a theologian who requires philosophy – for the sake of his integrity. What was a demand in the interests of objectivity for philosophy will turn out to be a demand in the interests of subjectivity for theology. They complete each other, and together they bring about a new type of philosopher or theologian, situated between theology and philosophy.<sup>34</sup>

If theology and philosophy belong together, then one of Rosenzweig’s boldest efforts is to locate the miracle *temporally*: removing it from the jurisdiction of sovereign execution and returning it to existential experience; that is, to all that cannot be known independently of time. In this, the miracle becomes something more and wholly other than the arbitrary or un-concrete. It not only means replacing the linearizing flows of historical progress with the facticities of the present. It also abridges the broad spans that separate the present from a defeated past and a deferred future; that is, from those extreme distances that allow time to stretch and distend into the paradoxical clarities of myth. Against this, only in the radical syncopation of past, present and future can the unexpected and as-yet-unknown be realised, or what is known reformed and rendered anew. Far from stepping outside or beyond time – either in the guise of a speculative abstraction or its supposed opposite, ‘irrationality’ – Rosenzweig’s miracle appears in the midst of the intricate, unclosed net of time: sticking with the tensions, the incongruent *tensings*, of the world, and to “the fact that here not everything is *assemblable*.”<sup>35</sup> Finally, this is a conception of the miracle freed from a theology (and idolatory) of exception and announced to the actuality – which is the real *historicity* – of history.

## 4

It is not possible to explicate – or even gloss – the key themes that make up Rosenzweig’s monumental *Star of Redemption*. My more limited aim is to consider the miracle as the disclosure of particular Judaic, and negative, model of time. In the manner of

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<sup>34</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star*, 116.

<sup>35</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, “Forward”, *System and Revelation*, 19

Žižek's *refuseniks*, we might see it as a kind of unwilled, un-commanded or even *pre-juridical* miracle: <sup>36</sup> as 'un-exceptional' present by which we are somehow summoned, and to which we must somehow respond *eventfully*; that is, respond "at the right point of time."<sup>37</sup> If this sort of miracle can make no claim to an assignable cause, if its singularity can never contract to a warranty, it also need not disqualify or eclipse its phenomenal reality. It is not enchantment or demonology; its meaning resides not in any wonderous inexplicability nor in its divergence from the observable patterns of natural law. On the contrary. Rosenzweig's Judaic miracle might be a frail and faltering potential, but it is also liberated from the powers of rationalist explanation as from the feints of magical thinking. Indeed, uncoupled from the temporal traps of historicism, it consists precisely in the "taking of time seriously."<sup>38</sup> Even the *Book of Exodus*, Rosenzweig reminds us in his notes on the medieval Spanish poet, Judah-ha-Levi, "explains the miracle of [the parting] of the Red Sea *post eventum* as something 'natural'":

Every miracle can be explained – after the event. Not because the miracle is no miracle, but because explanation is explanation... *In fact nothing is miraculous about the miracle except that it comes when it does.* The east wind had probably swept bare the ford in the Red Sea hundreds of times, and will do so again hundreds of times. But that it did this at a moment when the people in their distress set foot in the sea – that is the miracle. *What only a moment before was coveted future, becomes present and actual.* <sup>39</sup> (emphases added)

Here we are very far from relations of time as they signify indifferently – we may say, *intemporally* – in a system sanctioned by a divine, other-wordly, or politically sovereign source. For Rosenzweig's miracle "[does] not have to be proven like a universal proposition" or attest to the durability, and ultimate defensiveness, of the "once and for all."<sup>40</sup> As a present event, it comes about only with an inversion of such temporal accomplishments. Holding

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<sup>36</sup> On the idea of a "pre-creedal, pre-juridical experience of faith", specifically as it links to Agamben's reading of St. Paul see, Simon Critchley, "You Are Not On Your Own: On the Nature of Faith", *Paul and the Philosophers*, 226-228.

<sup>37</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star*, 83

<sup>38</sup> Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking", *Franz Rosenzweig's The New Thinking*, 87

<sup>39</sup> Rosenzweig, "On Miracles: A Note on a Poem by Judah-ha-Levi", *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, ed. Nahum N. Glazer (New York: Schocken Books, 1953), 289-290

<sup>40</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star*, 174

open the space of that inversion, paying attention to its “ever renewed presentness”<sup>41</sup> is what it means to hold true to “star of redemption.” The labour of doing so is already a mode of miracle, an enactment – of faith, of fidelity – that is the immanent *other* or *extra* of lawful, sovereign time. Indeed, even if nothing happens or ‘comes to pass’ – achieved in weakness, realised without power, the miracle appears only along with the danger of disappearing unrecognised, unnoticed, overlooked – the imperative is to arrive, and to constantly re-arrive, at this presently indeterminate point. “We are instructed to do the negative”, as Franz Kafka puts it in his own assumption of this task. “The positive is already within us.”<sup>42</sup>

## 5

In Part 3, Book 1 of *The Star of Redemption* – the only section that deals exclusively with Judaism – Rosenzweig focuses explicitly on the relation between a historical and liturgical community to argue the ways that *Judensein* (Jewish-being) transpires in just such an alternative (negative, non-sovereign) temporality. *Judensein* he writes,

purchases its eternity at the price of temporal life. For it, time is not its time, not a field it cultivates and a share in its inheritance. For it, the moment is solidified and remains fixed between an augmentable past and motionless future, so the moment ceases to fly away... Past and future become two interchangeable measures; and in so becoming they cease to be past and future and, thus solidified, become likewise an unchangeable present... Since the teaching of the Holy Law – for the appellation of Torah comprises the two in one, teaching and law in one – therefore lifts the people out of all temporality and historical relevance of life, it also removes its power over time. *The Jewish people does not calculate the years of its chronology. Neither the memory of its history nor the official times of its lawgivers can become its measure of time; for historical memory is affixed point in the past that becomes more past every year by one year, but a memory always equally near, really not at all past, but eternally present.* <sup>43</sup> (emphasis added)

To the forgettings and forgings ahead of chronology, Rosenzweig poses an eternal time. Such an eternity, however, leaves no place for anything resembling a calculus: of the past as something that has been and the future conceived as an indefinite extension, a discrete

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<sup>41</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star.*, 121

<sup>42</sup> Kafka, *The Aphorisms*, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir and Michael Hoffmann (New York: Schocken Books, 2015), 27.

<sup>43</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star*, 322-323

‘once’ ferried across into a sequence of repetitive, reproductive, ‘once mores.’ The eternal, in contrast, pours into time. It saturates the present, it “fills the moment.”<sup>44</sup> In it is compacted an always undone, unfinished past – a past able to momentarily emerge from absence and demand justice – and a future capable of being hastened or expected at any time. Perhaps right now? Perhaps “in the next moment”?<sup>45</sup> Perhaps “as early as today?”<sup>46</sup> Thus the eternal of Judaism radically abbreviates time – not in order to reduce or positively measure it, but to make its excesses tangible, material, graspable. In this, the eternal also fundamentally differs from the “bad infinity” condemned by Hegel but which, for Rosenzweig, the dull wastes of a Hegelian history still commend: “a past drawn out to an infinite length, a past projected forward;” precisely, not an eternity “but something that interminably crawls along the long strategic roadway of time.”<sup>47</sup>

Against this, Rosenzweig’s eternal pivots on the experience of its own insufficiency. We can see it as the experience of a lack, or of a desire, that simultaneously points up what is lacking, what is ‘wanting’. In its folds, lodge the splinters, the sparks, of unanswered pasts that in the sphere of the actual still await redemption, and a future able to name itself as that instant. Neither passage nor mere persistence, the eternal thus wagers a reversibility at the heart of time. Or rather, it speaks of an immanent redemption “valid at all times” and is therefore “without time.”<sup>48</sup> Like the weakness of the un-commanded miracle, it summons us to “[turn] things into something other than they are”,<sup>49</sup> calling us to take the resolute, or the apparently resolved, as something yielding, wavering, unguarded. And, conversely, it brings the inconclusive near-to-hand, placing the impossible within the reach of possible action. What the sovereignty of knowledge and historical time had mandated, Rosenzweig’s miracle can now modify:

[W]hat was mute becomes audible, the secret manifest, what was closed opens up, that which as thought had been complete inverts ... as new beginning.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 322

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 306.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 244

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 323

<sup>49</sup> Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking,” *Franz Rosenzweig’s New Thinking*, 77

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 119. As in many other things, Rosenzweig’s understanding of Judaic time parallels Agamben’s advocacy of Paul as he reads it through Walter Benjamin’s messianism. “Here, the past (the complete) rediscovers actuality and becomes unfulfilled, and the present (the incomplete) acquires a kind of fulfilment.” See, Agamben, *The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 75. One of



Thus, the miracle, whatever else it is, is novel, inaugural. Eternally making time happen, it marks the entrance of a re-beginning, the occurrence of a (non-juridical) just event, or the incitement to its ever-renewed efforts. With this argument, Rosenzweig not only rejects the terms of historical necessity, enriching the present with what might newly be brought into the world – but alarmingly, unpreparedly, inconclusively so.<sup>51</sup> He also introduces time as a term in the disclosures of ethical life.<sup>52</sup> As he writes in “The New Thinking”:

To need time means: not to be able to presuppose anything, to have to wait for everything, to be dependent on the other for what is ours”.<sup>53</sup>

When a beginning is no longer predicative and there is no end or abstraction to assess it, time ceases to be speculative and arises only as a present contingency. And to be present and contingent is to be weak: vulnerable to the risk of relations, receptive and readied for the anxieties of *being-in-relation*. This is why some of Rosenzweig’s most remarkable suggestions about the miracle turn on the experience of language; or what following the (converted) Christian theologian and social historian, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, he calls “speech-thinking” (*Sprachdenken*) as it enacts the relational conditions of time itself. “[T]he word”, as Rosenzweig reminds us,

is only a beginning until it reaches the ear that re-ceives it and the mouth that responds to it.<sup>54</sup>

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Benjamin’s own versions of this runs as follows: “[Remembrance] can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something incomplete. That is theology...” In Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass. And London: The Belknap Press of Harvard university Press, 1999), 471

<sup>51</sup> As initiative, Rosenzweig’s present time corresponds in interesting ways with Hannah Arendt’s theme of natality or ‘birth-as-action’ which she posits as a uniquely human and political faculty. See, Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 175-181.

<sup>52</sup> While it is difficult to see Rosenzweig as an ethical theorist or a theorist of alterity, in the manner of a later Emmanuel Levinas, the structuring of relationality *as* temporality suggests this possibility. On the clear distinctions between Rosenzweig and Levinas whose *Totality and Infinity* (1961) acknowledges its debt to *The Star* see, Gordon, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger*, 200-201. For full-length studies of the affinities between the Rosenzweig and Levinas in relation to their contributions to modern Judaism and philosophy see, Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992) and Richard A. Cohen, *Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994).

<sup>53</sup> Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking”, *Franz Rosenzweig’s New Thinking*, 87

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. Like other themes in his ‘new thinking’, Rosenzweig’s developed his distinctive approach to grammar/language in conversation with Rosenstock-Huessy, who first coined the term “speech-thinking.” See, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig, *Judaism Despite Christianity: The*

Like the structures of faith and hope, in other words, that which we speak and hear is nothing other than an undertaking of the discontinuities of time: the enunciation of a present instant turned consciously towards an externality, a stranger, a neighbour; an exchange between subjects bound to the temporality of its transmission. Indeed, unlike what Rosenzweig describes as the “mute essence”<sup>55</sup> of conceptual – that is, timeless and therefore incommunicative – thought, what is miraculous about a word, a name, a call, an address is that it does not posit or command anything. It cannot presume knowledge or furnish an explanation. Instead, the word lives only as a *sign*, a *symbol*; it is a semiotic form whose meaning is produced only in the event or surprise of its being recognised.<sup>56</sup> And misunderstanding, disappointment, delusion, is the sign’s necessary component. Failure is always a threat and the content of what is said does not yet imply evidence in a corresponding reality. In this sense, the ‘miracle’ of human speech or human dialogue is no less miraculous – both *momentary* and *momentous* – than the word received from a divine source. Both set in motion an orientation other than a (sovereign) predicate, a signifying order, a *juris-diction*. Both constellate an ethical relation in which neither side – speaker and respondent, mouth and ear, an ‘I’ that seeks a ‘you’ – rests on the stability of self-enclosure. And both transpire only “in the non-permanent, in the moment.”<sup>57</sup> Thus, language takes on the character of an authentic miracle insofar as within it insufficiency, agitation, incompleteness do not so much disappear as change their significance. They invite the experience of an *eventful* encounter: a mutual exposure beyond the self, a revealing or revelation for whomever utters or receives it.

“Through words come *remnants* of light,” Kafka writes.<sup>58</sup> Weakened and muddled though it is, what is illuminated in Rosenzweig’s miracle – and in the muted light of our enunciations – is nothing but this sudden relational risk. The way in which a subject speaks or fails to speak, hears or fails to hear, is thus more than a matter of linguistic communication. In taking time, in *making* time, it also ties language to its present in-determinations, or to

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*Wartime Correspondence Between Eugen Rosenstock-Huussy and Franz Rosenzweig* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). See also, Wayne Cristaudo, *Religion, Redemption and Revolution: The New Speech Thinking Revolution of Franz Rozenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huussy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

<sup>55</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star*, 174

<sup>56</sup> For an extended discussion of the miracle as “sign-event” or “event of meaning” see, Santner, “Miracles Happen”, 83-86. On Rosenzweig’s conception of speech in relation to the cognate categories of the written word and silence, see Nahum N. Glazer, “The Concept of Language in the Thought of Franz Rosenzweig”, *The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*, 172-184.

<sup>57</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star*, 176

<sup>58</sup> Kafka cited in Hent de Vries, “Inverse Versus Dialectical Theology,” *Paul and the Philosophers*, 502

what it means to be *in-determined* by the presence of others.

And perhaps, this is what happens in religious experience. For if, as miracle, language and speech is inseparable from relations of time, then prayer and liturgy can be taken as the ultimate deepening of that profane imperfection. For Rosenzweig, this is sound out every time the successions of secularised history are disrupted by the rhythms of Judaic ritual life. Here, in the daily-weekly-yearly cycles of prayer as in the periodic return of a commemoration, ceremony or observance, time saturates the everyday, is fixed within it, and so the “moment ceases to fly away.”<sup>59</sup> Here, too, a memory reactivated, re-begun in the moment, makes the past contemporary, “really not at all past”<sup>60</sup> and, if we respond, hurries the future “into the very nearest thing, into the today.”<sup>61</sup> Thus, for example, when the Hebrew Bible tells the story of Exodus, as when the ritual of Passover requires that we annually retell it – “every individual is supposed to regard the Exodus out of Egypt as if he himself has also gone out”<sup>62</sup> – at issue is neither the precedent of origin nor its temporal commitment to repetition, reiteration, preservation. It is an unplugging of the past as it lays a critical claim on the present – a beginning reactivated as “ever new ‘in the moment’”<sup>63</sup> – and the “not yet” (*noch nicht*) of a future which is always already here. Likewise, even those theological-political verdicts usually set into the end of times, the Jewish Day of Atonement and the Day of Judgement are handed over to the inversions of the event. Here, where “no waiting counts, no hiding behind history”<sup>64</sup> there is neither prophetic salvation nor damnation. There is only the intensifying of an ordinary, incalculable, accounting. Here, where what “yearly returns [is only] this the ‘latest’ judgement”,<sup>65</sup> what arises is neither time redeemed nor time revoked. There is only the unfulfillable facticity of time spent, time lived. If these are moments of the most profound attestation, they are testimonies to unending, ever-renewed, incompletions. As Kafka puts it in his own practice of this Judaic point:

Only our concept of Time makes it possible for us to speak of the Day of Judgment by that name; in reality it is a summary court in perpetual session. <sup>66</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star.*, 322

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 323

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 307

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 323

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 173

<sup>64</sup> Rosenzweig, *The Star.*, 344

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Kafka, *The Zürau Aphorisms*, ed. Roberto Calasso, trans. Michael Hofmann (New York: Schocken Books, 2006)

To be sure, in all religious experience the practices of ritual and liturgy oppose the flow of the historical, inserting enclaves of eternity into the line of additive time. Judaism has no monopoly in this. To some extent, as Stéphane Mosès reminds us, the civil calendars of the secular world also include privileged moments – holidays, memorialisations, celebrations – whose function is to “tell the same story, repeat the same scenario”<sup>67</sup> in ways that simultaneously contract and accelerate time or, at least, put a brake on its mere passing. Rosenzweig’s originality does not lie here. More crucial, for my purposes, is a certain shrouded or ‘inverted theology’<sup>68</sup> in which time is returned to indeterminacy; or we may say, in which the singular instant comes to suspend sovereignty and it is the event of the miracle that comes to sit in judgement of history. From this perspective, what progressivism negates becomes the unlikely site of possibility in the present: the useless and inoperative turn into the counterpoints of power, ‘eternity’ vouches for that which is urgent or emergent, and hope breaks through precisely where the temporal governance of history is interrupted. “What for dialectical [non-inverted] theology is light and shadow is reversed,”<sup>69</sup> as Theodor Adorno writes of the Jewish messianism of Kafka. Henceforth, faith gives over to the disjointedness of time and “the moribund becomes harbinger of Sabbath rest.”<sup>70</sup> Once again, the question is not any Schmittian (or sabbatical) exceptionality of the present. It is a matter of living the break of the event emphatically: directing ourselves to the intensities that Rosenzweig calls “the demands of the day” and taking away from this immediate encounter a way of thinking and doing otherwise. Present impossibility, in short, is the very ordeal in which the miracle is located; it is not a barrier to its realisation or the last word. If no historical or empirical situation can promise an imminent redemption, none excludes the dare that now, *this time*, something else, something other – unwilled, unbidden – might happen.

## 6

Where do these reflections leave us? What does it mean to abandon all positive

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<sup>67</sup> Stéphane Mosès, *The Angel of History: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem*, trans. Barbara Harshav (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009), 58

<sup>68</sup> First used by Adorno in a 1937 letter to Benjamin with reference to Kafka, the term “inverse theology” is later elaborated in Adorno’s “Notes on Kafka,” *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), 245-271. There it refers to Kafka’s collapsing of the qualitative distinctions between the theological and the profane, and the related dualisms they impose. “In Kafka... ambiguity and obscurity are attributed not exclusively to the Other as such but to human beings, and to the conditions in which they live” (p. 259). My reading of Rosenzweig’s temporal model echoes something of this inversion.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 269

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.

predications, to give up strong assertions and admit only the (minimal but maybe miraculous) presentness of time? A tentative, and paradoxical, answer might be that only a theology conceived in a mode of negativity – finite, contingent, out-of-joint – leads us back to a form of life able to think of hope, of redemption. And that the temporality of the miracle takes us back to the necessary fragmentariness of this experience. Similarly paradoxical, another answer might be that such a miracle shows us that it is secularity, and not theology, by which we are ensnared: that chronology itself is what magically captivates and transcends, transfixing us in the brightness of its sovereignties. In this, Rosenzweig’s miracle not only works against our compliance in existing organisations and the emptied repetitions of individual and social life. It also offers a way out of the (Schmittian) state’s extraordinary powers and asks that we suspend sovereignty’s own suspensions. It allows us to see, in Eric Santner words, the reversal at the heart of the matter: “that it is really secular thought that is most deeply invested in fantasies of exception, in other words, of being “excepted” [that is, ‘saved’] from the lot ... of finite human existence.”<sup>71</sup> Indeed, insofar as it is geared to terrestrial time we may see the Judaic miracle as a divine event announced for the sake of secularity; for the surprise of its unguarded, ‘un-commanded’ openings, languages, inaugurations, incompletions. And we might add, on the side of a suddenly eternal – that is, both a timely and untimely – justice.<sup>72</sup> In a world in which all odds are against it, the miracle makes it possible to breach a *chronic* (even reasoned, reasonable) despair over what is broken, dispirited, defeated. One can have no faith, be beyond hope, and yet, if the moment arises, recognise and respond to a rent in the unjust continuum of secular time.

Zižek’s example of the *refuseniks* is *this* anachrony, *this* rent. In the instant of their “No!” – this miraculous refusal or in-completing of time – we might find occasional hints, echoes, moments anticipatory of another politics. It is a “No!” that contains the murmur of a little ‘yes’: not as an affirmation that enshrines or transcends all that had been said but which generates the very indeterminacy it would seem to decide. It is also a “No!” – and a ‘yes?’ – that asserts nothing, fulfils nothing, but still lives for what might be gleamed in the obscurities of the present. In this, what I have proposed as a ‘negative temporality’ not only graces time with an alternative perception – call it a miracle – but returns us to the communicative core of all ethics:

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<sup>71</sup> Santner, “Miracles Happen”, 133.

<sup>72</sup> For a related exploration of justice as a ‘disjuncture’ of time see Derrida, *Spectres of Marx*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994)

[T]he power to refuse cannot come from us, nor in our name alone, but from a very poor beginning that belongs first to those who cannot speak.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Maurice Blanchot, *Friendship*, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), 112