Tax compliance after an audit: higher or lower?

Kasper, M. and Rablen, M. orcid.org/0000-0002-3521-096X (2023) Tax compliance after an audit: higher or lower? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 207. pp. 157-171. ISSN 0167-2681

Abstract

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Authors/Creators:
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
Keywords: Tax audits; probability misperception; learning; endogenous audit rules; censoring; uncertain audit probability; tax evasion game
Dates:
  • Accepted: 15 January 2022
  • Published (online): 25 January 2023
  • Published: March 2023
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield)
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 10 Oct 2022 15:15
Last Modified: 26 Jan 2023 12:46
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.01.013

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