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One Nation Under A Groove?
Understanding National Identity

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Abstract

There is a lot of evidence that identity matters for behavior. There is a widespread belief that societies will function better if they manage to establish a common sense of identity among the population and contemporary fears in many countries that this common identity is threatened. This paper presents a simple framework for the determinants of identity and uses it to inform an empirical investigation of the correlates of national identity in Britain. Our main conclusions are that people who feel they are treated with respect and who feel tolerated are the most likely to identify with feeling part of Britain.

Introduction

There is considerable evidence that 'identity matters', that many individuals think of themselves as part of a social group and that this membership has consequences for individual behavior, for behavior towards others with the same identity and towards those who do not or are perceived not to share that identity. How societies function is then likely to be affected by the number and type of social groups within it so the nature of identity becomes a matter of public concern. Because there is very considerable evidence that people behave more pro-socially towards those they perceive as being of the same identity (starting perhaps with Tajfel, 1970) it is a common belief that countries should seek to create a sense of common identity among its citizens, what we might call 'nation-building'[1]. This need is most acute in societies whose populations come from a diverse collection of cultures[2]. In many countries, there are those who argue that there has been a serious failure in 'nation-building'. In the United States, Huntington (2004) expressed concern that Mexican immigrants are failing to adopt an American identity and the values that traditionally go with that. In Britain – the focus of this study – a certain smug satisfaction that it had been relatively successful in building a multicultural society has turned to dismay as some young Britons turn suicide bombers. The result has been an active debate about 'Britishness'[3].

But, although there is a widespread belief that it is desirable to have a common sense of identity, there is much less agreement about how this is best achieved. The 'multicultural' approach suggests that minorities are more likely to feel part of a society if allowed or even encouraged to retain their traditional cultures. However, others (e.g. Sen, 2006) have argued that such a policy only preserves differences and leads to fragmentation and a failure to build a sense of common identity. But, in spite of the fact that many commentators have very strong views on the subject, we have remarkably little large-scale quantitative evidence on the factors associated with feeling a part of society. To present some evidence that sheds light on these questions is the purpose of this paper.

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[1] For example, Kymlicka (2002, p267) suggests "the common national identity provides a source of trust and solidarity that can accommodate deep disagreements over conceptions of the good life".

[2] According to Putnam (2007, p137) "one of the most important challenges facing modern societies…. is the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced societies". He also argues that a retreat to cultural homogeneity is not an option.

[3] To give but one example, see ex-Prime Minister Gordon Brown's speech to the Fabian Society on the future of Britishness http://www.fabians.org.uk/events/speeches/the-future-of-britishness.

Our particular application in this paper is to Britain, though we believe the insights are of wider applicability. Britain is a good country in which to investigate questions of identity because it contains a wide mix of ethnicities and cultures and because it has very good data on these topics, a product of the fact that the government has become very concerned about alleged failures in nation-building. We use data from Britain's 2007 Citizenship Survey to investigate the relationship between various measures of identity and other variables that have been thought related to these outcomes like ethnicity, religion, measures of integration, perceptions of fairness etc.

It should be admitted from the outset that we do not have a clean research design with exogenous variation in the variables we include on the right-hand side of our regressions so that what we are estimating are correlations and not necessarily causal effects. We will try to avoid interpreting our findings using language that smacks of causal effects though we may not always succeed in this to every readers' satisfaction. Nevertheless we think our exercise is worthwhile. Knowing what correlations are in the data does restrict the set of possible models to those that can explain that correlation. And it is important to remember that this is an area where many have very strongly-held views but there is little in the way of quantitative evidence of the sort we present. In such a vacuum we believe that correlations can be of interest.

The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we try to explain why a common sense of national identity has been regarded as important for the well-being of a society. We then use the theoretical work on identity to develop hypotheses about the factors that might be associated with identity. The second section describes our data and the third section considers the associations between identity and the factors identified as likely to be important. Our main conclusions are that people who feel well treated are more likely to feel they belong to or identify with the wider society. We also find little evidence that religious or ethnic minorities are either less likely to feel they belong or that they see an irresolvable conflict between their religion and identifying with Britain though many do experience some conflict at times. However the white British are more concerned about such conflict. The fourth section concludes.

1.   <u>Identity</u>

Who Cares?

There is now a considerable body of evidence from many parts of the social sciences that identity matters for behavior. This is partly because the 'rules' for membership of a group generally require certain behavior from individuals, often to mark the individual as a member of the group. Some of these prescribed behaviors may be regarded by others as undesirable even if the consequences fall wholly or largely on the individual (see, for example, Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005, on 'acting white' or Constant and Zimmermann, 2008, 2009, Casey and Dustmann, 2010, Nekby and Rodin, 2010, Battu and Zenou, 2010, for links between identity and economic outcomes).

But, identity also matters because it affects behavior towards others. A general feature of groups (and one that is arguably essential for them to be stable) is that one behaves in a more pro-social way towards other members of the same group and less pro-socially to outsiders (in some cases, it may be that a group actively causes harm to outsiders) - see Hogg and Vaughan (2005) for an accessible introduction to this literature or Bernhard et al. (2006), Goette at al. (2006), and Charness et al. (2007) for recent examples from the economics literature. Essentially one puts a greater weight on the welfare of someone who is part of one's group than one does on the welfare of an outsider.

From this perspective, it is easy to understand why it is widely believed that it is desirable for those in a country to have a common sense of national identity. To give an example, suppose a society consists of two groups who do not care about each other – a majority and a minority who differ in their preferences in some way. If decisions are made by majority vote, there is a danger that the majority will enact policies that are very disadvantageous to the minority – John Stuart Mills' 'tyranny of the majority'. In turn, the minority may then, realizing the impossibility of achieving more desirable outcomes peacefully through the ballot box, resort to violence or the threat of it in an attempt to get the majority to take its grievances seriously.

If, by creating a common sense of national identity, both groups think of the other as part of a wider in-group, then the effective distance in preferences will be reduced and less extreme outcomes will be produced. Although the minority does not have political

power, the majority will, in part, internalize the welfare of the minority, so that the policies enacted will be less harmful to the minority. And, because the minority now internalize, in part, the welfare of the majority they will be less likely to threaten harm to obtain a more desirable outcome.

We do have evidence of costs from diversity that is usefully surveyed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). They review evidence like that presented by Easterly and Levine (1997) that ethnic fragmentation leads to lower growth in Africa and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) that public good provision is lower in US cities with higher levels of ethnic diversity. Miguel (2004) argues, in a comparison between Kenya and Tanzania, that nation-building does help foster cohesive societies. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, p794) conclude that there is "overwhelming evidence" that public good provision is lower in fragmented societies". We do have some studies providing evidence against this i.e. that diversity raises productivity (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006) and encourages innovation (Ozgen, Nijkamp and Poot, 2011a, b) though also studies that ethnic conflict can raise job separations (Miaari, Zussman and Zussman, 2012)

Fostering a common sense of national identity is designed to reduce such fragmentation – political philosophers sometimes express this nicely as trying to align the boundaries of ethical communities with those of political communities[4]. But, even once one has accepted the desirability of 'nation-building', one has to try to understand what factors are likely to be associated with a common sense of identity. For that, one needs a theory of why people choose the identities they do.

Hypotheses

Theories of 'identity' are very much in their infancy and we make no pretence here to do more than sketch factors that might be thought to be important. We structure our discussion around the framework proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) but similar ideas are contained in, inter alia, Bernheim (1994), Akerlof (1997), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) or Shayo (2009).

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[4] Though the empirical evidence supporting this view is not all strong e.g. Masella (2012) finds no evidence of lower levels of national identity in fragmented societies.

In Akerlof and Kranton (2000) individuals are assumed to have a utility function that is in part conventional and in part depends on the strength or weakness of their identity which is assumed to have a positive effect on utility. The conventional part of the utility function depends on the individual's actions and the actions of others – for our purposes, we can ignore these latter factors. Assume that individuals have to make a decision, x_i – this could be multi-dimensional but to convey the basic ideas we will write as if it is one-dimensional. There is a value of x_i, $\tilde{x}_i$ which is the optimal value for individual i according to the conventional part of their utility function – this will be affected by the individual's tastes which themselves might be influenced by, for example, the culture of their parents. We assume there is a quadratic loss function $-\frac{1}{2}c_i\left(x_i - \tilde{x}_i\right)^2$ for deviations of actual behavior from the individual optimum. The parameter c_i can be thought of as a measure of how flexible an individual is or how strongly they adhere to their original values.

Now consider the 'identity' part of the utility function. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) assume this depends on own and others' actions and how closely one's actions conform to those prescribed by members of the group. We compress this by assuming that others' actions towards the individual depend on the extent of deviation between x_i and the group's optimal desired behavior, x_g^*. We assume the group offers identity level B_g if one conforms fully and reduces benefits as behavior deviates from this according to a quadratic loss function with parameter b_g. The parameter b_g can be thought of as a measure of how tolerant or inclusive a group is. So the identity part of the utility function can be written as $B_g - \frac{1}{2}b_g\left(x_i - x_g^*\right)^2$

Putting this together, the overall utility for individual i if they and take action x_i can be written as:

$$U_i\left(x_i, g\right) = -\frac{1}{2}c_i\left(x_i - \tilde{x}_i\right)^2 + B_g - \frac{1}{2}b_g\left(x_i - x_g^*\right)^2 \tag{1}$$

Individuals are assumed to choose the action x_i to maximize this utility function which leads to the following decision rule:

$$x_i = \frac{c_i \tilde{x}_i + b_g x_g^*}{c_i + b_g} \tag{2}$$

so that the optimal action is a weighted average of the individual and group optima with the weight on the individual optimum being larger the less flexible is the individual and the more tolerant is the group. The value of the identity component of the utility function at the optimal choice is given by:

$$I_i = B_g - \frac{1}{2} \frac{c_i^2 b_g}{\left(c_i + b_g\right)^2} \left(\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*\right)^2 \tag{3}$$

We will interpret this as a measure of the individual's strength of identification with group g. This will be a subjective feeling of the individual – it may not correspond with whether they are seen by others as a member of the group (and some of our results below do suggest differences in opinion). The level of identification will be lower the larger the gap between individual and group optima $\left|\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*\right|$ and the less flexible is the individual i.e. a higher c_i. The larger the group benefits B_g the stronger is the identification to the group. The effect of the toleration parameter b_g is more subtle. For a given action a more tolerant group will create a greater sense of identification. But the action will respond to more toleration by moving towards the individual optimum and this reduces the level of identification. With the functional forms used here, the level of identification first decreases and then increases in the level of b_g before eventually becoming flat as the group heads towards total intolerance.

In this set-up the level of an individual's identification with a group depends partly on their individual characteristics – here $\left(c_i, \tilde{x}_i\right)$ - but also on how they perceive they will be treated by the other members of that group – here captured by the parameters $\left(B_g, b_g, x_i^*\right)$. Although this is a model that assumes an individual can do something to influence their level of identification with a group, it is capable of capturing the idea that it may be impossible for some individuals to identify with some groups. For example if having a white skin is regarded as a requirement for having a particular identity by those who are white, this identity is effectively unavailable to ethnic minorities – in this case one might think of skin colour as the x, that whites do not tolerate any deviations from

'whiteness' i.e. b_g is very high and that the costs of making one's skin white for a non-white individual are also very high i.e. c_i is very high. In this case one can think of the extent of identification of non-whites with the white group as being very low.

Although this is a very simple set-up, we think it can provide insights into debates about individuals' identity. To give one example, consider Muslims. One view of Islam (e.g. that proposed by Huntington, 2002) – though not one, it will turn out, that is particularly supported by the empirical evidence we present below - is that it has norms about behavior that are very different from those prevalent among the populations of liberal democracies (i.e. $\left| \tilde{x}_i - x_g^* \right|$ is high), and of being intolerant of deviations from these norms so that b_g is high. In this case, Muslims in liberal democracies are likely to have a low level of national identity.

The simplicity of the set-up is appealing but does raise some questions that the original formulation in Akerlof and Kranton (2000) did not really answer. First, it is unclear about where the norms of behavior come from and who determines them. In reality the groups in society are not – as they are modeled - clubs (Buchanan, 1965) with a clearly defined membership, rules ones has to obey if one is a member, club benefits if one obeys the rules and sanctions if one does not. In reality membership is not clearly defined and 'members' will have different views about what is appropriate behavior to be a member of the group. The identity component of the utility function described above should really be thought of as an expected utility derived from the interactions with others who may clearly or ambiguously be members of the group. It is possible that this fuzziness in membership and norms is so great that the whole notion of identity is unhelpful and it would be better to think of people as simply taking actions which then influence how others behave towards them and this then determines utility. But the literature on 'identity' is predicated on it being a useful concept and individuals do seem to be able to think of themselves in that way (for example, they answer identity questions in surveys).

Because of the fuzziness there is likely to be differences in opinion about appropriate norms and behaviors and who belongs to which group. If these differences of opinion are aired in public, these norms are likely to change over time. That process of

change is a fascinating one but beyond the scope of the present paper. Bisin and Verdier (2000), Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004) and Tabellini (2008) seek to explain the norms by presenting models in which the preferences of individuals are moulded by their parents, while the norms of group behavior are likely to be influenced by those who are members of the group (see Patacchini and Zenou, 2009, for an example of this approach).

The discussion so far has assumed there is a single group to which individuals can be attached strongly or weakly. But, as Berry (1997) and Sen (2006) have emphasized, there are many groups in societies and individuals typically have varying degrees of identification with many of them. If the groups have the same norms, there is no conflict in identifying equally strongly with different groups but if there are different norms then there is a trade-off – an individual has to decide with which of the groups to identify most strongly.

This section has presented a simple model for the determination of the strength of identification of an individual with a group. We now turn to our application to the strength of identification with Britain.

2.   Data

Our empirical application is to Britain (actually, only England and Wales). However, we feel that the questions about identity are not unique to Britain so that our results are likely to be of more general applicability. Britain is an interesting country to study because it now has a population which is very diverse in both ethnicity and religion and events like the 2005 London bombings have shocked many people into thinking that there is a crisis in nation-building. Britain also has the advantage that, as a result of these concerns, it collects good data on identity and related issues. The data we use in this paper comes from England and Wales' 2007 Citizenship Survey (CS) administered by the Department for Communities and Local Government[5]. This survey has been conducted (though under varying names) every two years since 2001. The sample is approximately 10,000 adults in England and Wales with an additional boost sample of 5,000 adults from minority ethnic groups which allows a large enough sample from those groups for

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[5] See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith/research/citizenshipsurvey/ for more details.

statistical analysis. The survey asks questions about a wide range of issues, including race equality, faith, feelings about their community, identity, and various measures of social capital. The richness of this data set allows us to investigate the correlates of identity much more extensively than previous research. For example, Manning and Roy (2010) use the UK Labour Force Survey to investigate the correlates of national identity but that survey only contains demographics like age, education and gender as well as immigrant status, ethnicity and religion. This paper investigates broader forms of identity than national identity and has a much richer menu of variables to include in the regressions.

Historical Background

It might be useful to give a brief background on British policy towards the assimilation and/or integration of immigrants. Large-scale immigration into the UK started in the 1950s and by the 1960s there was an active discussion about the appropriate policy response. What emerged as the dominant idea is well-summarized by the following quotation from the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966: "I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a 'melting pot', which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone's misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman… I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance". This led to the early (by European standards) legislation against discrimination (the first law being the 1965 Race relations Act) and a generally sympathetic attitude to allowing cultural and religious exemptions to laws and practices e.g. allowing Sikh motorcyclists to wear turbans instead of helmets and Muslim policewomen to wear the hijab on duty. There was a belief that if natives were hospitable to immigrants, the minorities would, in return, come to feel part of the wider community – just one big happy family. The reality was often far from this rosy picture – there were riots in many British cities in the early 1980s and various organizations, notably the police, have been widely criticized for institutional racism. But more recently there has been a feeling that this strategy of multiculturalism has failed to create a common core of

values, primarily because it offered minorities more than it asked from them in return and that some communities chose not to integrate into the wider society. Events like the London bombings of 2005 have shocked people into thinking something has gone badly wrong. For example, the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (the government body charged with fighting discrimination) argued in a TV interview that multiculturalism was leading to segregation, saying that "too many public authorities particularly [are] taking diversity to a point where they [are] saying, 'actually we're going to reward you for being different, we are going to give you a community centre only if you are Pakistani or African Caribbean and so on, but we're not going to encourage you to be part of the community of our town'. The reaction has included not just a wringing of hands but also substantive changes to policy – immigrants becoming citizens now have to pass a test on language, culture and history designed to mould their values into those deemed appropriate (though how effective are these tests has been questioned).

Sub-Samples

In most of the analysis we focus on 3 sub-samples though not all of the outcome variables are relevant for all of them. The first sub-sample is the UK-born who describe their ethnicity as 'white British'. This is obviously the largest group in the population as a whole but, because the CS over-samples ethnic minorities they are under-represented in our analysis sample. Although it might be taken for granted that all of this group feels British and they virtually all do report a British national identity, we shall see that a sizeable minority report they do not feel a part of Britain and understanding why is of considerable interest.

Our second sub-sample is non-white first-generation immigrants i.e. those born abroad. These are of obvious interest because they will have come from cultures that may be different from British norms and their integration into British society is seen as an important matter of public concern. Our third sub-sample is the non-white British born – for the most part these will be the children of the second sub-sample. They are of particular interest because of fears that they adhere more closely to the culture of the countries from which their parents originated than to British values (see, for example, Algan and Cahuc, 2010, Fernandez and Fogli, 2009, for evidence pertinent to this). For

the non-white ethnic groups we reduce the 13 categories in the original survey to 8 –

Mixed, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African, Chinese and

Other. This is because sample sizes are very small for some of the other groups.

This way of dividing the sample does exclude white immigrants and the white

UK-born who do not describe their ethnicity as 'white British'.   We exclude them

because they are a small part of the sample (under 5% - as there is no explicit boost

sample for them) and because they are a very heterogeneous group comprising, for

example, those of Irish origin (who we know from other work are very reluctant to adopt

a British identity – see Manning and Roy, 2010), recent Eastern European immigrants

and some Middle Eastern immigrants. Any inference about the outcomes for these

groups are unreliable so we think it best to say nothing about them. Table 1 presents the

proportions of the three sub-samples in our data and the weighted proportions (the

weights being intended to reproduce the UK population as a whole).

Table 1 also presents some basic demographics. The white natives are older, on

average than the immigrants who in turn are older than the UK-born minorities. The

gender mix is similar. In terms of education both of the non-white sub-samples are more

likely to have a degree but the immigrants are also more likely to have only foreign or no

qualifications (see table A.1 in the Appendix for details of the education coding). The

ethnic mix of the foreign- and UK-born minorities is also different – the UK-born have

more Black Caribbeans and more of mixed race (who are mostly a Black-White mix).

Recent immigrant groups like the Bangladeshis and Black Africans are under-represented

in the UK born. In terms of religion 80% of the white natives report being Christian with

17% reporting no religion and very small numbers other religions. The minority sub-

samples are more likely to have some religion but are also different in their type of

religion – there are as many Muslims as Christians.

Identity Variables

The CS asks a number of questions about national identity and sense of belonging. First,

there is a question "what do you consider your national identity to be?" Respondents can

report multiple national identities. Here we restrict attention to those who report a British

identity (which means at least one of British, English, Scottish or Welsh) – we denote this variable by BRITID[6]. Table 2 shows that almost all white natives report a British identity so it is not interesting to analyse answers to this question for this group. For non-white natives, the reported levels of British identity are lower but still very high at 95%, perhaps higher than many might expect. For non-white immigrants reported levels of British identity are lower – 58%. These findings are in line with those reported using Labour Force Survey data in Manning and Roy (2010). One problem with this outcome variable is that it may be interpreted in a very legalistic way so that one reports a British identity if one holds a British passport (Manning and Roy, 2010 show that, for immigrants, citizenship is very strongly though not perfectly associated with reporting a British identity).   In terms of the theoretical framework sketched above, many respondents may consider the criterion for having a British national identity to be 'I have a British passport'. For this reason we also analyse other questions asked in the CS that relate to more subjective feelings of identity and belonging.

First, there is a question "to what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?" - FEELBRIT. This is a 4-point scale with 0 representing 'strongly disagree' and 1 'strongly agree'. The distribution of responses and mean response for our sub-samples are reported in Table 2. As one can see there are similar levels of responses for all three sub-samples which might indicate that the UK has done a good job in making immigrants and their children feel a part of British society or that it has succeeded in alienating a non-trivial portion of the native white section. But, just because there are similar overall levels reported for the three sub-samples does not mean the factors associated with feeling part of society are the same and we shall see they are not.

There is also a question on 'How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?', - BELONGBRIT - a 4-point scale with 0 representing 'not at all strongly' and 1 'very

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[6] It is an interesting and important question to consider how the recent devolution of political power to Scotland and Wales affects sub-national identities in the UK. But this is not our main focus of interest here so we ignore it.

strongly'. Table 2 again shows similar levels of sense of belonging among the 3 sub-samples. This is correlated with FEELBRIT but the level of correlation is low.

Finally, it is interesting to compare this with the sense of belonging to the neighbourhood and the local area with responses to the question on 'How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?', - BELONGNEIGH –and 'How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area?'-BELONGLOC. If individuals' experience of a country is through their local community then we might expect belonging to a neighbourhood and a country to be strongly related. But it may be that the sense of belonging to a country comes through national information e.g. the media. Both local identity variables are coded on a 4-point scale with 0 representing 'not at all strongly' and 1 'very strongly'. Again, all 3 sub-samples show remarkably similar levels in these variables.

All of these variables relate to the individual's sense of their own identity. But it is equally, if not more important, to consider the perception of your identity by others. We may well think it a problem if whites do not think of non-whites as British even if the non-whites themselves do. The CS has a number of questions which help us to get at this. First there a is a question –DUALID -"How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity?"coded on a 4-point scale where 0 is "strongly disagree" and 1 is "strongly agree". Here we do see differences between the sub-samples, the non-whites are much less likely than the whites to see a potential conflict. There is a certain ambiguity in interpretation but it does not seem likely that the whites think there is a conflict between their religious and cultural identity and feeling British – rather they are almost certainly referring to the religious and cultural identities of 'others'. Here we can see some differences across sub-samples – whites are more likely than non-whites to perceive a possible conflict. There is also a question FECONF on 'whether the respondent ever feels a conflict between religion and national identity' – a five-point scale with 0 being never and 1 all the time. Non-whites report more personal conflict than whites though less than 10% of non-whites report experiencing a conflict most or all of the time.

Independent Variables

The identity variables will be the dependent variables in the regressions we estimate in this paper. On the right-hand side of the regressions we include the usual demographics - gender, age, education, and region. Age may have an effect either because attitudes change over a lifetime or because they change from generation to generation. Education may have an effect because it is has been argued to affect citizenship (see, for example, Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004). But we are particularly interested in variables that others in the literature or public debate have hypothesized to be important for national identity. The factors we consider are:

- ethnicity
- religion
- English language proficiency
- mixing
- discrimination
- economic situation

Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 3. In describing these variables in more detail we use the conceptual framework described earlier to explain why these variables might be expected to be correlated with identity. For most of these variables we use a composite index, the composition of which is described in a web Appendix.

Ethnicity

A central part of debates about national identity in Britain has been about whether ethnic minorities feel a part of Britain. There are a number of reasons why they might be less likely than whites to feel a part of Britain. First, it is very likely that non-whites are the children of immigrants so (following research like Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009) may have cultural values different from the white majority (though see Hatton and Leigh, 2011, for evidence that behavior of whole communities changes over time) – in terms of our model this would correspond to a high value of $\left| \tilde{x}_i - x_g^* \right|$. But, it could also be that non-whites might say they do not feel British because they do not feel

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accepted by the white majority part of society so perceive the group benefits B_g to be low or the white majority as intolerant of deviations from white norms – a high value of b_g. It is also conceivable that some or all of these groups are not very flexible i.e. they have a low value of c_i.

We include variables that relate to self-described ethnicity and also variables which can be thought of measuring the intensity of ethnic identification (see Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2008) for other ways of doing this). The strength of ethnic identification could be interpreted as being about how much one is attached to the culture of one's forebears i.e. to the value of c_i. The CS contains two measures of the strength of ethnic identification – there is a question which asks 'how important is your ethnic background to your sense of who you are" (IMPETH) and a variable (IMPFO) which asks a similar question about the country from which the family came originally. Table 3 shows the average values of these variables for our 3 sub-samples – both of the non-white sub-samples attach more importance to ethnicity with similar level of importance of ethnicity between UK-born and immigrants but with higher importance of family origin for immigrants. However, white natives do show quite high levels of both of these variables.

Religion

Most, if not all religions, mandate certain behaviors on the part of its adherents and encourage parents to transmit these values to their children i.e. encourages them to be inflexible (a high c_i). This will then act to reduce the benefits of membership of any group with norms of behavior very different from that of the religion i.e. a high value of $\left| \tilde{x}_i - x_g^* \right|$. Although all religions probably contain some element of this, it is possible that it is more relevant for some religions than others. For example, a key part of radical Islamist ideas is that the first (and perhaps only) loyalty of Muslims should be towards Muslims of any nationality – the 'umma'. If these views are widely held we might expect to see low levels of British identity among Muslims. This is one reason to control for religious affiliation – the categories being Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Other and None. We also have some controls that measure the intensity of religious devotion –

whether the religion is being actively practiced, the importance of religion to one's sense of identity, and the importance of religion for where you live, where you work, who your friends are and what school you send your children to. We combine all of these measures into a single measure – IMPORTREL – which measures the importance of religion to the individual. Table 3 shows that religion is least important to the white natives and most important for the non-white immigrants. There are significant differences in the importance of religion across religions – it is most important to Muslims (in line with the findings of Bisin et al, 2008[7]) but there is not a clean division between them and others – Sikhs and Hindus lie between the Muslims and Christians in the importance of religion.

Language Proficiency

It is commonly argued that language proficiency is critical in enabling people to be full citizens. Policy changes in the UK in recent years have been directed towards ensuring that immigrants are sufficiently proficient to be able to hold down a job and mix with those outside their culture. In terms of the model developed above, one could argue that having a common language means people are more likely to care about the same things so that norms of behavior are more likely to be similar i.e. the value of $\left| \tilde{x}_i - x_g^* \right|$ will be reduced.

The CS contains a number of variables relating to proficiency in English. We combine four such measures - whether English is the main language spoken at home, and the self-assessed levels of proficiency in speaking, reading and writing into a single composite measure ELANG[8]. As one would expect English proficiency is highest for white natives, followed by non-white natives and non-white immigrants. It is worth noting that very few non-white natives report any problem with English so, as one might expect, all language problems affect only the first generation. In this context it is worth noting that there has been little or no dissent in the UK from the view that all education

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[7] Though see Arai, Karlsson and Lundholm (2011) for a sceptical view on many of the other results in this paper.

[8] Unfortunately it is the respondents who assess their own language ability (it would be better to have some test scores) and the routing of the questions does not ask about proficiency for those who speak English at home (and we assume they are proficient) even though there are, for example, well-known literacy problems among segments of the white native population.

should be in English so bilingualism is not the issue it is in some other countries (see, for example, Aspachs-Bracons et al 2008a,b, or Angrist et al, 2008)

Mixing

Fears are often expressed about how much mixing there is between cultures in Britain – it is argued that some groups mix very little outside their own ethnic group and that this hinders their participation in British society. There is a large literature on how attitudes towards ethnic and religious groups that differ from your own are affected by contact with those groups – Putnam (2007) provides an excellent discussion. Put simply, the 'contact' hypothesis suggests that mixing makes one more favorably inclined to other groups, but the 'conflict' hypothesis suggests that it simply brings conflict into the open. The 'contact' hypothesis could be interpreted as predicting that people will become more tolerant of the difference of others, i.e. mixing acts to lower b_g, that it makes people more similar in terms of norms i.e. it lowers $\left| \tilde{x}_i - x_g^* \right|$, or that it makes individuals more flexible i.e. it lowers c_i. On the other hand, the 'conflict' hypothesis might suggest that groups become less tolerant of diversity when there is competition among groups as they need to work harder to preserve their advantages.

The CS contains a number of variables related to this. First, there is a measure of the proportion of non-whites in the ward in which the respondent lives (PETHWARD) – this is only recorded as deciles across wards. This is hard data from the 2000 Census. As can be seen from Table 3, the non-white sub-samples are more likely to live in wards with many non-whites. The UK-born minorities are only marginally less segregated residentially than the immigrants.

Secondly there is a variable about perceptions of the ethnic mix in the local area (ETHAREA). This is a 4-point scale taking the value 0 if everyone is the same ethnicity as the respondent and 1 if less than half are the same ethnicity. Whites are more likely to live in an area with lots of the same ethnicity as one would expect.

These variables might be expected to reflect the opportunities for mixing but there are also some more direct questions about mixing. There are questions about the proportion of friends of the same ethnicity, and how often one mixes with people of a

different ethnicity in various environments[9]. The variable MIXING is a composite extracted from ten variables (see table A.7 in the Appendix for details). Table 3 shows that white natives are least likely to have friends of a different ethnicity (perhaps not surprising given the proportions in the population) but that there is more mixing for non-white natives than non-white immigrants. In interpreting results using this variable it is important whether one thinks of the mixing as unavoidable or a choice. The mixing questions ask about some domains e.g. shops where mixing is probably unavoidable if you live in an ethnically diverse community, but other domains e.g. the home where one has total control. Mixing across different domains is strongly correlated so we prefer to think as this being a variable affected primarily by the nature of the local community rather than a choice variable of the individual.

Discrimination

We have emphasized that whether one feels part of a group is likely to be affected by how one thinks one is treated by that group. If one thinks one is treated badly or unfairly then it is plausible to believe one is less likely to feel part of the group or choose that identity. In terms of the conceptual framework this is because the perceived benefits from group membership are low and/or the group is intolerant of any deviation from the ideal norms (a high b_g). Hence, perceptions and experience of discrimination might be expected to be important and the CS contains a number of questions on this topic.

We include three composite variables. The first, GOVDISCRIM, is a composite variable derived from the responses to questions on whether the respondent thinks one is treated worse, better or the same as people of other races by 15 public-sector organization from doctors, local councils through to the criminal justice system. Table 3 shows that non-whites are more likely than whites to think they will be treated worse but it is non-white natives who perceive this most. But, it is also worth noting that white natives also show a level of perceived discrimination not massively lower than non-white immigrants[10].

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[9] There are also more specific questions about the ethnicity of close friends but large numbers of missing values limit the usefulness of these questions.

[10] It is perhaps worth noting that there are differences across ethnic groups in the organizations perceived to treat them worse – blacks are especially likely to single out the police and criminal justice system, whites

The variable discussed above is about discrimination experienced or perceived by public-sector bodies. But it is also quite likely that how one is treated by other people in everyday interactions is important in influencing values. To capture this we use a variable, RESPECT, which is a composite variable constructed from responses to questions about whether one feels treated with respect in 4 settings. Table 3 shows generally high levels of respect but slightly higher among immigrants than both native sub-samples. It is important to note that these variables refer to perceptions of discrimination – it may be, for example, that expectations of treatment are lower for foreign-born as opposed to UK-born non-whites rather than the actual incidence of discrimination. And there are dangers of reverse causality here as with many other variables – if one does not feel a part of society one may be more inclined to perceive discrimination.

The two variables related to discrimination discussed so far have both been about how any discrimination affects one's personal experiences. But it may also be the case that perceptions of general discrimination (even if not directed towards the self) are also associated with particular identities. For example, if one cares about fairness then a belief in discrimination against some other group might make one less likely to identify with that group. So we construct a variable, GENDISCRIM, from responses to questions about the general level of discrimination in British society. The responses to these questions are, unsurprisingly, correlated with the personal experiences but not perfectly. This can be seen from Table 3 where whites report similar levels of general discrimination to non-white natives – perhaps interestingly it is the non-white immigrants who report the lowest levels of discrimination in British society.

Economic Situation

It is sometimes argued that economic disadvantage (whether from discrimination or other causes) is a powerful source of disillusion. In terms of the framework sketched above, suppose that economic success is a norm valued by some groups and that groups benefits

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the housing authorities and local councils. Asians report discrimination fairly evenly spread across organizations.

are less for those who are not economically successful. The poorer will perceive lower levels of benefit from group's membership in this case.

We include a variable, INCOME, which is a composite measure of the economic situation of the respondent and includes among other variables an index of deprivation of the area one lives[11] (see table A.6 in the Appendix). Table 3 shows that, as expected, whites have higher levels of economic well-being than non-whites. Non-whites are more likely to live in deprived neighbourhoods.

Pro-Sociality

In the framework we have sketched, identity is likely to be affected by the behavior of others with whom one comes into contact as how one is treated by them affects perceived group benefits, B_g. Accordingly we construct a variable, NEIGHPROSOC, to capture measures of pro-sociality in the neighbourhood using questions on vandalism, safety and neighbourhood cohesion. Table 3 shows the lowest levels for non-white natives. For completeness we also investigate the association of identity with a composite indicator of own pro-social behavior - we construct a measure, PROSOCIAL, derived from questions on volunteering, civic activity and charitable donations. Table 3 shows similar levels of pro-sociality for the two native sub-samples and a somewhat lower level for immigrants.

3.   Results

We now turn to our analysis of the associations between the variables described above and the variables we treat as outcomes. We reiterate once more that these are correlations not causal effects and will try to be careful in interpreting the associations we find. One other general point of warning – it is tempting when looking over the results to be drawn to those coefficients that are significantly different from zero. But statistical significance is also influenced by sample size and, for a given sample, (loosely) by the variance of the variable. So more variables will tend to be significant in the white native sample than the non-white samples because the sample size is larger. And the 'Muslim' dummy will tend to be more significant than the 'Sikh' dummy because the proportion of

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[11] See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/ for details of how this is computed.

Muslims is higher than that of Sikhs. So, one needs to look at the size of coefficients as well as their significance. Apart from national identity, the 'identity' variables are Likert scales that we convert to a 0-1 scale for ease of interpretation. In the regressions that follow we estimate linear models though none of the substantive conclusions are altered by using other statistical methods to take account of the categorical nature of the data used. Also, we estimate our equations one at a time but one should recognize that the 'identity' variables are not independent of each other. Again, other statistical methods lead to similar conclusions. In all the results that follow we report the R-squared – these are typically very low indicating either a lot of individual heterogeneity or some important omitted factors. It is perhaps unsurprising given the difficulties in getting good measures of the key concepts.

In what follows, there are a large number of variables in a large number of regressions and we are conscious that this makes the results hard to digest. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that many variables are generally insignificant so that no consistent pattern other than their insignificance is readily extracted from the data. Given this, one might reasonably ask why include these variables at all. We have decided to retain them because these are often variables e.g. religious affiliation, that are widely believed to be strongly associated with values and that omitting them would lead to the question 'why not include variable x'. Our analysis is then useful because it shows that many commonly-held opinions are not supported by the data.

To try to facilitate digestion of the results, our approach is the following. We discuss which variables seem to have similar effects for our three sub-samples and then which have different effects. We then offer an interpretation in terms of the theoretical framework we set out previously.

In the final row of each regression we also report an estimate of the dependent variable using a reference individual that is the same for all three sub-samples except for ethnicity which must differ for the whites and non-whites. For the non-whites our reference person is an Indian though ethnicity effects turn out to often be rather small so our results are not very sensitive to that choice.

Let us now consider the association of these questions with the independent variables discussed earlier. Results for BRITID are reported in table 4, for FEELBRIT

and BELONGBRIT in table 5, for BELONGNEIGH and BELONGLOC in Table 6, and DUALID and FECONF in Table 7. For BRITID – having a British national identity – we do not report results for white natives as 99% of them report a British national identity. For foreign born non-whites the marginal effects from a probit equation are reported in the first column of Table 4 – for UK-born non-whites the marginal effects are reported in the second column.

For the foreign-born non-whites, the variables that are significantly associated with reporting a British national identity are the following: First, recent immigrants are less likely to report a British national identity, as are those whose English proficiency is weak. There is some variation across ethnic groups with Black Africans, Chinese, other and mixed ethnicities being significantly less likely to report a British national identity than the omitted category of Indians – Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more likely to report a British national identity though the difference is not significant. Stronger identity with the country of origin is associated with being less likely to report a British national identity. Religion is not very important, a finding in line with Manning and Roy (2010). Immigrants perceiving that they live in areas with a higher proportion of other ethnicities are less likely to report a British national identity. Quite a lot of variables have estimated marginal effects that are not significantly different from zero.

The marginal effects for British-born non-whites are reported in the second column. These effects are all a lot smaller in magnitude than those for the foreign-born because of the differences in the mean of the dependent variable – 58% of the foreign-born report a British national identity compared to 95% of the British-born. For UK-born minorities, those with a strong ethnic identity are less likely to report a British national identity but those who live in areas with a higher proportion of ethnic minorities are more likely to. The ethnicity effects are different from those seen in the immigrants but none of them are significantly different from zero.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these findings is that religious affiliation is not significantly associated with lower levels of national identity though religiosity is. There is widespread concern that radical Islam is pushing the idea that Muslims should feel a common identity with fellow Muslims elsewhere in the world – the 'umma' - and

not with non-Muslims in their own country[12]. In fact 4 out of 1783 Muslim respondents did take advantage of the open-ended nature of the national identity question to list their identity as 'Muslim'. These views do exist, and have the potential to cause problems out of proportion to their numbers, but are rare - most people think of religion and national identity as separate categories.

Another set of variables that are perhaps not as significant as one might have expected relate to the proportion of non-whites in the ward, the perception of ethnic diversity and the extent of personal mixing. There are some significant correlations here – but the pattern is mixed.

The dependent variable of Table 4 – whether one reports a British national identity – has the potential problem that it might be interpreted by many respondents in a very legalistic way – e.g. Manning and Roy (2010) showed that being a UK citizen (a variable not in our data set here) was very strongly correlated with national identity. Table 5 turns attention to two other variables that are less likely to produce a legalistic response – FEELBRIT and BELONGBRIT. These two questions are similar in many respects and the pattern of responses are also similar so we will discuss them jointly, pointing out any important differences. We first describe the main results and then offer an interpretation.

First, there are some factors that have strong associations with the sense of belonging for all three of our sub-samples. Perhaps the most striking is that those who feel treated with respect, that they are not discriminated against and that British society is not discriminatory, are much more likely to report that they feel they belong. This simply suggests that people are more likely to feel alienated if they feel they are treated badly. There is also some suggestion that individuals who are more pro-social or live in pro-social neighbourhoods and (less strongly) who mix more are more likely to feel they belong though these effects are not always significant or even have the same sign for all sub-samples. The old and in all three sub-samples are more likely to feel they belong.

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[12] For example, one of the July 7 London bombers (British-born but whose parents were from Pakistan) appeared in a video and said "your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters", with the use of the words 'your' and 'my' clearly expressing the people with whom he identified.

Turning to differences across sub-samples, whites with a strong ethnic identity are much more likely to feel they belong. There is some evidence that those in areas with more non-whites are less likely to feel they belong. Turning to the non-white sub-samples, the Black, Chinese and other ethnic groups are less likely to report a sense of belonging than the South Asian, though the coefficients are only significant for BELONGBRIT. A stronger sense of ethnic identity raises the sense of belonging for the immigrants but reduces it for the British-born. All non-whites are less likely to report a sense of belonging if they live in wards with many other non-whites though these coefficients are often not significantly different from zero. Religion and religiosity do not seem to be important. More recent immigrants are much less likely to report that they feel they belong.

Table 6 turns to consider the factors associated with feeling that one belongs to the neighbourhood and local area. The responses to these questions are similar so we discuss them jointly. The extent of own pro-sociality and the degree of pro-sociality in the neighbourhood are very strongly associated with feeling that one belongs to the neighbourhood. Pro-social individuals are much more likely to feel they belong though the causality may well be that they contribute to the community because they feel they belong. Those with a strong sense of ethnic identity are more likely to feel they belong as are those who feel they are treated with respect and that there is not much discrimination in general.

In terms of differences between sub-samples, whites in high minority areas are significantly less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are the educated and the irreligious. Women and the rich are significantly more likely to report a feeling that they belong. For the non-white sub-samples, the Chinese and, to a less extent, the Black groups are less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are those who live in areas with fewer of their ethnic group. Those without a religion seem significantly less likely to feel they belong to the neighbourhood or area. There is some indication that non-white non-Christians are less likely to feel they belong to their local area (though not the local neighbourhood) and that this effect is stronger for the UK-born than for immigrants.

A number of general conclusions emerge from this. First, that you have to treat people well if you want them to feel they belong and identify with a group, whether that

group is a nation or a neighbourhood. This is by far the strongest effect. Secondly, having a minority ethnicity and religion is not strongly associated with a sense of belonging. Thirdly, living in an area with people like you does seem to have an effect, albeit quite weak, on whether one feels one belongs. And one striking feature is that the fitted values for representative individuals are similar for all sub-samples suggesting that the degree of belonging and British identity is very similar for whites and non-whites, foreign- and British-born.

It is instructive to compare the factors that are strongly associated with a sense of belonging to the neighbourhood or area (reported in Table 6) with those strongly associated with a sense of belonging to Britain (reported in Table 5). In general the factors are very similar – this is particularly true of the impact of the discrimination and respect variables – one interpretation of this is that many people's experience of a country is heavily influenced by their local neighbourhood. But there are also differences that are interesting. Perceptions of discrimination by public institutions (GOVDISCRIM) reduce the sense of belonging to Britain but do not affect belonging to the neighbourhood. And the pro-sociality of the neighbourhood (NEIGHPROSOC) affects belonging to the neighbourhood but not to Britain as a whole.

Ss discussed earlier in the paper, the differences in the outcomes we have considered so far are a product both of individual preferences that influence whether people do not want to belong and the behavior of others which influences whether people can belong or how they are treated if they do. It is hard to disentangle which results come from which of these two routes. To try to get some idea of which of these aspects are important we turn to an analysis of some questions that relate to perceptions about whether national and religious/cultural identities are in conflict. The results for these variables are reported in Table 7.

The first variable, DUALID, is the response to the question of whether one thinks one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity. The question is phrased in a somewhat unfortunate way as it seems to imply that there is a clear 'British' cultural and religious identity but we suspect the respondents understand what is intended by the question – whether non-whites and non-Christians can be a part of Britain. A striking fact is that the average value of the response for the representative

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individual is only slightly lower for whites than non-whites in spite of the fact that the raw differences in means reported in Table 2 are quite different. The reason is that the old white British are much more likely to perceive a conflict than the young.

In all three sub-samples those who feel they are treated with respect are significantly more likely to believe that diversity is possible. For both UK-born groups, perception of discrimination is associated with being less likely to believe that diversity is possible. Non-Christians and those non-whites with a strong sense of ethnic identity are all more likely to believe it is possible. Whites who mix more and live in more diverse neighbourhoods are more likely to think it is possible. More generally, ethnic and religious minorities think it is possible to belong to Britain and to preserve their heritage.

The last three columns of Table 7 ask about whether the respondent generally has ever felt any conflict between national identity and religion. Again, the fitted values for the reference individuals are similar for all three sub-samples. Those who feel they are treated with respect are less likely to have felt such a conflict, as are those who live in pro-social neighbourhoods. Non-whites living in areas with more people like them are more likely to perceive a conflict. Women and the old are less likely to perceive a conflict.

It is worth noting that non-Christians are more likely to have felt such a conflict. For the immigrant sub-sample the coefficients are of a similar size for all non-Christian groups and are generally significantly different from zero. For the non-white UK-born only the coefficient for Muslims remains significantly different from zero although all the coefficients on other religions are also positive. It is also worth noting that the more religious are more likely to have felt a conflict between national identity and religion. We would argue that this does suggest that the norms of behavior for having a British identity and the non-Christian religious identities are not the same so that there is sometimes a conflict between the two. This is line with the model presented earlier, but the results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 suggest that these differences are not so large that non-Christians feel it is impossible to belong to Britain while maintaining a separate religious and cultural identity.

These results do suggest some systematic difference in opinion between whites and non-whites about what is needed to belong to Britain. It may be that airing of these

differences leads views to converge over time, or that differences persist and remain a potential source of conflict.

Summary

We think that the most striking result from these regressions is that people need to feel they are treated fairly and with respect if they are to feel that they belong. Although the data comes from Britain, we feel this is likely to be a general conclusion. Minorities, whether ethnic or religious, do not perceive any inevitable conflict between feeling British and maintaining their cultural heritage though do sometimes feel a conflict between national and religious identity. There is some evidence that people are more likely to feel they belong when surrounded by people like them but the effect is not very large.

We have documented the sense of belonging and identity but have said nothing about what is required of the individual for them to say they belong i.e. what behaviors and attitudes are needed to be able to say you identify with Britain. There are those who believe that because Britain has asked too little from immigrants, that it has made it too easy for them to feel that they belong. This relates to a more academic debate about what should be contained in 'nation-building' programmes designed to create a common sense of national identity. For some a 'thin' conception based on a common language and acceptance of political institutions are enough, for others something deeper is needed. For example, Barry (2001, p83) states that "the problem is that the criteria for membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities" and that "British seems to be largely a legal conception tied up with formal British citizenship rather than one with significant affective cognitive or behavioral connotations". In terms of the conceptual framework sketched in this paper, this can be thought of as an argument that Britain has become too tolerant, that b_g has become so low, that 'British' identity has no consequences for behavior. Note that in (2) and (3), $b_g = 0$ will imply that individuals identify with the group but that it has no consequences for behavior, which is set at the individual optimum. A companion paper (Georgiadis and Manning, 2009) analyzes the Citizenship

Survey to investigate differences in values across groups within British society more directly, concluding that there are few large differences in practice.

4.   Conclusion

In this paper we have sought to understand the determinants of national identity. We presented a simple conceptual framework based on the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and used this to develop predictions about the correlations between various measures of identity and variables that measure the experiences, interactions, and integration that commentators have argued to be important determinants of identity. We then investigated which of these correlations are important in practice though the nature of the data is such that we cannot prove these are causal effects. However, we believe our analysis is worthwhile because this is an area where there are strongly-held views often based on no evidence whatsoever.

Our main finding that people who feel well treated and tolerated are more likely to feel they belong or identify with the society. People who are surrounded by people like themselves are more likely to feel they belong. That might suggest that putting pressure on minorities to conform or live in mixed communities might not be successful in generating a sense of belonging. Religious minorities are more likely to report experiencing a conflict between national identity and religion, but these groups also do not perceive any irresolvable conflicts in this area. However the white British do perceive a larger amount of conflict so that there is a gap between what minorities think and what the white British population think minorities think. Such lack of mutual understanding is quite possibly, a potent source of conflict and a justification for descriptive analysis like the one we have undertaken.

Our empirical results relate to England and Wales so it is worthwhile considering whether our conclusions are likely to be of wider applicability. While there are some characteristics of the UK that are distinctive e.g. the geographical background of the immigrant groups, the general conclusion that people feel they belong if they feel they are treated well is likely to be a general one though only research on other countries could confirm this.

In terms of future research, we would emphasize that the limitations of our research design mean that our conclusions must necessarily be tentative. The correlations we have found and the interpretations we have given them need to have a more robust evidence base. We also need similar studies of other countries to discover whether the findings here are unique to the UK or more generally applicable.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Demographics

Variable	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	47.65	41	30.3
Female	0.52	0.47	0.51
Married/cohabiting	0.65	0.64	0.38
Education	3.03	3.13	3.56
Ethnicity			
White	1	0	0
Mixed	0	0.04	0.15
Indian	0	0.26	0.24
Pakistani	0	0.13	0.2
Bangladeshi	0	0.068	0.047
Black Caribbean	0	0.08	0.18
Black African	0	0.17	0.06
Chinese	0	0.04	0.03
Other ethnicity	0	0.18	0.08
Religion			
Christian	0.8	0.32	0.36
Buddhist	0.002	0.03	0.006
Hindu	0.0003	0.17	0.1
Jewish	0.004	0.001	0.0005
Muslim	0.001	0.34	0.31
Sikh	0	0.05	0.08
Other religion	0.02	0.02	0.03
No religion	0.17	0.05	0.1
Sample size (unweighted)	7842	3935	1596
Unweighted proportion	0.58	0.29	0.12
Weighted proportion	0.91	0.058	0.026

Notes: Descriptive statistics are computed using individual sampling weights.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Identity Variables

Variable	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Dependent variables			
BRITID: Whether reports British national identity			
1: yes	0.99	0.58	0.95
0: no	0.01	0.42	0.05
Mean	0.99	0.58	0.95
FEELBRIT: Extent to which feels a part of British Society			
1:strongly agree	0.54	0.46	0.43
0.66: tend to agree	0.39	0.45	0.52
0.33: tend to disagree	0.05	0.06	0.04
0: strongly disagree	0.02	0.03	0.01
Mean	0.81	0.78	0.78
BELONGBRIT: Strength of feeling of belonging to Britain			
1:very strongly	0.46	0.44	0.35
0.66: fairly strongly	0.38	0.42	0.5
0.33: not very strongly	0.13	0.12	0.12
0: not at all strongly	0.03	0.02	0.03
Mean	0.76	0.75	0.72
BELONGNEIGH: Strength of feeling of belonging to immediate neighborhood			
1:very strongly	0.35	0.34	0.33
0.66: fairly strongly	0.41	0.43	0.43
0.33: not very strongly	0.19	0.17	0.20
0: not at all strongly	0.05	0.06	0.04
Mean	0.68	0.68	0.68
BELONGLOC: Strength of feeling of belonging to local area			
1:very strongly	0.27	0.26	0.28
0.66: fairly strongly	0.45	0.47	0.46
0.33: not very strongly	0.22	0.21	0.21
0: not at all strongly	0.06	0.06	0.05
Mean	0.64	0.64	0.65
DUALID: Extent to which agrees that one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity			
1:strongly agree	0.16	0.37	0.33
0.66: tend to agree	0.5	0.46	0.49
0.33: tend to disagree	0.23	0.11	0.14
0: strongly disagree	0.11	0.05	0.04
Mean	0.57	0.72	0.7
FECONF: Extent to which feels a conflict between national identity and religion			
1: all of the time	0.01	0.03	0.01
0.75: most of the time	0.03	0.06	0.08
0.5: some of the time	0.13	0.14	0.27
0.25: rarely	0.2	0.19	0.24
0: never	0.63	0.58	0.4
Mean	0.14	0.19	0.27

Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted proportions and averages computed using individual sampling weights.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables

Variable	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to your sense of who you are	0.63	0.8	0.8
IMPFO: Importance of family's origin to your sense of who you are	0.68	0.78	0.7
IMPORTREL: Importance of religion	0.24	0.47	0.4
ELANG: English Proficiency	1.99	1.44	1.9
PETHWARD: Decile of the proportion of non-whites in the ward	5	9	8.8
ETHAREA: Perception of the proportion of people of the same ethnicity in the local area	0.32	0.81	0.78
MIXING: Mixing with people from different ethnic and religious groups	0.34	0.57	0.64
GOVDISCRIM: Discrimination by government organizations	1.96	2.07	2.16
RESPECT: Extent individual feels is treated with respect	0.8	0.81	0.8
GENDISCRIM: Discrimination in society	1.83	1.7	1.85
INCOME: Economic situation	2.43	1.88	1.91
NEIGHPROSOC: Neighbours prosociality	2.34	2.3	2.15
PROSOCIAL: Own prosociality	0.11	0.08	0.1

Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are associated with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions; see the Appendix for a detailed variable coding. IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10).

Table 4: Results for British Identity

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	Belonging to Britain	
Independent variables	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	0.0290**	-0.00517
	(0.00923)	(0.00457)
Female	-0.00168	0.00443
	(0.0203)	(0.00835)
Mixed ethnicity	-0.178***	0.00847
	(0.0531)	(0.0200)
Pakistani	0.0591	0.0137
	(0.0418)	(0.0130)
Bangladeshi	0.0774	0.00400
	(0.0505)	(0.0201)
Black Caribbean	0.0798	0.0144
	(0.0462)	(0.0200)
Black African	-0.105*	-0.0234
	(0.0417)	(0.0409)
Chinese	-0.164*	-0.0773
	(0.0665)	(0.0884)
Other ethnicity	-0.144***	-0.0125
	(0.0366)	(0.0306)
IMPETH	-0.0267	-0.0402*
	(0.0444)	(0.0204)
IMPFO	-0.137**	-0.0172
	(0.0433)	(0.0170)
non-Christian		
Hindu	0.0661	-0.0304
	(0.0376)	(0.0442)
Muslim	0.104***	-0.0339
	(0.0316)	(0.0311)
Sikh	-0.0309	-0.0207
	(0.0560)	(0.0409)
Other religion	-0.0148	-0.0438
	(0.0510)	(0.0483)
No religion	-0.0320	-0.0555
	(0.0549)	(0.0316)
IMPORTREL	0.0654	-0.0425*
	(0.0439)	(0.0185)
ELANG	0.106***	
	(0.0190)	
PETHWARD	-0.00398	0.00655*
	(0.00926)	(0.00293)
ETHAREA	-0.0926*	-0.0261
	(0.0384)	(0.0139)
MIXING	-0.0157	0.0186

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	(0.0515)	(0.0224)
GOVDISCRIM	-0.0308	-0.0193
	(0.0488)	(0.0185)
RESPECT	0.0467	-0.00785
	(0.0736)	(0.0311)
GENDISCRIM	0.0256	0.0109
	(0.0243)	(0.00957)
Education	-0.00455	0.00350
	(0.00494)	(0.00233)
INCOME	0.0412*	0.00696
	(0.0168)	(0.00710)
NEIGHPROSOC	-0.0131	0.00228
	(0.0200)	(0.00846)
PROSOCIAL	-0.0255	-0.0148
	(0.146)	(0.0647)
came to UK in the last 5 years	-0.534***	
	(0.0218)	
came to UK 6/7 years ago	-0.295***	
	(0.0324)	
R-squared	0.266	0.098
Observations	3170	1365
	0.75	0.96
Fitted value for reference individual	(0.03)	(0.03)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also included in all specifications IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to "Christian" and ethnicity for non-whites being "Indian".

Table 5: Results for Sense of Belonging to Britain

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Feeling part of Britain			Belonging to Britain		
Independent variables	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	0.005**	0.017***	0.004	0.013***	0.019***	0.013
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Female	0.007	-0.018**	0.007	-0.003	-0.010	0.027**
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Mixed ethnicity		-0.035	0.001		-0.076***	-0.043
		(0.023)	(0.025)		(0.024)	(0.032)
Pakistani		0.003	-0.002		-0.023	-0.001
		(0.017)	(0.023)		(0.018)	(0.029)
Bangladeshi		0.019	-0.004		0.015	-0.056
		(0.021)	(0.035)		(0.022)	(0.042)
Black Caribbean		-0.036	-0.036		-0.066***	-0.087***
		(0.020)	(0.025)		(0.021)	(0.032)
Black African		-0.011	-0.034		-0.027	-0.090**
		(0.017)	(0.031)		(0.018)	(0.041)
Chinese		-0.069**	-0.039		-0.136***	-0.080
		(0.031)	(0.043)		(0.032)	(0.047)
Other ethnicity		-0.013	-0.035		-0.039**	-0.131***
		(0.014)	(0.028)		(0.015)	(0.036)
IMPETH	0.052***	0.014	-0.050**	0.095***	0.031	-0.045
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.028)
IMPFO		0.028	-0.007		-0.024	0.014
		(0.017)	(0.021)		(0.017)	(0.024)
non-Christian	-0.037			-0.039		
	(0.020)			(0.022)		
Hindu		0.010	-0.018		-0.012	-0.045
		(0.016)	(0.027)		(0.017)	(0.033)
Muslim		0.0001	0.001		0.008	-0.013
		(0.014)	(0.024)		(0.014)	(0.031)
Sikh		-0.016	-0.014		-0.016	-0.010
		(0.022)	(0.027)		(0.022)	(0.034)
Other religion		-0.040	-0.078**		-0.043**	0.016
		(0.022)	(0.034)		(0.021)	(0.034)
No religion	-0.019**	-0.028	-0.010	-0.023**	-0.069***	-0.021
	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.025)
IMPORTREL	0.006	-0.031	-0.016	0.025	-0.039**	-0.010
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.029)
ELANG		0.033***			0.037***	
		(0.008)			(0.008)	
PETHWARD	-0.003**	-0.006	-0.007	-0.001	-0.003	-0.012**
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)
ETHAREA	0.012	-0.008	0.042**	0.003	-0.026	0.049**

	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)
MIXING	0.022	0.021	0.060**	-0.012	0.028	0.074
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.038)
GOVDISCRIM	-0.121***	-0.094***	-0.176***	-0.132***	-0.158***	-0.244***
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.030)
RESPECT	0.241***	0.178***	0.208***	0.274***	0.131***	0.235***
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.052)
GENDISCRIM	-0.071***	-0.075***	-0.068***	-0.079***	-0.077***	-0.073***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Education	0.005***	-0.001	0.004	0.007***	-0.008***	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
INCOME	0.002	-0.006	-0.010	-0.009	-0.009	-0.024**
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)
NEIGHPROSOC	0.008	-0.002	0.018	0.019**	-0.006	0.028**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
PROSOCIAL	0.121***	0.150**	0.074	0.016	0.059	-0.055
	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.086)
Came to UK in the last 5 years		-0.094***			-0.109***	
		(0.012)			(0.013)	
Came to UK 6/7 years ago		-0.045***			-0.063***	
		(0.015)			(0.016)	
R-squared	0.089	0.129	0.150	0.103	0.170	0.172
Observations	5666	3124	1478	5681	3152	1474
Fitted value for reference individual	0.84 (0.01)	0.82 (0.02)	0.86 (0.02)	0.75 (0.01)	0.82 (0.02)	0.88 (0.03)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also included in all specifications. IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to "Christian" and ethnicity for non-whites being "Indian".

Table 6: Results for Sense of Belonging to Neighborhood and Local Area

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Belonging to neighborhood			Belonging to local area		
Independent variables	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	0.021*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.008)
Female	0.023*** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.040*** (0.015)	0.019*** (0.007)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.021 (0.015)
Mixed ethnicity		-0.040 (0.027)	0.007 (0.037)		-0.039 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.037)
Pakistani		0.014 (0.020)	0.045 (0.031)		0.014 (0.019)	0.022 (0.032)
Bangladeshi		0.027 (0.023)	0.015 (0.049)		0.010 (0.024)	0.053 (0.047)
Black Caribbean		-0.024 (0.025)	0.008 (0.037)		-0.023 (0.024)	-0.048 (0.037)
Black African		-0.037 (0.021)	-0.035 (0.048)		-0.042** (0.021)	-0.049 (0.048)
Chinese		-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.149*** (0.055)		-0.102*** (0.033)	-0.099 (0.053)
Other ethnicity		-0.033 (0.018)	0.009 (0.041)		-0.033 (0.017)	0.003 (0.038)
IMPETH	0.056*** (0.013)	0.043 (0.022)	0.024 (0.033)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.031 (0.021)	0.013 (0.033)
IMPFO		0.041 (0.022)	0.047 (0.028)		0.039 (0.020)	0.038 (0.028)
non-Christian	-0.031 (0.023)			-0.004 (0.023)		
Hindu		0.001 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.042)		-0.006 (0.020)	-0.096** (0.041)
Muslim		-0.005 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.034)		0.016 (0.017)	-0.052 (0.033)
Sikh		-0.028 (0.026)	-0.038 (0.042)		-0.004 (0.026)	-0.091** (0.042)
Other religion		0.003 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.040)		0.057** (0.023)	0.025 (0.034)
No religion	-0.036*** (0.011)	-0.034 (0.029)	-0.063** (0.030)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.028)	-0.079*** (0.028)
IMPORTREL	0.031 (0.018)	0.037 (0.023)	0.003 (0.033)	0.044** (0.018)	0.027 (0.022)	0.008 (0.033)
ELANG		-0.001 (0.009)			0.013 (0.009)	
PETHWARD	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.010** (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.008 (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)
ETHAREA	-0.0001 (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.018)	-0.051 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.068*** (0.018)	-0.063** (0.027)

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MIXING	0.017	0.049	-0.034	0.023	0.049	0.047
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.041)
GOVDISCRIM	0.004	-0.056**	0.001	0.001	-0.041	0.013
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.032)
RESPECT	0.234***	0.172***	0.263***	0.237***	0.210***	0.283***
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.056)
GENDISCRIM	-0.089***	-0.113***	-0.121***	-0.108***	-0.101***	-0.139***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.020)
Education	-0.013***	-0.007***	-0.003	-0.012***	-0.008***	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
INCOME	0.012**	0.001	-0.006	0.009	-0.011	-0.022
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.012)
NEIGHPROSOC	0.044***	0.033***	0.025	0.031***	0.022**	0.019
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.017)
PROSOCIAL	0.355***	0.274***	0.271***	0.271***	0.245***	0.058
	(0.048)	(0.074)	(0.089)	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.098)
Came to UK in the last 5 years		-0.109***			-0.072***	
		(0.014)			(0.014)	
Came to UK 6/7 years ago		-0.059***			-0.064***	
		(0.019)			(0.019)	
R-squared	0.115	0.144	0.110	0.096	0.126	0.117
Observations	5682	3155	1476	5684	3158	1480
Fitted value for reference individual	0.7	0.72	0.65	0.64	0.68	0.66
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also included in all specifications. IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to "Christian" and ethnicity for non-whites being "Indian".

Table 7: Results for Views about conflict between National and Religious/Cultural Identity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Belonging to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity			Conflict between national identity and religion		
Independent variables	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.017 (0.010)
Female	0.007 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.010)	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.025 (0.018)
Mixed ethnicity		-0.021 (0.029)	0.009 (0.036)		0.033 (0.035)	0.029 (0.046)
Pakistani		0.017 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.031)		-0.006 (0.024)	0.007 (0.036)
Bangladeshi		-0.042 (0.028)	0.019 (0.044)		-0.065** (0.029)	-0.009 (0.054)
Black Caribbean		-0.018 (0.026)	0.035 (0.037)		0.025 (0.028)	0.029 (0.049)
Black African		0.019 (0.022)	0.061 (0.043)		0.001 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.055)
Chinese		0.060 (0.032)	0.016 (0.057)		0.007 (0.042)	0.120 (0.086)
Other ethnicity		-0.010 (0.019)	0.008 (0.039)		0.032 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.049)
IMPETH	-0.023 (0.014)	0.074*** (0.024)	0.052 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.030)	0.075 (0.048)
IMPFO		0.015 (0.021)	0.012 (0.027)		0.028 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.040)
non-Christian	0.066*** (0.022)			0.031 (0.028)		
Hindu		0.087*** (0.021)	0.078** (0.040)		0.048** (0.023)	0.064 (0.049)
Muslim		0.088*** (0.017)	0.111*** (0.032)		0.099*** (0.020)	0.091** (0.041)
Sikh		0.060** (0.029)	0.096** (0.040)		0.109*** (0.031)	0.045 (0.048)
Other religion		0.033 (0.024)	0.056 (0.041)		0.085*** (0.032)	0.054 (0.051)
No religion	0.018 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.028)	0.031 (0.027)	0.024 (0.029)	0.156** (0.076)	-0.030 (0.063)
IMPORTREL	0.024 (0.020)	0.003 (0.023)	0.024 (0.032)	0.152*** (0.024)	0.124*** (0.028)	0.142*** (0.043)
ELANG		-0.001 (0.009)			-0.003 (0.011)	
PETHWARD	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.008)
ETHAREA	0.023 (0.018)	0.015 (0.019)	0.044 (0.026)	0.006 (0.023)	-0.073*** (0.024)	-0.098*** (0.033)

MIXING	0.103***	-0.006	0.062	0.047	0.019	0.110**
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.051)
GOVDISCRIM	-0.144***	0.022	-0.077**	0.002	0.022	0.117***
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.042)
RESPECT	0.139***	0.118***	0.097	-0.200***	-0.149***	-0.165**
	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.072)
GENDISCRIM	-0.081***	0.011	-0.054***	0.009	0.025	0.040
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.024)
Education	0.009***	-0.001	0.003	-0.013***	-0.002	-0.009
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)
INCOME	-0.010	-0.002	-0.005	-0.001	0.007	-0.0001
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.014)
NEIGHPROSOC	0.0001	0.001	-0.001	-0.041***	-0.042***	-0.048**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.019)
PROSOCIAL	-0.001	0.147**	0.102	0.025	0.078	0.096
	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.084)	(0.063)	(0.084)	(0.113)
came to UK in the last 5 years		0.005			-0.038**	
		(0.013)			(0.016)	
came to UK 6/7 years ago		0.004			0.0001	
		(0.019)			(0.021)	
R-squared	0.076	0.043	0.058	0.092	0.087	0.134
Observations	5463	3033	1444	2174	2392	948
Fitted value for reference individual	0.59 (0.01)	0.63 (0.02)	0.63 (0.04)	0.12 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.11 (0.05)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Regional dummies were also included in all specifications. The sample size is relatively smaller for specifications (4), (5) and (6) because the relevant question was asked only to those who responded to preceding questions that both national identity and religion are important for them. IMPORTREL, ELANG, MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCR, INCOME, NEIGHPROSOC and PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined in the Appendix (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to "Christian" and ethnicity for non-whites being "Indian".

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