eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/

A Realistic European Story of Peoplehood:
The Future of the European Union beyond the Basic Legitimation Demand[*]

Peter J. Verovšek

ABSTRACT The divisions emanating from the Eurozone crisis have led a number of political realists to argue that European identity should be conceived of via a political "basic legitimation demand" (Williams) that prioritizes the creation of order in backward-looking, non-utopian terms. I suggest that the EU would do better by building an ethically-constitutive "story of peoplehood" (Smith) that looks both backward and forward. I argue that the EU should build on the ideals drawn from the continent's shared past as well as its desire to retake control from the global economic forces that threaten democratic political sovereignty in the twenty-first century.

KEYWORDS Realism, European Union, Legitimation, Stories of Peoplehood, Collective Identity

Introduction

The success of the postwar project of European integration, institutionalized through the organization now known as the European Union (EU), is difficult to evaluate. In part this is due to the fact that it is – as Jacques Delors famously observed – a UPO: an "unidentified political object" that is more than a supranational federation but less than a superstate. Despite the difficulties involved in classifying the EU, it is clearly a success story, at least from a certain perspective. In the words of the Norwegian Nobel Committee (2012), it has "helped transform Europe from a continent at war to a continent at peace." In awarding it the 2012 Peace Prize, the Committee highlighted what is almost universally hailed as "the EU's most important result: the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation, and for democracy and human rights."

However, at the same time it is hard to endorse European project, especially in light of its response to the Great Recession (2007-13) and the financial, monetary and sovereign debt crisis that followed in its wake. Far from promoting the "ever closer union" called for by the Treaty of Rome (1957), the pressures exerted by the largest economic downturn since the Great Depression have fractured the EU, largely along national lines. Instead of working together to meet this challenge, as would be expected of a community that calls itself a union, "each country defend[ed] its own interests while attempting to benefit from 'free-rider' tactics" (Aglietta 2012: 24). Given the divisions that have emerged since 2010, it is clear that "[i]t was a mistake to believe that political union would come automatically out of economic union" (Roberto Ducci quoted in Guisan 2012: 73).

In the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the "return to Europe" of the states of the postcommunist region, scholars such as Thomas Risse (2010) argued that a

common European identity already existed based on the fact that Europeans were increasingly engaging in the same cultural, social and political debates mediated through their national public spheres. Two decades later this optimistic conclusion appears Panglossian at best. Although it is true that the crisis of the Eurozone has stimulated discussions on common issues and problems, these discourses have not led to greater solidarity and understanding. Instead, they have merely reinforced national and regional bifurcation between the rich members of the west and north and the crisis-ridden states of the south and east (Verovšek 2017; 2015).

The divisions that emerged over the course of the crisis of the Eurozone demonstrate the failure of EU to develop a meaningful collective identity. This realization has reinvigorated the "no demos thesis," which holds that the EU and its institutions cannot effectively or legitimately undertake political functions "because there is as yet no European people" (Grimm 1995: 295). This skepticism is part of a broader retreat from the euphoric hopes that followed the end of the Cold War in 1989. The attacks of September 11th, the subsequent "war on terror," and the onset of the Great Recession, as well as the rise of populism and authoritarianism around the world, have delegitimized optimistic narratives of progress, seemingly demonstrating that "radical political disagreement and conflict" (Sleat 2013: 1) characterize the post-Cold War world.

As a discipline that has always reacted to the atmosphere of its time, these developments in the geopolitical situation are also reflected in contemporary political philosophy. In response to the failure of the first decades of the twenty-first century to live up to the high hopes of the end of the twentieth, a new generation of self-styled

"realists" has sought to develop a more modest form of political theory that relies on "materials from non-philosophical sources" – including "an involvement with history or the social sciences" (Williams 2006: 155) – to rein in unwarranted optimism and "wishful thinking" (*Wunschdenken*). These "new realists" (Rostbøll 2017: 58) treat politics as an independent and autonomous sphere of human activity, rejecting what they derisively label as the "political moralism" of "political philosophy [as] applied ethics" (Geuss 2005: 16). Instead of engaging in what they see as the unwarranted speculation of ideal theorists working within the paradigm of liberalism, proponents of this approach instead seek to learn the lessons of the past by focusing on "real politics," i.e., on what is actually possible "in the here and now."

In this article I use European identity – or more accurately, the lack thereof – to evaluate the realist challenge to mainstream political theory. Many realists have sought to apply their understanding of politics to the EU by building on the pathbreaking work of the late Bernard Williams, particularly his concept of a "basic legitimation demand." Williams provides the foundations for political realism by arguing that although political order must be justified a "political" manner that does not draw on substantive moral understandings or moral philosophy more generally. In contrast to liberal political theory – often derisively referred to as "moralism" in realist discourse – Williams contends that narratives of political legitimacy must be realistic in that they should emerge from the lessons of history without engaging utopian hopes for the future. In this sense, he rejects forward-looking forms of justification in favor of a backward-looking approach (see Allen 2016:11; Verovšek 2019a).

Although other approaches to realism exist, I focus on Williams's ideas because

they provide the philosophical foundation for much of this intellectual movement. Additionally, his ideas are also interesting given Williams's insistence that political legitimacy cannot be grounded morally, but must instead be based on a purely political normativity. The EU thus serves an interesting test case for realism in general – and for William's "basic legitimation demand" more specifically – as it has sought to create a new, forward-looking postnational political order based on a backward-looking narrative of violence and atrocity that resulted in two world wars and the atrocities of the Holocaust (see Verovšek 2020a).

Although I agree that identity is crucial to answering popular demands for legitimation, I depart from Williams and political realism in arguing that such a European narrative should not focus solely on the creation of order and cannot rely on political normativity alone. Instead, I argue that it will have to build on the existing continental order while also drawing on forms of legitimation that go beyond the political to encompass broader economic and moral narratives. In particular, a shared, transnational European identity will need to build on both its shared past, rooted in collective memories of Europe's age of total war (1914-1945), as well as its desire to engage in joint, collective action in the future in order to reestablish control over global economic forces. Whereas realism focuses almost exclusively on the backward-looking lessons of history, my basic argument is that a successful narrative of European identity will have to incorporate a forward-looking, utopian dimension in order to succeed in capturing the imagination of its citizens.

Instead of following the basic tenets of William's realism, I therefore suggest that the EU should build a common identity on the idea of an ethically-constitutive narrative

that allows its citizens to cooperatively confront their shared problems in an age of increasing economic and political globalization. In 2003 Rogers Smith introduced the concept of "stories of peoplehood" as a way of thinking about how what he calls "'the three I's' – preexisting senses of identity, interests, and ideals" (2003: 34) – work together to create communal political identities. My thesis is that a truly realistic European "story of peoplehood" – i.e., one that is possible "in the here and now" – will need to build on backward-looking ethical values in order to ground its forward-looking task of retaking control over the global economic forces that threaten to overwhelm the state at the start of the twenty-first century.

The argument is organized as follows. I start by outlining the basic theoretical commitments of political realism focusing on Bernard Williams. Insodoing I compare the realist conception of identity that emerges from Williams's "basic legitimation demand" to a prominent "moralist" alternative, Rogers Smith's conception of ethically-constitutive "stories of peoplehood" (I). I then apply these two concepts to identity formation within the EU. Based on a critique of realism's focus on order as the end, not the beginning of politics, as well as its over-emphasis on the political as an autonomous domain of social life, I contend that European identity is more helpfully construed in terms of a continental "story of peoplehood" (II).

Finally, I argue that such narrative not only needs to meet demands for legitimation at the political level, as realists contend; it will also have to demonstrate the necessity of integration as a prerequisite for political control over the global economic forces that threaten to overwhelm political sovereignty at the start of the twenty-first century. I also reflect on what this means in the context of the crisis of the Eurozone, as well as the more

recent divisions exposed by the onset of the novel Coronavirus in 2020 (III). I conclude by arguing that truly realistic conceptions of the basic demand for legitimacy will have to go beyond Williams's narrow conception of realist political philosophy.

I. *Political Realism and Political Identity*

Given its many preexisting connotations, realism is not a particularly helpful label for determining the shared commitments of the "ragtag band" (Galston 2010: 386) of thinkers who have united under this banner. From a historical perspective, political realism developed as an "intellectual moment of resistance" (Philp 2012: 631) to the post-1989 liberal euphoria. In contrast to the high hopes of this period, these thinkers sought to capture the more pessimistic view of politics that emerged following the turn of the millennium. As a result, they have devoted themselves to "methodological disputes" (*Methodenstreite*) (Rossi 2016) with theorists who do not enforce a strict separation between moral and political philosophy. In contrast to this supposedly moralistic approach, which focuses on agreement and consensus, realists take disagreement as given, arguing that "political difference is of the essence of politics" (Williams 2005: 78). In emphasizing the inevitability of conflict and compromise, political realism claims to "begin from an understanding of the existing conditions and constraints of political life" (Mantena 2012:456).

In calling their approach "realism" both Williams and Raymond Geuss connect their ideas to realist tradition within international relations. Although neither of them make this relationship explicit, Matt Sleat (2013: 12) contends that they "would obviously both have been very aware of the connection and inferences that they were making, with all its connotations, when they used the term realist." Although little work

has been done to explore the connection between these two forms of realism, it makes sense at an intellectual level, as both share a broadly "tragic vision of politics" (Lebow 2003).

This background gives political realism a "utopophobic" (Frazer 2016), conservative sensibility. This does not mean that all realists occupy the right wing of the political spectrum. However, their shared commitment to disagreement as a stable, immutable feature of the "circumstances of politics" (Waldron 1999) makes realists skeptical of the possibility of fundamental political transformation. This decidedly Burkean perspective means that they are more likely to seek to conserve existing political arrangements. This orientation helps to explain why the "provision of order and stability is always, according to realism, a magnificent achievement" (Sleat 2013: 52).

Political realism's tragic view of politics also helps to define its core substantive commitments. First, as part of its opposition to moralism, political realists insist that political theory must "be grounded in as descriptively and explanatory accurate a vision of politics as we can muster" (Sleat 2013: 7). This commitment underlies the movement's "impurity" (Williams 2006: 155), as the first step in realist theorizing is an attempt to understand the contours of the problem at hand. This approach often requires engaging with empirical disciplines, especially history. Although many political realists would deny associating that they are inherent pessimistic, they are decidedly anti-utopian.

A second characteristic of political realism is its historicist sensibility. Despite their internal differences, realists agree on the importance of specific, contingent circumstances in all political actions. They argue that it is pointless to search for general laws of politics, since "what is possible at one time would not have been possible at an

earlier time" (Frazer 2010: 491). In this sense, realism encourages a "focus on the most salient dimensions of a given situation, whether or not they conform to our preferences or desires" (Bell 2009: 1).

The third commitment is realism's stress on the "the political" as a separate and autonomous domain of life with its own, independent form of normativity. Realists not only reject more optimistic, consensus-based approaches to "high liberalism" for displaying "a desire to evade, displace, or escape from politics" (Galston 2010: 386); they also argue for "politics as a distinct sphere of human activity" (Sleat 2016: 254). Although their emphasis on descriptive fidelity means that realists are prepared to borrow from other domains and disciplines, realists are committed to the idea that "political philosophy must use distinctively political concepts, such as power, and its normative relative, legitimation" (Williams 2005: 77).

As a result of these considerations, realism rarely provides universal answers to general questions like "What should we do?" (Hall 2015: 396, 408). Instead, it seeks to provide specific solutions to specific problems in specific moments. Even the answers to basic political questions will necessarily display considerable variation, as they will have to begin "from where a given political community is." The major overarching principle of realism is therefore an appreciation of political order as "the *sine qua non* for every other political good."

Despite these commonalities, there is also a great deal of variation within realism. Given his importance for my argument, as well as for subsequent thinkers working in this intellectual tradition, I focus on Bernard William's (2005: 3, 4) analytical approach. In his late work Williams starts with what he calls "first political question": the securing of

political order. For him the answer to this problem inevitably raises concerns regarding the regime's legitimacy or "acceptability," which he refers to as the "Basic Legitimation Demand."

Despite his anti-utopianism, Williams (2005: 10, 11) worries that an omnipotent, Hobbesian *Leviathan* might be able to force individuals to submit to its rule through violence or ideological brainwashing. He argues that in order to meet the legitimation demand the answer to the first political question must provide for an "intelligible order of authority" in which the "legitimation offered…goes beyond the assertion of power." For Williams, the creation of order that is accepted by individuals and is not based purely on force is intimately tied up with the idea of legitimacy as a source of authority. The response to such a request for justification is therefore tied to the common identity that political agents can call upon in order to justify their actions in the name of a notional collective.

Due to this emphasis Williams's realism can be fruitfully be compared to a different conception of legitimacy that emerges from Rogers Smith's liberal conception of "stories of peoplehood," which also focuses on the importance of narrative in forging political order. While material factors dominate much of the debate about political power, Smith argues that narrative is crucial to the formation of stable political entities. Using his own terminology to make this point, Smith (2003: 43) notes that "political projects of people-making are likely to be pursued by two general means: *coercive force* and *persuasive stories*." Although the threat of violence is effective in the short term, unity in the *longue durée* requires narrative legitimation as well.

Smith argues that political leaders play a key role in this process. This does not mean that the masses do not matter. On the contrary, leaders are constrained by the narratives their constituents will accept. After all, as Seyla Benhabib points out, "A story that is not well told will not be remembered" (2002: 102). Insofar as these "stories of peoplehood" fail, new political agents telling different histories will come to the fore. This gives leaders a strong interest in listening and responding to narratives that their constituents find to be meaningful.

However, despite their mutual agency, Smith (2003: 32) notes that the interactions between leaders and those whom they are trying to mold into their constituents "are *asymmetrical* because it is actual and would-be leaders who most directly articulate…conceptions of political peoplehood." As central nodes within society, political leaders have the advantage because they are able to present their narratives to a broader range of social actors. They are also able to mobilize the institutions of the state – most notably the school system – in support the stories that they favor.

In considering the kinds of "stories of peoplehood" or justifications that meet the "basic legitimation demand," both Smith and Williams emphasize the importance of the past. One of the most powerful ways for leaders to seek support and allegiance is by defining salient collective memories and linking them to the present. This is usually done through the telling of political narratives, in which the members of a community are able to see themselves as the protagonists, even if only vicariously through their ancestors (see Verovšek 2016). Joining with historians, writers and other cultural elites, political leaders play a key role in mobilizing society not only by helping the individual members interpret their personal experiences, but also by "decipher[ing] the community's past in antique

dynasties" (Anderson 1991: 109). The this extent, Williams's "basic legitimation demand" bears a resemblance to Smith's "stories of peoplehood."

The differences, however, emerge when realism's focus on the political is compared to Smith's more capacious approach, which draws on resources from other domains as well. Additionally, Smith also allows his ideas to be forward-looking, incorporating future projects and ambitions, whereas political realists (especially Williams) tend to focus on memory and the past (see Verovšek 2019b). Finally, Smith accepts that these stories can follow the creation of a stable order, whereas Williams seems to assume that legitimation and the creation of order occur in tandem.

II.   Order before Politics?

Both Smith and Williams agree that narrative plays a key role in the construction of political identities and thus also of political communities. However, their approaches differ significantly. As a political realist, Williams is committed to an account that stresses order as a good that is achieved through politics as an autonomous domain. The forms of legitimation that meet his demands are backward-looking and decidedly anti-utopian. By contrast, Smith represents the kind of "moralist" liberal political theory that realism opposes. Although he recognizes the importance of order and coercion, his account is based much more on consensus and includes a moral dimension as well. For Smith "stories of peoplehood" not only give the narrative legitimation necessary for political communities to function; additionally, "They provide sturdy anchors of morally compelling identity and worth amidst the roiling seas of competitive community construction" (Smith 2003:101). These narratives are thus not only politically, but also ethically constitutive.

I argue that Smith's model is both more theoretically coherent and more "realistic" (i.e., likely to succeed as an acceptable justification for political authority "in the here and now") than Williams's "basic legitimation demand." In the first place, the fact that Williams (2005: 3) delimits the sphere of politics by claiming that the "first political question" must address "the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation" is highly problematic. In questioning this assumption, I do not mean to suggest that securing political order is not important; of course it is. However, it is not clear that this forms the essence of politics or that it even qualifies as the "first political question."

Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the securing of order is pre-political – that is, it is the condition upon which politics itself depends. As Hobbes – who many realists consider to be one of their primary historical inspirations – was well aware, in cases of civil war and violence, order can often best (only?) be restored by a unitary Leviathan who has the power to scare the warring parties into submission.[1] It is only after these basic conditions of civil order have been met that the disagreement and difference can be allowed to reemerge within the confines of specifically delineated practices and institutions.

Unlike Williams, Smith recognizes that politics follows the establishment of a social order; it does not precede it. In doing so, he is following Hannah Arendt, who conceptualizes politics in terms of the "words and deeds" that occur within a polity.

---

[1] Hobbes makes his belief that only an omnipotent, unified *Leviathan* can restore order from the chaos of civil war and insurrection clear on the frontispiece of his most famous English-language manuscript. Superimposed over the image of the *Leviathan*, Hobbes included this biblical inscription from Job (41:24): "Non Est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei" ("There is no power on earth which can be compared to him").

Arendt agrees with Williams that human plurality – a multiplicity of individuals holding differing opinions and beliefs – is at the root of political life. However, she (1998: 198, 194-5) argues that politics understood as "action in concert" depends on the pre-existence of the *polis*, "physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its laws." Thus, in contrast to Williams, Arendt holds that pluralistic politics is the result of order: "Before men began to act [politically], a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place, the space being the public realm of the *polis*." In this sense, the pre-political imposition of order creates both the *space* and the *place* for politics disagreement based on the human condition of plurality.

Building on Arendt's insights, Smith's conception of "stories of peoplehood" demonstrate that politics need not be reduced to the creation of order. On the contrary, it can also refer to what occurs after this first step, i.e., to the legitimate exercise of authority within a preexisting polity. In this understanding, the problem facing the EU at the start of the twenty-first century is not one of basic legitimation, but of the creation of an identity that can support forms of politics above or beyond the nation-state.

Given his theoretical commitments, Williams (2005: 77) would push back against this idea. This is visible in the fact that he refers to "the idea of the political," not about politics as such. While the distinction between *politics* and *the political* may seem trivial, it has important consequences. As Charles Frye (1966: 821) points out, choosing the adjectival construction "the political" instead of the simple noun "politics" makes the concept more relational and ideal, as well as less substantive. Speaking of the political

also gives politics a more existential overtone, reducing this concept to issues of life and death, or of order and disorder.

The problem with confining the scope of politics to core issues of survival is that it threatens to marginalize sphere of the political, making it into something that occurs only infrequently at certain key moments in the life of the polity. As a result, William's focus on order seems to distance his analysis from "real politics" by re-idealizing it in existential, life-or-death terms. This has important consequences for the EU. Although Europe is a "paper tiger" in the military terms that usually constitute the political when it is understood to "hard," existentialist terms, Kathleen McNamara (2015, 3) points out that its "banal cultural infrastructure" has "made the EU a natural part of the political landscape" in everyday politics in the more mundane sense of the word.

Smith's more Arendtian approach thus understands politics as what emerges from order and helps to legitimate it after it has been created. Smith (2003: 34, 56) argues that "no political 'people' is natural or eternal" and emphasizes the fact that "the forging of senses of peoplehood never takes place *de novo*, in a state of nature." Instead, he points out that "the politics of people-making, involving both force and stories, is always an ongoing as well as a competitive politics, even within apparently well-established and unified political communities." This conceptualization of politics is much more conducive to a European story of peoplehood, given the importance of culture in the project of continental integration.

Responding to these considerations, some of Williams's followers have sought to associate politics with the spaces where this activity usually occurs. This approach stresses the importance of institutions such as parliaments, assemblies and councils, since

they are where "principles and aims…are worked up into concrete conceptions" (Galston 2010: 393). This suggestion is helpful, as it addresses the problem of politics as a product of order, not the cause of it. It also accords with everyday understandings of politics as the activity of politicians. However, it is also problematic, because it both fails to differentiate politics from other areas of social life and, at the same time, sets the boundaries of politics too narrowly.

In addition to failing to clearly differentiate politics from other areas of social life – and thus to distinguish political theory from social, economic, cultural, and legal theory – this institutional understanding of politics also seems far to narrow. On the positive side of the ledger, it does give politics a more communicative, Arendtian aspect by placing the speeches and discursive disagreements between individuals in forums like parliaments and local assemblies at the core of the political. However, it ignores the extra-institutional activity of citizens in the public sphere and the media (Habermas 1989). It also leaves out the crucial role that the EU has played in educational policy within its member-states by encouraging them to situate national history within a broader continental framework that pays attention to how the local community interacted with European trends and movements (see Schlisser and Soysal 2005; Challand 2009).

Even Williams (2005: 6) recognizes that solutions to civil disorder must answer a "basic legitimation demand" that "can be equated with there being an 'acceptable' solution to the first political question." In this sense, he can argue that even existing forms of "order" are unpolitical in the sense that they are based on the use of unaccountable or "bare" coercion. To ensure that this criterion is not based on external coercion alone, Williams (2004: 227) introduces the "critical theory principle" in order to

argue that "the acceptance of a justification [for an order of authority] does not count if the acceptance has been produced by the coercive power that is supposedly being justified."

While this principle is helpful, it raises new questions regarding the normative basis for this judgment, as well as for the criteria for its empirical adjudication. As Williams (2004: 227) himself recognizes, "the difficulty with it, of making good on claims of false consciousness and the like, lies in deciding what counts as having been 'produced by' coercive power in the relevant sense." Given his realist commitment to historical contextualism, Williams attempts to resolve this problem without relying on external normative standards. He argues that we "need a schema by which we start with the people's current beliefs and imagine their going through a process of criticism, a process in which the test plays a significant part." The idea here is that a form of order can only pass the critical theory test if individuals living under it would still retain their beliefs after having realized their provenance.

Despite its clarity, this move is problematic as it "arguably comes at the price of a tension with Williams' realist commitments." In particular, Janosch Prinz and Enzo Rossi (2017: 338) worry that Williams may have inadvertently tied himself to "an idea about the moral standing of agents," because he describes a situation in which a polity fails this test as one of "injustice." This approach violates realism's desire to deal with politics in specifically political terms.

Moreover, in addition to relying on the moral standing of individuals, Williams's "assessment of 'injustice' could also be viewed to connect to the moral ideal of autonomy" (Prinz and Rossi 2017: 339). Williams (2004: 231) even speaks of the critical

theory principle as helping the disadvantaged to recognize the "most basic sense of freedom, that of not being in the power of another." However, this once again seems to rely "on a moralised definition of politics," demonstrating how difficult it is to generate normativity from politics alone (Prinz and Rossi 2017: 339). As it is, what is seen as "acceptable" will inevitably draw on values that emerge from outside of politics, that is precisely from the domains of morality, religion, culture, etc. from which realism wants to differentiate political theory.

Williams (2005: 4, 11) is right that acceptability is "a category of historical understanding…a hermeneutical category," even though this undermines the separation of politics from other domains of social life. By contrast, due to his non-realist theoretical commitments, Smith's conception of politics as a process of identity formation that draws on both ethical and political sources does not suffer from these problems. Instead, he argues that "ethically constitutive stories can support claims of particularistic community memberships more effectively than economic or political power accounts…. for they alone present membership in a particular community as somehow intrinsic to who a person is" (2003: 96, 98).

This ethical character is important, because narratives of identity do more than just fulfill functional imperatives to justify coercion; they also help a people to define who they are by providing a collective account of their distinctiveness. Such Smithean narratives are "ethically-constitutive" in the sense that they help the community to define its unique version of "the good life." Such an ethical account – following Williams (1985: 116-7), I use this term to delimit accounts based on individual conceptions of the good life, not on universal moral standards – need not be positive in the sense that it

builds on a utopian vision for the future. On the contrary, it can also be about what a political community wants to avoid. This is arguably the case with the EU, which for much of its history has justified itself through the narrative of "never again" (Verovšek 2020a).

Williams would obviously be wary of this account. The risk of such an approach from the realist perspective is that such "stories of peoplehood" may end up building on what he considers to be pre-political ethical ideals that are not shared by the population as a whole, and thus risk failing the acceptability criterion of the critical theory principle.[2] This is a valid concern. However, completely excluding such ethical ideals from the narratives that underpin political orders of legitimation is both unrealistic, as the members of a political community will always draw on broader notions of collective identity that go beyond Williams's narrow framing of the political, and theoretically difficult (if not impossible), as the failure of the critical theory principle makes clear. Instead of excluding such notions of ethical constitution completely, I argue that it is better to include them, while ensuring that they are appropriated critically and with self-reflection.

As a result of these considerations, Smith's more capacious account, which allows for extrapolitical resources to enter into the equation and for "stories of peoplehood" to continue to evolve in the aftermath of the creation of order, provides a better account of everyday politics, especially in the EU. Additionally, his emphasis on the broad basis of successful stories of peoplehood, which have to encompass "economic interests, political beliefs, religious or cultural norms, or other values" (Smith 2003, 56) can better meet

---

[2] I would like to thank the reviewer from this journal for making this point to me.

legitimation demands in the modern world while also enabling these narratives to form the basis for unique identities. Although the idea of the basic legitimation demand provides an interesting philosophical framework that may be partially compatible with aspects of Smith's theory, the advantages of the latter are most clearly visible when viewed in light of concrete attempts by realists to construct a narrative of justification based on William's realism.

III.   *A Realistic European Story of Peoplehood*

Although realism within international relations tends to be skeptical of supranational institutions that restrain state sovereignty, including the EU, many realists within political philosophy have explicitly endorsed the European project. For example, Gal Gerson (2017: 1, 2, 12) makes a realist case for the EU by interpreting the European movement "as a means of survival in a world struggle rather than as a preamble to peace." This conflictual vision of integration – which recalls the hopes of many of the EU's "founding fathers," who thought that it could act as a "third force" between the US and the USSR during the Cold War – authorizes a vision where "Europe would take its own place among competing world powers." Instead of focusing on prosperity, Gerson places the emphasis on politics, positing "a postwar order in which the democratic states of Europe were united and fostered the spirit of public solidarity, thus enabling Europe to survive in a world marked by the struggle for domination."

Similarly, Geuss (2010: 28) has also suggested that political realism supports calls for "further European integration." In line with the realist emphasis on conflict, he also bases this judgment on the EU's traditional role as a guarantor of political order on the European continent. Thus, whereas for Gerson (2017: 1) the EU serves primarily "as a

means of survival in a world struggle," Geuss (2010: 28-9) endorses the EU as an institution that makes Europe "capable of taking an independent political stand in the world." This perspective is primarily based on the past, emphasizing the provision of peace – i.e. order – as the prerequisite for Europe's political survival within the Hobbesian world of anarchic international politics.

These accounts make sense on their own terms; I am actually very sympathetic to the latter, as will become clear below. However, it is unclear if they fulfill the theoretical *desiderata* of realism. Ever since the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, which announced the foundation of the European project, the narrative of a community-based, supranational Europe as a product of the experience of war and suffering in the first half of the twentieth century has dominated the continent's political discourse (Guisan 2012; Verovšek 2020a). However, in recent decades (particularly since the fall of communism in 1989) this backward-looking answer to the basic legitimation demand based on collective memories of two World Wars and the atrocities of the Holocaust seems to have lost its force (Verovšek 2015; 2020b).

As Paul Scheffer points out, at the beginning of the third millennium, "Nightmare images of a possible return to previous violent conflicts serve only as a distraction. […] Beyond 'never again,' there is a need for a renewed justification for European integration" (quoted in Verovšek 2020a: 147). The basic problem is that once it has been achieved, peace is often taken for granted. The same can be said of the realist emphasis on the "provision of order and stability" (Sleat 2013: 7). New, forward-looking resources that go beyond the mere achievement of order seem be to needed precisely because the

21

old ones no longer provide an "acceptable" answer to the basic legitimation demands posed by the EU at the start of the twentieth century.

In addition to Gerson and Geuss, other realists have sought to build more directly on Williams's "basic legitimation demand" to determine whether or not the EU can provide a "non-moralised normative account of how to shore up belief in legitimacy while steering clear of both raw domination and ideological distortions." By reframing William's account in terms of what they call "critical responsiveness," Jan Pieter Beetz and Rossi (2017: 22, 40) suggest that the EU's legitimation demand can be met by turning it "into a project to *maintain popular sovereignty at the expense of a degree of state sovereignty*." Beetz (2018: 340) makes a similar point independently in arguing that "the EU should take the form of a *demoicratic* confederacy" by giving member-states "a central role in EU decision-making procedures in a European Senate," composed of representatives from the member-states, which would act as an upper house within the European Parliament (EP), much like the American Senate provides equal representation to the states of the union within the United States.

These proposals are promising in the sense that they point to the importance of preserving sovereignty beyond the nation-state. However, I worry that they are insufficient as answers to the "basic legitimation demand." Although it is true that such institutional reforms would help to provide formal mechanisms of further democratic accountability, it is unclear that such procedural changes would actually answer the concerns associated with the democratic deficit from the perspective of the citizens of Europe.

Starting with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and continuing through the last major revision of the EU's "functional constitution" in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the leaders of the EU have sought to bolster the democratic credentials of the EU by expanding the powers of the EP. As a result, today the Parliament is a major player within the EU, playing a crucial role in proving the individuals selected to serve in the European Commission (EC), and consolidating its powers of co-decision alongside the Council of Ministers (a kind of European Senate) and the EC.

Unfortunately, these changes have made little to no difference in terms of the EU's perceived democratic legitimacy. By focusing too much on institutional remedies designed to answer the "basic legitimation demand," these "realist" solutions miss the mark due to their overly-narrow institutional focus on "the political." While such an approach might have working in the direct aftermath of Europe's age to total war, the mere "provision of order" is no longer a sufficient justification for integration at a time when generations that remember these conflicts are beginning to pass away (Verovšek 2014a).

Instead of tinkering with the EU's constitutional architecture, what the European project really needs to generate popular support is a new ethically-constitutive narrative of transnational identity that links the "space of experience" (Koselleck 1985: 195). incorporated into the present through the collective memory of total war and the "horizons of expectations" Europeans have for the future. Such a realistic story of European peoplehood cannot be based only the "backwards-looking" lessons of the past; it will also have to build on "forward-looking" visions of the future (Verovšek 2020c)

that go beyond the muddling through the difficulties of the present, whatever those may be.

Reflecting on the narrative legitimations that have been used to justify the EU, Glyn Morgan (2005: 19) observes that "the case for European political integration has always appealed to some conception of peace (more broadly understood as 'security') and some conception of prosperity (more broadly understood as 'welfare')." The first justification seems to have been exhausted. Meanwhile, the second has been discredited as a result of the poverty enforced by the EU on its poorer members in the course of the Eurocrisis that started in 2010. As Smith (2003: 82) points out, it is "risky to attempt to 'sell' a vision of political community strictly in terms of its economic benefits. Inevitably, economic bad times will come, to some or many of their core constituents."

This does not mean that welfare can no longer play a role in justifying the EU, just as its success in achieving peace does not mean that security is no longer salient either. On the contrary, both of these factors remain important. However, they need to be reconceptualized in ways that account for the difficulties of the present (Verovšek 2020a). In the wake of the Eurozone crisis – which highlighted the growing tension between democratic politics and the functional imperatives of late modern "financialized capitalism" – these two variables are increasingly linked. The events that followed the Great Recession demonstrated that economic interests have taken *de facto* control over politics, as global financial markets and institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been able to dictate policy to formally sovereign political communities. Faced with the prospect of rising interest rates and default on public debt, states have been forced to liberalize their internal economies, lower labor standards, rescue over-

leveraged banks, and sell off public assets in order to placate markets interests that operate across borders.

The globalization of economic interests, which have successfully moved beyond the nation-state, has not been matched by an expansion of politics to a similar level. On the contrary, developments since the end of the Cold War show that the power of the state to control events within its borders, which is crucial to the traditional doctrine of sovereignty, is in decline. According to Matti Koskenneimi (2011: 63), "The pattern of influence and decision-making that rules the world has an increasingly marginal connection with sovereignty."

In the face of these developments, the existing European order can legitimize itself by showing that it can protect its citizens against the encroachment of external economic forces. In other words, following the proposals by French President Emmanuel Macron (2019), the EU needs to become the basis for "*une Europe qui protège.*" Such a "protective Europe" must not focus on the kinds of issues of security contained within the realist understanding of "the political"; it should also entail the protection of the economic, social and political rights of its citizens in an increasingly globalized, multicultural world increasingly dominated by multinational corporations and international market forces.

This narrative combines the security and welfare justifications for integration by reconceptualizing these ideas. Instead of focusing on warfare as the primary threat to internal economic prosperity within the state, it justifies postnational governance as a necessary response to threats to the welfare of citizens posed by transnational economic interests that can no longer be harnessed by the state. In this sense, a realistic European

story of peoplehood would be based on the need for politics "to catch up with globalized markets, and has to do so in institutional forms that do not regress below the legitimacy conditions for democratic self-determination" (Habermas 2011: 84).

Such an approach, which combines external security (broadly understood) with economic welfare has become all the more important in the aftermath of the onset of the novel SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus in the winter of 2020. The economic lockdowns necessary to contain the spread of Covid-19 have demonstrated the mutual interdependence of security and welfare in a powerful new manner. Whereas the so-called Frugal Four (the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Finland) had successfully beaten back attempts to mutualize debt in the form of "eurobonds" over the course of the Euro-crisis, they were convinced to sign off on a proposal endorsed by Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to create a trillion dollar recovery fund financed through joint borrowing by the EC. Although reaching this agreement required the five days of negotiation at the longest European summit in history, this revolutionary step towards the collectivization of debt at the European level to promote both security and welfare in the face of global challenges has the potential to serve as an important turning point in the creation of a European "story of peoplehood" (see Tooze 2020).

It is difficult for political realism to conceive of an answer to the basic legitimation demand in terms of *both* order and prosperity. However, this account is consistent with the framework I advocate. Smith (2003: 101, 121) predicts that narratives of justification that "give us a sense of belonging, a sense of place in the world, a sense of partnership in a larger, meaningful collective existence and its shared endeavors" will become more necessary precisely in moments "*when the ideas, institutions, and practices expressive of*

established ethically constitutive stories are threatened, from whatever source." In such

moments – the aftermath of the crisis of the Eurozone clearly qualities – what is

necessary is a political order, a community that allows for individuals to come together

and engage in Arendtian "action in concert" to address threats to their survival.

There is already some evidence that the EU has started to develop in this direction.

These moves towards greater European political control over international market forces

are visible in the emergence of two differing models of globalisation in the post-Cold

War world. The first, American path is driven by bilateral agreements, limited planning

and the idea that the power of multi-national corporations and other economic interests

should predominate "without organising or even supervising, markets" (Abdelal and

Meunier 2010: 351). This approach build's on the US's hegemonic position in global

politics to support its vision of globalisation based on market liberalisation.

In contrast, Europe has developed a second, alternative approach. The European

form to 'managed globalisation' seeks to embed economic policy within multi-lateral

agreements that allow for intervention by supranational politicians and bureaucrats based

on codified rules and an awareness of the economic consequences of market

liberalisation. As Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow (2014: 61, 64) observe, "In

contrast to the American neoliberal theories that profits are ultimately good for everyone

because prosperity will trickle down, the European approach is rooted in a more

egalitarian theory of justice…[that] make it compatible with a more just social

democratic model of society." In addition to its anti-trust cases against Google, another

example of this is the development and passage into law of the General Data Protection

Regulation (GDPR), which seeks to give individuals control over the use of their private

online data. Because it applies to any enterprise that deals with subjects located within the EU regardless of citizenship, it has had a profound effect on global data sharing practices.

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the European problem is twofold. First, the EU's commitment to protection in this capacious understanding has not been applied consistently enough, as the internal divisions and lack of solidarity displayed during the Eurozone crisis make clear. Second, the EU has also not succeeded in translating these developments in its institutional competencies into a clear story of peoplehood. While *ad hoc* solutions created through crisis summits can work – as the example of the Coronavirus recovery fund of 2020 demonstrates – relying on multilateral negotiations between domestic political leaders, each of whom wields a veto, is difficult and often fails to provide adequate, timely solutions to emerging crises. Although the elements for such a narrative are present, they need to be effectively presented and accepted by the peoples of Europe.

Despite the fact that such justifications have traditionally been confined to the nation-state, given the problems of the contemporary world Smith (2003: 130, 24) advises "peoples to strive to work out peaceful systems of cooperation…by forming some sort of ongoing confederation to deal with shared problems." In light of this, he explicitly endorses the creation of "a heightened supra-national system of power and membership in the form of the European Union." Similarly, Arendt (1994: 416-7) supports what she describes as the "very healthy and necessary efforts to federate the European nations" as a way of preserving the lessons of nationalism, thus meeting the security demand, and of combatting the increasing dominance of economic thinking in public life, a phenomenon

she (1998) calls "the rise of the social" (for more on Arendt's unexpected support for European integration, see Verovšek 2014b).

The "realistic story of peoplehood" I am suggesting here contains both a backward-looking and a forward looking dimension. Building on the past, the EU can root its identity in the lessons of two world wars, which originally grounded the "necessary efforts to federate the European nations" (Arendt 1994: 416-7). Initially, the EU sought peace and prosperity in its rejection of the nation, which had become "the cheapest and the most dangerous disguise…in the political realm" (Arendt 1990: 195). However, at a time when interstate rivalries on the continent have been eliminated and the economic benefits of a common, internal market have been achieved, new projects must be found to link the European "space of experience" to a "horizons of expectations" that can ground a European story of peoplehood.

Unlike the purely backward-looking, security-focused narratives proposed by political realism, I argue that the justification for Europe must also retain a forward-looking, utopian dimension, which sets out its goals for the future. The European project has already achieved much and Europeans actually do see themselves as a common people, at least in certain situations. As Umberto Eco (2005: 15-6) points out, "a European identity reveals itself as soon as we come into contact with a non-European culture, including American culture. There are moments….when we suddenly share a common feeling that makes the behavior and taste of someone from France, Spain, or Germany seem more familiar to us than others." These perceived commonalities provide an important foundation for a common identity.

However, an identity must also allow its holders to do things together, to "act in concert" and create "new beginnings," to speak in Arendtian terms. Indeed, many aspects of "how Europe at large presents itself to non-Europeans" (Habermas 2005: 8) relate to the European desire to exercise greater control over the global economic forces that define capitalism at the start of the third millennium. For example, compared to individuals from other parts of the world – especially the US – Europeans display a much greater faith in the abilities of big government, a preference for the welfare state, and a suspicion of markets more generally. Building on these common ethical values, a realistic European story of peoplehood should build on the prospect of exerting political sovereignty over the forces of global economics.

Conclusion
As part of their revolt against mainstream liberal political theory, realist political philosophy has sought to provide a narrative that can fulfill the "basic legitimation demand" posed by the democratic deficit of the EU. By subjecting their ideas and approach to critical scrutiny, I have argued that realism cannot justify the EU given its overly narrow, anti-utopian, backward-looking focus on order and on politics as an autonomous domain with its own form of normativity. Instead of building on Williams's realism, I presented an account that draws on Smith to develop a narrative which draws on forms of legitimization that go beyond the domain of politics to encompass broader economic and ethical narratives. Although it incorporates the roots of the European project in the legacy of the continent's experience of total war, my realistic story of peoplehood has a forward-looking, utopian dimension that defends integration as

necessary to endure political control over the global economic forces that threaten to overwhelm political sovereignty at the start of the twenty-first century.

My argument implies not only that supranational political cooperation to influence global markets is necessary to answer the European demand for legitimation; I also argue that it is necessary for the survival of the existing European order as such. In order to reassert political control over the kinds of impersonal market forces that threatened its survival over the course of the crisis of the Eurozone, the EU will have to develop its own mechanisms of economic governance, including mutual borrowing, fiscal transfers from richer to poorer regions, and the presence of a lender of last resort. Although the EMU was "initially conceived as a technocratic exercise," in response to the crisis it "is now rapidly transforming the EU into a federal entity" (Streeck 2012: 67) especially when taking subsequent developments over the course of the viral pandemic of the Coronavirus into account.

Despite the external pressures that are driving further political integration at the present moment, embracing a realistic European story of peoplehood based on the need to reassert control over global financial capitalism may allow Europeans "to take their political destiny into their own hands" (Habermas 2001: 64) by actively taking on and buying into this project. Although such a narrative of identity would clearly be a construction, Smith (2003: 36-7) points out that all such narratives are constructed as part of an active "politics of people-building." However, such constructions lose what Jürgen Habermas (2005: 12, 10) refers to as their "stigma of randomness" if they are accompanied by an act of "self-conscious appropriation." Achieving the goal of self-conscious appropriation of a politics that will allow for Europeans to regain control over

31

the market forces that are increasingly exercising control over their lives is the key task of European politics today.

University of Sheffield
p.j.verovsek@sheffield.ac.uk

References

Abdelal, Rawi and Sophie Meunier. 2010. "Managed Globalization: Doctrine, Practice and Promise," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17(3): 350-367.

Aglietta, Michel. 2012. "The European Vortex," *New Left Review* 75: 15-36.

Allen, Amy. 2016. *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Arendt, Hannah. 1994. *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

———. 1998. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1990. *On Revolution*. New York: Penguin Classics.

Beetz, Jan Pieter. 2018. "From Practice to Principle and Back: Applying a New Realist Method to the European Union's Democratic Deficit," *Political Studies* 66(2): 339-355.

Beetz, Jan Pieter and Enzo Rossi, "The EU's Democratic Deficit in a Realist Key: Multilateral Governance, Popular Sovereignty and Critical Responsiveness," *Transnational Legal Theory* 8(1): 22-41.

Bell, Duncan. 2009. "Under an Empty Sky - Realism and Political Theory," in *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, edited by Duncan Bell, 1-25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Black, Jeremy. 2006. *The Age of Total War, 1860-1945*. Westport: Praeger Security International.

Challand, Benoit. 2009. "European Identity and its External Others in History Textbooks (1950-2005)," *The Journal of Educational Media, Memory and Society* 1(2): 60-96.

Dunn, John. 2000. *The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of Politics*. New York: Basic Books.

Eco, Umberto. 2005. "An Uncertain Europe between Rebirth and Decline," in *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*, edited by Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and John C. Torpey, 14-20. London: Verso.

Ehlermann, Claus Dieter. 1998. "Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Co-Operation: The New Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty," *European Law Journal* 4(3): 246–270.

Frazer, Elizabeth. 2010. "What's Real in Political Philosophy?" *Contemporary Political Theory* 9(4): 490-507.

Frazer, Michael L. 2016. "Utopophobia as a Vocation: The Professional Ethics of Ideal and Nonideal Political Theory," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 33(1-2): 175-192.

Frye, Charles E. 1966. "Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political," *The Journal of Politics* 28(4): 818-830.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16: 3-18.

Galston, William A. 2010. "Realism in Political Theory," *European Journal of Political Theory* 9(4): 385-411.

Gardner Feldman, Lily. 1999. "Reconciliation and Legitimacy: Foreign Relations and Enlargement of the European Union," in *Legitimacy and the European Union: The Contested Polity*, edited by Thomas Banchoff and Mitchell Smith, 66-90. London: Routledge.

Gerson, Gal. 2017. "George Orwell on Political Realism and the Future of Europe." *The European Legacy* 22(1): 1-15.

Geuss, Raymond. 1981. *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2005. *Outside Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2010. *Politics and the Imagination*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2015. "Realism and the Relativity of Judgement." *International Relations* 29(1): 3-22.

———. 2016. "Realism, Wishful Thinking, Utopia," in *Political Uses of Utopia*, edited by S. D. Chrostowska and James D. Ingram, 233-247. New York: Columbia University Press.

Grimm, Dieter. 1995. "Does Europe Need a Constitution?," *European Law Journal* 1(3): 282-302.

Guisan, Catherine. 2012. *A Political Theory of Identity in European Integration: Memory and Policies*. New York: Routledge.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2005. "February 15, Or: What Binds Europeans," in *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*, 3-13. London: Verso.

———. 2001. *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

———. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hall, Edward. 2015. "How to do Realistic Political Theory (and Why You might Want to)." *European Journal of Political Theory* 16(3): 283–303.

Koselleck, Reinhart. 1985. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Koskenniemi, Martti. 2011. "What use for Sovereignty Today?" *Asian Journal of International La*w 1: 61-70.

Lapavitsas, Costas and et al. 2012. *Crisis in the Eurozon*e. London: Verso.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2003. *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Order*s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levy, Jacob T. 2016. "There is no such Thing as Ideal Theory." *Social Philosophy and Polic*y 33(1-2): 312-333.

McNamara, Kathleen R. 2015. *The Politics of Everyday Europe: Constructing Authority in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Macron, Emmanuel. (2019). "For a European Renewal," *Élysée*, 4 March 2019 (https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/for-european-renewal.en, accessed 30 March 2020).

Mantena, Karuna. 2012. "Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence." *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 455-470.

Morgan, Glyn. 2005. *The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Norwegian Nobel Committee. 2012. "The Nobel Peace Prize 2012 - Press Release," *Nobelprize.org*, 12 October.

Offe, Claus. 1976. "'Crisis of Crisis Management': Elements of a Political Crisis Theory," *International Journal of Politics* 6(3): 29-67.

Philp, Mark. 2012. "Realism without Illusions." *Political Theory* 40(5): 629-649.

Prinz, Janosch and Enzo Rossi. 2017. "Political Realism as Ideology Critique," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 20(3): 348-365.

Reich, Simon and Richard Ned Lebow. 2014. *Good-Bye Hegemony: Power and Influence in the Global System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Risse, Thomas. 2010. *A Community of Europeans?: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rossi, Enzo. 2016. "Can Realism Move Beyond a *Methodenstreit*?" *Political Theory* 44(3): 410-420.

Rostbøll, Christian F. 2017. "Kant and the Critique of the Ethics-First Approach to Politics," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 22(1): 55-70.

Scheffer, Paul. 2012. "EU can no Longer Play the War Card," *De Morgen*, 19 January.

Schissler, Hanna, and Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal. 2005. *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Sleat, Matt. 2014. "Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and Realpolitik," *Political Theory* 42(3): 314-337.

———. 2013. *Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of Liberal Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

———. 2016. "What is a Political Value? Political Philosophy and Fidelity to Reality," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 33(1-2): 252-272.

Smith, Rogers M. 2003. *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Soros, George. 2012. *Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States*. New York: Public Affairs.

Streeck, Wolfgang. 2012. "Markets and Peoples: Democratic Capitalism and European Integration." *New Left Review* 73: 63-71.

Tooze, Adam. 2020. "It's a New Europe – if you can keep it," *Foreign Policy*, 7 August 2020 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/07/merkel-macron-eu-its-a-new-europe-if-you-can-keep-it/, retrieved 8 August 2020).

Verovšek, Peter J. 2020a. *Memory and the Future of Europe: Memory and Integration in the Wake of Total War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

———. 2020b. "Caught between 1945 and 1989: Collective Memory and the Rise of Illiberal Democracy in Postcommunist Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy*, forthcoming.

———. 2020c. "Memory, Narrative and Rupture: The Power of the Past as a Resource for Political Change," *Memory Studies*, 13(2): 208-22.

———. 2019a. "Historical Criticism without Progress: Memory as an Emancipatory Resource for Critical Theory," *Constellations* 26(1) (2019): 132-147.

———. 2019b. "Impure Theorizing in an Imperfect World: Politics, Utopophobia and Critical Theory in Geuss's Realism," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 45(3): 265-83.

———. 2017. "The Immanent Potential of Economic Integration: A Critical Reading of the Eurozone Crisis," 15(2): 396-410.

———. 2016. "Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past: The Politics of Memory as a Research Paradigm," *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4(3): 529-43.

———. 2015. "Expanding Europe through Memory: The Shifting Content of the Ever-Salient Past," *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 43(2): 531-50.

———. 2014a. "Memory and the Euro-Crisis of Leadership: The Effects of Generational Change in Germany and the EU," *Constellations* 21(2): 239-48.

———. 2014b. "Unexpected Support for European Integration: Memory, Totalitarianism and Rupture in Hannah Arendt's Political Theory," *The Review of Politics* 76(3): 389-413.

Waldron, Jeremy. 1999. *Law and Disagreemen*t. Oxford; Oxford University Press.

Williams, Bernard. 2005. *In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argumen*t. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2006. *Philosophy as a Humanistic Disciplin*e. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2004. *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealog*y. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1985. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana.