Article:
Giorgi, C., Moses, J. and Pavan, I. (2020) Remodeling welfare. Social policies between emergencies and renewal. Contemporanea, 23 (4). pp. 507-518. ISSN 1127-3070

https://doi.org/10.1409/99933

From War to Welfare.
Global Perspectives on Twentieth-Century Europe

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This special issue of *Contemporanea*: *Rivista di storia dell' '800 e del '900*, dedicated to the relationship between war and welfare, was completed while the Covid-19 pandemic was invading the lives of tens of millions of people around the world, rapidly changing their lifestyles, priorities, and expectations about the future. The very concepts of safety and risk—concepts that have always been entwined with any theoretical reflection on the welfare state, as well as on its concrete practices—were radically affected.[1] The vastness and complexity of the emergencies to be handled sorely tested the capacity of governments and institutions, both national and supranational, to act and react. They were called on to come up with short and medium-term solutions to defend public health and organize collective healthcare, but also to find tools and policies to deal with the dire economic repercussions, which will bring about an increase in unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The recent pandemic has been an exogenous shock, a classic black swan[2]: an unimaginable, sudden, violent event. A scenario very similar, in some ways, to a global military conflict. And it may be no coincidence the narrative of the clash with the virus provided by the media and social networks over these months has frequently relied on the vocabulary of warfare. Expressions like "war," "trenches" "on the front lines," "battlefield," "line of fire" have been used and abused, sometimes creating a sloppy analogy (which probably does not do much towards helping us understand the unique aspects of this new emergency) with a military context.

A very long-term reconstruction of historical reasons for inequality[3] recently singled out pandemic and war, along with revolution and the collapse of states and empires, as the "Four Horsemen of Leveling" that, almost in spite of themselves, usher in forms of collective redistribution. Global conflicts in particular—like the wars of the twentieth century—are violent shocks, long periods of emergency, that act as an "uniquely powerful catalyst" to propel and spread vast political and social changes, "providing powerful impetus to franchise extensions, unionization, and the expansion of the welfare state."[4]

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[1] On the new scenarios of risk in contemporary society, see U. Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage 1992); for a contextualization of the concept of risk in the evolution of social policies, see J. Moses, E., Rosenhaft, "Moving Targets Risk, Security, and the Social in Twentieth-Century Europe," *Social Science History*, 39 (Spring 2015): 25-37.
[2] N. Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (New York: Random House, 2007).
[3] W. Scheidel, *The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2017.
[4] Ibid., 7.

How, then, has the development of the welfare state been connected to wars? In which specific spheres, and through which institutional and social agents, have conflicts brought about innovation in the welfare policies adopted at the national and international level?[5] With what restrictions and limitations have conflicts remodeled, in whole or in part, the picture of European welfare? Have the effects of war had a repercussion on social policies only in the short term? And, to what extent have these changes to welfare been linked to long-term causal processes?

§. **War, elephants and swans**

In the abundant literature on the welfare state, the question of origins and underlying causes has been extensively addressed. It is usually framed in terms of constitutional history, with the affirmation of social rights; of political history, with the rise of progressive parties and trade union activism; of economic history, with the expansion of industrial capitalism and urbanism; and, as the result of democratization within European nation states, including the expansion of universal suffrage.[6] The involvement of multiple, interdependent factors in the emergence of the welfare state is a well-established idea in studies of the subject. However, the role played by war, as a moment of emergency and as a catalyzing, accelerating factor, has rarely entered into such reconstructions.[7] As F. G. Castles, who in 2010 edited the monumental *Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, critically noted, "'black swans' of war do not get their own chapter" in the 908-page volume. "The impact of emergencies is, at best," he notes, "a very minor theme of welfare state analysis."[8]

This lack of attention to "black swans of war" usually has to do with the emphasis placed on path dependence, that is, the significant influence that institutions and practices of the past exert on the transformations underway. This is a phenomenon that has been particularly evident in the complex institutions set up to implement welfare policies: As Castles notes, "modern welfare states have a massive inertia supplied precisely by the fact that they are an accretion of a vast set of institutional routines established over many, many, decades." In this sense, welfare states have been called "'elephants on the move', rarely significantly thrown off course by particular events."[9] These elephants on the

[5] On the role played by the International Labour Organization, see S. Kott, J. Droux (eds.), *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
[6] See the classic study by P. Flora and A.J. Heidenheimer (eds.), *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981).
[7] Even in those that take a comparative approach, as is quite common in the literature. One recent contribution is H. Obinger, K. Petersen, P. Starke (eds.), *Warfare and Welfare: Military Conflict and Welfare State Developement in Western Countries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); for a discussion of this text, see the essay by Chris Renwick in this dossier.
[8] F. G. Castles, "Black Swans and Elephants on the Move: The Impact of Emergencies on the Welfare State," *Journal of European Social Policy* 20, 2 (May 2010): 92.
[9] Ibid., 93. See also F. G. Castles (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

move[10] "are difficult to divert from their course because their size supplies momentum and their institutional routines supply a thick skin impervious to all but the biggest pinpricks applied repeatedly over long periods of time."[11]

These interpretations, which are based primarily on studies in political science, seem particularly applicable to analyzing welfare systems that already have a long, sedimented history, and thus more pronounced dynamics of path dependence. But the effects of wars—and World War I is a prime example—play out within national contexts that often vary quite a bit in the development of their respective welfare policies and institutions; in this sense, the pre-war scenarios of France, Italy, but also other countries of Central and Eastern Europe were much less consolidated and complex than the situations in Germany or Britain. It is no coincidence that many of the essays collected here refer precisely to World War I and the years just after it. This points to the decisive, driving role that the conflict played in various contexts, which has only recently been highlighted in comparative works such as the volume by H. Obinger, K. Petersen and P. Starke[12]. That role seems even more important in nations that could be called latecomers to the welfare policy arena, and therefore did not have to struggle with the institutional inertia, the significant phenomena of path dependence, that characterized more mature systems of welfare.

This allowed for radically new solutions and paths that, as Paolo Mattera's essay in this volume illustrates, led Italy to abandon many weak policies of the past in that decisive two-year period of 1917-1919. As a consequence, it introduced the new principle of obligatory social insurance and very innovative safeguards such as protection against unemployment, which for the first time in international legislation was also extended to agricultural workers. In France, on the other hand, the conflict led governments to undertake a vast overall reform of the social insurance system, passed after a long legislative process in 1928; this reform was presented by its sponsors as "having arisen the day after the war [...] out of the desire to give those who fought for their country in the trenches, the members of the lower classes who were forced to defend the shared wealth of the nation, the aid that they need in these sad times."[13] For welfare policy, the decisions made during the conflict and (sometimes to an even greater extent) those adopted in the years that followed truly came to stand as one of several chapters in the

[10] The apt metaphor of "elephants on the move" was introduced, specifically, to explain the difficulty of modifying pension systems; see K. Hinrichs, "Elephants on the Move: Patterns of Public Pension Reform in OECD Countries," in S. Leibfried (ed.) *Welfare State Futures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 77–102.

[11] Castles, "Black Swans and Elephants on the Move," 92. This view has been widely shared by historians of the welfare state, especially to account for the relative stagnation of US welfare reform in the twentieth century. See for example J. S. Hacker, *The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[12] H. Obinger, K. Petersen, P. Starke, *Warfare and Welfare.* However, the authors themselves acknowledge that "the very limited data availability" still "precludes sophisticated analysis" of the impact of WWI, especially on post–war social spending; Ibid. 436.

[13] These are the words of deputy L. Bonnevay, see *Débats parlamentaires: Chambres des députés*, April 17, 1930, p. 1945.

long, delicate transition from war to peace that historiographers now tend to call the *sortie de guerre*.[14]

Yet this transitional phase, up to now, has been explored by historical studies of the welfare state mostly in regard to specific, individual fields such as assistance for children and mothers, or the reintegration of veterans and management of their disabilities from a medical and social standpoint.[15] For that matter, it was in relation to veterans, in particular, that World War I definitely ended up reinforcing the two main principles of the welfare state: that of the social contract, and that of the social debt. As Pierre Rosanvallon has pointed out, it was with the Great War that the existence of the individual's "social debt" towards the community was established, and along with it, the central role of the state as the "producer of security when faced with radical risk."[16]

The literature regarding World War II and its links to the development of the welfare state differs somewhat, in part because—as Chris Renwick's article shows—the causal relationship between WWII and the development of a complex, modern welfare system was highlighted early on by studies of the British system. And so the idea that "welfare and warfare went hand in hand"[17] has held a firm place in contemporary analysis, becoming "a general feature of the historiography on the topic."[18] Since the 1950s, the work of sociologists like Richard Titmuss has emphasized, often in a way that can be misleading about the actual British situation before the war, how the experience of WWII served as an incubator for later welfare policies. In a literature with celebratory overtones, the conflict has been portrayed as the cradle of the Beveridge Report and the precondition—since it involved managing emergencies related to evacuations, provisions and healthcare—for completely new institutional solutions to arise.[19] Though this portrayal has been challenged,[20] for a long time a sort of interpretive paradigm could nonetheless be seen in which the British model became a yardstick for judging and measuring the evolution and characteristics of all other postwar welfare states.

This yardstick was inevitably Anglocentric. Forgetting that "modern war did not put everyone in the same boat,"[21] it risked obscuring the unique paths followed by other nations and how World War II had played, or failed to play, a part in them. It was a model that tended to underestimate—even in the case of Britain itself—the elements of

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[14] S. Audoin-Rouzeau, C. Prochasson (eds.), *Sortir de la Grande Guerre: le monde et l'après-1918*, Paris, 2008; B. Cabanes, G. Piketty, "Sortir de la guerre: jalons pour une histoire en chantier," *Histoire@Politique* 3, 3 (2007).

[15] On the latter, see for example, D. Cohen, *The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); H. Perry, *Recycling the Disabled: Army, Medicine and Modernity in WWI Germany* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).

[16] P. Rosanvallon, *La Société des égaux* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2011), 186. But on this topic, see also A. Rasmussen, "Protéger la société de la guerre: de l'assistance aux «droits sur la nation»," special issue of *Grande guerre et protection sociale, Revue d'histoire de la protection sociale* 1, 9 (2016a): 9-24.

[17] T. Judd, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London, Heinemann, 2005), 73-78.

[18] See C. Renwick, *Infra*, ….

[19] R. M. Titmuss, *Problems of Social Policy* (London: Longmans, Greens, 1950); Id. "War and social policy," in *Essays on the Welfare State* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), 75-88.

[20] D. Edgerton, *The rise and fall of the British nation* (London: Allen Lane, 2018); Id. *Warfare state: Britain 1920–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[21] D. Edgerton, "War and the Development of the British Welfare State," in H. Obinger, P. Starke, K. Petersen, *Warfare and Welfare,* 226.

continuity in the structure of different welfare states, concentrating instead on the elements of rupture.[22] And for a long time, it led to a failure to emphasize sufficiently another effect of war on the evolution of post-1945 welfare models: the influence that the Cold War had in both a political/ideological and a practical sense, which is a topic that has inspired a new branch of research in recent years.[23] In this way, as the essay by Mirjam Galley in this volume illustrates, in the case of the USSR, too, World War II at first glance seemed like a game changer for social policy, even if more complicated dynamics were at hand. The war deaths and devastation it had brought, as well as the new international role of the Soviet Union as a victorious global player, appeared to force the leadership's hand in designing social reforms to improve general living conditions—although, as recent scholarship has shown, much of the rhetoric surrounding those reforms was exaggerated. And for countries like Francoist Spain, which famously remained neutral during World War II, the experience of civil war, and its devastating demographic consequences, became a turning point for many social policies, especially regarding aid to mothers and children and to families, as is highlighted here by Angela Cenarro.

§ War, transnational vectors and the role of the state

Reflecting on the relationship between welfare and warfare also means asking questions about how conflicts served to encourage or accelerate the exchange of ideas, the spread of border-crossing languages, and the emulation of principles and concepts related to social policies.[24] Given the transnational turn that has also affected welfare state studies in recent years, scholars have already identified—to borrow the apt wording suggested by Christoph Conrad[25]—various "transnational vectors" that have helped guide the study of the welfare state beyond the traditional limits and boundaries of national

[22] It is a well-known fact that the Beveridge Report itself was primarily an attempt to reorganize and rationalize the British legislation on social insurance and assistance that had built up in the years between the wars; see N. Whiteside, "The Beveridge Report and Its Implementation: a Revolutionary Project?," *Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société*, no. 24 (September-December 2014).

[23] See K. Petersen, "The Early Cold War and the Western Welfare State," *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 29, 3 (2013): 226-240; H. Obinger, C. Schmitt, "Guns and Butter? Regime Competition and the Welfare State during the Cold War," *World Politics* 63, 2 (April 2011): 246-270; Y.S. Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); H. Obinger, K. Petersen, P. Starke, *Warfare and Welfare*, 448-456.

[24] Emulation (i.e., the desire to bring a nation's institutions up to the standards of model or competitor nations) has been identified as one of the prime mechanisms involved in the transnational diffusion of welfare principles and institutions. Other factors are harmonization (i.e., the drive to synchronize a nation's institutions with those of others in order to facilitate trade or investment or administrative efficiency) and penetration by coercion. See F. Dobbin, B. Simmons, and G. Garrett, "The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33 (2007): 449-72.

[25] C. Conrad, "Social Policy History after the Transnational Turn," in P. Kettunen, K. Petersen (eds.), *Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 228; see also M. Herren, "Sozialpolitik und die Historisierung des Transnationalen," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32, 4, (2006): 542–59. With a sociological approach: A. Abbott, S. DeViney, The Welfare State as Transnational Event: Evidence from Sequences of Policy Adoption," in *Social Science History* 16, 2 (Summer, 1992): 245-274.

history. This long list includes the circulation of models;[26] the activity of international organizations and forums of transnationalization, and with it the role played by epistemic communities and networks of experts in humanitarian assistance; the significance of transnational law and norms; the interconnections between the global dimension (imperial, colonial and post-colonial) and the scenarios of European welfare;[27] the transnationalism of disease in peacetime and wartime;[28] and, not least, the impact of mobile groups such as refugees, expellees and migrants.

Social protection for migrant workers is the subject of the article by Federico Del Giudice and Giulio Francisci in this volume, which reconstructs the Italian-French talks that led in 1919 to a bilateral agreement between the two countries regarding social protection for migrants, an agreement that in the years that followed became an international model. Rendered even more urgent by the economic fallout of the conflict, the competition over the management of labor that developed between sending states and receiving states made migrant workers, and the protection of their rights, a pivotal issue just after the war. The various governments' handling of this question, which was closely entwined with problems related to citizenship and which contributed to the diffusion of the principle of reciprocity in postwar international law, involved constant tension between nationalism and universalism, and thus between bilateral and multilateral solutions.

The persistence of bilateral treaties as a favorite tool for negotiating and managing safeguards in the field of migrant rights returns our attention to the decisive role of the nation state in welfare. Although as Daniel Rodgers has emphasized, "the history of social policy is in the midst of a global and transnational turn,"[29] all the articles in this issue still point to the central role of the (nation-)state, its goals, and its specific interests.[30] While the traditional state-centered explanations "rest now within awareness that the policy initiatives to which state actors responded were never confined within their borders," but circulated "across nations and empires to be adapted, modified, remade, repudiated, or re-imagined,"[31] there is no question that in studies of the welfare state, the nation state is still center stage. Despite similar experiences of the war, the domestic politics and different social conditions of the various countries had a key influence on the separate evolution of their welfare policies. Not least, "conceptions within each government about

[26] Regarding the circulation of the British model in China, during WWII and in the years immediately afterwards, see see T. Ma, "'The Common Aim of the Allied Powers': Social Policy and International Legitimacy in Wartime China, 1940–47," *Journal of Global History* 9 (2014): 254–275.
[27] On the guidelines adopted by the ILO for the development of welfare systems in post-colonial contexts, see D. Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization (ILO) 1940-1970* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012);
[28] See P. Baldwin, *Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); E. Charter, *Disease, War, and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces During the Seven Years' War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
[29] D. T. Rodgers, "Bearing Tales: Networks and Narratives in Social Policy Transfer," *Journal of Global History* 9 (2014): 301.
[30] On this subject, see in general P. B. Evans, D. Reuschemeyer, T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). On the importance of national context in comparatively assessing the evolution of welfare systems, see J. Moses, *The First Modern Risk: Workplace Accidents and the Origin of European Social States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[31] Rodgers, *Bearing Tales*, 301.

the role of the state and the function of the law in mediating social problems proved decisive."[32]

In this sense, even when the new notion of "social security"—designating a broader and more universal model of welfare state—achieved global diffusion in the postwar period, "the concept took on different meanings in different countries."[33] As Paolo Mattera's essay documents, although Italy and France shared a similar experience of WWI, their welfare outcomes remained dissimilar, showing that the same problems did not lead to the same results. One need only think of the new territories that entered the boundaries of the two countries: Alsace and Lorraine, for France, and the northeast of the peninsula, for Italy. In both cases, these were areas that had long been equipped with social legislation that was more sophisticated and extensive than the French and Italian laws. The question of how to harmonize social policies nationwide—as well as the problem of consensus and political legitimacy with regard to a recently annexed population—sparked the debate in France that led to reform in 1928. The Fascist government, on the other hand, decided in 1925-26 to extend Italy's less advanced legislation to its newly annexed territories, depriving its new citizens of the safeguards they previously enjoyed. In this respect, as Chris Renwick reminds us, "we are brought to ask whether the histories of welfare states are highly specific, with each country having its own individual story to tell, or if there are transnational issues that play similar roles everywhere." As we look for an answer, we think it is wise in any case to heed the warning that "turning one's back on the national format of the welfare states of the twentieth and twenty first centuries might be a premature move."[34]

§ War, the family and renewal

Despite the transnational movement of people and ideas, as well as shifts towards international standards and coordination, that flowed out of war, welfare states therefore remained largely national affairs. On the surface, this tendency was especially evident when it came to social measures targeting the family. Since at least the late eighteenth century, the family had increasingly come to be seen in Europe another area that could be "policed" as part of a broader policy of population management[35]—through new social statistics and social services, schools, and healthcare programs targeting issues like infant mortality, alongside new jurisprudence that opened up what had previously often been considered private relations within the household. At the same time, the family took on a new normative function as the embodiment of national culture, and, as such, something that needed special protection and cultivation. This could be seen in areas ranging from

[32] Moses, *The First Modern Risk*, 258.
[33] M. Lengwiler, "Cultural Meanings of Social Security in Postwar Europe," *Social Science History* 39, 1 (March 2015): 88.
[34] Conrad, *Social Policy History after the Transnational Turn*, 221.
[35] J. Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

marriage law to imperial policies on interracial relations.[36] This tendency to exalt the family, and to make it the target of special social policies, was exacerbated in times of war. War—especially the total wars of the twentieth century—cut across supposed divides between public and private, including the boundaries between the family, the nation and the state. The contributions to this special issue highlight three facets of this trend. They suggest that, above all, the connection between war and welfare when it came to the family emphasized processes of renewal, rebirth and regeneration after conflict (as well as the ability to withstand and conquer in future battles).

As early as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, a general pattern connecting war and welfare began to emerge: fears of population decline and degeneration. The conflict, which saw Prussia quickly defeat its large neighbor, set off waves of anxiety in France about low birth rates and children's wellbeing in general, feeding into movements to promote childhood health in France and its overseas empire, encourage larger families, and ensure that families were well cared for both in terms of finances and in terms of childcare provisions.[37] France was by no means alone in these concerns. The Boer War of 1902-4—an embarrassing near defeat for Britain in South Africa—led to nationwide reflections on the health of the population, as British recruits seemed physically ill equipped for battle. Measures to improve children's wellbeing, from physical fitness at school to school meals and infant milk dispensaries, were all seen as a means of addressing Britain's potential wartime deficiencies.[38]

These anxieties reached unprecedented levels across Europe during World War I and fed into decades of social policies that supported pronatalism, eugenics and specific ideals of the family, including men's and women's roles as fathers and mothers. The war, which saw over nine million servicemen killed across Europe, fueled fears of a "lost generation" of bright young men who would need to be replaced.[39] These concerns were not unique to policy makers or social commentators, as Lukas Grawe and Nikolas Dörr argue in their contribution to this collection. As Germany's birth rate began to stall in the early twentieth century, dipping further during the war, the country's military leadership took note. A 1917 memo from its Supreme Army Command went as far as to say, "worse than the war is the decline of our population caused by the decline of our birth rate. This

[36] E. Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (eds.), *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991), 86-106; K. Celello and H. Kholoussy (eds.), *Domestic Tensions, National Anxieties: Global Perspectives on Marriage, Crisis, and Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[37] On these issues, see for example: M. C. Andersen, *Regeneration through Empire: French Pronatalists and Colonial Settlement in the Third Republic* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015); L. L. Downs, *Childhood in the Promised Land: Working-Class Movements and the Colonies de Vacances in France, 1880-1960* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

[38] G. R. Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971); J. Vernon, "The Ethics of Hunger and the Assembly of Society: The Techno-Politics of the School Meal in Modern Britain," *American Historical Review* 110, 3 (2005): 693-725.

[39] On the contours of these discussions: M. S. Teitelbaum and J. M. Winter, *The Fear of Population Decline* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1985). These concerns could already be seen during the war. See for example: L. Bryder, "Mobilising Mothers: The 1917 National Baby Week," *Medical History* 63, 1 (2019): 2-23;

is the greatest danger."[40] Despite this strong warning, due to Germany's defeat, ensuing regime change, and financial crisis, little was done to address the issue until the Weimar Republic became firmly established. Even then, it was only under National Socialism—with its preoccupation about cultivating a eugenically fit population—that pronatalist policies came to the fore.[41]

The National Socialist concern with population health was part of a pan-European anxiety during the interwar era that stretched from Scandinavia to Britain, and from totalitarian regimes like those in Germany, the USSR, Italy, and Spain to the other side of the political spectrum.[42] The shadow of the First World War—alongside other conflicts during this era, including the Spanish Civil War—meant that worries about population health as it related to wartime capacity (and postwar regeneration) rarely faded from view. And, these concerns were especially pronounced in what Pat Thane and Gisela Bock have termed an "authoritarian" model of the welfare state.[43] As Angela Cenarro argues in her contribution on Francoist Spain, "pronatalism was not exclusively a component of fascist dictatorships, but the most comprehensive version of pronatalism arose [there] because they identified with greatest clarity a connection between the strength of the nation and a desire for imperial expansion..." This involved a "specific politics that reinforced the maternal role of women." While many of Francoist Spain's policies and institutions continued pre-Civil War traditions and tropes, this emphasis on maternalism and pronatalism was now especially pronounced, perhaps because of how it associated republicans and those on the left with racial "degeneration."

Worries about degeneration—and the parallel hope to strengthen the nation—stretched beyond initiatives geared toward infants and mothers to those aimed at rescuing older children as well. This could be seen especially clearly in the Soviet Union, which established an extensive network of institutions to assist war orphans and other children requiring residential care. As Mirjam Galley shows in her contribution, Khrushchev's 1958 reform of residential childcare was a "means to police deviance, monitor people's behavior, and raise the next generations loyal to the Soviet cause—all of which without resorting to Stalin-era terror." This movement was driven, in part, by the ongoing effects of World War II, as well as the new Cold War landscape. In the USSR, the warfare state and the welfare state were, to a degree, intertwined, at least on a rhetorical level, in that social measures like children's homes were often conducted out of concern for

[40] "Denkschrift der OHL über die deutsche Volks- und Wehrkraft," 1917, BA-MA, PH 3/446, p. 1, quoted in Lukas Grawe and Nikolas Dörr, "Military Influence on German Pronatalism before and during World War One," in this volume.

[41] On continuities and ruptures in this area from WWI into the Weimar Republic and National Socialism, see P. Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); M. Mouton, *From Nurturing the Nation to Purifying the Volk: Weimar and Nazi Family Policy, 1918-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[42] M. S. Quine, *Population Politics in Twentieth-Century Europe: Fascist Dictatorships and Liberal Democracies* (London: Routledge, 1996); A. Spektorowski, "The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism: Sweden, Germany, and the Soviet Union," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, 1 (2004): 84-106; A. T. Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Western Europe, 1890-1970: The Maternal Dilemma* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[43] See G. Bock and P. Thane (eds.), *Maternity and Gender Policies: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States 1880s-1950s* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

maintaining "public order". These concerns continued long after the end of Stalinism, reaching well into the 1970s. And, yet, due to the Cold War context, the public admission of children's problems—poor schooling, delinquency, missing parents—remained taboo. Only in capitalist societies, it seemed, did such things occur. In this sense, the Soviet Union's trope of postwar and Cold War-era degeneration echoed that of Francoist Spain: for Spain, pronatalism was a way forward, while the USSR instead focused on reforming wayward youth.

Concerns about reforming or rescuing children were intimately tied to projects of national renewal. And yet they also emerged from a growing international movement that saw children as innocents who deserved a special kind of humanitarian intervention that was universal, rather than national or exclusionary, in scope. This could be seen after World War I, throughout the early interwar era, and after World War II, also informing Cold War politics, as Tara Zahra, Sara Fieldston and others have shown in a range of important work.[44] Organizations like Save the Children emerged alongside initiatives within international bodies like the League of Nations to provide famine relief and other forms of aid, including the wartime rehoming and postwar repatriation of children. As Nicoleta Roman shows in her contribution, post-WWI Romania became the object of both domestic and international efforts to address its large number of postwar orphans. She shows how, for Romanian authorities, taking care of war orphans was part of a project of national redemption, while for humanitarian organizations—especially from Britain and the United States—it was "an endeavour of civilizing aid" that attempted to keep Romanian children within the sphere of Western influence and stability, and prevent the country from falling prey to revolution or Bolshevism.

Welfare measures targeting children were thus part of an effort to preserve broader social norms and prevent even more radical social change from ensuing in the wake of war. Indeed, as a number of scholars have shown, postwar social initiatives often targeted the family, including children, as a means of instilling conservative values, including ideals about gender roles and generational differences. For example, a number of countries reinstated marriage bars on women's work after the First and Second World Wars, while others sought to support women's roles as stay-at-home mothers through taxes and child benefit.[45] Despite the ostensible radicalism of the Bolshevik Revolution, even the USSR eventually turned away from the Leninist vision of equal gender rights

[44] T. Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); T. Zahra, *The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe's Families after World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); J. F. Irwin, "Sauvons les Bébés: Child Health and U.S. Humanitarian Aid in the First World War Era," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 86, 1 (2012): 37-65; E. Baughan, "'Every Citizen of Empire Implored to Save the Children!': Empire, Internationalism and the Save the Children Fund in Interwar Britain," *Historical Research* 86, 231 (2013): 116-37; S. Fieldston, *Raising the World: Child Welfare in the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

[45] On these issues, see, for example, R. G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); C. Briar, *Working for Women? Gendered Work and Welfare Policies in Twentieth-Century Britain* (London: UCL Press, 1997); E. D. Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). These initiatives and attitudes naturally also came up against backlash and alternative visions for postwar families. See Allen, *Feminism and motherhood*, ch. 9.

towards preserving more traditional, heteronormative familial roles. During the Cold War, battles over radicalism and traditionalism within the family—and the role of social policy in guiding these values—continued on both sides of the Iron Curtain, feeding into discussions of childrearing, love and sexuality as well as women's roles within and outside the home.[46]

The conservatism of wartime and postwar measures aimed at the family leads to broader questions about the nature of the connection between war and welfare. To what extent were wartime and postwar social provisions bound by path dependencies—in terms of institutions, ideas and individuals who had already been involved in some way with thinking about and governing "welfare"? Do external shocks—black swans—like war change social values and associated social policies in the longer term? And what effect, if any, do these changes have on the nature of the relationship between states and citizens, and on the relationship between individuals and broader global networks and forces that govern social welfare? The contributions to this theme issue attempt to shed new light on these questions, and to open up a systematic and sustained conversation about them.

[46] See, for example: A. F. Timm, *The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-Century Berlin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chs. 6-8; J. McLellan, *Love in the Time of Communism: Intimacy and Sexuality in the GDR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).