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Inclusive citizenship and degenderization: A comparison of state support in 22 European countries

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[Correction added on 03 March 2021 after first online publication. The reference details for Kremer 2007 were inadvertently included in the Abstract section and have been removed in this current version.]

Abstract

This paper argues that welfare state progress needs to be based upon support for "inclusive citizenship" – the right to care, work and earn. Comparative analyses of welfare have often focused on defamilization to capture these dimensions. But inclusive citizenship requires challenging gender roles in both work (public sphere) *and* care (private sphere), and thus the paper argues that the concept of degenderization is a more suitable analytical tool. This paper adds to our understanding by operationalizing the concept of degenderization to compare how (far) 22 European countries degenderize. Indeed, it goes further to examine not just how *much* welfare states degenderize but *how* – whether they focus on degendering *both* work and care, crucial for "inclusive citizenship". To examine how states degenderize, it uses a new way of classifying welfare states by examining policy packages using radar charts. It examines how much they degenderize against a yardstick, using the Surface Measure of Overall Performance approach. Seven welfare types were identified, but none fully supported inclusive citizenship. Indeed, the country clusters identified in this study differ from those found by previous studies, challenging commonly held views about which countries ought to be seen as key exemplars. This reflects the paper's distinctive

focus on inclusive citizenship – capturing support for degendering care and work – and that it compares countries on the basis of their policy packages. It also examines how approach to and generosity of degenderization are related to gender equality outcomes.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Feminist analysts of the welfare state have sought to understand how far social policies sustain the male breadwinner/ female housewife carer model of the family. Defamilization has been the common analytical tool used to examine this. Lister (1994) coined the term defamilization as "the degree to which individuals can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of family relationships" (Lister, 1994, p. 37). Esping-Andersen defined it slightly differently as "the degree in which households" welfare and care responsibilities are relaxed' (Esping Andersen, 1999, p. 51). Whilst defamilization can be more comprehensively and multi-dimensionally understood (Zagel & Lohmann, 2020), much of the research to date on welfare regime analysis has adopted a narrow definition that focused on the care responsibilities of the family. This culminates from the feminist critiques of Esping Andersen's (1990) 'Three Worlds of Welfare' that highlighted how he ignored gender and gender role norms within the breadwinner/female care model of the family and ultimately the differential impact that these have on the welfare for women and men. The research that has developed from this body of work has adopted a defamilization perspective focusing on the role of the state in unburdening women from their care responsibilities within the family so they can be active in the labour market, that is, in commodifying women (Korowska, 2018). The policy solutions linked to this have generally focused on *removing* care from the family rather than directly challenging the gender division of unpaid care work in the private sphere. However, to enable mothers to access paid work, we need to more directly tackle gender roles within the family, encourage men to care, value care in its own right and thus incorporate care, as well as work, into "inclusive citizenship" – the right to care, work and earn (Kremer, 2007). To support "inclusive citizenship", policy needs to actively challenge the existing gender role norms in unpaid as well as paid work – to degenderize – otherwise the status quo is likely to continue with men and women not equally achieving access to paid work and care. Saxonberg (2013) argued that the concept of degenderization would more directly measure how well welfare state policies, such as parental leave, tackle gender role norms within the family. This paper adds to our understanding by aiming to operationalize the concept of degenderization to compare how (far) 22 European countries degenderize – promote the elimination of gender roles (Saxonberg (2013, p. 7) – in both the public and private sphere.

Indeed, it adds further original contribution to the debate by examining not just *how much* welfare states degenderize but *how* – whether they focus on degendering both work *and* care, crucial for "inclusive citizenship".

2 | FROM DEFAMILIZATION TO INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP

Welfare states analysts have used citizenship as a yardstick to classify regimes into types. Inevitably, how citizenship is defined influences how welfare states are assessed. Esping Andersen's (1990) classic welfare regime typology was based upon the extent that welfare states decommodify labour and enable citizens to live independently from the market. This has attracted criticism because it was based upon the mainstream definition that assumes social

citizenship rights are attached to labour market participation but ignores how the gender division of labour within the family has limited women's integration into paid work. Feminists responded by focusing on the extent that welfare state regimes enable women to access paid work and employment-based welfare state provision on an equal basis as men (e.g., Lewis, 1992; Lister, 1994; Orloff, 1993), using the analytical framework defamilization and familization. Defamilizing policies reduce the care responsibilities of the family (mother) with states and markets filling the gap to enable women to take up paid work (Lister, 1994; Esping Andersen, 1999. Familistic policies encourage the families caring function and thus are assumed to support the male-breadwinner, female carer model of the family. Various researchers have built defamilization indexes, ranking and grouping countries into welfare types according to "how well" they defamilize (e.g., Bambra, 2004; Ferrarini, 2006; Gornick et al., 1997; Kroger, 2011; Lohmann & Zegal, 2016).

Defamilization recognizes that women undertake a disproportionate share of unpaid care work, reducing their access to financial autonomy. Arguably, however, the concept adopts a "Cinderella approach" that assumes care is a "burden" and a "problem" needing to be solved by extra-familial childcare "freeing" women to access paid employment (Kremer, 2007). By doing so, it only indirectly addresses how the gender division of care in the private sphere limits equality in the public sphere (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014; Ciccia & Verloo, 2012). Defamilization therefore does not fully recognize how the "burden" of care continues and is potentially magnified, when women enter paid work – even the most generous extra-familial childcare will not wholly solve the "problem" of care (Ciccia & Verloo, 2012). The "independence" of paid work can lead to a "double shift" as mothers return from the public sphere of work to undertake the caring role in the private sphere. The "burden" of care is thus intensified, leading to reduced work opportunities and women withdrawing or reducing labour market attachment – women are unable to be fully defamilized.

By problematizing care, the concept of defamilization overlooks the importance of care for society as a form of welfare that everyone needs. In both the mainstream and defamilization definitions of citizenship, carers are given a lower citizenship status than those in paid work. Care is undervalued and consequently remains gendered. To reduce the "burden" of care, care needs to be valued as a social right in itself rather than as a condition for paid labour (Cantillon, Ghysels, Mussche, & Van Dam, 2001; Ciccia & Verloo, 2012; Knijn & Kremer, 1997). This requires adopting the "snow white" approach – care as a pleasure – as well as the "Cinderella" approach – care as a burden (Kremer, 2007). If care is valued as a right in itself, it will become less feminized by giving men the *right* to care, increasing men's *opportunities* and enabling them to be less tied to traditional "male" roles – both in the private and public sphere. If citizenship is about participation in all aspects of life, including caring, working and earning (Fraser, 1989), then the lack of *opportunity* to participate in one aspect would be a denial of full citizenship. This is what Kremer defines as "inclusive citizenship".

3 | WELFARE STATES AND "INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP"

For welfare states to support "inclusive citizenship", they need to (a) support female paid work *and* male care and (b) actively challenge gender role norms. Saxonberg (2013) argues it therefore makes more "sense to talk about gendering and degenderizing policies rather than familizing and defamilizing policies" which only assess one side of the equation (pp. 7). The concept of degenderization enables welfare states to be analysed in terms of how far they challenge the gender role norms in both the public and private sphere – how far they support paid work *and* care as citizenship rights for men *and* women.

A key reason to focus on degenderization rather than defamilization is that since the latter overlooks the value of care as a social right, it tends to view highly familistic welfare states negatively, assuming they will strengthen the caring role of women and reproduce the gendered division of labour (Leitner, 2003). However, some familistic policies such as parental leave (a) are not automatically familizing or defamilizing (Saxonberg, 2013) and (b) can challenge gender roles by promoting men's role in care (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014). Reflecting this ambiguity, some studies view parental leave as defamilizing (Bambra, 2004), whereas others include it as familizing. Michon (2008) identifies positive care familization (carers are supported to care at home, so that parental caring is optional for *working*

parents), as opposed to negative familization (when parents care rather than undertake paid work due to the lack of state support to do so). However, Michon does not include male care in positive care familization, explicitly excluding paternity leaves from the analysis. There are examples where paternity leave is deemed positive familism (e.g., Daly & Schweiwe, 2010), but generally in the literature, men's care is treated as a means to facilitate women's defamilization, rather than as a means to degender the care role per se.

In this sense, defamilization is limited as an analytical tool for assessing state support for "inclusive citizenship". The concept of degenderization overcomes this. It recognizes that familizing policies can be pivotal in enabling both men and women to enjoy "inclusive citizenship" – the right to work *and* the right to care. So, defamilization *and* familization can be positive, as long as they degender – actively challenge the gender division of labour – and do so alongside each other. There is thus value in empirically assessing the extent to which welfare states support degenderization rather than defamilization. This paper aims to do this across European nations. We turn next to the question of how such an empirical assessment might proceed.

4 | OPERATIONALIZING DEGENDERIZATION

Saxonberg (2013) operationalizes the concept of degenderization to an extent – but "focuses on "re-theorization" rather than empirical details of each country" (pp. 9). When empirically measuring the extent to which welfare states seek to support degenderization, it is important to choose indicators that measure policy rather than outcomes (J. Javornik, 2014; Saxonberg, 2013). This is because these measure two different issues – the former is state support whereas the latter is the result of these – but also of other factors such as culture – and thus does not necessarily measure state support for degenderization or, at least, not directly. It is also important to choose policy indicators that explicitly challenge gender role norms. Policies, such as leave rights, that are not in themselves gendering may result in gendered outcomes given the culture of gender role norms within society. We focus on policies that challenge gender role norms during the transition to parenthood and for those caring for preschool children. Whilst gender inequalities in care need to be challenged throughout the life course, shared care when children are very young will likely have an impact beyond (Duvander et al., 2020; Unterhofer & Wrohlich, 2017). We will explore how degenderization – both men's caring role and women's access to paid work – can be measured and outline the six indicators that comprise the degenderization policy index used in this paper. A benchmark of a best and worst possible score is identified for each indicator. Raw data for each indicator can be found in Figure A1. Data are from the OECD Family Database unless otherwise indicated. The sample comprised all European countries covered by this database, excluding those for which key indicators were unavailable. This left 22 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, German, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

4.1 | Degendering paid work in the public sphere

When analysing how welfare states degenderize paid work, there has been a tendency for analysts to include the proportion of pre-school children attending day care as an indicator of childcare policy. However, this is likely to be measuring policy outcomes rather than policy inputs, because "day care" includes both public and private sector care and because wider influences other than policy such as cultural norms and socio-economic factors (including ability to pay) will impact take-up (J. Javornik, 2014). So, attendance may differ between countries with the same amount of public support for day care, and it is not therefore a reliable measure of *welfare state* support for degenderization (Saxonberg, 2013).

The state can influence the availability of childcare through childcare guarantees. Whilst this reflects a right to receive (institutional) care financially organized by the state, this right to receive care guarantees that citizens can participate in employment and earn income. It challenges the gender roles norms by enabling the main carer, normally women, the right *not* to care in order to take up their right to employment (Kremer, 2007). A fulltime childcare guarantee (for pre-schoolers) is best for enabling mothers to take up paid work. A guarantee only for older pre-schoolers or for a few hours a week is an indication childcare is provided more for educational or social needs of children rather than maternal employment. In this paper, we use two measures multiplied together to create an indicator of a full childcare guarantee. The first measures the age when a pre-school childcare guarantee begins in 2012/13 (source, Eurydice, 2014).[1] In the index, welfare states were scored according to the age from which they guarantee childcare – under the age of 1 scoring 5, from age 1–2 scoring 4, age 2–3, scoring 3, age 3–4 scoring 2 and from age 4 to compulsory school age scoring 1. The final group scored 0 because either they did not guarantee childcare or were selective. The second indicator is the number of hours per week childcare is guaranteed, which was capped at 40 hours a week; Eurydice does not capture guarantees beyond 40 hr. The most degenderizing score is therefore 200 (5 (guarantee from under age 1) × 40 hours), the least was 0.[2]

Take up of paid work is influenced by the costs of childcare and the financial benefits of entering paid work for second earners (usually mothers). High childcare costs impact heavily upon the financial incentives for mothers (with pre-school children) to enter paid work, and they can negate earnings gained by a second earner (Esping Andersen, 2002), but welfare states can step in to mitigate the effects of childcare costs. Welfare states can also ensure work pays via careful design of tax and benefit systems and through mitigating the loss of out of work and income tested benefits. To measure the financial incentive for mothers to enter work, we use the childcare participation tax rate (CPTR) calculated by OECD for a second earner moving from labour market inactivity into full-time employment with 67% average earnings using a scenario where their two children are aged 2 and 3 and their spouse has earnings equal to 100% of average earnings in 2015. The CPTR is the proportion of prospective gross earnings that would be "taxed" away and also includes the influence of childcare fees alongside tax burdens and benefit withdrawals.[3] If the CPTR is high, a large proportion of the second earner's gross earnings will be taxed way/lost to childcare fees, creating a financial disincentive to take up paid work. A CPTR of 100% would mean second earners would keep none of their earnings. In our sample, the CPTR of 102% in the UK was taken as the benchmark for the least degendering score partly because it was the worst in the sample and partly because a CPTR above 100% would mean that the second earner enters paid work at their own expense. The most degendering score is 0 as this would mean the second earner keeps all their earnings and thus a high financial incentive to move into paid employment.

Maternity leave protects women's right to paid work after taking a break for caring rights when they have (more) children (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). A gender leave gap indicator discussed in the next section recognizes that maternity leave can however serve to genderize if the leave is lengthy, and whilst the length at which leave shifts from a benefit to a detriment is debateable, there are documented negative effects of lengthy leaves on maternal employment and the gender pay gap (see e.g., Ruhm, 1998). At the same time, low or unpaid leaves are unlikely to grant full citizenship either as citizens will have to negotiate paid work and care at their own expense (Kremer, 2007). Thus, the non-transferable maternity leave average wage replacement rate in 2016 is included in the index to reflect this. This indicator captures the proportion of previous earnings replaced by maternity leave benefit over the duration of the paid leave entitlement for a person earning 100% of average national earnings. It ranges from 0, when the maternity leave is unpaid to 100% when the mother is paid the equivalent of her full wage whilst on leave.

4.2 | Degenderizing care in the private sphere

Familistic policies can be degendering if they (a) actively challenge the gender role norms and (b) enable the right to care and earn an income. Familisitic policies, such as transferable gender neutral leaves, that allow the family to organize work and care will likely lead to gendered outcomes; evidence suggesting they do not increase fathers'

participation in care work since it is usually the mother who takes the leave (Bergman & Hobson, 2002; Bruning & Plantenga, 1999). On the other hand, non-transferable leave can challenge existing norms by allocating separate leave rights to fathers or by allocating equal individual rights to mothers and fathers.[4] To capture this, we compute a gender leave gap, which compares all employment protected paid leave available to mothers (including home childcare leaves), and all *non-transferable* paid leave for fathers in order to compare whether states support paternal and maternal care on an equal basis. Both duration of leave and average wage replacement rate have been accounted for to assess generosity. It is assumed that women will take up transferable or shared leave, even if the replacement rate is relatively high. Thus, only leave that is specifically allocated to the father, and will be lost if he does not take it, is included in the index as this is more likely to encourage take up by fathers. The gender leave gap captures how equal leaves are in lengths and replacement rates. It is calculated as follows: weeks of paid leave reserved for father*average wage replacement rate/weeks of paid leave available to mothers*average wage replacement rate. The highest score is 1, when the mother and father are entitled to an equal combination of payment and leave length. The lowest is 0 when no paid paternity leave exists. Theoretically, if paternity leave was more generous than maternity, then the highest score would rise above 1, but this is not the case for any of the countries in our sample.

Given gendered assumptions about masculine roles, it is also unlikely gendered outcomes will be challenged without high wage replacement and flexibility of leave since these are well-documented ways in which states can encourage increased fathers' take-up of leave (Bruning & Plantenga, 1999; Wilkinson, Radley, Christie, Lawson, & Sainsbury, 1997). Economists argue that it is more economically rational for women rather than men to take parental leave, given gender pay gaps (Björnberg, 2002). If the benefit is paid at less than full earnings, the absolute income lost will increase with higher (usually male) earnings. Thus, a high-wage replacement rate will serve to encourage, and enable, fathers to take leave up. We therefore include the average replacement rate for all non-transferable leave for fathers – not just immediately post birth (2016). The highest rate is 100% of earnings replaced. The lowest is 0 if transferable paternity leave either does not exist or is unpaid.

Research indicates that even when the economic costs of fathers taking leave are negligible, take up is still low. It may be that fathers will be less willing than mothers to take a complete break from the labour market to undertake full-time care since paid work is deeply engendered (Björnberg, 2002). Thus it is important that leave is flexible (e.g. that working hours can be reduced) in order to enable fathers to access their right to care alongside their right to paid work. We therefore compare flexibility of paid individual non-transferable paternity leave (Source: International Network on Leave Policies and Research, 2016) based on whether there are options for leave to be taken (a) on a part-time basis (b) in one or several blocks, (c) for a shorter period with a higher benefit or longer with lower benefit and (d) at any time until a child reaches a certain age. A score of 1 is given for each of these, a range of 4 if all exist through to 0 if no (paid) paternity leave exists or if the leave is not flexible.

Table 1 summarizes the indicators for policies that support degenderizing of paid work in the public sphere and degendering care in the private sphere.

5 | TYPOLOGIZING WELFARE STATES ACCORDING TO DEGENDERIZATION

Inclusive citizenship requires welfare states to support degendering in both the public and private sphere *and* to be generous in their approach. We need to understand not just *how much* (if at all) overall support for "inclusive citizenship" is provided by welfare sates but also, if they do degender at all, *how* they support "inclusive citizenship" – do they support both women's access to paid work *and* men's access to care? Supporting both sets of policies evenly and generously encourages inclusive citizenship.

To visualize *how* countries support inclusive citizenship, radar charts will be used to illustrate degendering policies. This approach enables performance to be compared on multiple dimensions and can illustrate the areas where

TABLE 1 Summary of degendering policy indicators

Policies degendering in the public sphere	Policies degendering in the private sphere
• Number of hours per week childcare is guaranteed • Age when a pre-school childcare guarantee begins • Childcare participation tax rate (CPTR) • Non-transferable maternity leave average wage replacement rate	• Gender leave gap • Replacement rate for individual paternity leave • Flexibility of paid individual non-transferable paternity leave

welfare states are placing more focus relative to others. Welfare states with similar-shaped polygons on the radar chart will be emphasizing similar policies and be similar in their approach to degenderization. We can thus typologize welfare states according to this visualization – *how* they approach degendering policies and whether they degenderize in all areas to support inclusive citizenship. While such an approach allows us to usefully group countries based on visual similarity of actual policy differences rather than mere arithmetic similarity, it might be objected that visual inspection may miss similarities that would be found in arithmetic taxonomy techniques such as cluster analysis. Consequently, sensitivity analysis was carried out using cluster analysis to classify countries in relation to *how* they approach degendering policies. A hierarchical cluster analysis was undertaken using the Ward method and Squared Euclidean Distance as the measure. This sensitivity analysis confirmed the radar approach to be robust (Table B1, Figure B1), albeit with some differences in the clustering of countries between the two approaches. These are explained and justified below.

To fully support inclusive citizenship, welfare states need to be generous. Two countries might have similar approaches, but one might be more generous and thus more degendering. In other words, we need to understand not just *how (approach)* but *how much (generosity)*. We can see how well a country is doing in each indicator in the index as they are standardized so that the highest score — the best performance — is 1 and the lowest score – the worst performance – is 0 meaning a country does not degenderize at all on that indicator. Each country's overall support for degenderization, and in each sphere, can be assessed using the SMOP approach (Surface Measure of Overall Performance). This calculates the total surface area of the radar diagram. The better a country is performing, the larger the total surface area covered. If a country does not degenderize on any measures, the SMOP score will be 0. The actual values for each indicator are used to define the area using the following formula for calculating the area of a polygon:

$$\text{SMOP} = ((I1*I2) + (I2*I3) + (I3*I4) + (I4*I5) + \dots + (In*I1)*SIN(((360/n)*PI/180))) /$$
$$2 \ (I = \text{the indicator score and } n = \text{the number of sides}).$$

The score can then be presented as a proportion of the best possible score – that is, the area of the polygon if a country scored the best score possible on each indicator. The closer a country's actual values are to the ideal, the closer their overall score will be to 1 and the better the country is doing in relation to degenderization. Previously, radar charts have been used illustrate how parental leaves and childcare support differ cross-nationally but only in eight post socialist states (J. Javornik, 2014) and eight Northern European states (K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017) and without benchmarking the performance of countries using the SMOP score. In this paper, the SMOP proportion is used to compare the performance of countries in relation degenderization policies, comparing welfare states against a benchmark of an "ideal" welfare state which fully degenderizes both work and care.

Worth noting is that in SMOP analyses, the calculated surface area differs according to the order in which the indicators are placed. It is possible to account for this with a low number of indicators by finding the average of the combinations of orders, although this is more difficult to do for larger numbers, and in any case, Mosley and Mayer (1999) demonstrated the difference between the various combinations is minimal. Nonetheless, a number of measures were taken to account for this potential issue. With six indicators, there are 720 possible combinations;

computation of all possible iterations of the SMOP score was prohibitive, so a random sample of 10% (the 1st and then the 11th thereafter) of these combinations was taken and the SMOP score calculated for each of them. We then used the average of these 72 SMOP scores to compare the extent to which welfare states were degendering rather than relying on a single iteration of the SMOP score. In addition, a simple additive index of our six indicators was computed as a sensitivity analysis (See Appendix B: Figure B1); this confirmed the SMOP method as robust with only two slight differences in the ordering of the countries, detailed below.

6 | HOW WELFARE STATES DEGENDERIZE?

We will now examine inclusive citizenship by comparing *how* welfare states degenderize according to differing *types* of approach in degendering policies in the private and public sphere. By examining patterns of degendering policy packages, we found seven major types of welfare states with the UK forming a sub-type within the final type.

6.1 | Type I: Balanced degendering policy package: Norway, Sweden and Germany

Type I includes Norway, Sweden and Germany, which the cluster analysis also groups together (with Estonia – Appendix B: Figure B1). Figure 1 shows they have a fairly balanced degendering policy profile, with efforts to degenderize both work and care. Their paternal leave has a relatively high-wage replacement rate and is flexible. Nevertheless, leave is still relatively genderizing due to longer maternal leaves, being 63.3 weeks longer in Sweden, 87.9 weeks in Norway and 91.3 weeks in Germany.

These welfare states take a relatively balanced approach to degenderizing paid work in all the policy areas, not focusing on one over the other. Unlike the other two states, Germany's maternity replacement rate is higher than its paternity – indicating that mothers more than fathers are encouraged to take a break from work to care. Type I welfare states offer a full-time childcare guarantee from the age of 1, reflecting that care is considered a mother's role in first 12 months. Financial incentives for mothers to enter paid work are fairly high, keeping around two thirds of their gross earnings, but only a half in Germany.


FIGURE 1 Type 1: Balanced degendering policy package: Norway, Sweden, Germany [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

FIGURE 2 Type II: Mixed degendering policy package: Finland, Denmark, Slovenia

6.2 | Type II: Mixed degendering policy package: Finland, Denmark and Slovenia

Type II includes Finland, Denmark and Slovenia (see Figure 2). These cases are also grouped together in the cluster analysis (Table B1, Figure B1). Degendering policies are mixed in these countries – limiting inclusive citizenship. A key feature is the greater emphasis on a full childcare guarantee relative to other policies but coupled with relatively low financial incentives to undertake paid work. The right time to care is weakly supported – the gender leave gap is wide – and none of the countries are fully flexible or offer a full paternity wage replacement rate. In agreement with Saxonberg (2013) and K. Javornik and Kurowska (2017), we thus find that Denmark and Finland combine degenderizing childcare with explicitly genderizing parental leaves, a combination is more common in former communist countries (Saxonberg, 2013), which perhaps explains the pairing with Slovenia in this paper and others (e.g., Ciccia & Verloo, 2012).

6.3 | Type III: Work focused, gendering care policy package: Estonia and Hungary

Type III includes Estonia and Hungary (Figure 3). The cluster analysis includes Estonia in Type I and Hungary with the Type II (Table B1, Figure B1), but differences justify a separate welfare type: Ciccia's (2017) study of 30 countries identified Estonia and Hungary as a distinct male breadwinner/caregiver parity sub-type. First, Estonia places less emphasis on degendering care than Type I countries – non-transferable paternity leave of only 2 weeks (and 1 week in Hungary), with limited flexibility. Both states have wide gender leave gaps, with extra-ordinarily long leaves available to mothers – 166 weeks in Estonia and 160 in Hungary – and in Hungary (as with Greece), the paternity replacement rate is higher than the maternity. Despite Estonia and Hungary supporting some degendering of care, it is mothers who are deemed the main carers.

In contrast to type II welfare states, Hungary offers a full-time childcare guarantee from age 3. Other studies place Estonia close to the Nordic countries (not Iceland) in this respect since it supports maternal employment immediately after leave (K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017) and thus is similar to Type I countries, with a full childcare guarantee from age 1.5. Attention is also paid to supporting financial incentives for mothers to take up employment, with Estonia 4th in the sample (a childcare participation rate of 31.5%) and Hungary 8th (46.6%).

FIGURE 3 Type III: Work focused, predominantly gendering care policy package: Estonia and Hungary


FIGURE 4 Type IV: Time to care focused policy package: France, Luxembourg and Portugal

6.4 | Type IV: Care focused policy package: France, Luxembourg and Portugal

France, Portugal and Luxembourg are placed together in the radar chart approach (Figure 4) and the cluster analysis (see Table B1, Figure B1). These states support working mothers to retain their right to care but do less to enable them to take up the right to paid work – minimal childcare rights and limited financial incentives. Notably, type V supports more equal care rights than other types, with relatively narrow gender leave gaps; Portugal's gap (paternity leave at 62% of leave available to mothers) being the narrowest in the sample, Luxembourg's (40%), the second narrowest and France (30%) the 5th narrowest gap. However, despite generous paternal time rights (22 weeks in Portugal, 26 weeks in Luxembourg and 28 weeks in France), fathers are unlikely to take these up, given limited wage replacement and only partial flexibility.

6.5 | Type V: Hybrids: Belgium and Iceland

Type V – Belgium and Iceland – (Figure 5) has an approach to degenderization that does not fit with other countries. The cluster analysis places them together (Table B1, Figure B1) since both have a relatively low gender leave gap – amongst the lowest in the sample with paternity leave at 38% of total leave available for mothers for Belgium (behind Luxembourg) and 50% in Iceland (only Portugal has a smaller gap).

But visualizing their policy patterns highlights important differences: Belgium has a partial childcare guarantee of 28 hr childcare from the age of 3, but Iceland lacks a childcare guarantee. Nevertheless, Saxonberg (2013) showed Iceland had high public childcare coverage (albeit using old data), and so it may be that this welfare state successfully plugs the childcare gap despite no guarantee. Belgium has a low paternity replacement rate, relative to the other policy areas. So, despite an overall fairly balanced policy profile, each has reduced support in one policy area.

6.6 | Type VI: Financially supportive policy package: Austria, Netherlands, Spain, Poland and Greece

Type VI (Figure 6) consists of welfare states that were also grouped together in the cluster analysis (with Hungary – Table B1, Figure B1). These emphasize financial incentives to take up rights via a focus on childcare participation rates and maternity leave replacement rates for mothers. However, little importance is placed on the role of childcare guarantees to enable mothers to work. Likewise, more attention is placed on the paternity leave replacement rate than flexibility of leave or time to care – the gender leave gap is wide – although Austria and Spain stand out in these groups with relatively narrow gender leave gaps. Financial supports alone will not successfully degenderize.

The Netherlands' may be mis-represented by placing it in type VI: Its weak degendering leaves could be a trade-off for strong rights for part-time employment, designed to encourage dual-caring. This, however, is unlikely to challenge gender role norms since the decision about how to divide work and care is still left to the family in the context of a 14.1% gender pay gap (OECD, 2017).

FIGURE 6 Type VI: Financially supportive policy package: Austria, Netherlands, Spain, Poland and Greece [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

6.7 | Type VII: Explicitly gendering: Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Ireland

Type VII (Figure 7) includes liberal and post-communist countries which do little to challenge gender norms in the private sphere and provide minimal support in the public sphere. They have in common a non-existent paternity leave and some of the longest maternal leaves in the sample. Any support for degenderization is focused on childcare guarantees and maternity replacement rates, albeit with low generosity; only 35% of the average wage in Ireland, the second lowest in the sample. Childcare guarantees are minimal (no guarantee in Slovak Republic) focusing on the right to receive care via early education of older pre-school children rather than the right not to care by enabling mothers to work.

6.8 | Type VIIa: Predominantly gendering: The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is placed with Ireland in the cluster analysis (Table B1, Figure B1), but the radar approach identified some differences that supported Ciccia (2017)'s finding that the UK is a sub-type (Figure 8). The main difference is that there is some attempt to support the right of fathers to care, with 2 weeks' paternity leave available albeit at a low replacement rate and low flexibility and thus limited encouragement for it to actually be taken up. Similar to type VII is limited incentives for mothers to take up paid work, with only a 15 hr childcare guarantee from the age of 3, and the highest childcare costs in Europe – a childcare participation tax rate of 102%. The maternity leave replacement rate is only 31% of an average wage, the lowest in the sample, with mothers and fathers having to organize paid work and care at their own expense.

7 | HOW MUCH WELFARE STATES DEGENDERIZE

To fully support inclusive citizenship, welfare states also need to be generous. To understand generosity, in this section, we examine *how much* welfare states policies degender. We also examine whether patterns in approach (how

**FIGURE 7** Type VII: Explicitly gendering policy package: Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Ireland

FIGURE 8 Type VIIa: Predominantly gendering policy package: UK

welfare states degenderize) is related to generosity. Figure 9 summarizes the overall SMOP proportions for state support for degenderization as a proportion of the best possible score of 2.598 (see Appendix A for the country rankings of unstandardized scores). Only one country, Norway (58.1%) is over half way toward the benchmark of degendering policy. Sweden (46.5%), Estonia (42.9%) and Germany (39.1%) follow. Countries that are the least degendering are Czech Republic (4.0%), Slovak Republic, (2.3%), the United Kingdom (2.3%) and Ireland (0.9%). (The sensitivity analysis produces a similar country ranking, with only Hungary and Iceland swapping places and France moving below Greece – See Appendix B: Figure B1).

Figure 10 compares the SMOP proportion for degendering in the public sphere (maternal employment) compared to the private sphere (care). It is evident that nearly all welfare states more generously challenge gender role norms in the public sphere than the private, with Estonia (type III), Norway, Sweden and Germany (type 1) reaching above half-way toward full support in this area. Portugal (care-focused type IV), Belgium (hybrid) and Poland

FIGURE 9 Generosity: Surface measure of overall performance proportion for Degendering Index [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

■ Public sphere ■ Private sphere

FIGURE 10 Generosity: Surface measure of overall performance proportion for Degendering public and private sphere [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

(financially supportive, type V1) (and the UK at a very low level) are more equally degendering in the public and private sphere, albeit with different emphasis placed on differing aspects of public and private spheres leading to these countries having differing approaches to degenderization. Iceland is the only country more degendering in care than work – albeit still quite a distance from the benchmark of degenderization – reflecting its hybrid status.

Generally speaking, degendering approach (type) is related to generosity (SMOP score) of a welfare state: the type of degendering welfare state is significantly correlated with the SMOP generosity score (−0.857 *p* = .000). The balanced policy approach of type 1 seems to be the most common route to a highly degendering welfare state, with SMOP proportions that are 1st (Norway), 2nd (Sweden) and 4th (Germany) in the degendering league table. They still, however, fall short of being fully degendering since women are assumed to be the main carers to very young children. Germany is the least generous of the group, reflecting its emergence from a transitional phase from a conservative country previously discouraging female labour, previously ranking 7th, 8th or 9th in defamilizing indexes (Lohmann & Zegal, 2016) and being classed as explicitly gendering by Saxonberg (2013) who did, however, correctly predict (p. 19) that "Germany might eventually join the group of degenderized countries".

At the other end, the policy approach of type VII and VIIa has virtually no support for degenderization: all welfare states in these types are amongst the least generous in the sample, falling at the bottom of the degendering league table.

But a similar approach does not always indicate similar levels of generosity. A notable example of this is type III: Estonia is the third most generous in the sample, but Hungary is ranked 13th. That Estonia is so generous may be an argument for placing it in type 1 in line with the cluster analysis. But, in contrast to type 1, both Hungary and Estonia are more generous in degenderizing paid work than they are care (see Figure 10). Despite Estonia's generosity in supporting maternal paid work, such an unbalanced approached will fall short of supporting inclusive citizenship. Basically, Hungary is a less generous version of Estonia, but more generous than other postcommunist states. So, despite varying levels of generosity, their approach is similar, which warrants them being placed in the same type.

8 | ARE MORE SUPPORTIVE WELFARE STATES MORE DEGENDERING?

There is little systematic evidence about the impact of different *packages* and *typologies* of childcare/parental leave regimes on gender equality outcomes (Lauri, Põder, & Ciccia, 2020). Studies that examine the relationship between defamilization and gender equality outcomes report mixed results (e.g., Lauri et al., 2020; Chau et al., 2017). Lauri et al. (2020) conclude this is because similar policy configurations produce different outcomes in different cultural contexts. But it might be because the policy indexes and/or the outcomes examined do not (fully) measure gender equality per se. This section seeks to understand whether measuring policies from the standpoint of degenderization indicate a link with gender equality outcomes – whether welfare states with more generous/different types of degendering welfare packages also experience more positive gender equality outcomes. Simple correlations were undertaken with key indicators, chosen to reflect degenderization. Whilst this provides an indicator of how policies translate into outcomes, it is by no means conclusive. More complex analysis needs to be undertaken to understand the link between the two, but space constrains further discussion here.

Key outcomes that are significantly related to both generosity and type of degendering state were gender gaps: in employment (−0.611** and 0.658**) and in full-time equivalent rates (the proportion of the population that would be employed if all those in employment worked a full-time 40-hr working week) (−0.630** and 0.683**). The gender gap in unpaid (0.644*) and care (0.739**) work was related to *type* of degendering state but not generosity, although data were only available for 12 countries (this however included a representative of each degendering type). The female employment rate is *not* significantly correlated with generosity or degendering type (although this is partly due to the outliers Iceland and Greece), but the maternal employment rate (no data for Iceland or Norway) *is* (0.517*, −0573**). This is attributed to the correlation of maternal employment with generosity of private sphere polices (0.628**) but not public, which are actually more overtly aimed at maternal employment (n.s). This may explain why Germany's maternity employment rate (although not female) is lower than Sweden (both type 1), given its less generous private policies, although it may also be due to a policy lag, with Germany's degendering family policies being introduced relatively recently in 2009 and 2015.

There is not a significant relationship between the employment rate for mothers with children aged 0–2 (no data for Norway, Sweden and Iceland by age) for generosity or type, with the Eastern European countries (Czech republic, Estonia, Slovakia Republic and Hungary) – having noticeably lower employment rates for mothers with children under 2 than might be expected, given their generosity and degendering type. However, generosity (0.555*) and type of degendering state (−0.641**) *are* significantly related to employment for mothers with a child aged 3–5 – significantly related to public (0.555*) as well as private (0.542*) policies, although with Greece and Spain as outliers – lower maternal employment than expected. Estonia also has the highest employment rate for mothers with children aged 3–5 of the sample for which data are available, reflecting its generosity for degendering paid work. Whilst this sets it apart from its type III cousin Hungary and may again be an argument for placing it in type 1, both have very low maternal employment rates with children aged 0–2, likely explained by similar approaches to degendering care. More sophisticated analysis needs to be undertaken, but there appears to be some evidence that degendering policies do matter for gender equality outcomes.

9 | CONCLUSION

This paper has compiled an index to compare *how much* (generosity) and *how (type)* 22 European welfare states degenderize and thus how far they support inclusive citizenship – the right to care, work and earn (Kremer, 2007). Supporting inclusive citizenship requires welfare states to challenge gender role norms in *both* paid work and care to enable both men and women to break from gendered assumptions and enjoy full citizenship. Thus, to better understand welfare state progress in supporting inclusive citizenship, this paper adopted the concept of degenderization, rather than defamilization, as a more suitable analytical tool to compare cross-nationally.

The paper has built upon studies that have applied benchmarking and graphical analyses to comparative family policy (e.g., J. Javornik, 2014; K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017; Kurowska & Javornik, 2019) by widening the countries analysed, and adopting the surface measure of overall performance (SMOP) method to compare how much welfare states degenderize (generosity), as well as utilizing radar charts to examine how they do so (approach). We have therefore been able to examine policies in more detail and identify policy patterns that have not been identified previously with different methods. This includes variation among countries that are often treated as representatives of one of the "worlds of welfare" (K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017). It has enabled us to identify welfare states that encourage full inclusive citizenship by visually examining how countries degenderize in *both* public *and* private policy, and by using SMOP to understand which are also being generous – how close to the ideal they are – in their approach. Together, the concept of degenderization and chosen methods has enabled a more nuanced analysis of childcare and parental leave that identifies degendering policy types that are more or less supportive of inclusive citizenship.

The visual analysis identified seven types. Type 1's approach more closely supports inclusive citizenship compared to other types because these welfare states take a relatively balanced approach to degenderizing paid work in all the policy areas, not focusing on one over the other, with efforts to degenderize both work and care. But all 22 welfare states failed to reach the benchmark of inclusive citizenship (including type 1) because of the failure to degenderize care. This shows that more policy attention has been paid to women's right to paid work than men's right to care, even in Nordic countries. This reflects findings in other recent research. For example, Ciccia and Verloo (2012), Ciccia and Bleijenbergh (2014) and (Ciccia (2017) compared 30 countries to understand how they can be related to Fraser's (1994) theoretical family models of the division of labour, and found none were reaching the utopia of supporting the ideal "universal caregiver" model, with the majority of countries still adhering to universal breadwinner models. Whilst some welfare states have extended father's time rights, they have either not supported father's to take these up (especially in type IV, V and VII) and/or still support women to enjoy more generous maternity or transferable leaves rights (especially types III, VI and VII), meaning that they are unlikely to successfully challenge gender role norms in the private sphere. Indeed, this paper has shown that welfare states with a more generous and balanced degendering policy approach in both the public (paid work) and private (care) sphere will be

most supportive of inclusive citizenship: they more likely to have lower intra-household gender gaps in unpaid work and care and in turn higher maternal employment, especially, for *older* pre-school children.

The paper has shown that a visualization method can enlighten our understandings of the nuanced differences between states that are often grouped together, and similarities between states not traditionally grouped together. It has highlighted inconsistencies between parental leave and childcare policy packages but also individual policy indicators. It builds upon K. Javornik and Kurowska (2017) who used a similar visualization method to examine the Nordic and Baltic states, who also found that the Nordic countries do not make up a single type of welfare state when analysed in relation to support for gender equality. This appears in part because many of the Nordic countries have parental leave and childcare policies with contradictions in terms of how they degender (Ciccia, 2017). Thus, the paper has shown the need for a more nuanced understanding of how welfare types breakdown gender roles. It has indicated that the extent that welfare states degenderize in the public and private sphere explains intra-household gender gaps and maternal employment and that without a balanced policy approach welfare states are unlikely to achieve inclusive citizenship.

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ENDNOTES

[1] Except the Netherlands – the source was OECD and date 2014.

[2] NB: If the number of hours offered changes according to age then the score for each age group would be calculated accordingly, added together and then averaged.

[3] The CPTR is based on the assumptions inherent to the OECD Tax/Benefit models when calculating the tax/benefit position of persons (OECD, 2016).

[4] In some countries it is possible to reallocate the days to the other parents in special circumstances.

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APPENDIX

## A. CHARTS FOR INDIVIDUAL INDICATORS: RAW DATA

FIGURE A1 (a) Participation rate 100 + 67% of average earnings including childcare costs (2015). (b) Childcare Guarantee (Hours guaranteed * Age guaranteed from) (2012/13). (c) Maternity leave wage replacement rate (2016). (d) Flexible paternity leave (2016). (e) Paternity leave payment rate (%) (2016). (f) Gender leave gap (%) (2016) (Leave open to mother (weeks)*average replacement rate/leave reserved for father (weeks)*average replacement rate rate/ maternity) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

TABLE B1 Cluster analysis

Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5	Cluster 6	Cluster 7
Norway	Finland	Hungary	Iceland	France	Ireland	Slovak Republic
Sweden	Slovenia	Netherlands	Belgium	Portugal	United Kingdom	Czech Republic
Germany		Austria		Luxembourg		
Estonia	**Denmark**	Spain				
		Poland				
		Greece				

Note: Bold terms represents some evidence that these form a type cluster of its own.

(a)

Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5	Cluster 6	Cluster 7
Norway	Finland	Hungary	Iceland	France	Ireland	Slovak Republic
Sweden	Slovenia	Netherlands	Belgium	Portugal	United Kingdom	Czech Republic
Germany		Austria		Luxembourg		
Estonia	**Denmark**	Spain				
		Poland				
		Greece				

**Bold**: Some evidence that these form a type cluster of its own**.**

(b)

FIGURE B1 Degendering score: Additive index [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]