Article:

Political and ideological normalisation: Quality of government, mainstream-right ideological positions and extreme-right support

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Abstract:	This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella – namely, the extreme and the radical – they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical right parties. This paper shows that electoral support for extreme-right parties is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties. The former creates political legitimisation for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalisation of extreme-right.

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Abstract

This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella – namely, the extreme and the radical – they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical right parties. This paper shows that electoral support for extreme-right parties is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties. The former creates political legitimisation for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalisation of extreme-right.

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1. Introduction

Electoral support for far-right parties (FRPs) in Europe has attracted substantial scholarly attention, especially since the so-called 'third-wave' of 1980s (Kitschelt, 2007; Mudde, 2013). The far-right family is considered one of the most successful party families in recent Europe, though the parties included in this grouping display considerable ideological heterogeneity (Mudde, 2007; Ennser, 2012; Golder, 2016; Carter, 2018). Specifically, scholars distinguish radical from extreme-right parties (ERPs), based on parties' relationships with liberal democracy, fascism and violence (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015; Golder, 2016). Despite acknowledging the ideological differences of parties under the far-right umbrella, the literature does not take these differences into account in empirical analyses, with few exceptions (Ignazi, 1992; Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 2003; Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin, 2011). When such ideological differences are considered, the literature is biased toward explanations of electoral support for European radical-right parties (RRPs). This is

1

understandable as the radical variants are more successful, especially in Western Europe, compared to the extreme right; at the theoretical level, no theory has expected ERPs to achieve electoral success in post-war Europe, due to their anti-democratic and anti-systemic stance[1] (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). In recent years, and especially after the severe economic crisis that engulfed the European Union (EU) after 2008, electorally successful ERPs emerged in several European countries, including in Greece (Golden Dawn (GD)), Slovakia (People's Party Our Slovakia) or Hungary (Jobbik)[2]. Golder (2003) found that the electoral success of ERPs ('neofascist' for Golder) cannot be explained from the various mainstream theories, such as economic (unemployment) or cultural (immigration) competition, that explain the electoral support for radicals. Complicating matters, countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland suffered from economic crises and mass immigration similar to those expected to explain ERPs' successes; however, the failure of ERPs in these countries undermines such explanatory factors. In short, the cross-national variation of electoral support for ERPs in Europe remains unexplained, and more importantly, conventional theories of far-right support does not seem to explain this variation, so we need to look beyond them (see Golder, 2003). This paper aims to address that gap. While there are a few scholars who focused on the extreme variants of the far-right such as Ignazi (1992; 2003), Ford and Goodwin (2010), Goodwin (2011) or Golder (2003), their studies do not explain cross-national variation in the electoral support for ERPs in Europe. According to the best of our knowledge, this is the first research which aims to systematically explain cross-national variation in ERPs' (and not RRPs') electoral success.

Considered unelectable due to their anti-democratic stance, ERPs require favourable demand and supply to be electorally successful. This paper understands ERP's success partly as a 'normal pathology' (Mudde, 2010). 'Normal pathology' thesis suggests that ERPs require non-normality in order to be electorally attractive, due to the fact that their ideology is alien to European values (Mudde, 2010). As Mudde (2010) showed, this is in fact not true for radical right parties, but the anti-democratic stance of ERPs requires a different approach. As mainstream theories and explanatory factors do not explain variation in the electoral support for ERPs, we need to look beyond them. This paper argues that, to increase the likelihood of

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[1] For more details about the definitions and classification of the parties see section 2.

[2] Jobbik was an anti-democratic extreme-right party until 2015, and was characterised as one of the few comparable parties to Golden Dawn. It is important to note here that Jobbik from 2015 onwards moved towards the centre and cannot be considered as extreme-right. However, for the timeframe of the analysis of this paper (2004-2015), Jobbik was an extreme-right party, and is classified as one of them.

being electorally successful, ERPs require a form of non-normality, which would politically normalise their anti-democratic stance. Building on the existing literature on the effects of the quality of government on support for democracy, and in extension on voting for anti-system parties (Agerberg, 2017; Boräng et al., 2017), this paper expects that poor quality of government (QoG), is a form of non-normality that politically normalises anti-system parties, and ERPs are anti-system by definition. However, a 'normal pathology' approach is not enough to explain cross-national variation in the electoral support for ERPs, as not every country with poor QoG saw an increase in ERP vote share[3], and also, as Agerberg (2017) showed, QoG explains voting for populist parties (left and right), as well. This paper assumes that demand-side needs to meet favourable supply-side for ERPs to be electorally successful.

This paper argues that ideological normalisation of ERPs is the missing step. The effect of mainstream right parties' (MRPs) ideological positions on the electoral success of far-right parties is debated in the existing literature (Eatwell, 2000; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). There are two conflicting hypotheses; first, the more centrist the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs, due to limited competition; second, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs, as the latter's ideological positions are legitimised by their proximity to mainstream figures. Both expectations are plausible, and the existing literature is inconclusive. We argue that those conditions interact: QoG is a moderating factor for the relationship between the ideological positions of MRPs and the electoral support for ERPs in Europe. In countries with poor QoG, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs, as this creates political legitimacy and ideological normalisation for the latter. However, the effect of MRPs' positions on the electoral support for ERPs has the opposite (or no) effect when QoG improves.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the classification of the extreme right parties. Next, we present the main hypothesis of the paper in the context of the existing literature on the topic. The following sections discuss the statistical model and the data, present the results from the statistical analysis, and discuss the implications of the findings.

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[3] South and Eastern European countries tend to have poor quality of government, especially compared to Western European and Scandinavian countries, however, only in few countries are extreme-right parties electorally successful. See Figure A1 in Appendix A.

2. Classifying Extreme Right Parties

Existing literature broadly defines the features that a party should meet in order to be considered as far-right (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015). However, this party family is one of the most diverse in European party politics (Ennser, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). The broad definition of the FRP family, emphasises nativism, populism, authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007), and typically includes parties like GD from Greece or Jobbik from Hungary. However, such parties resemble the traditional ER position of hostility toward liberal democracy and willingness to countenance violence against their internal or external enemies in order to impose their ideology. On the other hand, the category includes parties like FPÖ from Austria and True Finns from Finland, which are ideologically more moderate. The diversity raises questions of the comparability of the involved parties.

This paper seeks to account for this problem of party comparability. It suggests, based on Mudde's (2007; 2019) and Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou's (2015) definition, that under the far-right umbrella category, there are two, distinct, sub-party-families: the extreme-right and the radical-right, that are different in kind, not only in their extremeness (Golder, 2016). The main differences between these two sub-party families are the hostility to liberal democracy, the acceptance of violence as a political means (either physical or verbal) (Mondon and Winter, 2020)[4], and the relation to fascism. In this paper, we focus on explaining the electoral success of parties from the extreme right only[5]. This is theoretically and empirically crucial, as no theory has expected the electoral success of ERPs, and also, as there is no research which focuses on ERPs only, there are no theoretical, and empirical, explanations with regards to their success,.

Far Right

Nativism

Authoritarianism

Populism

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[4] Even if parties themselves officially reject that violent practices come from their official party, these acts could come from their youth groups or supporters. The parties do not distance themselves from these acts.

[5] For parties' identification and sources see Appendix A, Table A1.

Extreme	**Radical**
Hostile to Liberal Democracy	*Not totally hostile to Liberal Democracy*
Tolerance to the use of violence	*Total rejection of violent acts*
Tolerance to Fascism	*Total rejection of Fascism*

3. Theorising the political and ideological normalisation of the extreme right

ERPs, as predicted by various theories (see Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), are usually unelectable in post-war Europe due to their anti-system/ anti-democratic stance. To be electorally attractive, they need a form of non-normality, as 'normal pathology' thesis suggests (Mudde, 2010). Many studies argue that this non-normality exists in periods of crisis, such as economic or immigration crises (Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 2010). However, this is empirically falsified as ERPs were not electorally successful in countries which faced either economic or immigration crises, such as Portugal, Ireland or Italy, but also from Golder's (2003) findings. This paper therefore, looks beyond the conventional theories, and argues that for ERPs to be electorally successful, they require conditions which create demand for anti-democratic parties (political normalisation of ERPs) and also favourable supply-side conditions through party competition (ideological normalisation).

QoG and ERPs political normalisation

QoG and quality of institutions are two factors that create demand for anti-democratic parties (Rothstein, 2009; Magalhaes, 2014; Boräng et al., 2017). As a concept, QoG has attracted recent attention from political economy scholars (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004), with ongoing debate over how to define this term (Teorell and Rothstein, 2008; Holmberg et al., 2009). For Teorell and Rothstein (2008) and Rothstein (2009), QoG should not violate the principle of impartiality; corruption and clientelism are the opposite of the term. Though

plausible, there are theoretical problems with this definition. First, there could be poor QoG without corrupt politicians, as politicians can be impartial but also produce bad governance. Second, assuming that corruption automatically violates the principle of impartiality is problematic because if corrupt politicians are equally corrupt with every citizen, then they are not partial (Sparling, 2018). Instead, we adopt the World Bank's influential definition of governance as 'the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them' (Kaufmann et al., 1999, p.1).

Studies associate QoG with support for the existing regime (Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014; Boräng et al., 2017). Starting with the relationship between QoG and support for democracy, the former varies across different states, so scholars suggest that it should be treated as an independent driver for support for the regime (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008; Charron and Lapuente, 2010; Fukuyama, 2013). Moreover, Rothstein (2009) challenges the idea that electoral democracy is the key for political legitimacy and argues that the latter largely depends on QoG. The theoretical expectation that QoG is key for the legitimacy of the regime and support for democracy has also been confirmed by Dahlberg and Holmberg (2014). It is expected, therefore, from the existing literature that QoG, and more specifically *poor* QoG, creates a support for anti-democratic forces within states, as it reduces the political legitimacy of the regime, and thereby reduces support for democracy. In other words, it serves to legitimise the political existence of anti-democratic parties.

On the other hand, one might argue that it is plausible to assume that individuals in countries with poor QoG, instead of an alternative regime type and support for anti-democracy, or different forms of representation, might want to enhance their democratic institutions and practices. This is indeed a plausible alternative way in which QoG might affect voting behaviour. However, and despite the alternative explanation that in countries with poor QoG individuals might want to enhance the democratic institutions and practices in their country, there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to argue that poor QoG politically normalises anti-democratic or anti-system parties due to the decline in diffuse support for democracy. This can be explained by various causal mechanisms that relate poor QoG with support for democracy, party system collapse and social contract. Starting with support for democracy, we

6

look at the two different types of regime support; 'specific' support, which focuses on "outputs and performance of the political authorities" (Easton, 1975, p. 437), and 'diffuse' support which is "evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does" (Easton 1975: 444). Several studies have shown that there is no, or weak, relationship between QoG and 'specific' support for a regime, but there is a strong relationship between QoG and 'diffuse' support for democracy (see Magalhaes, 2014; Boräng et al., 2017). This is in line with Lipset's (1959), Linz's (1978), and Dahl's (1971) reasoning who argue that government effectiveness, or governability, and the regime's ability to offer successful solutions to basic societal problems, affects the stability of the regime, and the latter's legitimacy.

Moreover, scholars who have investigated democratic representation or party system collapse in regions such as Latin America, have theorised and supported with empirical findings that when QoG is poor, then it is not only the legitimacy of party systems that is affected (mainstream parties lose their legitimacy, party systems collapse, and new parties, including anti-system, are more likely to be electorally attractive), but also the legitimacy of the system itself (see Mainwaring et al., 2006; Seawright, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2018). More specifically, in countries with poor QoG/ governability, state capacity to meet its social contract obligations and provide the basic needs to their citizens is, or is perceived as, limited. This weakens democratic institutions and leads to party system collapse but also delegitimises the system of governance and democracy. This is therefore linked with the earlier discussion about the relationship between QoG and diffuse support for democracy, or the legitimacy of the regime.

So, despite that it is plausible to assume that voters, or a significant proportion of them, in countries with poor QoG, or where governments are inefficient, might want to strengthen democratic institutions and practices, and thus support democratic political parties, it is equally plausible to assume that individuals in these countries will develop negative attitudes towards democracy (the ideals of it) based on the outputs that regimes produce. Empirical findings of studies which have systematically tested the causal mechanisms discussed above, show that poor QoG has a negative relationship with support for democracy and a positive relationship with support for anti-democratic or anti-system parties.

7

Linking the previous discussion with the electoral support for ERPs, the latter have tended to gain support because of the anti-democratic attitudes in newly democratised European states (Bustikova, 2009; Just, 2017). There are some scholars, however, who have tried to link QoG with the electoral support for ERPs in Europe through different causal mechanisms. Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2018) suggest that, in times of economic crisis, poor QoG will lead to a decline of trust in democratic institutions, so, ERPs are more likely to succeed. They confirmed this suggestion by carrying out a controlled comparison of three South European states, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain; all suffered from the economic crisis but electoral support for ERPs in these countries varied, and only in Greece, where QoG is poor compared to the rest, ERP (GD) was successful. Bustikova (2009) hypothesised that QoG in Eastern European countries is associated with higher support for ERPs. She suggested that poor QoG leads to less satisfaction with democracy, and those individuals who are dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to vote for ERPs. Agerberg (2017) associates low QoG with higher support for populist parties through the mechanism of 'failed expectations' from democratic systems and the anti-elite supply of populist parties. So, various studies link QoG with support for democracy, and with support for anti-system parties due to their ideology and supply for alternative forms of representation, or even regime type. However, the relationship between the QoG and ERP support deserves further investigation. Firstly, those studies which link QoG with far-right support are regional specific (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2018) focus on South Europe, and Bustikova (2009) on Eastern Europe). Secondly, Agerberg (2017) showed that low QoG is associated with higher support for both left- and right-wing populist parties. So, from the findings of the studies above, it is fairly safe to assume that low QoG is associated with ERP support, however, it is unclear under what conditions low QoG leads to higher ERP support, as not in every country with poor QoG, are ERPs successful.

The importance of party competition and ideological normalisation of the ERPs

As briefly discussed earlier, in countries with low QoG, such as in Greece, the most successful challenger/ anti-system parties following the eruption of the crisis (2008-2009) were the left-wing SYRIZA and GD, an ERP. On the other hand, in Spain only Podemos, on the left, was electorally successful, and also in Portugal, only far-left parties increased their vote share, while a significant part of the population abstained (Pinto and Raimundo, 2014). So, ERPs

8

find political opportunities due to poor QoG in some countries but not in others. There is a need, therefore, to look not only on demand-side factors, but also to discuss supply-side factors that potentially create political opportunities for ERPs as well, and make the latter electorally attractive. We expect that ideological normalisation of ERPs is the factor, accompanied by low QoG, that creates fertile grounds for ERPs. Mainstream party positions have attracted substantial attention as a potential explanatory factor for the emergence of far-right parties and niche parties (Meguid, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Pardos-Prado, 2015; Gidron and Ziblatt, 2019). Indeed, the logic of strategic voting suggests that far-right parties' electoral success is conditional on MRPs' positions (e.g. Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). If MRPs adopt positions close to the far right on issues that are important for the latter, then why should individuals vote for smaller parties?

To operationalise the above, some studies expect that, when MRPs distance themselves from the far-right, then FRPs (extremes included) are more likely to succeed, mainly because they will find political opportunities in the absence of a mainstream competitor (Eatwell, 2000; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). This expectation is plausible in a sense that when MRPs are liberal, they may adopt positions on immigration, multiculturalism, religion or gay and minority rights, that are further away from those of far-right parties, creating space in the political system for parties with tougher stances on the above issues (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). Far-right parties, by definition, are anti-immigration, nationalists, authoritarian, xenophobic, so if no other party represents these ideas, then they are more likely to be electorally successful (Eatwell, 2000). This discussion led MRPs to adopt positions closer to the far-right in order to weaken the latter's electoral support (Pardos-Prado et al., 2014; Pardos-Prado, 2015).

At the same time though, as Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Eatwell (2000) and Down and Han (2020) correctly identify, a very conservative MRP can have the exact opposite result, compared to the above, with regards to the electoral success of far-right parties as well. This second theoretical expectation suggests that when MRPs converge with the far-right, the latter are more likely to be successful (Eatwell, 2000; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Pirro, 2014). The basic idea behind this expectation is that a very conservative MRP normalises the ideological positions of far-right parties, due to the fact that more voters are exposed to these positions (Eatwell, 2000; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009). So, far-right parties would not be considered, ideologically, as alien or outsiders of the party competition. Down and Han

9

(2020) tested the same theory on the electoral success for radical-right parties in Europe. They found that when mainstream parties adopt positions close to the radical-right this increases the likelihood of voting for the latter, through far-right parties' normalisation. Lastly, Bale (2018) found that the British Conservative Party's ideological repositioning closer to anti-EU and populist ideas created fertile grounds for UKIP.

Both theoretical expectations, therefore, are plausible. On the one hand, far-right parties can find breeding grounds for success if mainstream-right parties are very liberal, as there is no competition. On the other hand, they can find fertile grounds if their ideology is legitimised through the conservativeness of the mainstream right. Both hypotheses have support in the existing literature (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009; Dahlström and Sundell, 2012; Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2013; Bale, 2018) and are plausible.

Political and ideological normalisation of ERPs

In a nutshell, this paper argues that for ERPs to be electorally attractive, both demand and supply sides should create fertile grounds for them. Specifically, political and ideological normalisation should interact to explain variation in the electoral support for ERPs. The logic behind this argument is that there are two different types of support for democracy: one is the support for the ideal type of democracy and the second is the support based on what democracy offers to its citizens (Easton, 1975). QoG measures what democracy offers and how it works. If we then accept the premise that QoG is a proxy for what regimes (in this case democracies) offer to their citizens, then it is a good indicator about satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the democratic system more broadly[6]. So, poor QoG increases dissatisfaction towards democracy, which in turn creates fertile grounds for anti-system parties. This paper assumes that as ERPs are by definition anti-system, due to their anti-democratic stance, poor QoG creates fertile grounds for ERPs. Political normalisation is necessary for an ERP's electoral support, but is, however, not sufficient. Poor QoG may lead to the electoral success of anti-systemic and/or

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[6] See Appendix A, Figure A2 and Table A3, for the scatter plot and the correlation between QoG and Satisfaction with Democracy.

populist parties from the left or from the right-wing (see Agerberg, 2017), so ERPs' electoral success is underdetermined[7].

We argue that ideological normalisation of ERPs is required as well. MRPs as key ERPs' competitors, can either close, or create political opportunities for ERPs. Studies have shown that when MRPs adopt positions close to ERPs, then the latter cannot find space in party competition and therefore cannot be electorally successful (see Eatwell, 2000). Other studies though suggest the opposite; when MRPs adopt positions close to ERPs, then the latter becomes ideologically normalised and eventually electorally successful. The existing literature on party competition does not specify the conditions under which one of the two hypotheses above will prevail. We expect the crucial condition to concern the political normalisation of the ERPs through low QoG. As such, in those countries with poor QoG, the more conservative the MRPs on social or cultural issues, the more successful the ERPs. At the same time, in those countries with good QoG, highly conservative positions of MRPs are associated with either reduction in the electoral support for ERPs, or will be insignificant. The logic is that in countries with poor QoG and a highly conservative MRP, ERPs can find both the demand for anti-democracy, due to poor QoG, and the supply through their ideological normalisation, due to the positions of MRPs. We therefore expect that:

H1: *The effect of mainstream right ideology on ERP support is moderated by the quality of government*

4. Operationalisation

Dependent Variable

This paper investigates cross-national variation in electoral support for ERPs in national elections from 2004-2015 in every EU member-state. Many previous studies exclude countries where FRPs were absent (Knigge, 1998; Givens, 2005). However, this creates selection bias

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[7] See Appendix A, Figure A1 for the descriptive bar chart which plots the average QoG and the average ERP's vote share by country from 2004-2015.

(Arzheimer, 2009). In order to solve this issue, and as a result of the classification of the ERPs used in this article, all the 28 European Union members are included, following Golder's (2003) and Jackman and Volpert's (1996) assumptions that, even if ERP parties do not exist, we can assume that the demand for these parties exist; there are ER movements almost everywhere in Europe, even in countries without formal ERPs (Caiani et al., 2012), demonstrating the demand for these parties. In countries where ERPs are absent, the vote share has been coded as zero (0).

This paper concentrates on national elections, despite European Parliamentary (EP) elections providing some very useful controls, such as the electoral systems or the time of the elections (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). However, because EP elections are second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hix and Marsh, 2007), the electoral support for ERPs might be over-represented. Voters are more likely to express their dissatisfaction by supporting smaller parties.

Measuring QoG

We use data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 1999)[8] to measure QoG, which other studies have used to test the effects of QoG on far-right support (e.g. Bustikova, 2009; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2018). Others have used data from the Quality of Government Institute, and more specifically, from the European Quality of Government Index dataset (i.e. Agerberg, 2017), however this dataset has some limitations. First, the proxy for the QoG is perceptions based, and second this dataset includes only three year points, 2010, 2013 and 2017. Governance for the World Bank is defined as 'the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them' (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p. 4). By using this definition, the World Bank created six different variables to capture the three different aspects of the definition[9]. In order to capture and measure the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, they created

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[8] The data gathered from the Quality of Government Institute Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2017, 2019).

[9] For more details about the creation of these variables see (Kaufmann et al., 2009).

two variables, namely *voice and accountability*, and *political stability*. To capture the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, they created another two different variables, *government effectiveness* and *regulatory quality*. Last but not least, to capture the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them, the variables they created are *control for corruption* and *rule of law*. All these variables are scales which range from -2.5, which indicates the lowest QoG, to 2.5, which indicates the highest QoG (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p.12)[10].

To measure QoG as a whole and to address multicollinearity[11], we created a new variable, which is the average of all the six variables from the World Bank (a=0.96)[12]. Studies associate QoG with corruption, so as robustness checks we use the Bayesian Corruption Indicator (Standaert, 2015), which is a scale from 0-100, and higher values indicate less corruption, as well as the political corruption index from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al., 2020; Pemstein et al., 2020), where higher values indicate more corruption. Last, as this study argues that low QoG creates fertile grounds for ERPs through low satisfaction with democracy, we test the direct effect of the latter by using a satisfaction with democracy index (Klassen, 2018), which is a range from 0-100 where 0 indicates the lowest satisfaction with democracy and 100 the highest.

Measuring mainstream right parties' positions

The second important explanatory factor for the argument of this paper is the positions of the MRPs. In order to measure this, we collected data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend file from 1999-2014 (Bakker et al., 2015). Despite the shortcomings when using CHES to explain electoral outcomes (e.g. the data do not line up with elections), as this paper is primarily interested in parties' positions, rather than saliency, CHES data is still the best available source. As the time frame of this research is from 2004 to 2015, we rely on three (3) different years of the data collection, 2006, 2010 and 2014[13]. To measure the ideology of the

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[10] For more information on the construction of the variables see Kaufmann et al. (2010) accessed at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130

[11] For the correlation matrix see Appendix A, Table A9.

[12] For Cronbach's Alpha test table see Appendix A, Table A11.

[13] For the list of MRPs see Appendix A, Table A17. It is important to note here that the MRPs are selected based on their electoral support, even if they are borderline cases of being far-right, such as Fidesz (Hungary) and PiS (Poland). It is important to note here that in some cases (20 elections) MRPs positions data from Chapel Hill are subsequent to the election years. This

mainstream right parties, we created two variables that capture the parties' positions on social issues and immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities, respectively. Firstly, we sum the values of the variables that the Chapel Hill Expert Survey includes in order to capture the parties' positions, namely the authoritarian-libertarian position, the positions on law and order, social lifestyle (which includes the positions on issues such as gay rights), religious principle, immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic minorities (alpha = 0.89)[14]. All these variables are scales from 0-10. The higher the number the more conservative the party, with smaller numbers indicating more liberal positions[15]. Moreover, we disaggregated this variable further and we created an alternative variable that captures the mainstream-right parties' positions on immigration issues only. This latter variable was created by combining the variables on immigration position, multiculturalism and position on ethnic minorities (alpha = 0.85)[16]. We employ this variable to test the effect of mainstream-right ideological positions on the issues of immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities—key for ERPs (Pirro, 2014). We also use data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens, et al., 2019), as a robustness check. We calculated MRPs positions on the national way of life (for more details about the calculation, see Appendix A, Table A2), as a robustness check for the CHES variable. We also tested the effect of saliency of MRPs on issues far-right parties own, but also MRPs' positions on the same issues. We tested the effect of MRPs' positive mentions on national ways of life, which captures issues such as nationalism, and support for established national ideas, and also we created a proxy which captures the saliency of MRPs on both multiculturalism (negative mentions) and national way of life (positive).

Control Variables

We also control for other factors that scholars connect to the electoral success of the right-wing extremist parties[17]. To control the effect of the economy on the electoral support for ERPs, we control for unemployment (%), real GDP growth, and also the effect of the economic crisis by

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is done as CHES started collecting data on immigration and new politics issues from 2006 onwards. However, we followed CHES coding and used the data on each MRP's position that is closest to the election year (see CHES trend-file codebook for more details). To solve the potential issues with endogeneity, we used Manifesto Project data as a robustness check, which is collected from manifestos prior to elections.

[14] For Cronbach's Alpha test table see Appendix A, Table A13.

[15] For the definitions and the measurement of all the variables see Appendix A, Table A2.

[16] For Cronbach's Alpha test table see Appendix A, Table A14.

[17] All the independent variables (both key independent variables and control variables) are lagged by one year, or to the closest available data.

14

introducing a dummy variable with values 1 for every election after 2009 and 0 for every election from 2004-2008. We also control for the effect of immigration related variables by controlling the asylum seekers as percentage of the population. We also tested a series of supply-side variables by controlling for the electoral rules, effective number of parties on votes level, voting turnout, electoral threshold, and the extent to which MRPs were incumbent prior the elections. Last, we controlled for the effect of potential historical contexts in different regions (e.g. authoritarian past) by creating three dummy variables; firstly, a dummy which takes the value of 1 when countries are from south and eastern Europe, and 0 otherwise, secondly, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when countries are postcommunist and 0 otherwise, and lastly, a dummy which takes the value of 1 when countries are from south Europe and 0 otherwise[18].

Model

The dependent variable is the vote share of the ERPs in every European Union member-state national election from 2004-2015. This timeframe allows us to test the effect of the economic crisis (2004-2008 pre-crisis and 2009-2015 crisis). The dependent variable is left-censored as it cannot be negative. Also, as this paper aims to overcome the issue of selection bias and include countries with no ERP, the data includes many zeros on the dependent variable. It is problematic to use ordinary least squared (OLS) regression analysis when the dependent variable is censored or includes many zeros because of violations of the linearity assumption. Secondly, despite the absence in some countries of ERPs, one cannot assume that no support for such parties exists (Golder, 2003; Coffé et al., 2007). However, the OLS regression cannot take into account latent support for the ERPs in countries where these parties are absent.

Instead, following Golder's (2003), Jackman and Volpert's (1996) and Jesuit, et al's (2009) suggestions, we utilise a type I Tobit model. Tobit models, initially proposed by Tobin (1958), are mostly applied to data-censoring problems (Jesuit et al., 2009, p.284); however, as Wooldrige (2002) suggests, these models can be applied for corner solutions to data with many zeros in the dependent variable. As the dependent variable of this research has many zeros

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[18] For the description and the sources for all variables see Appendix A, Table A2 and for the summary statistics see Appendix A, Table A4.

(see Figure A3, Appendix A, page 11), a Tobit model is the most appropriate statistical model as it utilizes the maximum-likelihood for left-censored variables (Golder, 2003).[19]

Despite the many advantages of the Tobit model for corner solutions issues, this statistical model could face some potential issues. To start with, the Tobit model assumes that there is no heteroskedasticy and non-normality in the distribution of the error term (Jesuit et al. 2009; Wooldridge, 2002). As the data for this paper is panel or cross-national time series, we cannot use panel corrected standard errors[20] (Golder, 2003). However, the test for heteroskedasticity[21] shows that this exists and we should take this into account. A way to do this is to run a fixed-effect model by using country dummies in order to account for potential heterogeneities among the countries (see Golder, 2003; Swank and Betz, 2003). Another way to account for the issue of autocorrelation is to transform the dependent variable using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) function that approximates a logarithm, following Jesuit et al's (2009: 286) suggestion[22]. After the transformation of the dependent variable using the above formalisation, the dependent variables show much less variance (See Table A8, Appendix A). Also, Tables A5 (test before transformation) and A6 (after transformation) in Appendix A show that after the transformation of the dependent variable, autocorrelation is not an issue. The formalisation of IHS is as follows:

$$sin^{-1}y = lnln\left(y + \sqrt{1+y^2}\right) \approx ln2 + l$$

Model Formalisation

After considering the solution that the Tobit model offers to this analysis, as well as potential issues and how we take them into account, we present the formal models used. The standard Tobit model's equation when the data is left-censored at 0 is that:

$$y_i^* = x_i\beta + \varepsilon_i, \ \varepsilon_i \sim N(\sigma^2, 0) \ i = 1,...,n \rightarrow y_i^* \sim N(x_i\beta, \sigma^2)$$
$$y_i = y_i^* \ if \ y_i^* > 0$$

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[19] For more information on Tobit models see Amemiya (1984), Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2000, 2001a, 2001b).

[20] After xttobit command, STATA does not allow for robust command.

[21] For Heteroskedasticity tests see Appendix A, Table A7.

[22] Stata command for the transformation gen IHS = log(erp_vote + sqrt(erp_vote^2 + 1)).

16

$$y_i = 0 \; if \; y_i^* \leq 0$$

where y_i^* is the latent dependent variable and y_i is the observed dependent variable (e.g. Amemiya, 1984; Golder, 2003; Jesuit et al., 2009; Wooldridge, 2002). Additionally, x_i is the vector for the independent variables and β is the vector for the coefficients. We present the coefficients, which are the marginal effects on the latent dependent variable y_i^* for the issues of comparability as all the studies which utilised tobit models presented these coefficients (Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Jesuit et al., 2009; Swank and Betz, 2003)[23]. For the purpose of this paper the standard Tobit model will be transformed as:

$$DV_{i,t}^*$$
$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 QoG_{i,t} + \beta_2 MRPs \; Positions_{i,t} + \beta_3 QoG * MRPs \; Positions_{i,t} + \beta_4 Unemployment(\%)_{i,t} + \beta_5 Real \; GDP \; Growth_{i,t} + \beta_6 Asylum \; Seekers \; (\%)_{i,t} + \beta_7 Electoral \; House \; Rules_{i,t} + \beta_{n-n} Country \; Dummies_{i,t} + e_{i,t}$$
$$DV_{i,t} = DV_{i,t}^* \; if \; DV_{i,t}^* > 0$$

$$DV_{i,t} = 0 \; if \; DV_{i,t}^* = 0$$

The two baseline models include as key independent variables the proxy for QoG, the two proxies for the ideology of mainstream right-wing parties[24], their interaction terms, and the controls for unemployment, real GDP growth, asylum seekers, and electoral rules. All the baseline models include country fixed effects (inclusion of country dummies) in order to account for heteroskedasticity[25]. This could absorb cross-national variation, however, all the country dummies are statistically insignificant,[26] showing that the models capture cross-national variation well.

5. Results

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[23] Results from tobit could be analyzed as a) the marginal effects of the independent variables on the observed outcome or b) on the uncensored observed outcome (Golder, 2003).

[24] To control for multicollinearity and also tackle potential endogeneity issues, we have plotted a scatter plot of QoG against MRPs' positions on immigration multiculturalism and ethnic minorities, and added a table with the correlation matrix between the two variables (See Appendix A, Table A18, Figure A7). Both show that the two variables are not correlated.

[25] We have included OLS regression models with and without country fixed effects as robustness checks. See Appendix B, Table B1 and Figure B1 for results.

[26] Despite the fact that country dummies show statistical insignificance, the log-likelihoods of the models with country dummies also show that they should be retained in the analysis.

We ran a series of cross-sectional time-series Tobit regression models in national parliamentary elections from 2004 to 2015. For this time period, there were 90 observations-elections points for most regression models, given missing data. As the key argument of this paper includes an interaction term, and also due to the fact that interaction effects cannot be evaluated from tables (Brambor et al., 2006; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016), we plot the interaction terms; however, we have included the regression tables in Appendix A.

The upper left panel of Figure 1 plots the average marginal effects of the MRPs' positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities on ERPs' support conditional on the two key independent variables on QoG, after the baseline model[27]. It shows that in countries where QoG is 0.8 or below, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs. However, when QoG increases the effect of MRPs' positions becomes insignificant. The upper right panel plots the average marginal effect of MRPs' positions on social issues on ERPs' support conditional on QoG. The results are similar to the left panel's. When QoG is 0.8 or below, when MRPs move towards the right on social issues, support for ERPs is increasing. But when QoG is above 0.8, then the effect of MRPs' positions on ERPs' support loses its significance. The lower left panel plots the average marginal effect of MRPs' positions on national way of life conditional on QoG. The results are fairly similar with the two interaction terms with the key IVs from CHES data. When QoG is poor (below 0.5), the more conservative the MRP, the more likely for ERPs to increase their vote share.

[Figure 1 about here]

These findings shed light to why the re-emergence of ERPs did happen in some countries with poor QoG such as Greece, Hungary and Slovakia, but not in others such as Portugal, and is explained by the MRPs' positions and the extent to which ERPs are ideologically normalised. Also, in countries with good QoG, such as Western European or Scandinavia, ERPs will remain electorally as they are not politically legitimised.

Robustness Checks

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[27] For the regression table see Appendix A, Table A15

We have run a series of robustness checks in order to test the sensitivity of the results. We started by testing the baseline model with the transformed DV, and the two CHES variables as key IVs for MRPs' positions, but with Front National coded not as an ERP[28]. We ran the same models with key independent variables, the MRPs positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities and QoG by using firstly, a tobit model with the non-transformed dependent variable, and also, two OLS regression models one with and another without fixed effects[29]. The results of the baseline models hold after these robustness checks[30].

We also ran several tobit models starting by controlling for MRPs' positions on immigration saliency to control for Meguid's (2005) findings. Secondly, we added several control variables to control for the effect of supply-side factors. Thirdly, we excluded from the sample only Greece, only Hungary and then both countries[31]. Fourthly, we controlled for the effect of the 2008 economic crisis. Fifthly, we added time dummies to control for potential time effects. Sixthly, we added three dummy variables to control for the effect of historical contexts in a) Postcommunist countries, b) South European countries, and c) Postcommunist and South European countries. Last, we controlled for the effect of RRPs' vote shares. The results of the interaction terms hold even after these robustness checks[32].

In the fourth step of robustness checks, we disaggregated the QoG variable, and added as key independent variables the six variables created from the World Bank, plus three own calculated variables that capture the three aspects of QoG as defined by the World Bank[33]. The results hold even after the disaggregation of the QoG variable, especially for when QoG is poor[34].

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[28] There are several reasons why we decided to rerun the baseline models with the exclusion of the Front National from our dependent variable, but without excluding France from the sample. The most important one is that according to the definition of ERPs of this paper, the FN can lie under the extreme-right umbrella under Jean-Marie Le Pen's leadership, due to the relationship with fascism, or to put it correctly, holocaust denial and racism. However, the vast majority of scholars who work on the far-right classify FN, as radical-right, and also scholars such as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) used FN as their master case (as radical-right). So, to test the robustness of the findings of this study, and also to acknowledge the fact that FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen was a borderline case, we decided to consider this party as radical-right for the robustness check. For the regression outputs and the interaction plots see Appendix B, Table B1 and Figure B1.

[29] For the regression outputs and the interaction plots see Appendix B, Table B2 and Figure B2.

[30] It is important to note here, that the results hold even after the OLS regression model with fixed effects, which shows that the key hypothesis of this study is confirmed, but also allows us to, at least partially, control for endogeneity and/or other potential issues such as omitted variable bias.

[31] Greece and Hungary have the most successful extreme-right party (Golden Dawn and Jobbik) in the sample, poor quality of government and highly conservative mainstream right parties (New Democracy and Fidesz), which may be driving the results. As a robustness check, we decided to exclude these countries from the sample. The results of the interaction terms hold after the exclusion of Hungary. When we exclude Greece and then Greece and Hungary, the results hold at 90%.

[32] For regression tables and interaction plots see Appendix B, Table B3 and Figure B3.

[33] For the definitions and the creation of the variables see Appendix A, Table A2.

As a fifth step, instead of the QoG variable, we used three other key IVs, starting with satisfaction with democracy index, and we continued with the Bayesian corruption index, and political corruption index from V-DEM. The results of the interaction terms show the same patterns even after we used different proxies for the QoG[35].

For the last set of robustness checks, we run the baseline model for the years after 2006 to control for endogeneity. The CHES dataset collects data on positions on immigration and other new politics from 2006 onwards. As mentioned earlier, we used the coding from the CHES trend-file to attach MRPs' positions to each election year, however, sometimes the election year is prior to the data collection. This might create some methodological issues (endogeneity). To control for the validity of our statistical findings, we excluded all the election years prior to 2006. Even after the exclusion of the elections prior to 2006, and with the total sample dropped to 70, the results hold[36].

For the last step of our analysis, we run two tobit models with two three-way interaction terms. We started by including the interaction term between QoG without political stability, MRPs' positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities, and the extent to which the MRP competitor was incumbent or not. Someone could say that ERPs will be electorally successful in countries with poor QoG and highly conservative MRP positions, only if MRPs were incumbent in the previous elections. This is plausible, however, the results from Figure A4 (Appendix A for the regression table see, Table A16, model 1) show that in countries with poor QoG, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful the ERPs, independently of the incumbency status of MRPs. However, when MRPs were not incumbent, in countries with good QoG, the accommodation strategy harms ERPs, but when MRPs were incumbent, the effect of their positions in countries with QoG above 0.7 is statistically insignificant.

Secondly, we tested the interaction term between our key IVs with MRPs' salience of national way of life, and issues that far-right parties, usually, own. Figures A5 and A6 (Appendix A) show that when MRPs' salience increases on national way of life, and/or on issues far-right parties own in countries with poor QoG, the more conservative the MRPs, the more successful

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[34] For interaction plots see Figure B4 and for the regression table see Table B4 in Appendix B.
[35] See Appendix B, Table B5 and Figure B5.
[36] See Appendix B, Table B6, and Figure B6.

the ERPs, which further confirms the ideological normalisation hypothesis. It also shows that in countries with good QoG, when the salience increases, ERPs are less successful when MRPs adopt accommodative strategies.

6. Illustrative cases

The findings of the statistical analysis of this paper show that ERPs are more likely to increase their vote share when QoG is poor, which normalises ERPs' political presence, and MRPs adopt highly conservative positions, especially on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities, through normalisation of ERPs' ideology. These findings explain why traditional ERPs tend to be electorally successful only in South or Eastern Europe, where QoG tends to be significantly worse than in Western Europe or Scandinavia. Taking into consideration the limited number of observations (90) of the statistical analysis, and despite that the results hold a bevy of robustness checks, it is important to discuss some illustrative cases (successful and unsuccessful) to strengthen the plausibility of the argument of this paper. This will also allow us to control for potential endogeneity or the alternative explanation that MRPs shift towards the right after ERP electoral support. We will focus then at the two cases which mostly drive the statistical findings, Greece and Hungary, to show that the qualitative stories of these countries confirm the findings of our statistical analysis.

Starting with Greece, the rise of GD shows how the political and ideological normalisation of ERPs works. Greece is a country with poor QoG[37]. There is a clear significant drop in QoG from 2005 onwards and this drop is even clearer after 2008. As a result, the political normalisation of the FR in Greece exists since 2008. However, ERPs remained completely electorally marginalised in national elections until 2012 or, as discussed above, until 2010, in mayoral elections in Athens, as GD received only 0.3% in the 2009 national elections. After the 2009 national elections, when New Democracy lost to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, the former changed leadership. Under the then-new leadership of Antonis Samaras, New Democracy changed its positions. The party became more conservative on social issues, and

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[37] See Appendix B, Figure B7.

even more clearly so on issues such as immigration, multiculturalism and rights of ethnic minorities[38]. Only after the transformation of New Democracy did GD manage to be electorally successful and enter the Greek parliament.

The same pattern can be found if we look at Hungary, and the rise of Jobbik. Jobbik, became electorally successful in the 2010 national elections. The party gained 16.67% of the total votes and became the third largest party in the Hungarian parliament, similar to GD in the 2015 Greek national election. Fidesz, the MRP in Hungary, initially formed as a civic youth movement (1988) and transformed to a liberal party (in terms of economy and cultures) in 1990 (Pytlas, 2016). The transformation of the party to a highly conservative MRP started initially in 1994, with a party split when liberal members of the party left, and continued further from 1995 onwards. In 2001, Fidesz moved further towards the far-right (Bozóki 2008: 210)[39]. Fidesz continued to be highly conservative, especially on social issues, which resulted in the normalisation of far-right ideas. It is not surprising that individuals in Hungary show the highest anti-immigration sentiments across Europe (Messing and Ságvári, 2019). Jobbik took advantage of the normalisation of FR ideas in Hungary, and as the QoG was declining from the mid-2000s onwards[40], normalised politically the agenda of the ERP. The normalisation of the far-right continued even after 2010, and the transformation of Fidesz to a far-right party, continues to normalise far-right ideas in Hungary. Most crucially though, the transformation of Fidesz did not happen as a response to Jobbik's electoral support, but started much earlier.

The two illustrative cases show that in Greece and Hungary, ERPs were politically and ideologically normalised, and also that the transformation of the MRPs happened prior to the electoral success of ERPs in these countries.

7. Conclusion

This paper aimed to explain variation in the electoral support for ERPs in European Union member-states, contributing to the wider literature on far-right success. Though scholars

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[38] See Appendix B, Table B7.

[39] A prime example which shows the shift of Fidesz further to the right from 2001 is the Hungarian Status Law, adopted in 2001. For more details about this please see (Pytlas, 2016; Chapter 2, 'Hungary: Jobbik vs Fidesz' section).

[40] See Appendix B, Table B7.

(Ignazi, 1992; Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 2003; Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin 2011) accounted for the differences of the parties under the far-right umbrella, their studies did not explain cross-national variation in the electoral support for ERPs. This paper theorised and showed that political and ideological normalisation of the ER creates political opportunities for ERPs' success.

Building on studies on the relationship between QoG and voting behaviour, we expected that in countries with poor QoG, anti-system parties would find fertile grounds for electoral success through various mechanisms, such as dissatisfaction with democracy, or 'failed expectations' (Agerberg, 2017). This article also expected that the positions of mainstream right parties can create or close the political space for ER competitors. The existing literature proposes two competing hypotheses; MRPs' accommodation strategy, firstly, legitimise ERPs' ideology, so the latter are more likely to succeed, and secondly, close the political space for ERPs, the latter therefore are electorally unsuccessful. The findings regarding the effects of MRPs' positions on ERPs' support are conflicting. After running several regression models, this paper shows that QoG moderates the effect of the MRPs' positions, on the electoral support for ERPs. More specifically, as hypothesised, ERPs are more likely to succeed in countries with poor QoG and a highly conservative MRP. However, as the QoG improves, the effect of MRPs' positions on ERPs' support loses its significance, and is some cases even reduces ERPs' support (mainly when QoG is extremely good). We also show that MRPs' salience on far-right issues mitigates the size of the effect of MRPs' positions and QoG on ERPs' success. The last key finding of this paper shows that in countries with poor QoG, highly conservative MRPs are associated with higher support for ERPs, independently of the fact they were part of the government in the previous elections or not. The findings of this paper are particularly important as they show that under specific conditions, party competition, and more specifically, the ideological positions of MRPs, could have different effects on voting for ERPs. The findings of this study correspond closely to the existing literature about the effectiveness of political ostracism, as a strategy to combat anti-immigration parties' support (see van Spanje and and Weber, 2019), as they show that contextual characteristics, in this case QoG, might explain cross-national variation in the electoral support for ostracised anti-immigration parties.

The contribution of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it is the first paper that focuses solely on explaining the variation in electoral support for ERPs across Europe. Second, by demonstrating the interaction with QoG, we reconcile two competing hypotheses in the

existing literature, which suggest that MRPs' positions have conflicting effects on the electoral success of ERPs. This paper showed that demand-side conditions, QoG in this case, moderate the effect of the ideological positions of the mainstream right.

By combining demand- and supply-side factors, this paper opens avenues for further research. More specifically, by showing that QoG moderates the effect of the positions of MRPs, this article creates fertile grounds for further research on how demand-side factors moderate or mitigate the effect of supply-side and vice versa. This paper derived macro-level hypotheses; however, the micro-level implications of these findings deserve attention. Also, this paper found that party competition, in this case the relationship between the mainstream and the far-right helps us to explain variation in the electoral support for the latter. Despite that it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is equally important to test the effect of party competition across the left-right spectrum on ERP support. Also, as this paper's sample is rather small, with the availability of data on QoG and parties' positions, scholars can test the hypothesis of this study by expanding the temporal coverage. Last, the same framework can be applied to other party families, such as the far right as whole or the far left.

Acknowledgments

8. References

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26

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30

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31

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32

Figure 1: ERP's Vote Share (2004-2015)

Table A1: Extreme right parties in Europe

Countries	Extreme Right Parties	Sources
Austria	None	
Belgium	Front National (2007), Belgians Rise Up(check)	First: part of: http://aemn.info Second: https://www.asiaone.com/world/belgium-bans-anti-semitic-hatefest
Bulgaria	Ataka	(Bustikova, 2018)
Croatia	None	
Cyprus	National Popular Front (ELAM)	(Katsourides, 2012)
Czech Republic	Worker's Party of Social Justice	(Minkenberg, 2013)
Denmark	None	
Estonia	None	
Finland	None	
France	Front National (-2011)	Under Jean-Marie Le Pen due to fascism
Germany	National Democratic Party	(Minkenberg, 2013)
Greece	Golden Daw	(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015)
Hungary	Jobbik	(Minkenberg, 2013)
Ireland	None	
Italy	Fiamma Tricolore, Forza Nuova, CasaPound	(Minkenberg, 2013)
Latvia	All for Latvia (-2006)	(Bustikova, 2009)
Lithuania	Young Lithuania	(Bustikova, 2018)
Luxemburg	None	
Malta	None	
Netherlands	None	
Poland	None	
Portugal	National Renovator Party	(Marchi, 2013)
Romania	Greater Romania Party	(Minkenberg, 2013)
Slovakia	Our Slovakia	(Bustikova, 2018)
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	(Bustikova, 2009)
Spain	Espana 2000, National Democracy	(Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015)
Sweden	None	
United Kingdom	British National Party	(Minkenberg, 2013)

Table A2: Variables Descriptions and Sources

Variable	Description	Sources
Vote for extreme right parties (erp_vote)	Percentage of votes for extreme right parties in National parliamentary elections from 2004-2015	Various Sources: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2019) Political Yearbook: www.politicaldatayearbook.com
Transformed Dependent Variable	DV = log(erp_vote + sqrt(erp_vote^2 + 1))	Own Calculation
IMF Unemployment (%)	Percentage of Unemployment: years used for each country: year prior to elections (2004-2014)	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/download.aspx (IMF, 2014)
real GDP growth (%)	Growth of real GDP, percent change from previous year	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/download.aspx (IMF, 2014)
Quality of Government	Row mean of the variables, control for corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, political stability and voice and accountability	Own Calculation:
Control For Corruption (CCE) Index (-2.5 to 2.5)	Control of Corruption - Estimate: "Control of Corruption" measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of "additional payments to get things done", to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring "grand corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in "state capture". Years used for each country: year prior to elections if applicable, otherwise the elections years.	Worldbank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Rule of Law (RLE) Index (-2.5 to 2.5)	Rule of Law - Estimate: "Rule of Law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected. Years used for each country: year prior to elections if applicable, otherwise the elections years.	Worldbank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (Kaufmann et al., 2010)

Government Effectiveness	"Government Effectiveness" combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.	Worldbank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Regulatory Quality	"Regulatory Quality" includes measures of the incidence of market unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.	Worldbank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Political stability and absence of violence	"Political Stability" combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.	Worldbank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Voice and Accountability	"Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.	Worldbank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Control For Corruption and Rule of Law Row Mean (CCE and RLE Row Mean)	Row mean of Control for Corruption and Rule of Law for each country.	Own Calculation
Government Capacity	Row mean of the variables government effectiveness and regulatory quality	Own Calculation
Government Selection	Row mean of the variables Political Stability and Voice and Accountability	Own Calculation
MRP Positions on Cultural Issues	Measures the positions of mainstream right parties on issues related to immigration. Row Total of the variables: immigration policy, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities.	Own calculation All variables gathered from Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File (Baker et al., 2015)
MRP Positions on Social Issues	Measures the position of mainstream right parties in EU-28 on social issues. row mean of the variables: gal/tan, civil liberties/law and order, social lifestyle, religious principle, immigration policy, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities.	Own calculation. All variables gathered from Chapel Hill

		Expert Survey Trend File (Baker et al., 2015)
MRPs Incumbent	Measures the extent to which mainstream-right parties were incumbent or not before the elections.	Own Calculation
Electoral Rule House	Which electoral rule (proportional representation or plurality) governs the election of the majority of House seats? This is coded 1 if most seats are Plurality, zero if most seats are Proportional. In cases where the majority of legislators are appointed or indirectly elected, the variable is coded Indirect.	Database of Political Institutions 2017 (Scartascini et al., 2018)
Asylum Seekers (%)	Refugee population by country or territory of asylum (World Development Indicators: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (World Bank, 2016) as percentage of Population	Own calculation
Effective Number of Parties (votes level)	Effective number of parties on the votes level according to the formula [N2] pro-posed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Years used for each country: year prior to elections	Armingeon, Wegner, Wiedemeier, Isler, Knoepfel, Weisstanner and Engler http://www.cpds-data.org/ (Armingeon et al., 2018)
Electoral Threshold	What is the vote threshold for representation? Records the minimum vote share that a party must obtain in order to take at least one seat in PR systems. If there are more than one threshold, record the one that governs the most seats.	Database of Political Institutions 2017 (Scartascini et al., 2018)
Voting Turnout	Voting turnout in elections	Armingeon, Wegner, Wiedemeier, Isler, Knoepfel, Weisstanner and Engler http://www.cpds-data.org/ (Armingeon et al., 2018)
National way of life (MRPs positions)	National Way of Life: Positive – National Way of Life: Negative National Way of Life: Positive Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals. May include: • Support for established national ideas; • General appeals to pride of citizenship; • Appeals to patriotism; • Appeals to nationalism; • Suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion. National Way of Life: Negative Unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation and history. May include:	Data gathered from Manifesto Project: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ Volkens, Andrea / Krause, Werner / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Weßels, Bernhard(2019): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 2019b.

4

|	• Opposition to patriotism; • Opposition to nationalism; • Opposition to the existing national state, national pride, and national ideas.	Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2019b
National way of life (positive)	National Way of Life: Positive Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals. May include: • Support for established national ideas; • General appeals to pride of citizenship; • Appeals to patriotism; • Appeals to nationalism; • Suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion. For all documents that have been coded with version 5 of the Coding Instructions	Data gathered from Manifesto Project: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ Volkens, Andrea / Krause, Werner / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Weßels, Bernhard(2019): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 2019b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2019b
Far-right issues	Measures mainstream right parties salience on national way of life and multiculturalism. The variable created from four variables gathered from Manifesto Project, and more specifically salience = national way of life positive + multiculturalism negative	Own Calculation. Data gathered from Manifesto Project: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ Volkens, Andrea / Krause, Werner / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Weßels, Bernhard(2019): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 2019b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin

5

		für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2019b
Satisfaction with Democracy Index	These index scores represent an average of all country-survey scores available within each country-year observation. Overlapping country-survey are averaged to create unique country-year observations. Scores range from 0 representing the lowest possible level of satisfaction to 100 representing the highest possible level.	Human Understanding Measured Across National (HUMAN) Surveys https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/KIPB57 (Klassen, 2018)
Political Corruption Index	Political corruption. Question: How pervasive is political corruption? Clarification: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation). The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive (at the level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished 640 types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation. Aggregation: The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index; (b) executive corruption index; (c) the indicator for legislative corruption; and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption. In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. V-Dem replace missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of (a), (b) and (d).	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project: https://v-dem.net/en/data/ (Coppedge et al., 2017) (Pemstein et al., 2018)
Bayesian Corruption Index	The BCI index values lie between 0 and 100, with an increase in the index corresponding to a raise in the level of corruption. This is a first difference with CPI and WGI where an increase means that the level of corruption has decreased. There exists no objective scale on which to measure the perception of corruption and the exact scaling you use is to a large extent arbitrary. However, we were able to give the index an absolute scale: zero corresponds to a situation where all surveys say that there is absolutely no corruption. On the other hand, when the index is one, all surveys say that corruption is as bad as it gets according to their scale. This is another difference with CPI and WGI, where the scaling is relative. They are rescaled such that WGI has mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in each year, while CPI always lies between 0 and 100. In contrast, the actual range of values of the BCI will change in each year, depending how close countries come to the situation where everyone agrees there is no corruption at all (0), or that corruption	The Bayesian Corruption Index - 2018 update. (Standaert, 2015)

6

	is as bad as it can get (100). By way of illustration, the figure below shows the histogram of the BCI in 2014. The country with the lowest level of corruption is New Zealand (15.4), while corruption is most problematic in Somalia (70.9). The absolute scale of the BCI index was obtained by rescaling all the individual survey data such that zero corresponds to the lowest possible level of corruption and 1 to the highest one. We subsequently rescaled the BCI index such that when all underlying indicators are zero (one), the expected value of the BCI index is zero (hundred).	
Postcommunist dummy	1 if countries are postcommunist – 0 otherwise Postcommunist countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	Own calculation
South European dummy	1 if countries are in South Europe – 0 otherwise South European countries: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain	Own calculation
Postcommunist/ South European dummy	1 if countries are either postcommunist or south European – 0 otherwise	Own calculation

Figure A1:QoG and ERPs vote share across Europe

Table A3: Correlation between Satisfaction with Democracy and Quality of Government

	Satisfaction with Democracy	Quality of Government
Satisfaction with Democracy	1.0000	
Quality of Government	0.8394	1.0000

Figure A2: Relationship between Satisfaction with democracy and quality of government

Table A4: Summary Statistics of all variables

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
ERPs vote share	90	1.531078	3.388663	0	20.22
Transformed DV	90	.6387486	.998135	0	3.70043
Quality of Government	90	1.01705	.5218111	-.0464918	1.908547
Control for Corruption and Rule of Law Mean	90	1.011043	.7356749	-.2624495	2.24216
Government Capacity	90	1.134887	.5249662	-.1705045	2.066595
Government Selection	90	.9052201	.3637561	.232786	1.692318
Control for Corruption	90	.9539356	.8479524	-.303652	2.5
Government Effectiveness	90	1.104999	.62659	-.316024	2.3449
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	90	.6987221	.4250948	-.305335	1.51389
Rule of Law	90	1.06815	.6428085	-.227121	2.12056
Regulatory Quality	90	1.164774	.4548137	-.072293	1.90389
Voice and Accountability	90	1.111718	.3951302	.295875	2.5
MRPs Positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities	90	19.6682	3.05145	9.749269	24.76786
MRPs Positions on Social Issues	90	44.6533	7.830914	27.23757	58.48
National way of life (position)	86	2.59436	2.631623	0	12.048
National way of life (positive) (salience)	87	2.54023	2.641089	0	12.05
Far-right issues (salience)	87	3.469425	3.625428	0	18.81
MRPs Incumbent	90	.4	.4926425	0	1
Unemployment (%)	90	9.648122	5.016642	3.3	26.47
Real GDP Growth	90	1.688778	4.120205	-14.35	11.09
Asylum Seekers (%)	90	.222311	.3452964	.00037	1.9754
Effective number of parties on votes level	90	4.90402	1.559035	2.05005	10.06918
Voting Turnout	90	68.24667	13.497	39.2	93.3
Electoral Rule House	90	.1	.3016807	0	1
Electoral Threshold	84	3.942143	4.223053	0	25
Satisfaction with Democracy Index	88	49.59342	13.54137	20.84309	80.09397
Political Corruption Index	88	.1988179	.1858928	.0059285	.7857288
Bayesian Corruption Index	90	38.11589	12.84644	14.5244	56.383

Figure A3: ERP's Vote Share (2004-2015)

Table A5: Test for Autocorrelation before the transformation of the DV

Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data

H0: no first order autocorrelation

F(1, 22) = 34.703

Prob > F = 0.0000

Table A6:Test for Autocorrelation after the transformation of the DV

Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data

H0: no first order autocorrelation

F(1, 22) = 0.724

Prob > F = 0.4041

Table A7: Test for heteroskedasticity

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

Ho: Constant variance

Variables: fitted values of ihs_dep2

chi2(1) = 17.42

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Table A8: Dependent Variable Summary Statistics (Before and After the transformation)

VARIABLES	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance	skewness	kurtosis
Vote Share (%) Extreme Right Parties	90	1.531	3.389	11.48	3.354	15.99
Transformed Dependent Variable	90	0.639	0.998	0.996	1.408	3.783

Table A9: Correlation Matrix, Quality of Government variables

	Control for Corruption	Government Effectiveness	Political Stability and Absence of Violence	Rule of Law	Regulatory Quality	Voice and Accountability
Control for Corruption	1.0000					
Government Effectiveness	0.9451	1.0000				
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	0.5913	0.5924	1.0000			
Rule of Law	0.9473	0.9408	0.5996	1.0000		
Regulatory Quality	0.8968	0.8823	0.5829	0.9095	1.0000	
Voice and Accountability	0.8637	0.8437	0.5728	0.8535	0.8212	1.0000

Source: Data from Worldwide Governance Indicators gathered from Quality of Government Institute.

Table A10: Summary statistics of Quality of Government variables

VARIABLES	N	Mean	sd	min	max
Control for Corruption	90	0.954	0.848	-0.304	2.500
Government Effectiveness	90	1.105	0.627	-0.316	2.345
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	90	0.699	0.425	-0.305	1.514
Rule of Law	90	1.068	0.643	-0.227	2.121
Regulatory Quality	90	1.165	0.455	-0.0723	1.904
Voice and Accountability	90	1.112	0.395	0.296	2.500
Control for Corruption and Rule of Law Row Mean	90	1.011	0.736	-0.262	2.242
QoG	90	1.017	0.522	-0.0465	1.909
Government Selection	90	0.905	0.364	0.233	1.692
Government Capacity	90	1.135	0.525	-0.171	2.067

Source: Data from Worldwide Governance Indicators gathered from Quality of Government Institute. *Note*: The variables Control for Corruption and Rule of Law Row Mean, Quality of Government, Government Selection and Government Capacity are calculated by the author based on data from Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Table A11: Cronbach's Alpha test for QoG variable

Item	Obs	Sign	item-test correlation	item-rest correlation	Average interitem correlation	alpha
Control for Corruption	90	+	0.9625	0.9444	0.7599	0.9406
Government Effectiveness	90	+	0.9552	0.9336	0.7639	0.9418
Political Stability	90	+	0.7230	0.6154	0.8904	0.9760
Rule of Law	90	+	0.9637	0.9461	0.7592	0.9404
Regulatory Quality	90	+	0.9347	0.9039	0.7750	0.9451
Voice and Accountability	90	+	0.9094	0.8677	0.7888	0.9492
Test scale					0.7895	0.9575

Table A12: Summary Statistics of Ideological Positions of Mainstream Right Parties

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
MRPs Positions on Social Issues	90	44.6533	7.830914	27.23757	58.48
MRPs Positions on Cultural Issues	90	19.67	3.051	9.749	24.77
GAL-TAN	90	6.392	1.466	3.125	9.570
Civil Liberties - Law and Order	90	6.603	1.263	4.125	9.430
Social Lifestyle	90	5.935	1.798	1.875	9.710
Religious Principle	90	6.054	1.963	2	9.430
Immigration Policy	90	6.646	1.142	2.611	8.455
Multiculturalism	90	6.774	1.234	3.263	8.778
Ethnic Minorities	90	6.248	1.089	3.875	8.375
Number of id	28	28	28	28	28

Source: Data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999-2014 trend file. *Note*: The first two variables, Ideology of Mainstream Right and Anti-Immigration Mainstream-Right Parties have been calculated by the author based on data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey.

Table A13: Cronbach's Alpha test for MRP1

Item	Obs	Sign	item-test correlation	item-rest correlation	average interitem correlation	alpha
GAL-TAN	90	+	0.9086	0.8665	0.4932	0.8538
Civil Liberties - Law and Order	90	+	0.7422	0.6404	0.5536	0.8815
Social Lifestyle	90	+	0.8117	0.7324	0.5284	0.8705
Religious Principle	90	+	0.7331	0.6285	0.5570	0.8829
Immigration Policy	90	+	0.7039	0.5910	0.5676	0.8873
Multiculturalism	90	+	0.8291	0.7560	0.5221	0.8676
Ethnic Minorities	90	+	0.7210	0.6129	0.5613	0.8848
Test scale					0.5404	0.8917

Table A14: Cronbach's Alpha test for MRP on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities

Item	Obs	Sign	item-test correlation	item-rest correlation	average interitem correlation	alpha
Immigration Policy	90	+	0.8754	0.7164	0.6713	0.8034
Multiculturalism	90	+	0.9011	0.7693	0.6035	0.7527
Ethnic Minorities	90	+	0.8621	0.6901	0.7063	0.8279
Test scale					0.6604	0.8537

Table A15: Baseline Model after the inclusion of interaction terms between variables on Quality of Government and Ideological Positions of Mainstream-Right Parties on Social Issues

Columns Key IV	(1) QoG1/Anti-Immigration	(2) QoG1/social Issues	(3) QoG1/National Way of Life
QoG	11.80**	7.547	-3.392**
	(4.734)	(5.020)	(1.604)
Anti-Immigration	0.716***		
	(0.175)		
QoG # Anti-Immigration	-0.625***		
	(0.205)		
Social Issues		0.225***	
		(0.0735)	
QoG#Social Issues		-0.198**	
		(0.0924)	
National Way of Life			0.388**
			(0.178)
QoG # National Way of Life			-0.379**
			(0.189)
Unemployment (%)	-0.0153	0.000116	-0.0318
	(0.0330)	(0.0374)	(0.0381)
Real GDP Growth	-0.0137	-0.00696	-0.000656
	(0.0273)	(0.0291)	(0.0299)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	2.178	1.999	2.513
	(1.722)	(1.867)	(2.065)
Electoral Rule House = Plurality	0.368	-0.561	-0.382
	(1,580)	(2,027)	(1,046)
Constant	-18.20	-12.99	0.105
	(468.5)	(683.4)	(368.2)
Sigma_u	0	0	0
	(0.0956)	(0.104)	(0.109)
Sigma_e	0.655***	0.717***	0.756***
	(0.0798)	(0.0880)	(0.0935)
Observations	90	90	86
Number of id	28	28	27
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Log Lik	-47.82	-52.37	-55.43

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table A16

VARIABLES	(1) Three-way-interaction with Incumbent	(2) Three-way-interaction with National Way of Life Saliency	(3) Three-way-interaction with Far-right Issues Saliency
QoG	14.57***	10.60*	10.74*
	(5.314)	(5.568)	(5.534)
Anti-immigration	0.792***	0.647***	0.651***
	(0.190)	(0.208)	(0.203)
QoG # Anti-immigration	-0.704***	-0.550**	-0.554**
	(0.228)	(0.240)	(0.238)
MRPs incumbent=1	1.382		
	(3.477)		
MRPs incumbent=0 # QoG	0		
	(0)		
MRPs incumbent=1 # QoG	-3.664		
	(4.063)		
MRPs incumbent=0 # Anti-immigration	0		
	(0)		
MRPs incumbent=1 # Anti-immigration	-0.0808		
	(0.174)		
MRPs incumbent=0 # QoG # Anti-immigration	0		
	(0)		
MRPs incumbent=1 # QoG # Anti-immigration	0.162		
	(0.200)		
National Way of Life (positive)		-1.678	
		(1.138)	
QoG # National Way of Life (positive)		1.929	
		(1.251)	
Anti-immigration # National Way of Life (positive)		0.0790	
		(0.0510)	
QoG # Anti-immigration # National Way of Life (positive)		-0.0961*	
		(0.0572)	
Far-right Issues (positive)			-1.727
			(1.060)
QoG # Far-right Issues (positive)			1.996*
			(1.107)
Anti-immigration # Far-right Issues (positive)			0.0814*
			(0.0476)
QoG # Anti-immigration # Far-right Issues (positive)			-0.100**
			(0.0505)

Unemployment (%)	0.0138	-0.0113	-0.0123
	(0.0365)	(0.0313)	(0.0301)
Real GDP Growth	-0.00567	-0.0121	-0.0145
	(0.0313)	(0.0266)	(0.0257)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	-0.565	2.964*	3.555**
	(2.574)	(1.759)	(1.775)
Electoral Rule House = 1, Plurality	0.241	0.323	0.307
	(1,462)	(1,777)	(1,550)
Constant	-19.90	-17.56	-17.89
	(564.5)	(664.2)	(562.2)
Sigma_u	0	0	0
	(0.0917)	(0.0892)	(0.0858)
Sigma_e	0.627***	0.610***	0.585***
	(0.0762)	(0.0745)	(0.0714)
Observations	90	87	87
Number of id	28	27	27
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Log Lik	-45.65	-45.04	-43.27

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Figure A4: Effect of mainstream-right parties positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities on extreme-right parties support conditional on QoG, by mainstream-right parties incumbency status

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95% CIs

Source: Table A16, Model 1

Figure A5: Effect of mainstream-right parties positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities on extreme-right parties support conditional on QoG, by mainstream-right parties salience on national way of life and multiculturalism

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95% CIs

Source: Table A16, Model 2

Figure A6: Effect of mainstream-right parties positions on immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities on extreme-right parties support conditional on QoG, by mainstream-right parties salience on far-right issues

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95% CIs

Source: Table A16, Model 3

Table A17: List of Mainstream Right Parties

Country Name	Election Date	MRP name	Party Abbreviation
Austria	01-Oct-06	Austrian People's Party	ÖVP
Austria	28-Sep-08	Austrian People's Party	ÖVP
Austria	29-Sep-13	Austrian People's Party	ÖVP
Belgium	10-Jun-07	New Flemish Alliance	N-VA
Belgium	13-Jun-10	New Flemish Alliance	N-VA
Belgium	25-May-14	New Flemish Alliance	N-VA
Bulgaria	25-Jun-05	National Movement Simeon the Second	NDSV
Bulgaria	05-Jul-09	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB
Bulgaria	12-May-13	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB
Bulgaria	05-Oct-14	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB
Croatia	25-Nov-07	Croatian Democratic Union	HDZ
Croatia	04-Dec-11	Croatian Democratic Union	HDZ
Croatia	08-Nov-15	Patriotic Coalition	
Cyprus	21-May-06	Democratic Coalition	DISY
Cyprus	22-May-11	Democratic Coalition	DISY
Czech Republic	03-Jun-06	Civic Democratic Party	ODS
Czech Republic	29-May-10	Civic Democratic Party	ODS

Czech Republic	26-Oct-13	Civic Democratic Party	ODS
Denmark	08-Feb-05	Liberals	V
Denmark	13-Nov-07	Liberals	V
Denmark	15-Sep-11	Liberals	V
Denmark	18-Jun-15	Liberals	V
Estonia	04-Mar-07	Estonian Reform Party	ER
Estonia	06-Mar-11	Estonian Reform Party	ER
Estonia	01-Mar-15	Estonian Reform Party	ER
Finland	18-Mar-07	National Coalition	KK
Finland	17-Apr-11	National Coalition	KK
Finland	19-Apr-15	National Coalition	KK
France	10-Jun-07	Union for a Popular Movement	UMP
France	10-Jun-12	Union for a Popular Movement	UMP
Germany	18-Sep-05	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	CDU/CSU
Germany	27-Sep-09	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	CDU/CSU
Germany	22-Sep-13	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	CDU/CSU
Greece	07-Mar-04	New Democracy	ND
Greece	16-Sep-07	New Democracy	ND
Greece	04-Oct-09	New Democracy	ND
Greece	06-May-12	New Democracy	ND

Greece	17-Jun-12	New Democracy	ND
Greece	25-Jan-15	New Democracy	ND
Greece	20-Sep-15	New Democracy	ND
Hungary	09-Apr-06	Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party	FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP
Hungary	11-Apr-10	Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party	FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP
Hungary	06-Apr-14	Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party	FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP
Ireland	24-May-07	Familiy of the Irish	
Ireland	25-Feb-11	Familiy of the Irish	
Italy	10-Apr-06	Go Italy	FI
Italy	13-Apr-08	People of Freedom	PdL
Italy	24-Feb-13	Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right	FDI-CDN
Latvia	07-Oct-06	People's Party	TP
Latvia	02-Oct-10	Unity	
Latvia	17-Sep-11	Unity	
Latvia	04-Oct-14	Unity	

Lithuania		12-Oct-08	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats	TS-LKD
Lithuania		14-Oct-12	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats	TS-LKD
Luxembourg		13-Jun-04	Christian Social People's Party	CSV/PCS
Luxembourg		07-Jun-09	Christian Social People's Party	CSV/PCS
Luxembourg		20-Oct-13	Christian Social People's Party	CSV/PCS
Netherlands		22-Nov-06	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA
Netherlands		09-Jun-10	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD
Netherlands		12-Sep-12	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD
Poland		25-Sep-05	Law and Justice	PiS
Poland		21-Oct-07	Law and Justice	PiS
Poland		09-Oct-11	Law and Justice	PiS
Portugal		20-Feb-05	Social Democratic Party	PSD
Portugal		27-Sep-09	Social Democratic Party	PSD
Portugal		05-Jun-11	Social Democratic Party	PSD
Portugal		04-Oct-15	Portugal Ahead	PàF
Romania		28-Nov-04	Justice and Truth Alliance	ADA
Romania		30-Nov-08	National Liberal Party	PNL
Romania		09-Dec-12	Social Liberal Union	USL

Slovakia	17-Jun-06	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democartic Party	SDKÚ-DS
Slovakia	12-Jun-10	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democartic Party	SDKÚ-DS
Slovakia	10-Mar-12	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	OľaNO
Slovenia	03-Oct-04	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS
Slovenia	21-Sep-08	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS
Slovenia	04-Dec-11	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS
Slovenia	13-Jul-14	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS
Spain	14-Mar-04	People's Party	PP
Spain	09-Mar-08	People's Party	PP
Spain	20-Nov-11	People's Party	PP
Spain	20-Dec-15	People's Party	PP
Sweden	17-Sep-06	Moderate Coalition Party	MSP
Sweden	19-Sep-10	Moderate Coalition Party	MSP
Sweden	14-Sep-14	Moderate Coalition Party	MSP
United Kingdom	05-May-05	Conservative Party	Conservatives
United Kingdom	06-May-10	Conservative Party	Conservatives
United Kingdom	07-May-15	Conservative Party	Conservatives

Table A18: Correlation Matrix, Quality of Government against MRPs positions on Immigration, Multiculturalsim and Ethnic Minorities

	Anti-immigration mainstream right parties	QoG
Anti-immigration mainstream right parties	1.0000	
QoG	0.0247	1.0000

Correlation between Quality of Government and MRPs positions on immigration

Table B1

Columns Key Variables	(1) QoG/Anti-Immigration	(2) QoG/social Issues
QoG	12.03***	5.357
	(4.222)	(4.641)
Anti-Immigration	0.713***	
	(0.156)	
Anti-Immigration	-0.658***	
	(0.184)	
Social Issues		0.197***
		(0.0676)
Social Issues		-0.160*
		(0.0852)
Unemployment (%)	-0.0213	-0.00582
	(0.0294)	(0.0344)
Real GDP Growth	-0.0121	-0.00444
	(0.0241)	(0.0266)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	3.138**	2.666
	(1.594)	(1.752)
Electoral Rule House = 1, Plurality	0.401	-0.355
	(5,539)	(1,990)
Constant	-17.86	-11.17
	(888.6)	(663.8)
sigma_u	0	0
	(0.0865)	(0.0968)
sigma_e	0.580***	0.656***
	(0.0712)	(0.0812)
Observations	90	90
Number of id	28	28
Country FE	YES	YES
Log Lik	-41.09	-46.89

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Figure B1

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs Positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95% CIs

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs positions on Social Issues with 95% CIs

Source: Appendix B, Table B1

Table B2

| Columns Statistical Models	(1) Baseline Tobit	(2) Tobit Model Non-Transformed DV	(3) OLS Model Non-Transformed DV	(4) OLS Model Non-Transformed DV-Fixed Effects
QoG	11.80**	30.73*	6.916***	8.495*
	(4.734)	(17.80)	(2.231)	(4.569)
Anti-immigration	0.716***	2.213***	0.831***	0.967***
	(0.175)	(0.684)	(0.224)	(0.135)
QoG ## Anti-immigration	-0.625***	-1.733**	-0.503***	-0.609***
	(0.205)	(0.785)	(0.124)	(0.0825)
Unemployment (%)	-0.0153	-0.0580	-0.0224	-0.0108
	(0.0330)	(0.122)	(0.0578)	(0.0622)
Real GDP Growth	-0.0137	-0.0799	-0.0352	-0.0155
	(0.0273)	(0.105)	(0.0606)	(0.0481)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	2.178	2.980	0.233	-0.208
	(1.722)	(6.376)	(0.387)	(0.338)
Electoral Rule House = 1, Plurality	0.368	1.442	0.187	1.156**
	(1,580)	(3,355)	(0.560)	(0.492)
Constant	-18.20	-52.23	-11.56***	-13.88***
	(468.5)	(1,047)	(3.617)	(4.383)
sigma_u	0	0	-11.56***	-13.88***
	(0.0956)	(0.354)	(3.617)	(4.383)
sigma_e	0.655***	2.359***	-11.56***	-13.88***
	(0.0798)	(0.275)	(3.617)	(4.383)
Observations	90	90	90	90
Number of id	28	28	28	28
Country FE	YES	YES	NO	YES
Log Lik	-47.82	-92.98		
R-squared			0.179	0.169
R-squared between model			0.119	0.108
R-squared within model			0.316	0.321

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In models 3 and 4 we used robust standard errors. Stata does not allow the use of robust standard errors after tobit models.

Figure B2

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95% CIs

Source: Appendix B, Table B2

Table B3

| Columns Key IV	(1) Tobit Model_Transformed DV	(2) Controlling for Saliency	(3) Controlling for Saliency	(4) More Controls	(5) Without Hungary	(6) Without Greece	(7) Without Greece & Hungary	(8) Controlling for Crisis	(9) Time Dummies	(10) Postcommunist Dummy	(11) South European Dummy	(12) South/Eastern European dummy	(13) Controlling for RR vote share
QoG	11.80**	13.24***	15.90***	13.92***	13.32***	4.743	5.977	12.95***	10.23**	3.870	3.619	3.861	12.72***
	(4.734)	(5.067)	(5.019)	(4.145)	(4.725)	(5.271)	(5.064)	(4.372)	(4.806)	(3.005)	(2.911)	(3.088)	(4.508)
Anti-immigration mainstream right parties	0.716***	0.781***	0.880***	0.816***	0.752***	0.394*	0.389*	0.812***	0.700***	0.491***	0.483***	0.484***	0.733***
	(0.175)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.167)	(0.171)	(0.209)	(0.204)	(0.172)	(0.189)	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.164)
QoG # Anti-immigration	-0.625***	-0.689***	-0.803***	-0.466**	-0.676***	-0.261	-0.291	-0.708***	-0.566***	-0.287**	-0.287**	-0.274*	-0.653***
	(0.205)	(0.221)	(0.219)	(0.187)	(0.203)	(0.241)	(0.231)	(0.194)	(0.216)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.150)	(0.195)
Unemployment (%)	-0.0153	-0.0138	-0.0108	-0.0520	-0.0103	-0.0612	-0.0535	0.00413	-0.0158	-0.0276	-0.0299	-0.0260	-0.00566
	(0.0330)	(0.0327)	(0.0315)	(0.0325)	(0.0326)	(0.0399)	(0.0381)	(0.0304)	(0.0418)	(0.0355)	(0.0353)	(0.0359)	(0.0321)
Real GDP Growth	-0.0137	-0.0127	-0.0197	-0.0315	-0.000960	-0.0108	0.00802	-0.0636**	-0.0387	-0.0144	-0.0127	-0.0152	-0.0229
	(0.0273)	(0.0270)	(0.0264)	(0.0247)	(0.0282)	(0.0317)	(0.0327)	(0.0286)	(0.0342)	(0.0324)	(0.0323)	(0.0327)	(0.0260)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	2.178	2.512	3.240*	2.191	2.357	1.650	1.952	1.382	1.218	0.260	0.167	0.490	1.325
	(1.722)	(1.765)	(1.770)	(1.825)	(1.714)	(1.677)	(1.611)	(1.535)	(1.656)	(0.916)	(0.909)	(1.033)	(1.711)
Electoral Rule House = 1, Plurality	0.368	0.449	0.415	-0.625	0.355	0.261	0.186	0.447	0.800	0.570	0.487	0.767	-0.387
	(1,580)	(2,226)	(1,919)	(2,107)	(2,176)	(2,234)	(2,255)	(1,891)	(1,846)	(0.853)	(0.866)	(0.938)	(1,931)
Effective Number of Parties (Votes Level)				0.306**									
				(0.154)									
Electoral Threshold				-0.213									
				(0.137)									
Voting Turnout				-0.125***									
				(0.0285)									
Far-right Issues (positive)			-0.112**	-0.225***									
			(0.0563)	(0.0567)									
MRPs incumbent				-0.279									
				(0.219)									
National Way of Life (positive)		-0.0460											
		(0.0601)											
Crisis (after 2009)								-0.869***					
								(0.272)					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Postcommunist dummy										0.428			
										(0.794)			
South European dummy											-0.280		
											(0.751)		
Postcommunist/South European dummy												0.816	
												(1.222)	
Radical Right Vote Share													-0.0708**
													(0.0336)
Constant	-18.20	-19.95	-22.76	-17.68	-19.72	-11.33	-12.33	-17.78	-15.81	-8.168***	-7.461***	-8.738**	-16.76
	(468.5)	(587.7)	(531.2)	(602.0)	(332.9)	(621.4)	(625.1)	(560.2)	(592.4)	(3.126)	(2.789)	(3.500)	(444.7)
Constant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.353***	1.348***	1.391***	0
	(0.0956)	(0.0946)	(0.0912)	(0.0681)	(0.0972)	(0.0981)	(0.0970)	(0.0856)	(0.0894)	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.309)	(0.0918)
Constant	0.655***	0.648***	0.623***	0.428***	0.645***	0.635***	0.606***	0.583***	0.610***	0.840***	0.842***	0.842***	0.626***
	(0.0798)	(0.0791)	(0.0758)	(0.0530)	(0.0827)	(0.0818)	(0.0826)	(0.0709)	(0.0743)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.0760)
Observations	90	86	87	81	87	83	80	90	90	90	90	90	90
Number of id	28	27	27	25	27	27	26	28	28	28	28	28	28
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Lik	-47.82	-47.53	-45.88	-25.06	-44.43	-41.74	-37.66	-42.98	-44.89	-83.51	-83.59	-83.42	-45.56
Time FE									YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure B3

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs on Immigration Multicultrualism and Ethnic Minorities

Source: Appendix B, Table B3

Figure B3 - continue

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95% CIs

Source: Appendix B, Table B3

Table B4

Columns Key IV	(1) QoG	(2) Control for Corruption and Rule of Law	(3) Government Selection	(4) Government Capacity	(5) Control for Corruption	(6) Rule of Law	(7) Regulatory Quality	(8) Government Effectiveness	(9) Voice and Accountability	(10) Political Stability
QoG	11.80** (4.734)									
Anti-immigration mainstream right parties	0.716*** (0.175)	0.468*** (0.111)	0.587*** (0.189)	0.798*** (0.195)	0.443*** (0.0981)	0.499*** (0.122)	0.695*** (0.197)	0.767*** (0.166)	0.649*** (0.230)	0.390*** (0.111)
QoG#Anti-immigration	-0.625*** (0.205)									
Control for Corruption and Rule of Law		6.690** (3.325)								
Control for Corruption and Rule of Law #Anti-immigration		-0.461*** (0.140)								
Government Selection			8.123 (5.020)							
Government Selection #Anti-immigration			-0.402* (0.241)							
Government Capacity				12.02*** (4.376)						
Government Capacity #Anti-immigration				-0.580*** (0.195)						
Control for Corruption					8.394*** (2.831)					

Control for Corruption #Anti-immigration					-0.477*** (0.126)					
Rule of Law						4.641 (3.281)				
Rule of Law #Anti-immigration						-0.393*** (0.145)				
Regulatory Quality							8.398** (4.093)			
Regulatory Quality #Anti-immigration							-0.442** (0.191)			
Government Effectiveness								12.47*** (3.876)		
Government Effectiveness #Anti-immigration								-0.579*** (0.175)		
Voice and Accountability									8.104 (4.976)	
Voice and Accountability #Anti-immigration									-0.371 (0.236)	
Political Stability and Absence of Violence										2.818 (3.370)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence #Anti-immigration										-0.198 (0.158)
Unemployment (%)	-0.0153 (0.0330)	-0.0287 (0.0288)	-0.00104 (0.0321)	-0.00431 (0.0329)	-0.0156 (0.0274)	-0.0371 (0.0299)	-0.0266 (0.0396)	0.00944 (0.0280)	0.00810 (0.0310)	-0.00660 (0.0302)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Real GDP Growth	-0.0137	-0.0137	-0.0169	-0.0142	-0.00588	-0.0447*	-0.0117	-0.0171	-0.0251	0.00455
	(0.0273)	(0.0244)	(0.0306)	(0.0267)	(0.0279)	(0.0260)	(0.0276)	(0.0263)	(0.0288)	(0.0314)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	2.178	3.199*	1.033	1.717	3.591**	2.123	1.602	1.585	0.972	0.284
	(1.722)	(1.657)	(1.773)	(1.739)	(1.740)	(1.636)	(1.778)	(1.709)	(1.801)	(1.779)
Electoral Rule House = 1, Plurality	0.368	0.606	0.425	-0.133	0.450	0.677	-0.581	1.174	0.0451	0.396
	(1,580)	(1,762)	(1,707)	(2,086)	(1,829)	(1,884)	(1,873)	(1,586)	(1,068)	(1,680)
Constant	-18.20	-10.68	-16.36	-21.32	-12.90	-8.671	-17.80	-21.32	-18.41	-10.96
	(468.5)	(603.5)	(658.3)	(645.8)	(509.0)	(625.7)	(648.6)	(504.2)	(393.2)	(665.6)
Sigma_u	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0.0956)	(0.0882)	(0.103)	(0.0974)	(0.0898)	(0.0890)	(0.101)	(0.0956)	(0.103)	(0.102)
Sigma_e	0.655***	0.602***	0.710***	0.668***	0.610***	0.610***	0.692***	0.654***	0.710***	0.702***
	(0.0798)	(0.0730)	(0.0870)	(0.0814)	(0.0737)	(0.0744)	(0.0847)	(0.0794)	(0.0870)	(0.0861)
Observations	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
Number of id	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Log Lik	-47.82	-44.14	-51.78	-48.62	-44.14	-45.36	-50.34	-47.63	-51.75	-51.56

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95% CIs

Table B5

Columns Key IV	(1) Bayesian Corruption Index	(2) Satisfaction with Democracy Index	(3) Political Corruption Index
Anti-immigration mainstream right parties	-0.987**	0.491	0.0897
	(0.407)	(0.335)	(0.185)
Bayesian Corruption Index	-0.719***		
	(0.217)		
Bayesian Corruption Index#Anti-immigration	0.0290***		
	(0.00886)		
Satisfaction with Democracy Index		0.104	
		(0.166)	
Satisfaction with Democracy Index#Anti-immigration		-0.00495	
		(0.00747)	
Political corruption index			-13.92
			(10.15)
Political Corruption Index#Anti-immigration			0.642
			(0.526)
Unemployment (%)	0.0241	0.0156	0.0129
	(0.0319)	(0.0328)	(0.0405)
Real GDP Growth	-0.0389	-0.0154	0.00512
	(0.0297)	(0.0343)	(0.0326)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	2.055	1.597	1.342
	(1.777)	(1.966)	(1.876)
Electoral Rule House = 1, Plurality	0.620	0.293	0.264
	(2,342)	(1,765)	(1,251)
Constant	19.23	-15.17	-6.485
	(643.8)	(638.2)	(394.3)
Sigma_u	0	0	0
	(0.0959)	(0.108)	(0.104)
Sigma_e	0.655***	0.721***	0.719***
	(0.0797)	(0.0909)	(0.0880)
Observations	90	88	88
Number of id	28	28	27
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Log Lik	-47.66	-49.41	-52.18

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure B5

Source: Appendix B, Table B5

Table B6

Columns Key IV	(1) QoG1/Anti-Immigration	(2) QoG1/social Issues
QoG	12.45**	12.19**
	(6.047)	(5.503)
Anti-immigration mainstream right parties	0.642***	
	(0.196)	
QoG#Anti-immigration	-0.620**	
	(0.262)	
Social Issues		0.234***
		(0.0807)
QoG#Social Issues		-0.320***
		(0.107)
Unemployment (%)	0.0103	0.00666
	(0.0325)	(0.0347)
Real GDP Growth	-0.0227	0.00104
	(0.0378)	(0.0400)
Asylum Seekers (% of population)	1.210	-1.523
	(3.346)	(3.479)
Electoral Rule House = 1, Plurality	4.379	2.519
	(726.4)	(467.3)
Constant	-17.25	-9.156
	(726.4)	(467.3)
sigma_u	0	0
	(0.0990)	(0.102)
sigma_e	0.595***	0.616***
	(0.0798)	(0.0828)
Observations	70	70
Number of id	28	28
Country FE	YES	YES
Log Lik	-34.52	-35.75

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Figure B6

In years after 2006

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs Positions on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities with 95%

Average Marginal Effects of MRPs Positions on Social Issues with 95% CIs

*Figure B7*

Table B7

		Greece	Hungary
Years	Party Positions	ND	Fidesz
2006	Left-Right	6.44	6.67
	GAL/TAN	6.25	7.00
	Civil Liberties/Law and Order	6.88	6.25
	Social Lifestyle	5.88	7.00
	Religious Principle	7.75	6.80
	Immigration Policy	6.13	6.75
	Multiculturalism	5.63	6.00
	Ethnic Minorities	5.38	5.20
2010	Left-Right	6.82	6.88
	GAL/TAN	7.30	7.24
	Civil Liberties/Law and Order	8.00	7.56
	Social Lifestyle	7.09	7.19
	Religious Principle	8.09	8.19
	Immigration Policy	7.80	6.46
	Multiculturalism	7.36	7.21
	Ethnic Minorities	6.91	5.60
2014	Left-Right	7.22	7.93
	GAL/TAN	7.00	8.64
	Civil Liberties/Law and Order	7.11	8.86
	Social Lifestyle	8.11	8.31
	Religious Principle	8.44	8.71
	Immigration Policy	8.00	7.83
	Multiculturalism	8.22	7.85
	Ethnic Minorities	8.22	7.43

Source: Data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1999-2014 trend-file.