



This is a repository copy of *Winning the war and losing the peace: Spain and the Congress of Vienna*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/177205/>

Article:

Royle, D. (2022) *Winning the war and losing the peace: Spain and the Congress of Vienna*. *The International History Review*, 44 (2). pp. 357-372. ISSN 0707-5332

<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1951326>

Reuse


This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long as you credit the authors, but you can't change the article in any way or use it commercially. More information and the full terms of the licence here: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/>

Takedown

If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.



eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/>



Winning the War and Losing the Peace: Spain and the Congress of Vienna

Dan Royle

To cite this article: Dan Royle (2021): Winning the War and Losing the Peace: Spain and the Congress of Vienna, The International History Review, DOI: [10.1080/07075332.2021.1951326](https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1951326)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1951326>



© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 26 Jul 2021.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 122



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Winning the War and Losing the Peace: Spain and the Congress of Vienna

Dan Royle 

Department of History, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

ABSTRACT

When Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne in 1814, Spain attempted to return to the pre-war status quo. Domestically this suited an exhausted people, but internationally it proved disastrous. Elsewhere, 'Restoration' was understood more flexibly: that war with Napoleon had transformed the continent, and that things could simply not have gone back to the way they were. Previous interpretations for Spanish failure at Vienna emphasise weakness, either individual or collective, and these remain true. But weakness was not necessarily a barrier to diplomatic success. Instead, this article argues that Spain's failure lies in its conceptualisation of itself as a pre-war state. This meant that, rather than cooperate and compromise, it clung jealously to narrow dynastic or retributive aims. The dissolution of the Cádiz *Cortes* excluded the political elite from government and further hampered efforts as the representatives from the other powers increasingly formed a European network with friends and contacts among this excluded Spanish elite. Its inability to collaborate saw Spain side-lined in the Seventh Coalition, and its subsequent short-lived incursion into France was widely condemned. It was a failure which not only affected Spain at Vienna, but one which also had longer-term implications for its place in Europe.

KEYWORDS

Spain; Congress of Vienna; Labrador; diplomacy; 1815

On 30 September 1814, the day before the official opening of the Congress of Vienna, the Spanish plenipotentiary, Pedro Gómez Labrador, received a letter. It contained an invitation to preliminary talks at the home of the Austrian chancellor, Prince Klemens von Metternich, on the Rennweg. Immediately, the Marquis of Labrador rushed out to the house where the French minister, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, was staying. He announced that the seemingly innocuous invitation was, in fact, a secret plot drawn up by the Four (Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia) to organise the congress, reducing Spain and France to subordinate positions.¹ The French minister was worried too, and he agreed not to allow the Four to divide the two allies in the forthcoming negotiations.²

Later that evening on the Rennweg, the Four did present a pre-agreed protocol for the organisation of the congress to the Spanish and French representatives. They argued that participation needed to be significantly narrowed to simplify proceedings. But Spain and France depended on broadening participation to include smaller countries more sympathetic to their aims.³ Talleyrand argued that nothing should be decided until after the formal opening and, only then,

CONTACT Dan Royle  hia05dr@shef.ac.uk

© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

after consultation with all the participants. Realising the strength of opposition, the Four agreed to revoke the protocol and claimed that they had never intended it to form the basis of negotiations. Showing uncharacteristic insight, Labrador asked why, if it was of such little importance, they had all signed it.⁴ As, of course, they had.⁵ ‘The intervention of Talleyrand and Labrador hopelessly ruined all our plans,’ recalled Friedrich von Gentz, the Prussian secretary to the congress.⁶ However, if Labrador believed that this early victory was a good omen for Spain’s success at the congress, he would have been wrong.

This article concerns Spain’s failure at the congress, which has often been seen in terms of flaws in personality: Labrador’s, King Ferdinand VII’s, or both.⁷ Even more recent scholarship, which increasingly emphasises the geopolitical realities of post-Napoleonic Europe, assume that failure was something that happened to Spain.⁸ Elsewhere in Europe, especially in Britain, a pervasive liberation narrative means that the story has been told in this way for some time. C. K. Webster for example wrote, ‘Spain, with her colonies in open revolt, and impotent outside the Peninsula was too proud to admit her weakness.’⁹ And this matches Metternich’s own view, that ‘Spain defends her rights with much zeal, often even with a haughtiness, which little agrees with her extreme feebleness.’¹⁰ This was true, but it was only part of the truth. There was a widespread recognition of the weakness of Spain’s position within its political elite, including by Labrador himself.¹¹

Spain’s failure at the Congress of Vienna had less to do with its weakness—personal or collective—and more to do with its conception of itself and, by extension, of diplomacy. When the Italian Prince of Canosa claimed that Spain had shown more resistance to Napoleon than any other in country in Europe, he was talking about a different Spain from the one represented by the Marquis of Labrador.¹² The liberal *Cortes* had managed to hold out against Napoleon’s forces in the island city of Cádiz, and the *guerrilla* had undermined the French army behind the lines. Both were deliberately excluded from the restoration political system by Ferdinand, who had been held—not altogether unwillingly—in France since 1808. And this conscious attempt to return to the pre-war status quo met with broad popular approval, including among a large number of deputies from the *Cortes*.

The congress itself was a festival of peace. It was a celebration of the return to normality, but it was a new normal. At that dinner on the Rennweg, the other representatives were clear about how much had been changed by the death and destruction of the war. Rivalries and disagreements persisted, but there was a realisation that much of Napoleon’s success had lain in his ability to divide the other powers, and that co-operation and compromise was the only way to ensure peace. Their experiences were nothing compared to the near-relentless horror of the Peninsular War. But Spain’s desire to imagine it away, which was so popular at home, had devastating implications for its diplomacy at Vienna and beyond. Rather than amiable co-operation, its combative approach—which had much in common with those approaches which had enabled Napoleon’s domination of the continent—left it isolated. For the other powers, ‘Restoration’ was understood figuratively, for Spain it was literal.¹³

Personalities

More capable and personable individuals—both in Vienna and in Madrid—might have helped Spain, but their mitigation could only ever have been partial. The appointment of the uninspiring Labrador has long been attributed to nepotism.¹⁴ But there was a certain logic to it. Born in 1755, Labrador graduated in law from the prestigious but conservative University of Salamanca. He served as a judge before embarking on a diplomatic career. Although undistinguished, he had been among those who accompanied Ferdinand on his ill-fated trip to Bayonne in 1808, which ended in the king’s abdication and imprisonment. After refusing to take the oath to Joseph, Labrador was briefly held prisoner before fleeing to Cádiz. Such was his popularity for

escaping French captivity, that he was appointed foreign minister by the *Cortes* on 27 November 1812.¹⁵ But he proved an uncomfortable liberal. Amongst other things, he opposed the abolition of the Inquisition, and he resigned on 11 July the following year. The liberal newspaper, *El Conciso* suggested that, for his replacement, the *Cortes* should look instead to men without the 'conceit that makes them believe that they know everything and do not need advice; men who do not despise others.'¹⁶ Nevertheless, after supporting the restoration of Ferdinand and with now-impeccable anti-liberal credentials, Labrador returned to favour.¹⁷

It had been widely assumed that the Duke of San Carlos, Ferdinand's recently-appointed arch-absolutist foreign minister, would attend the congress. But Labrador was appointed as early as 26 May 1814.¹⁸ Between the two, he was probably the sensible choice. The duke had had an affair with Talleyrand's wife, and he was viewed with considerable suspicion in London.¹⁹ There were other possible candidates. Miguel Ricardo de Álava, the ambassador in the Hague, for example, would go on to fight alongside Wellington at Waterloo and was particularly popular amongst the English. Or the Spanish chargé d'affaires in Vienna itself, Camilo de los Ríos, the doyen of the city's society. During the congress, he was welcomed at the many informal meetings in the grand salons, from which Labrador tended to be excluded.²⁰ And Brian Vick's recent work has emphasised the vital role played by this kind of sociability as a mechanism of diplomacy at the congress.²¹

Chronically short of funds and with a prickly demeanour, the Spanish plenipotentiary struggled with Viennese social life.²² Like all two hundred or so visiting dignitaries, he was invited to the official balls at the Hofburg Palace and into the houses of the upper aristocracy. But he was a reluctant host.²³ He failed even to offer his fellow ambassadors the Marquis of Castelar's minimum requirement of a Spanish diplomat: 'a good cigar and a glass of Sherry.'²⁴ His austere Catholicism sat uncomfortably with the extravagance of the congress. At one palace ball, for example, he remained in deep conversation with the severe Papal delegate, as Tsar Alexander danced the polonaise around them.²⁵ At home, newspapers enthusiastically reported Labrador presenting his credentials to the Austrian Emperor and awarding the Order of the Golden Fleece to the Russian Tsar.²⁶ But such reports of diplomatic conviviality could not disguise the views of François-René de Chateaubriand, who could not decide whether Labrador thought too much or not at all. Or of the Duke of Wellington, who allegedly thought him the most stupid man he had ever met.²⁷ On the other hand, despite having no official role in proceedings, de los Ríos still managed to hold discussions with Talleyrand about the restoration of the Bourbons to the Neapolitan throne.²⁸

Although he had served as plenipotentiary to the Papal States and Etruria, in Italy, Labrador had never taken part in any high-level discussions comparable with the Congress of Vienna. But this did not prove much of a barrier to his involvement. He was appointed chairman of the committee on diplomatic precedence, which at a time when diplomacy was highly personal was of considerable importance.²⁹ He also sat on the committee on the navigation of rivers, another internationally important and potentially delicate issue. Indeed, someone was sufficiently interested in Labrador's secrets that they broke into the Spanish embassy, making off with papers from his office.³⁰ However during the course of the congress, he largely abandoned a position of active participation, appearing content with a position of second order.³¹ He was also quick to offence, protesting so much about the composition of the committee which decided the fate of disputed former-Napoleonic territories, that he was excluded altogether.³² Yet his shortcomings were a symptom rather than the disease.

Spaniards had been widely praised for their actions in the fight against Napoleon. Metternich, for example, wrote that 'the resistance of the people of the Peninsula has broken the charm in the eyes of all the European nations,' many of whom had previously admired the emperor.³³ However, this was also problematic for post-war Spanish society. The divisions between 'patriots' and 'collaborators' ran deep—even if these were sometimes more imagined than real—and they

were exacerbated by Ferdinand's deep mistrust of the former. He was particularly suspicious of the *Cortes* in Cádiz, even though it had remained enduringly loyal to him.

Ferdinand was a jealous but ineffective ruler, and domestically at least he was one of the few in Spain who did not seek a complete return to the pre-war status quo. He was not an old absolutist with the natural and historical limits that that entailed; his despotism contravened the most elementary principles of balances accepted even by the most conservative sectors.³⁴ His own government appointees were frequently excluded from decision making; their average tenure was just six months.³⁵ Instead, he relied heavily on a narrow and capricious clique, called the *camarilla*. Decisions were made in secret behind closed doors, and this process excluded many of those who had opposed Napoleon. But, more than that, it excluded those with experience of government, and in turn removing Spain's link to the European elite who met in Vienna.

The other powers brought large entourages with them to the Austrian capital: Britain had 24 representatives, France 15, Russia 53, and Prussia 46. By contrast, Spain had just 5.³⁶ Many of these people were already known to each other. This meant Spain could not benefit from the cultural diplomacy of non-state actors, especially women, and instead relied disproportionately on officials like Labrador. This disconnected Spain from much of the parallel informal discussions which came to heavily influence the proceedings themselves. In the absence of reliable information and with no one to advocate otherwise, instability in Spain became the subject of much rumour in Vienna.³⁷

Labrador complained that 'the ministers of the four powers, who consider themselves to be the arbiters of Europe, have been meeting almost daily but, what they talk about, we do not know or know only through the grapevine.'³⁸ Yet Spain's desire to return to 1808 meant there could be no compromise, and they soon realised that there was little point involving Labrador in negotiations.

He had been appointed to a committee, reported buoyantly in Spain, to discuss the claims of the Bourbon King of Etruria over the duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, a key priority for Ferdinand VII.³⁹ But the committee never actually met.⁴⁰ The Four eventually decided amongst themselves—against the king of Etruria and against Spain's interests—to give the duchies to Napoleon's wife. This was, however, only after Metternich had offered to return all but the city of Piacenza to the Bourbons, a compromise which Spain had refused.⁴¹ France initially supported the Spanish claim, but in the end Talleyrand sided with the Four. Although they would revert to Bourbon rule on her death, this was a humiliation for Labrador and for Spain. It would not be the only one.

International relations

After Napoleon's abdication at Fontainebleau in April 1814, the allies had met in Paris to decide on peace terms. The Spanish delegate, the Duke of Fernán Núñez, was turned away because his powers of plenipotentiary had been invested by the regency council rather than by the now restored Ferdinand.⁴² Misfortune turned to farce at the Congress of Chatillon when José García de León y Pizarro was nominated as the Spanish representative only after proceedings had already drawn to a close.⁴³ This was particularly significant because it was here that the allies agreed that the restored Ferdinand should keep his throne. The absence of a Spanish representative reinforced the impression that peace had been gifted by the European powers, rather than won for itself. The idea that Spain had been liberated was not wholly accurate, but it became a pervasive narrative at Vienna and beyond.⁴⁴

Spain's problems, however, can be traced back further. In 1813, Ferdinand received a letter at Valençay, where he had been held captive since his abdication in 1808. In it, Napoleon offered to restore him to the Spanish throne. Ferdinand wavered, so Napoleon sent Antoine de Laforêt, one-time ambassador in Madrid, to appeal to the king's autocratic instincts. Laforêt painted a

grim picture of life in Spain. 'Religion is destroyed,' he wrote. 'The clergy are lost, the nobility are despondent, the navy exists only in name, the American colonies dismembered and in insurrection, and everything lies in ruin.'⁴⁵ Ferdinand was in a difficult position. His authority was invested in a regency council based in Madrid, and so he arranged for the Duke of San Carlos, a long-term supporter, to intercede with the French on his behalf. A treaty was signed on 11 December 1813, which included the immediate cessation of hostilities, the recognition of Ferdinand as king, and the territorial integrity of pre-war Spain. It called for both French and British troops to leave the Peninsula immediately and concurrently.⁴⁶ But the British had not been involved in the negotiation. Amid strong opposition from the Four, and from both the regency council and the *Cortes*, the Treaty of Valençay was never ratified. Nevertheless, Ferdinand was still allowed to return to Spain on 24 March 1814. By then, the damage had been done.

Spain was therefore technically still at war with Napoleon. But it was a long-term ally of France and a long-term enemy of Britain, and at least within Ferdinand's inner circle there was a feeling that peace could be made with the French emperor if he agreed to leave the peninsula. Labrador even questioned the restoration of Louis XVIII. Instead, he suggested that, if no accommodation could be made with Napoleon, his wife should be given the regency instead.⁴⁷ It is perhaps a step too far to suggest that the Four sought to punish Spain at Vienna for a perceived alliance with Imperial France.⁴⁸ However, after the Treaty of Paris, it is clear that they did not share Spanish hopes that Napoleon could be accommodated in a peaceful Europe.

If there was sympathy for Napoleon at the Spanish court, there had been little in the *Cortes*, which saw him as a pernicious influence intent on driving a wedge between Spain and her allies. They described the Treaty of Valençay as 'an outrage to the king, a shameful treaty, a contract between victim and executioner.'⁴⁹ However, even within the *Cortes*, there was a desire to turn back the clock to 1808.

Sixty-nine deputies (among them the Marques of Labrador) signed the so-called *Manifesto of the Persians*, urging a return of the traditional *Cortes*, drawn from the estates. Ferdinand interpreted this as an invitation to rule as an autocrat.⁵⁰ And, on 4 May 1814, he dismissed the *Cortes*. In August, Labrador wrote to San Carlos to express his hopes that 'the excessive influence of the judiciary and the clergy do not negate the good intentions of the king', and his concerns that Ferdinand's actions were undermining the Bourbon cause in Europe.⁵¹ Two weeks later, he went so far as to call the new form of government 'monstrous.'⁵²

But the reaction from Spain's European allies was more muted. Castlereagh was glad that Ferdinand did not 'aim at the restoration of the ancient order of thing,' even though that was precisely what he did aim at.⁵³ The Prussian diplomat Karl August Varnhagen von Ense was more prescient. Ferdinand, he wrote, was 'fully engaged in enslaving and punishing his noble people who had, in their heroic struggle, undeniably, attained freedom.'⁵⁴ But, after years of war and hardship, the Spanish people were not so worried. The dissolution of the *Cortes* was met with festivals. In Zaragoza, locals smashed monuments to the constitution and even cheered news of political detentions in Madrid.⁵⁵

In Britain, the public was firmly on the side of the disenfranchised Cádiz liberals, and suspicions about Valençay endured. There were accusations in parliament that Ferdinand did nothing to revoke the treaty 'but, on the contrary, acting up to its true spirit, he mediated only upon projects to get rid of the interference of the *Cortes*.'⁵⁶ There were even concerns about Spanish pretensions to the French throne, and the British forced Ferdinand to sign a treaty renouncing any such claim.⁵⁷ In Spain, on the other hand, there was a feeling that Britain had made unfair financial gains from its involvement in the Peninsular War and in its subsequent support for the American uprisings. The contribution of its 'lazy and greedy' soldiers had been overstated.⁵⁸ Labrador himself wrote that 'the English look at London as the centre of the universe.'⁵⁹ And *El Conciso* even accused Wellington of lusting after the Spanish throne.⁶⁰

Criticism of Labrador's performance is sharpened as the other powers are now viewed as more flexible and compromising than they had been previously.⁶¹ For Castlereagh to change his mind, for example, it apparently took only 'being asked to breakfast.'⁶² Talleyrand recognised this flexibility and used it to manoeuvre France onto the committee of Four. His original plan, together with Labrador, had been to flood the congress with minor powers, diluting opposition to French aims. However, following a failed revolution in Spain in September 1814, its leader, the former guerrilla, Francisco Espoz y Mina fled to Paris. The Spanish government ordered his arrest without consulting the French authorities. Furious, they freed Espoz and broke off diplomatic relations with Spain.⁶³ Although short lived, the quarrel had a significant effect on Spain's position at the congress. On 9 January 1815, Castlereagh made a formal demand for the inclusion of France onto the committee of Four which was unanimously agreed, relegating Spain to non-Great Power status.⁶⁴ It is possible that Talleyrand was consciously trying to keep Spain under his thumb.⁶⁵ And, for Jeronimo B ecker y Gonz alez, the return of Bourbon rule brought the return of a foreign policy of subordination to French interests.⁶⁶ However, although Ferdinand did see Spanish interests as aligned to those of France, he seemed unwilling to jeopardise already strained relations with the other powers to gain French support for his own aims.

Across Europe, there was growing public interest in the political turmoil in South America, especially in Russia where Tsar Alexander appeared willing to assist the Spanish government.⁶⁷ However, sending Russian military aid to South America presented significant logistical problems and, whilst there was limited support from France, Britain opposed any such action on moral and commercial grounds. Even without support, the Spanish army experienced early military successes in 1815, and as late as 1818 both France and Russia were still considering joint intervention with Spain.⁶⁸ But defeating the rebels and subduing them were two different things. Spain had neither the financial nor the military means to pacify the continent, and Jos e  lvarez-Junco attributes its weakened international position to the loss of the colonies.⁶⁹ Whether this would have been apparent to the representatives in Vienna at the time, however, is not so certain. In 1815, Spain's empire was still the most significant of any of the European powers. News travelled slowly across the Atlantic, and it seems unlikely that those at the congress would have had much idea about the direction Spain's colonial wars were taking. And there was certainly no meaningful support for the South American rebels from any of the other powers.

Whilst its influence had been shrinking since the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht a hundred years before and though the congress was largely focussed on Central Europe, Spain could still have been a useful ally for the Four. Its army was weakened, but it was still significant.⁷⁰ Its much-depleted navy meant it could no longer be considered a global power, but it could still exert substantial regional influence. Spanish power in Italy was coming under increased threat from Austria, but in 1815 a Hapsburg hegemony was far from assured; the Bourbon kings continued to look to Spain rather than Austria, of whom they were deeply suspicious. In this context, it is possible to see how Spain could have contributed to a balance of power in the Mediterranean, especially after 1817 when eight naval ships were acquired from Russia.⁷¹

Restoration Spain's desire to return to 1808 meant it adopted a policy of dithering neutrality on the new questions posed by Napoleon's defeat. On the Polish-Saxon question, for example, Ferdinand instructed Labrador not to do anything to alienate any of the Four.⁷² But, considering the strong British and Austrian opposition to Russian claims, this meant only equivocation was possible. Talleyrand, who had received no such instructions, sided firmly with Britain and Austria, helping to force a compromise. France, it seems, suffered little diplomatic fallout from the slighted Tsar, and won favour with the other powers.⁷³ Spain, by refusing to become involved in issues outside its own aims, excluded itself from the new collegiate European diplomacy. Indeed, the very concept irritated Labrador. 'Prussia, Austria, and Russia', he wrote, 'had discovered that they were less distant from Spain, than Spain was from Germany.'⁷⁴

Spanish aims

It was not just politically that Spain hoped to revert to 1808, it was also in its approach to diplomacy. Ferdinand's interests at Vienna were largely dynastic and ranged from the obscure to the fantastic. In this he was not unique, indeed most of the powers arrived with ambitions to claim or reclaim marginal territories or compensation for their loss. What was different about Spanish aims, was their narrowness and inflexibility; they scarcely extended beyond such ambitions. In a letter of 29 May 1814, the Duke of San Carlos set out Ferdinand's aims to Labrador. There was to be no compromise on Spain's territorial integrity; all property, papers and art seized by the French should be returned; the pre-war trading arrangements with America should be reintroduced; and discussion about French refugees was to be avoided.⁷⁵ In Italy, Ferdinand's aims were more complicated, but scarcely less parochial. He could not countenance the continued rule of Napoleon's general Marshal Murat in Naples, but only because he wanted to see the return to the throne of his cousin, Ferdinand IV. He also demanded that the Duchies of Parma, Placencia and Guastalla be returned to the House of Bourbon-Parma, and he opposed the return of Genoa to Piedmont. Louisiana, sold by Napoleon to America, was to be returned in compensation for Austrian occupation of Etruria, now Tuscany. These demands were popular at home and reported favourably in the press.⁷⁶ But while Spain may have wanted to revert back to 1808, the other powers knew it was impossible.

It is fair to say that some of Spain's aims were more realistic than others. It was reasonable, for example, that the government should not want to concede any territory. But the Four had little appetite for restitution of territories along dynastic grounds. Indeed, the three continental powers were keen to increase their influence at the expense of the smaller states which had been subsumed into the French Empire. There was some sympathy for the return of Ferdinand IV in Naples. But not from Metternich, and there was also a widespread if tacit acceptance of Murat. The Four had a strong interest in ensuring a peace which did not punish France and thus compromise the restored king. Britain was making too much money from trade with Spanish America to countenance a complete return to Spanish hegemony in the South Atlantic. The idea that Louisiana could be returned to Spain was always ridiculous even if the other powers had supported its claim, and there is no evidence to suggest that they did.

Labrador did complain that his instructions were too limited and requested clarification from Madrid. When Ferdinand's reply came, he simply re-iterated his previous demands, adding that if the Italian duchies could not be regained, then the House of Bourbon-Parma should be compensated with Sardinia. He also suggested that Labrador request some ten thousand horses from France in compensation.⁷⁷ The Marquis of Villa-Urrutia argued that the Congress of Vienna saw a change in the role of the ambassador, becoming the arbitrator rather than just the instrument of government policy and that, in this, Labrador was hampered by the vagueness of Spanish foreign policy.⁷⁸ Paradoxically perhaps, it is the highly specific nature of Spain's aims which demonstrates this vagueness. The purely transactional nature of Spanish foreign policy was entirely the wrong approach at Vienna. It demonstrated the government's unwillingness to co-operate, and thus limited Spain's involvement in the Concert of Europe.

If the narrowness of Spain's aims was a mistake, so too was its strategy to seek the support of Talleyrand to realise them.⁷⁹ On 13 November 1814, Labrador demanded an Italian committee be set up to deal with the affairs of the peninsula, especially the Genoese question. Metternich replied with his famous metaphor that Italy was 'a collection of independent states in the same geographical area.'⁸⁰ He was determined that it was to have no political existence. Two weeks before, Talleyrand had made the same suggestion, but in the intervening period he had spotted an opportunity. He announced, without consulting his Spanish counterpart, that the Genoese issue could be immediately and unilaterally resolved in Austria's favour. This had two important consequences. Firstly, it meant that further negotiations over Italy were fragmentary, to Austria's benefit and Spain's disadvantage. Secondly, and more significantly, it brought an end the

partnership between France and Spain which had been decided on 30 September and had been so damaged by the Espoz affair. Talleyrand had, it seemed, left Labrador 'in the corridor.'⁸¹

Despite the criticism, Labrador was not completely ignorant when it came to diplomacy, nor was he entirely intolerant of liberal ideas. The Genoese representative, the Marchese de Brignole, proposed a liberal constitution for the territory within the Piedmontese state, which Labrador described as close to the 'perfection of the social order within the present system of Europe.'⁸² He had also formulated a plan to win support for Spain's claim to Louisiana.⁸³ He proposed withdrawing support for Etrurian claims to the Italian duchies in favour of Austria. In return, Austria would intercede with Britain to include the return of Louisiana in any peace made with the United States. Further, Spain would accede to Talleyrand's petitions and support France over Poland-Saxony, thus winning their support too. However, even this limited foray into modern diplomacy was a non-starter; Ferdinand was definitive that he had nothing to say about the Polish-Saxon question. This weakened Spain's negotiating position more generally as the committee of Five (Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia) originally designed to settle the Polish-Saxon question became the main mechanism for decision-making at the congress. It met forty-one times. The committee of Eight which included Spain, by contrast, met on just nine occasions.⁸⁴

Prolonged war with Napoleon and the loss of a ready supply of colonial gold had brought Spain to the brink of bankruptcy. By 1816, it required a third of its revenues to service war debts.⁸⁵ And the significance of this cannot be overstated. Ferdinand valued the treasures looted by the French alone at fifty billion *reales*.⁸⁶ In that first meeting in Paris without Spanish representation, the allies had decided that no indemnity was to be paid for war damage and none of the looted art was to be returned.⁸⁷ Many of those responsible for the sacking were, by then, serving in King Louis' government and were in the process of finding foreign buyers for their plunder. At Vienna, Labrador demanded that Generals Soult and Sebastiani 'respond with goods to the value of the canvases sent to England.'⁸⁸ Only after Soult sided with Napoleon during his return in the Hundred Days did the Four agree that looted art would be returned and limited reparations paid to Spain. In the end, Spanish commissioners received just 284 looted paintings, a paltry figure given that nearly a thousand Spanish Masters had been stolen from the Alcazar alone.⁸⁹ However, as international protocols only applied to government institutions, it was not practicable to retrieve most of the paintings as they remained in private hands, including in those of Talleyrand himself.

Slavery

Another area in which Spain's hopes of a literal Restoration were thwarted by post-war reality was slavery. By 1815, British public opinion was solidly abolitionist, and in Spain too there was some sympathy with the movement. However, there, discourse was tempered with a widespread acceptance that it was a necessary evil supporting a precarious imperial economic system, a phenomenon João Pedro Marques termed *tolerantism*.⁹⁰ There was also much suspicion of British intentions. The 1807 abolition law had made it difficult for British planters to compete against foreigners using indentured labour, even though they had been given twenty-years notice of abolition during which time they had considerably increased the number of slaves. Although in Spain there was a tendency to mitigate moral and religious objections to the slave trade with economic realism, there were some notable interventions by abolitionists.

In 1811, José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, a Spanish-Mexican deputy in the *Cortes* presented a project for the abolition of slavery, which he contended was against Natural Law.⁹¹ In Cádiz, there was opposition to the abolition of slavery—especially from some of the other representatives from Spanish America—but there was widespread moral support for ending the slave trade. Augustín Argüelles, for example, one of the principal authors of the 1812 constitution, was

another particularly vocal supporter of abolition.⁹² On learning, a few weeks after Guridi's petition, that the British intended to make a formal request that Spain abolish the slave trade, Argüelles requested more time to make the case, to make it seem like a Spanish initiative.⁹³ Nothing came of this before the restoration of Ferdinand, and it is not easy to determine the king's own thoughts on the issue of slavery. On 24 August 1814, he signed an addendum to a treaty of friendship concluded with Britain the month before. In addition to acknowledging the 'injustice and inhumanity' of the slave trade, he agreed that Spanish vessels would not supply foreign countries, including Britain, with slaves.⁹⁴ Spain seemed not to oppose abolition, only the imposition of it. Castlereagh, recognising this and under pressure at home, postponed further discussion until the opening of the congress.

At Vienna, Labrador was in a difficult situation. He had received no specific instructions from the government on abolition, but he knew any concessions would be unpopular with Cuban planters. He also felt that abolition took up too much of the congress' time, and that in any case Spain did not have as many slaves in its possessions as Britain had in Jamaica.⁹⁵ In October 1814, he did concede to limit slavery to south of the equator and ten degrees north.⁹⁶ But, given that this included virtually all of Spain's imperial possessions, it was barely a concession at all. He also agreed to an eight-year timescale for abolition, which was also poorly received in Britain. William Wilberforce, for example, condemned the ruin that could be accomplished by anything other than immediate abolition.⁹⁷ And any such latitude undermined the gains made by the 1807 abolition act, as slavers could continue with impunity under a foreign flag. Labrador's approach, severely limited by lack of policy, did little to ingratiate Spain to Britain.

As the congress proceeded, Labrador increasingly felt that he was being actively undermined at home. He claimed that the Duke of San Carlos had 'allowed himself to be seduced by the vague offers of a loan and of co-operation against the rebels in America, offers which had not been forthcoming.'⁹⁸ Castlereagh had written to the duke with an offer of ten million Spanish dollars for the immediate and complete abolition of the slave trade.⁹⁹ However, this offer was never accepted, so it was no surprise that the money had not been forthcoming. That is not to say that Labrador was not handicapped by this dualist nature of negotiations, though given his inability to commit in Vienna, it is clear why Britain sought clarification in Madrid.

Spain's position was, again, also undermined by its changing relationship with France. French public opinion was vehemently opposed to immediate abolition, but Talleyrand offered to help Castlereagh pressure Spain to abolish or restrict its trade in slaves.¹⁰⁰ After his return as emperor during the Hundred Days, Napoleon abolished the slave trade in France, and Talleyrand recognised that after Waterloo the Bourbon government would never be permitted to reinstate it. In a remarkably fortuitous turn of events, it gave him the moral authority he needed without having the impossible job of persuading the restoration government to announce immediate abolition. This further isolated Spain.

Labrador considered it unbelievable that the congress would take up the cause of the transatlantic trade, but that it would 'do nothing to protect Europeans against the most horrible slavery.'¹⁰¹ He was referring to the Barbary Corsairs, North African pirates and slavers who had harried the Mediterranean coast for centuries. But the two were scarcely comparable. The Barbary threat had been diminishing for some years, even though in October 1815, 160 residents of Sant' Antioco, a small island off Sardinia, were seized for ransom.¹⁰² While Spain had been supplanted by Britain as the hegemonic sea power in the Mediterranean, the British had little interest in the Corsairs. Spain therefore had a potential role to play on issues such as this which affected only those countries with significant territory in the region. In September, Labrador spoke with Johann Friedrich Hach, the representative of the Hanseatic city of Lübeck, who had produced an anti-Barbary pamphlet for circulation in Vienna. Labrador suggested that the work be translated into English.¹⁰³ But this recommendation (which came to nothing) seems to be the extent of the Spanish contribution. As it was, it was Piedmont-Sardinia which made the proposal

for a universal declaration against Barbary slavery, which was signed in late October. The declaration made Britain, rather than Spain, the power responsible for applying the resolution.¹⁰⁴

All the powers at the congress signed a statement against the slave trade on moral and religious grounds, declaring it 'repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality.'¹⁰⁵ Spain and Portugal successfully argued that they should be allowed to work towards abolition according to their own timetables, but this remained unpopular with the other powers.¹⁰⁶ Castlereagh backed economic sanctions against countries making insufficient progress towards abolition, including a boycott of products. Labrador threatened reprisals, but the other powers, and notably the tsar, backed Castlereagh and the motion carried. Metternich, for his part, followed the declaration with a denouncement of slavery on behalf of the non-colonial powers and offered their 'good offices to aid in the solution to any disputes which might arise between Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal.'¹⁰⁷ For the Austrian Chancellor, this was preventative diplomacy in action, amidst genuine fear that the abolition of the slave trade could lead to war. He also supported the establishment of a permanent international committee which Castlereagh intended would continue to pressure France, Spain and Portugal.¹⁰⁸ Pressure which drew complaints about British interference in Spanish affairs. Fernán Núñez, by then ambassador in London, complained about the seizure of two Barcelona-based, legally-operating slave ships by the Royal Navy.¹⁰⁹

The slave trade negotiations had provided Spain with another opportunity to self-consciously break with the pre-1808 world, much as Talleyrand had done against an even less supportive domestic backdrop. Castlereagh himself felt that slavery, 'compared to the settlement and adjustment of the equilibrium of Europe, was a somewhat minor detail.'¹¹⁰ But he knew that it was a domestic priority. He even recognised that the immense public pressure at home weakened his hand in negotiations, and this gave Spain an advantage. Castlereagh insisted, against Spanish wishes, that the abolition committee should include all Eight powers, even though more than half had no stake in the slave trade. This presented Spain with an opportunity to press for a greater role in affairs which did not directly affect it. However, again Spanish aversion to collective diplomacy meant that perceived intrusion into its own affairs was matched only by disinterest in the affairs of others. Further, an agreement to immediately abolish the trade could have reaped invaluable diplomatic support from Britain for Spanish interests, especially in Italy and South America. The government's intransigence on the other hand, yielded just £400,000, and made little difference to the depleted Spanish treasury.¹¹¹

The hundred days and beyond

On 13 March 1815, six days after learning of Napoleon's escape, the Eight collectively declared the former emperor an outlaw. They promised the French king every assistance to re-establish domestic tranquillity.¹¹² The Treaty of Alliance against Napoleon, which instituted the Seventh Coalition, was then agreed by the Four on 25 March. Spain was only a 'signatory', rather than an 'acceding party,' and this difference was more than technical.¹¹³ It meant that Spain, unlike the Four, did not have to contribute 150,000 men. Nevertheless, initially keen to help, Labrador went to ask Wellington what contribution the Spanish government could make. He received the reply that 80,000 men should be stationed on the border. But there was a caveat. The troops should not enter France unless necessary in defence of Spanish territory. The situation was complicated. The powers were not technically at war with France, only with Napoleon, and there was widespread concern about the behaviour of Spanish troops and its potential effect on French public feeling. Labrador wrote that 'no one disputes our personal courage and perseverance, almost all believe us incapable of order and accuracy.'¹¹⁴ The king's nephew the Duke of Angoulême did urge invasion, but the Spanish government—and Ferdinand in particular—were reluctant to take military action against Napoleon.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile, news of Napoleon's escape was met with panic at home. Ferdinand banned the import of all 'distorted news which might lead to malicious actions.'¹¹⁶ This further isolated Spain. But following the dissolution of the *Cortes* and the repeal of the 1812 constitution, there was a broad concern that a resurgent Imperial France could be a catalyst for revolution. Whether there was ever a genuine fear at court of another French invasion is less clear. The government's commitment to the alliance against Napoleon was at best lukewarm and, even at this late stage, Ferdinand avoided doing anything which could have been construed as unfriendly to Napoleon, including granting asylum to fleeing Bourbons.¹¹⁷ With hindsight, it seems unimaginable that Napoleon would have considered invading Spain. His Waterloo campaign was a defensive one, made from a position of weakness rather than strength. And no invasion against Spain, even if successful, could have saved his regime from the allied armies.

In the final Treaty, Spain was expected to provide just 11,800 men. And, as Napoleon's army was suffering its final defeat at Waterloo, they were still only slowly organising around the Catalan city of Girona. Eventually in early August, General Castaños, a veteran of the Peninsular War, did lead a Spanish expeditionary force into Rousillon. But it was a 'small and shabby contingent.'¹¹⁸ His orders were ostensibly to uphold the rule of law amid concerns about the loyalty of elements of the French Royalist army.¹¹⁹ However this late entry, coming after the restoration of Louis XVIII, was strongly opposed by the French government. The Council of State in Paris requested that the Spanish troops leave. And this was reiterated by the threat of war from the Duke of Angoulême, who before Waterloo had been so encouraging Spanish action.¹²⁰ On 28 August, Castaños agreed to withdraw without consulting Ferdinand beforehand. He took the threat of war seriously and had heard rumours of an allied conspiracy to break the ties between the Bourbon kings of Spain and France. Ferdinand himself was subsequently supportive of his general's decision, and he reiterated his own keenness not to upset either the French or the Allies.¹²¹ Nevertheless, as this example shows, it is erroneous to blame any individual figure for Spanish apprehension. It permeated all layers of the Spanish state; it had become structural.

The withdrawal of troops further weakened the Spanish position at the Congress of Vienna.¹²² That the invasion and occupation of Roussillon was based on a late realisation by the Spanish government that it would improve its negotiating position seems in little doubt. However, by intervening only after Napoleon's defeat, it had the opposite effect. In an attempt to avoid alienating any of the other powers, it had managed to alienate them all. In the subsequent negotiations and the second Treaty of Paris, France was forced to forfeit border installations to Prussia, the Netherlands and the German Confederation. General Castaños argued that Spain should gain the Fort de Bellegarde—or the funds to build its own installation—on the border in a bid to better balance the two powers along the Pyrenees.¹²³ Considering the transfer of the fortresses in the north, this seems a reasonable request, but it came to nothing. In the same treaty, each of the four major powers received 100 million francs in compensation for France to be paid over five years; Spain received just 5 million.¹²⁴ And this despite having suffered more than any other country.¹²⁵

The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna was little better. Murat's decision to support Napoleon on his return to France did mean that the Bourbon Ferdinand IV was restored to the Neapolitan throne (as Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies). This was at best a Pyrrhic victory for Spain, as a secret treaty bound him to Austrian influence.¹²⁶ Influence which now extended throughout the Italian peninsula. In a further blow, the Four had decided that Spain should return the enclave of Olivenza to Portugal, which had been gained after a brief war in 1801. Although the invasion had been encouraged by Napoleon, the Spanish government did not consider it an episode in the Peninsular War. Instead, they felt its restitution was a personal project of the Duke of Wellington.¹²⁷ Labrador refused to sign the final document, arguing that only a small proportion of the subjects dealt with in the Final Act had ever been reported in the sittings of the committee of Eight. He was angry that a fraction of the powers had settled affairs across Europe and had merely summoned the rest to agree. But in this, he found little support. The

other representatives had much earlier realised the value—even the necessity—of co-operation, albeit sometimes reluctant. Only Hans von Gagern of the Netherlands shared Labrador's irritation at the way things had been run.¹²⁸ Mostly Restoration Spain, whose anachronism had only been reinforced by events both in Vienna and beyond during the Hundred Days, had side-lined itself.

Conclusion

The idea of Two Spains permeates the country's historiography. It is at best problematic and at worst misleading. But after the restoration of Ferdinand in 1814, it felt as though it was government policy. Christiana Brennecke shares Labrador's view that a significant cause of the loss of Spanish prestige was its internal politics.¹²⁹ To an extent they are both right, but the 1812 constitution was little mourned. And, as José Álvarez-Junco pointed out, the restored king's absolutism was far from exceptional in Europe.¹³⁰ The problem was that the Spanish government and its representatives acted as though the Napoleonic wars had never happened; and in a way for them—and particularly for Ferdinand in exile—they had not.

The Congress of Vienna was a watershed moment in European diplomatic history. It heralded a new way of interacting, where power was balanced, and decisions were made in common. Spain did eventually accede to the Final Act in 1817, but by then the damage had been done. Labrador was still bitter when he wrote, years later, that it was 'impossible to conceive of the subordinate rank which they assigned to Spain.'¹³¹ It is this idea that Spain was somehow slighted at the congress which has become the prevailing one, that the other powers sought to further their own aims at the expense of the 'dead hand of Spain.'¹³² It is certainly true that the powers had their own interests at the front of their minds, but there is little evidence to suggest that they sought this at the particular expense of Spain. Indeed, this argument ignores the numerous occasions when the other powers supported Spanish aims, particularly at the beginning. France and Britain, for example, pressed for the restoration of Ferdinand IV in Naples. And, although Metternich felt bound by treaties Austria had signed with Murat, even Emperor Francis II spoke in favour of a change of ruler.¹³³ José Jover Zamora wrote that power had shifted north and that, after Vienna, Spain was radically introverted.¹³⁴ Whilst this is certainly true, it is only part of the truth.

Spain no longer had the capacity to single-handedly determine the international structure or to function as an entirely independent regulatory power.¹³⁵ However, as their countries' differing fortunes show, little was determined when Labrador and Talleyrand attended that preliminary meeting on the Rennweg. Spain could have played a significantly more active role in collective decision making at Vienna and in the mechanisms for monitoring them in the years which followed. Hampered though he was by aims both too narrow and too vague and by capricious allies, Labrador must nonetheless take some of the blame. In Vienna, where diplomacy was essentially a series of personal exchanges, Labrador's manner and stubbornness were undoubtedly an encumbering factor for Spain. He failed, unlike Talleyrand, to take advantage of expedient situations to either win favour with, or extract concessions from, the other powers. Nevertheless, to blame Labrador for Spain's failure attributes to him an influence that he never had. Even Ferdinand VII, for all his hesitance and suspicion, cannot bear the sole responsibility. Absolutist Spain did not by definition solicit a broad range of views, but the only real opposition to its path at Vienna came from Labrador, and only then sporadically. The problem was not individual but conceptual.

Across the continent, there was widespread recognition of the need to avoid the 'perfidious intervals of peace, more destructive to Europe than even the wars with which it was tormented.'¹³⁶ There was little such recognition in Spain, where instead there was a collective need to forget the war had ever happened. Elsewhere, it was vital for it to be remembered, and this idea of preventative diplomacy genuinely informed the decisions made in Vienna.¹³⁷ Spain, with little vested interest in many of the issues at stake, was in the perfect position to take advantage

of these changes. It also had more to bargain with, particularly in relation to the slave trade, than its weakness suggested. However, neither the Spanish state apparatus nor Spain's plenipotentiary in Vienna recognised this, clinging to eighteenth-century approaches to diplomacy. It is telling that territorial ambitions, colonial disputes and dynastic issues, the major causes of European wars in the eighteenth centuries were not the principal causes of any of the conflicts of the remainder of the nineteenth century.¹³⁸ And yet, it was precisely these issues which dominated Spain's aims at Vienna. The congress was always more about process than it was about substance.¹³⁹ What was at stake was not what individual states gained but what role they would play in the Concert of Europe. And, in this, Spain was out of tune.

Notes

1. Marques de Labrador, *Mélanges sur la vie privée et publique du Marquis de Labrador* (Paris: E. Thunot et Cie., 1849), 35.
2. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, *Mémoires du Prince de Talleyrand*, II (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1891), 318.
3. Upon his arrival in Vienna, Labrador had received numerous pleas for Spanish mediation from these smaller powers. Labrador to San Carlos, 23 September 1814, Antonio Rodríguez-Moñino (ed.), 'Cartas del Marqués de Labrador (1814)', *Revista de estudios extremeños*, 15 (1959), 607.
4. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, *Mémoires*, 321.
5. Comte d'Angeberg (ed), *Le congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815 : Précédé et suivi des actes diplomatiques qui s'y rattachent*, i (Paris: Amyot, 1863), 171.
6. Mark Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 92–3.
7. The classic example is W.R. de Villa-Urrutia, *España en el Congreso de Viena según la correspondencia oficial de D. Pedro Gómez Labrador* (Madrid: Tipografía de la Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos, 1907), 2.
8. See Christiana Brennecke, *¿De ejemplo a "mancha" de Europa? La Guerra de Independencia española y sus efectos sobre la imagen oficial de España durante el Congreso de Viena (1814–1815)* (Madrid: CSIC/ Doce Calles, 2010), 11.
9. Charles K. Webster, *The Congress of Vienna 1814–1815* (Oxford: University Press: 1918), 7.
10. Klemens von Metternich, Robina Napier [trans.], *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, ii 1773–1815 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1880), 580.
11. Labrador to San Carlos, 21 June 1814, Antonio Rodríguez-Moñino (ed.), 'Cartas', 583.
12. José María Jover Zamora, *España en la política internacional: siglos XVIII-XX* (Madrid: Marcial Pons), 124.
13. Paul Schroeder demonstrated the general unanimity in approach among the other powers. France, while initially reluctant, came to strongly embrace the new continental system. See *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), especially 586.
14. W. R. de Villa-Urrutia, *Congreso de Viena*, 8–9.
15. At this time the Minister of State (*Secretario de Estado de España*) was the head of the government with wide-ranging domestic and foreign responsibilities.
16. *El Conciso*, 16 July 1813.
17. William Cobbett (ed), *Cobbett's Political Register*, xxvi (London: Houston, 1814), 22.
18. *The Morning Post*, 15 July 1814.
19. Duff Cooper, *Talleyrand* (New York: Grove Press), 169; Patrycja Jakóbczyk-Adamczyk, *Friends or Enemies: Political Relations between Spain and Great Britain during the reign of Ferdinand VII (1808–1833)* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2015), 228.
20. David M. O. Miller, *The Duchess of Richmond's Ball: 15 June 1815* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2005), 80; Villa-Urrutia, *Congreso de Viena*, 59.
21. Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014)
22. He complained to the Duke of San Carlos before proceedings that he was expected to play the role of 'a beggar and an ambassador at the same time', Labrador to San Carlos, 2 July 1814, Antonio Rodríguez-Moñino (ed.), 'Cartas', 587. He later complained that he was not treated in a way befitting his rank, Labrador to San Carlos, 16 August 1814, *ibid*, 599.
23. Hazel Rosenstrauch, *Congress mit Damen 1814/15: Europa zu Gast in Wien* (Vienna: Czernin, 2014), 18.
24. Villa-Urrutia, *Congreso de Viena*, 47, 60.
25. David King, *Vienna 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harmony, 2008), 174.
26. *Diario Balear*, 18 December 1814, 27 November 1814

27. Jacques-Alain de Sédouy, *Le Congrès de Vienne: L'Europe contre la France, 1812–1815* (Paris: Perrin, 2003), 172; Paul Johnson, *The Birth Of The Modern: World Society 1815–1830* (London: W&N, 1991).
28. Thierry Lentz, *Le congrès de Vienne* (Paris, France: Tempus, 2015), 118.
29. Lentz, *Congrès*, 104.
30. King, *Vienna 1814*, 127.
31. Ricardo M. Martín de la Guardia, 'España y Austria al final de Antiguo Régimen', *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, extraordinary issue (2003), 127–35.
32. Rosario de la Torre del Río, *El Congreso de Viena* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Catarata, 2015), 58.
33. Metternich, *Memoirs*, 350.
34. Encarna García Monerris and Carmen García Monerris, 'El Rey depredador', *Revista de Historia Constitucional*, xviii (2017), 23.
35. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Spain and Portugal* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1973), 428.
36. *Atalaya de La Mancha en Madrid*, 12 December 1814.
37. Labrador to San Carlos, 26 June 1814, Antonio Rodríguez-Moñino (ed.), 'Cartas', 586.
38. Labrador to San Carlos, 20 May 1815, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cáceres, ML/1/12.
39. *El Procurador General*, 3 March 1815.
40. *The Times*, 27 July 1815.
41. W. R. de Villa-Urrutia, *Fernando VII: Rey Absoluto* (Madrid: Francisco Beltrán, 1925), 87.
42. Duke of Wellington, John Gurwood [ed.], *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G.*, vii (Cambridge: University Press, 2010 [1844]), 511.
43. Martín de la Guardia, 'España y Austria', 131.
44. Webster, *Congress of Vienna*, 3.
45. Manuel Pando Fernández de Pinedo, *Documentos a los que se hace referencia en los Apuntes histórico-críticos sobre la Revolución de España* (London: Ricardo Taylor, 1834), 10.
46. Pando Fernández de Pinedo, *Documentos*, 12–14.
47. Labrador to San Carlos, 20 May 1815, ML/1/12.
48. De la Torre del Río, *Congreso de Viena*, 103.
49. Manuel de Marliani, *Histoire Politique de L'Espagne Moderne*, i (Brussels: Wouters, Raspoet & Co., 1842), 110.
50. Juan Luis Simal, 'Strange Means of Governing', *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift für moderne europäische Geschichte / Revue d'histoire européenne contemporaine*, xv (2017), 197–220, 200.
51. Labrador to San Carlos, 2 August 1814, Antonio Rodríguez-Moñino (ed.), 'Cartas', 593.
52. Labrador to San Carlos, 18 August 1814, *ibid.*, 602.
53. Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 243.
54. Alexandra Bleyer, *Das System Metternich: die Neuordnung Europas nach Napoleon* (Darmstadt: Primus-Verlag, 2014), 21.
55. Mark Lawrence, *Nineteenth Century Spain: A New History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 36.
56. *The Parliamentary Debates from the year 1803 to the Present Time*, xxxiii (London: Hansard, 1816), 586.
57. *Ibid.*, 374.
58. Manuel Tuñón de Lara, *La España del Siglo XIX I* (Madrid: Akal, 2000), 59.
59. Labrador to San Carlos, 20 May 1815, ML/1/12.
60. Jakóbczyk-Adamczyk, *Friends or Enemies*, 208–9.
61. Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 235.
62. Hugh Thomas, *The Slave Trade* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 591.
63. Brennecke, *Imagen oficial de España*, 39.
64. Genevieve Peterson, 'Political Inequality at the Congress of Vienna', *Political Science Quarterly*, lx (1945), 541–2.
65. Matías Ramisa Verdagar, 'La ocupación española de Rosellón en 1815' in *Hispania*, lxxv (2015), 747–8.
66. Jeronimo Bécker y González, *Acción de la Diplomacia Española durante la Guerra de la Independencia, 1808–1814* (Zaragoza, 1909), 171.
67. Russell H. Bartley, *Imperial Russia and the Struggle for Latin American Independence* (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1978), 10.
68. Jarrett, *Vienna and its Legacy*, 199.
69. José Álvarez-Junco, *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester: University Press, 2016), 295.
70. De la Torre del Río, *Congreso de Viena*, 75.
71. This sale became notorious as the ships proved unseaworthy. Although certainly not a panacea, the transaction was probably less humiliating than the liberal opposition claimed as the Spanish naval authorities were at least partly responsible through failures of maintenance. In the end, the government received a reduction on the price and two additional seaworthy vessels from Russia. See Richard Stites, *The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (Oxford: University Press, 2014), 59.
72. Brennecke, *Imagen oficial de España*, 39.
73. Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 529–31.

74. Labrador, *Vie privée et publique*, 48.
75. San Carlos to Labrador, 29 May 1815, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cáceres, ML/1/13.
76. *Diario de Mallorca*, 24 July 1814.
77. Miguel Artola, *La España de Fernando VII* (Madrid, Spain: Espasa, 1999), 439.
78. Villa-Urrutia, *Congreso de Viena*, 5.
79. De la Torre del Río, *Congreso de Viena*, 90.
80. Reinhard Stauber, *Der Wiener Kongress* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2014), 68.
81. Lentz, *Congrès de Vienne*, 97.
82. Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 246.
83. Labrador was preoccupied with the question of Louisiana. He mentions it in a letter of 13 August to San Carlos, Antonio Rodríguez-Moñino (ed.), 'Cartas', 593. And then again, see Villa-Urrutia, *Congreso de Viena*, 74.
84. Webster, *Congress of Vienna*, 74.
85. Henry Butler Clarke, *Modern Spain 1815–1898* (Cambridge: University Press, 1906), 41.
86. Artola, *España de Fernando VII*, 439.
87. Tim Chapman, *The Congress of Vienna 1814–1815: Origins, Processes, Results* (Oxford: Routledge, 1998), 35.
88. Villa-Urrutia, *Congreso de Viena*, 113.
89. Gary Tinterow & Gennevieve Lacambre, *Manet/Velázquez: The French Taste for Spanish Painting* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 29, 22.
90. João Pedro Marques, *The Sounds of Silence: Nineteenth-Century Portugal and the Abolition of the Slave Trade* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2006), 2. He defines *tolerationism* as 'the attitude of those who, while in some way condemning the traffic, were not (or not yet) abolitionists.'
91. Thomas, *Slave Trade*, 580.
92. Jakóbczyk-Adamczyk, *Friends or Enemies*, 255.
93. Thomas, *Slave Trade*, 580.
94. Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, ii (London: Henry Butterworth, 1827), 271.
95. Labrador, *Vie privée et publique*, 35.
96. Jerome Reich, 'The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna: A Study in English Public Opinion' in *The Journal of Negro History*, liii (1968), 133.
97. Thomas, *Slave Trade*, 584.
98. Labrador to San Carlos, 20 May 1815, ML/1/12.
99. Reich, 'Slave Trade', 132.
100. *Ibid.*, 135
101. Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 221.
102. *Ibid.*, 214.
103. *Ibid.*, 218.
104. Daniel Panzac, Victoria Hobson [trans.], *Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend 1800–1820* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 273.
105. Reich, 'Slave Trade', 139.
106. *Ibid.*, 137.
107. *Ibid.*, 140.
108. Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 204–5.
109. Thomas, *Slave Trade*, 587.
110. John Bew, *Castlereagh: A life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2012), 388.
111. Jarrett, *Vienna and its Legacy*, 146.
112. Henry Kissenger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 176.
113. De la Torre del Río, *Congreso de Viena*, 74.
114. Villa-Urrutia, *Congreso de Viena*, 91.
115. Ramisa Verdaguar, 'Occupación española de Rosellón', 732.
116. *Real orden* (27 May 1815)
117. Ramisa Verdaguar, 'Occupación española de Rosellón', 730, 731.
118. Clarke, *Modern Spain*, 37.
119. Ramisa Verdaguar, 'Occupación española de Rosellón', 736.
120. *Ibid.*, 743.
121. *Ibid.*, 745, 746.
122. Martín de la Guardia, 'España y Austria', 133.
123. Ramisa Verdaguar, 'Occupación española de Rosellón', 749.
124. *Papers presented to Parliament in 1816*, ii (London: R. G. Clarke, 1816)
125. Payne, *Spain and Portugal*, 423.
126. Harold Nicholson, *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity 1812–1822* (Glasgow: The University Press, 1947), 192.

127. Brennecke, *Imagen oficial de España*, 55.
128. Peterson, 'Political Inequality', 549.
129. Brennecke, *Imagen oficial de España*, 39.
130. Álvarez-Junco, *Spanish Identity*, 295.
131. Labrador, *Vie privée et publique*, VII.
132. J. G. Lockhart, *The Peacemakers 1814–1815* (New York: Books for Libraries, 1934), 19.
133. Alexandra Bleyer, *System Metternich*, 39.
134. José María Jover Zamora, *Política internacional*, 112.
135. De la Torre del Río, *Congreso de Viena*, 103–4.
136. *The Times*, 29 May 1815.
137. Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 517.
138. Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989* (Cambridge: University Press, 1991), 150–3.
139. Kyle Lascurettes, *The Concert of Europe and Great-power Governance Today: What Can the Order of 19th-century Europe Teach Policymakers about International Order in the 21st Century?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2017), 18–19.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Charlotte Alston and Daniel Laqua at Northumbria University for their comments on an earlier version of this research, as well as the anonymous readers for The International History Review.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Dan Royle works on nineteenth-century Spain, particularly the power relationship between state, government and citizens. He is currently researching the 1848 Revolution.

ORCID

Dan Royle  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0960-8392>