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## Abstract

11

12 The bioaerosol exposure data from the study by Akpeimeh, Fletcher, and Evans (2019) was used  
13 to compute the risk of infection from the exposure of dumpsite workers to *A. fumigatus* and *E.*  
14 *coli* O157:H7. A stochastic (Markov Chain) model was used to model the transport of the inhaled  
15 dose through the human respiratory system and then integrated into the beta-Poisson dose-  
16 response model to estimate workers risks of respiratory and gastrointestinal (GI) infection. The  
17 infection risk was computed based on workers exposure to *E.coli* O157:H7 at 10-50% pathogen  
18 ingestion rate and pathogen-indicator ratio (P:I) of 1:10<sup>3</sup> and 1:10<sup>4</sup>, while exposure to *A.*  
19 *fumigatus* was based solely on the average initial exposure dose.

20 The results showed that after 11 hrs of exposure, workers engaged in scavenging, waste sorting  
21 and site monitoring were at risk of respiratory and GI infection in the magnitude of 10<sup>-1</sup>. However,  
22 the risk estimates associated with specific areas of the dumpsite showed that, the risk of GI  
23 infection at the active area ranged between 3.23×10<sup>-3</sup>-1.56×10<sup>-2</sup> and 3.25×10<sup>-4</sup>-1.62×10<sup>-3</sup>;  
24 dormant area 2.06×10<sup>-3</sup>-1.01×10<sup>-2</sup> and 2.09×10<sup>-4</sup>-1.04×10<sup>-3</sup>; entrance 1.85×10<sup>-3</sup>-9.09×10<sup>-3</sup> and  
25 1.87×10<sup>-4</sup>-9.27×10<sup>-4</sup>; boundary 1.82×10<sup>-3</sup>-8.82×10<sup>-3</sup> and 2.09×10<sup>-4</sup>-8.94×10<sup>-4</sup> for P:I=1:10<sup>3</sup> and  
26 1:10<sup>4</sup> respectively, while the risk of respiratory infection risks were in the magnitude of 10<sup>-1</sup> for  
27 all four locations.

28 The estimated risk of workers developing respiratory and gastrointestinal infections were high  
29 for all activities assessed at the dumpsite.

30

31 **Summary:** MSW dumpsite workers are exposed daily to bioaerosols from dumpsite activities.  
32 Risk of respiratory and gastrointestinal infection from exposure was estimated using QMRA  
33 modelling. The result shows high infection risk of workers.

34 .

35

36

37 **KEYWORDS:** Bioaerosols; *Aspergillus fumigatus*; *E. coli*; QMRA; Open dumpsite

## 38 **1. INTRODUCTION**

39 The public health and environmental hazards that result from the mismanagement of municipal  
40 solid waste (MSW) are a global issue that cannot be ignored. The most severely impacted are  
41 developing and transition countries where the rate of solid waste generation has been on the rise  
42 due to urbanization, but without corresponding infrastructure developments to treat such volumes  
43 of waste (UN-HABITAT, 2009). For instance, sub-Saharan Africa alone is estimated to generate  
44 62 million tonnes of MSW per year, with a corresponding annual urban population growth rate  
45 of 2.27 percent per year, yet lacks a sustainable system of managing MSW (Akpeimeh et al.,  
46 2019; Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 2012). This results in the uncontrolled dumping of the excess  
47 MSW on open land areas, forming large waste hills over time known as open dumpsites. Open  
48 waste dumps are a major source of environmental pollution and a huge public health risk in  
49 vicinities where they are located. They generate heavy metals, polluting the soil and nearby  
50 water bodies; emit toxic chemicals such as dioxins due to uncontrolled burning; bioaerosols,  
51 organic dust and methane gas which is a potent greenhouse gas (Minh *et al.* 2003; Karakurt *et al.*  
52 2012; Han *et al.* 2016; Akpeimeh *et al.* 2019; Vongdala *et al.* 2019). Respiratory diseases are  
53 one of the most commonly reported health symptoms by dumpsite workers and residents living  
54 near dumpsites, and have been attributed to exposure to aerosolized aetiological agents from  
55 these dumpsites (Ray *et al.* 2005; Garrido *et al.* 2015). Although a lot of information has been  
56 reported on the respiratory health impact from exposure to toxic particulate matter (Hamra et al.,  
57 2014; Kim, Kabir, & Kabir, 2015), reports exclusively associating respiratory disease to exposure  
58 to bioaerosols are limited. Moreover, empirical data supporting infection resulting from exposure  
59 to bioaerosols are scarce and only available for a few microorganisms (Haas, Rose, & Gerba,  
60 2014). Thus the use of analytical models such as Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment  
61 (QMRA) by Haas, Rose, and Gerba (1999) for the evaluation of public risk from exposure to  
62 bioaerosols have become widely accepted. The main advantage of QMRA is that it provides

63 researchers with readily available analytical models that can mimic the human response to  
64 pathogen exposure without over reliance on existing animal models, which are expensive to run  
65 and may have ethical implications.

66 QMRA as a mathematical model for evaluating risks associated with exposure to pathogenic  
67 microbial agents have been widely used as an invaluable tool in decision and policy making in  
68 the areas of food safety, recreational water safety and wastewater reuse (McBride *et al.* 2013;  
69 Romero-Barrios *et al.* 2013; Pielaat *et al.* 2014). However, given the rise in global concerns about  
70 infectious diseases (e.g SARS in 2003) and bioterrorism threats, government agencies and public  
71 health experts have developed a keen interest in infection risk modelling and quantification of  
72 exposure to aerosolised pathogenic microbial agents (Ksiazek *et al.* 2003; Bartrand *et al.* 2008;  
73 Huang and Haas 2009). The QMRA framework is such that it utilizes mathematical models and  
74 quantitative data to examine the exposure, characterize the spread of the pathogenic agents and  
75 assesses the infection risk from such exposure. The four-tiered approach commonly used are  
76 hazard identification (HAZ ID), dose-response assessment, exposure assessment and risk  
77 characterization. The dose-response assessment phase in the QMRA model is the quantitative  
78 yardstick for estimating infection risk. In previous studies of respiratory health risks from  
79 bioaerosol exposure, most often, the average exposure dose were used in this phase to estimate  
80 the workers risk of respiratory diseases from exposure to bioaerosols. However, in reality, when  
81 bioaerosols considered infectious are inhaled, they are transported to specific regions of the lungs  
82 and would have to be deposited for an infection to take place (Weir & Haas, 2011). Thus, the  
83 average exposed dose does not account for the required particle transport through and losses in  
84 initiating infection in the respiratory system. Bartrand *et al.* (2008) demonstrated that the host's  
85 response to bioaerosol particle dose was a function of the particle diameter, leading to the need  
86 to develop an effective dose-response model based on the understanding of this behaviour. Weir  
87 and Haas (2011) attempted to model a physical system incorporating the Markov Chain

88 stochastic principles to estimated particle transport and deposition in the various stages of the  
89 respiratory system based on the particle size. In this study however, ingestion of pathogenic  
90 bacteria particles was coupled to the model by Weir and Haas (2011), further stretching the  
91 applicability of the model to include gastrointestinal (GI) infections exclusively from swallowing  
92 of particles deposited in the nasopharynx region of the lungs.

93 The data on bioaerosol concentration used in this study has already been published in a previous  
94 report by Akpeimeh et al. (2019). They reported the ambient concentration for total bacteria,  
95 gram-negative bacteria and *Aspergillus fumigatus* at Olusosun open dumpsite, Nigeria. The  
96 dumpsite workers were reported to be exposed to bioaerosols at concentrations up to  $10^6$  cfu m<sup>-3</sup>  
97 depending on the activities they were involved in. These workers spent on average 11 hours  
98 daily on the dumpsite and would have been working on the dumpsite for 5 years (median). The  
99 authors also reported that only 11% of the workers used nose mask at least twice during work in  
100 the last 6 months prior to the study, while 89% used nose mask only once or not at all for the  
101 same period. High prevalence of respiratory symptoms were also reported among the dumpsite  
102 workers, and was attributed to the prolong exposure to aetiological agents including bioaerosols.  
103 Because these respiratory symptoms was partly as a result of exposure to bioaerosols, it was  
104 necessary to compute the probable health risk associated with such exposure by running a QMRA  
105 with the dataset. It is worthy of note that hitherto, QMRA reports on bioaerosols isolated from  
106 solid waste dumpsites either do not exist or are extremely scarce. As such, this study aims to  
107 estimate the probable risk of infection of the dumpsite workers from exposure to gram-negative  
108 bacteria and *Aspergillus fumigatus*.

## 109 2. METHODOLOGY

### 110 2.1 Markov Chain Model

111 A Markov chain model is a probabilistic tool that uses stochastic processes to model physical  
112 systems (Privault, 2013). Fig. 1 shows the schematics of the Markov chain applied in this study  
113 where the physical element in each region is represented as ‘states’ and the loss rates from each  
114 associated state is signified as  $\lambda$ . The loss rate ( $\lambda$ ) is the function that describes the rate of change  
115 of the pathogen from state  $i$  to state  $j$ , or pathogens being removed from state  $i$  to state  $j$ . It can  
116 be seen that in this study the Markov chain model consists of 8 states. Described in order, the  
117 model starts from the nasopharynx region  $R_1$  with the bulk fluid in state 1 (air) and deposition on  
118 the surface of the respiratory system in state 2 (deposition). As flow passes from  $R_1$  to  $R_2$  starting  
119 with the bulk fluid in state 3 (air) and deposition on surface of the respiratory system in state 4  
120 (deposition). Then from  $R_2$  to  $R_3$  starting with the bulk fluid in state 5 (air) and deposition on the  
121 surface of the respiratory system in state 6 (deposition). Inactivation of the pathogen from natural  
122 causes is defined as state 7 (applicable to  $R_1$ ,  $R_2$  and  $R_3$ ) and exhalation is state 8.

#### 123 2.1.1 The Markov Transitional Matrix

124 The Markov transition probability matrix ( $\mathbf{P}$ ) (e.q 1) contains probabilities ( $p$ ) that predict the  
125 transitioning of the pathogens from one state to another, either within the same region or to  
126 another region of the respiratory system. Consider an inhaled pathogen in state  $i$  (air), in the next  
127 time step  $\Delta t$ , the pathogen has an unconditional probability of remaining in the same state  $i$ ,  
128 denoted as  $p_{ii}$  and an unconditional probability of transitioning to another state  $j$ , denoted as  $p_{ij}$ .  
129 The sum of  $p_{ij}$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, 8$ ) equals one. Equation 1 shows the first order transition probability  
130 matrix  $\mathbf{P}$  for the system in Fig. 1. The values of  $p_{ij}$  are entered with each row representing a state  
131 in the system. The zero entry, i.e.  $p_{ij} = 0$ , signifies that the pathogen cannot move between the  
132 two states in one-time step (1 min), e.g.  $P_{51}$ ,  $P_{36}$ . For absorbing states such as states 7 and 8,  $p_{ij} =$   
133 1.

134 Furthermore, considering the Markov chain at time zero, a pathogen is introduced into the state  
 135  $i$ , and after  $n \times \Delta t$  time steps, the probability that the introduced pathogen is in state  $j$  at  $n \times \Delta t$  is  
 136 the entry in  $i$ th row and  $j$ th column of  $\mathbf{P}$  multiplied by itself  $n$ th times. The probability is  
 137 designated  $p_{ij}^n$ , while the latter matrix is designated as  $\mathbf{P}^{(n)}$ , with  $n$  being the number of  
 138 multiplications.

$$139 \quad \mathbf{P} = \begin{bmatrix} p_{11} & p_{12} & p_{13} & 0 & 0 & 0 & p_{17} & p_{18} \\ 0 & p_{22} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & p_{27} & 0 \\ p_{31} & 0 & p_{33} & p_{34} & p_{35} & 0 & p_{37} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & p_{44} & 0 & 0 & p_{47} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & p_{53} & 0 & p_{55} & p_{56} & p_{57} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & p_{66} & p_{67} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad [1]$$

#### 140 2.1.2 Loss rates and Probabilities

141 Given the sum all the losses from state  $i$  ( $\lambda_i$ ), the probability of remaining in state  $i$  or  $p_{ii}$  is the  
 142 exponential survival probability in eq. 1 (Nicas & Sun, 2006).

$$143 \quad p_{ii} = \exp(-\lambda_i \cdot \Delta t) \quad [2]$$

144 Since the Markov chain model is based on a flow through the system, pathogenic particles that  
 145 are not deposited and have survived inactivation in a previous region (e.g. from R1 to R2) are  
 146 assumed to have moved to the next region. Hence, the unconditional probability of the pathogen  
 147 transitioning from state  $i$  to state  $j$  in  $\Delta t$  is the product of the probability that the pathogen in  
 148 states  $i$  moves to  $j$ , i.e.  $(1 - p_{ii})$ , and the ratio of the loss rates associated with transitioning from  
 149 state  $i$  ( $\lambda_i$ ) to state  $j$  ( $\lambda_{ij}$ ), shown in eq. 3 (Weir & Haas, 2011).

$$150 \quad p_{ij} = \frac{\lambda_{ij}}{\lambda_i} \cdot [1 - p_{ii}] \quad [3]$$

151 Where  $\lambda_i > 0$ . If  $\lambda_i = 0$ , state  $i$  is an absorbing state and  $p_{ij} = 0$  for  $i \neq j$

152 The loss rate associated with inhaled pathogens moving deeper into the respiratory system from  
153 a region of higher  $R_x$  air volume to lower  $R_y$ , is generalised in eq. 4 (Weir & Haas, 2011).

$$154 \quad \lambda_{xy} = \frac{Q+B}{V_{R_x}} \quad [4]$$

155 Where  $V_{R_x}$  = the volume of the higher region ( $\text{cm}^3$ ),  $\lambda_{xy}$  = the loss of a spore in the higher region  
156 transitioning from region  $x$  to region  $y$ ,  $Q$  = the volumetric flow rate of the inhaled air and  $B$  =  
157 the volumetric flow rate of exhaled air. Both  $Q$  and  $B$  are assumed to be constant throughout the  
158 lungs (i.e. inflow is equal to outflow) and has the value of  $125 \text{ cm}^3 \text{ min}^{-1}$  (Weibel, Cournand, &  
159 Richards, 1963).

160 The loss rate associated with spores transitioning from lower regions to the higher regions of the  
161 respiratory system via exhalation, is expressed in eq. 5

$$162 \quad \lambda_{yx} = \frac{B}{V_{R_y}} \quad [5]$$

163 Where  $V_{R_y}$  = the volume of the lower region,  $\lambda_{yx}$  = the loss of a spore in the lower region  
164 transitioning from region  $y$  to region  $x$ .

165 Bulk transport or phagocytosis is the main mechanism for the loss of pathogens in the human  
166 body, including the respiratory system (Clarke et al., 2010). In addition to phagocytosis,  
167 deposition can occur on the respiratory system surface. The resuspension of the deposited  
168 pathogens is prevented by mucociliary escalators, and they are eventually expectorated within  
169 12 h (Koblinger, 1985). The loss due to deposition is accounted for by impaction, sedimentation  
170 and diffusion (Weir & Haas, 2011). For sedimentation, the rate is determined by the terminal  
171 settling velocity of the particle ( $v_{ts}$ ) and is expressed in eq. 6

$$172 \quad v_{ts} = 0.0018 \cdot d_p^2 \cdot \left[ 1 + \frac{0.166}{d_p} \right] \quad [6]$$

173 Where  $d_p$  is the particle size and hold accurate for particle up to 50  $\mu\text{m}$  in diameter.

174 Therefore, the loss of pathogen from deposition accounting for sedimentation, impaction and  
175 diffusion can be estimated in eq. 7

$$176 \quad \lambda_{deposition} = \frac{v_{ts}}{d_{Rx}} + DI_{Rx} \quad [7]$$

177 Where:  $DI_{Rx}$  = diffusion deposition rate in associated region,  $d_{Rx}$  = diameter of the associated  
178 region. The estimated values of the loss rates in the Markov chain model and the physiological  
179 parameters for humans used in the computation are found in S1 Table and S2 Table in supporting  
180 information.

### 181 *2.1.3 Effective dose from inhalation*

182 Effective dose is the fraction of the viable pathogens that would have been deposited on the target  
183 organ, survived inactivation and has the potential of germination that results in infection. Once  
184 the probabilities of the transition matrix P (eq. 1) were assigned, the estimate of the viable  
185 pathogens in any given state at time  $\Delta t$  is the product of the sum total of the probabilities  
186 associated with that state in each time step as seen in eq. 8

$$187 \quad E[D_i] = N_i \cdot \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} p_{ij}^n \quad [8]$$

188 Where  $n$  is the number of multiplications associated with the time step in the model,  $N_i$  = initial  
189 pathogen load either transitioned or remaining in the same state.

190 Subsequently, the initial pathogen load for the next state or region in turn equals the effective  
191 dose  $E[D_e]$  of the previous state or region. For example, in order to compute the effective dose  
192 of the particle deposited in the surface at state 6, let's consider  $E[D_1]$  which denote viable  
193 pathogens in state 1 (Air),  $E[D_3]$  denotes viable pathogens in state 3 (Air),  $E[D_5]$  denotes viable

194 pathogens in state 5 (Air) and  $E [D_6]$  denotes viable pathogens to state 6 (Respiratory surface),  
195 the doses are quantified as follows:

$$196 \quad E [D_1] = N_1 \times (p_{11}^n + p_{13}^n) \quad [9]$$

$$197 \quad N_2 = N_1 \times p_{12}^n \quad [10]$$

$$198 \quad E[D_2] = N_2 \times p_{22}^n \quad [11]$$

$$199 \quad E [D_3] = E[D_1] \times (p_{33}^n + p_{35}^n) \quad [12]$$

$$200 \quad E [D_5] = E[D_3] \times (p_{55}^n) \quad [13]$$

$$201 \quad N_6 = E[D_3] \times p_{56}^n \quad [14]$$

$$202 \quad E [D_6] = N_6 \times p_{66}^n \quad [15]$$

#### 203 *2.1.4 Effective dose from the swallowing of pathogens*

204 The effective internal swallowed dose ( $d_i$ ) was calculated from considering two major sources:

- 205 i. The estimated internal dose from particles with an aerodynamic diameter  $< 3.3 \mu\text{m}$ , which  
206 may be deposited in the Nasopharynx region of the respiratory system, i.e.  $E [D_2]$ .
- 207 ii. The estimated internal dose of viable pathogens  $> 3.3 \mu\text{m}$  in diameter that may be deposited  
208 in the Nasopharynx region of the respiratory system,  $E_c$ . For gram-negative bacteria of this size  
209 range, it was assumed that all inhaled pathogen particles were deposited in the upper respiratory  
210 track or Nasopharynx region of the respiratory system.

211 The sum total of the inhaled dose ( $d_i$ ) of viable gram-negative bacteria deposited in the  
212 Nasopharynx region can be estimated in eq. 16

$$213 \quad d_i = E [D_2] + E_c \quad [16]$$

214 Where  $E_c = ec \cdot \lambda_7$ ,  $ec$  being the initial exposure concentrations per day of particles with an  
215 aerodynamic diameter  $> 3.3 \mu\text{m}$ .

216 Fig. 2 shows a schematic representation of the GI infection pathway of inhaled particles that were  
217 eventually swallowed. The entrapped particles (or pathogens) on the surface of the respiratory  
218 system are prevented from resuspension by the actions of the mucociliary escalators, and they  
219 are eventually removed by expectoration or swallowed, with the latter increasing the  
220 gastrointestinal (GI) pathogen load (Koblinger, 1985; Pillai, 2007). The ingestion rate  $ag$ , is  
221 estimated to be between 10-50% of the inhaled pathogens (Medema *et al.* 2004; Brooks *et al.*  
222 2005). Pathogen ingestion is accounted for by multiplying eq. 16 with ingestion rate  $ag$ , as shown  
223 in eq. 17:

$$224 \quad d_{sw} = d_i \cdot ag \quad [17]$$

225 The effective gastrointestinal pathogen dose is expressed in the eq. 18:

$$226 \quad E[d_{sw}] = d_{sw} - (d_{sw} \cdot \lambda_s) \quad [18]$$

227 Where  $d_{sw}$  is the ingested pathogen load;  $ag$  = ingestion rate (%);  $E[d_{sw}]$  = effective  
228 gastrointestinal pathogen dose;  $\lambda_s$  ( $\text{min}^{-1}$ ) is the rate of inactivation of *E. coli* from stomach acid  
229 (Lindqvist & Barmark, 2014).

230 The estimated values of the loss rates in the Markov chain model and the swallowing of *E. coli*  
231 used in the computation of the GI load can be seen in S1 Table and S2 Table (supporting  
232 information).

## 233 **2.2 Dose-response (D-R) Assessment**

234 The beta-Poisson dose-response model was used in this study because the model has been widely  
235 used from inhalation and ingestion of *Aspergillus fumigatus* and *E.coli* respectively (Teunis *et al.*

236 2008; Leleu *et al.* 2013; Dungan 2014). The dose-response assessment establishes a  
237 mathematically relationship between the inhaled pathogen dose and the probability of infection  
238 in exposed waste workers at Olusosun dumpsite. The beta-Poisson D-R model by Haas et al.  
239 (1999) was used to estimate the risk of infection from exposure to both respiratory and GI  
240 pathogens as described in eq. 19:

$$241 \quad P_i = 1 - \left[1 + \left(d_e/\beta\right)\right]^{-\alpha} \quad [19]$$

242 Where  $P_i$  is the probability of infection,  $d_e$  is the effective infective dose (either as  $E [D_6]$  or  
243  $E[d_{sw}]$  for respiratory or gastrointestinal respectively),  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are the slope parameters related  
244 to the pathogen, and their values can be found in Table I.

### 245 **2.3 Risk characterization**

246 The risk characterization combined the dose-response results and exposure information to  
247 estimate the magnitude of the risk to the exposed waste workers. The infection probability was  
248 calculated based on a one-time (one-minute), daily (11 hours/day) and annual exposure duration  
249 (Akpeimeh et al., 2019). A Pathogen to Indicator ratio (P:I) ranging from conservative 1: 1000  
250 to a least conservative 1: 10,000 for the ratio of *E. coli* O157:H7 to gram-negative bacteria was  
251 used to calculate the infection risk from exposure to gram-negative bacteria. Brooks et al., (2005)  
252 used similar ratios in modelling of infection risks from aerosolized *Salmonella* spp. and  
253 coxsackievirus A21 from the spreading liquid biosolids. Risk combination using the inclusion-  
254 exclusion principle estimated the overall risk estimate in different scenarios combining several  
255 risk estimates.

#### 256 **2.3.1 Combining Risk**

257 The mathematical principle of inclusion-exclusion was used to calculate the overall expected  
258 infection risk ( $E[R]$ ) in any particular scenario. This assumes that infection can occur only once,

259 as described in eq. 20,21 and 22 for two, three and four risk combination respectively (Nicas &  
260 Sun, 2006):

$$261 \quad E[R] = |R_A| + |R_B| - |R_A R_B| \quad [20]$$

262 OR

$$263 \quad E[R] = |R_A| + |R_B| + |R_C| - |R_A R_B| - |R_A R_C| - |R_B R_C| + |R_A R_B R_C| \quad [21]$$

264  $E[R]$  = Overall expected risk,  $R_A$ ,  $R_B$ ,  $R_C$ , are the risk variables

## 265 **2.4 Data analysis and model testing**

266 The Markov chain model was developed as a steady state model. A one-minute time-step was  
267 used, as the model was expected to estimate pathogen deposition in human lungs based on the  
268 number of breaths taken per minute. The model was developed in MS Excel 2013 (Microsoft  
269 Inc.) and in R-project (by the R Foundation). The Monte Carlo simulation for the  $\beta$ -Poisson  
270 dose-response model was run on Minitab 18 statistical software. The Monte Carlo simulation  
271 was used to account for the natural variability in the model parameters and to reduce the level of  
272 uncertainty in the model results (Soller, Schoen, Bartrand, Ravenscroft, & Ashbolt, 2010). The  
273 technique works by sampling values at random from the probability distribution of the input data,  
274 in this case, the bioaerosols exposure data (Kottegoda & Rosso, 2008). Thus, it was important  
275 that, prior to running the Monte Carlo simulation, a goodness-of-fit test was conducted to  
276 determine the kind of distribution that best fits the input data for this study. A one-sample  
277 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was carried out on the bioaerosol exposure data to determine  
278 the distribution of best-fit for gram-negative bacteria and *Aspergillus fumigatus* (Sunger & Haas,  
279 2015). The data for gram-negative bacteria was fit to a normal distribution ( $p = 0.59$ ) and  
280 *Aspergillus fumigatus* fit to an exponential distribution ( $p = 0.49$ ). Randomised data were  
281 subsequently generated based on the result of the one-sample K-S test for *Aspergillus fumigatus*

282 ( $E[D_6]$ ) and *E. coli* O157:H7 ( $E[d_{sw}]$ ) and subsequently use to run the Monte Carlo simulation  
283 for  $\beta$ -Poisson dose-response model. The Monte Carlo simulation was run for 10,000 iterations  
284 and the median was considered to present the most likely scenario for estimating the infection  
285 risk.

## 286 **3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### 287 **3.1 Risk of infection inherent to location on the dumpsite (*Aspergillus fumigatus*)**

288 The results of the QMRA have shown the potential health risk of the poor microbial air quality  
289 at Olusosun dumpsite. The risk from the one-time exposure ( $1.4 \times 10^{-5}$ ) to *Aspergillus fumigatus*  
290 increased by 5-log (combined risk:  $5.33 \times 10^{-1}$ ) after 11 hours of exposure from passive activities  
291 (e.g. Middlemen, visitors and small business owners) at the dumpsite (Table II). This implies that  
292 overall; there is at least a 53.3% chance of an individual involved in passive activities at the  
293 dumpsite to develop a respiratory ailment from inhalation of the spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus*  
294 from merely being present at Olusosun dumpsite for 11 hours. *Aspergillus fumigatus* is one of  
295 the common moulds present in the ambient air at composting sites and landfill sites (Persoons,  
296 Parat, Stoklov, Perdrix, & Maitre, 2010; Schlosser, Robert, & Debeaupuis, 2016). Though the  
297 respiratory pathologies associated with the inhalation of its spores have been thoroughly  
298 investigated, the probable estimate of the risk of infection from inhalation of the spores have  
299 received limited attention. In this study, the results of the D-R model suggest that, based on the  
300 concentration of spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus* in the air samples, the risk to the individuals  
301 actively working on the dumpsite per day might be between  $1.01 \times 10^{-1}$  to  $3.01 \times 10^{-1}$ , which 1.24  
302 times higher overall compared to those who are not involved in activities at the dumpsite (Table  
303 II). The differences between the two infection risk estimates (passive and active workers) was  
304 marginal, suggesting that the aetiology of the infection would be the same once the pathogen is  
305 inhaled whether or not people are active at the dumpsite.

306 Fig. 3 shows a trend that suggests an overall reduction in risk levels with distance from the active  
307 area to the site boundary. Although the risk magnitude remained the same across locations i.e.  
308  $10^{-1}$ , the result otherwise suggests that workers working at the active area may be at greater risk  
309 of infection from *Aspergillus fumigatus* than those located further away.

310 The combined infection risk indicates adjusted overall expected risk for Olusosun open dumpsite,  
311 considering the risk levels inherent to each sampling location. Because the waste workers and  
312 food vendors spend their time moving from one part of the dumpsite to the other during the day  
313 (11-hour exposure), the minimum expected infection risk for these group of workers is the  
314 combined risk of  $5.90 \times 10^{-1}$  (Annual risk =  $9.58 \times 10^{-1}$ ). In other words, on the one-time pathogen  
315 exposure, for every 10 times during the day they are exposed at the dumpsite, they will likely be  
316 infected 6 times from inhaling spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus*. Owners of small businesses and  
317 middlemen are usually stationed at the dormant area and the boundary, which are ‘relatively’  
318 lower risk compared to the active area where scavenging is the predominant activity. However,  
319 by combining the inherent risk from each activity with their associated locations, the chances of  
320 infection increases to the range of 66-78% (see S4 Table, supporting information). Taking the  
321 dormant area as an example; the result of the combined risk for waste sorting (which is the  
322 predominant activity) estimates the chances of infection at 68% and 90% as daily and annual  
323 infection risk respectively, which is a 5 and 4 percentage points increase, assuming the individual  
324 was not engaged in waste sorting at the dormant area. The trend suggests that the kind of activity  
325 undertaken at the dumpsite can play an important role in heightening the risk of infections for  
326 the workers irrespective of the location they take place.

### 327 **3.2 Risk of GI infection inherent to location on dumpsite (*E.coli* O157:H7)**

328 The risk of GI infection from an 11-hour exposure to bioaerosols containing *E.coli* O157:H7 at  
329 the active area was only 1-log greater than the boundary for P: I =  $1:10^3$  and  $1:10^4$  (Table III).  
330 The decrease in bioaerosol concentration with distance as reported by Akpeimeh et al. (2019)

331 may explain the decrease in GI infection risk from the results of the QMRA. A similar trend was  
332 observed by Dungan (2014), where the decrease in GI infection risk from enteric pathogen during  
333 land application of dairy wastewater was associated with the decrease in the concentration with  
334 distance, owing primarily to wind dilution. There are currently no guidelines for the acceptable  
335 risk threshold from exposure to aerosolized enteric bacteria in occupational environments,  
336 however, the range  $10^{-6}$ - $10^{-4}$  (conservative to a less-conservative) have been commonly cited in  
337 the literature for GI infection risk, and have been adopted in this study for comparison purposes  
338 (Dungan, 2014; Regli, Rose, Haas, & Gerba, 1991). Considering the results of the QMRA, only  
339 the estimates of GI infection risk for P: I =  $1:10^4$  were within acceptable limit (upper boundary).  
340 For individuals involved in passive activities at the entrance ( $1.31 \times 10^{-4}$ -  $6.57 \times 10^{-4}$ ) dormant area  
341 ( $1.46 \times 10^{-4}$ -  $7.32 \times 10^{-4}$ ) and the boundary ( $1.46 \times 10^{-4}$ -  $5.72 \times 10^{-4}$ ) would do so within the  
342 acceptable GI infection risk threshold. Furthermore, only individuals involved in active activities  
343 at the entrance ( $1.87 \times 10^{-4}$ - $9.27 \times 10^{-4}$ ) and the boundary ( $2.09 \times 10^{-4}$ - $8.94 \times 10^{-4}$ ) would do so within  
344 the acceptable GI infection-risk threshold. Furthermore, the data for P: I =  $1:10^3$  showing an 11-  
345 hour combined risk for all four sampling locations indicates that workers who are physically  
346 active (lifting, climbing the waste hill, pulling etc.; breathing rate = 17 breath per min) at the  
347 dumpsite will have a risk range of  $8.93 \times 10^{-3}$  –  $4.29 \times 10^{-2}$ , while the infection risk for those who  
348 are passively active (breathing rate = 12 breath per minute) will range from  $6.19 \times 10^{-3}$ - $3.05 \times 10^{-2}$   
349 (Table III). Interestingly, the differences in the risk estimates for the two levels of activities is  
350 only marginal, thereby indicating that, not engaging in physical activities does not necessarily  
351 decrease the magnitude of the risk. Jahne, Rogers, Holsen, Grimberg, and Ramler (2015) reported  
352 a GI infection risk from *E. coli* O157:H7 aerosolized during manure application to be  $10^{-3}$ - $10^{-2}$   
353 for an 8-hour exposure, values comparable to the prediction in this study. Although ranked as a  
354 medium-risk scenario, they however cautioned that that the risk level could easily escalate to  
355 high should there be any outbreak of *E. coli* O157:H7 from the sources feeding the point of  
356 exposure. A similar threshold ( $5 \times 10^{-3}$ ) was also reported by Seto, Soller, and Colford Jr (2007)

357 and Brooks, McLaughlin, Gerba, and Pepper (2012) to have caused the *E.coli* O157:H7 outbreak  
358 in 2006, with 205 reported illnesses and 5 death in the United States.

### 359 **3.3 Risk of respiratory infection inherent to activities at dumpsite (*Aspergillus*** 360 ***fumigatus*)**

361 The annual respiratory infection risk inherent to activities like scavenging, waste sorting and site  
362 supervision are as high as  $10^{-1}$  (Table IV). The result further indicates that by engaging in these  
363 activities in the active area (infection risk =  $3.01 \times 10^{-1}$ ), the risk of infection increases by  $3.11 \times 10^{-1}$   
364 <sup>1</sup>,  $3.16 \times 10^{-1}$  and  $3.70 \times 10^{-1}$  points for scavenging, waste sorting and site monitoring respectively.  
365 The annual risk of respiratory infection from exposure to *Aspergillus fumigatus* during  
366 scavenging, waste sorting and site monitoring ranged from  $7.93 \times 10^{-1}$ - $8.25 \times 10^{-1}$ . For such  
367 estimates, it can be assumed based on a one-time exposure, for every 10 times the workers are  
368 exposed during the year to this dose at the dumpsite, they will likely become infected 8 times,  
369 especially those with suppressed immune systems. By implication, the workers are likely to be  
370 infected several times in a year from inhaling the spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus*. The risk  
371 estimates are very high considering that the workers are exposed 6 days per week and may be  
372 exposed to other pathogenic agents that may take a toll on their immune systems.

373 For healthy individuals, the inhaled spores are either removed by the mucociliary clearance  
374 mechanism or killed by the alveolar macrophages. Those that evade macrophage killings may  
375 germinate in the bronchioles or alveolar spaces; and at this point are targeted by infiltrating  
376 neutrophils capable of destroying their hyphae (Dagenais & Keller, 2009). The risk associated  
377 with developing any form of invasive aspergillosis is primarily the breakdown or dysfunction of  
378 the hosts defence system and the survival ability of the pathogen in the target growth environment  
379 of the hosts (Schaffner, Douglas, & Braude, 1982). Moreover, the combination of smoking and  
380 exposure to other aerosolized environmental pollutants can impair mucociliary clearance even in  
381 healthy individuals, thereby increasing the chances of deposition and possible growth of inhaled

382 spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus* (Wolff, 1986; Xavier et al., 2013). In the case of the study by  
383 (Akpeimeh et al., 2019) where 41% of the participants were smokers and 89% had never used  
384 nose masks for nasal protection during their work at the dumpsite, the respiratory risk estimates  
385 modelled in this study may be consistent with the reality of the respiratory health risk associated  
386 with working in environments such as Olusosun dumpsite.

### 387 **3.4 Risk of GI infection inherent to activities at dumpsite (*E.coli* O157:H7)**

388 Workers engagements in activities at the dumpsite, depending on the kind of activity, are at a  
389 high risk of GI infection, i.e. risk estimates higher than the inherent risk associated with the  
390 location where the activity took place. The risk of GI infection from scavenging at the active area  
391 ( $5.03 \times 10^{-1}$ - $6.63 \times 10^{-1}$ ) for example, is two-threefold greater than the inherent risk at the active  
392 area ( $3.23 \times 10^{-3}$ -  $1.56 \times 10^{-2}$ ) for the same exposure duration (Table III and V). A similar trend  
393 was also observed for the category of P:I =  $10^4$  where risk levels were higher by three-four orders  
394 of magnitude for scavenging, waste sorting and site supervision compared to the inherent risk  
395 levels at the active area where the sampling took place. Furthermore, the combined risk showed  
396 an even higher risk estimate overall than if the inherent risk for the locations and activity were  
397 measured as stand-alone (S4 Table, supporting information). Combining the risk of the active  
398 area and scavenging increased the overall adjusted risk by 2-3 orders of magnitude to  $5.05 \times 10^{-1}$ -  
399  $6.68 \times 10^{-1}$  for P:I= $10^3$  and 3-4 orders of magnitude to  $2.10 \times 10^{-1}$ - $4.21 \times 10^{-1}$  for P:I= $10^4$ . The  
400 proximity of these activities to the exposure source and the reduced effect of dilution during these  
401 activities might explain the high-risk values in the dose-response model. Occupational risk  
402 studies accounting for enteric bacterial risk is very limited. Some notable exceptions are  
403 healthcare workers, wastewater treatment plant personnel and in concentrated animal feeding  
404 operations (CAFOs) (Medema *et al.* 2004; Bobo and Dubberke 2010; Brooks *et al.* 2012).  
405 Notably, Medema et al. (2004) reported the predicted annual risk from a wastewater treatment  
406 plant to be as high as  $2 \times 10^{-1}$  from a one-time exposure to enteric pathogens. Tanner et al. (2008)

407 on the otherhand, simulated an annual risk range of  $2 \times 10^{-2}$  (use of protective equipment) to  
408  $3 \times 10^{-1}$  (no use of protective equipment) during CAFOs. Brooks et al. (2012) reported similar  
409 risk values to Tanner et al. (2008), ranging from  $1 \times 10^{-2}$  to  $5 \times 10^{-1}$ , values comparable what is  
410 predicted in this study (Table V). As it currently stands, there are no epidemiological or clinical  
411 studies establishing the inhalation-ingestion route of transmission of enteric bacterial pathogens  
412 in humans (Brooks et al., 2012). This is because in most of the cases considered, there also exist  
413 faecal-oral route of transmission (from fomite, waterborne or foodborne) in the same  
414 environment. It is also worthy of note that because the detection procedure for the faecal-oral  
415 transmission has been established over time, it is common to ignore the inhalation-ingestion route  
416 of transmission. However, there is mounting evidence from animal trials that inhalation-ingestion  
417 routes of transmission exist and can pose a high risk of GI infection in a population exposed to  
418 aerosolized enteric bacteria (Clemmer *et al.* 1960; Fedorka-Cray *et al.* 1995; Darlowa *et al.* 2009).

### 419 **3.5 Risk management options**

#### 420 *3.5.1 Use of PPEs an RPEs*

421 Workers at Olusosun dumpsite generally did not use personal protective equipment (PPE), including  
422 respiratory protective equipment (RPE) because they were expensive, and they could not afford them  
423 (Akpeimeh et al. (2019). This reflects the economic status of the workers, as most of the recycled  
424 materials are sold to intermediaries at cheap rates; barely enough to cover their daily upkeep let alone  
425 afford a personal protective equipment. To this end, intervention by the authorities is necessary to  
426 protect the health of the workers. PPE's should be subsidised for the workers, and the workers  
427 monitored for effective usage of the PPE's. Routine, but compulsory respiratory health checks  
428 (however rudimental) should be carried as part of the requirement to work on the dumpsite. This will  
429 help the authorities keep on top of the health conditions of the workers and incentivise record keeping.

#### 430 *3.5.2 Reduction of the number of waste scavengers in dumpsites*

431 Scavengers composed of the highest proportion (61%) of workers at Olusosun dumpsite (Akpeimeh  
432 et al. (2019). By the nature of their activity, they are the most exposed to bioaerosols and have the

433 highest risk of getting infected. It is therefore recommended that by systematically reducing the  
434 number of scavengers picking at the dumpsite, it is possible to reduce the overall health impact on  
435 population at the dumpsite. If city authorities implement programmes that reduces to the barest  
436 minimum the amount of recyclables reaching dumpsites, the population of scavengers on the  
437 dumpsite will consequently reduce. The UK's waste hierarchy for example is core to the waste  
438 directive (Directive 2008/98/EC), which prioritizes waste prevention, then re-use, then recycling,  
439 then recovery and last of all, disposal (e.g. in landfill). Another example is described by Asim, Batool,  
440 Chaudhry, and Recycling (2012) where informal recyclers are integrated into the mainstream of the  
441 waste management system of Lahore city, Pakistan. They go door-to-door collecting household  
442 recyclable waste, and then take them to waste transfer points across the city where itinerant buyers  
443 buy the waste at higher value than they would at the dumpsite. Moreover, the approach of using local  
444 expertise (like above) to proffer sustainable low-cost solutions to solid waste management problems  
445 will directly or indirectly impact positively on the social-economic status of the people in that society  
446 (Zurbrügg, Gfrerer, Ashadi, Brenner, & Küper, 2012). Conclusively, the informal waste workers  
447 will earn more money from their enterprise while reducing exposure to pathogens and improving  
448 their overall health.

### 449 **3.6 Research limitations**

450 In carrying out this research, there were sources of uncertainty inherent to the simulation such as  
451 the sample collection, effective dose dose-response model and the population type and these may  
452 have cascaded through the model, widening the 'cone of uncertainty' through the various steps  
453 of the modelling process. Firstly, the method of sample collection was a potential source of  
454 uncertainty in the risk calculation, as *E.coli* O157:H7 was not originally isolated in the air  
455 samples at the dumpsite. However, one of the approaches used to address this was to assume a  
456 pathogen-indicator ratio in the exposure dose. This approach has been applied by Brooks et al.  
457 (2005) representing the risk estimate as a range of values of the pathogen doses and this was  
458 adopted in this study. Secondly, because inactivation rates vary by microbial specie and the

459 environment, applying the same inactivation rates for both indicator microorganisms as used in  
460 this study, may have increased the uncertainty in the model. However, the use of a Monte Carlo  
461 simulation to estimate the natural variability of the indicator organisms as they are inhaled  
462 mitigates this uncertainty to some extent.

#### 463 **4. CONCLUSION**

464 The QMRA simulation presented here involved the first application of a stochastic model to  
465 predict the transport of bioaerosols in the human respiratory system (Markov Chain Model), and  
466 to estimate the risk of infection specific to dumpsite workers from the settlement of those  
467 pathogens in the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracks. The overarching trends suggest that the  
468 infection risk from inhaling contaminated air containing spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus* at all  
469 locations were of the same magnitude ( $10^{-1}$ ) irrespective of whether the individual was involved  
470 in activities in the dumpsite or not. The combined risk of exposure from activities and ambient  
471 exposure to *Aspergillus fumigatus* increases the daily chances infection. At the active area, the  
472 risk of infection ranged between 73-78%, while at the boundary the range was 66-70% for all  
473 activities associated with the locations. The daily estimates of the risk of infection from ingestion  
474 of *E.coli* O157:H7 ranged from  $10^{-3}$ - $10^{-2}$  for the conservative and  $10^{-4}$ - $10^{-3}$  for the least  
475 conservative pathogen to indicator ratio and was classified as a medium-high and low-medium  
476 risk respectively. The probable outcome from ingesting inhaled *E.coli* O157:H7 during  
477 scavenging, waste sorting and site monitoring was high ( $10^{-1}$ ), with similar magnitude  
478 comparable to the annual infection risk.

479 Overall, the trends in the risk estimates suggest that the activities at the dumpsite may contribute  
480 more to the likelihood of workers developing either respiratory infection or GI infection than any  
481 other factor.

482 **Conflict of Interest**

483 Each named author has contributed substantially to conducting the underlying research and  
484 drafting this manuscript. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, the named authors have  
485 no conflict of interest, financial or otherwise.

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490 **Ethics approval**

491 Ethical approval was obtained from the Engineering Faculty Research Ethics Committee,  
492 University of Leeds, UK.

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
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
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


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**Fig. 1. Schematics showing the connection between the eight states in the Markov Chain model used to model transport and deposit in the respiratory system**



**Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the GI infection pathway**



**Fig 3. Eleven-hour risk of infection from bioaerosol containing *Aspergillus fumigatus* and *E. coli* O157:H7 from the four sampling locations at Olusosun dumpsite. Boxplots indicates upper/lower quartiles and median; Whiskers indicates 95th percentiles.**

**Table I Slop parameters used in the beta-Poisson D-R model and assumptions**

Pathogen	D-R Model	Parameter	Conditions of development	References
<i>A. fumigatus</i>	$\beta$ -Poisson	$\alpha = 1.1, \beta = 20$	Developed from animal model of immunosuppressed mice.	Leleu et al. (2013)
<i>E.coli</i>	$\beta$ -Poisson	$\alpha = 0.248, \beta = 48.8$	Developed from fitting data from 8 out breaks from <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7	Jahne et al. (2015); Teunis et al. (2008)

**Table II: Risk of infection (median) from inhalation of spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus* at the four sampling locations**

Variable	Risk of infection	
	11 h	1 year*
<i>Risk associated with active involvement at sampling location (Breathing rate = 17 breathe per min)</i>		
Active Area	$3.01 \times 10^{-1}$	$6.27 \times 10^{-1}$
Entrance	$2.04 \times 10^{-1}$	$5.71 \times 10^{-1}$
Dormant Area	$1.72 \times 10^{-1}$	$5.50 \times 10^{-1}$
Boundary	$1.01 \times 10^{-1}$	$4.96 \times 10^{-1}$
Combined risk	$5.9 \times 10^{-1}$	$9.64 \times 10^{-1}$
<i>Risk associated with passive involvement at the sampling location (Breathing rate = 12 breathe per min)</i>		
Active Area	$2.75 \times 10^{-1}$	$6.12 \times 10^{-1}$
Entrance	$1.77 \times 10^{-1}$	$5.54 \times 10^{-1}$
Dormant Area	$1.48 \times 10^{-1}$	$5.34 \times 10^{-1}$
Boundary	$8.12 \times 10^{-2}$	$4.77 \times 10^{-1}$
Combined risk	$5.33 \times 10^{-1}$	$9.58 \times 10^{-1}$
One-time exposure ( $\text{min}^{-1}$ )	$1.4 \times 10^{-5}$	-

\*Annual risk of infection based on exposure for 6 days per week for 52 weeks.

**Table III: Risk of infection (median) from inhalation-ingestion exposure to *E.coli* O157:H7 at the four sampling location at Olusosun dumpsite**

Variable	Risk of infection for 10-50% ingestion rate			
	1:1000‡		1:10000‡	
	11 h	1 year*	11 h	1 year*
<i>Risk associated with active involvement at sampling location (Breathing rate = 17 breathe per min)</i>				
Active Area	3.23×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 1.56×10 <sup>-2</sup>	3.32×10 <sup>-1</sup> -5.32×10 <sup>-1</sup>	3.25×10 <sup>-4</sup> -1.62×10 <sup>-3</sup>	8.16×10 <sup>-2</sup> - 2.41×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Entrance	1.85×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 9.09×10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.58×10 <sup>-1</sup> -4.68×10 <sup>-1</sup>	1.87×10 <sup>-4</sup> -9.27×10 <sup>-4</sup>	5.12×10 <sup>-2</sup> -1.75×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Dormant Area	2.06×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 1.01×10 <sup>-2</sup>	2.72×10 <sup>-1</sup> - 4.81×10 <sup>-1</sup>	2.09×10 <sup>-4</sup> -1.04 ×10 <sup>-4</sup>	5.64×10 <sup>-2</sup> -1.87×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Boundary	1.82×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 8.82×10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.56×10 <sup>-1</sup> -4.64×10 <sup>-1</sup>	2.09×10 <sup>-4</sup> -8.94×10 <sup>-4</sup>	5.01×10 <sup>-2</sup> -1.71×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Combined Risk	8.93 ×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 4.29 ×10 <sup>-2</sup>	7.32 × 10 <sup>-1</sup> -9.31 × 10 <sup>-1</sup>	9.32 ×10 <sup>-4</sup> -4.47×10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.19 ×10 <sup>-1</sup> -5.78 ×10 <sup>-1</sup>
<i>Risk associated with passive involvement at the sampling location (Breathing rate = 12 breathe per min)</i>				
Active Area	2.28×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 1.11×10 <sup>-2</sup>	2.86×10 <sup>-1</sup> - 4.90×10 <sup>-1</sup>	2.29×10 <sup>-4</sup> - 1.14×10 <sup>-3</sup>	6.09×10 <sup>-2</sup> - 1.99×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Entrance	1.31×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 6.46×10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.15×10 <sup>-1</sup> - 4.24×10 <sup>-1</sup>	1.31×10 <sup>-4</sup> - 6.57×10 <sup>-4</sup>	3.71×10 <sup>-2</sup> - 1.39×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Dormant Area	1.45×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 7.19×10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.27×10 <sup>-1</sup> - 4.43×10 <sup>-1</sup>	1.46×10 <sup>-4</sup> - 7.32×10 <sup>-4</sup>	4.11×10 <sup>-2</sup> - 1.49×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Boundary	1.15×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 5.73×10 <sup>-3</sup>	1.99×10 <sup>-1</sup> - 4.09×10 <sup>-1</sup>	1.46×10 <sup>-4</sup> - 5.72×10 <sup>-4</sup>	3.31×10 <sup>-2</sup> - 1.25×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Combined Risk	6.19×10 <sup>-3</sup> - 3.05×10 <sup>-2</sup>	-	6.52×10 <sup>-4</sup> - 3.11×10 <sup>-3</sup>	-
One-time exposure (min <sup>-1</sup> )	1.39×10 <sup>-5</sup> - 6.97×10 <sup>-5</sup>	-	1.40×10 <sup>-6</sup> - 7.00×10 <sup>-6</sup>	-

\*Annual risk of infection based on exposure for 6 days per week for 52 weeks.

‡ Pathogen – indicator ratio at 1:10<sup>3</sup> and 1:10<sup>4</sup>

**Table IV: Risk of infection (median) from inhalation of spores of *Aspergillus fumigatus* during activities at the Olusosun dumpsite**

<b>Exposure Activity</b>	<b>Risk of infection</b>	
	11 h	1 year*
Scavenging	$6.11 \times 10^{-1}$	$7.93 \times 10^{-1}$
Waste sorting	$6.17 \times 10^{-1}$	$7.96 \times 10^{-1}$
Site monitoring/ supervision	$6.71 \times 10^{-1}$	$8.25 \times 10^{-1}$

\*Annual risk of infection based on exposure for 6 days a week for 52 weeks.

**Table V: Risk of infection (median) from inhalation-ingestion exposure to *E.coli* O157:H7 during activities at Olusosun dumpsite**

Exposure Activity	Risk of infection for 10-50% (low-high) ingestion rate ( <i>ag</i> )			
	1:1000‡		1:10000‡	
	11 h	1 year*	11 h	1 year*
Scavenging	5.03×10 <sup>-1</sup> -6.63×10 <sup>-1</sup>	8.79×10 <sup>-1</sup> -9.19×10 <sup>-1</sup>	2.10×10 <sup>-1</sup> -4.20×10 <sup>-1</sup>	7.86×10 <sup>-1</sup> -8.56×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Waste sorting	4.54×10 <sup>-1</sup> -6.27×10 <sup>-1</sup>	8.66×10 <sup>-1</sup> -9.11×10 <sup>-1</sup>	1.63×10 <sup>-1</sup> -3.65×10 <sup>-1</sup>	7.62×10 <sup>-1</sup> -8.40×10 <sup>-1</sup>
Site monitoring/ supervision	1.89×10 <sup>-1</sup> -3.96×10 <sup>-1</sup>	7.76×10 <sup>-1</sup> -8.49×10 <sup>-1</sup>	3.04×10 <sup>-2</sup> -1.18×10 <sup>-1</sup>	6.05×10 <sup>-1</sup> -7.34×10 <sup>-1</sup>

\*Annual risk of infection based on exposure for 6 days a week for 52 weeks.

‡ Pathogen – indicator ratio (P:I) at 1:10<sup>3</sup> and 1:10<sup>4</sup>