Beyond good and bad: reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence

Barlassina, L. (2020) Beyond good and bad: reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 9 (4). pp. 274-284. ISSN 2161-2234

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
  • Barlassina, L.
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2020 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Keywords: affect; affective forecasting; decision making; evaluativism; imperativism; pain; phenomenal character; pleasure; valence
Dates:
  • Accepted: 12 October 2020
  • Published (online): 10 November 2020
  • Published: December 2020
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 21 Oct 2020 13:46
Last Modified: 06 Jan 2021 15:21
Status: Published
Publisher: Wiley
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.471

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