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ARTICLE

Constructing the Islamic State: Analysing the interplay between media and policy frames in the aftermath of the November 13th 2015 Paris attacks

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This article analyses the imagined threat posed by the Islamic State in the aftermath of the November 13th Paris attacks and during the build-up to the December 2nd 2015 House of Commons vote to extend U.K. airstrikes to Syria. Drawing together Political Communications and International Relations approaches to framing analysis, and focusing on Britain's three main television news providers (BBC, ITV and Channel 4), it questions (1) *how* is the Islamic State is framed for U.K audiences, (2) *who* shapes those frames, and (3) what *consequences* arise from adopting certain frames over others? The analysis identifies three competing representational frames (labelled here as the "(Para)Military", the "Elusive" and the "Extremist" frames), and their main advocates, and shows how, ultimately, U.K. news media tend to support an "elite"-centred framing of the threat, via its foregrounding of the "(Para)Military" and "Extremist" frames, thus legitimising calls for extending airstrikes into Syria. In so doing, the article provides two contributions to knowledge: first, empirical, by generating substantive new insight into the way the Islamic State was portrayed in the days and weeks following the Paris attacks, and in particular who shapes such frames; and, second, conceptual, via its blending of Political Communications and International Relations approaches to framing and their consequences.

Key words: Framing; Islamic State; political possibility; television; terrorism; visual/verbal representation

Introduction

Despite a long history of terrorism on its soil, over the course of 2015 France witnessed a wave of terrorist activity linked to conflicts in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria (Kepel 2017). Attacks by lone or small groups of individuals took place across the Île-de-France region in January, Nice in February, Villejuif in April, Saint-Quentin-Fallavier in June, and Oignies in August. Of these incidents, however, the November 13th 2015 Paris attacks were, by far, the most devastating. Nine men, divided into three groups, led a series of coordinated assaults on locations across Paris. In total, 131 people were killed and 413 injured in the ensuing violence,

making them one of the most deadly terrorist incidents in Europe since the 2nd World War (see Zoli & Williams 2019). The attacks were quickly claimed by the Islamic State, a revolutionary Takfiri-Kharijite insurgency (Antúnez & Tellidis 2013), who claimed, amongst other things, that they were in response to French airstrikes on its territory (Jocelyn 2015).

Rather than focus on the *physical* threat posed by the Islamic State during these events, the current article seeks to analyse the *imagined* threat it presented (after Archetti & Taylor 2003), and in particular the way those cultural imaginings shape the boundaries of political (*im*)possibility. This is not to deny the reality of this phenomenon or claim that media representations have direct, causal effects. Instead, it is to show how the Islamic State is as much a product of our own deep-seated insecurities and cultural imaginings, than it is of the material forces it comprises. While not the only site in which “terrorism” is rendered meaningful, analysing news media portrayals is an essential task for CST scholars because those very representations and framings are central to the construction of terrorism as an object of knowledge and power. As will be explained in greater detail, in addition helping shape the reality of terror threats, news media framings of terrorism perform a central role in the formation and legitimisation of policy responses, rendering, in the words of Jack Holland (2011: 52), certain actions “*conceivable, communicable and coercive*”.

Before continuing, however, we should be clear that the media-state-terror relationship (Ahmad 2019) has received a significant level of academic scrutiny (Norris et al., 2003; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 200; Freedman and Thussu, 2012). Much of the debate tends to fluctuate between the extent to which media portrayals reflect elite perspectives (see Archetti & Taylor 2005; Jackson 2005; Matthews 2014; Larsen 2018) or the way they provide terrorist groups with much-needed publicity (see Leibes & Kampf 2004). A small, but significant, portion of this research has explored the relationship between news media framings of terrorism and foreign counter-terrorism policy (see Gadarian 2010; Ahmad 2016; Polońska-Kimunguyi

& Gillespie 2017), but questions remain about the level of *interaction* between media and policy framing in this context. When it comes to the Islamic State, moreover, much of the existing research has focused on the group’s “sophisticated” communications strategy (see Baele et al 2020 for an overview), and in particular its use of violent propaganda imagery (see Fris 2015 & 2017; Kraidy 2018; Fahmy 2020). While there remains little research into the way news media have sought to portray this entity, for those who have it is claimed that the Islamic State have “been able to exert significant control over the way in which it is depicted” (Williams 2016: 6). Most notably in this regard, research by Audrey Courty et al (2019: 80) has shown how Western print media “unwittingly” reinforced the group’s core propaganda messaging in the aftermath of the Paris attacks (Courty et al 2019: 80), with publications such as *Daily Mail* offering, somewhat predictably, the most reductive and stereotypical portrayals (Boyle & Mower 2019: 213).

Given the impact of these attacks on both perceptions of the terror threat and subsequent counter-terrorism policy in the United Kingdom and beyond (see Bigo 2015; Brisard 2015; Iacobucci et al 2015), this article intervenes in these debates by questioning precisely (1) *how* the Islamic State threat is framed for U.K audiences, (2) *who* shapes those frames, and (3) what *consequences* can be said to arise from adopting one frame over and above others? The analysis focuses on the U.K’s three main television channels (BBC1, ITV and Channel 4) in the period immediately following the Paris attacks (November 13th – December 2nd 2015). This focus is, in part, due to status of television news within the U.K., for example, where, despite access to a growing range of information sources (Reuters 2019), 75% of adults continue to view the medium as their most trusted and accessed medium (Ofcom 2019). In fact, the role of television is particularly contradictory in this context, as it is believed to provide citizens with a sense of normality and reassurance, thus helping to repair the social fabric after a terror attack (see Hoskins & O’Loughlin 2007; Flood et al 2012; Gillespie & O’Loughlin 2017). And yet, at the

same time television viewing is also believed to increase public support for aggressive policy responses (Gadarian 2010: 476).

In order to investigate these issues in detail, the article begins by outlining the conceptual and methodological approach developed in this study. Here, the analysis blends approaches taken from Political Communications scholarship, which centre on the way frames emerge out of an interplay between events, influential actors and culturally-resonant elements, and Constructivist-inspired International Relations literature, which focus on the way policies are made possible through the representations and identities with which they invoke. It then moves to explore three weeks' worth of BBC1, ITV and Channel 4 news coverage following the Paris attacks and during the build-up to the House of Commons vote to extend U.K airstrikes to Syria. Specifically, the analysis identifies three distinct representational frames used to portray Islamic State and the Paris attackers (labelled here as the "(Para)Military", the "Elusive" and the "Extremist" frames), and shows how overall the coverage tends to echo "elite" framing of the terror threat. In particular, the article argues that the dominance of the "(Para)Military" frame, alongside support from the "Extremist" frame, serves to reinforce British foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, thus legitimising calls for extending airstrikes on Islamic State targets in Syria.

In so doing, the article offers contributions to the growing academic scholarship on Islamic State, the contemporary media-state-terror relationship, and the framing process more broadly. First, it generates substantive new empirical insight into the way the Islamic State has been portrayed for British citizens, identifying which frames are selected over and above others and how those frames are mobilised in support of expansive policy objectives in the Middle East. As few citizens have direct access to the Islamic State, or have time to read complex policy documents about the danger it poses, it is vital that we understand how certain frames are mobilised, and by whom, as those representations form the very basis of public debates

about how best to tackle such a threat. Second, in bringing into dialogue disparate approaches to framing analysis, in particular those situated within the fields of Political Communications and International Relations, this article provides a wider conceptual contribution to our understanding of how frames take shape and, importantly, the effects they have on policy formation. In this regard, the article concludes with a discussion of why certain frames are so prominent within the coverage, and how frames help create the conditions of possibility for particular policy outcomes.

Framing and the media-policy relationship

In analysing the imagined threat posed by the Islamic State, and in particular how particular ways of seeing and speaking about this entity are prioritised above others, one of the most useful conceptual tools available is the notion of “framing”. While many competing definitions exist (see Goffmann 1974; Tuchman 1978; Gitlin 1980; Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Entman 1993; Reese 2010), most approaches work with the assumption that framing is a process of selecting and omitting aspects of reality in order to make that information more salient and meaningful in a communicative text. As Robert Entman explains (1993: 52), frames serve to promote “*a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation*” for the issue under scrutiny. Viewed in this way, framing can be understood to be a basic feature of human communication, as it helps to logically organise and interpret large amounts of information and then fit the resultant “facts” within professionally-useful and culturally-resonant frameworks of knowledge (after Gitlin 1980).

Within the academic literature on framing, however, there is fundamental disagreement over precisely *who* and *what* shapes frames. Some scholars adopt an “event-driven” view, whereby the situational dynamics and contextual factors surrounding a given event have a significant bearing on the way frames take shape (Yarchi et al 2013; see also Lawrence 2000;

Livingston & Bennett 2003). Here, the seemingly random and unpredictable nature of an event can be understood to generate their own dynamics that are outside the institutional control of political and societal elites. Others, by contrast, adopt a more “elite-driven” understanding, arguing that frames are strategic ways of seeing and speaking about the world mobilised by influential groups or individuals to further their own interests (see Carragee & Roefs 2004; Entman 2004; Bacchi 2009; Robinson et al 2010). In this, functionalist or positivist-inspired understanding, framing is a purposeful *action* that agents knowingly take part in to increase their chance of shaping the political process. For those working within the Constructivist tradition, moreover, frames are viewed as “culturally-driven”; that is, as “unconsciously used conceptual scaffolds” emerging from the cultural symbols and discursive raw material that circulate within a given society (Goffman cited in Bacci 2009: 20). Here, much like the broader notion of discourse, framing is understood as a *process* that lacks a single, primary, trans-historic author or agent, and thus emerges out of the deeper epistemic struggle for meaning, truth, knowledge and power (see Foucault 1974).

For the purposes of this particular study, however, rather than be determined by a single all-encompassing force, frames can be understood to emerge out of the *interaction* between each of the three interrelated elements identified above. Thus, the material and contextual factors generated by a random, unanticipated event, such as the Paris attacks, will have a significant impact on the kinds of framing and reasoning devices available and, moreover, the types of people authorised to speak about such incidents. Likewise, in making sense of those events, speakers are limited in what they can say and the kinds of identities, narratives and symbols they can invoke to construct their frames. Rather than employ whichever frames they desire, what they say and do are to a large extent determined by events and the cultural-resonance of the language and imagery used to make sense of them (after Hülse & Spencer 2008: 577).

In considering the way frames take shape, and who or what shapes them, a central area of concern is the level of interaction between news media and policy frames (Livingston & Eachus 1995; Wolfsfeld 1997; Robinson 2001). Here, debate oscillates between the ability for news media to independently shape the policy process (the so-called “CNN effect”) and the more longstanding claim that journalists tend to reinforce, or “index”, elite policy preferences (the “manufacturing consent” paradigm) (Robinson 2002). Notably, when it comes to media coverage of terrorism, much of the existing literature falls in line with the latter approach, arguing that that news reporting typically serves to reinforce elite perspectives (see Archetti & Taylor 2005; Jackson 2005; Reece & Lewis 2009). Here, news media can be said to “enable” certain policy responses by mobilising domestic support (Robinson 2002). As research by Shana Kushner Gadarian has shown (2010; 2014), the presence of threatening imagery in the aftermath of a terrorist attack can increase public support for hawkish policies, capitalising on citizens’ feelings of fear and insecurity. As noted above, this is not to say that there is a direct, causal link between a frame and a set of policies. More realistically, frames help to form the emergent meaning structures and conditions through which a given set of responses are *made possible*. That is, frames engender particular actions or policy outcomes “not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather rendering these actions plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable, conceivable or inconceivable” (Yee 1996: 97).

While there is very little development of this line of thinking within the Political Communications literature on framing (see Entman 1993 & 2004), scholars working within the field of International Relations have sought to further theorise the media-policy relationship, and in particular the way foreign policies are often dependent upon the framing and representational practices that underpin them (see Doty 1993; Hansen 2006; Holland 2011). For example, in her analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines, Roxanne Lynn Doty has shown how key policies were made possible by mobilising certain identities,

endowing them with particular attributes, and then positioning them vis-à-vis one another within the policy literature. Here, Filipino subjects were portrayed as “inept”, “wasteful”, “disordered” or “child-like”, while the United States were constructed as a “noble” and “enlightened” nation, with “moral obligations” and “principles” (Doty 1993: 311). In doing so, however, such framing helped render U.S. policy in the Philippines not only conceivable, but also inevitable.

Jack Holland has further contributed our understanding of the relationship between framing and foreign policy processes by suggesting that in order for a particular policy to be rendered possible it must contain three analytical moments: it must be made “*conceivable, communicable and coercive*” (2011: 52). That means the framing process must first make a particular policy “thinkable” by constructing the various subjects, objects and identities contained within it via manifest *framing devices* (e.g. key words, metaphors, descriptive and evaluative attributes, visual symbols or imagery and subject positions) (see Berbers et al 2016: 802). Following this, subsequent frames then need to be communicated in ways that resonate or “mesh” with existing fears, identities and cultural symbols. As he explains,

[c]onstructing a set of interpretive dispositions — particular and contingent identities, meanings and relationships — is only enabling if those constructions are understood and accepted by a given population. Political possibility is not achieved in the utterance alone, but rather relies upon the *resonance* of particular narratives of foreign policy (Holland 2011: 53).

To accomplish this, frames must contain latent, culturally-resonant *reasoning devices* (e.g. problem definitions, causal interpretations or explanations, moral evaluations, etc.), which help to ensure that they are internalised and understood by the wider population (see Berbers et al 2016: 806). Though it is important to remember that frames do not have a universal, anesthetising effect on audiences, overall they serve to shape their awareness and understanding of events or political actors by providing a framework through which to view such phenomena, therefore obscuring alternative interpretations or “counter-frames”. For

Holland, the counteraction of opposing views constitutes the final analytical moment in the policy framing process, as it serves to ensure that a single frame dominates above all others, thus ensuring frame dominance (2011: 55-56).

Importantly, despite their differences, the parallels between Political Communications and International Relations approaches to framing are evident. Here, the core elements of the framing process identified above (namely, the role of events in establishing the initial enunciative and ideational limits, the influence of powerful groups and individuals, and, lastly, the cultural-resonance of the framing and reasoning devices on offer) map onto Holland's tripartite conceptualisation of the policy process. In particular, the specific circumstances surrounding an event and the presence of a unified group of speakers can increase the conceivability of a given policy response and, moreover, the likelihood that it will be reported on by news media. Likewise, the repeated use of a widely accepted set of cultural and cognitive cues when reporting on an issue greatly enhances its communicability and ability for audiences to accept such ways of seeing and speaking about the issues at stake. Finally, the combination of these three factors functions to ensure that a particular view achieves "frame dominance", as less space can be devoted to exploring counter-frames.

Methodology

With these perspectives in mind, the data analysed for this article was drawn from the U.K.'s three major broadcasters: namely, BBC1's "News at Ten" programme, ITV's 6:30pm "Evening News" bulletin and Channel 4's 7 o'clock "News" show. These channels were selected because of their standing within Britain's media environment, their popularity and viewer ratings, and because they represent a variety of news styles and funding models, ranging from conventional "public-service" and "commercial" broadcasting, as typified by the BBC1 and ITV, to the more "alternative/alternative-mainstream" style represented by Channel 4 (Cushion 2012). During

the period under analysis they respectively received nightly news audiences of around 5.7 million (BBC), 1.3 million (ITV), and 736,000 (Channel 4) (see Sweney 2015). The three week timeframe (November 13th – December 2nd 2015) was chosen, in the first instance, as it proved to be the most intensive and extensive period of media attention to the Paris attacks and the Islamic State. These dates were also selected, moreover, as they encompassed the House of Commons vote on extending British airstrikes to Islamic State positions in Syria. Due to a lack of political support for military intervention in Syria prior to these events (see Ralph et al 2013), the U.K. had largely limited its actions to launching airstrikes on Islamic State military facilities in Iraq or targeted drone strikes in the Caliphate (see BBC online 2015b). The events in Paris, therefore, helped reinforce official calls for intervention into the Syria conflict that had been made by the Cameron government over the course of 2015 (see BBC online 2015a & 2015c).

The analysis employed a mixed methods approach to framing and proceeded in the following stages. First, in order to facilitate close examination of visual and verbal elements, and their interplay (see Mitchell 1996), all bulletins were watched in their entirety and then transcribed verbatim using parallel columns for news language and imagery (see Ahmad 2018: 39-43, for a detailed explanation). Overall, 247 individual items were included in the corpus (BBC = 91; ITV = 63; Channel 4 = 93) which resulted in around 14 hours of continual news coverage. This included all bulletins focusing directly on the Paris attacks and the search of the perpetrators, alongside items centring on the Islamic State and the build-up to the House of Commons vote to extend U.K. airstrikes to Syria.

After initial piloting and “soaking” of the data (see Hall 1975), and in view of the research questions identified above, five variables were selected for further analysis: (1) the main speakers and sources shaping news media representations of the Islamic State and the Paris attackers; (2) the key words, descriptive and evaluative attributes or characteristics used to portray the perpetrators (e.g. “terrorists”, “attackers”, “gunmen”, “killers”, “fanatics”); (3)

their actions (e.g. “terror attacks”, “a killing spree”, “callous and brutal crimes”); (4) the possible aims and motives used to explain the Paris attacks (e.g. to “create chaos, disorder and fear” in Europe or in retaliation for “air-strikes against Islamic State targets”); and, finally, (5) the images used to portray Islamic State or the Paris attackers (e.g. scenes from propaganda videos, passport photographs, CCTV footage). This final variable was chosen because images are central to the framing process (Parry 2010), helping to capture attention and evoke particular memories and emotions in audiences (Domke et al 2002; Gadarian 2010; Bleiker et al 2013). More specifically, in focusing on both the visual and verbal elements of the framing process this helps increase our understanding of the way word and image often work hand-in-hand to secure particular frames.

Following this, the second stage of the analysis moved to focus in greater detail on qualitatively identifying the frames used to construct the Islamic State. Here, particular attention centred on the manifest framing devices (e.g. key words, metaphors, descriptive and evaluative attributes, visual images, etc.) and more latent, culturally-salient reasoning devices (e.g. problem definitions, causal interpretations or explanations, moral evaluations, etc.) appearing within the coverage (after Berbers et al 2016). The primary units of analysis consisted of all words or images making reference to, or depicting, the Islamic State and Paris attackers. This this helped identify the basic clusters of language (both visual and verbal) used by the various speakers to frame Islamic State and thus secure meaning for audiences. Inspired by Barney Glasser and Anselm Strauss’s grounded theory approach (1967; see also Birks & Mills 2011), throughout the analysis emerging coding categories were continually compared to one another in order to see if they could be logically grouped into overarching, theoretically-informed frames (see also Smith et al 2016: 43). To strengthen the analysis, intercoder reliability tests were applied to 15% of all news broadcasts by a second coder. Coding categories were further refined via an iterative process that involved short periods of coding

followed by detailed discussion between both coders and then possible reassessment of each category (Parker et al 2018). The process went on until consensus was reached for all categories.

Dominant Speakers and Patterns of Framing

As might be expected, the Paris attacks dominated coverage on all three broadcasters during the period under analysis, appearing first in the running order for the two weeks after the event, with two brief exceptions following a terror attack in Bamako, Mali and an incident involving the downing of a Russian fighter jet in Syria by Turkish forces. Although the issue of U.K. airstrikes was initially reported on as early as November 15th (see BBC, November 15th), around the third week of coverage attention begins to shift onto the House of Commons vote. In terms of the main speakers and sources responsible for framing the Islamic State during this time, eight broad categories are identified in the coverage, with journalists constituting the largest (33.7%), politicians and (named and unnamed) government sources identified as the second (32.1%), members of the public making up the third (16.7%), representatives of the police, security and legal domains ranking fourth (8.0%), and the Islamic State itself functioning as fifth within the sample (3.0%). Other categories of speaker include academics (2.8%) and military officials (2.0%). Despite significant changes in Britain's media landscape (Chadwick 2017), these initial findings show that journalists continue to play a central, gatekeeping role in selecting, filtering, interpreting and packaging knowledge about terrorism for audiences (see Picard & Adams 1987), with other "elite" groups in positions of social and political power also given a major role in defining the parameters of debate (see Matthews 2014; Larsen 2018). As the following sections reveal, however, when discussing the Islamic State these speakers and sources tend to invoke one of three competing frames; labelled in the following sections as the "(Para)Military", the "Elusive" and "Extremist" frames. As we shall

see, while conceptually distinct, and thus discussed separately, it should be clear that the boundaries separating these frames are not fixed or permanent, but rather are in a state of flux, with one frame feeding into, or interacting with, the next.

[INSERT CHART 1 HERE – see appendix]

The “(Para)Military” frame

Comprising 49.7% of the total number of framing and reasoning devices, the most common way of viewing the Islamic State in the coverage is described here as the “(Para)Military” frame (see Hülse & Spencer 2008; Smith et al 2016; Courty et al 2019). Within this frame, the Islamic State is portrayed as an external, paramilitary-style organisation that, while motivated by religious factors, justifies its actions principally by way of secular concerns such as the impact of French air-strikes on its territory. Notably, while journalists tend to be the main advocates of this frame ($n = 1,160$), politicians and government sources ($n = 271$), and police, security and legal officials ($n = 67$) form the second and third largest categories of speaker, with academics ($n = 27$), military officials ($n = 13$) and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Islamic State itself ($n = 19$) also appearing as key frame advocates.

The “(Para)Military” frame is first evident in the manifest framing devices used to portray the Islamic State as a hierarchical, state-like entity, that is “sophisticated” (Channel 4, November 14th), “well-staffed” and “well organised” (ITV, November 16th), with a centralised “leadership” (BBC1, November 30th), “militarised structure” (Channel 4, November 17th) and a clear “command-and-control” system (Channel 4, December 2nd). As if to further reinforce the image of a formidable and highly organised enemy, the Islamic State is described as being made up of “teams” (BBC1, November 14th; Channel 4, November 14th; ITV, November 15th) of “fighters” (Channel 4, November 13th; BBC1, November 16th), conventional “forces” (Channel 4, November 13th; BBC1, November 15th), “recruits” (BBC1, November 13th;

Channel 4, November 23rd), “militants” (BBC 1, November 15th ; Channel 4, November 13th; ITV, November 22nd), “operatives” (BBC1, November 16th; Channel 4, November 23rd), “scouts” (Channel 4, November 21st), “gunmen” (BBC1, November 13th; ITV, November 14th; Channel 4, November 15th) and “suicide bombers” (BBC1, November 14th; ITV, November 16th; Channel 4, November 18th).

Drawing on the Islamic State’s own self-representation as a dangerous, formidable, state-like entity (see Zelin 2015; Anfinson 2019), these framing devices help to invoke deep, historical and culturally entrenched imaginings of enemy “Others”, such as those witnessed during the 2nd World War and Cold War eras, thus helping to maintain the belief that those dangers are *external* to the nation state. In fact, as Stuart Croft and Cerwyn Moore have shown (2010: 825), this particular framing is not unique to the Islamic State, and has actually been evident across different phases of the “war on terror” period, reflecting a broader “cultural proclivity to understand ‘threat[s]’ as centralized” and tightly controlled in nature.

As if to further support this view, there are also numerous characterisations within the coverage of the Islamic State as a territorially-expansive, albeit delegitimised, “proto-state”. Thus, it is portrayed as having a “de-facto” or “self-declared capital” in Raqqa, Syria (BBC1, November 15th; Channel 4, November 13th; ITV, November 26th), a designated “territory” under its control (BBC1, November 17th; Channel 4, November 19th; ITV, December 2nd), complete with “headquarters” (BBC1, November 17th; Channel 4, November 18th), “training-camps” (BBC1, November 15th; Channel 4, November 16th), “oil fields” (Channel 4, November 14th), “barracks” (ITV, December 2nd), “positions” (BBC1, November 17th; Channel 4, November 21st; ITV, December 2nd) and “strongholds” (BBC1, November 13th; Channel 4, November 17th; ITV, November 18th). As discussed in greater detail below, in framing the Islamic State precisely as an external *state*-like actor, this not only helps maintain existing ways

of viewing enemy “Others”, it also, as Rainer Hülse and Alexander Spencer point out (2008: 586), “automatically makes the use of one’s own military to confront the threat appear logical”.

Crucially, the “(Para)Military” frame is also reinforced visually through the appearance of a sequence of aggressive, militarised images and visual representations taken from the Islamic State’s own extensive propaganda output. While much of the literature on framing tends to overlook the role of visuals in the framing process (see Parry 2010; Rodriguez & Dimitrova 2011, for exceptions), according to David Domke et al (2002: 135-138), images are significant in that they serve to “trigger” networks of interconnected cognitive structures, “thus helping to “*spur and strengthen* existing beliefs or memories in news audiences”. Word and image, therefore, work hand-in-hand to secure particular frames (see Mitchell 1996). In this regard, the repeated appearance of propaganda images denoting large groups of fighters dressed in military uniforms, marching and carrying weapons or banners serves to further the sense that the Islamic State is a highly organised, state-like threat, made up of conventional military “recruits” and disciplined “fighters”. These images also appear alongside scenes of armoured convoys of tanks and pick-up trucks driving through “liberated” Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities (see Figure 1), which reinforce the belief that the Islamic State is a territorially-expansive force in control of large swathes of land. Specifically, out of a total of 298 images, 24.8% ($n = 74$) portrayed the Islamic State in such a manner. As with the verbal framing devices discussed above, such images draw upon the Islamic State’s own visual self-representation as a far-reaching, destructive and formidable military force (see Zelin 2015; Anfinson 2019), therefore helping to further animate culturally-ingrained constructions of the kinds of large-scale threats and dangers seen in war-time propaganda throughout history (see Spillman & Spillmann 1997; Robin 2001; Merskin 2004; Zelizer 2018).

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

The “Elusive” frame

As the search for the perpetrators and their accomplices unfolds, we begin to see the emergence of another, more “Elusive” way of seeing and speaking about the threat appear within the coverage. Constituting 24.8% of all framing and reasoning devices ($n = 803$), here Islamic State and the Paris attackers are imagined in much more fluid and ambiguous terms; as a simultaneously internal *and* external threat, made up of unknown numbers of individuals. While previous studies have adopted a range of labels to make sense of this phenomenon, from the “Other-as-Self” (Hutchings & Miazhevich 2009) or home-grown “Double” (Szpunar 2015), to the “stranger” (Combes 2016) or “Trojan Horse” threat (Englund & Stohl 2017), the term “Elusive” is adopted here (after Ahmad 2016, 2018 & 2019) to reflect the radical uncertainty and ambiguity invoked by this figure. The “Elusive” frame simultaneously blurs the distinction between inside and outside, belonging and unbelonging, normality and deviance, visibility and invisibility, constituting an almost ghost-like threat within contemporary, multicultural societies. Interestingly, while journalists constitute the main advocates of such a view ($n = 584$), in contrast to the “(Para)Military” frame, notably members of the public are identified as the second most prominent frame advocates ($n = 78$), with politicians and government sources ($n = 60$), police, security and legal officials ($n = 48$), and academics ($n = 16$) also mobilising this view.

The “Elusive” frame is first apparent in the ambiguity over the identity of Islamic State operatives, alongside the wider blurring of boundaries between “inside” and “outside” of France and Europe. This can be seen, for instance, in the mixing of insider/outsider cultural codes when describing the Paris attackers and those comprising Islamic State’s foreign ranks. Thus, we see the appearance of a series of conflicting framing devices describing the attackers as both “EU citizens” (BBC1, November 19th), “Belgian-national[s]” (BBC, November 16th; ITV, November 16th) or “French/French-speaking” (ITV, November 14th; Channel 4,

November 16th), but also as “multinational” citizens (ITV, November 16th) of “Moroccan” (BBC, November 16th; ITV, November 16th) or “Algerian-descent” (Channel 4, November 15th). This uncertainty is further evident in statements such as “they were *inside*, it is a 5th column” (Channel 4, November 14th, emphasis added), or, moreover, that the Paris attacks “were planned, organised and prepared from the *outside*, and with accomplices from the *inside*” (BBC1, November 14th, emphasis added), alongside wider speculation that Islamic State “cells” (BBC1, November 14th; ITV, November 14th; Channel 4, November 17th) are potentially “active in France, in Belgium at least in Europe, possibly the UK and Germany too” (Channel 4, November 18th). In so doing, the threat posed by the Islamic State is viewed in liminal terms; as one that exists at the frontier between the “Self” and “Other”, or between Europe and the wider, imagined geography of “the East”.

Above all, however, the “Elusive” nature of the threat is especially prominent in a chain of manifest framing devices indicating the fleeting, almost ghost-like, nature of the Islamic State and Paris attacks suspects. This can be seen, for instance, in repeated references to the fact that the attackers “escaped” (ITV, November 15th; Channel 4, November 15th) or “vanished” from the scene (BBC1, November 20th), that they remain “undetected” (BBC1, November 19th), “invisible” (Channel 4, November 20th) and “unseen” (ITV, November 22nd), that they are still “missing” (ITV, November 17th; Channel 4, November 19th; BBC1, November 20th), “on the loose” (Channel 4, November 14th), “hid[ing] among civilians” (ITV, December 1st), or, perhaps more ominously, that “weren’t alone” in their movements across Europe (BBC1, November 16th). On a similar level, these framing devices are further supplemented by recurrent speculation that the Paris attackers included “refugee[s]” in their ranks (BBC1, November 14th; ITV, November 14th; Channel 4, November 14th) or, perhaps more worryingly, that some were “*disguised* as” or “*pretended* to be refugees” (BBC, November 17th, emphasis added). Here, the “Elusive” frame is further supported via claims

that the attackers had “come from different countries” (BBC1, November 14th), “entered” (BBC1, November 20th; Channel 4, November 14th), “travelled through” (Channel 4, November 14th; BBC1, November 16th; ITV, November 19th) or, in the case of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, “could move from Syria to Europe, apparently *at will*” (Channel 4, November 20th, emphasis added). As noted above, these patterns of framing help to further the levels of uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the Islamic State by amplifying fear that hidden among the many refugees travelling across Europe and the Middle East are terrorists primed to attack Western nations.

As regards the visual components to this frame, here we see the appearance of a series of images that further emphasise the levels of uncertainty and elusively surrounding the Islamic State and the Paris attackers. Constituting around 35.9% (N=107) of all images appearing within the coverage, the “Elusive” frame features images associated with both the private/domestic realm, such as school portrait and family album-style photographs, and home video footage, which serve to strengthen the notion that the Islamic State constitutes a ghost-like threat within European society (see Figure 2). In contrast to the previous frame, here the threat tends to be individualised as lone suspects, with news items presenting audiences with images of seemingly “ordinary” members of French and Belgian multicultural society. When pictured alongside the portraits of the actual victims it is difficult to visually distinguish the two. Indeed, this notion is further supported in the repeated references to apparent the normality of the attackers, and Islamic State fighters more generally, where we see descriptions of them as “young” (Channel 4, November 13th; ITV, November 14th), “normal” (BBC1, November 13th; Channel 4, November 13th), “quiet” (BBC1, November 13th; Channel 4, November 13th), “ordinary” (BBC1, November 13th) and “unassuming” (Channel 4, November 13th).

Significantly, appearing alongside these more private and domestic forms of imagery are instances of, what Mette Mortensen refers to as, “surveillance representations” (2019);

namely, mugshot or ID photographs, silhouette-style images and CCTV footage of the attackers. Whilst typically made sense of through frames centring on notions of criminality and deviance (see Machin & Mayr 2013), these images have been included as part of the “Elusive” frame due to the way they provide a powerful visual reminder of the shadowy, almost phantom-like, presence that Islamic State operatives pose within European society (see Ahmad 2018). As numerous social theorists have shown, it is precisely this “diffuse, scattered, unclear, unattached, unanchored, [and] free floating” sense of uncertainty that characterises our relationship with modern terror threats (Bauman 2006: 2). Or, in the words of Slavoj Žižek (2002: 38), today we are “encircled by an invisible Enemy who is mainly heard and seen only in the guise of sleeting shadows and blurred appearances”.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

The “Extremist” frame

The final frame identified in the analysis is labelled here as the “Extremist” frame. This way of seeing and speaking about the Islamic State comprises 23.8% of all framing and reasoning devices ($n = 772$), and is typically invoked when attempting to explain the overall aims and motives behind the Paris attacks. In particular, the “Extremist” frame portrays the Islamic State as an *external*, inherently evil entity primarily driven by extremist religious motives and an inherent hatred of “Western” culture. Drawing on a rich tradition of cultural stereotypes and media portrayals of “the East” and Islam (see Said 1978 & 1997), this category is mainly called into play by journalists ($n = 457$), politicians and government sources ($n = 186$), with members of the public ($n = 69$), representatives of the police, security and legal domains ($n = 20$), military officials ($n = 11$) and academics ($n = 9$) also identified as key advocates.

Invoking a series of stock enmification tropes (see Steuter & Wills (2010), the “Extremist” frame first manifests itself in a string of dehumanising framing devices portraying Islamic State and the Paris attackers as “evil” (BBC1, November 13th; Channel 4, November

16th; ITV, November 23rd), “inhuman” (BBC1, November 15th; Channel 4, November 17th), “barbaric” (BBC1, November 13th; Channel 4, November 16th), “menacing” (Channel 4, November 13th), “monsters” (ITV, November 16th; BBC1, December 2nd; Channel 4, December 2nd), who are simultaneously “poisonous” (BBC1, November 16th), “extreme” (BBC1, November 14th; ITV, November 26th; Channel 4, December 2nd) or “callous” (BBC1, November 16th), and who seek to “wreak carnage” (BBC1, November 17th), carry out “appalling massacres”, “foul atrocities” (Channel 4, November 16th), “mass executions” (BBC1, November 15th) or “acts of depravity” (BBC1, November 16th). These simplistic stereotypes are reinforced by allusions to the psychological status of Islamic State fighters, with terms such as “psychopaths” (ITV, November 14th) or “sociopaths” employed (Channel 4, November 16th) alongside statements pointing to the fact that the Paris attack perpetrators carried out their violence with “terrifying calm” (Channel 4, November 13th; BBC1, November 14th; ITV, November 14th) and “horrifying calculation” (BBC1, November 14th).

As regards reasoning devices, moreover, the Islamic State is primarily portrayed in culturally and morally differentiated terms, as practicing “a kind of medieval and modern fanaticism” or “a new [kind of] barbarism” (BBC1, November 14th), and is imagined more simply as a “death-cult” (BBC, November 17th) or “a threat to civilization”, more broadly (Channel 4, November 18th). Although we should be clear that there are clear attempts to distance this phenomenon from the wider Muslim community in France, the “Extremist” frame is further sustained through a series of guarded references to Islam and religious extremism. Thus, we see repeated descriptions of the Islamic State as forming a “sect” (Channel 4, November 16th), made up of “followers” (ITV, November 16th), “Islamists” (BBC1, November 15th; Channel 4, November 17th), “Islamic extremists” (BBC1, November 16th) and “Islamic radicals” (Channel 4, November 14th), or, most frequently, as “Jihadis(ts)” (BBC1, November 15th; ITV, November 16th; Channel 4, November 22nd). As Richard Jackson has noted (2007: 421), these labels not

only draw upon a long tradition of reductive stereotypes portraying Muslims as inherently violent, fanatical and bloodthirsty, they also serve to silence the grievances of groups such as the Islamic State and obscure the possibility that its terrorism is a response to specific Western policies. This is by no means to justify the Paris attacks, or the Islamic State's wider violence in Iraq, Syria and beyond, but instead to acknowledge the fact that there is a political context to its terrorism.

Finally, turning to the images appearing within this frame, significantly 39.2% of all visual representations were identified as part of the "Extremist" frame ($n = 117$), thus forming the largest category of images within the coverage. As with the "Elusive" frame, these images tend to personalise and individualise the threat posed by the Islamic State, centring attention onto lone fighters and operatives who are often pictured making statements while holding copies of the Koran or Islamic State banners (see Figure 3). As indicated earlier, news images work alongside spoken language to reinforce and secure frames by invoking pre-existing beliefs and cultural imaginings (after Domke et al 2002: 134). And in calling into play a host of images that culturally-resonate with broader notions of fanaticism and religious extremism they therefore help to powerfully visualise the verbal framing and reasoning devices identified above. In addition, and drawing on a long history of cultural representations of terror threats as "faceless, anonymous, homogenous" masked extremists (Mitchell 2011: 17), many of the images identified in this category feature individuals wearing balaclavas to hide their identity. Such imagery helps to further "Other" the Islamic State threat by containing the abstract notion of the "extremist" in a familiar, yet unsettling, category of representation (see Ahmad 2017).

[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]

Discussion

As Scott Englund and Michael Stohl have recently pointed out (2017: 209), despite their conflicting nature, the various frames attributed to the Islamic State can each be viewed as

“facets of a singular phenomenon”, with each construction reflecting broader aspects of the group’s social and political “reality”. But the point of this analysis is not to say that one frame is more truthful, or accurate, than the others. Rather, it is to understand the factors that give rise to such shifting patterns of framing, and, importantly, their broader effects. Put simply, why is it that the “(Para)Military” frame is so prominent in the coverage when it is clear not only that there are other ways of imagining the Islamic State, but also that the majority of the perpetrators were themselves European citizens? Similarly, why is it that such a narrow range of sources and speakers dominate so much of the reporting during this period? And, perhaps most importantly, what consequences can be said to arise from adopting certain frames over and above others? That is, how do these competing imaginations of the Islamic State serve to render certain policies possible and others impossible?

Briefly returning to the conceptual framework outlined earlier, frames emerge out of the interplay between three competing elements: (1) the material constraints and situational dynamics surrounding an event; (2) the role of influential groups and individuals, who seek to impose their own interpretations onto those events and their perpetrators; and, finally, (3) the resonance of the various framing and reasoning devices used to portray, and thus bring meaning to, events and those involved. These key components of the framing process, furthermore, connect with the three analytical moments in the policy process, as outlined by Holland (2011: 52), helping to render certain policy frames “*conceivable, communicable and coercive*”.

In this regard, one of the most significant factors shaping the framing of the Islamic State is the sheer scale and character of the Paris attacks themselves. Specifically, the highly coordinated and organised nature of the strikes, the use of military weaponry and tactics by the perpetrators, such as Kalashnikov assault rifles and suicide bombings, and the high number of victims functions to limit the framing and reasoning devices on offer, thus making a militarised conception of the threat appear more plausible. In fact, the very aims and motives put forward

by the Islamic State in its initial claim of responsibility, where they justified these acts as revenge for “[air]strikes against Muslims in the lands of the Caliphate” (see Jocelyn 2015), further stands to support the emerging “(Para)Military” frame and enable the first speakers to describe these incidents as “acts of war” (BBC1, November 14th; Channel 4, November 14th; ITV, November 14th). While this in itself does not make an aggressive foreign policy response conceivable, it does, in the words of Doty (1993: 314), help “frame interpretive possibilities, create meanings and thereby naturalize a particular state of affairs”. As can be seen in Chart 2, the “(Para)Military” frame quickly emerges as the dominant way of seeking and speaking about the Islamic State, and remains so throughout the period under analysis.

[INSERT CHART 2 HERE]

While the specific characteristics and dynamics underpinning the Paris attacks are important for establishing the initial boundaries of such frames, however, they also help determine *who* gets to speak about the Islamic State, and *which* speakers and sources are deemed to be legitimate and authoritative. As we have seen, politicians and government officials quickly emerge as the second most prominent category of speaker, after journalists, making up 32.1% (n = 203) of the total range of speakers appearing across the period under analysis. Steven Livingston & W. Lance Bennett have described this as a process of “reinstitutionalisation”, whereby a narrow range of elite speakers move to “recapture control” of the framing process and impose their own preferred interpretation onto events. As they explain (2003: 376-377), when random, unscripted events take place, “the one predictable component of [news] coverage is the presence of official sources”, who aim to influence the way various groups and individuals involved are portrayed. Existing research shows, moreover, that such groups tend to adopt more ominous, martial, and often sensationalised language when talking about terror threats (see Jackson 2005; Woods 2007; Bogain 2019), thus further increasing the conceivability of an aggressive, military response. This is not to downplay the

presence of other categories of speaker, such as members of the public, who do receive prominent attention in the immediate aftermath of these incidents. But as representatives of the “institutions or organisations that traditionally wield power in society” (Matthews 2013: 298), politicians and government officials are also socially and culturally invested with the status of authority and legitimacy (Foucault 1974: 50-51), and therefore best positioned to take control of the framing process and communicate their preferred policy responses.

Nevertheless, the most lasting frames are not simply those that are shaped by monumental events and promoted by influential social and political groups, but also, those which invoke powerful symbols, narratives and culturally-resonant framing and reasoning devices. In this regard, the “(Para)Military” frame becomes even more conspicuous and communicable in the way it echoes one of the most enduring myths of the Cold War era; namely, the reduction of large-scale, complex threats to the actions of a single, external, collectivised enemy “Other” (see Robin 2001; Croft & Moore 2010). The construction of Islamic State, described above, as a “sophisticated”, “well-organised” entity, with a centralised “leadership” and “command-and-control” structure, that has its own “headquarters”, “training camps” and “barracks”, and oversees large numbers of “recruits”, “forces” and “operatives” serves to invoke deep, culturally ingrained imaginings of the kinds of conventional, state-like threats faced by Britain and its allies in earlier conflicts. Barbie Zelizer refers to this powerful cultural trope as “Cold War mindedness” (2018: 139), describing it as a “repressed memory waiting to pounce into relevance” in the aftermath of a sudden terror attack, providing journalists, politicians and other categories of speaker with “a set of interpretive tenets for making sense of the complex and ambiguous violence of contemporary public life”.

Perhaps most importantly, such heightened cultural and political resonance functions to imbue the “(Para)Military” frame with significant levels of explanatory appeal, as it helps mitigate the fear and uncertainty present in the immediate aftermath of the Paris attacks, and,

thus, contain the threat within a simplified and culturally familiar enemy image. In so doing, this imagination of the Islamic State helps to externalise and project the danger outwards, rather than inwards, thus serving to re-establish the boundaries of national identity that the (predominantly European) attackers had called into question. As Ariane Bogain makes clear (2019: 242), the figure of the terrorist functions as “an enabling other... facilitating both the re-assertion of a national self, and the creation of an enemy from whom the state has to protect the in-group, thereby justifying its existence”.

Despite this, however, while the “(Para)Military” frame emerges as the dominant way of imagining the Islamic State during this period, when it comes to the reasoning devices used to explain its violence, it is important to note that these do not appear with anywhere near the same level of frequency as other framing categories. Specifically, over the course of the three weeks of reporting there are just 37 references to the Islamic State’s aims and grievances within the “(Para)Military” frame, compared to 111 for the “Extremist” and 28 for the “Elusive” frames. In this regard, although comprised of a different set of framing and reasoning devices, the appearance of the “Extremist” frame serves to supplement the dominant “(Para)Military” frame by providing audiences with a powerful, and culturally-resonant, explanation for the Paris attacks. According to this view, these events are understood to be less a result of French airstrikes in the Caliphate, and more a consequence of the Islamic State’s irrational hatred of Western values and culture. As Chart 2 reveals, as coverage of the debate to extend U.K. airstrikes to Syria intensifies, so too does the presence of the “(Para)Military” and “Extremist” frames.

By the same token, moreover, this also explains why the “Elusive” frame slowly begins to fade from the coverage after the first week of reporting, as it can be considered too damaging to the delicate social fabric in the aftermath of these incidents. While perhaps more reflective of the day-to-day “reality” of the Paris attackers, and the identities of Islamic State fighters

more broadly, the presence of the “Elusive” frame serves to forcefully destabilise the social, political and culturally-ingrained boundaries that separate the (non-terrorist) “Self” from the (terrorist) “Other” (see also Ahmad 2016 & 2018).

In fact, it is here where the interplay between the “(Para)Military” and “Extremist” frames can be understood to be at their most effective. As indicated earlier, while we should express caution at the suggestion that there is a direct, causal relationship between media frames and policy responses, frames help to create the emerging meaning structures through which a given set of responses are made conceivable, thinkable and thus politically possible. And one of the most powerful ways of “selling” a foreign policy is by constructing frames that are directly linked to notions of national identity and myth. In Holland’s words (2011: 55),

[w]hen foreign policy, along with events perceived to be linked to international affairs, are articulated in ways that invoke a particular (and often widely shared and accepted) understanding of the national Self, it becomes particularly difficult to challenge the basic assumptions upon which any foreign policy debate would take place.

In this sense, the construction of the Islamic State as both an external, highly organised, *and* (culturally) threatening enemy thus helps legitimise the emerging political consensus surrounding the issue of extending British air-strikes to its targets in Syria. As research by Gadarian has shown, when citizens are exposed to “threatening information and evocative [news] imagery” in the aftermath of a large-scale terror attack, this increases “the public’s probability of supporting the hawkish policies advocated by political leaders” (2010: 469), therefore making them appear legitimate, common-sense responses to those events. Correspondingly, studies have also shown how connecting terrorism with Islam and religious extremism can further stand to elevate threat perceptions and hence result in higher risk judgements in news audiences (see Woods 2011). Though this is not to say that audiences will accept these frames equally or their inferred policy recommendations, their dominance within the coverage, and in particular the way they render other ways of seeing and speaking about

the threat socially problematic, helps make other potential policy outcomes seem redundant by comparison. As Holland makes clear (2011: 63),

[i]t is not only necessary for practitioners to frame a conceivable and communicable foreign policy, it must also be coercive of potential oppositional voices [and frames], acquiescing them to accept a position they might otherwise contest.

Conclusion

This article has sought to consider the imagined threat posed by the Islamic State in the aftermath of the Paris attacks and during the build-up to the December 2nd 2015 House of Commons vote to extend U.K. airstrikes to Syria. Focusing on the competing frames used to stabilise and bring meaning to this entity, the analysis has shown *how* the Islamic State threat has been portrayed for U.K. television audiences, *who* shapes those frames, and *what* consequences arise from adopting certain frames over and above others. Despite being based on a relatively small sample, and focusing on a single event, the article highlights important findings relevant to the emerging scholarly literature on the Islamic State threat, the contemporary media-state-terror relationship, and the broader relationship between framing and foreign policy formation in the context of the Syria conflict.

As we have seen, though audiences are presented with a range of competing frames in the aftermath of these incidents, the dominance of the “(Para)Military” frame across the coverage, not to mention its mobilisation by journalists, politicians and government sources, alongside representatives of the police, security and legal domains, stands to reinforce long-standing academic debates claiming that news coverage of terrorism tends to be kept within tight, “elite-legitimated” boundaries (after Hallin 1986). In this respect, the findings add to previous analysis of television news coverage of al-Qaeda (Ahmad 2016), and recent studies focusing on print reportage of the Islamic State threat (see Smith et al 2016; Boyle & Mower 2019; Courty et al 2019), shedding much-needed light on both the visual and verbal dimensions

of these portrayals, revealing how certain frames are selected over and above others, and how the various frames interact to make foreign policies appear more conceivable. The analysis also strengthens research by Gadarian (2010 & 2014), which focuses more on public perceptions of threats rather than their cultural imaginations. Likewise, the analysis supports research focusing on the way elite groups move “recapture” control over the framing process in the immediate aftermath of a terror event (Livingston & Bennett 2003), showing precisely *how* this process takes shape: first, quantitatively, in the way politicians and government sources emerged as the second largest category of speaker, after journalists themselves, and second, qualitatively, by demonstrating how culturally resonant framing and reasoning devices are employed to cement the meaning of the Islamic State. Much more so than that, however, the analysis outlined here further helps bring into dialogue Political Communications and International Relations scholarship focusing on the interplay between media and policy framing processes in the aftermath of large-scale terrorist attacks. As discussed above, there are clear parallels between the various components of the framing and policy formation process, with each analytical moment complementing and strengthening the other.

And yet, while the focus here is on domestic reporting, questions remain about how these patterns of framing played out on international broadcasters such as France24, RT or Al Jazeera? Indeed, how did news audiences negotiate these frames in the aftermath of the Paris attacks? As noted, previous research on citizens’ perceptions of terror threats has shown how news coverage can increase support for expansive foreign policies (Gadarian 2010 & 2014), and others have shown how exposure to news coverage of terrorism increases fear and anxiety in audiences (Slone & Shoshani 2010), but we know very little about how this process has played out since the emergence of the Islamic State threat. This ongoing research is of considerable importance because even if the Islamic State dissolves and disappears, like many believed al-Qaeda did before it, if current geopolitical trends tell us anything it is that the threat

posed by so-called “Islamic” terrorism is not going to go away anytime soon, and we need to better understand the way imagined threats help enable an ever-expanding and hegemonic foreign policy agenda.

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Figures and tables

Chart 1: Dominant frames used to portray Islamic State and the Paris attackers (p.12)




Chart 2: Contestation between “(Para)Military”, “Elusive” and “Extremist” frames (p. 20)





Figure 1: Images appearing within the “(Para)Military” frame (p.14-15)



(See BBC1, November 17th, 26th, 27th, 30th & December 2nd; ITV, November 16th & December 2nd; Channel 4, November 14th & December 1st)

Figure 2: Images appearing within the “Elusive” frame (p. 17)



(See BBC1, November 13th, 14th & 15th; Channel 4, November 18th & 24th)

Figure 3: Images appearing within the “Extremist” frame (p. 19)



(See BBC1, November 13th; ITV, November 16th; Channel 4, November 16th & 17th).