

This is a repository copy of *Making Peace or Preventing It? UN Peacekeeping, Terrorism, and Civil War Negotiations*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:

<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/166498/>

Version: Accepted Version

Article:

Hinkkainen Elliott, Kaisa Helena, Polo, Sara and Reyes, Liana (2020) Making Peace or Preventing It? UN Peacekeeping, Terrorism, and Civil War Negotiations. *International Studies Quarterly*. sqaa078. ISSN 1468-2478

<https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa078>

Reuse

Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item.

Takedown

If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.

Online appendix for

Making Peace or Preventing It? UN Peacekeeping, Terrorism, and Civil War Negotiations

Kaisa Hinkkainen Elliott¹, Sara M.T. Polo², and Liana Eustacia Reyes³

¹University of York

²University of Essex

³Rice University

The first part of the supplementary appendix provides additional descriptive information about the data and variables. Table 4 provides summary statistics of all the variables used in the the main analysis as well as in this appendix.

The unconditional models for soft targets and soft target ratio variables are provided in Table 5 of the appendix. This table also includes the replication of the successful attack results from Thomas (2014) (Model 4) and the subsequent interaction model (5).

The next section of the appendix includes the robustness tests for our main model specifications, followed by a discussion on the instrumental variable approach with additional variables. The final section of the supplementary appendix includes Tables 18-28, which are replicates of the robustness check Tables 6 & 8-16, but with the full sample specification instead of the matched sample. The penultimate table in the appendix employs mixed effects logit to the full sample in order to control for dyad-specific heterogeneity (Table 29), and as with all of our models, the results remain unchanged.

The final table (30) in the appendix lists the conflict dyads in our data that experience UN troop deployments.

Table 4: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Negotiations	0.118	0.323	0	1	3416
Terrorist Attacks	0.315	1.645	0	48	3416
Soft Targets	0.228	0.797	0	13	3416
Hard Targets	0.082	1.329	0	46	3416
Soft Target Ratio	0.042	0.156	0	1	3416
UN Troops (in 1000)	0.501	2.584	0	29.209	3416
Rebel Relative Strength	1.86	0.661	1	5	3318
Third Party Mediation	0.594	0.491	0	1	3278
Main Group	0.761	0.426	0	1	3416
Explicit Support	0.453	0.498	0	1	3318
Regime Type	-2.774	3.779	-8	8	3032
ln(Deaths)	5.372	1.515	3.219	9.397	3282
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	2.371	2.586	0	8.759	2943
Number of Conflict Episodes	1.37	0.84	1	6	3416
Episode Duration	35.681	38.536	1	192	3416
Ethnic War	0.74	0.439	0	1	2841
Number of Rebel Groups	1.754	0.763	1	4	3416
ln(GDP)	22.467	1.393	19.107	25.865	3234
Time Since Last Negotiation	19.204	30.294	0	192	3416
Territorial War	0.205	0.404	0	1	3292
PKO Deployment	0.085	0.278	0	1	3416
Child Soldiers	0.851	0.356	0	1	3365
Successful Attacks	0.262	1.694	0	49	3416
ln(Govt One Sided Violence)	1.793	2.592	0	13.122	2943
Battle Events	3.023	5.81	0	67	3416
Battle Deaths	52.203	358.881	0	9082	3416
Cumulative Negotiations	4.603	8.637	0	59	3416
Any Previous Negotiations	0.451	0.498	0	1	3416
Time Since Last Negotiation ²	1286.267	4152.107	0	36864	3416
Time Since Last Negotiation ³	140447.623	651540.666	0	7077888	3416
Ceasefire	0.181	0.385	0	1	3341
Partial Peace Agreement	0.006	0.08	0	1	3416
PKO Duration	1.14	5.131	0	56	3416
Spatial Lag	0.124	0.644	0	14	3416
Cumulative Terrorism Count	2.029	8.176	0	191	3416
Weak Rebels	0.895	0.307	0	1	3341
Rebel Resources	0.327	0.469	0	1	3416
Terrorism Binary	0.133	0.34	0	1	3416

Table 5: Baseline and successful attack models

	Soft target baseline (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio baseline (Matched sample)	Successful attacks baseline (Matched sample)	Successful attacks interaction (Matched sample)
Soft Targets (t-1)	0.109 (0.67)			
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.278** (-2.41)	-0.260** (-2.44)	-0.274** (-2.39)	-0.384*** (-4.38)
Hard Targets (t-1)	0.304** (2.01)			
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)		0.538 (0.93)		
Successful Attacks (t-1)			0.208*** (3.36)	0.150*** (3.49)
Successful Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)				0.178*** (4.13)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.472* (1.90)	0.397* (1.76)	0.464* (1.93)	0.512** (2.26)
Third Party Mediation	1.625*** (2.75)	1.670*** (2.86)	1.611*** (2.63)	1.612*** (2.71)
Main Group	-0.171 (-0.42)	-0.151 (-0.37)	-0.161 (-0.40)	-0.191 (-0.48)
Explicit Support	0.258 (1.18)	0.305 (1.43)	0.258 (1.17)	0.257 (1.18)
Regime Type	0.127* (1.86)	0.112* (1.81)	0.124* (1.85)	0.147** (2.39)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0426 (-0.37)	-0.0289 (-0.25)	-0.0437 (-0.38)	-0.0555 (-0.50)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0614 (0.60)	0.0578 (0.56)	0.0633 (0.61)	0.0557 (0.55)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.440*** (-3.72)	-1.334*** (-4.09)	-1.393*** (-4.42)	-1.377*** (-4.44)
Episode Duration	0.00921*** (2.67)	0.00803** (2.34)	0.00922*** (2.63)	0.00943** (2.50)
Ethnic War	1.129* (1.68)	1.099* (1.70)	1.124* (1.70)	1.234** (2.00)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.263 (-1.04)	-0.295 (-1.25)	-0.261 (-1.03)	-0.270 (-1.03)
ln(GDP)	0.445** (2.33)	0.443** (2.39)	0.439** (2.30)	0.473** (2.55)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0637*** (-4.08)	-0.0655*** (-3.92)	-0.0650*** (-3.89)	-0.0635*** (-3.64)
_cons	-12.21*** (-2.72)	-12.12*** (-2.84)	-12.09*** (-2.73)	-12.83*** (-2.98)
N	1164	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Alternative violence regressions

	Battle events (Matched sample)	Battle deaths (Matched sample)	Rebel osv (Matched sample)	Govt osv (Matched sample)	Terrorism deaths (Matched sample)
Battle Events (t-1)	-0.0111 (-0.37)				
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.257 (-0.99)	-0.240* (-1.67)	0.251 (1.23)	-0.325*** (-2.89)	-0.446*** (-3.16)
Battle Events (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	-0.00929 (-0.17)				
Battle Deaths (t-1)		-0.00143* (-1.79)			
Battle Deaths (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		-0.00419 (-0.53)			
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence t-1)			0.0865 (0.83)		
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			-0.149*** (-3.67)		
ln(Deaths)			-0.0342 (-0.30)	-0.0242 (-0.26)	-0.0246 (-0.28)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)			0.174*** (2.85)	0.146*** (2.95)	
ln(Govt One Sided Violence t-1)				-0.0812 (-1.44)	
ln(Govt One Sided Violence t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)				0.0546 (0.93)	
Terrorism Deaths (t-1)					0.000968 (0.14)
Terrorism Deaths (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)					0.0309*** (4.05)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.403* (1.72)	0.399* (1.71)	0.489** (1.99)	0.441* (1.77)	0.463** (2.22)
Third Party Mediation	1.671*** (3.50)	1.691*** (3.38)	1.605*** (2.62)	1.801*** (2.82)	1.699*** (3.47)
Main Group	-0.184 (-0.38)	-0.139 (-0.31)	-0.196 (-0.46)	-0.225 (-0.61)	-0.241 (-0.64)
Explicit Support	0.271 (0.82)	0.280 (1.12)	0.267 (1.23)	0.444* (1.71)	0.315 (1.43)
Regime Type	0.129** (1.97)	0.129** (2.07)	0.129** (2.00)	0.141** (2.21)	0.154** (2.30)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.179*** (-4.59)	-1.273*** (-4.73)	-1.462*** (-4.12)	-1.514*** (-4.33)	-1.371*** (-5.21)
Episode Duration	0.00792** (2.34)	0.00815** (2.41)	0.0102*** (2.84)	0.00827*** (2.75)	0.00808** (2.19)
Ethnic War	1.179** (2.01)	1.150** (2.08)	1.281** (1.97)	1.314** (2.43)	1.291** (2.42)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.317 (-1.36)	-0.323 (-1.36)	-0.246 (-0.96)	-0.164 (-0.70)	-0.324 (-1.27)
ln(GDP)	0.437** (2.47)	0.461*** (2.66)	0.387* (1.95)	0.467** (2.47)	0.485*** (2.71)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0625*** (-3.10)	-0.0624*** (-3.40)	-0.0617*** (-3.86)	-0.0614*** (-3.77)	-0.0607*** (-3.32)
_cons	-11.98*** (-2.83)	-12.40*** (-2.96)	-11.27** (-2.41)	-12.66*** (-3.05)	-12.89*** (-3.15)
N	1164	1164	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Effect of UN troops on terrorism

	Terrorism binary (Full sample)	Number of terrorist attacks (Full sample)
UN Troops (t-1)	0.0789 (1.46)	0.127** (2.38)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.208 (0.70)	0.143 (0.49)
Main Group	0.0572 (0.15)	-0.112 (-0.36)
Explicit Support	-0.0917 (-0.25)	0.250 (0.67)
Regime Type	0.00524 (0.10)	-0.00181 (-0.03)
ln(Deaths)	0.268*** (3.17)	0.472*** (5.98)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.232*** (3.54)	0.212*** (3.60)
Number of Conflict Episodes	0.790** (2.49)	0.534*** (3.18)
Episode Duration	0.00509 (0.98)	-0.000944 (-0.13)
Ethnic War	-0.594* (-1.68)	-0.572 (-1.45)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.685*** (-2.61)	-0.777*** (-3.24)
ln(GDP)	0.420*** (3.64)	0.513*** (4.72)
Any Previous Negotiations	-0.191 (-0.49)	0.242 (0.70)
Territorial War	-1.542 (-1.29)	-0.652 (-1.20)
_cons	-13.36*** (-4.79)	-15.75*** (-5.83)
lnalpha		
_cons		1.346*** (4.61)
<i>N</i>	2283	2283

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Robustness checks

To test the robustness of our results, we run several alternative model specifications. First, we include a control variable for government one sided violence for our models in Table 8 and find that the inclusion does not alter our hypothesized relationship.

Second, the occurrence of negotiations could be affected by prior negotiations between the warring parties. Therefore, we test this by including a dummy control variable for any previous negotiation attempts (Model 1-3, Table 9). We also account for the cumulative number of previous negotiations (Models 4-6, Table 9) as well as taking into account the time since the last negotiation. Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we also generate cubic polynomials in the models for Table 10. The results are in line with our main models.

It is also possible that negotiation occurrences are driven by peace agreements and ceasefires by the warring parties. Since our unit of analysis is active conflict dyad-months, we cannot control for conflict ending peace agreements due to those dyads dropping out of our sample when conflicts terminate. Instead, we recode partial peace agreements from the conflict level to dyad-month level to see the effect these partial peace agreements have on the probability of negotiations (Harbom et al. 2006). Table 11 shows that regardless of partial peace agreements and ceasefires, our results remain unchanged. Table 12 illustrates the robustness of our results when dropping partial peace agreements from our data.

The duration of PKO presence in a country may impact our results, so we include a PKO duration control for our models in Table 13. In a similar vein, we investigate the effect of the number of terrorist attacks in the previous 12 months (while controlling for cubic polynomials, cumulative negotiations or any previous negotiations). In Table 14 we show that all substantive conclusions remain unchanged.

While all of our models include a control variable for the number of rebel groups in a given conflict, we also generate an alternative way to capture dependency between rebel groups. In Table 15, we estimate our results with a spatial lag of terrorist attacks by other rebel groups in the conflict and find that our original findings remain robust.

Finally, it is also plausible that the effect of rebel terrorism is specific to strong rebels in so far as the government would not be willing to negotiate with weak rebels, even if they use terrorism in the presence of UN troops. In order to test for such possibility we re-estimate our models on the sub-sample of weak rebel groups.¹ Table 16 shows that the results for the weak rebels' sub-sample are in line with our main models.

Figure 4 is a graphical illustration of the conflict in Mali. The visualization highlights that

¹We construct the sub-sample by creating a binary variable from the NSA dataset's ordinal variable of rebel strength, where we code rebels as weak if they are coded as weaker or much weaker in the original NSA variable (Cunningham et al. 2009).

even for an out of sample case such as Mali, the results are in line with our theoretical expectations.




Figure 4: Mali

Table 8: Government one sided violence models

	All attacks (Matched sample)	Soft targets (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.116*** (5.78)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.453*** (-3.74)	-0.460*** (-3.86)	-0.436*** (-3.58)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.182*** (4.70)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.0102 (-0.09)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.195*** (5.01)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.306** (1.98)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.300 (-0.64)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.729*** (4.56)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.515** (2.34)	0.522** (2.32)	0.442** (2.25)
Third Party Mediation	1.769*** (2.79)	1.778*** (2.95)	1.850*** (3.15)
Main Group	-0.194 (-0.52)	-0.191 (-0.51)	-0.158 (-0.41)
Explicit Support	0.411 (1.63)	0.406 (1.62)	0.499* (1.92)
Regime Type	0.148** (2.51)	0.150** (2.49)	0.131** (2.36)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0690 (-0.63)	-0.0715 (-0.66)	-0.0677 (-0.62)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0643 (0.66)	0.0648 (0.66)	0.0686 (0.71)
ln(Govt One Sided Violence)	-0.0636 (-1.08)	-0.0628 (-1.07)	-0.0822 (-1.26)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.569*** (-4.47)	-1.455*** (-3.68)	-1.425*** (-3.82)
Episode Duration	0.00887** (2.55)	0.00907*** (2.58)	0.00775** (2.30)
Ethnic War	1.362*** (2.64)	1.369*** (2.61)	1.371*** (2.74)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.187 (-0.80)	-0.188 (-0.80)	-0.191 (-0.82)
ln(GDP)	0.501*** (2.87)	0.499*** (2.84)	0.499*** (2.91)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0636*** (-3.89)	-0.0624*** (-3.91)	-0.0647*** (-3.75)
_cons	-13.48*** (-3.54)	-13.58*** (-3.53)	-13.50*** (-3.65)
N	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Cumulative and past negotiations regressions

	All terror (Matched sample)	Soft target (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio (Matched sample)	All terror (Matched sample)	Soft target (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.117*** (4.90)			0.117*** (5.11)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.454*** (-3.74)	-0.461*** (-3.86)	-0.437*** (-3.69)	-0.504*** (-4.07)	-0.511*** (-4.22)	-0.487*** (-3.93)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.178*** (4.61)			0.195*** (4.76)		
Cumulative Negotiations (t-1)	0.0302** (1.98)	0.0302** (1.99)	0.0300** (2.00)			
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.0150 (-0.12)			-0.0329 (-0.30)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.192*** (4.88)			0.210*** (5.10)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.282* (1.75)			0.371*** (2.61)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.166 (-0.39)			-0.224 (-0.56)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.702*** (4.65)			0.758*** (4.87)
Any Previous Negotiations (t-1)				1.391*** (3.33)	1.402*** (3.36)	1.401*** (3.43)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.469** (2.34)	0.478** (2.33)	0.394** (2.19)	0.700*** (3.46)	0.711*** (3.44)	0.624*** (3.16)
Third Party Mediation	1.518*** (2.68)	1.531*** (2.88)	1.564*** (2.92)	1.400*** (2.63)	1.424*** (2.90)	1.442*** (2.86)
Main Group	-0.137 (-0.37)	-0.134 (-0.37)	-0.104 (-0.28)	-0.250 (-0.67)	-0.244 (-0.66)	-0.215 (-0.56)
Explicit Support	0.430* (1.84)	0.428* (1.84)	0.478** (2.07)	0.0762 (0.38)	0.0698 (0.35)	0.127 (0.66)
Regime Type	0.154*** (2.88)	0.157*** (2.86)	0.138*** (2.65)	0.146** (2.48)	0.147** (2.48)	0.130** (2.23)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0998 (-0.80)	-0.103 (-0.84)	-0.0914 (-0.73)	-0.138 (-1.24)	-0.142 (-1.31)	-0.132 (-1.18)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0548 (0.55)	0.0553 (0.55)	0.0537 (0.54)	0.0751 (0.82)	0.0770 (0.83)	0.0741 (0.80)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-2.118*** (-6.24)	-1.983*** (-5.23)	-1.914*** (-6.06)	-2.202*** (-5.71)	-2.083*** (-4.85)	-2.020*** (-4.59)
Episode Duration	0.00354 (0.64)	0.00375 (0.67)	0.00243 (0.45)	0.00342 (1.00)	0.00361 (1.06)	0.00226 (0.65)
Ethnic War	1.141** (2.10)	1.152** (2.08)	1.114** (2.13)	1.001* (1.88)	1.007* (1.86)	0.978* (1.87)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.253 (-1.04)	-0.253 (-1.02)	-0.285 (-1.24)	-0.207 (-0.79)	-0.205 (-0.78)	-0.240 (-0.98)
ln(GDP)	0.435** (2.31)	0.434** (2.30)	0.428** (2.31)	0.553*** (3.43)	0.551*** (3.41)	0.541*** (3.36)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0529*** (-3.11)	-0.0517*** (-3.12)	-0.0545*** (-3.01)	-0.0337** (-1.99)	-0.0321** (-2.01)	-0.0344* (-1.94)
_cons	-10.97** (-2.54)	-11.11** (-2.56)	-10.86*** (-2.58)	-14.16*** (-3.92)	-14.28*** (-3.93)	-13.91*** (-3.89)
N	1164	1164	1164	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Cubic polynomial regressions

	All attacks (Matched sample)	Soft targets (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.114*** (3.35)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.414*** (-3.48)	-0.418*** (-3.58)	-0.397*** (-3.54)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.200*** (4.92)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.0477 (-0.58)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.215*** (5.71)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.376*** (2.61)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.470 (-1.05)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.800*** (4.72)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.642*** (4.09)	0.651*** (4.08)	0.569*** (3.92)
Third Party Mediation	1.406*** (2.89)	1.442*** (3.24)	1.441*** (3.19)
Main Group	-0.450 (-1.22)	-0.446 (-1.23)	-0.420 (-1.12)
Explicit Support	0.353* (1.73)	0.348* (1.72)	0.405** (2.00)
Regime Type	0.178*** (3.43)	0.179*** (3.44)	0.163*** (3.40)
ln(Deaths)	-0.00696 (-0.07)	-0.0104 (-0.11)	-0.00130 (-0.01)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0390 (0.45)	0.0407 (0.47)	0.0372 (0.43)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.132*** (-3.58)	-1.000*** (-3.17)	-0.933*** (-2.64)
Episode Duration	0.00821** (2.23)	0.00845** (2.26)	0.00708** (2.02)
Ethnic War	1.433*** (3.37)	1.439*** (3.35)	1.422*** (3.45)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.191 (-1.10)	-0.190 (-1.08)	-0.224 (-1.45)
ln(GDP)	0.426*** (3.00)	0.422*** (2.95)	0.414*** (3.01)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.258*** (-2.65)	-0.260*** (-2.64)	-0.274*** (-2.94)
Time Since Last Negotiation ²	0.00816 (1.40)	0.00841 (1.44)	0.00917* (1.69)
Time Since Last Negotiation ³	-0.0000605 (-0.74)	-0.0000640 (-0.79)	-0.0000750 (-1.00)
_cons	-12.06*** (-3.84)	-12.15*** (-3.83)	-11.79*** (-3.87)
N	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Ceasefires and partial peace agreements

	All terror Ceasefires (Matched sample)	Soft target Ceasefires (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio Ceasefires (Matched sample)	All terror Partial PA (Matched sample)	Soft target Partial PA (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio Partial PA (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.116*** (4.43)			0.126*** (5.23)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.484*** (-4.12)	-0.490*** (-4.23)	-0.476*** (-4.13)	-0.456*** (-3.87)	-0.462*** (-4.02)	-0.437*** (-3.75)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.184*** (4.84)			0.183*** (4.95)		
Ceasefire (t-1)	0.494 (1.51)	0.490 (1.50)	0.598* (1.76)			
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.00843 (-0.08)			-0.00205 (-0.02)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.197*** (5.12)			0.196*** (5.27)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.319** (2.02)			0.338** (2.32)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.271 (-0.69)			-0.183 (-0.44)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.737*** (4.87)			0.727*** (4.88)
Partial PA (t-1)				-0.396 (-1.04)	-0.406 (-1.07)	-0.429 (-1.09)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.373* (1.65)	0.382* (1.66)	0.276 (1.35)	0.535** (2.45)	0.543** (2.43)	0.460** (2.24)
Third Party Mediation	1.588*** (2.61)	1.605*** (2.81)	1.614*** (2.76)	1.616*** (2.70)	1.630*** (2.89)	1.657*** (2.93)
Main Group	0.0169 (0.05)	0.0183 (0.06)	0.0939 (0.28)	-0.208 (-0.54)	-0.204 (-0.53)	-0.175 (-0.44)
Explicit Support	0.190 (0.83)	0.187 (0.82)	0.228 (0.97)	0.274 (1.28)	0.271 (1.27)	0.323 (1.58)
Regime Type	0.120** (2.01)	0.122** (2.02)	0.100* (1.78)	0.155*** (2.59)	0.157** (2.57)	0.140** (2.42)
ln(Deaths)	-0.146 (-1.22)	-0.149 (-1.25)	-0.159 (-1.39)	-0.0545 (-0.48)	-0.0575 (-0.52)	-0.0469 (-0.41)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0726 (0.76)	0.0734 (0.76)	0.0763 (0.80)	0.0514 (0.52)	0.0523 (0.52)	0.0504 (0.50)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.349*** (-3.42)	-1.243*** (-2.83)	-1.143** (-2.54)	-1.465*** (-4.80)	-1.354*** (-3.88)	-1.275*** (-3.71)
Episode Duration	0.00865** (2.42)	0.00886** (2.45)	0.00757** (2.22)	0.00935** (2.41)	0.00957** (2.44)	0.00824** (2.17)
Ethnic War	1.086** (2.12)	1.096** (2.10)	1.042** (2.08)	1.267** (2.16)	1.276** (2.14)	1.242** (2.17)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.231 (-0.81)	-0.231 (-0.80)	-0.251 (-0.90)	-0.272 (-1.04)	-0.271 (-1.03)	-0.304 (-1.24)
ln(GDP)	0.546*** (3.06)	0.544*** (3.03)	0.552*** (3.18)	0.486*** (2.70)	0.484*** (2.67)	0.478*** (2.71)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0604*** (-3.86)	-0.0593*** (-3.87)	-0.0606*** (-3.80)	-0.0625*** (-3.72)	-0.0614*** (-3.74)	-0.0638*** (-3.58)
_cons	-13.97*** (-3.43)	-14.06*** (-3.41)	-14.07*** (-3.54)	-13.07*** (-3.13)	-13.18*** (-3.12)	-12.91*** (-3.17)
<i>N</i>	1164	1164	1164	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Regression models excluding partial peace agreements

	All terror (Matched sample)	Soft targets (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.125*** (5.12)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.450*** (-3.84)	-0.457*** (-3.98)	-0.432*** (-3.73)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.181*** (4.93)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.00786 (-0.07)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.195*** (5.25)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.343** (2.41)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.185 (-0.46)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.721*** (4.85)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.522** (2.36)	0.531** (2.35)	0.448** (2.17)
Third Party Mediation	1.619*** (2.70)	1.633*** (2.90)	1.660*** (2.93)
Main Group	-0.198 (-0.51)	-0.193 (-0.51)	-0.166 (-0.42)
Explicit Support	0.251 (1.17)	0.247 (1.16)	0.299 (1.45)
Regime Type	0.152** (2.53)	0.154** (2.51)	0.136** (2.36)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0561 (-0.49)	-0.0592 (-0.53)	-0.0484 (-0.42)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0537 (0.54)	0.0546 (0.54)	0.0527 (0.53)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.481*** (-4.86)	-1.367*** (-3.95)	-1.293*** (-3.77)
Episode Duration	0.00928** (2.40)	0.00951** (2.43)	0.00817** (2.16)
Ethnic War	1.219** (2.08)	1.227** (2.06)	1.193** (2.09)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.267 (-1.03)	-0.266 (-1.01)	-0.299 (-1.22)
ln(GDP)	0.496*** (2.76)	0.495*** (2.73)	0.488*** (2.77)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0622*** (-3.74)	-0.0610*** (-3.76)	-0.0635*** (-3.60)
_cons	-13.23*** (-3.18)	-13.35*** (-3.17)	-13.07*** (-3.22)
<i>N</i>	1156	1156	1156

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: PKO duration regressions

	All terror (Matched sample)	Soft target (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.119*** (4.58)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.504*** (-3.21)	-0.520*** (-3.42)	-0.490*** (-3.16)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.192*** (4.46)		
PKO Duration	0.0159 (0.93)	0.0179 (1.07)	0.0170 (1.07)
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.0126 (-0.13)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.208*** (4.92)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.140*** (5.39)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.206 (-0.49)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.750*** (4.46)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.523** (2.36)	0.541** (2.35)	0.448** (2.16)
Third Party Mediation	1.600*** (2.69)	1.570*** (2.59)	1.638*** (2.90)
Main Group	-0.226 (-0.57)	-0.229 (-0.59)	-0.195 (-0.48)
Explicit Support	0.306 (1.34)	0.315 (1.41)	0.358* (1.65)
Regime Type	0.158*** (2.70)	0.163*** (2.69)	0.142** (2.51)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0527 (-0.44)	-0.0534 (-0.45)	-0.0449 (-0.37)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0516 (0.52)	0.0508 (0.50)	0.0509 (0.51)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.829*** (-3.71)	-1.697*** (-3.03)	-1.664*** (-3.61)
Episode Duration	0.00921** (2.46)	0.00947** (2.50)	0.00810** (2.20)
Ethnic War	1.290** (2.26)	1.313** (2.24)	1.268** (2.26)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.282 (-1.08)	-0.282 (-1.08)	-0.313 (-1.28)
ln(GDP)	0.485*** (2.68)	0.484*** (2.65)	0.476*** (2.68)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0607*** (-3.50)	-0.0594*** (-3.51)	-0.0621*** (-3.42)
_cons	-12.67*** (-2.95)	-12.80*** (-2.93)	-12.48*** (-2.98)
N	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 14: Cumulative terrorism regressions

	Cumulative terrorism Cubic polynomials (Matched sample)	Cumulative terrorism Cumulative negotiations (Matched sample)	Cumulative terrorism Any previous negotiations (Matched sample)
Cumulative Terrorism Count (t-1)	0.0296*** (5.41)	0.0377** (2.18)	0.0354** (2.26)
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.494*** (-2.79)	-0.506*** (-2.78)	-0.576*** (-3.39)
Cumulative Terrorism Count (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.0932*** (2.85)	0.0778** (2.48)	0.0887*** (3.22)
Cumulative Negotiations (t-1)		0.0265 (1.62)	
Any Previous Negotiations (t-1)			1.376*** (3.32)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.642*** (4.00)	0.472** (2.36)	0.698*** (3.57)
Third Party Mediation	1.381*** (2.73)	1.507** (2.56)	1.371** (2.52)
Main Group	-0.477 (-1.32)	-0.173 (-0.48)	-0.276 (-0.75)
Explicit Support	0.393* (1.90)	0.441* (1.88)	0.113 (0.59)
Regime Type	0.182*** (3.36)	0.155*** (2.87)	0.147** (2.56)
ln(Deaths)	0.00992 (0.10)	-0.0750 (-0.59)	-0.119 (-1.05)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0298 (0.35)	0.0476 (0.48)	0.0675 (0.74)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.234*** (-3.64)	-2.237*** (-4.82)	-2.365*** (-4.78)
Episode Duration	0.00788** (2.20)	0.00392 (0.69)	0.00325 (0.96)
Ethnic War	1.447*** (3.56)	1.150** (2.22)	1.000** (1.98)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.191 (-1.12)	-0.252 (-1.05)	-0.206 (-0.82)
ln(GDP)	0.420*** (2.98)	0.427** (2.28)	0.540*** (3.37)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.258*** (-2.65)	-0.0545*** (-3.28)	-0.0343** (-2.13)
Time Since Last Negotiation ²	0.00822 (1.43)		
Time Since Last Negotiation ³	-0.0000625 (-0.78)		
_cons	-11.89*** (-3.87)	-10.79** (-2.53)	-13.78*** (-3.92)
<i>N</i>	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 15: Spatial lag of terrorism

	All terror (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.129*** (5.34)
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.458*** (-3.92)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.184*** (4.94)
Spatial Lag (t-1)	-0.100 (-0.42)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.527** (2.42)
Third Party Mediation	1.609*** (2.66)
Main Group	-0.212 (-0.54)
Explicit Support	0.262 (1.23)
Regime Type	0.155*** (2.59)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0581 (-0.52)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0512 (0.52)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.477*** (-4.93)
Episode Duration	0.00941** (2.43)
Ethnic War	1.273** (2.13)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.272 (-1.03)
ln(GDP)	0.486*** (2.70)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0620*** (-3.72)
_cons	-13.01*** (-3.14)
<i>N</i>	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 16: Weak rebel sub-sample regressions

	All terror (Matched sample)	Soft targets (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.110*** (6.10)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.509*** (-5.71)	-0.520*** (-6.48)	-0.485*** (-5.41)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.191*** (6.09)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.0626 (-0.45)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.208*** (8.08)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.324*** (2.73)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.401 (-0.62)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.759*** (4.62)
Rebel Relative Strength	1.268*** (4.00)	1.313*** (4.69)	1.256*** (4.63)
Third Party Mediation	1.535*** (2.70)	1.551*** (2.96)	1.581*** (3.06)
Main Group	0.363 (0.78)	0.366 (0.79)	0.368 (0.81)
Explicit Support	0.290 (0.80)	0.286 (0.80)	0.397 (1.25)
Regime Type	0.146*** (3.65)	0.150*** (3.63)	0.128*** (3.08)
ln(Deaths)	0.00554 (0.05)	0.00300 (0.03)	0.0178 (0.17)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0839 (0.87)	0.0829 (0.83)	0.0837 (0.88)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-1.385*** (-5.69)	-1.229*** (-4.35)	-1.156*** (-4.30)
Episode Duration	0.00925*** (3.13)	0.00947*** (3.16)	0.00822*** (2.68)
Ethnic War	0.447 (1.34)	0.457 (1.37)	0.477 (1.46)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.0628 (-0.20)	-0.0583 (-0.19)	-0.117 (-0.42)
ln(GDP)	0.496*** (4.02)	0.495*** (3.91)	0.472*** (4.06)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0542*** (-3.57)	-0.0515*** (-3.64)	-0.0561*** (-3.31)
_cons	-15.52*** (-5.92)	-15.77*** (-5.97)	-15.24*** (-6.15)
<i>N</i>	1031	1031	1031

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note on the instrumental variable

In order for our child soldier variable to serve as a valid instrument that can account for potential endogeneity, it must meet two key criteria. First, it should have sufficient strength in explaining peacekeeping deployments after controlling for other relevant covariates. Table 3 in the manuscript demonstrates that this is indeed the case.

Second, “it must meet the exclusion restriction by precluding any correlation between the instrument and the error term” (Wucherpfennig et al. 2016, 893-894), also see Greene (2012, 267-268) and Wooldridge (2010, 89-90). Specifically, the exclusion restriction will be violated if:

1. The negotiation propensity of both the government and the rebels influences rebel groups’ decision to recruit child soldiers. This seems highly unlikely given the existing literature on child soldiers, which focuses on rebel groups’ resources, norms and ideology, mobilization capacity, etc. (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2006; Beber and Blattman 2013).

2. The instrument has an effect on negotiations through an omitted variable (i.e. other than peacekeeping). It should be noted that, as long as these other variables are included in the model, our empirical strategy remains valid. Thus, the exclusion restriction imposes no restriction on potential correlation (or causation) between the instrument and any observed variables which may also affect deployment, provided they are included in the model (Wucherpfennig et al. 2016). For example, some authors have argued that child soldiers increase violence against civilians and conflict duration (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Haer and Böhmelt 2017). The latter, in turn, could influence the likelihood of negotiation. This is why, in our analyses, we specifically control for conflict duration, and for several forms of rebel violence (i.e. conventional and terrorism). In addition, Table 17 below presents an additional specification of the bivariate probit which includes rebel one-sided violence (civilian deaths) and whether rebel groups have access to natural resources (see Weinstein 2006) as well as PKO duration. Our results hold even when controlling for these additional factors.

Finally, we note that our theoretical argument is strictly conditional. Peacekeeping should positively influence negotiations only in combination with rebel terrorism. Peacekeeping deployments on their own should not induce negotiations. When regressing the child soldiers variable directly on negotiations we do not find any evidence of a significant direct effect. This provides additional support for the validity of our empirical strategy.

Table 17: Bivariate probit regression with additional variables

	Negotiations (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.0848*** (3.11)
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.233*** (-4.10)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.0953*** (5.62)
Rebel Resources	0.0810 (0.47)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.357*** (3.47)
Third Party Mediation	0.882*** (5.71)
Main Group	0.275* (1.77)
Explicit Support	0.263* (1.83)
Regime Type	0.0812*** (3.36)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0435 (-0.70)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.00468 (0.16)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.159 (-1.43)
Episode Duration	0.00438*** (3.29)
Ethnic War	0.479* (1.85)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0921 (1.05)
ln(GDP)	0.295*** (4.27)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0301*** (-5.29)
PKO Duration	-0.0144** (-2.13)
Territorial War	-0.291 (-1.23)
_cons	-9.179*** (-5.17)
PKO Deployment	
Child Soldiers	5.690*** (11.03)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	-0.00968 (-0.23)
Rebel Resources	1.331*** (3.43)
Rebel Relative Strength	1.329*** (3.32)
Main Group	-0.347 (-0.82)
Explicit Support	-1.229*** (-3.15)
Regime Type	0.0889** (2.01)
ln(Deaths)	0.208** (2.17)
Number of Conflict Episodes	1.328*** (3.13)
Episode Duration	0.0186*** (2.85)
Ethnic War	-1.466*** (-2.84)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.456* (-1.87)
ln(GDP)	-0.0270 (-0.27)
Territorial War	-5.171*** (-2.77)
_cons	-11.19*** (-3.99)
athrho	
_cons	0.303*** (5.19)
N	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18: Baseline and successful attack models

	Soft target baseline (Full sample)	Soft target interaction (Full sample)	Soft target ratio baseline (Full sample)	Soft target ratio interaction (Full sample)	Successful attacks baseline (Full sample)	Successful attacks interaction (Full sample)
Soft Targets (t-1)	0.126* (1.65)	0.107 (1.34)				
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.191* (-1.90)	-0.340*** (-3.38)	-0.184* (-1.88)	-0.338*** (-3.43)	-0.189* (-1.88)	-0.278*** (-3.59)
Hard Targets (t-1)	0.405* (1.66)	0.412* (1.71)				
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.153*** (4.77)				
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			0.519 (1.44)	0.324 (0.91)		
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)				0.617*** (4.63)		
Successful Attacks (t-1)					0.186*** (4.48)	0.179*** (4.34)
Successful Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)						0.144*** (4.34)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.548*** (2.96)	0.571*** (3.21)	0.519*** (2.86)	0.544*** (3.13)	0.548*** (2.98)	0.565*** (3.13)
Third Party Mediation	1.658*** (4.64)	1.670*** (4.70)	1.666*** (4.33)	1.671*** (4.37)	1.644*** (4.16)	1.652*** (4.21)
Main Group	0.419 (1.37)	0.410 (1.36)	0.385 (1.22)	0.379 (1.22)	0.406 (1.32)	0.398 (1.31)
Explicit Support	0.549** (2.34)	0.529** (2.35)	0.554** (2.45)	0.534** (2.47)	0.561** (2.48)	0.543** (2.46)
Regime Type	0.141*** (3.48)	0.149*** (3.96)	0.133*** (3.33)	0.141*** (3.72)	0.142*** (3.41)	0.149*** (3.76)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0811 (-0.73)	-0.0812 (-0.74)	-0.0483 (-0.39)	-0.0490 (-0.41)	-0.0747 (-0.65)	-0.0750 (-0.67)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0179 (0.32)	0.0146 (0.27)	0.0207 (0.37)	0.0187 (0.33)	0.0204 (0.37)	0.0179 (0.32)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.330 (-1.07)	-0.343 (-1.13)	-0.293 (-0.97)	-0.299 (-1.02)	-0.302 (-1.04)	-0.316 (-1.09)
Episode Duration	0.00647*** (3.21)	0.00648*** (3.13)	0.00557*** (2.80)	0.00555*** (2.74)	0.00644*** (3.23)	0.00646*** (3.17)
Ethnic War	0.793 (1.62)	0.830* (1.78)	0.783 (1.56)	0.823* (1.73)	0.843* (1.67)	0.877* (1.78)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.185 (1.31)	0.177 (1.21)	0.136 (0.99)	0.126 (0.88)	0.174 (1.24)	0.167 (1.17)
ln(GDP)	0.520*** (4.15)	0.536*** (4.58)	0.525*** (4.31)	0.539*** (4.72)	0.514*** (4.06)	0.528*** (4.33)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0699*** (-4.91)	-0.0697*** (-4.87)	-0.0715*** (-4.64)	-0.0716*** (-4.59)	-0.0708*** (-4.77)	-0.0709*** (-4.75)
Territorial War	-0.449 (-1.13)	-0.498 (-1.32)	-0.481 (-1.19)	-0.531 (-1.38)	-0.459 (-1.13)	-0.495 (-1.26)
_cons	-15.87*** (-4.94)	-16.22*** (-5.33)	-15.98*** (-5.09)	-16.29*** (-5.46)	-15.80*** (-4.87)	-16.08*** (-5.10)
<i>N</i>	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 19: Alternative violence regressions

	Battle events (Full sample)	Battle deaths (Full sample)	Rebel osv (Full sample)	Govt osv (Full sample)	Terrorism deaths (Full sample)
Battle Events (t-1)	0.0269** (2.36)				
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.127 (-0.67)	-0.130 (-1.05)	0.0213 (0.12)	-0.205** (-2.08)	-0.323*** (-3.06)
Battle Events (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	-0.00864 (-0.23)				
Battle Deaths (t-1)		-0.000442 (-0.91)			
Battle Deaths (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		-0.00271 (-0.41)			
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence t-1)			0.0238 (0.41)		
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			-0.0624 (-1.37)		
ln(Deaths)			-0.0772 (-0.69)	-0.0722 (-0.70)	-0.0485 (-0.45)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)			0.186*** (3.93)	0.187*** (5.02)	
ln(Govt One Sided Violence t-1)				-0.00160 (-0.04)	
ln(Govt One Sided Violence t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)				0.0224 (0.44)	
Terrorism Deaths (t-1)					0.00554 (1.08)
Terrorism Deaths (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)					0.0247*** (3.93)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.566*** (3.23)	0.575*** (3.23)	0.533*** (2.91)	0.553*** (3.13)	0.565*** (3.34)
Third Party Mediation	1.426*** (4.99)	1.424*** (4.86)	1.628*** (4.15)	1.633*** (4.55)	1.675*** (4.59)
Main Group	0.184 (0.47)	0.326 (0.82)	0.417 (1.33)	0.390 (1.13)	0.347 (1.02)
Explicit Support	0.629*** (2.99)	0.580** (2.55)	0.535** (2.29)	0.564*** (2.73)	0.545** (2.54)
Regime Type	0.127*** (3.38)	0.128*** (3.24)	0.141*** (3.37)	0.146*** (3.52)	0.145*** (3.61)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.339 (-1.32)	-0.343 (-1.43)	-0.343 (-1.06)	-0.329 (-1.09)	-0.317 (-1.07)
Episode Duration	0.00609*** (2.99)	0.00593*** (2.91)	0.00661*** (3.23)	0.00643*** (3.15)	0.00568*** (2.81)
Ethnic War	0.833* (1.91)	0.820* (1.71)	0.836 (1.62)	0.833* (1.68)	0.852* (1.86)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.151 (1.14)	0.171 (1.11)	0.178 (1.25)	0.181 (1.25)	0.119 (0.81)
ln(GDP)	0.467*** (3.84)	0.500*** (4.12)	0.512*** (3.98)	0.523*** (4.20)	0.541*** (4.75)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0711*** (-5.39)	-0.0700*** (-5.14)	-0.0708*** (-4.75)	-0.0707*** (-4.60)	-0.0709*** (-4.68)
Territorial War	-0.0163 (-0.04)	-0.122 (-0.29)	-0.415 (-1.03)	-0.484 (-1.24)	-0.549 (-1.48)
_cons	-14.87*** (-4.84)	-15.59*** (-4.96)	-15.69*** (-4.77)	-15.92*** (-5.06)	-16.30*** (-5.49)
<i>N</i>	2276	2276	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 20: Government one sided violence models

	All attacks (Full sample)	Soft targets (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.174*** (4.66)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.336*** (-3.25)	-0.341*** (-3.31)	-0.346*** (-3.39)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.146*** (4.38)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		0.106 (1.30)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.153*** (4.63)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.411* (1.75)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			0.242 (0.59)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.632*** (4.60)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.569*** (3.29)	0.572*** (3.27)	0.554*** (3.33)
Third Party Mediation	1.646*** (4.44)	1.672*** (5.03)	1.700*** (4.88)
Main Group	0.401 (1.27)	0.409 (1.31)	0.363 (1.12)
Explicit Support	0.544*** (2.68)	0.531** (2.56)	0.571*** (2.90)
Regime Type	0.151*** (3.95)	0.149*** (3.97)	0.142*** (3.80)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0784 (-0.70)	-0.0810 (-0.74)	-0.0483 (-0.41)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0124 (0.22)	0.0148 (0.27)	0.0221 (0.38)
ln(Govt One Sided Violence)	-0.000993 (-0.03)	-0.00143 (-0.04)	-0.0246 (-0.53)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.350 (-1.11)	-0.344 (-1.13)	-0.315 (-0.99)
Episode Duration	0.00640*** (3.10)	0.00648*** (3.10)	0.00561*** (2.73)
Ethnic War	0.851* (1.79)	0.834* (1.78)	0.889* (1.82)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.176 (1.27)	0.178 (1.27)	0.156 (1.16)
ln(GDP)	0.537*** (4.80)	0.537*** (4.78)	0.549*** (4.86)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0710*** (-4.60)	-0.0698*** (-4.71)	-0.0722*** (-4.50)
Territorial War	-0.485 (-1.30)	-0.499 (-1.33)	-0.546 (-1.40)
_cons	-16.23*** (-5.67)	-16.24*** (-5.65)	-16.60*** (-5.73)
N	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 21: Cumulative and past negotiations regressions

	All terror (Full sample)	Soft target (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)	All terror (Full sample)	Soft target (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.163*** (3.52)			0.162*** (3.60)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.341*** (-3.34)	-0.347*** (-3.39)	-0.351*** (-3.44)	-0.367*** (-3.30)	-0.372*** (-3.36)	-0.372*** (-3.42)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.145*** (4.22)			0.155*** (4.15)		
Cumulative Negotiations (t-1)	0.0156 (1.23)	0.0152 (1.19)	0.0185 (1.49)			
Soft Targets (t-1)		0.0981 (1.19)			0.0896 (1.08)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.153*** (4.55)			0.163*** (4.47)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.379 (1.54)			0.403* (1.67)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			0.284 (0.77)			0.207 (0.58)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.618*** (4.47)			0.652*** (4.45)
Past Negotiations (t-1)				0.602** (2.47)	0.607** (2.47)	0.640** (2.57)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.535*** (3.05)	0.539*** (3.04)	0.505*** (3.00)	0.611*** (3.45)	0.615*** (3.44)	0.590*** (3.39)
Third Party Mediation	1.601*** (4.19)	1.627*** (4.76)	1.617*** (4.33)	1.502*** (3.87)	1.529*** (4.42)	1.512*** (3.95)
Main Group	0.402 (1.36)	0.408 (1.40)	0.379 (1.27)	0.269 (0.89)	0.277 (0.93)	0.240 (0.77)
Explicit Support	0.584*** (2.68)	0.569** (2.57)	0.584*** (2.76)	0.522*** (2.63)	0.506** (2.49)	0.509*** (2.63)
Regime Type	0.147*** (3.97)	0.146*** (3.99)	0.137*** (3.79)	0.154*** (4.12)	0.152*** (4.14)	0.144*** (3.88)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0825 (-0.77)	-0.0846 (-0.80)	-0.0551 (-0.48)	-0.0819 (-0.76)	-0.0845 (-0.80)	-0.0550 (-0.48)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0104 (0.19)	0.0128 (0.24)	0.0162 (0.29)	0.00647 (0.12)	0.00947 (0.18)	0.0131 (0.24)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.429 (-1.07)	-0.418 (-1.09)	-0.393 (-1.01)	-0.518 (-1.49)	-0.511 (-1.51)	-0.477 (-1.44)
Episode Duration	0.00353 (1.10)	0.00368 (1.11)	0.00217 (0.74)	0.00417** (2.10)	0.00422** (2.14)	0.00322 (1.55)
Ethnic War	0.760 (1.64)	0.745 (1.63)	0.722 (1.57)	0.845* (1.96)	0.825* (1.94)	0.821* (1.90)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.171 (1.18)	0.172 (1.18)	0.123 (0.87)	0.177 (1.31)	0.179 (1.31)	0.128 (0.97)
ln(GDP)	0.499*** (4.27)	0.500*** (4.26)	0.495*** (4.36)	0.521*** (4.84)	0.520*** (4.81)	0.520*** (4.94)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0677*** (-4.03)	-0.0666*** (-4.12)	-0.0679*** (-3.91)	-0.0598*** (-3.92)	-0.0585*** (-3.95)	-0.0598*** (-3.82)
Territorial War	-0.374 (-0.93)	-0.390 (-0.97)	-0.399 (-0.98)	-0.298 (-0.82)	-0.310 (-0.85)	-0.334 (-0.90)
_cons	-15.15*** (-4.82)	-15.19*** (-4.82)	-15.03*** (-4.88)	-15.85*** (-5.65)	-15.85*** (-5.63)	-15.84*** (-5.74)
N	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 22: Cubic polynomial regressions

	All attacks (Full sample)	Soft targets (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.144*** (3.15)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.294*** (-3.06)	-0.297*** (-3.08)	-0.296*** (-3.13)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.158*** (4.49)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		0.0682 (1.04)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.165*** (4.68)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.428* (1.68)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			0.284 (0.78)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.640*** (4.50)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.505*** (3.07)	0.509*** (3.06)	0.483*** (2.99)
Third Party Mediation	1.591*** (4.41)	1.623*** (5.12)	1.604*** (4.54)
Main Group	0.289 (1.03)	0.298 (1.07)	0.263 (0.93)
Explicit Support	0.444** (2.33)	0.426** (2.18)	0.442** (2.40)
Regime Type	0.117*** (3.67)	0.115*** (3.72)	0.109*** (3.58)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0572 (-0.58)	-0.0608 (-0.64)	-0.0319 (-0.30)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0149 (0.30)	0.0180 (0.38)	0.0200 (0.41)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.272 (-1.25)	-0.266 (-1.25)	-0.240 (-1.17)
Episode Duration	0.00541*** (3.26)	0.00550*** (3.26)	0.00463*** (2.88)
Ethnic War	0.722* (1.87)	0.696* (1.85)	0.696* (1.81)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.166 (1.54)	0.170 (1.54)	0.123 (1.14)
ln(GDP)	0.406*** (3.97)	0.403*** (3.94)	0.407*** (4.13)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.343*** (-8.73)	-0.344*** (-8.79)	-0.354*** (-8.91)
Time Since Last Negotiation ²	0.0142*** (5.97)	0.0143*** (6.06)	0.0148*** (6.29)
Time Since Last Negotiation ³	-0.000163*** (-4.30)	-0.000165*** (-4.36)	-0.000172*** (-4.50)
Territorial War	-0.302 (-0.92)	-0.309 (-0.93)	-0.342 (-1.02)
_cons	-12.66*** (-5.07)	-12.62*** (-5.06)	-12.67*** (-5.23)
N	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 23: Ceasefires and partial peace agreements

	All terror Ceasefires (Full sample)	Soft target Ceasefires (Full sample)	Soft target ratio Ceasefires (Full sample)	All terror Partial PA (Full sample)	Soft target Partial PA (Full sample)	Soft target ratio Partial PA (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.163*** (3.73)			0.175*** (3.79)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.387*** (-3.56)	-0.390*** (-3.59)	-0.398*** (-3.64)	-0.337*** (-3.34)	-0.342*** (-3.40)	-0.339*** (-3.45)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.157*** (4.48)			0.146*** (4.43)		
Ceasefire (t-1)	0.516* (1.95)	0.501** (1.97)	0.599** (2.04)			
Soft Targets (t-1)		0.105 (1.32)			0.109 (1.36)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.163*** (4.72)			0.154*** (4.76)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.373* (1.66)			0.412* (1.71)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			0.264 (0.72)			0.330 (0.93)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.653*** (4.56)			0.618*** (4.63)
Partial PA (t-1)				-0.333 (-1.02)	-0.320 (-0.98)	-0.282 (-0.85)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.544*** (3.54)	0.547*** (3.51)	0.518*** (3.37)	0.570*** (3.22)	0.573*** (3.21)	0.545*** (3.13)
Third Party Mediation	1.602*** (4.11)	1.627*** (4.61)	1.616*** (4.22)	1.648*** (4.19)	1.673*** (4.71)	1.673*** (4.38)
Main Group	0.439 (1.46)	0.446 (1.49)	0.423 (1.39)	0.405 (1.34)	0.413 (1.37)	0.382 (1.24)
Explicit Support	0.543** (2.38)	0.530** (2.30)	0.534** (2.35)	0.545** (2.48)	0.531** (2.36)	0.536** (2.49)
Regime Type	0.131*** (3.57)	0.130*** (3.55)	0.119*** (3.18)	0.151*** (3.92)	0.150*** (3.95)	0.141*** (3.71)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0815 (-0.80)	-0.0837 (-0.83)	-0.0568 (-0.53)	-0.0802 (-0.72)	-0.0828 (-0.76)	-0.0504 (-0.42)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0256 (0.46)	0.0274 (0.50)	0.0340 (0.61)	0.0132 (0.24)	0.0155 (0.28)	0.0194 (0.34)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.289 (-1.04)	-0.284 (-1.04)	-0.233 (-0.89)	-0.352 (-1.12)	-0.345 (-1.13)	-0.301 (-1.02)
Episode Duration	0.00654*** (3.11)	0.00661*** (3.12)	0.00580*** (2.81)	0.00638*** (3.13)	0.00646*** (3.13)	0.00553*** (2.74)
Ethnic War	0.811* (1.66)	0.794* (1.65)	0.788 (1.59)	0.851* (1.80)	0.832* (1.79)	0.825* (1.74)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.156 (1.03)	0.158 (1.03)	0.109 (0.72)	0.176 (1.23)	0.178 (1.22)	0.127 (0.89)
ln(GDP)	0.586*** (4.59)	0.583*** (4.58)	0.597*** (4.71)	0.538*** (4.62)	0.537*** (4.60)	0.540*** (4.74)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0678*** (-4.81)	-0.0668*** (-4.85)	-0.0677*** (-4.74)	-0.0711*** (-4.75)	-0.0699*** (-4.86)	-0.0717*** (-4.58)
Territorial War	-0.316 (-0.80)	-0.331 (-0.84)	-0.339 (-0.84)	-0.488 (-1.29)	-0.502 (-1.32)	-0.534 (-1.38)
_cons	-17.54*** (-5.33)	-17.49*** (-5.33)	-17.84*** (-5.43)	-16.23*** (-5.37)	-16.24*** (-5.35)	-16.30*** (-5.48)
N	2219	2219	2219	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 24: Regression models excluding partial peace agreements

	All terror (Full sample)	Soft targets (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.170*** (3.65)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.324*** (-3.17)	-0.328*** (-3.23)	-0.326*** (-3.29)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.142*** (4.32)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		0.0969 (1.22)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.150*** (4.66)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.423* (1.80)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			0.204 (0.56)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.618*** (4.60)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.563*** (3.17)	0.566*** (3.16)	0.541*** (3.11)
Third Party Mediation	1.621*** (4.09)	1.648*** (4.61)	1.646*** (4.29)
Main Group	0.386 (1.25)	0.394 (1.29)	0.362 (1.16)
Explicit Support	0.552** (2.51)	0.537** (2.39)	0.543** (2.53)
Regime Type	0.147*** (3.81)	0.146*** (3.83)	0.137*** (3.57)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0680 (-0.59)	-0.0709 (-0.63)	-0.0389 (-0.32)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0109 (0.19)	0.0134 (0.24)	0.0185 (0.33)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.315 (-1.04)	-0.308 (-1.05)	-0.262 (-0.92)
Episode Duration	0.00650*** (3.11)	0.00658*** (3.11)	0.00565*** (2.74)
Ethnic War	0.804* (1.69)	0.784* (1.67)	0.778 (1.63)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.179 (1.24)	0.181 (1.24)	0.126 (0.89)
ln(GDP)	0.535*** (4.48)	0.535*** (4.46)	0.536*** (4.61)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0706*** (-4.66)	-0.0693*** (-4.76)	-0.0711*** (-4.50)
Territorial War	-0.504 (-1.32)	-0.520 (-1.36)	-0.549 (-1.42)
_cons	-16.24*** (-5.30)	-16.25*** (-5.28)	-16.29*** (-5.43)
N	2203	2203	2203

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 25: PKO duration regressions

	All terror (Full sample)	Soft target (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.175*** (3.51)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.329*** (-2.70)	-0.333*** (-2.72)	-0.340*** (-2.87)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.145*** (4.09)		
PKO Duration	-0.00207 (-0.16)	-0.00235 (-0.18)	0.000686 (0.06)
Soft Targets (t-1)		0.108 (1.36)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.152*** (4.43)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.415* (1.67)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			0.324 (0.91)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) UN Troops (t-1)			0.618*** (4.35)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.569*** (3.21)	0.572*** (3.20)	0.543*** (3.13)
Third Party Mediation	1.648*** (4.28)	1.673*** (4.83)	1.670*** (4.44)
Main Group	0.402 (1.32)	0.410 (1.36)	0.379 (1.22)
Explicit Support	0.537** (2.23)	0.522** (2.11)	0.536** (2.31)
Regime Type	0.151*** (3.94)	0.149*** (3.96)	0.141*** (3.73)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0775 (-0.67)	-0.0801 (-0.71)	-0.0493 (-0.40)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0124 (0.22)	0.0148 (0.27)	0.0186 (0.33)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.343 (-1.08)	-0.336 (-1.09)	-0.301 (-0.98)
Episode Duration	0.00639*** (3.10)	0.00647*** (3.10)	0.00556*** (2.72)
Ethnic War	0.849* (1.79)	0.831* (1.78)	0.823* (1.73)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.174 (1.22)	0.176 (1.21)	0.126 (0.89)
ln(GDP)	0.537*** (4.57)	0.536*** (4.54)	0.539*** (4.70)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0711*** (-4.61)	-0.0699*** (-4.72)	-0.0716*** (-4.51)
Territorial War	-0.491 (-1.23)	-0.506 (-1.27)	-0.528 (-1.30)
_cons	-16.23*** (-5.26)	-16.24*** (-5.25)	-16.28*** (-5.39)
N	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 26: Cumulative terrorism regressions

	Cumulative terrorism Cubic polynomials (Full sample)	Cumulative terrorism Cumulative negotiations (Full sample)	Cumulative terrorism Any previous negotiations (Full sample)
Cumulative Terrorism Count (t-1)	0.0319*** (5.92)	0.0404*** (6.16)	0.0377*** (5.41)
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.360** (-2.51)	-0.391** (-2.57)	-0.427*** (-2.75)
Cumulative Terrorism Count (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.0750*** (2.77)	0.0660** (2.36)	0.0726*** (2.70)
Cumulative Negotiations (t-1)		0.0120 (0.96)	
Any Previous Negotiations (t-1)			0.540** (2.15)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.507*** (3.10)	0.543*** (3.08)	0.608*** (3.43)
Third Party Mediation	1.618*** (4.64)	1.629*** (4.44)	1.536*** (4.11)
Main Group	0.272 (0.96)	0.384 (1.29)	0.266 (0.88)
Explicit Support	0.465** (2.44)	0.598*** (2.71)	0.546*** (2.71)
Regime Type	0.122*** (4.03)	0.153*** (4.36)	0.159*** (4.45)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0606 (-0.59)	-0.0877 (-0.78)	-0.0867 (-0.77)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0113 (0.24)	0.00603 (0.11)	0.00266 (0.05)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.280 (-1.29)	-0.432 (-1.09)	-0.518 (-1.47)
Episode Duration	0.00558*** (3.30)	0.00446 (1.36)	0.00463** (2.27)
Ethnic War	0.727** (1.99)	0.782* (1.78)	0.846** (2.06)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.189* (1.76)	0.203 (1.41)	0.205 (1.53)
ln(GDP)	0.406*** (4.04)	0.504*** (4.39)	0.520*** (4.84)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.334*** (-8.56)	-0.0670*** (-4.30)	-0.0594*** (-4.12)
Time Since Last Negotiation ²	0.0137*** (5.81)		
Time Since Last Negotiation ³	-0.000158*** (-4.20)		
Territorial War	-0.263 (-0.80)	-0.339 (-0.84)	-0.259 (-0.70)
_cons	-12.74*** (-5.22)	-15.36*** (-4.99)	-15.87*** (-5.72)
<i>N</i>	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 27: Spatial lag of terrorism

	All terror (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.174*** (3.77)
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.336*** (-3.33)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.146*** (4.44)
Spatial Lag (t-1)	-0.0128 (-0.26)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.568*** (3.23)
Third Party Mediation	1.645*** (4.17)
Main Group	0.404 (1.33)
Explicit Support	0.540** (2.42)
Regime Type	0.151*** (3.93)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0790 (-0.71)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0122 (0.22)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.350 (-1.12)
Episode Duration	0.00640*** (3.13)
Ethnic War	0.844* (1.77)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.175 (1.21)
ln(GDP)	0.538*** (4.57)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0710*** (-4.75)
Territorial War	-0.487 (-1.29)
_cons	-16.23*** (-5.34)
<i>N</i>	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 28: Weak rebel sub-sample regressions

	All terror (Full sample)	Soft targets (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.124** (2.18)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.406*** (-5.21)	-0.412*** (-5.54)	-0.411*** (-5.87)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.170*** (6.31)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		-0.0139 (-0.10)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.184*** (7.65)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.442** (2.27)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.0127 (-0.02)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.710*** (4.75)
Rebel Relative Strength	1.094*** (4.17)	1.080*** (4.19)	1.074*** (4.35)
Third Party Mediation	1.589*** (4.08)	1.626*** (4.73)	1.597*** (4.16)
Main Group	0.357 (1.13)	0.369 (1.17)	0.343 (1.07)
Explicit Support	0.642*** (3.30)	0.617*** (3.12)	0.633*** (3.27)
Regime Type	0.183*** (5.15)	0.185*** (5.03)	0.182*** (5.12)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0141 (-0.12)	-0.0140 (-0.12)	0.00390 (0.03)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	-0.0174 (-0.28)	-0.0147 (-0.24)	-0.0150 (-0.24)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.359 (-1.61)	-0.340* (-1.67)	-0.322 (-1.59)
Episode Duration	0.00565*** (3.01)	0.00578*** (3.06)	0.00522*** (2.70)
Ethnic War	0.587 (1.52)	0.562 (1.46)	0.584 (1.48)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.337** (2.36)	0.346** (2.36)	0.309** (2.20)
ln(GDP)	0.545*** (5.25)	0.550*** (5.25)	0.553*** (5.48)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0609*** (-4.31)	-0.0587*** (-4.43)	-0.0602*** (-4.27)
Territorial War	-0.290 (-0.71)	-0.333 (-0.80)	-0.348 (-0.85)
_cons	-17.63*** (-6.88)	-17.77*** (-6.85)	-17.81*** (-7.15)
N	2023	2023	2023

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 29: Mixed effects regressions

	All terror (Full sample)	Soft targets (Full sample)	Soft target ratio (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.139** (2.26)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.317** (-2.47)	-0.321** (-2.50)	-0.333*** (-2.59)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.119** (1.97)		
Soft Targets (t-1)		0.0739 (0.82)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.128** (2.10)	
Hard Targets (t-1)		0.306* (1.65)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)			-0.00438 (-0.01)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)			0.556** (2.36)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.609*** (3.47)	0.614*** (3.51)	0.584*** (3.28)
Third Party Mediation	1.536*** (5.27)	1.561*** (5.33)	1.567*** (5.39)
Main Group	0.264 (0.96)	0.271 (0.98)	0.254 (0.92)
Explicit Support	0.695*** (2.87)	0.667*** (2.76)	0.777*** (3.15)
Regime Type	0.154*** (4.14)	0.154*** (4.14)	0.141*** (3.80)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0134 (-0.18)	-0.0128 (-0.18)	0.00120 (0.02)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.00782 (0.21)	0.00933 (0.25)	0.0111 (0.29)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.303 (-1.41)	-0.291 (-1.36)	-0.249 (-1.16)
Episode Duration	0.0101*** (3.89)	0.0102*** (3.91)	0.0101*** (3.83)
Ethnic War	1.241*** (3.27)	1.226*** (3.25)	1.220*** (3.18)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.198 (1.49)	0.199 (1.50)	0.161 (1.21)
ln(GDP)	0.554*** (4.98)	0.556*** (5.01)	0.564*** (4.97)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0582*** (-5.25)	-0.0574*** (-5.19)	-0.0581*** (-5.26)
Territorial War	-0.458 (-0.97)	-0.479 (-1.01)	-0.469 (-0.98)
_cons	-17.57*** (-6.41)	-17.62*** (-6.45)	-17.84*** (-6.40)
lns1_1_1			
_cons	-0.565** (-2.16)	-0.576** (-2.19)	-0.524** (-2.11)
N	2220	2220	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 30: Conflict dyads with UN PKOs

Country	UN PKO missions	Starting years	Conflict dyads	Dyad IDs	Years active
Angola	UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, MONUA	1991, 1995, 1997	Angola-UNITA	7	1992-1995, 1998-2000
Burundi	ONUB	2004	Burundi-Palipehutu-FNL	15	2004-2006
Chad	MINURCAT	2007	Chad-UFR	783	2009
DRC	MONUC	1999	Congo-RDC & Congo-MLC, Congo-CNDP	40, 41, 646	2000-2001, 2000, 2001 2006-2008
Ivory Coast	UNOCI	2004	Ivory Coast-FRCI	439	2004
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL, UNIOSIL	2006	Sierra Leone-AFRC, Sierra Leone-RUF, Sierra Leone-WSB	130, 131, 714	1998-1999, 1998-2000, 2000
Somalia	UNOSOM	1992	Somalia-USC/SNA	29	1992-1995
Sudan	UNMISS, UNAMID	2005, 2007	Sudan-JEM, Sudan-SLM/A, Sudan-SLM/A-Unity	433, 434, 648	2007-2009, 2008-2009, 2007-2008
Rwanda	UNAMIR	1993	Rwanda-FPR	127	1993-1994

References

- Beber, B. and C. Blattman (2013). The logic of child soldiering and coercion. *International Organization* 67(1), 65–104.
- Carter, D. B. and C. S. Signorino (2010). Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data. *Political Analysis* 18(3), 271–292.
- Cunningham, D. E., K. Skrede Gleditsch, and I. Salehyan (2009). It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4), 570–597.
- Greene, W. H. (2012). *Econometric analysis, 7th Edition*. Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
- Haer, R. and T. Böhmelt (2017). Could rebel child soldiers prolong civil wars? *Cooperation and Conflict* 52(3), 332–359.
- Harbom, L., S. Höglbladh, and P. Wallensteen (2006). Armed conflict and peace agreements. *Journal of Peace Research* 43(5), 617–631.
- Humphreys, M. and J. M. Weinstein (2006). Handling and manhandling civilians in civil war. *American Political Science Review* 100(3), 429–447.
- Humphreys, M. and J. M. Weinstein (2008). Who fights? the determinants of participation in civil war. *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2), 436–455.
- Thomas, J. (2014). Rewarding bad behavior: How governments respond to terrorism in civil war. *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4), 804–818.
- Weinstein, J. M. (2006). *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Rebellion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). *Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Wucherpfennig, J., P. Hunziker, and L.-E. Cederman (2016). Who inherits the state? colonial rule and postcolonial conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4), 882–898.