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Hyper-realistic face masks in a live passport-checking task

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Keywords:	Masks, Silicone, Realistic, Face perception, Face Recognition, Passports, Identification, Fraud, Deception
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Hyper-realistic face masks in a live passport-checking task

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Abstract

Hyper-realistic face masks have been used as disguises in at least one border crossing, and in numerous criminal cases. Experimental tests using these masks have shown that viewers accept them as real faces under a range of conditions. Here, we tested mask detection in a live identity verification task. Fifty-four visitors at the London Science Museum viewed a mask wearer at close range (2 metres) as part of a mock passport check. They then answered a series of questions designed to assess mask detection, while the masked traveller was still in view. In the identity matching task, 8% of viewers accepted the mask as matching a real photo of someone else, and 82% accepted the match between masked person and masked photo. When asked if there was any reason to detain the traveller, only 13% of viewers mentioned a mask. A further 11% picked disguise from a list of suggested reasons. Even after reading about mask-related fraud, 10% of viewers judged that the traveller was not wearing a mask. Overall, mask detection was poor, and was not predicted by unfamiliar face matching performance. We conclude that hyper-realistic face masks could go undetected during live identity checks.

Key Words

Masks, Silicone, Realistic, Face Perception, Face Recognition, Passports,
Identification, Fraud, Deception

Introduction

Relying on unfamiliar face recognition to verify identity is an important aspect of national security (Robertson & Burton, 2016). In the context of border control, officials are routinely required to decide whether a traveller's passport photo matches the traveller's face. False acceptance in this situation could result in an identity fraudster entering the country. Despite the social and economic investment in face-photo ID in security critical situations, matching instances of unfamiliar faces remains highly prone to error (Papesh, 2018; Robertson, 2018; White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014). It is also a process that fraudsters wishing to deceive ID checkers actively exploit (Robertson, Kramer, & Burton, 2017; Robertson, et al. 2018).

Opportunistic identity fraud relies on the fraudster obtaining photo-ID of someone who looks similar to them. In such cases, fraudsters can increase the likelihood of their deception succeeding by disguising their own face so that it looks more like the face of their victim. Traditional methods of disguise have tended to focus on simple paraphernalia such as glasses and wigs (Dhamecha, Singh, Vatsa, & Kumar, 2014; Kramer & Ritchie, 2016; Righi, Peissig, & Tarr, 2012; Terry, 1994). However, a number of recent criminal cases have raised the profile of a different approach—hyper-realistic silicone masks that completely transform the appearance of the wearer (Sanders et al., 2017; Sanders & Jenkins, 2018).

In one widely cited example, a young Asian man used a hyper-realistic mask to impersonate an elderly Caucasian man whose passport he had stolen. Wearing the mask, the fraudster passed through several identity checks at Hong Kong airport and successfully boarded a flight to Canada. The deception was only detected when he removed the mask during the flight, and a fellow traveller reported the incident to the crew (Zamost, 2010). This example suggests that hyper-realistic face masks can be sufficiently convincing to pass for

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3 real faces. Importantly, this appears to be the case even at passport control, where an
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5 official's attention is directly focused on facial image comparison.
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8 Despite the threat posed by this new type of fraud, few experiments have addressed
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10 detection of hyper-realistic face masks. Sanders et al. (2017; Experiment 1) asked participants
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12 to rate the appearance of 20 face photos on (task irrelevant) social dimensions such as
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14 attractiveness. Unbeknownst to the participants, one of these photos showed a person wearing
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16 a hyper-realistic mask. Following the rating task, participants were given the opportunity to
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18 report this imposter in a series of increasingly leading questions. None of the participants
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20 reported the presence of the mask spontaneously, or when prompted with a general question
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22 about the appearance of the faces. Moreover, only 22% of participants guessed that the face
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24 images included a mask when explicitly asked. When shown an array of all the images and
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26 asked to pick out the mask, 30% of participants missed the mask, and nearly every real face
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28 was singled out as the mask by at least one participant. These findings suggest that the
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30 detection of hyper-realistic masks is difficult when comparing photos. Even when the viewer
31
32 is aware that a mask is present, detection levels remain far from perfect.
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37 Sanders et al. (2017; Experiment 3) also examined detection of masks in live viewing.
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39 As seen in Figure 1, a mask-wearing confederate sat at a bench on a university campus, and
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41 experimenters stopped passers-by to ask them questions about the confederate's appearance.
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43 Respondents viewed the confederate at a distance of 5 metres (Near) or 10 metres (Far). As
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45 with the photographic study, participants were initially asked to rate the individual on social
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47 dimensions such as attractiveness. They then turned toward the experimenter (away from the
48
49 confederate) to answer the open, prompted, and explicit questions concerning mask detection.
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51 None of the participants in the Far condition (10m), and only 6% of those in the Near
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53 condition (5m), reported the presence of a mask in the open or prompted report. For the
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55 explicit report question (i.e. was that person wearing a hyper-realistic mask), only 43% of
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3 participants reported that the confederate was wearing a mask (detection rates were
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5 significantly higher for those viewing from 5m than 10m).
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19 **Figure 1.** Illustration of live viewing conditions from Sanders et al (2017; Experiment 3).
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21 The images show the confederate (author RJ) wearing the mask (left), the confederate's real
22 face (right). Images reproduced with permission of the authors.
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29 To summarise Sanders et al.'s (2017) study, detection of hyper-realistic masks was
30 poor in both photographic viewing and in live viewing. These low detection rates suggest that
31 hyper-realistic masks may provide a viable route to identity fraud. Here, we assess this
32 possibility directly in a mock border control scenario. Our study design extends the preceding
33 work in four important ways. First, we modelled aspects of a border control setting to test
34 whether participants would ever accept a masked imposter as a match for a real passport
35 photo. The context of a passport document has previously been shown to boost acceptance
36 rates in facial image comparison (McCaffery & Burton, 2016). Second, we used concurrent
37 perceptual matching rather than immediate memory when assessing detection. That is,
38 participants completed the image comparison task and the mask detection questions (open,
39 prompted, and explicit) with the mask wearer directly in view. Third, we used a closer
40 viewing distance. Sanders et al. (2017) used 'social' viewing distances of 5 metres and 10
41 metres, but passport checks are typically carried out at 1–2 metres (Noyes & Jenkins, 2017;
42 Verhoff, Witzel, Kreutz, & Ramsthaler, 2008). We use a viewing distance of 2 metres to
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3 capture this applied constraint. Finally, we examined individual differences in face matching
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5 ability. Here, we assess whether those who score highly on the Glasgow Face Matching Test
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7 (Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010; Robertson, Noyes, Dowsett, Jenkins, & Burton, 2016), are
8
9 more likely to detect a hyper-realistic face mask. We expected that the gravitas of the
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11 passport context, the availability of the masked face during the task, the closer viewing
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13 distance, and the high face-matching aptitude of some observers would lead to high detection
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15 rates for the mask.
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22 **Methods**

23 **Ethics Statement**

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25 This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology,
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27 University of York and the London Science Museum. All participants provided written
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29 informed consent. The participants shown in Figure 3 provided appropriate photographic
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31 release.
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39 **Participants**

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41 Fifty-four participants (37 female, 17 male) with a mean age of 28 years ($SD = 7$,
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43 Range = 18–49) volunteered as part of a public engagement event at the London Science
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45 Museum. During the experimental debrief all participants confirmed that they had no prior
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47 knowledge that a hyper-realistic mask was being used in this study.
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52 **Design and Procedure**

53 **Overview**

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55 Testing took place on a single evening at the London Science Museum. The study
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57 comprised three phases, and all participants completed these phases in the same sequence. In
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3 Phase 1, we used the short version of the Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT) to estimate
4 unfamiliar face matching ability. For Phase 2, participants proceeded to a mock passport
5 control area. The task in this phase was to verify the identity of a traveller (an experimental
6 confederate) by comparing a passport photo to his live appearance. Finally, in Phase 3,
7 participants completed a short questionnaire that was designed to assess detection of the
8 hyper-realistic face mask. Together, these measures allowed us to estimate both the rate of
9 mask detection and the predictive value of face matching accuracy in this situation. The
10 testing space was divided into three areas—a GFMT testing area, a passport control area, and
11 a debrief area. The layout ensured that participants could not see the traveller before entering
12 the passport control area, and could not hear the debrief before entering the debrief area.
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28 **Phase 1: Face matching ability**

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30 The short version of the GFMT consists of 40 pairs of unfamiliar faces photos
31 presented in a random sequence on a computer screen. In 20 of these pairs, both photos show
32 the same identity. In the remaining 20 pairs, the two photos show different identities. For
33 each pair, the participants' task is to decide whether the photos show the same person or two
34 different people. Participants' scores out of 40 are converted to percentage scores for
35 analysis.
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47 **Phase 2: Mock Passport Check**

48 **Passport Photo to Face Matching**

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50 To reinforce the participant's role as passport checker, and to approximate the real-
51 world visual demands of photo-to-face comparison, we embedded the face photographs in
52 realistic passport documents, as seen in Figure 2 (McCaffery & Burton, 2016). The
53 demographic information (e.g. sex, date of birth) in these documents was the same for match
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3 and mismatch images. Pilot testing confirmed that this information was plausible for both the
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5 face photos and mask wearer. We created two versions of the mock passport. The first
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7 version contained a photo of experimental confederate Josh (author JS) wearing the hyper-
8
9 realistic mask (photo taken two weeks before testing). This version allowed us to examine
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11 detection of a mask that was presented live and in the ID document. The second version
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13 contained a photo of a real person (no mask) whose facial appearance was similar to the mask
14
15 face fit the same general description of the mask (i.e. young white male with dark hair). This
16
17 version models a form of identity fraud in which a fraudster has obtained a mask that
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19 resembles the identity in the stolen document. The two versions of the passport were
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21 alternated across participants. In each case, the participants' task was to decide whether the
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23 photo in the passport showed Josh or someone else (identity matching).
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33 --- FIGURE 2 HERE PLEASE ---
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40 **Figure 2.** Mock passport check (due to copyright reasons we cannot show the actual
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42 passports used in the study, however, the images that we present here are a close
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44 approximation). The left panel shows a mock passport containing a photo of a real face (due
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46 to copyright reasons we could not show the actual foil identity used in the study). The right
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48 panel shows a mock passport containing a photo of the masked confederate. Participants
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50 received either a passport containing a photo of the foil identity or of the confederate wearing
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52 the mask, and were asked to decide whether the face in the passport photo matched the
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54 person in front of them (viewing distance 2m).
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Masked confederate

An experimental confederate, Josh (author JS, real face included in Appendix images), played the role of traveller. Josh was seated 2 metres from the participants' desk for the duration of testing, as seen in Figure 3. Unbeknownst to the participants, Josh was wearing a hyper-realistic silicone mask (the 'Male Model' mask, from Realflesh Masks, Montreal, Quebec). This aspect of the study was not mentioned to participants until debriefing. Participants were instructed that the traveller was returning to the UK from Spain. Josh was provided with props (e.g., hand luggage with an 'I love Barcelona' sticker) to reinforce this cover story. Our main interest was (i) the participant's response to the identity comparison, and (ii) whether the participant noticed the mask.

--- FIGURE 3 HERE PLEASE ---

Figure 3. The passport control area showing (left) participants carrying out the mock passport check, and (right) masked confederate Josh from the participant's point of view (2m viewing distance). Participants shown in Figure 3 provided appropriate photographic release.

Phase 3: Mask detection

Following Sanders et al. (2017), the questionnaire comprised a series of increasingly leading items. The first item (spontaneous detection) allowed participants to report spontaneously that the traveller was wearing a mask (open response). The second item (prompted detection) raised the possibility that the traveller was wearing a disguise (checklist responses). The third item (categorical detection) asked directly whether or not the traveller

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3 was wearing a mask (Yes/No response). The three questions were printed on separate pages
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5 so that participants could only advance to the next question after being instructed to do so by
6
7 the experimenter. The questions were as follows:

11 12 **Spontaneous Detection (open response)**

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14 Regardless of whether the passport photo shows Josh or not, is there *any other reason*
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16 why you would not allow him to enter the UK?
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19 20 21 **Prompted Detection (checklist responses)**

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23 Has Josh disguised his appearance (Y/N)? [critical item]. Is Josh's date of birth
24
25 suspicious (Y/N)? Should Josh's luggage be searched for drugs (Y/N)? Do you suspect that
26
27 Josh is carrying more than the 4-litre allowance of wine in his luggage (Y/N)? Josh claims to
28
29 have been in Spain for a business trip. Is there any reason to believe that this was not the true
30
31 purpose of his visit (Y/N)? If you have circled 'Yes' to any of the questions above, please
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33 briefly explain why in the response box below.
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40 41 **Categorical Detection (Yes/No response)**

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43 This workshop runs for over three hours. Half the time Josh will be a regular law
44
45 abiding traveller. At other times Josh is a fraudster and will be wearing a hyper-realistic face
46
47 mask. He does this to make himself look more like the person whose passport he has stolen.
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49 Is Josh wearing a hyper-realistic mask right now? (Circle 'Yes' or 'No' and briefly describe
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51 why you have made that choice in the response box below).
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Results

Face matching ability

Mean accuracy on the GFMT was 82% (SD = 12%; Range = 50–100%). Importantly, as this test was administered to the general public in a museum setting, this distribution was very similar to published norms (Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010; N = 194; M = 81%, SD = 10%, Range = 50–100%).

Mock passport check

We analysed responses in the passport check separately for the two versions of the passport document. For the version containing a photo of Josh wearing the mask, the acceptance rate was 82%. For the version containing a photo of someone else (no mask), the acceptance rate was 8%.

Mask Detection

Mask detection data are summarised in Table 1. Only 13% of participants spontaneously reported that the traveller was wearing a mask. Of the remaining participants, a further 11% indicated when prompted that the traveller had disguised his appearance.

Table 1. Proportion (%) of participants who detected (Yes) or did not detect (No) the mask at each detection stage.

Detection stage	Yes (%)	No (%)
Spontaneous detection	13	87
Prompted detection	11	89
Categorical detection	90	10

As can be seen from Table 2, viewers were more likely to query the purpose of the traveller's trip or the contents of his luggage than to suspect that he was disguised. Even when we drew attention to the issue of mask fraud, and informed participants that the traveller may be wearing a mask (categorical detection), only 90% of participants thought that he was. In other words, 10% of participants judged that Josh was *not* wearing a mask, even while viewing him from a distance of 2 metres.

Table 2. Proportion (%) of participants who checked each reason to deny the traveller entry at the prompted detection stage. Participants were free to check as many or as few reasons as they liked.

Reason to deny entry	Yes (%)
Disguised appearance	36
Suspicious date of birth	34
Drug check	55
Wine limit	15
Business trip	66

Justification of Responses

Participants gave a range of reasons for 'Yes' responses at the categorical detection stage. Most participants (78%) attributed their response to a specific cue. Figure 4 shows these responses broken down by face region. Unattributed detection accounted for only 22% of responses.

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--- FIGURE 4 HERE PLEASE ---

Figure 4. Proportions of written justifications that mentioned each cue (categorical detection task).

Individual Differences

To test whether unfamiliar face matching ability was associated with mask detection, we compared GFMT scores for participants who detected the mask at spontaneous or prompted report ($N = 12$, $M = 83\%$, $SD = 10\%$, $\text{Range} = 68\%–98\%$), and those who did not ($N = 42$, $M = 81\%$, $SD = 12\%$, $\text{Range} = 50–100\%$). A between-subjects t-test revealed no significant difference between these subgroups either for overall GFMT scores or scores on the match and mismatch conditions separately (all t 's < 1). GFMT scores for participants who failed to detect the mask in the categorical (Yes/No) report were also normal ($M = 85\%$, $SD = 7\%$, $\text{Range} = 75\%–90\%$).

General Discussion

Previous research by Sanders et al. (2017) found that detection rates for hyper-realistic masks were remarkably low. ~~In the current study, we tested whether these findings generalised to a mock passport control situation.~~ In that study, participants relied on immediate memory of the masked confederate from 5 or 10 metres. In contrast, we allowed participants to view the mask wearer throughout testing, and from the shorter distance of just 2 metres, similar to passport control conditions (Noyes & Jenkins, 2017). These viewing conditions are much more conducive to mask detection, compared with previous work. Nonetheless, our findings follow a very similar pattern. Participants only detected the mask

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3 22% of the time at spontaneous or prompted report. Even when explicitly asked whether or
4 not the traveller was wearing a mask, 10% of viewers judged that he was not. Moreover,
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6 participants accepted the face of a mask wearer as matching a photo of another person 8% of
7
8 the time (cf. Zamost, 2010). These findings suggest that a hyper-realistic silicone mask can
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10 pass for a real face, even when viewers are aware that it could be a mask, and even when
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12 their viewing time is not restricted.
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17 Interestingly, participants singled out various aspects of facial appearance to explain
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19 their judgement (at the explicit question stage) that the traveller was wearing a mask. This
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21 wide range of justifications suggests that there may be no single cue that gave the mask away.
22
23 A recent analysis by Sanders and Jenkins (2018) found that the most reliable differences
24
25 between photos of real faces and photos of hyper-realistic masks were in the eye region, and
26
27 that viewers who classified the photos accurately used information in that diagnostic area.
28
29 However, that analysis was based on dozens of trials involving different faces and different
30
31 masks, whereas the current study involved one-shot decisions to a single mask wearer.
32
33 Moreover, Sanders and Jenkins (2018) did not ask participants to explain their classification
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35 decisions. It seems entirely plausible that their participants were unaware of their reliance on
36
37 the eye region. Previous studies have shown that insight into one's own decision making is
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39 generally limited, and that participants often rationalise their own decisions post hoc (Nisbett
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41 & Wilson, 1977). This includes decisions concerning face identification (Sauerland et al.
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43 2016). Either way, we found little evidence in this task that successful mask detection could
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45 be attributed to any particular facial cue.
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51 Although the participants in this study were members of the general public, ~~previous~~
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53 ~~research suggests it is not clear~~ that ~~experienced passport officials~~ ~~professionals whose work~~
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55 ~~involves face viewing~~ -would ~~be unlikely to perform~~ ~~perform~~ any better ~~(see Zamost, 2010,~~
56
57 ~~for a real-world example)~~. ~~Previous studies have shown that professional training- and~~
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experience confer no discernable advantage in face identification tasks (Papesh, 2018; White et al., 2014). While recent research has focused on the selection of individuals who naturally excel at face recognitionsuch tasks (Bobak, Dowsett, & Bate, 2016; Bobak, Hancock, & Bate, 2016; Davis, Lander, Evans, & Jansari, 2016), our findings did not show that greater GFMT scores were associated with earlier mask detection, and scores for those who did not detect the mask at all were within the normal range. The suggestion here is that face identification and mask detection may be separable problems. Any relation between them could be clarified by comparing performance distributions on the two tasks.~~However the group sample sizes were small and unequal so further research is needed to properly assess whether or not individuals with a high aptitude for facial identification are also better at mask detection.~~

Our previous studies on this topic have tested many different masks worn by many different people. That approach allowed us to generalise our observations across a range of viewing conditions. Here we took the complementary approach of testing a single mask in a more ecologically valid setting. Our findings provide an existence proof of an artificial face that can withstand direct scrutiny under live viewing conditions and at close range. The existence of such masks presents some interesting challenges for security and crime prevention. For example, in one recent case, criminals used a silicone mask to impersonate a French minister for video calls with business leaders (Schofield, 2019). The criminals were able to defraud businesses of 80 million euros before being stopped. This case raises interesting issues for future research, including impersonation of faces that are familiar to the viewer. Some very recent work has shown that viewers are better able to see through impersonation disguise when they are familiar with the target of impersonation (Noyes & Jenkins, 2019). However, that work did not consider hyper-realistic face masks as disguises. It is possible that a moderate resemblance would be enough to fool a moderately familiar viewer, while a strong resemblance would be required to fool a highly familiar viewer. In the

1
2
3 current study, 8% of participants accepted the image of our foil identity as a match to the
4 mask, but this may be an underestimate of acceptance rates. Our foil image was selected from
5 an existing database of face photos as a good match to our mask. However, in a real attempt
6 at fraud, the perpetrator could have a mask created to resemble the face photo in a stolen
7 passport, or could select a target who resembles an existing mask (e.g. Schofield, 2019). Such
8 a process is likely to Either approach could make the resemblance between the mask and
9 passport photo greater than was possible in this study, potentially leading to higher false
10 acceptance rates.
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15 In order to mitigate human error at passport control, airports across the world have
16 invested in e-Gates (electronic facial recognition technology) which use an algorithm to
17 match a the digital face photo image stored on thea passport to thea travellers passport
18 holder's face. Despite this investment, such systems are also prone to identification errors
19 (Phillips et al., 2018). I, and it is not yet clear to what extent how they would perform when
20 comparing a passport image to a mask. accept a mask-wearing fraudster as a match to a photo
21 in a stolen passport. However In principle, e-Gates could be modified in two ways in order to
22 enhance the likelihood of detecting such a disguise to enhance mask detection. For
23 example first, infra-red imaging could be used to distinguish the thermal signature of a masked
24 face from that of a real face. as Given that the masks does not disguise a fraudsters occlude
25 the wearer's eyes, an the addition of iris scans to the biometric information held on passports
26 coupled with iris verification technology at the e-Gate, iris scan could provide identify the
27 wearer an effect counter measure. Second, in places in which iris based biometrics are not
28 being introduced, the addition of thermal imaging sensors to e-Gates could also provide an
29 effective counter measure here. These sensors would be able to detect the pattern of heat
30 across a travellers face, and as it is possible that the heat signature emanating from a fraudster
31 wearing a mask could be different in pattern or scale to that of a regular traveller, such
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~~information could trigger the detection of this disguise. Indeed, some face recognition algorithms already possess heat sensors to support ‘liveness detection’, and they could therefore be adapted to support the detection of those wearing hyper-realistic masks.~~

Conclusions

To conclude, this study extends the findings of Sanders et al. (2017) to an important applied situation. In a mock passport control task, we found that (i) a hyper-realistic mask was often accepted as a match to a stolen passport photo, (ii) spontaneous mask detection was remarkably rare, and (iii) raising awareness of mask-related fraud did not fully solve this problem. Based on these findings, we conclude that hyper-realistic masks pose an unresolved problem in identity fraud.

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Appendix

For Peer Review

--- Appendix Image Here Please ---

Left image shows the real face of mask wearer (Author JS), and with the addition of the mask on the right.

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For Peer Review




Figure 1. Illustration of live viewing conditions from Sanders et al (2017; Experiment 3). The images show the confederate (author RJ) wearing the mask (left), the confederate's real face (right). Images reproduced with permission of the authors.

258x119mm (72 x 72 DPI)

Traveller's view



Participant's view



Figure 3. The passport control area showing (left) participants carrying out the mock passport check, and (right) masked confederate Josh from the participant's point of view (2m viewing distance). Participants shown in Figure 3 provided appropriate photographic release.

715x403mm (96 x 96 DPI)

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


Figure 4. Proportions of written justifications that mentioned each cue (categorical detection task).

1074x1057mm (96 x 96 DPI)



Appendix Image: Left image shows the real face of mask wearer (Author JS), and with the addition of the mask on the right.

259x157mm (150 x 150 DPI)