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# **Evaluating the vulnerability of physical and virtual water resource networks in China's megacities**

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## 1 **Highlights**

- 2 ● Megacity water resource network should include physical and virtual water supply
- 3 ● Input-output analysis is used to analyze megacity water vulnerability
- 4 ● Megacities were more vulnerable to external than internal water scarcity
- 5 ● Virtual water inflow help decrease vulnerability in water stressed megacities

## 6 **Abstract**

7 The water resource networks that provide water for urban consumption consists not  
8 only of physical water supply, but also water embodied in imported goods and services  
9 i.e. virtual water supply or external water footprint. However, it remains unknown that  
10 if relying on external water footprint will increase or decrease the vulnerability of cities'  
11 water resource networks. Here, we evaluate the vulnerability of urban water resource  
12 networks for China's six megacities i.e. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing,  
13 Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. The vulnerability index was developed through combining  
14 a refined multi-region input-output table with both water footprint and water scarcity  
15 footprint analysis. The results showed that megacities need to import large volumes of  
16 virtual water embodied in food related sectors to balance their physical water shortages.  
17 The external blue water footprint (BWF) of the six megacities accounted for 80.7% of  
18 their total BWF, and was almost twice their physical water supply. The large share of  
19 external BWF helped Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, which suffer extreme water stress  
20 in their urban areas, to decrease their total vulnerability by 39%, 33%, and 28%  
21 respectively, but conversely increase their vulnerability to external water shortages i.e.  
22 indirect vulnerability. Establishing megacity physical and virtual water resource  
23 networks based on input-output analysis provides an opportunity for urban water  
24 planners to internalize the risk of their external water footprint. Avoiding import water-  
25 intensive products from regions suffering extreme water stress, or managing indirect  
26 vulnerability through cooperation with those regions are suggested as viable water

27 management approaches.

28 **Keywords:**

29 Input-output analysis, Virtual water, Water footprint, Water Stress Index

## 30 **Nonmenclature**

<b>Abbreviations</b>	
MRIO	Multi-region input-output
WSI	Water stress index
DWSI	Direct water stress index
IWSI	Indirect water stress index
WPL	Water productivity leverage
WVL	Water volume leverage
BWF	Blue water footprint
BWSF	Blue water scarcity footprint

## 31 **1. Introduction**

32 In this urbanizing world, sufficient freshwater supply is a fundamental challenge  
33 for many cities due to their increasing populations and rising levels of affluence  
34 (Hadjikakou et al. , 2019, McDonald et al. , 2014). Globally, urban freshwater use has  
35 quintupled since the 1950s (Padowski and Gorelick, 2014), and urban domestic and  
36 industrial water use combined correspond to 31% of global freshwater withdrawals  
37 (Larsen et al., 2016). Particular concerns have been raised in cities in rapidly developing  
38 economies, such as China and India, in which unprecedented rates of urbanization are  
39 occurring, making these nations need to restrict economic development due to  
40 inadequate water supplies (Srinivasan et al. , 2013).

41 While urban water planners seek to secure physical water supplies through water  
42 resource networks (Jeong and Park, 2020), the need for large amounts of virtual water  
43 supply emanating from beyond the city boundary (the “external water footprint”) to  
44 support the growing urban consumption demand is often overlooked (Zhang et al.,

45 2019). The virtual water concept, first introduced by Allan (1992), may generally be  
46 defined as the water required for the production of goods and services along the  
47 associated supply chain (Yang and Zehnder, 2007). Hence, virtual water studies are  
48 usually linked to the impact of trade activities on regional or global water stress  
49 alleviation or aggregation (Orlowsky et al. , 2014, Zhao et al. , 2018, 2016). The water  
50 footprint, subsequently proposed by Hoekstra and Hung (2002), is the water use of  
51 goods and services consumed by a defined geographical region (or an industrial sector  
52 or population) (Hoekstra, 2017). The water footprint concept is frequently used to  
53 evaluate the effects of regional consumption on global water resources (Hoekstra and  
54 Mekonnen, 2012, Hoff et al., 2014, Hou et al., 2018). According to Hoekstra and  
55 Mekonnen (2016), the “internal water footprint” is thus the water use within a  
56 geographical boundary to produce the goods and services that are consumed within that  
57 boundary, and the “external water footprint” is the water use in other geographical  
58 regions to produce the goods and services which are then imported and consumed  
59 within the geographical boundary under consideration.

60 A city’s reliance on external water footprint has been addressed in literature  
61 (Zhang et al., 2012, Zhao et al., 2016, Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016, Chini et al., 2017).  
62 For example, Rushforth and Ruddell (2016) indicated that the external blue water  
63 footprint of Flagstaff, USA amounted to 93.7% of the total blue water footprint of the  
64 city. These studies suggest that external water footprint provides a non-negligible  
65 virtual water supply to modern cities which, by necessity, must be included in a cities’

66 water resource networks alongside physical water supply for water management and  
67 planning purposes.

68 Relying on external water footprint, as so many cities do, has its risks and benefits  
69 in terms of water resource networks. On the one hand, through economic activity, cities  
70 can generate a leverage to more external water footprint than its own physical water  
71 supply (Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016). Such leverage help cities to shift the burden of  
72 their own water stress and use its own limited physical water endowment to produce  
73 high value goods and services (Zhao et al., 2015, 2016). On the other hand, the  
74 dependence on external water footprint introduces a risk to cities when the water of the  
75 exporting region is overexploited (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2016, Orłowsky et al.,  
76 2014), or is capped for its consumption (Liu et al., 2018). This inverse relationship  
77 reveals that cities are not only vulnerable to internal water shortages but also to external  
78 water shortages. Hence, it is crucial for urban water planners to understand and balance  
79 the trade-offs between the leverage of utilizing external water resources and the  
80 vulnerability existing in the external water footprint.

81 Previous studies have evaluated virtual water flows, as well as direct  
82 vulnerability (vulnerable to internal water shortages) and indirect vulnerability  
83 (vulnerable to external water shortages) for cities based on bilateral commodity flow  
84 data (Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016, Djehdian et al., 2019). However, the bilateral trade  
85 data has the limitation of being unable to distinguish between intermediate and final  
86 demand products, thus is difficult to trace the life cycle processes of water use along

87 complex supply chains (Hoekstra et al. , 2011, Kastner et al., 2011). In contrast, the  
88 accounting framework based on the multi-region input-output (MRIO) table has the  
89 advantage of showing whole industry supply chain effects, and provides relatively more  
90 detailed sector disaggregation for industrial products (Feng et al., 2011). The MRIO  
91 approach, capable of reflecting economic transactions between different regions and  
92 economic sectors, has been widely used to quantify the virtual water flows (Feng et al.,  
93 2014, Hou et al., 2018, Serrano et al., 2016). However, to best of our knowledge, there  
94 is no study applying a MRIO analysis approach to evaluate and compare the direct and  
95 indirect vulnerability of physical and virtual water resource networks in different  
96 megacities.

97 In this study, we develop an accounting framework based on a refined MRIO table  
98 to investigate the characteristics of physical and virtual blue water flows for six Chinese  
99 megacities. The indicators of water volume and water productivity leverage, as well as  
100 vulnerability of these megacities to external water resources were derived from  
101 previous work (Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016, Zhao et al., 2016), and combined into the  
102 MRIO framework. The vulnerability of these megacities water resource networks was  
103 further explained through the introduction of the concept of a water scarcity footprint  
104 (Ridoutt and Pfister, 2010).

## 105 **2. Data and Methodology**

### 106 **2.1 Data**

107 The Chinese MRIO table formally contains four Chinese provincial-level

108 megacities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. Accordingly, existing water  
109 footprint studies within China using the MRIO approach tend to have only considered  
110 these four megacities (Li and Han, 2018), and have ignored two other recognized  
111 megacities; Shenzhen and Guangzhou. In order to give a comprehensive analysis of the  
112 water footprint of China's megacities, we have thus extended the existing Chinese  
113 MRIO table to include Shenzhen and Guangzhou. We selected the 2010 Chinese MRIO  
114 table from Liu et al. (2014), which is the most up to date at the time the work was  
115 carried out, to perform the extension. The 2010 Chinese MRIO table contains 30  
116 economic sectors for 30 provincial-level administrative regions (provinces,  
117 autonomous regions, and municipalities – here referred to as provinces for simplicity).  
118 Because both Shenzhen and Guangzhou form part of Guangdong Province, we  
119 disaggregated Guangdong Province into three sub-regions: Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and  
120 Rest of Guangdong (ROG). Detailed sector and region information can be found in  
121 Appendices (Table A1-A2). The interregional trade of the three sub-regions was  
122 estimated using a gravity model, originally developed by Leontief and Strout (1963).  
123 According to Miller and Blair (2009), data of three variables is needed to estimate the  
124 interregional trade of the three sub-regions using the gravity model. These are the  
125 supply of sector  $i$  in the exporting sub-region, the demand of sector  $i$  in importing sub-  
126 region, and the total production of sector  $i$  for all sub-regions. These data were obtained  
127 through the single region input-output tables of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Guangdong  
128 Province. Finally, the interregional trade between the three sub-regions and other

129 provinces in China was estimated using similar trade ratios between Guangzhou  
130 Province and other provinces in China.

131 In this study, we only considered blue virtual water (surface water and  
132 groundwater) to match with the physical water supply. We didn't consider green virtual  
133 water (soil water) or grey virtual water (polluted water) in quantifying the water  
134 footprint and vulnerability of each megacities' water resource networks. Green water is  
135 a value substitute resource to blue water (Hoekstra et al., 2011), and grey water and  
136 their effects on water quality are important issues for megacities (Zhao et al., 2016).  
137 Both green and grey water will be addressed in our future work. For blue water, we  
138 applied consumptive water use rather than water withdrawal/use. The difference  
139 between consumptive water use and water withdrawal/use is that consumptive water  
140 use excludes the part of a diverted flow that is not consumptively used and returned to  
141 its original source or another body of water i.e. return flows  
142 (<http://water.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html>). The sectoral water use data for all  
143 provinces was obtained according to Zhao et al. (2018). We then multiplied the sectoral  
144 water use data by the water consumption coefficient for that sector to acquire sectoral  
145 water consumption data. The water consumption coefficient is taken from the Water  
146 Resource Bulletin in different provinces. It is worth noting our study of the six Chinese  
147 megacities took into consideration all urban districts, including all counties within the  
148 cities' jurisdiction. This means these megacities also rely on their counties to provide  
149 physical and virtual water resources to the urban area.

150 The Water Stress Index (WSI) as a water scarcity indicator was used to evaluate  
 151 the vulnerability of a megacities' water resource networks. Derived from Pfister et al.  
 152 (2009), the WSI was developed through the WaterGAP2 global model with a spatial  
 153 resolution of 0.5°. Pfister et al. (2009) adapted the water withdrawal-to-availability  
 154 indicator applying a logistic function to acquire continuous values between 0.01 and 1  
 155 for WSI. Hence, four levels of water stress were described in WSI i.e. Minor (0.01-0.09);  
 156 Moderate (0.09-0.5); Severe (0.5-0.91); and Extreme (0.91-1). The WSI in Pfister et al  
 157 (2009) are presented at the grid level. In order to achieve the provincial and megacity  
 158 level WSI, we aggregated the WSI values to the provincial and megacity level in China  
 159 using the arithmetic average of grid WSI within that province or megacity.

## 160 **2.2 Combining leverage and vulnerability assessment with the multi-** 161 **region input-output model**

162 We utilise the “Water Embodied in Trade” approach with the MRIO table to  
 163 quantify both internal and external blue water footprint (BWF) in China's megacities  
 164 (Feng et al., 2011, Zhao et al., 2016). A detailed illustration of the “Water Embodied in  
 165 Trade” approach can be found in Zhao et al. (2016). The BWF is the sum of the internal  
 166 BWF and external BWF. In order to quantify the BWF of city  $r$ , direct water use  
 167 intensity is introduced, which is the blue water consumption  $w^r$  of each sector per unit  
 168 of their total output  $\mathbf{x}^r$ , i.e.  $\mathbf{d}^r = \mathbf{w}^r \cdot (\mathbf{x}^r)^{-1}$ . Hence, the internal and external BWF can  
 169 be expressed as:

$$170 \quad \mathbf{ibwf}^r = \mathbf{d}^r (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}^{rr})^{-1} \mathbf{y}^{rr} \quad (2)$$

171 
$$\mathbf{ebwf}^r = \sum_{s \neq r} \mathbf{d}^s (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}^{ss})^{-1} \mathbf{e}^{sr} \quad (3)$$

172 Where  $\mathbf{ibwf}^r$  and  $\mathbf{ebwf}^r$  are the internal and external BWF of city  $r$ , respectively,  $\mathbf{d}^r$   
 173 and  $\mathbf{d}^s$  are direct water use intensity of city  $r$  and region  $s$ ,  $\mathbf{I}$  is the unit matrix,  
 174  $\mathbf{A}^{rr} = \mathbf{Z}^{rr} \cdot (\mathbf{x}^r)^{-1}$  is the technical coefficient of city  $r$ , representing the intermediate  
 175 inputs  $\mathbf{Z}^{rr}$  of each sector per unit of their total output  $\mathbf{x}^r$  of city  $r$ .  $\mathbf{y}^{rr}$  is the final  
 176 demand of city  $r$  derived from local production of city  $r$ .  $\mathbf{A}^{ss}$  is the technical  
 177 coefficient of regions  $s$ , and  $\mathbf{e}^{sr}$  represents the exports of region  $s$  to fulfill the final  
 178 demand of city  $r$ .

179 Megacity leverage to external water resources is two-fold. First, megacities may  
 180 leverage the import of more virtual water, rather than use their own local physical water  
 181 supplies to support the production of final consumption. Such leverage may be defined  
 182 as water volume leverage (WVL). The WVL is used to measure the extent to which a  
 183 megacity has access to external water resources. The WVL of city  $r$  can be expressed  
 184 as the ratio between external BWF (or blue virtual water import) and physical water  
 185 consumption:

186 
$$WVL^r = \frac{\sum EBWF^r}{PWC^r} \quad (4)$$

187 Where  $WVL^r$  is the WVL of city  $r$ ,  $EBWF^r$  is the external BWF of city  $r$ , and  $PWC^r$   
 188 is the physical water consumption of city  $r$ , including water use for production and for  
 189 domestic use.

190 Comparing the leverage on water quantity, cities also have the leverage to use  
 191 water more economic efficiently (Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016), i.e.

192 cities may have larger economic water productivity. For example, Zhao et al. (2016)  
 193 found that every 1 m<sup>3</sup> of water used in the megacity Shanghai on average produces  
 194 1000 Chinese Yuan of products, but only produces 111 Chinese Yuan of products  
 195 imported from other provinces. Such leverage, termed Water Productivity Leverage  
 196 (WPL) in this paper, helps the megacities import low value products, and make use  
 197 their own limited water supply to produce high value products. The WPL is used to  
 198 evaluate the extent to which a megacity has the leverage to import low value water-  
 199 intensive products and use its own limited water resources to produce high value  
 200 products (Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016, Zhao et al., 2016). The WPL of city  $r$  ( $WVL^r$ )  
 201 is calculated as the ratio between value intensity of exports ( $vie^r$ ) and value intensity  
 202 of imports ( $vii^r$ ), i.e.  $WPL^r = \frac{vie^r}{vii^r}$ . The value intensity measures how much goods and  
 203 services can be produced in terms of value per unit water consumption (direct and  
 204 indirect).  $vii^r$  and  $vie^r$  may be obtained as follows:

$$205 \quad vii^r = \sum_{s \neq r} \mathbf{e}^{sr} / \sum_j \mathbf{vwi}^r \quad (5)$$

$$206 \quad vie^r = \sum_j \sum_{s \neq r} \mathbf{e}^{rs} / \sum_j \mathbf{vwe}^r \quad (6)$$

207 Where  $\sum_j \mathbf{vwi}^r$  and  $\sum_j \mathbf{vwe}^r$  are the sum of virtual water import and export of city  
 208  $r$  for  $j$  sectors.

### 209 **2.3 Measuring the vulnerability of megacity water resource networks**

210 Megacity water resource networks are more vulnerable when their water demand  
 211 is sourced in regions with higher water stress (Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016). In order  
 212 to evaluate this vulnerability, megacity water footprint must be linked to the water

213 scarcity situation where the water is consumed. When the BWF is weighted by the water  
 214 scarcity indicator of the region where the water consumption is located, this new  
 215 indicator may be termed the blue water scarcity footprint (BWSF). The BWSF is an  
 216 appropriate indicator showing the impact of water consumption on water scarcity (Hess  
 217 et al. , 2015, Ridoutt and Pfister, 2010), and can be used to measure the vulnerability of  
 218 megacity water resource networks. For example, two megacities may have the same  
 219 external BWF, but the megacity with the higher external BWSF is more vulnerable to  
 220 its external water sources.

221 Both physical water supply and virtual water supply (external BWF) constitute  
 222 megacities' water resource networks. Hence, physical water consumption and external  
 223 BWF impact on a megacity's internal and external water availability, respectively. The  
 224 vulnerability of a megacities' water resources network can therefore be classified into  
 225 direct vulnerability (vulnerable to internal water shortages) and indirect vulnerability  
 226 (vulnerable to external water shortages). Direct vulnerability of city  $r$  ( $DV^r$ ) is the  
 227 water stress index (WSI) of city  $r$  weighted by the ratio of city's physical water  
 228 consumption to its total physical and virtual water supply:

$$229 \quad DV^r = DWSI^r \times \left( \frac{PWC^r}{EBWF^r + PWC^r} \right) \quad (7)$$

230 Where  $DWSI^r$  is the WSI of city  $r$ .  $PWC^r$  and  $EBWF^r$  are physical water  
 231 consumption and external BWF of city  $r$ , respectively.

232 Indirect vulnerability of city  $r$  ( $IV^r$ ) is the indirect water stress index (IWSI) of  
 233 city  $r$  weighted by the ratio of city's external BWF to its total physical and virtual water

234 supply:

$$235 \quad IV^r = IWSI^r \times \left( \frac{EBWF^r}{EBWF^r + PWC^r} \right) \quad (8)$$

236 Where  $IWSI^r$  is the IWSI of city  $r$ , which can be quantified as the ratio between external  
237 BWSF and external BWF of city  $r$ :

$$238 \quad IWSI^r = \frac{EBWSF^r}{EBWF^r} = \sum_{s \neq r} \frac{VWE^{s-r} \times DWSI^s}{\sum_{s \neq r} VWE^{s-r}} \quad (9)$$

239 Where  $EBWSF^r$  and  $EBWF^r$  are external BWSF and BWF of city  $r$ ,  $VWE^{s-r}$  is the  
240 virtual water export from region  $s$  to city  $r$ , and  $DWSI^s$  is the WSI of region  $s$ .

241 Thus, the total vulnerability of city  $r$  ( $TV^r$ ) is the combination of its direct  
242 vulnerability and indirect vulnerability:

$$243 \quad TV^r = IV^r + DV^r \quad (10)$$

244 Similar to WSI, total vulnerability may also be classified as four levels, i.e. Minor  
245 (0.01-0.09); Moderate (0.09-0.5); Severe (0.5-0.91); and Extreme (0.91-1).

246 As can be seen from equation (7) and (8), direct vulnerability of city  $r$  is positively  
247 correlated with the city's WSI and physical water consumption, whilst indirect  
248 vulnerability of city  $r$  is positively correlated with the city's IWSI and external BWF.


## 249 **3. Results**

### 250 **3.1. The characteristics of physical and virtual water resource** 251 **networks in China's megacities**

252 The characteristics of physical and virtual blue water flows in China's six  
253 megacity water resource networks are shown in Fig. 1. The physical water consumption

254 within the boundary of each megacity is partly consumed for domestic water demand,  
255 and partly for production of goods and services. Once consumed in the production  
256 process, water is turned from its “physical form” to its “virtual form” and flows through  
257 the supply chain. This virtual water embodiment may then be further disaggregated to  
258 blue virtual water export and internal BWF (Fig. 1). The other source of virtual water  
259 is external BWF (i.e. blue virtual water imports), flowing from exporting regions  
260 outside the megacity boundary. Hence, the total BWF is the sum of the internal BWF  
261 and external BWF.

262 Quantitatively, the total BWF of the six Chinese megacities amounted to  $30.4 \text{ km}^3$ .  
263 These megacities, having 8.1% of the national population, consumed 11.1% of national  
264 BWF. The total external BWF of the six megacities was  $24.5 \text{ km}^3$ , which was almost  
265 twice their physical water consumption, and accounted for 80.7% of the total BWF. The  
266 total physical water consumption within the boundaries of these megacities was  $12.5$   
267  $\text{km}^3$ , comprising  $3.3 \text{ km}^3$  for domestic use and  $9.2 \text{ km}^3$  of virtual water used for  
268 production. This virtual water embodiment derived from local physical water supply  
269 can be further divided to  $3.3 \text{ km}^3$  of blue virtual water export and  $5.9 \text{ km}^3$  of internal  
270 BWF.



271

272

**Fig. 1. Physical and virtual blue water flows in China’s megacity water**

273

**resource networks**

274

The physical and virtual water flows in the water resource networks of the six

275

megacities are different in volume and distribution. Fig. 1 shows the numerical

276

relationships between BWF, external BWF, internal BWF, and physical water

277

consumption for each megacity. Shanghai had the largest BWF (10.3 km<sup>3</sup>), followed by

278

Beijing (5.4 km<sup>3</sup>), Tianjin (5.3 km<sup>3</sup>), Chongqing (4.0 km<sup>3</sup>), Guangzhou (3.5 km<sup>3</sup>), and


279 Shenzhen (1.8 km<sup>3</sup>). For most of the studied megacities, the BWF consists of a larger  
280 proportion of external BWF and smaller proportion of internal BWF. Chongqing was  
281 the exception, having a slightly larger share of internal BWF accounting for 51.9% of  
282 its BWF. Chongqing also had the largest physical water consumption (4.1 km<sup>3</sup>),  
283 followed by Shanghai (2.3 km<sup>3</sup>), Beijing (2.1 km<sup>3</sup>), Guangzhou (2.0 km<sup>3</sup>), Tianjin (1.5  
284 km<sup>3</sup>), and Shenzhen (0.5 km<sup>3</sup>). For all megacities, most of their physical water  
285 consumption is transformed into virtual water flow, and these virtual water flows were  
286 mostly consumed as internal BWF. In addition, all megacity blue virtual water exports  
287 were lower than their virtual water imports.

### 288 **3.2 Blue water footprint in sectorial detail**

289 Based on our accounting framework, the total BWF may be disaggregated to  
290 sectoral level BWF (Table A1). For each megacity, the agricultural BWF formed the  
291 largest component of their total BWF (Fig. 1); the share ranging from 40.25%  
292 (Guangzhou) to 57.37% (Shanghai). The second largest sectoral BWF for each  
293 megacity was “Food and tobacco processing”, ranging from 11.12% (Guangzhou) to  
294 16.82% (Chongqing) of the total BWF of the respective cities. The large BWF of this  
295 sector is due to overwhelmingly water input from agricultural sector as intermediate  
296 demand. Indeed, the processing of this sector only generated 4% of the BWF, and the  
297 production of the intermediate agricultural products generated 94% of the BWF. Beijing,  
298 Tianjin and Shanghai had relatively smaller shares of BWF for their industrial sectors,  
299 ranging from 34.03% to 34.47%. In comparison, Guangzhou, Chongqing, and

300 Shenzhen had larger share of industrial BWF, ranging from 43.91% (Shenzhen) to  
 301 52.14% (Guangzhou). Summing up sectoral BWF for all the megacities, the sectors  
 302 with the largest share of BWF were “Agriculture” (51.75%), “Food and tobacco  
 303 processing” (13.69%), “Construction”(3.68%), “Hotels, food and beverage  
 304 places”(3.55%), “Chemicals”(3.27%), “Other services”(3.13%), and “Textile industry”  
 305 (2.98%).

### 306 3.3. External blue water footprint in regional and sectorial detail



307  
 308 **Fig. 2. Top blue virtual water flows to selected megacities: Beijing and Tianjin**  
 309 **versus Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The black arrows show the virtual water flows**  
 310 **from virtual water exporting provinces to the megacities, and the width of the**  
 311 **arrows show the magnitude of virtual water flow.**

312 The provinces from which the six studied megacities imported the largest volumes  
 313 of blue virtual water were Xinjiang, Hebei, Anhui, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Inner  
 314 Mongolia, Shandong, Guangxi, Guangdong other, and Hunan respectively (Table A2).

315 These top 10 provinces cumulatively accounted for 68.0% of the external BWF of the  
316 six megacities. Amongst these 10 provinces, the top 7 provinces are located in northern  
317 China, or the border area between northern and southern China (Anhui and Jiangsu).  
318 Megacities in different geographical locations in China imported large volumes of blue  
319 virtual water from different provinces. Taking two northern cities (Beijing and Tianjin)  
320 and southern cities (Shenzhen and Guangzhou) as examples (Fig. 2), Beijing and  
321 Tianjin imported their largest amounts of blue virtual water from northern China or the  
322 north-south border areas, i.e. Xinjiang, Hebei, Anhui, Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia,  
323 Heilongjiang, and Shandong, accounting for 65.6% of their external BWF. In contrast,  
324 Guangzhou and Shenzhen imported their largest blue virtual water from areas of  
325 southern China i.e. Guangdong other, Hunan, Guangxi, Hubei, Yunnan, Jiangxi, and  
326 Guizhou, amounting to 59.0% of external BWF for these two megacities.

327 When examining the external BWF for all the megacities at sectoral level, we  
328 found that the external BWF of “Agriculture” and “Food and tobacco processing” had  
329 an even larger share, accounting for 56.63% and 15.54% of the total external BWF of  
330 all the megacities. This result indicates that blue virtual water was imported mainly to  
331 satisfy the food demands of the six megacities. The sectors having the largest share of  
332 BWF also had the largest share of external BWF except for “Construction”, which  
333 accounted for only 0.36% of total external BWF.

### 334 **3.4. Megacity leverage to external water resources**

335 Megacity quantitative leverage to external water resources is expressed through

336 the ratio between external BWF and physical water consumption. According to Table  
337 1, five of the studied megacities had a WVL larger than 1 meaning these cities have  
338 consumed more external virtual water resources than their own physical water supplies  
339 in order to satisfy final consumption. For example, Shanghai with the largest WVL  
340 (4.01) of the six megacities, gained greater leverage to import virtual water, but was  
341 also more susceptible to changes to the external water resources on which it also  
342 depends.

343 The WPL shows megacity leverage towards greater economic efficient use of  
344 water. The results of WPL analysis varied significantly, ranging from 1.76 (Chongqing)  
345 to 77.97 (Shenzhen) (Table 1), mainly due to the large differences in value intensity of  
346 exports between the six megacities. As shown in Table 1, the value intensity of imports  
347 ranged relatively narrowly between 26 USD/m<sup>3</sup> (USD: US dollar) and 35 USD/m<sup>3</sup>,  
348 whereas the value intensity of exports ranged much more significantly between 49  
349 USD/m<sup>3</sup> to 2,224 USD/m<sup>3</sup>. These two indicators, calculated according to equation (5)  
350 and (6), signify the average value created by the imported or exported products from  
351 consumption of 1 m<sup>3</sup> of water. Taking Shenzhen as an example, 1 m<sup>3</sup> of imported virtual  
352 water produced just 29 USD of products, whereas the same amount of exported virtual  
353 water created 2,224 USD of products. This means Shenzhen enjoys great leverage over  
354 its importation of products with low value intensity, and uses its physical water supply  
355 to produce products with high value intensity.


356 **Table 1 Water Volume Leverage and Water Productivity Leverage of the studied**  
357 **megacities**

	Water Leverage (WVL)	Volume Imports (VII) Unit: USD/m <sup>3</sup>	Value Intensity of Exports (VIE) Unit: USD/m <sup>3</sup>	Water Leverage (WPL=VIE/VII)	Productivity
<b>Beijing</b>	2.28	28	334	12.09	
<b>Tianjin</b>	3.17	26	233	8.92	
<b>Shanghai</b>	4.01	24	324	13.30	
<b>Guangzhou</b>	1.19	35	219	6.35	
<b>Shenzhen</b>	3.22	29	2224	77.97	
<b>Chongqing</b>	0.47	28	49	1.76	

### 358 **3.5. The vulnerability of megacity water resource networks**

359 The total vulnerability of a megacity's water footprint is determined by its physical  
360 water consumption, internal and external BWF, and BWSF (Eq. 7-10). Comparing the  
361 BWF and BWSF of the six megacities (Fig. 3), we found that Tianjin and Beijing  
362 (located in northern China), and Shanghai (located in the border region between  
363 northern and southern China) had larger BWF and BWF per capita than the other three  
364 megacities located in southern China, namely Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Chongqing.  
365 However, this difference is not significant: for example, Chongqing had the largest  
366 internal BWF among all the studied megacities, and the per capita BWF of Guangzhou  
367 was close to that of Beijing. In contrast, the BWSF and per capita BWSF of Shanghai,  
368 Beijing, and Tianjin were significantly larger than those of the southern megacities.  
369 Such large discrepancies may be explained by both the large DWSI and IWSI of  
370 Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin (Table 2). As for DWSI, the megacities located in  
371 northern China i.e. Beijing and Tianjin have the highest DWSI, followed by Shanghai  
372 (0.795). In contrast, the megacities located in southern China i.e. Guangzhou, Shenzhen,  
373 and Chongqing all had DWSI lower than 0.1 (minor water stress). The differences on  
374 the spatial pattern of virtual water import have substantial impact on the indirect water

375 stress index (IWSI) of these megacities. The cities with higher DWSI also had higher  
 376 IWSI. This is mainly because the blue virtual water imports of Beijing, Tianjin, and  
 377 Shanghai imported more of their BWF from the water scarce regions of northern China  
 378 (Fig. 2).



379  
 380 **Fig. 3. Comparison of blue water footprint (BWF) and blue scarcity water**  
 381 **footprint (BWSF) in both volumetric and per capita terms. (The m<sup>3</sup>/per capita of**  
 382 **each megacity was calculated through dividing BWF or BWSF by population of**  
 383 **that city.)**

384 The results of direct, indirect and total vulnerability of the six megacities are  
 385 shown in Table 2. The megacities located in southern China all had smaller direct,  
 386 indirect and total vulnerability. Whilst the total vulnerability of Beijing, Tianjin, and  
 387 Shanghai were classified as severe, for the other three southern megacities it was  
 388 classified as moderate. All megacities had larger indirect vulnerability than their direct  
 389 vulnerability. Interestingly, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai all had larger DWSI than  
 390 IWSI, but these three megacities still had lower direct than indirect vulnerability. This

391 may be explained by the larger share of external BWF or higher WVL of these  
 392 megacities, which indicates that higher WVL will raise the indirect vulnerability of  
 393 megacities. From another point of view, a higher WVL helps to decrease the total  
 394 vulnerability of water scarce megacities. For example, according to equation (7-10),  
 395 and assuming that Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin had no imports from other provinces,  
 396 their indirect vulnerability would be zero, and their total vulnerability would then be  
 397 equal to their direct vulnerability. This means the total vulnerability of these three cities  
 398 based on a no trade assumption would be 1, 1, and 0.795 respectively (Table 2).  
 399 Comparing the existing total vulnerability, we can deduce that virtual blue water  
 400 imports have helped these cities decrease their total vulnerability by 39%, 33%, and 28%  
 401 respectively.

402 **Table 2 Water stress index and vulnerability of the six megacities**

	<b>Direct Water Stress Index (DWSI)</b>	<b>Indirect Water Stress Index (IWSI)</b>	<b>Direct Vulnerability (DV)</b>	<b>Indirect Vulnerability (IV)</b>	<b>Total Vulnerability (TV)</b>
<b>Beijing</b>	1	0.45	0.30	0.31	0.61
<b>Tianjin</b>	1	0.57	0.24	0.43	0.67
<b>Shanghai</b>	0.795	0.52	0.16	0.41	0.57
<b>Guangzhou</b>	0.078	0.20	0.04	0.11	0.15
<b>Shenzhen</b>	0.078	0.23	0.02	0.17	0.19
<b>Chongqing</b>	0.021	0.32	0.01	0.10	0.12

403 We may further analyze the contribution of provinces and sectors to the indirect  
 404 vulnerability of each megacity. Contributions of different provinces to indirect  
 405 vulnerability were shown in Table A3. Xinjiang, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, and  
 406 Ningxia contributed the most to indirect vulnerability. For example, 54.3 % of Tianjin’s  
 407 indirect vulnerability came from Xinjiang, and 17% of Guangzhou’s indirect

408 vulnerability came from Jiangsu. Contribution from “Agriculture” to indirect  
409 vulnerability was the largest for each city, ranging from 46.2% (Guangzhou) to 70.7%  
410 (Shanghai) (Table A4). Other sectors contributing great to indirect vulnerability of the  
411 six megacities were “Food and Tobacco Processing”, “Textile Industry”, and  
412 “Chemicals”.

## 413 **4. Discussion**

### 414 **4.1 Understanding the water demand of megacities through their** 415 **water resource networks**

416 The water resource networks proposed in this study include both physical and  
417 virtual water supplies. Understanding such networks help to comprehensively identify  
418 the path of water flow in megacities from supply side to end users, and with sectoral  
419 levels of detail. The end-use water demand of megacities may be categorised as  
420 domestic water consumption, BWF, and virtual water export (Fig. 1). We found that  
421 BWF was the largest driver of megacity water supply, accounting for 82.1% of total  
422 physical and virtual water inflows to the studied megacity water resource networks. For  
423 the six megacities, almost half of their physical water was transformed to virtual water  
424 in support of their BWF, but that this transformed virtual water only made up 19.3% of  
425 the total BWF. Hence, megacities need to import large volumes of virtual water to  
426 balance physical water shortages.

427 The water resource networks were built based on a MRIO approach. One of the  
428 advantages of input-output analysis is to provide a comprehensive coverage of all

429 relevant goods and services and their interrelationships for water footprint accounting  
430 (Daniels et al. , 2011). Looking in sectoral detail, we found the “food related sectors”  
431 i.e. “Agriculture”, “Food and tobacco processing”, and “Hotels, food and beverage”  
432 (Zhao et al., 2016), contributed most to the BWF, together accounting for 69% of total  
433 BWF. The large BWF of the latter two sectors is because they used a large amount of  
434 agricultural products as their intermediate input. Overall, this illustrates the  
435 overwhelming demand of megacities for food related products dominates their total  
436 water demand.

437 It worth noting that the megacities’ BWF of “Electricity and heating power  
438 production and supply” only accounted for 1.5% of total BWF. This results are  
439 consistent with previous finding that consumptive water use in electricity supply  
440 generates a small amount of water consumption but large amount of water withdrawal  
441 (Zhang et al., 2016, Zhang and Anadon, 2013). The difference is mainly because the  
442 popular once-through cooling technology used in thermal power plants need huge  
443 amount of water withdrawal but later return most of the water to the sources.

#### 444 **4.2 Urban agriculture are key determinants in the vulnerability of** 445 **megacity water resource networks**

446 Historically, a city’s food supply is mainly provided through agricultural activity  
447 located in its urban district (Zezza and Tasciotti, 2010). Such a pattern remains evident  
448 for Chongqing, which has the largest urban farmland amongst the studied megacities  
449 enabling it to meet large proportion of its food consumption demands, with a

450 correspondingly large physical water consumption. Chongqing's urban area is 5,475  
451 km<sup>2</sup>, but its urban district area (mostly comprising counties with agricultural land) is  
452 82,135 km<sup>2</sup>. The second largest urban district area in our study belongs to Beijing,  
453 which has only 16,411 km<sup>3</sup>. Relying more on urban agriculture can explain why  
454 Chongqing had the lowest WVL and WPL, since the agricultural sector uses the largest  
455 amount of water and contributes least to urban GDP growth. However, it is difficult for  
456 megacities such as Chongqing to maintain their urban agriculture since the main  
457 priority for megacities is economic development. For example, an index decomposition  
458 analysis found that recent economic development in Suzhou, a large city located to the  
459 west of Shanghai, compressed the agricultural crop area, decreased its internal BWF,  
460 and hence increased its external BWF (Zhao et al., 2017).

461 In addition, we found that megacities externalise their BWF mainly to nearby  
462 provinces, which may be viewed as an extension of the megacities' farmland. This  
463 might be because nearby provinces have similar climatic conditions and dietary habits.  
464 Such a finding suggests that megacities in water scarcity status are more vulnerable  
465 than previously thought since their surrounding regions might also be in scarcity status.  
466 For example, Beijing and Tianjin both imported large amounts of blue virtual water  
467 from their neighboring province i.e. Hebei Province, which is in extreme water stress,  
468 but exported the second largest amount of blue virtual water among all provinces to the  
469 six megacities. Hence, it is important for water scarce megacities not only to manage  
470 their internal agriculture, but also to pay attention to their nearby agriculture in other

471 provinces. China's strategy of "coordinated development for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei  
472 region", initiated in 2015, provides an opportunity to manage the agriculture and water  
473 supply for the whole region. The strategy aims to achieve balanced development  
474 between Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei through a series of actions, given that the  
475 development of Hebei is far behind Beijing and Tianjin. Since one of the goals of the  
476 strategy is to solve the region's resource and environmental problems together through  
477 integrated planning and cooperation, we suggest here to develop a framework under the  
478 strategy to compensate for the water loss suffered by Hebei Province due to virtual  
479 water exports to Beijing and Tianjin. Such framework could act as a pilot example for  
480 water scarce megacities around the world.

### 481 **4.3 Internalizing the risk of virtual water supply beyond the city** 482 **boundary**

483 An important question for urban water planners is that will relying on external water  
484 resources increase or decrease the total vulnerability of cities' water resource networks?  
485 To answer this question, we established an accounting framework using a MRIO table  
486 to better understand the role of external BWF on the vulnerability of megacity physical  
487 and virtual water resource networks. The results showed that for those megacities with  
488 extreme water stress i.e. Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, relying on external water  
489 resources helped to decrease direct and total vulnerability, but at the price of increasing  
490 their indirect vulnerability. Hence, the vulnerability index provides an opportunity for  
491 urban water planners to internalize the risk of virtual water supply beyond the city

492 boundary i.e. ‘managing’ the indirect vulnerability.

493 Beijing and Tianjin, in extreme water stress, have made great efforts to reduce the  
494 risk to their physical water supplies following the “limit city scale with water  
495 constraints” initiative, which was first proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in  
496 2014 (Zhang et al., 2018). This initiative requires the city to monitor its population  
497 based on domestic water demand and its corresponding capacity of providing physical  
498 water. Such action may help control limited physical water demand, and in the  
499 meanwhile contribute indirectly to BWF reduction. However, population control in  
500 itself will not decrease per capita water demand from consumption of goods and  
501 services, thus can only partially decrease the BWF and vulnerability. Hence, it is  
502 recommended that megacities in extreme water stress take action to decrease their  
503 indirect vulnerability to their water resource networks. This requires megacities to  
504 pinpoint hotspots of large virtual water exporters in extreme water stress within their  
505 supply chain, and choose alternative exporting regions with less water stress.  
506 Megacities may thus act to internalize, and manage their indirect vulnerability through  
507 integrated cooperation with water stressed exporting regions. Zhao et al. (2016)  
508 suggested that megacities could provide fiscal aids to support water saving actions in  
509 large water stressed exporting regions first through pilot project and then roll out  
510 nationally. Since Xinjiang contributed the largest proportion to indirect vulnerability of  
511 water stressed megacities (about 54%, 36%, and 24% of indirect vulnerability in Tianjin,  
512 Shanghai, and Beijing were due to importing goods and services from Xinjiang),

513 Xinjiang may be chosen as the first target for fiscal aids. Our work provides a first step  
514 i.e. it provides an evaluation framework for both direct and indirect vulnerability of  
515 megacity water resource networks.

#### 516 **4.4 Limitations**

517 We recognized several limitations in this study. First, different water scarcity  
518 indicators could be used to calculate the BWSF, which may result in different vulnerability  
519 results. For example, AWARE method was recently developed by the UNEP/SETAC Life  
520 Cycle Initiative (UNEP/SETAC, 2016). The method derived water scarcity indicator  
521 through evaluating the relative water remaining in a region by subtracting human  
522 consumption and water ecosystem requirement from local renewable water availability  
523 (Boulay et al., 2017). Ridoutt et al. (2018) have used both the WSI and AWARE indicator  
524 to quantify the BWSF of Australian agricultural products with a MRIO approach. They  
525 found that AWARE and WSI are not directly comparable in absolute values, since the range  
526 of AWARE is between 0.1-100, and WSI is 0.01-1. However, they found that the BWSF  
527 using different indicators were highly correlated at sectoral level; i.e. the top sectors with  
528 the highest and lowest water scarcity footprint are consistent for the two indicators. Such  
529 finding suggest that exchanging the two indicators has no significant impact to the BWSF  
530 results. Based on the above finding, we only used the WSI indicator from Pfister et al.  
531 (2009) in this study, which has been widely applied to quantify the BWSF (Feng et al.,  
532 2014, Zhao et al., 2018). Comparing the BWSF results of different water scarcity indicator  
533 is beyond the scope of this study.

534 Second, although widely used, the MRIO modelling may result in uncertainties and  
535 errors from the approach itself, such as linear production functions, assumptions of  
536 homogeneity, sectoral aggregation, and the MRIO table compilation (Lenzen et al., 2010).  
537 For example, agriculture is aggregated into only one sector in the Chinese MRIO table due  
538 to lack of data. As a result, we were unable to carry out a detailed analysis for different  
539 agricultural products, such as crops and livestock. The link of agriculture management  
540 practices, such as improving irrigation efficiency, with megacity water vulnerability will  
541 be investigated in our future study, through using a hybrid input-output analysis (Ewing et  
542 al., 2012).

543 Last but not least, uncertainties are inevitable for consumptive water use accounting.  
544 Sectoral water consumption coefficient and water use data are multiplied to derive  
545 consumptive water use at sectoral level, which is considered as a relatively crude method  
546 (Lin et al., 2019). In addition, both water consumption coefficient and water use data were  
547 acquired from official statistics, which are sensible to the accuracy of data quality. It was  
548 estimated that statistical data in China usually has uncertainties between 5%–10% (Du et  
549 al., 2018). Overcoming such uncertainties are beyond the scope of this study.

## 550 **5. Conclusions**

551 We evaluated and compared the direct and indirect vulnerability of water resource  
552 networks for six megacities in China, based on a refined MRIO table. Our work  
553 highlights the importance of incorporating virtual water flows and “physical to virtual  
554 water transformations” in urban water resource management, so as to identify the

555 trade-offs between the leverage and vulnerability to external water resources. We  
556 found that all megacities had larger indirect vulnerability than their direct vulnerability,  
557 indicating megacities' non-negligible risk to external water shortages. Xinjiang, Hebei,  
558 Jiangsu, Shandong, and Ningxia were provinces contributing most to these megacities'  
559 indirect vulnerability. Whilst "Agriculture", "Food and Tobacco Processing", "Textile  
560 Industry", and "Chemicals" were sectors contributing most to indirect vulnerability.  
561 Megacities with extreme water stress, i.e. Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, decreased  
562 their direct vulnerability at the price of increasing indirect vulnerability, mostly due to  
563 importing large amounts of virtual blue water from nearby provinces. We thus  
564 conclude that megacities may act to first internalize, and then manage their indirect  
565 vulnerability through integrated planning and cooperation with water stressed  
566 provinces that providing goods and services to megacities. It should be noted that  
567 water quality problems also represent huge challenges for megacities and their trading  
568 partners. Our future work will focus on water quality stress and the resulting  
569 vulnerability of megacities.

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574 are available via a repository (<https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.9879473>).

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