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Should vegans compromise?

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Abstract: In two recent articles, Marcus William Hunt has posed questions about raising children as vegans. In ‘Parental Compromise’, he argues that pro-vegan-children parents should compromise with anti-vegan-children co-parents, and, in ‘Veganism and Children’, he challenges arguments in favour of vegan parenting. I argue that his pro-compromise position overlooks the idea that respect for animal rights is a duty of justice, and thus not something to be compromised on lightly. To demonstrate the plausibility of this position, I challenge his arguments that Tom Regan’s case for animal rights does not endorse vegan parenting. Nonetheless, I argue that there may be space for pro-vegan-children parents to compromise with anti-vegan-children parents over ‘unusual eating’. This seeks out unusual sources of animal protein that do not involve violations of animals’ rights.

Keywords: Veganism, compromise, parents, children, animal rights, animal ethics, food ethics

In ‘Parental Compromise’, Marcus William Hunt (2019a) argues that when parents disagree over how to raise their child, they should – if they are unable to reach a consensus – seek a compromise. For the most part, I have no quarrel with this claim, or with his conceptualisation of the nature of parental authority. However, the running example of a case

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of parental dispute is between co-parents who disagree about whether to raise their child as a vegan, and the conclusion that parents should compromise on *this particular* aspect of child-rearing is, I think, a claim that requires further attention. In this paper, I will argue that Hunt fails to consider a key concern underlying a reluctance to compromise on veganism: the *injustice* involved in the violation of animals' rights. However, I will argue that there is still space for compromise on veganism, and that a pro-vegan-children parent might – consistent with her recognition of the injustice of the violation of animals' rights – allow her child to 'eat unusually' (Fischer 2018). What this means is that compromising on veganism would not entail the consequentialist strategy of *minimising* animal products eaten, or ensuring that the products eaten are *less harmful*, but the justice-based, rightist strategy of identifying those (exceptional) animal products that do not involve harm to animals at all.

Before I begin, I note that I am not here merely picking fault with the example that Hunt chooses. Hunt devotes considerable space to considering the *particular* issues of raising children as vegans, and, indeed, has published another paper – 'Veganism and Children' – on the ethics of raising children as vegans (Hunt 2019b). As such, I take it that this is not an example incidental to his argument, but a genuine, core concern for him. Even if it were not, however, it is an important issue that has been under-discussed in the academic literature. Prior to Hunt's papers, a dispute in the 1990s and 2000s between Kathryn Paxton George (e.g., 1990; 1994; 2000), a feminist critic of the idea that vegetarianism/veganism is morally mandatory, and her various interlocutors (e.g., Lucas 2005; Mangels and Havala 1994; Pluhar 1992), explored the question of the nutritional adequacy of veganism for children (among other groups) and the consequences of this putative (in)adequacy for the ethics of diet. More recently, Anna Sherratt (2007) explored several facets of the ethics of raising children as vegetarian, though the prospect of raising children as vegan was explicitly shelved. The first

published philosophical paper (of which I am aware) that defends the prospect of raising children as vegans at length is a recent comment, a response to Hunt's 'Veganism and Children', by Carlo Alvaro (2019).

This relative paucity of literature is surprising, as this is a dilemma faced by any number of vegan and vegetarian parents – and one that is potentially of interest to at least animal ethicists, food ethicists, bioethicists, and childhood ethicists. Hunt's 'Parental Compromise' is the first and only paper (to my knowledge) to seriously explore the very practical and real ethical dilemma that parents face when they sincerely disagree about raising their children as vegans, rather than the more general ethical question of whether one should support raising children as vegans. In taking this question seriously, and in offering clear and practical solutions, Hunt is to be commended – even if I think his arguments and conclusions go wrong.

Before I begin, an important caveat. I will be leaving aside arguments that veganism is in some way harmful for children. If veganism is harmful in this way, then it is *possible* that no injustice is committed in harming animals to feed children, even if animals have rights (Hunt 2019b, 285-6). By setting them aside, I do not mean to downplay the significance of these arguments, but challenging Hunt's arguments that veganism is harmful for children (2019b, 271-9) is the focus of Alvaro's piece (2019). For the purposes of this paper, then, I will assume that veganism is not harmful to children, or, at the very least, that steps can be taken to mediate this harm, so that I might focus on other aspects of Hunt's arguments.

Compromise and injustice

Despite the overarching push of his paper, Hunt believes that compromise is not *always* appropriate when co-parents disagree about how to raise their children. His particular – apt –

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example is how ‘faced with a “pro-murder” co-parent one ought not to compromise and, say, agree to command the child to conduct the occasional savage beating’ (2019a, 13). Hunt is right, but for the wrong reasons. He worries that a ‘pro-murder’ commitment is an ‘extreme’ commitment, and should be rejected for that reason (2019a, 13). Hunt defines extreme commitments (circularly) as commitments that make parental compromise impermissible. In order for the concept to be a useful one for our purposes, we need an idea of what it is that makes a pro-murder commitment (or any other) extreme independently of its relationship to parental compromise.

There is not an obvious way in which parental commitments might be ‘extreme’ in a mathematical sense – i.e., that they might be the furthest one can go in a particular direction, the largest/smallest members of a set, etc. The more colloquial sense of extremity (one particularly appropriate for describing ethico-political positions) would presumably see a view as ‘extreme’ simply if it diverges strongly from the norm. Thus, we can have those on the far left, or those on the far right; we can have pacifists, or warmongers; we can have raw vegans, or badger-baiters. All of these individuals could meaningfully be described as having ‘extreme’ commitments, but this would presumably only stand as approbation if we took the *status quo* to be normatively desirable. Extremity in this colloquial sense, I suggest, has only a tenuous relationship with morality. Presumably, all sorts of morally odious behaviours might be ‘normal’ in a given context, meaning that all sorts of morally proper ways to raise children might be ‘extreme’ (in that context). In plenty of contexts, historical and contemporary, raising daughters and sons as equals will be extreme; raising children to not be homophobes and racists will be extreme; and raising children to believe that they can freely choose their own path in life will be extreme.

What is troubling about the pro-murder position is not that it is extreme – indeed, it might not be in some historical or hypothetical society – but that it advocates, in its disrespect for people’s rights, great injustice. For many vegans, veganism similarly represents not simply something that it is morally preferable, or good, or virtuous to do, but something that justice demands of us. The language of justice has always been present in philosophical approaches to animal rights – including the classic exposition in Tom Regan’s *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983), which is replete with references to the injustice of many harms to animals – but it has come to the forefront in recent ‘political’ approaches to animal ethics. Indeed, a focus on justice is the defining and unifying feature of works in the ‘political turn’ in animal ethics (Cochrane, Garner, and O’Sullivan 2016). One of the important features of the concept of justice (for animal ethicists and political philosophers) is precisely that its entitlements are particularly pressing, and not the kind of thing that one has the option of overlooking (Garner 2013, chap. 3). The importance of this for Hunt’s pro-compromise position should be clear.

While learning to live together in the face of disagreement about morality is a (arguably, *the*) core goal for liberals, justice is different: though there may be room for disagreement about what justice requires, a failure to respect the demands of justice must be looked upon harshly. Any compromise on justice will be a tragedy, to be undertaken only in the most regrettable of circumstances. (Though, it is worth noting that these deeply regrettable circumstances may be common-place in the real world, if the real world is an unjust place. I will return to this point later.) This focus on justice in the animal-rights literature gives us two broad options for responding to Hunt. One takes it that respect for animal rights *is* a duty of justice; the other remains neutral on the moral fact of the matter, and takes it merely that one co-parent sincerely and reasonably believes that respecting animals’ rights is a duty of justice.

From the point of view of the parent in question, of course, there is no difference between these two possibilities.

Let us return to Hunt's argument. Hunt (2019a, 13) allows that, in cases of 'extreme' (and here, I read 'unjust') commitments, one should not compromise with one's co-parent, instead forcing them into a settlement, or ensuring that the child does not heed the co-parent's commands. Further, given that it is wrong to enter an agreement that one intends to break, Hunt (2019a, 13) says, one should not voluntarily become a co-parent with someone with unjust commitments. (This, too, will be returned to later.) These are both serious courses of action, and thus, for Hunt (2019a, 13), are not to be done lightly. But, in response, I suggest that unjust treatment of animals is not something to be done lightly – nor, for that matter, should entering a co-parenting relationship by choosing to have a child (or through some other route) be done lightly. To put it another way: it should not be a surprise that justice makes serious demands of us, and should not be a surprise that entering a co-parenting relationship might be something that we should not do.

Ultimately, Hunt suggests that we must either allow that raising children as meat-eaters is not extreme/unjust, or 'admit that we must be much more willing to disrupt co-parental relationships and radically narrow who it is that we are willing to form them with' (2019a, 14). Given that the latter possibility is 'more revisionary' (2019a, 14), he leans toward the former. But that a position is revisionary is not an argument against it. It is plausible – indeed, I think, obvious – that taking animals' rights seriously means revising our moral judgements. What we perhaps find when it comes to vegan parenting is a further revision entailed by animal-rights positions, and one in (perhaps) an unexpected area. And Hunt's note that 'the commitments widely agreed to be extreme are, luckily, quite rare' (2019a, 14) will be unconvincing to the committed animal rightist. We are not, for current purposes, particularly

concerned with those actions widely agreed to be extreme or unjust. We are concerned with those actions that *are* unjust, or (at least) those that co-parents sincerely take to be unjust. (In any case, I suspect that Hunt is optimistic, here; racist and sexist attitudes, for example, are hardly rare, yet might plausibly be framed as ‘extreme’ or unjust.)

Hunt (2019a, 15) allows that vegan parents could ‘bite the bullet’ and – despite its calling for serious actions – allow that it would be extreme (or unjust) to fail to raise a child as a vegan. This response, he thinks, is consistent, though he thinks it is ‘deeply implausible and that most philosophical argumentation for veganism might not support such a line’ (2019a, 15). The cases for (childhood) veganism he mentions in ‘Parental Compromise’ are care-based, virtue-ethical, relational, and utilitarian (2019a, 15). Strikingly, he does *not* mention either ‘rights-based’ or ‘justice-based’ cases for veganism, both of which appear (separately) in a list of cases for veganism in his ‘Veganism and Children’ (2019b, 281). Perhaps, then, it is *these* cases for childhood veganism that he finds ‘deeply implausible’ (2019a, 15).

Animal rights and vegan children

In ‘Veganism and Children’, Hunt argues that a Reganite case for animal rights (hereafter, *the rights view*) – whatever it says about the ethics of veganism for adults – does not entail that feeding children a non-vegan diet violates animals’ rights. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the rights view is minimally plausible. Assuming this, *if* Hunt’s conclusion about childhood veganism on the rights view can be shown to be false, *then* Hunt’s apparent supposition that it is ‘deeply implausible’ that childhood veganism is a demand of justice will be refuted. (A wide range of other animal-rights positions would, I suggest, also entail that there is injustice in the routine killing of animals to feed children; I have focussed on the

rights view solely because it is the one that Hunt uses to argue that respect for animal rights does not entail childhood veganism.)

On the rights view, many animals are subjects-of-a-life. This means that they are entitled to respect, including not being made to suffer, not being killed, and not being treated as mere replaceable resources. Unsurprisingly, Regan concludes that the ultimate goal of his rights view is the total dissolution of animal agriculture as we know it, and the end of hunting, trapping, and fishing (Regan 1983, §§9.1-2). If this the the ultimate end of the rights view, then it may seem a fair assumption that it prohibits the use of animals for food for adults *or* children. It is against this assumption that Hunt argues.

Hunt observes that, for Regan, moral patients (that is, beings owed moral consideration who are not moral agents, and so who cannot act upon moral reasons) cannot violate rights (Hunt 2019b, 283; Regan 1983, 152). Thus, Hunt surmises, children cannot violate rights, and so, ‘in a *Lord of the Flies* type situation a child would not violate the right of a pig not to be harmed if the child killed the pig (even if other food sources were available for the child)’ (2019b, 283). Leaving aside the complicated matter of killing for food in survival situations, Hunt goes wrong in assuming that the children of *Lord of the Flies* entirely lack moral agency. In fact, paradigmatic adolescents are able to deliberate on moral matters – and Ralph, Piggy, and the rest are certainly not exceptions, even if their moral choices may have been suboptimal. (Hunt surely accepts this, as he recognises that ‘the moral patient/moral agent distinction is plausibly scalar, since children slowly develop from the one state to the other’ (2019b, 286).) Nonetheless, the broad point that, on the rights view, very young children are incapable of violating rights – and perhaps that older children are *less* responsible for their actions than paradigmatic adults – is correct.

Hunt argues that ‘if *ex hypothesi* children cannot violate the right of an animal not to be harmed, then there is no reason based in respect for the animal’s rights for the parent to forbid the child from killing’ the animal (2019b, 284). Indeed, parents might permissibly give permission for children to kill animals, as ‘[i]t would seem strange to say that it is wrong for a parent to permit a child to do something that is not wrong for the child to do’ (2019b, 284).

Hunt makes at least two mistakes, here. The first is to simply assume that the *proximate cause* of the animals’ death – that is, in this case, the child – is the only entity that might be *responsible* for the animals’ death. It might be that the animal is a victim of injustice, but that the responsible party is someone *other* than the being who dealt the killing blow, as it were. A relatively straightforward example of how this is possible is provided by the thought of a dog mauling a child. Granted that, for Regan, the dog is a moral patient, and thus unable to violate rights. But it would not be unreasonable (for Regan or *per se*) to hold the human guardian of the dog responsible for the mauling, especially if (though perhaps not only if) they had set the dog upon the child, or negligently left their aggressive dog near a child. If the guardian stood up in court and declared that the dog could not violate the child’s rights, and thus she did nothing wrong in failing to forbid the dog from mauling the child, or else that she did nothing wrong in actively *permitting* the mauling of the child, we would not find her appeals even minimally compelling.

This case is a structurally identical case to the parent who fails to forbid, or actively permits, a child to kill an animal. We might (or might not) allow that the child’s parent or dog’s guardian is *less* responsible for the killing than they would be had they done it themselves (see Milburn 2015), but all this shows is that responsibility for an action – like moral agency itself – is scalar rather than binary. Hunt (personal correspondence) agrees with my conclusion about dogs mauling children, but worries that to consistently reach this

conclusion within Regan's framework, we must open the door to less intuitive conclusions, such as guardians of cats having (a degree of) moral responsibility for their cats' killing of mice. In response, I suggest that this is actually perfectly reasonable, and, indeed, I have defended this view elsewhere – not merely as a reading of Regan, but as a plausible position in its own right (Milburn 2015). And I am not the only advocate of animal rights who raises concerns about the predatory activity of companion animals (e.g., Cochrane 2018, 95; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 150); counter-intuitive or not, the idea that humans have a degree of responsibility for the harms their companion animals inflict upon other animals is not an unusual one in animal-rights theory.

The second mistake Hunt makes is to suggest that permitting a child to kill an animal is anything like the real-world cases of parents feeding their children non-vegan foods. Realistic moral cases of non-vegan children are not cases in which non-agent children are about to kill an animal and parents can intervene or not. It is not even a case of a non-agent child about to purchase non-vegan food. Children's food is bought (or otherwise acquired) and prepared by others – especially their parents. And these others – regardless of whether or not they are themselves eating the food they purchase (or otherwise acquire) and prepare – might reasonably be held responsible for rights violations in the food's production. (Let us leave aside, here, complicated questions about the moral responsibility of consumers.) This does mean, I accept, that it may not always be the parents who are morally responsible for the food provided to their children; perhaps, for instance, parents could be held non-responsible (or could be held only minimally responsible) if a child was fed non-vegan foods at a friend's house, or in school. But this does not change the fact that the parents can be considered morally responsible for harms caused by the child's diet when they (the parents) are themselves purchasing the food. Hunt (personal correspondence) suggests that the trouble

with this argument is that it leads to counter-intuitive conclusions about the ethics of feeding meat to companion (and other) animals – namely, that it is generally impermissible to feed companions meat. Though, again, I do not see this as a difficult bullet to bite, and I am an advocate of feeding companion animals a plant-based diet when possible (see Milburn 2017). And again, the idea that companions should be fed a vegan diet is not a particularly unusual one in contemporary animal-rights theory (e.g., Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 149; Francione 2018, 508-9).

As such, I suggest that the question of whether the child can violate rights should not even arise when we discuss the ethics of vegan parenting. The plausibility of this view can be underlined by a comparison to a theft case: even if a non-agent child could not be held morally responsible for taking of a toy without the owner’s permission, a parent could not claim that there has been no violation of property rights in *her* theft of a toy (that is, the parent’s theft of a toy) because she gave the toy to her non-agent child. Equally, a parent cannot claim that she has no responsibility for the death of an animal purely because she fed the animal to her child, rather than to herself.

We have reached the conclusion that children’s lack of agency – when children do lack agency – does not entail that parents may unproblematically feed said children animal products on the rights view. Hunt is wrong to claim otherwise.

No compromise?

Let us recap. Hunt holds that parents who disagree about whether to raise their children as vegans should seek a compromise. I have argued that, if animal rights are a matter of justice (or: if sincerely and reasonably believed to be a matter of justice by one of the co-parents), pro-vegan-children parents should not compromise with anti-vegan-children parents (who

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may or may not have principled reasons for their anti-vegan-children stance). This is analogous to how (this is Hunt's example) anti-murder parents should not compromise with pro-murder parents. Hunt holds that this 'no compromise' position is consistent, but implausible. I have demonstrated its plausibility by rebutting his arguments that the rights view – which is a view about what justice requires – does not require parents to raise children as vegans. Assuming that the rights view is minimally plausible, this demonstrates that the position of the uncompromising vegan parent is plausible. Thus, if animal rights are a matter of justice (or are sincerely and reasonably held to be so), pro-vegan-children parents should not compromise with anti-vegan-children parents.

Perhaps there does remain space for compromise, however. On the argument that I have been developing, the *moral* positions of vegan parents may call for veganism, but *justice* calls for animal rights. *If* there is space between veganism and animal rights, *then* there is space for compromise. To put it starkly: Even if parents should not compromise on matters of justice, they should be prepared to compromise (assuming no consensus can be reached) on matters of 'mere' morality – even when 'merely' moral commitments are deeply held.

The possibility of space between veganism and animal rights is revealed by the prospect that we 'eat unusually', in the words of Bob Fischer (2018, 263). An 'unusual' diet is one that is vegan but for some very particular non-vegan foods. These foods themselves may or may not be unusual themselves. Non-vegan foods in unusual diets may include 'roadkill, bugs, bivalves, in vitro meat, [or] animal products that will be wasted' (Fischer 2018, 263). Why these things? Insects and bivalves may be unthinking and unfeeling – and if so, they are not entitled to rights on the rights view (or, indeed, other mainstream animal-rights views). Gathering roadkill and animal products that would otherwise be binned, even if these are products made from the bodies or excretions of rights-bearing animals, in no way contributes

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to harm to these animals. And *in vitro* meat, though it is surely not ‘suitable for vegans’, could plausibly be produced in the future without any animals’ rights being violated. There may be other products that could be added to this list; elsewhere, for example, Fischer (Fischer and Milburn 2019; Fischer 2019) defends the eating of eggs of hens rescued from exploitative industries. And perhaps something similar is possible when it comes to milk, or even meat – though this would be meat without slaughter, from animals who died naturally (Cochrane 2012, 86-9).

I do not mean to suggest that there is not healthy debate about *in vitro* meat, roadkill, and the rest in animal ethics. But I do mean to suggest that the debate might be primarily *moral* in character. At the very least, many advocates of animal rights could allow that there is no *injustice* in the acquisition or consumption of these things – even if they might have moral, aesthetic, or other objections. Thus, pro-vegan-children parents could justifiably reach a compromise with anti-vegan-children parents on *these* foodstuffs, even if they could not on conventionally produced animal products.

Compromising on unusual eating is preferable to the kinds of compromise that Hunt explicitly favours. He acknowledges that there is not an obvious ‘middle ground’ between veganism and non-veganism (2019a, 15), but a plant-based diet supplemented by a few fish-based meals a week is one ‘intermediate’ position proposed (2019a, 16). However, given that (according to animal rightists) fish are animals with rights, this is analogous to Hunt’s own example of the compromise with a pro-murder parent that a child be commanded ‘to conduct the occasional savage beating’ (2019a, 13). Indeed, given that it still involves some of the death and suffering of conventional non-vegan diets, perhaps it is analogous to a compromise with a pro-murder parent that a child be commanded to murder, but a little less frequently than the bloodthirsty parent might prefer. Such a compromise might well be attractive to a

consequentialist, welfarist animal ethicist – but deontological rightists are going to be less accommodating.

Another possibility proposed by Hunt is a ‘grand compromise’ (2019a, 18). This is effectively a capitulation from the non-vegan parent in exchange for a capitulation from the vegan parent in some other area of child raising. For example, a child might be raised with Parent A’s veganism, but Parent B’s Christianity. But it is wrong that a parent be forced to worsen – to appropriate diplomatic language – her negotiating position to insist upon a demand of justice. If this sounds questionable, consider the case of the pro-murder parent. There is something amiss about the anti-murder parent having to give up her commitments to raise a child with her religion, her language, her interests, and so on just to push through her non-murder commitment. The latter is a *different kind* of commitment. The idea that a child might be brought up with pro-murder commitments should simply not be a part of the negotiation. Just as it is not something that should be compromised on, it is not something that should have to be negotiated off the table. Thus, on an animal-rights view, a grand compromise by a pro-vegan-children parent to ensure her child is raised vegan is inappropriate.

Hunt (personal correspondence) has expressed sympathy with the idea of unusual eating, suggesting that, even on his view, a compromising vegan parent would want to explore this strategy before exploring a welfarist or grand compromise. Thus, even if my arguments against compromise have been unsuccessful – or even if particular pro-vegan-child parents have limited sympathy with a justice-based, rights-based case for veganism – the prospect of unusual eating is plausibly an important one for the debate about vegan parenting.

Concluding remarks

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There is reason to believe that Hunt is wrong that parents should compromise on veganism. Animals' rights are a matter of justice. Or, at least, a parent might sincerely and reasonably believe that they are. And if animals' rights are a matter of justice, and feeding a child animal products violates animals' rights, then this is not something that parents should be compromising on – just as, as Hunt accepts, parents should not compromise with 'pro-murder' parents and command children to engage in the 'occasional savage beating' (2019a, 13). Hunt suggests that it is not a reasonable belief that childhood veganism might be demanded by justice, though I have shown – through engagement with his exposition of Regan's rights view – that it is.

Despite this, there may be some room for compromise at the margins. Even if most animal products (i.e., the products of conventional animal agriculture) are off the table, as it were, perhaps parents could compromise on feeding children animal products that would otherwise go to waste, or the products of certain invertebrates, or the products of new biotechnological methods of food production, or similar. (There may also be room for compromise for reasons other than those identified by Hunt. An anonymous reviewer of this article correctly notes that in 'our existing circumstances, a diet in which no animal rights are violated is an impossibility. Hence all diets' – vegan or otherwise – 'are something of a compromise'.) This 'unusual eating' may sound like a lot of trouble for a little animal protein, and I agree – but perhaps we should not be surprised that a life taking the just treatment of animals seriously looks far-fetched in a world in which animals have long been considered mere objects for our use.

In closing, two comments are worth making about what all this means in practice. First, we must return to the significance of justice for liberals. It was not my claim that justice can *never* be compromised upon, but that a compromise on justice is a tragedy, to be

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considered only in the most regrettable of circumstances. But I also noted that, in a deeply unjust world – and let us be clear that, from an animal-rights perspective, we live in a *very* deeply unjust world – such tragic and regrettable circumstances may be common. Perhaps, then, the need to compromise on justice will be common. The lesser of two injustices, for pro-vegan-children parents, may be to engage in a grand compromise to ensure that children are raised vegan (or more-or-less vegan, allowing that unusual eating might be permissible, even if potentially not morally ideal). That way, though they unfairly must compromise on some other aspect of child-rearing, at least they will not be complicit in the injustices involved in violating animals' rights to feed their children.

This leads to the second comment. There is a sense in which, if a prospective co-parent reaches the stage of making a grand compromise, it is too late. Perhaps, in an unjust world in which vegan parents are forced to face the prospect of compromising on whether their children are fed meat, it is incumbent upon pro-vegan-children parents to make their commitments clear from the start. That their children will be vegan – or all but vegan – is not up for debate, or negotiation, or discussion, in much the same way that it is not up for debate that their children will not be raised as racists, or thieves, or hooligans. And if this is not something that prospective co-parents can accept, then they will be prospective co-parents no longer.

Anecdotally, I am aware of vegans who have drawn a line in the sand concerning their children being raised vegan, and would be prepared to not have children if this is something that would not be respected by prospective co-parents. Scholarship exists on the vegans who refuse to have sex with meat-eaters, or at least express a strong preference for sex with vegans (Potts and Parry 2010). It should thus hardly be a surprise that some committed vegans are unwilling to have children with those who would not raise these children vegan. Entering a

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co-parent relationship is, after all, a greater commitment than entering a sexual relationship or participating in a sexual encounter. My conclusion is thus comparatively modest: While I make no claim about whether vegans should be willing to enter sexual or co-parenting relationships with non-vegans, I do claim that they should be very reluctant – if they take the view that animal rights are a matter of justice – to enter into a co-parenting relationship with someone unprepared to raise children as vegans.

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Note on contributor

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