**Solidarity with Refugees: An Institutional Approach**

By the standards of most normative accounts of states’ obligations towards refugees – understood to include the prompt and fair processing of asylum applications, and the offering of initial refuge to successful applicants, and the willingness to accept a (potentially modest) ‘fair share’ of refugees – a majority of states are falling short. One likely reason for this is that public attitudes in potential refugee-receiving states are not sufficiently disposed toward meeting such obligations. One way to talk about such attitudes is in the language of solidarity. In this paper, drawing on Sally Scholz’s tripartite conception, we highlight how solidarity with refugees might be ‘social’, ‘civic’ or ‘political’ in character.[[1]](#endnote-1) How can such solidarities come about? They may have several generative sources. One such potential source is rationalist in character, wherein we reason our way to moral commitments to refugees which possess intrinsic motivational force. A second potential source is sentimentalist, wherein solidarity develops by means of the stimulation of our emotions.[[2]](#endnote-2) In this paper, however, we focus on institutions as a third potential route to solidarity, arguing that institutions can engender or undermine solidarity, both in general terms, and with reference to solidarity with refugees in particular. We thus seek to contribute to the literature on cross-border solidarity by theorising a relatively neglected potential source.

In the first section, we outline an instrumental, first-personal understanding of solidarity, distinguish the three forms of solidarity drawn from Scholz, and apply these to the idea of solidarity with refugees specifically. The following section discusses how solidarity in general can be generated and how institutions can be a source of, and/or an obstacle to, all three forms of solidarity. The final section specifically considers how domestic and international institutions currently hinder solidarity with refugees, and which institutional arrangements could be more productive in generating solidarity with refugees. We focus in particular on generic welfare state institutions, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

**1. Solidarity (with refugees)**

In this paper, we assume the normative view that the majority of states are today failing to meet their moral obligations toward refugees (as set out in very general terms above). We do not argue for this view here, but note that these obligations may have several moral grounds, and can be endorsed even by more ‘restrictionist’ accounts of obligations toward refugees.[[3]](#endnote-3) They may, for example, issue from the ‘weak cosmopolitan’ view that all humans have obligations to one another to safeguard human rights.[[4]](#endnote-4) Alternatively, fulfilment of obligations towards refugees may be considered a premise of the legitimacy of the international order.[[5]](#endnote-5) They might also be based on special obligations incurred by states due to their causal role in, for example, a specific refugee-producing conflict.[[6]](#endnote-6) Rather than seek to intervene into the debate about the normative grounds of widely accepted moral obligations toward refugees, we instead consider the conditions under which the *first-personal psychological state* of solidarity with refugees might develop in the citizens of potential receiving states such that it could play an instrumental, motivational role in the realisation of those obligations.

What does this state of solidarity amount to? Here we can usefully refer to Sally Scholz’s work. For Scholz, the general concept of solidarity possesses the following three characteristics. First, solidarity ‘mediates between the community and the individual…in solidarity the individual sees him- or herself as part of a unique grouping’.[[7]](#endnote-7) Second, ‘solidarity is a form of unity… Something binds people together’.[[8]](#endnote-8) And third, ‘solidarity entails positive moral obligations’.[[9]](#endnote-9) Understood from the first-personal perspective, then, to be in solidarity is, at the most general level, to feel a binding connection with particular others, a connection to which moral obligations are understood to relate. Being in solidarity entails the mental state of believing one has a moral obligation toward certain others, an obligation that arises from the relationship one shares with those others, and/or is a constitutive part of a wider vision of justice.

 Solidarity so understood is instrumentally useful, we hypothesise, because recognising a moral obligation to X makes one more likely to hold the attitude that X ought to be done, which in turn makes X more likely to *be* done. To apply this hypothesis to our particular case: where citizens in potential receiving states understand their state to have moral obligations toward refugees, they are more likely than they would otherwise be to hold the attitude that their state ought, in fact, to disburse such obligations; in turn, the state is more likely actually to disburse such obligations than it would otherwise be. The first step of this hypothesis appears uncontroversial to the point of tautology; the second we also consider to be uncontroversial, given that the claim is one of increased *likelihood* of state action, rather than a strict causal claim. Whether increased solidarity with refugees will ultimately lead to the outcome that states meet their obligations to refugees will depend on a range of other factors as well.

We do not suggest that this instrumental understanding of solidarity is exhaustive of the concept’s proper usage. One might instead, for example, take the view that a sense of solidarity *constructs* our proper moral obligations.[[10]](#endnote-10) Our focus however is on the instrumental role of a sense of solidarity in aiding the realisation of independently existing obligations.

Scholz disaggregates her general account of solidarity into three distinct kinds of solidarity. *Social* solidarity ‘pertains to group cohesiveness’.[[11]](#endnote-11) On this understanding, a group is solidaristic to the extent that it recognises a shared identity, shared characteristics, shared experience, or some other uniting feature. In social solidarity, positive moral obligations are understood to arise *from* this group cohesiveness. Nationalist normative theories, for example, are premised upon social solidarity: such theories identify certain characteristics that national groups share, and claim that particular moral obligations between co-nationals arise from these shared characteristics that do not extend more widely.[[12]](#endnote-12) As we will understand it here, then, social solidarity refers to the first-personal experience of recognising oneself to be part of a cohesive group, and personally endorsing certain moral obligations that arise from this recognition.

*Civic* solidarity ‘is the idea that society has an obligation to protect its members through programs that ensure adequate basic needs are met’.[[13]](#endnote-13) Rather than focussing primarily on the shared characteristics or cohesiveness of a group, civic solidarity involves the recognition of moral obligations that are understood to arise on account of the interdependence – and resultant shared vulnerability – of a population. The moral obligation accrues to ‘the state, society or community, of which [individuals] are a contributing part’, and the obligation is ‘to protect individuals against vulnerabilities’.[[14]](#endnote-14) Welfare state regimes are the most obvious instance of civic solidarity put into action.[[15]](#endnote-15) To be in civic solidarity with others, then, is to understand oneself to share an interdependence with to certain others, and to endorse a moral obligation to protect those others against vulnerabilities, an obligation that one understands to arise as a result of this interdependence.

Finally, *political* solidarity characterises persons mutually dedicated to the furthering of a political cause, typically in opposition to perceived injustice. Here, ‘moral commitment provides the source of the solidarity’[[16]](#endnote-16) directly, rather than it being the case (as with social and civic solidarity) that moral obligations arise from a pre-existing relationship of some kind. A coherent single group defined by shared political struggle *may* form here (a paradigmatic case being where ‘the workers’, in struggling against the same power, come to develop class consciousness), but political solidarity may also be ‘expressional’, wherein one group, collection of individuals, or indeed even individual person, acts in the political interests of others whose predicament they do not themselves share.[[17]](#endnote-17) To be in political solidarity, then, is to directly recognise a moral obligation to act with and/or for certain others toward a given end, most typically the alleviation of perceived injustice.

 It is no part of the first-personal, instrumental conceptualisation of solidarity that the self-understood moral obligations internal to a sense of solidarity track what justice or interpersonal morality *in fact* demand. To claim otherwise would be to rule out analytically the possibility that (for example) a group might act solidaristically in the mutual pursuit of immoral ends. But we take it that the first-personal state of being in solidarity can in practice be instrumentally useful for the realisation of both just and unjust ends. Solidarity so understood is in itself ‘non-evaluative’.[[18]](#endnote-18) Nevertheless, we do of course have a particular end in view in this paper, which we do assume to be what justice in fact demands. Our primary focus is the instrumental value of a sense of solidarity to realising that end, rather than an exploration of the morality of acting in solidarity in particular circumstances and on particular grounds. The latter is the approach taken recently by Avery Kolers.[[19]](#endnote-19) Kolers conceives of solidarity as ‘political action on others’ terms’, and then asks when we ought to defer to others in this way. His answer is ‘Kantian and deontological’:[[20]](#endnote-20) we have a duty to act in solidarity with those who suffer inequity. Since Kolers grounds solidarity in deontological moral duty, he wants to dispense with appeal to pre-existing shared relationships; his is therefore an exclusively *political* solidarity. From an instrumental perspective, however, the personal recognition of shared relationships has significant motivational potential. As such, all three of Scholz’s varieties of solidarity are at play in this paper, rather than one selected as the morally right kind of solidarity.

With Scholz’s varieties of solidarity in mind, then, how might we conceive of a sense of solidarity with refugees specifically? For one to be in *social* solidarity with refugees would be, first, to identify with refugees on the basis of shared group characteristics of some kind. The group in question may extend as far ‘humanity’, in which case the relevant characteristic in question may be, for example, shared vulnerability to suffering.[[21]](#endnote-21) Moral obligations of receptivity toward refugees would then be understood to arise simply from this shared humanity and the vulnerable position that refugees find themselves in. Here, social solidarity with refugees can be understood as an instance of a broader ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’. This is not the only way in which social solidarity with refugees might be grounded, however, since it is also possible to recognise moral obligations to *particular* refugees on the basis of particular, exclusionary groups memberships (ethnic or religious, for example), although clearly this latter grounding risks leaving us without a sense of solidarity with refugees with whom we do not recognise any such shared membership.[[22]](#endnote-22)

To be in *civic* solidarity with refugees would be for one to recognise that one shares with all or some refugees an existence within an interdependent society, a society in which refugees have become distinctly vulnerable. This may be a society based upon global or regional civic institutions, which those in solidarity recognise as morally relevant to their having resultant moral obligation to receive refugees. To be in *political* solidarity with refugees would be to unite explicitly and directly around a perceived injustice that has led to the current plight of refugees.[[23]](#endnote-23) For many of those who demonstrate political solidarity with refugees, it is the exclusionary state system itself that is often considered part of the injustice against which solidaristic action is directed.[[24]](#endnote-24)

These three forms of solidarity with refugees are not mutually exclusive: one might, for example, recognise a sense of shared humanity, recognise global or regional interdependence, and recognise the plight of refugees explicitly as a matter of institutional injustice to be fought against. To repeat, because our interest in this paper is in the instrumental value of a first-personal state of solidarity, we need not attempt to intervene in any debate about whether one of these forms of solidarity is the ‘right kind’, morally speaking, and resultantly the kind that ought exclusively to be fostered. Indeed, to do so would be actively counterproductive. Suppose that one believes that moral obligations toward refugees arise simply from our common humanity, and that to claim that we only owe moral obligations toward refugees because of our interdependence within a global social system renders the right of asylum morally contingent in an improper manner. Even if this is the case, *belief in* the interconnection argument might be instrumentally useful to the realisation of moral obligations toward refugees that are in fact properly grounded in some other way. It would then be unwise, from an instrumental perspective, to seek to undermine such belief. Therefore, in this paper we take an ecumenical approach to solidarity, and consider the prospects for the fostering of a state of social, civic and political solidarity with refugees.

**2. How might solidarity be engendered? An institutional focus**

How can a sense of moral obligation toward persons beyond our borders be engendered? One possibility is that people can be rationally argued into it. Such an approach is seemingly the *modus operandi* of much of the academic ‘global justice’ literature. Thomas Pogge, for example, begins his *World Poverty and Human Rights* with the premise that many people do not currently find the eradication of poverty “morally compelling”, and that to understand why this is – and, hopefully, to change their minds – we must confront their “conscious and semi-conscious *reasons* for seeing thigs the way they do”.[[25]](#endnote-25) Here, primary emphasis is placed upon critical reason, with the apparent hope that the audience will respond to being confronted with such reason by recognising (perhaps even acting upon) the moral obligations the author defends.

 Recently, this rationalist approach to motivating transnational solidarity has seen some challenge from a ‘sentimental’ direction.[[26]](#endnote-26) While not wishing to reject the idea that reason can be important in motivating solidaristic action, those who appeal to sentiment as a moral motivator pay due heed to the truth that humans are in practice not *simply* rational. Since we are not simply, or even primarily, rational, we may also become motivated to a sense of solidarity in other ways. In particular, emphasis is placed upon the role of the emotions, which may be stimulated by way of, for example, engagement with arts and literature.[[27]](#endnote-27) More bluntly, appeal to sentiment forms a clear part of the strategic toolkit of campaign organisations such as charities and global poverty reduction advocacy groups, for whom the sharing of images and stories of specific suffering persons has proven to be more effective in stimulating donations and engagement than rationalist arguments about global injustice.[[28]](#endnote-28) Sentiments are also argued to be relevant to a rationalist approach, in that sentiments can draw our attention toward certain issues, and thereby motivate us to reason about them in the first place.[[29]](#endnote-29)

 Without wishing to reject either rationalism or sentiment as potentially valuable generators of solidarity, we want in this paper to explore a third potential generator by focussing on institutions. What are institutions?[[30]](#endnote-30) At the most general level they are ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’.[[31]](#endnote-31) Such constraints can be formal – rules and processes that determine our liberties, right and duties, wherein non-compliance is punished; or they can be informal – cultural conventions and social practices that, while not formally prohibitive or obligatory, nevertheless exert significant influence on individual behaviour. Our focus in this paper is on formal institutions. This is not to say, however, that we do not recognise that informal institutions – such as family and gender norms – may sometimes exert stronger influence upon behaviour than formal ones.[[32]](#endnote-32) Therefore, the institutional approach to thinking about solidarity with refugees that we offer in this paper might well be extended to incorporate the role of informal social institutions. Moreover, we also recognise that effective formal institutions are likely to be supported by corresponding informal institutions. Indeed, we argue that the two are interconnected, so that formal rules can help construct new informal social norms.

Institutions can pervade persons’ everyday experience, and directly structure the way we perceive and understand the world. By contrast, the explicit presentation of reasoned argument (as in the academic article) or attempt to jog the sentiments (as in the charity campaign), while both potentially potent, are also typically fleeting. Furthermore, while the presentation of argument or the appeal to sentiment will be experienced as external communications or exhortations, the effect that institutions may have on our phenomenology may not be experienced as external at all, but rather as originating ‘from the inside’. The effects of institutions can then come to seem ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ to those who experience them – in other words, institutions may generate a sense of solidarity by way of a process of habituation.

 We have already noted above that the stimulation of sentiments might in fact be relevant to the employment of reason. Similarly, it might often be the case that institutions generate a sense of solidarity by making us more likely to reason in certain ways, and/or by engendering certain sentimental patterns. For example, the pervasive nature of the state has, since its existence, stimulated much theoretical debate about its proper conceptualisation, its legitimacy, and what justice means within it – indeed, as was much remarked upon by the early wave of global justice theorising, the context of the state has often been *taken for granted*, rather than argued for, when thinking about what justice entails. Institutions can clearly also direct our sentiments, most obviously by deliberate ‘nation building’ exercises that seek to engender patriotic sentiment, from which social solidarity can arise. In these two instances, institutions are *indirect* generators of solidarity, in that they have their effect by way of first directing our reason or sentiment. Our interest in this paper is not necessarily in establishing institutions as a distinct, direct generator of solidarity, but rather in emphasising that institutions are an important part of the story, whatever their precise relation to rationalism and sentiment (and indeed, whatever the latter two’s relation to each other).

We suggest that formal institutions can affect solidarity, both positively and negatively, in the following ways: they can affect *social* solidarity by constructing group boundaries; *civic* solidarity by creating interdependence; and *political* solidarity by perpetuating ideas about (in)justice. Insofar as solidarity is instrumental to the fulfilment of duties of justice, institutions are in these ways important sites where the prospects for the realisation of justice become altered.

*Social solidarity*

To recall, the basis of social solidarity is perceived group cohesiveness. This cohesiveness can come from a shared identity, shared characteristics, shared experience, or some other uniting feature. To generate social solidarity, therefore, a group of people must feel that they are united in some way. Achieving such a group identity entails a process of categorisation, wherein we categorise ourselves and others as either belonging or not belonging to a group on the basis of some particular feature(s). Social psychology research on social identity and social categorisation has shown that even completely random, seemingly trivial features can stimulate categorisation, and are enough to engender prejudice, in-group bias and out-group discrimination.[[33]](#endnote-33) Unsurprisingly then, shared membership in, or subjection to, institutions –especially those that encompass a wide set of social relations – is important to the process of categorisation and identity formation, as well as to the maintaining of existing social categories.

Institutions are often viewed as ‘structures of cooperation’ that solve collective action problems.[[34]](#endnote-34) Such description is misleadingly idealistic, however, as institutions may in practice be extractive and exploitative rather than reciprocal and cooperative. It is better to describe institutions as structures of *coordination*. Formal institutional coordination can be cooperative or not, but it always categorises, by way of, *inter alia*, what John Searle calls ‘deontic powers’.[[35]](#endnote-35) To Searle, deontic powers are ‘rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments, requirements, and certifications.’[[36]](#endnote-36) To formally institutionalise human coordination means to create deontic powers for a specific human activity. When institutions allocate deontic powers, they create relationships that constitute group boundaries, both within the institution, and between those inside and outside of the institution. Boundaries create categories – demarcating who is on the inside and who is on the outside – and can thereby engender social solidarity across certain populations, while hindering it across others. The more encompassing an institution is – the more it organises social, political and economic life – the more pervasive its boundary drawing and categorisation.

A wide range of migration scholars across disciplines have studied the concept of ‘bordering’.[[37]](#endnote-37) Rather than understanding borders as static and easily geographically locatable, such scholars are interested in how borders are constructed and managed territorially, extraterritorially and internally. Some scholars focus specifically on bordering as ‘measures taken by state institutions – whether at territorial frontiers or inside them – which demarcate categories of people so as to incorporate some and exclude others, in a specific social order’.[[38]](#endnote-38) Studying bordering practices helps us understand how ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed – how the included and excluded are managed by institutions. Nation-building practices are a standard example of how (state) institutions construct group boundaries, via (for example) school systems, the military, national holidays, language policies, citizenship and integration policies, cultural and welfare institutions and so forth, thereby developing a sense of a shared national identity.[[39]](#endnote-39) Thus, perhaps the most important group identity with respect to social solidarity – nationality – has strong institutional roots.

State institutions, though, can also construct group boundaries *within* states. Bridget Anderson has provided an extensive account of how internal borders create an ‘us’ and ‘them’.[[40]](#endnote-40) In the UK, border controls have been institutionalised in expanding areas of society: from universities, to employers, and landlords. The state thus in effect delegates its law-enforcement to citizens and thereby potentially engenders the construction, in the minds of state citizens, of the social categories of, on the one hand, the law-abiding and law-enforcing citizen and, on the other hand, the criminal or potentially criminal migrant. These bordering practices often are not specifically targeted at asylum-seekers, but rather anyone deemed to reside in a country illegally, which can nevertheless include asylum-seekers and refugees, who are often treated as illegal despite having a right to cross international borders in order to seek asylum.[[41]](#endnote-41)

*Civic solidarity*

The basis of civic solidarity is recognition of mutual interdependence. Institutions were characterised above as structures of coordination, often to the end of solving a collective action problem. When people engage in such coordinative institutional activities, they come to rely on one another to perform a particular task. The institution therefore creates mutual interdependence. When people come to rely on others within an institution to perform a task, they may also become incapable of performing it themselves. For example, most humans in industrialised societies are dependent on institutions regulating the market, food production standards and infrastructure, in order to nourish themselves. Most do not have the skills to produce their own food if this became necessary, let alone the required material resources. Those who depend for their subsistence on the same institutions (which, in the case of food security, are increasingly globalised) are therefore in a relation of mutual interdependence. The point here is essentially that which animates Émile Durkheim’s notion of ‘organic solidarity’: institutions enable the division of labour, which leads to mutual interdependence among those who share the institution.[[42]](#endnote-42) We add merely that where interdependence is subjectively *recognised*, civic solidarity may follow.

As has been discussed above, institutions create power relationships by allocating deontic powers. This also creates interdependence. People’s rights and entitlements become dependent upon the continued functioning of shared institutions. For example, the fulfilment of someone’s right to social assistance is dependent on sufficient numbers of taxpayers fulfilling their duty to pay taxes. Large levels of tax evasion or corruption will eventually jeopardise others’ social rights. Institutionalised power relations, in this way, create vulnerabilities between people that are much more immediate than many (but not all) non-institutionalised forms of human relations. In recognising these vulnerabilities, people may develop a sense of civic solidarity.

*Political solidarity*

Finally, the basis of political solidarity is moral commitment. Political solidarity can arise when there are shared ideas about justice, and/or mutual recognition of injustice. Institutions play a role in forming and sustaining such ideas.

John Rawls argued that just institutions are self-supportive because they generate a commitment to justice.[[43]](#endnote-43) Unjust institutions, however, can also be self-supportive. In both cases, institutions can be powerful in perpetuating informal norms and ideas. For example, there is a wide research literature on the effect of institutions in instilling norms of trust and reciprocity.[[44]](#endnote-44) This research has found that formal institutional design is very important for the development of trust and reciprocity. The effect of such formal institutions is also strong compared to the effect of informal cultural norms.[[45]](#endnote-45) Important for political solidarity, however, is that institutions also contribute to forming and/or sustaining conceptions of justice. When a norm becomes institutionalised, it becomes part of our everyday activities, and a background condition of our lives. It may therefore come to be seen as ‘normal’ or ‘natural’. Feudal institutions, and institutions of slavery, rendered their respective economic and social norms ‘natural’ to many, for instance. With respect to immigration, modern state borders have become naturalised in this way, such that many practices that would appear blatantly unjust if directed towards co-citizens, such as indefinite detention or physical violence, appear justified as means of upholding the institutional structures of states’ border regimes. The institutions of nation-states are perhaps the most obvious means by which particular norms of justice are institutionally perpetuated. They encourage the naturalisation of the idea that justice between compatriots is more substantive and more important than global justice by directing most of people’s justice-contributing behaviour towards their compatriots.[[46]](#endnote-46)

When institutions naturalise and perpetuate ideas about (in)justice, they create shared moral commitments that can be a source of political solidarity. As with social and civic solidarity, this is not the only source of political solidarity. Often political solidarity comes about in *opposition* to perceived unjust institutions. Yet institutions, especially when they are widely encompassing, are an important source of shared norms of justice and therefore can shape the prospects of political solidarity.

**3. Institutions as a source of solidarity with refugees**

We now turn to the specific question of how institutions might create, or hinder, solidarity between citizens of potential refugee-hosting states and refugees.

There are many institutions one could think of that affect solidarity with refugees. There is an array of national, international and transnational institutions that directly or indirectly impact the three aspects of solidarity that we have discussed. To narrow our analysis, we focus on two major institutions affecting the way citizens of potential refugee-hosting states view their relationship with refugees: the welfare state and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While the former is internal to the state, the latter is external. This difference allows us to illustrate how both domestic and international institutions can be a source of, or hindrance to, cross-border solidarity. These institutions also differ conceptually insofar as ‘the welfare state’ is treated generically, while the UNHCR is a specific institution. The discussion seeks to highlight how institutional structures and norms are important for instrumental solidarity, but it is far from complete. We can only hope to touch upon how these institutions may currently hinder the development of solidarity with refugees and how they could instead further it.

*The Welfare State*

By the welfare state, we mean those various institutions tasked with the social redistribution of resources and the provision of social services, but also those regulating labour markets to form regimes of ‘welfare state capitalism’.[[47]](#endnote-47) The welfare state is one key site of bordering within states, which can affect how citizens view ‘outsiders’ both inside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the state. Welfare states specifically construct group boundaries by including or excluding people in the redistribution of rights, entitlements and privileges. They can, for example, discriminate between those who are entitled to certain benefits and those who are not, and between those who can claim certain rights and those who cannot. In doing so, they can produce the sense of a distinction between those who are ‘net contributors’ and those who are ‘net receivers’ of redistributed resources, or between the perceived ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’.[[48]](#endnote-48) These instances of bordering are not always co-extensive with state territorial borders, as entitlements may travel with people beyond the state territory (such as pensions), and many people are excluded within the territory of the state.[[49]](#endnote-49)

Of particular relevance to our purposes is that welfare states engage in bordering practices that maintain ‘us and them’ social categories both before, and in some cases after[[50]](#endnote-50), refugees have gained a right to stay. In many countries, such as the UK, asylum-seekers do not enjoy rights to work, nor are they entitled to the same social benefits as citizens. By drawing these boundaries, welfare states institutionalise and emphasise group difference between citizens and asylum-seekers that may make social solidarity harder to achieve. We are not suggesting that asylum seekers must always be entitled to exactly the same welfare benefits as permanent residents; instead, we are suggesting that the larger the difference in entitlements, the more pronounced is the difference in social categorisation, which may undermine the prospects of social solidarity.

Some have argued that in universal welfare states, where citizens do not need to make ‘deservingness’ judgments to the same extent as in selective welfare regimes, newcomers will be subject to such judgments to a lesser degree. Studies have found that universal welfare states correlate with more positive attitudes to immigration in general.[[51]](#endnote-51) But in practice, universal welfare states also differentiate between asylum-seekers, refugees and citizens. For example, in Denmark refugees receive lower levels of social benefits than citizens. Denmark’s welfare state has also gone further in institutionalising group boundaries between citizens and migrants in general, for example by the recent introduction of a policy whereby children in immigrant-dense, poor areas will need to attend 25 hours of compulsory nursery from one year old to learn about ‘Danish values’.[[52]](#endnote-52) Although this policy is not directly targeted at refugees, it is nevertheless the case, because of the composition of immigrants in Denmark, that in practice and in the public mind it targets refugees and their families. In this way, social institutions create group boundaries that appear to be counter to the generation of social solidarity. They may make it harder for citizens to perceive of themselves as belonging together with refugees.

On the other hand, it must be considered that ‘civic’ or ‘assimilationist’ integration policies could lead to greater social cohesion and with that, potentially, a greater sense of social solidarity in the long term. An instrumental approach to solidarity must consider this possibility. There is however currently very limited evidence of the effect of integration policies on social cohesion, where this refers to creating a common ‘we’ and a sense of belonging. This may be because such outcomes are difficult to measure – indeed most studies look at other integration outcomes, such as employment rates or political participation. There is little settled evidence, therefore, that assimilationist integration models would produce better outcomes than, for example, multicultural ones.[[53]](#endnote-53)

Without directly considering the normative case for or against welfare states treating refugees, asylum-seekers and citizens differently, we can then suggest that from an *instrumental* perspective, there may be a benefit to the erosion of such differential treatment, and in particular, the removal of a ban on the right to work for asylum-seekers. Such a change could also be, we suggest, of benefit to the creation of *civic* solidarity. Allowing asylum seekers equal access to the labour market potentially allows others to see them as part of the same interdependent economic system, rather than simply as persons supported *by* that system. On average in rich countries, refugees take longer to find work than other immigrants and stay longer on social benefits.[[54]](#endnote-54) If asylum-seekers are denied the right to work, this pattern will not be improved.

Thirdly, welfare state institutions can help generate *political solidarity* by embodying norms and principles that make it more likely that citizens will share moral commitments with the struggles of refugees. For example, research has suggested that the values of equality, universalism and solidarity embedded in Scandinavian welfare states have contributed to these countries’ more generous asylum and foreign aid policies.[[55]](#endnote-55) Bergman argues, for example, that Nordic states see themselves as ‘good international citizens’ and champions of enlightenment values and human rights.[[56]](#endnote-56) She suggests specifically that Sweden has a ‘thin cosmopolitanism’, which puts the interests of its own citizens first, but is very mindful of the rights of non-nationals. A former social democratic foreign minister, Jan Eliasson, defined Swedish solidarity in the following way:

[the] solidarity … tradition in Swedish foreign policy is based on the Swedish people’s strong conception of justice, the equal value of all people and a life in dignity for everyone — both in our own country and internationally.[[57]](#endnote-57)

In a study of 17 OECD countries, Frida Boräng finds that ‘comprehensive welfare state institutions correlate with the solidaristic act of accepting forced migrants’.[[58]](#endnote-58) She argues that this is because universal welfare states promote norms and values of solidarity that translate beyond redistribution within the state.[[59]](#endnote-59) Another study also found that people in more generous welfare states had a more transnational, rather than national or local, sense of belonging.[[60]](#endnote-60)

There is nothing certain about the instrumental effect of the welfare state on solidarity with refugees. Indeed, the instrumental effect is unlikely to be unidirectional. For example, allowing access to the labour market may actually work *against* engendering a sense of solidarity, given that anti-immigrant sentiment is often stimulated by the sense (however inaccurate that sense may be) that newcomers are taking jobs that might otherwise have gone to existing citizens. And as noted, it is possible that assimilation policies may, in the long term, help generate social solidarity with refugees. Quite whether and when such changes will overall be instrumentally beneficial in practice will depend on the particular empirical circumstances of the case at hand, and is not something that can be settled theoretically. Nevertheless, the theoretical point that can be made is that the welfare state, as a catalogue of institutions that structure citizens’ lives in various ways, may offer possibilities for reform which may help, however modestly, to stimulate a sense of social, civic and political solidarity with refugees.

*UNHCR*

While changes to institutions within states may be of some instrumental benefit to the pursuit of refugee solidarity as compared to the status quo, it is also the case that states, by definition, place borders between citizens and refugees. This fact implies that international institutions are likely to be important in generating stronger bonds of solidarity. This final section therefore focuses on one aspect of the international refugee regime, the UNHCR. We discuss some ways in which it could be reformed to help generate the three forms of solidarity with refugees. We appreciate that the UNHCR is subject to a complex governance structure in which it enjoys some independence, but is also constrained by the state system. The fact that the UNHCR operates under certain constraints does not, however, negate the importance of the UNHCR as a potential generator of solidarity with refugees, or entail that it cannot be criticised for how it currently operates. Indeed, a substantial part of the work of the UNHCR is advocacy towards governments, often aimed precisely at increasing solidarity with refugees.

First, with respect to social solidarity, let us consider the main ways in which UNHCR manages refugees. Its three so called ‘durable solutions’ to the management of refugees who have fled their home state are voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in a third state. The way it manages refugees in ‘non-durable’ ways is through camps or offering support to those who arrange their own housing in countries where the UNHCR operates, the latter mostly in urban areas where refugees tend to enjoy very few rights. Of these five (durable and non-durable) ways in which refugees are managed by the UNHCR, only local integration and resettlement do not entail the ongoing categorisation of refugees as being ‘outside’ of potential host states. Voluntary repatriation, camps, and settling in an urban area with few prospects of being formally integrated into a new state, all institutionalise refugees as a separate category to the host state’s citizens. The image of the refugee in a camp is perhaps the starkest trans-border institutionalisation of the refugee as belonging to a different social and political category than citizens of any state. Indeed, protracted refugee situations, or any instance when refugees become defined by their dependence on international refugee institutions, maintain the boundary between refugees and citizens. They reinforce the very category of being a refugee as someone living outside of the order of states, rather than as someone who has become temporarily excluded from that order.

UNHCR has been accused of prolonging camp life and other emergency solutions due to those solutions’ political and practical convenience in ‘containing’ refugees, as well as the UNHCR’s primary focus on voluntary repatriation.[[61]](#endnote-61) Voluntary repatriation remains the main focus in the new Global Compact on Refugees (2018), even though there has also been increased focus on resettlement. However, as opposed to the right to seek asylum, resettlement remains a discretionary activity of states, and the Compact includes no suggestions to change the current system to one where, for example, resettlement became a legal obligation.[[62]](#endnote-62) In order to remove refugees from the protracted situations that so starkly institutionalise the group boundaries between refugees and everyone else, drastic institutional reforms would be required, especially in the area of resettlement and solutions to protracted refugee situations.[[63]](#endnote-63)

Secondly – and more plausibly – we suggest that *civic solidarity* may receive a boost from a reorientation in the way the UNHCR presents itself. In principle, the Refugee Convention and the right to seek asylum function as a kind of global insurance institution. All humans are part of an international order of states that recognises state sovereignty as its core principle. In recent times this principle has become premised on the assumption that each sovereign state has a ‘responsibility to protect’ the basic human rights of its citizens.[[64]](#endnote-64) The global refugee regime, in effect, insures individuals against their rights being unprotected if the state tasked with protecting those rights fails in its responsibilities.[[65]](#endnote-65) The UNHCR is thus a constitutive part of a normative international order that encompasses all individuals; it is expressive and representative of an interdependent world order. It is, in *theory*, already an *example* of civic solidarity: insurance against mutual vulnerability in an interdependent world order. Explicitly presenting refugee institutions as tasked with insuring all humans against the risk of becoming a refugee is a way to highlight this mutual vulnerability, with the hope that recognition of mutual vulnerability to the existing global order may help engender a greater sense of civic solidarity in practice.

Insurance schemes, as well as being an institutional *response* to vulnerability, can also *create* a kind of mutual vulnerability by virtue of dependency upon their functioning: the fact that the UNHCR is the main institution tasked with protecting refugees in the case of state failure means that it creates, by its very existence, a kind of mutual vulnerability of humans facing such risk (that is, to differing degrees, all humans). Recognition of the existence of the UNHCR as an insurance scheme may then be relevant to the generation of global civic solidarity by way of the recognition of two related mutual vulnerabilities: mutual vulnerability to the existing world order (to which the UNHCR responds); and mutual vulnerability to the improper functioning of the UNHCR itself, wherein the proper solidaristic response is to ensure, as best as possible, that the institution does indeed function as it is supposed to for those persons who happen to find themselves refugees at any one time.

There is clearly a sense in which our thought here is rather optimistic. Persons in stable states do not tend to perceive state breakdown or persecution as a risk to which they are vulnerable, and it’s not at all clear that they will come to accept that they are vulnerable in this way just on account of rebranding attempts by the UNHCR. And yet there is room for change.

The UNHCR’s official rhetoric is only directed towards the current refugee population. Changing the description of the institution, towards an insurance-based portrayal, is a small but achievable step. Non-refugees around the world need to feel that they share an institution with refugees, and that they are also subject to some risk of becoming refugees, not that they are merely contributing to an alien institution tasked at protecting a population that is fundamentally different to them. In short, the UNCHR – and other similar institutions – may be able to contribute to mutual recognition of the existence of a ‘world risk society’.[[66]](#endnote-66) The rise of new world risks – most obviously, climate change – increasingly offers the possibility of presenting the issue of refugee protection as one that ought to be of personal concern to *us*, and not just to *them*.

 Finally, for there to be *political solidarity*, citizens of refugee hosting states must recognise a moral responsibility toward refugees, and in this regard the refugee agency ought to play a role in institutionalising and communicating some of the moral issues at stake. There are two types of injustice that the UNHCR might emphasise: the injustices that made someone a refugee in the first place (e.g. the failure of their home state to protect their basic human rights), and the injustice refugees are often faced with when seeking protection (e.g. the failure of other states to offer the asylum or assistance that international law prescribes). In both cases, refugees are often, and ought to be described as, people who have been *wronged*, either by their state of habitual residence or by a state of refuge. As things stand, however, the issue of asylum is often depicted as a purely humanitarian, apolitical one, in which refugees are simply unlucky victims of forces beyond their control. Indeed, in the UNHCR statute it is stated that its work is ‘humanitarian and social and of an entirely non-political character’.[[67]](#endnote-67) But in most cases, the predicament refugees find themselves in – indeed, the only kind of predicament that the global refugee regime currently formally recognises – is a distinctly political one.[[68]](#endnote-68) The UNHCR might do well to advert more explicitly, and more frequently, to these political causes.

 We do recognise that the UNHCR must proceed with some caution when taking on a political role. While there is evidence that it has some institutional autonomy,[[69]](#endnote-69) it is nonetheless the case that it is governed and, perhaps more importantly, funded by states. Being too political in its condemnation of state behaviour may jeopardise its already scarce funding (though this may point to a need to reform its funding model to align it better with its political purpose). As a minimum, however, the UNHCR could aid refugees *themselves* to act politically, and to be understood as political subjects, both vis a vis their host state and state of origin, and indeed the UNHCR itself. Yet to the contrary, many studies have argued that the UNHCR facilitates the representation of refugees as apolitical victims.[[70]](#endnote-70) For example, some studies suggest that to fit the UNHCR’s purposes, specifically to emphasise its humanitarian mandate, refugees are portrayed (e.g. in official images and language) and treated (e.g. by UNHCR staff) as ‘mere humans’ and depoliticised.[[71]](#endnote-71)

**Conclusion**

We have here assumed that solidarity with others is instrumentally useful to the realisation of independently grounded moral ends. Our particular focus in this paper has been the psychological state of solidarity with refugees, as instrumentally useful to the disbursement of states’ independently grounded moral responsibilities toward refugees (grounds that we do not enter into here in any detail). In order to think about what a sense of solidarity entails we have employed Sally Scholz’s tripartite understanding of solidarity, and understood the latter from a first-personal perspective. We have then sought to highlight the possible place of institutions in generating social, civic and political solidarity, as a compliment to thinking about the generation of solidarity either rationally or sentimentally. In the final section, we have sought to apply this institutional approach to the case of solidarity with refugees specifically.

 The suggestions in the final section have been modest. This is in our view unavoidable. The very concept of a refugee entails the existence of formidable institutional barriers placed between persons, barriers that are always likely to undermine transnational solidarities by constructing more exclusionary senses of solidarity between citizens, and distinctions between those citizens and others. Nevertheless, it may be possible to make plausible political changes to existing institutions that represent an instrumental benefit as compared to the *status quo*. As such, while the case of solidarity with refugees is a particularly hard case for an institutional approach to solidarity, it nevertheless is one worth considering alongside rational and sentimental approaches.

1. 1 Sally Scholz, *Political Solidarity* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. For discussion of the these approaches as applied to the general question of cosmopolitan motivation, see Graham Long, “Moral and Sentimental Cosmopolitanism,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 40, no. 3 (2009): 317-342. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. See, for example, David Miller, “Justice in immigration”, *European Journal of Political Theory* 4, no. 14 (2015): 391–408. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. 2 David Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*: *The Political Philosophy of Immigration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); Matthew Gibney, *The Ethics and Politics of Asylum* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. David Owen, “In Loco Civitatis: On the Normative Basis of the Institution of Refugeehood and Responsibilities for Refugees,” in *Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership*, eds. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 269-289. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. James Souter, “Towards a Theory of Asylum as Reparation for Past Injustice,” *Political Studies* 62, no. 2 (2014): 326–342. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Scholz, *Political Solidarity*, 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Scholz, *Political Solidarity*, 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Scholz, *Political Solidarity*, 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Carol Gould, “Transnational solidarities,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 38, no. 1 (2007): 148–164, 162. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Scholz, *Political Solidarity*, 21. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Scholz, *Political Solidarity*, 29. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Scholz, *Political Solidarity*, 31. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. For some theorists, such regimes *just are* what solidarity means. In such interpretations, solidarity is not understood from a first-personal perspective, but instead as a quality of political outcomes. Bo Rothstein, for example, understands solidarity as the ‘sum of political practices that increases equality in people’s overall life chances’. See Bo Rothstein, “Solidarity, Diversity, and the Quality of Government”, in *The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*, eds. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 300-326. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Scholz, *Political Solidarity*, 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Ashley Taylor, ‘Solidarity: Obligations and Expressions’, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 23, no. 2 (2015): 128-145. The difference here has also been described as the difference between ‘solidarity among’ a group and ‘solidarity with’ others: see David Miller, “Solidarity and Its Sources,” in *The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*, eds. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 61-79. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Avery Kolers, *A Moral Theory of Solidarity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Kolers, *A Moral Theory of Solidarity*. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Kolers, *A Moral Theory of Solidarity*, 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Cf. Christine Straehle, “National and cosmopolitan solidarity,” *Contemporary Political Theory* 9, no. 1 (2010): 110-120. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. See Joshua Hobbs and James Souter’s contribution to this volume: “Asylum, Affinity, and Cosmopolitan Solidarity with Refugees”, *Journal of Social Philosophy* (Early View: https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12313). [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Political solidarity *among* refugees involves the mutual recognition by refugees of the injustice they suffer together, and the commitment to work together *as* refugees to overcome it. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. <http://www.foeeurope.org/yfoee/Closing-borders-to-refugees-and-migrants-is-unjust-and-dangerous> [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Gould, “Transnational Solidarities”; Graham Long, “Moral and Sentimental Cosmopolitanism”; Kerri Woods, “Whither Sentiment? Compassion, Solidarity, and Disgust in Cosmopolitan Thought,” *Journal of Social Philosophy*43, no. 1 (2012): 33-49. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in *On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993*, eds. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (London: Basic Books, 1993): 111–34; Martha Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defence of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. For worries about such methods, see Woods “Whither Sentiment?”; Vanessa Pupavac, “Refugee Advocacy, Traumatic Representations and Political Disenchantment,” *Government and Opposition* 43 no. 2 (2008): 270-292; Prem Kumar Rajaram, “Humanitarianism and Representations of the Refugee”, *Journal of Refugee Studies* 15, no. 3 (2002): 247-264. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Woods “Whither Sentiment?” [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. The meaning of ‘institution’ seems often to be taken for granted in political theory. Jeremy Waldron’s recent book, for example, which is subtitled “Essays on Institutions” and which emphasises the point that “institutions are massively important” to politics and political theory (Jeremy Waldron, *Political Political Theory*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016: 5), nevertheless declines to offer a definition of what an institution is. Waldron is speaking in particular of what we will here call formal political institutions, and although he does not offer a definition, he does offer examples from the UK context: “parliament, the monarchy, the courts, the administration, the political parties, the country’s division into nations with devolved legislatures, and the international laws and institutions in which we participate” (Waldron, *Political Political Theory*, 8). Not all of these examples need necessarily be understood as institutions, however. Douglass C. North for example, in his study of institutions and economic performance, distinguishes institutions, as the ‘rules of the game’, from organisations, as players *in* the game. Among those understood as organisations North includes political parties, which Waldron wants to consider as institutions. In fact, political parties can be understood as both institutions *and* organisations: they set rules of the game for *certain* persons (party members, for instance), and so are understandable as a sub-state institution, while at the same time seeking to succeed as collective ‘players’ in a state’s wider institutional structure, and so can also be understood as organisations. Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. North, *Institutions*, 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Thierry Baudesse, Remi Bazillier and Ismael Issifou, “Migration and Institutions: Exit and Voice (From Abroad)?” *Journal of Economic Surveys* 32, no. 3 (2018): 727-766. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Rebecca S. Bigler, Lecianna C. Jones and Debra B. Lobliner, “Social Categorization and the Formation of Intergroup Attitudes in Children,” *Child Development* 68 no. 3 (1997): 530-543, [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Terry M. Moe, “Power and Political Institutions,” *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 2 (2005): 215-233, 216. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. John Searle, “What is an institution?” *Journal of Institutional Economics* 1, no. 1 (2005): 1-22, 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Searle, “What is an institution?”, 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. David Newman, “Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue”, *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2 (2006): 171-186. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Simon Guentner, Sue Lukes, Richard Stanton, Bastian A. Vollmer and Jo Wilding, “Bordering Practices in the UK Welfare System,” *Critical Social Policy* 36, no. 3 (2016): 391-411, 392. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. See for example David V. Axelsen, “The State Made Me Do It: How Anti-Cosmopolitanism is Created by the State,” *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 21, no. 4 (2013): 451-472. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Bridget Anderson, *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. James Banks, “The Criminalisation of Asylum Seekers and Asylum Policy”, *Prison Service Journal* 175 (2008): 43-49. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984 [1893]). [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 177. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Markus Freitag and Marc Bühlmann, “Crafting Trust: The Role of Political Institutions in a Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 12 (2009): 1537-1566. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Peter Nannestad, Gert Svendsen, Peter Dinesen and Kim Sonderskov, “Do Institutions or Culture Determine the Level of Social Trust? The Natural Experiment of Migration from Non-western to Western Countries,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40, no. 4 (2014): 544-565. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. ‘Statist’ theorists, of course, believe there to be good normative grounds to consider our obligations of justice to our fellow citizens more extensive than to persons elsewhere. But the point here is that institutions, simply by their existence and operation, can perpetuate and naturalise certain norms and ideas of justice, quite apart from whether or not those norms are in fact philosophically justifiable. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 14. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Wim van Oorschot, “Making the Difference in Social Europe: Deservingness Perceptions Among Citizens of European Welfare States”, *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no. 1 (2006): 23-42. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Guentner et al. “Bordering Practices”. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. E.g. <https://www.thelocal.dk/20150701/denmark-government-to-reduce-asylum-seeker-benefits> [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Markus Crepaz and Regan Damron, “Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants”, *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 3 (2009): 437-463. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/europe/denmark-immigrant-ghettos.html [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. See, for example, Sarah Wallace Goodman and Matthew Wright, “Does Mandatory Integration Matter? Effects of Civic Requirements on Immigrant Socio-economic and Political Outcomes”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 12 (2015): 1885-1908; [Matthew Wright](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Matthew%20Wright&eventCode=SE-AU) and [Irene Bloemraad](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Irene%20Bloemraad&eventCode=SE-AU), “Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political Integration? Policy Regimes and Immigrant Incorporation in Comparative Perspective”, *Perspectives on Politics* [10](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/volume/62489AC61E51DD421C7082903C257EAE), no, 1 (2012) : 77-95. Though cf. Ruud Koopmans, “Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 1-26. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2016/01/23/for-good-or-ill> [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Frida Boräng, “Large-Scale Solidarity? Effects of Welfare State Institutions on the Admission of Forced Migrants,” *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 2 (2015): 216-231; Peter Lawler, “Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union”, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35, no. 4 (1997): 656 – 594. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Annika Bergman, “Co-Constitution of Domestic and International Welfare Obligations: The Case of Sweden’s Social Democratically Inspired Internationalism,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 1 (2007): 73-99, 77. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Quoted in Bergman, “Co-Constitution of Domestic and International Welfare Obligations”, 81. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Boräng, “Large-Scale solidarity?”, 227. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. While universal welfare states tend to be more open to refugees, they have traditionally been more closed to labour migrants, however. See Martin Ruhs, *The Price of Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Tim Reeskens and Matthew Wright: “Host-Country Patriotism among European Immigrants: A Comparative Study of its Individual and Societal Roots”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37, no. 14 (2014): 2493-2511, 2505. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy,” *The International Migration Review* 35, no. 1 (2001): 33-56, 48. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. James C. Hathaway, “The Global Cop-Out on Refugees”, *International Journal of Refugee Law* 30, no. 4: 591-604, 593. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. James C. Hathaway, “A Global Solution to a Global Refugee Crisis”, *European Papers* 1, no. 1 (2016): 93-99. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. David Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” *Legal Theory* 8, no. 1 (2002): 1-44. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Cf. Owen, “In Loco Civitatis”. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Statute of the Office of the UNHCR, Annex Chapter 1, Article 2.

<https://www.unhcr.org/4d944e589.pdf> [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Cf. Matthew Price, *Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). There may be cases, such as people fleeing climate change, where it is more difficult to describe refugees as having been wronged by any particular agent. Yet even in these cases, refugees may be victims of a structural injustice, and they may still be wronged by receiving states who fail to respect their rights as refugees and their human rights more generally. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics”. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Stephan Scheel and Philipp Ratfisch,”Refugee Protection Meets Migration Management: UNHCR as a Global Police of Populations”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40, no. 6 (2014): 924-941, 936. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Liisa H. Malkki, “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization”, *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 3 (1996): 377-404. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)