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**The Austerity Governance of Baltimore’s Neighbourhoods:  
“the conversation may have changed but the systems aren’t changing”**

Dr Madeleine Pill

**Abstract**

The governance of neighbourhood redevelopment and revitalisation in Baltimore demonstrates the normalisation of the logics and practices of austerity governance and the concomitant challenge of governance transformation. Analysis of tiers of governance activity refines understanding of the state-society relationships of austerity governance, characterised by the local state’s absence with the exception of its basic function of (over)policing of the most marginalised. The elites governing Baltimore are corporate developers, major “ed and med” anchor institutions and nationally-operating private philanthropies, with a mix of other non-profit organisations, anchor institutions and philanthropies playing roles at the middle and lower tiers. Citizens are excluded from these opaque governance arrangements. Mainstream regime analysis argues for incremental change in response to challenges such as that posed by the uprising in the city in 2015. But the analysis highlights that the city’s iniquitous governance requires the ideological challenge posited by urban governance theory.

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**Introduction**

Research into urban governance, or the process through which a city is governed, examines the causes and consequences of the different forms of relationships between local state and

society actors in governance processes (Pierre, 2014). Scholars vary in how they perceive the centrality of political institutions or the significance of networks and collaborative forms of governance (John, 2001; Pierre, 2011; Torfing et al., 2012). Some critique network governance arrangements as dominated by economic and institutional urban elites into which societal actors are enrolled, linked to debates about the de-politicisation of the city (Davies, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2007). And some stress the continued centrality of the state's coercive powers, as expressed in forms of extreme policing and carceral governance (Davies, 2014; Wacquant, 2008). Others see the potential of network governance to incorporate a wide range of groups into policymaking, enabling capacity to address complex urban problems and enhance democratic legitimacy (Rhodes, 1997). But despite varying perspectives on their collaborative, contested, co-optative or coercive nature, the shared focus of urban governance scholarship is local state-society relationships. In this case the local state principally comprises Baltimore city government and its agencies.

“Austerity governance” refers to the logic and practices of governing under conditions of “extreme economy” (Peck, 2012), refining the urban governance approach by considering how local state-society relationships are reconfigured under austerity's public spending cuts and associated justificatory narratives and practices. In U.S. cities, austerity governance has long been the norm (Peck, 2012) with the notion of “urban crisis” deployed since the 1980s to justify austerity practices in urban settings (Weaver, 2017). The logic or political ideology invoked under austerity governance asserts the neoliberal argument of bloated and inefficient local states that hamper the operation of market forces. Austerity governance practices in cities are characterised as downscaling (localist), with the devolving of risks and responsibilities to the local scale, and as offloading (privatist), with the outsourcing and privatization of governmental services and social supports. Thus austerity measures

“concentrate costs and burdens on those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, compounding economic marginalization with state abandonment” (Peck, 2012, p. 651).

Deploying an urban governance approach broadens understandings of city governing processes compared to those derived from the mainstream U.S. approach of urban regime analysis. The narrowness of regime analysis is critiqued on several grounds, including its lack of attention to the multi-scalar context, to the role of other actors including those of civil society, and the common interpretation that business elites are central to any regime (Pierre, 2014; Davies & Blanco, 2017). Indeed, Stone (2015), the foundational proponent of regime analysis, has latterly stressed the increasingly diffuse nature of urban regime governing arrangements. Despite these criticisms, regime analysis yields some useful analytical tools that inform this analysis. Firstly, its “iron law” (Stone, 1993), that actors need to gain “power to” through building alliances to assemble resources commensurate with their agenda. Secondly, the heuristic of governance tiers or “significantly different layers of concurrent activity” (Stone, 2015, p. 109). These tiers (rather than scales or levels) are distinguished in terms of the types of actors whose activities predominate - elites, the middle and the marginal - who have different resource capacities or “power to”. Deploying these analytical tiers and considering cross-tier interactions broadens the focus of regime analysis from elite actors to the nature of state-society relationships at the core of urban governance approaches. As the analysis focuses on the governance of neighbourhood redevelopment/ revitalisation, the spatial expression of each tier’s activities is also assessed.

The key aspect of the regime approach subject to critique in this analysis is Stone’s assertion of the potential of the more diffuse governing arrangements he identifies to pave the way for an “alternative form of urban civic and political life” (Stone, 2015, p. 122). He argues that

the challenge is organisational rather than ideological, with accommodation reached through piecemeal but cumulative adjustment rather than fundamental alteration of a city's governing arrangements (Stone, 2015, p. 103). Stone's emphasis on the importance of "concrete purposes" rather than "ideological challenge" is misplaced. In the new institutionalist approach to urban governance (Pierre, 1999; 2011), institutions comprise not only the structures of local politics but their overarching values. The approach thus emphasises the importance of values and ideologies in constituting both policy agendas and individual and collective action in response. Urban governance theory's emphasis on the importance of ideas and values not only in framing but in structuring governance change is vital to understand the need to repoliticise the city before progressive change can be realised in terms of transformed governance processes. Thus the argument here is to "bring democracy back in" (Pierre, 2000; Hendriks, 2014) to urban governance, rather than it be sidetracked by the "middle range accommodations" (Stone, 1989) of consensus.

The analysis of Baltimore's governance of neighbourhood redevelopment/ revitalisation validates urban governance theory's emphasis on the fundamental ideological challenge of governing arrangements rather than the incremental change of mainstream regime analysis. Previous analyses of the city take a regime analytical approach, regarding neighbourhood revitalisation (Stoker, Stone & Worgs, 2015) and human capital policies (Orr, 1992).

Following an explanation of methodology, the analysis extends previous research in three main ways and is structured accordingly. Firstly, through elucidating and validating the concept of austerity governance in terms of its logic and practices as manifested in Baltimore, particularly in terms of a localist and privatist form of governance, and how this is expressed via strategies of development (gentrification) and demolition (displacement). Secondly,

through refining understanding of Baltimore's governance of neighbourhoods with the identification of (elite, middle and marginal) tiers of governance activity to illuminate the state-society relationships of austerity governance, plus consideration of the spatial manifestation of these layers of activity, which highlight the diminished role of city government and the changed composition of the local "state". Finally, the research interrogates continuity and change, crisis and normalisation in the context of a potentially pivotal moment. Fieldwork was undertaken following the "uprising" (the preferred term in the discourse of most respondents) in the city in April 2015, triggered by the death of a young black man (Freddie Gray) following injuries sustained whilst in police custody. Previous analyses do not capture this period, which enables consideration of the transformative potential of a crisis point to city governance.

## **Methodology**

The analysis draws from a combination of documentary review and extensive qualitative research. Prior to fieldwork, a desk-based review was conducted of secondary sources, including census data, city government/ agency and key institution (university, philanthropic foundation, non-profit organisation) policy documents, budgets, annual reports, evaluations and press releases to assemble an understanding of local state-society relationships and the logic and practices of governance processes. Interviews and observations were conducted in two phases, an initial exploratory phase (November 2015) and a principal phase (May-October 2016). The review of foundational data informed initial phase semi-structured respondent interviews (11 total), conducted using a shared interview guide. The guide elicited: perceptions of state-society relations in how the city is governed; understandings of and the extent of collaboration and austerity; key actors; and how public spending decisions are made, managed and contested and their spatial and policy realm effects. Exploratory

phase findings were tested in the principal phase (31 interviews), using a refined shared interview guide which retained the focus on collaboration and conflict in the state-society relationships of city governance, but also elicited respondents' own practices, experiences and examples, and incorporated questions regarding the governance of neighbourhoods and future prospects for the city.

The range of actors interviewed enables a nuanced and rounded understanding of the city's governance. Of the 42 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted, respondents comprised: elected city politicians; public officials of city or state government or agencies; locally based/ operating philanthropic foundation staff; staff of education and medical ("ed and med") anchor institutions; staff of non-profit (including neighbourhood-based) organisations; members of informal community groups (including neighbourhood associations); and citizen activists (members of social movements or organisations with an explicit transformative mission). Of these, three were group interviews (one with staff of a local foundation; and two with groups of citizen activists). Five observations were conducted: three of routine meetings (of the city council, a citizen activist group and the steering committee of a neighbourhood initiative); the other two were one-off professional symposia relevant to the case focus on neighbourhood redevelopment/ revitalisation, regarding the role of anchor institutions and of planners in the city respectively. Interviews were recorded and fully transcribed, meeting observation notes prepared and all data were subject to content analysis (using NVivo). A nested approach was used to code the data, starting with the main nodes as defined by each phase's interview guide, and refined with child nodes to generate critical themes inductively. Initial findings were presented at a stakeholder workshop, attended by 20 research interviewees or their representatives, plus

other interested parties, held in the city in July 2017 to enable checking, update and refinement of the research findings.

Respondents are coded in the order cited in the analysis, as follows: city politicians (Politician 1-2); public officials (Official 1-4); philanthropic foundation staff (Foundation 1-3); anchor institution staff (Anchor 1-3); non-profit organisation staff (Non-profit 1-6); members of community groups (Community 1-3); and citizen activists (Activist 1-5, group interviews indicated where relevant). Two of the five observations are cited, coded Obs 1-2, as well as the stakeholder workshop.

### **Baltimore's Austerity Governance**

Baltimore's definitively localist and privatist governance encapsulates the logic and practices of austerity governance. "Austerity" is not in mainstream U.S. public discourse (Peck, 2012). But this is because austerity is so normalised that the term is not required, confirmed in research interviews, one respondent explaining that "[Baltimore] is used to austerity and functions like that all the time" (Non-profit 1). The research affirmed a perception of permanent austerity due to the enduring and extreme lack of public investment, as one respondent reflected when considering the challenges the city faced:

*"We don't have an economy to support our citizens. We have a tremendous amount of racism institutionally in how we've been planned as a city, how our institutions function as a city, and the lack of resources and leadership to really do some reconciliation that's necessary, but then also address the 50 plus years of delayed investment in, not only neighbourhoods, but institutions of our government and our schools. And we have a huge human capital problem starting from birth on and very few pathways for the majority of*

residents to really access any opportunity, whether it be schools or health or decent housing *and obviously, they're all interconnected*" (Anchor 1).

The city's longstanding "culture of scarcity" (Non-profit 1) was linked by respondents to the de facto devolution of Reaganomics (Obs 1) rather than the 2008 financial crisis, not regarded as a significant turning point for the city. Austerity is "normal and local" following the decades-long downloading of risks, responsibilities, debts and deficits to the local scale in the U.S. (Peck, 2012, p. 650). In the city the more commonly-used notion is that of "fiscal squeeze" due to falling revenues and increasing need. The city's population loss and hyper-concentration of the poor has resulted in a shrinking tax base and rising service needs, used to reinforce a harsh realities narrative that frames governance imperatives. Baltimore's current population of 615,000 is over a third smaller than its 1950 peak of 950,000 and a quarter of its residents fall below the poverty level (U.S. Census 2016; 2010). The city's predominant narrative of decline, used to provide "the logic" for austerity governance practices, is encapsulated in the following extract from the Mayor's annual "State of the City" speech (2013):

*"For over 50 years, Baltimore's story has been dominated by a narrative of post-industrial decline. From 1950 to 2000, the city lost a third of its population. Jobs disappeared, crime rates rose, schools deteriorated, and many neighbourhoods destabilised. City government itself was left with a legacy of high taxes, growing liabilities, and crumbling infrastructure".*

To operationalise austerity governance, tactics have included release by the Mayor's Office of a "doomsday budget" (Politician 1) in 2011 to "soften up" the city council prior to introduction of a ten-year financial reform plan. The plan, "Change to Grow" (City of

Baltimore, 2013) was presented as helping achieve the goal of growing Baltimore by 10,000 families in ten years by:

“Seek[ing] to eliminate a nine-year \$750 million structural budget deficit; allowing new investments in neighborhood infrastructure... providing a funding surge for the demolition of more than 4,000 vacant homes; all while reducing homeowner property taxes by more than 20% ” (Mayor’s press release, 2013).

The plan’s description as one that “the city could implement on its own... [not] a wishlist of things that we want the state or federal government to do for us” (Official 1) underlines the localist (“downscaled”) nature of the city’s governance. The accompanying deployment of standard austerity governance practices which “offload” government responsibilities (such as a city hiring freeze, pension and health benefit reform for agency workers and cuts in community services such as recreation centres) was seen by the majority of respondents as part and parcel of the “muddling through” characteristic of “the quotidian experience of city governance” (Weaver, 2017). These practices were generally interpreted as inevitable, “a lot of tough decisions had to be made, things had to be cut” (Politician 2). Only two interviewed saw these as political choices, one commenting that the Mayor is influenced by the technocratic repertoire of austerity governance, “it’s coming from people in leadership in the city who see it as a virtue to be fiscally conservative, who believe what the bureaucrats tell them” (Politician 1).

Of particular relevance to the focus on neighbourhood redevelopment/ revitalisation, the “meta-goal” (Official 2) of deconcentrating poverty is used to justify the strategies pursued in the city’s enactment of austerity governance. Strategies of poverty deconcentration combine seeking to attract and retain wealthier people with efforts justified as connecting poorer

people “to opportunity”, via housing mobility (relocation) and social mobility (economic inclusion) initiatives. Emphasis on attracting a younger, more affluent population to the city is reflected in the prominence of millennials as a target group and the perceived need for “bike lanes, parks, better nightlife, jobs” (Official 3) in this regard. Housing mobility initiatives (such as the Baltimore Regional Housing Mobility Program) disperse poverty through relocating city public housing residents to suburban “opportunity” neighbourhoods. Less emphasised is the poverty deconcentration resulting from the displacement of the city’s poor through relocation resulting from “stressed” neighbourhood redevelopment (explained below).

### **Tiers of Governance Activity – and their spatial expression**

Current strategies for neighbourhood redevelopment and revitalisation, set in the 2000s, reiterate the logic and practices of austerity governance. Continued reductions in federal aid combined with the city’s shrinking tax base led to the justificatory narrative of the “greater realism” of housing market-based approaches. A pivotal moment was adoption by city government of the still-operating “asset-based” mode of resource allocation (Davies & Pill, 2012; Pill, 2018). It is manifested spatially via a typology of housing markets (first prepared in 2005, latest update 2014) with different policy prescriptions and thus differential prioritisation of resources. The neighbourhood typology ranges from “stressed” neighbourhoods (subject to demolition for site assembly for redevelopment), through “the middle” (where interventions seek to revitalise the neighbourhood by “helping the market”, such as by supporting homeownership) to those deemed “regionally competitive” (and thus not requiring intervention).

The analysis (summarised in Table 1) assesses each governance tier that comprises different groupings of actors whose activities predominate. Actors have different resource capacities: top-tier elites have greater ability to assemble “power to” compared to those in the middle tier and particularly to the marginalised at the lower tier. Identifying actors in each of these tiers, considering if and how they work together, and ascertaining cross-tier interactions refines understanding of governance relationships under austerity. An assessment of the spatial expression of the tiers of governance activity enables interrogation of the operation of the different neighbourhood typology policy prescriptions, the prioritisation accorded to neighbourhood redevelopment or revitalisation, and how this pattern of governance activity has changed, if at all, given the irruption of uprising.

**Table 1: Tiers of Governance Activity in Neighbourhood Redevelopment/ Revitalisation**

	<i>Spatial expression</i>	<i>Post-uprising change?</i>
<b>Top tier: Elite actors with substantial resources who can set &amp; pursue a priority agenda</b>		
<b>City government:</b> aligns with other elite priorities; use of federal/state funding & tools (notably TIF)	Major waterfront/ anchor-focused redevelopment	No substantive change
<b>Corporate developers:</b> agendas for major mixed-use redevelopment of former industrial sites - 260-acre Port Covington, to house 10-15,000 residents (\$660m TIF approved 2016) - 27 acre Harbor Point, with 1,000 residential units (\$107m TIF, 2013)	Waterfront - Port Covington site 2.5 miles of South Baltimore waterfront - Harbor Point last substantive stretch of Inner Harbor not redeveloped	No substantive change: - longstanding waterfront emphasis (Inner Harbor redevelopment, 1980; Harbor East, 2007) - Port Covington nominal city-wide community benefits negotiated
<b>Major “ed &amp; med” anchors:</b> anchoring major ongoing redevelopments - Johns Hopkins medical complex anchors EBDI, 88-acre science & technology park & mixed development with 1,700 dwellings (\$82m TIF, 2008) - University of Maryland Baltimore anchors 12-acre BioPark (\$17.5m TIF, 2016) Economic inclusion agenda - HopkinsLocal (2015) - Baltimore Integration Partnership (BIP) (2014)	- Redevelopment of proximate “stressed” neighbourhoods in city’s inner east & inner west - Economic inclusion agenda targets anchor proximate neighbourhoods & city-wide	No substantive change: - Major developments ongoing - HopkinsLocal launch brought forward; city-wide hiring targets residents of “stressed” neighbourhoods - Impetus to BIP
<b>Major, nationally-operating philanthropies with a Baltimore focus:</b> partner in major anchor developments - Casey managed relocation/ extra benefits for 700 families displaced by EBDI site assembly - Weinberg funded EBDI early childhood centre (2014) Economic inclusion agenda - Casey a BIP funding partner	Focus as above (EBDI)	No substantive change: impetus to BIP

<b>Middle: Actors with sufficient resource to operate within/ adjust established policies &amp; practices</b>		
<b>City government:</b> not agenda-setting, seeks to partner with key actors, eg Anchor Plan & BIP (2014)	Aligns with activities of other top &/ or middle tier actors, triage approach	No substantive change
<b>Neighbourhood-based non-profit organisations:</b> able to generate sufficient resource by aligning with elite priorities eg CDCs	Operating in “middle” neighbourhoods	No substantive change
<b>Other “ed &amp; med” anchors:</b> eg Bon Secours Baltimore Health System, Universities of Baltimore, Loyola, Morgan State, Coppin State, Notre Dame, Maryland Institute College of Art – all BIP partners	Proximate “middle” & “stressed” neighbourhood focus	No substantive change: impetus to BIP
<b>Locally-operating philanthropies:</b> eg private Goldseker & Abell Foundations; public Associated Black Charities (ABC) & Baltimore Community Foundations; Association of Baltimore Area Grantmakers (ABAG) - Some efforts to influence policy - Economic inclusion - Goldseker, ABC & ABAG are BIP funding partners - Programmatic & some general operating support for other middle & lower tier actors	Tend to crowd in to align with activities of other top &/ or middle tier actors	No substantive change: impetus to BIP; plus limited general funding support to community groups in uprising locus
<b>Community organising coalition:</b> BUILD (member resourced)	City-wide mission; focus on “stressed” inner east (Oliver) neighbourhood levers on EBDI	Community listening project; convened meetings; negotiated Port Covington community benefits agreement
<b>Marginal: Actors lacking resource seeking to confront circumstances of pronounced disadvantage</b>		
<b>City government:</b> role reduced to basic functions, especially (over)policing	De facto withdrawal from “stressed” neighbourhoods	Project CORE – Maryland State funding boost to implement “stressed” neighbourhood policy prescription of demolition for redevelopment (launched 2016)
<b>Community groups:</b> with sufficient capacity to organise/ seek development benefits from any proximate developments; self-help by those with requisite capacities	“Stressed” neighbourhoods where poverty especially concentrated	No substantive change: South Baltimore Six (neighbourhood coalition) involved in Port Covington community benefits negotiation (with BUILD); Some general funding support for groups in uprising locus
<b>Non-profit and activist organisations:</b> mix of self-generated (including social enterprise) & granted/ contracted resource	May not be “stressed” neighbourhood-based, but target “stressed” communities	Some general funding support for organisations conducting policing and criminal justice reform advocacy

### **Top tier - elite actors**

Under austerity governance the city lacks elite actors with combined resource sufficient to set and implement a city-wide, comprehensive priority agenda of neighbourhood redevelopment/revitalisation. Corporate developer and major ed and med actors, particularly Johns Hopkins University and Health System, set the development agenda for specific sites and gain “power to” implement through resource alignment with other elites. The selective spatial engagement of high-resource actors is expressed in the city’s megaprojects, where city government deploys federal government-provided tools (notably tax increment financing, TIF), augmented with some state government resources, to realise elite priorities. Thus major redevelopment overrides neighbourhood revitalisation, continuing the longstanding priority placed on prime waterfront sites that gain corporate interest, though without the huge federal transfers of urban renewal, and encompassing the growth needs and perceived economic development benefits generated by major anchor institutions. At interview, the emphasis on “inclusive” economic development amongst elites combined implicit and explicit critique of trickle down-premised economic development and associated gentrification. But “that’s essentially the model that we have that is pretty global at this point” (Activist 1, group).

The prominent example mentioned by all principal phase respondents was the agenda set for the Port Covington megaproject to create a 260-acre “city within a city” of up to 15,000 residents. Post-uprising it received approvals for \$660m of TIF bonds, the biggest financing package in Baltimore’s history (Broadwater, 2016). This affirms the direct power of top-tier private investment but also its reliance on leveraging public resources and its co-optative capacity of lower-tier activity as “the whole city is going to be affected by this because of... servicing a \$600m debt for 40 years” (Activist 2). The project exemplifies the primacy of generating economic development and population growth to support the meta-goal of poverty

deconcentration, and the power wielded by those who can offer this. The developer, Sagamore, is affiliated with the development's anchor, a sportswear company already headquartered in Baltimore. Elite respondents acknowledged that the development raises "gentrification and race issues" (Official 3) but also cited it as an example of developers' becoming more "socially conscious" since the uprising:

"Every developer that has come in post Freddie Gray has come in with the same approach and that is, how can my project, how can my building or my larger development be part of the solution? What do I need to do to be more inclusive? How do I engage more with minority firms? On the local hiring front, what can you do to help me ensure that I get more jobs here? Or what can I do to give back?" (Official 3).

Citizen activists and advocacy organisations in contrast were clear that the development was "tone deaf coming on the heels of the uprising" (Non-profit 2), another example of where "we're disinvesting from places that need it the most... and the benefits promised don't materialise" (Activist 2), whilst "another private community [is created] where we're not even welcome" (Community 1).

Another widely mentioned, substantively implemented megaproject is the East Baltimore Development Initiative (EBDI, commenced 2004), overseen by a quasi-public corporation comprising government and top-tier anchor institution and philanthropic partners, which is redeveloping the stressed "Middle East" city neighbourhoods north of the Johns Hopkins medical complex. The initiative, with a twenty-year timeframe, involves creation of an 88-acre science and technology park and mixed development including a new park, school and early childhood centre, along with 1,700 dwellings. Site assembly to create the neighbourhood, now known as Eager Park, involved the relocation of 700 families. A major,

nationally-operating but Baltimore-based philanthropy, the Casey Foundation, is an EBDI partner which advocated on behalf of (displaced) residents. But its approach, which included funding supplemental relocation benefits, co-opted residents into aligning with rather than challenging elite priorities (Davies & Pill, 2012). In turn, whilst the initiative was purportedly market-led, with the medical complex envisaged as attracting a cluster of biomedical research companies, it did not attract the corporate investment predicated. Its realisation remains reliant on public investment, including \$82 million in TIF bonds and most recently Maryland State neighbourhood initiative funding support for its hotel.

More recent emphasis on economic inclusion highlights the importance of the city's ed and med anchors and its philanthropies at the top and middle tiers in developing and implementing strategies aligned with the poverty deconcentration meta-goal. The leadership of a non-governmental elite actor, Ron Daniels, President of Johns Hopkins since 2009, is clear. His convening power, backed up by Hopkins being not only the city but the State of Maryland's major employer, is widely recognised:

*“President of Hopkins University... announced a lot of policies that the University... was adopting... Johns Hopkins University, which is a city in itself, setting a pattern of commitment back to the city that they are then promulgating amongst their other college and university neighbours. They're not trying to make us [city government] do it... they're taking the lead”* (Councilperson 1).

The initiative, HopkinsLocal, comprises contracting, hiring and purchasing commitments by Johns Hopkins' institutions to expand participation of local businesses and city residents, and favours hiring local residents from the city's stressed as well as the anchor's proximate neighbourhoods. Its launch was brought forward to September 2015 in response to the

uprising. This gave impetus to the Baltimore Integration Partnership (BIP), a “collaborative partnership” established in 2014 between the city’s top and middle tier philanthropies and ed and med anchors, including Casey and Hopkins, “to promote economic opportunity and economic inclusion” (Foundation 1).

### **Middle tier**

Activity at this tier encapsulates the governance of neighbourhood revitalisation rather than major redevelopment. Here key actors are the city’s non-profit elites, including other ed and med anchors and locally-operating philanthropies. City government’s absence is pronounced. Activity, characterised as operating within or making adjustments in established policies and practices, is clearly manifested in the spatial focus on neighbourhoods “in the middle” of the neighbourhood typology, using a triage approach wherein relatively modest resources are deployed to prevent neighbourhoods “at risk” of tipping into stress. Such activities align with meta-goal imperatives to attract and retain wealthier residents. Neighbourhood-based non-profits such as Community Development Corporations (CDCs) emphasised the need to align with the neighbourhood typology, “[we are] an asset-based community development organisation, we don’t work in the strong areas and we don’t work in the weak areas, we work in the middle” (Non-profit 1). CDCs are thus enrolled under austerity governance as “systemic conditions of fiscal restraint... induc[e] instrumentalism” (Peck, 2012, p. 632).

However, middle-tier activity is not confined to the policy prescription for neighbourhoods “in the middle” and is not spatially confined to these neighbourhoods. Non-profits operating in both “middle” and “stressed” neighbourhoods proximate to anchor institutions tend to be able to access anchor resource, and philanthropic support may crowd in. For example, the Central Baltimore Partnership gains resource given its proximity to Johns Hopkins’

Homewood campus and its Community Partners Initiative. This encourages other resource flows (such as from Maryland State’s neighbourhood initiative and foundation and bank support for its development fund). BUILD, the city’s community organising coalition, focuses on housing development with a non-profit partner in the east-side Oliver neighbourhood proximate to EBDI, seen as “greasing the wheels” (Activist 3). But BUILD also commands requisite resource (via its church-based membership) to play the role of a cross-tier (cross-city) broker, evident in its post-uprising community listening project and meetings attended by city government and other elites. During principal phase research city-wide debate focused on city government’s provision of TIF and its initial waiving of inclusionary zoning requirements for Port Covington. BUILD’s negotiations with the developer, city government, and the proximate neighbourhoods resulted in city-wide community benefits such as construction work by city residents and “inclusionary housing”. It thus indicated some, albeit bounded, success in terms of improving “the deal”. But scope for more fundamental debates about the priorities being pursued within the city appear foreclosed by the enduring priorities of top-tier actors. As a stakeholder workshop participant explained, city government “got pushback they had never gotten before, but the outcome was the same”.

Middle-tier private foundations such as Goldseker, and public foundations such as Associated Black Charities and the Baltimore Community Foundation, provide programmatic funds and some, limited general operating support to middle and lower tier non-profit and community groups as an “impactful choice” in relation to foundation priorities. Post-uprising, a foundation supported a community group “given the lack of neighbourhood infrastructure” in the uprising locus (Sandtown, inner west neighbourhood). The foundation respondent explained this in terms of the “moral responsibility to reconsider resource allocation”

(Foundation 2). But a cross-section of respondents able to provide a longer-term perspective commented on the decline of such unconditional general funding support, and linked this to more constrained participation, stifling citizen voice, particularly of the marginal and deprived concentrated in stressed neighbourhoods.

Some locally-based philanthropies at the middle tier seek to influence policy and adjust the neighbourhood revitalisation agenda, “they help to set trends in place and directions and priorities... they’re very, very good thinkers” (Politician 1). The Goldseker Foundation championed the neighbourhood typology before its adoption by city government. The Abell Foundation funds research into topics such as the role of immigrants in growing Baltimore (2014), homelessness and dealing with evictions (both 2016). But the key shift, accelerated if not prompted by the uprising, is towards economic inclusion initiatives. These contain elements of what Imbroscio (2013; 2016) regards as a more community- than market-based policy paradigm as they attempt to locally capture economic benefits for residents rather than attract corporate actors. Philanthropic foundations were recognised as key “convenors” in developing approaches, particularly the Association of Baltimore Area Grantmakers (ABAG), described as “a neutral table setting organisation to bring these partners together” (Non-profit 3). ABAG convenes BIP, which has been spurred by the HopkinsLocal initiative of its top-tier partner. The approach was regarded as “really challenging institutions... around workforce development” (Anchor 2) and highlights increased top to middle cross-tier interactions seeking to mitigate lower-tier marginality.

City government has sought to brand anchor activities as city-led, or at least city-engaged, efforts, with the former Mayor talking of “partnering closely with Baltimore’s campuses of higher learning and medicine to reinvest in surrounding neighbourhoods” (Mayor’s State of

the City speech, 2013), resulting in a “Baltimore City Anchor Plan” (City of Baltimore, 2014) as well as the Mayor’s Office inclusion as a BIP partner (2014). However, the anchor institutions set their agenda and pursue it, informing the city which ideally aligns, “we do our own thing and the City kind of follows along with us” (Anchor 2). This was affirmed in observing a symposium attended by representatives of the city’s anchor institutions and city government (Obs 2). A major foundation respondent claimed:

“The great anchor institutions in our city have really stepped up and increased the climate of collaboration. And I think that all of us have realised that without collaboration - again, in spite of city leadership - without *collaboration, we won’t be able to accomplish our goals*” (Foundation 1).

Across U.S. cities, anchors and foundations are gaining prominence in increasingly diffuse governance arrangements but their collaboration is highly uneven (Stone, 2015). In Baltimore, anchor institutions (with Hopkins in the lead) and foundations (as exemplified by BIP) are increasingly working collaboratively. Attempts to develop a systemic approach to lever anchors’ employment and procurement activities link top and middle tier activities with benefits for the lower tier in terms of proximate neighbourhoods and more recently with stressed neighbourhoods more generally city-wide. Thus the “islands” of co-operation and collaboration described by Stoker et al. (2015) in the city are expanding across tiers, though scope for subsequent fragmentation was recognised, an anchor respondent observing that “private foundations move onto something else, they’re not going to support anything for 20 years” (Anchor 3).

The uprising accelerated and expanded these attempts to link lower-tier marginality with the economic opportunities provided by top and middle tier actors. But the approaches mirror

existing patterns of power. While top and middle tier actors linked funding scarcity with the need to work together, citizens and community groups were not generally mentioned, collaboration interpreted as being amongst elites. Tensions were evident in this regard in an observed meeting wherein anchor institution and CDC staff emphasised the need to talk more directly to “the broader community” who may feel “disenfranchised” from the (neighbourhood-targeted) initiative under discussion (Obs 1). This was accompanied by reflective recognition that economic inclusion is not the anchors’ “core business”. Ensuring citizen voice is challenged as “the emphasis on the anchors, the danger is the pendulum swings to the benevolent top-down thing” (Anchor 3). The contrast is highlighted between the more localist model of economic inclusion now being pursued, “taking the pie and cutting out a slice for the groups that aren’t benefitting... [but] it’s not pulling them in” (Anchor 3) and the “community wealth-building” and ownership (as posited by Imbroscio, 2013 and 2016 in describing worker co-operatives) advocated for by some activist groups:

“If there was a collective ownership model where individuals of and from the *community could be able to be a part of the process... That is a model that is much more likely to not gentrify areas*” (Activist 1, group).

However, stakeholder workshop participants familiar with what they described as the “white-led” worker co-operative initiatives which Imbroscio (2013; 2016) describes, “never developed so that the African American community could rise to the top to manage it”, affirmed Silverman’s (2016) critique of Imbroscio for not “broaching race”. Indeed, at the middle tier the schism between the city’s (mostly white-led) top and middle tier non-profit elite governing actors and the city’s majority-minority residents (64% African American, U.S. Census 2010) is starkly revealed. Citizen activists contrasted their embedded work in communities with Baltimore’s “non-profit industrial complex” (Activist groups 1 and 4). A

government official agreed, critiquing the “whole infrastructure here of non-profits and others” that “co-opt community voice and say, this is what the community wants” (Official 2). In stressing the importance of relationships with “key community leaders and activists”, a major non-profit alluded to its instrumental need for consensus by getting “diverse neighbourhoods to think collectively” (Non-profit 4). This leads to tensions, as “the foundation world generally has a lot of power... large white philanthropic organisations... they drive the policy agenda for the marginalised communities” (Activist 4, group). An activist pithily explained that “one of the biggest issues that we have in Baltimore... is a condensation of non-profit and foundation forces that then are allowed to produce policies” (Activist 4, group).

### **Lower tier - marginal actors**

At this tier activity is characterised as seeking to redress the problems faced by the marginalised “who command resources far short of what is needed to alter the conditions that disadvantage them” (Stone, 2015, p. 110). The marginalised are concentrated in the city’s stressed neighbourhoods where Baltimore’s stark inequalities are spatially manifested. Under the city’s extreme form of austerity governance the abandonment of these neighbourhoods was generally regarded as inevitable:

*“It’s just the nuts and bolts of a city... they [the city] can barely manage that. And in certain [stressed] neighbourhoods like a Sandtown... they look at the [neighbourhood] typology like everyone else. They’ll say, you know, in this area we’re not going to pave the streets anymore. We’re going to focus on public safety, fire, police, rat abatement, cleaning and...you know basic services. Maybe help people move out of that neighbourhood, but we’re not going to invest in housing or infrastructure in that neighbourhood”* (Non-profit 1).

The de facto policy of withdrawal compounds communities' lack of resource, agency and voice in city governance. Stressed neighbourhoods which offer major redevelopment opportunities gain elite attention, but the needs of and vision held by existing residents is overridden, as exemplified in implementation of EBDI and most recently in agenda-setting for Port Covington. Community group members contrasted their community “meeting and asking and bidding for every little dollar” with “what’s left if they do all that for Port Covington” (Community 1). The ability of groups and organisations operating in these neighbourhoods to garner resource from upper-tier actors, or to self-generate resource, is vital. The need to seek cross-tier interactions with elite city institutions despite a heritage of distrust was generally recognised:

*“Hopkins doesn’t have the best reputation. They have done some awful things... I get that but I’m also trying to create a dialogue with these people, because they are the 800-pound gorilla in the room... And we need to be able to work with them and they need to be able to know that we’re not going to be calling them out every five minutes”* (Community 2).

Self-provisioning of services (in those neighbourhoods with capacity to do so) is longstanding practice. Examples did arise in some stressed neighbourhoods through the extraordinary commitment of residents who described the persistence and relationship-building involved, and the “fighting over a little bit of money” (Community 1). These included a formerly city-funded recreation centre that fell victim to “Change to Grow” reforms that is now community-operated in partnership with a local school.

Some saw spatial prioritisation as “common sense”, the path to pursue when resources are limited. Others made explicit that neighbourhoods that do not offer opportunities are “written off” (Activist 4) with a West Baltimore anchor institution described as being located in a

“containment area” (Anchor 3). Post-uprising, more city and state government resource has been allocated to stressed neighbourhoods, in addition to the economic inclusion efforts of non-governmental actors. This is via Project CORE (“Creating Opportunities for Renewal and Enterprise”), a counterpoint to the Port Covington megaproject. It is a principally Maryland State-funded demolition and redevelopment initiative, symbolically launched January 2016 in the Sandtown inner west neighbourhood that formed the uprising’s epicentre. Whilst a cross-section of respondent types felt that city priorities are lost in state politics, that “the Governor seems to have a complete disregard to Baltimore City and the actual urban situation here” (Community 3), funding to boost the city’s policy prescription of demolition and site assembly for stressed neighbourhoods points to “red state blue city” agreement on the agenda.

Within the city views were more complex, reflecting the tensions related to meta-goal strategies. Upper-tier respondents emphasised the community consultation underway, commenting that post-uprising there was at least more “talking about listening to communities” (Non-profit 5). Others agreed it was not “business as usual” (Official 4) given the “workforce conversation” about those employed by the initiative. And elites and some community group members were in agreement about the demolition of vacant housing. A foundation officer explained, “when you allow that much disinvestment, there’s no other choice... you can’t change Sandtown until you take it down” (Foundation 3). But tensions were evident regarding the poverty dispersal of resident relocation, the foundation officer reprising the rationale of housing mobility strategies: “If I’m already poor and black and living in that much trauma and I’ve got kids, if I got the opportunity to escape that, come on. I’m going to escape it” (Foundation 3), whilst community group members saw it as a gentrification strategy displacing the poor:

“It’s insensitive of our community... not even considering the issues that gave us *blocks and blocks of blighted properties... this is a low-income neighbourhood* so you’re proposing all this demolition to lure *developers.... It’s a slow gentrification process*” (Community 3).

However, the key role played by the local state in the stressed neighbourhoods which house the most marginalised of Baltimore’s residents is expressed in terms of its most basic function, that of policing. That the stressed neighbourhoods are subject to “extreme over-policing or police violence” (Activist 3) is well-documented (for example, Shane et al., 2015). The “crisis point” of the uprising acted as a focusing event in state-citizen interactions, an expression of citizens’ frustration due to the “continuing centrality of coercion in the governance of cities” (Davies, 2014, p. 590). The activist groups that are key actors at the lower tier emphasise racial justice, especially with regard to policing and criminal justice. The growing voice of black, young activists “trained outside of the local non-profit formula” (Activist 4, group) was evident in “show[ing] the world that it is wrong about them not caring about themselves and the city” (Councilperson 2). One activist organisation, a “grassroots think-tank which advances the public policy interest of black people in Baltimore” was mentioned by most citizen activists and community group members interviewed, as well as a foundation official who had grant-aided the organisation. Founded prior to the uprising, it has gained voice and purchase in its aftermath in the realm of policing and criminal justice reform advocacy.

### **Discussion: Austerity Governance across Tiers**

Analysis of tiers of governance activity refines understanding of the state-society relationships of Baltimore’s austerity governance. City government/ the local state has a

presence across all tiers. At the top tier, it aligns with elite priorities, using tools (notably TIF) to further major waterfront and anchor-focused redevelopment. At the middle tier, it does not play an agenda-setting role but seeks to partner with key actors in their neighbourhood revitalisation and economic inclusion efforts. At the lower, marginal tier, the local state re-emerges, but in its reduced form of performing the basic function of (over) policing, demonstrating the continued importance of “power over” rather than “power to” in governance (Davies and Blanco, 2017). It is the local state’s absence, with the exception of its punitive policing functions in the marginal, stressed neighbourhoods, which captures the essence of Baltimore’s austerity governance. The elites governing Baltimore, whose “power to” is expressed in agenda-setting and implementation, are corporate developers, Johns Hopkins’ institutions and major, nationally-operating private philanthropies, with a mix of other non-profit organisations, anchor institutions and philanthropies playing roles at the middle and lower tiers. These elites thus comprise an integrated part of “the state” in Gramscian terms, rather than a Tocquevillian counterbalance to the state as “civil society” actors (Pill, 2017). Citizens are excluded from these opaque governance arrangements.

Top-tier actors and their major redevelopment priorities remain paramount, subsuming and displacing public subsidy and investment from the activities of neighbourhood revitalisation’s middle tier and excluding the lower tier concentrated in stressed neighbourhoods. The discourses of “fiscal squeeze” and “change to grow” are deployed to justify these approaches. That many respondents, whilst keenly aware of the city’s inequities, saw the “common sense” of Baltimore’s austerity governance underlines its normalisation. But is it entrenched?

The uprising provided an opportunity to interrogate continuity and change, crisis and normalisation in the context of what was constructed by all interviewed as a pivotal moment.

The multi-tier analysis reveals little alteration despite this disruption. The political imperative to respond to the uprising did accelerate and expand top to middle tier interactions seeking to mitigate lower-tier marginality, “since the unrest... businesses and philanthropic organisations and the institutions are really stepping forward and saying, ‘We’ve got to do more collectively’” (Anchor 2). But whilst the city’s governance has seen a degree of adjustment in style and tone, the priorities and fixes (spatial and institutional) remain the same. Small-scale changes and concessions have occurred at the granular level, for example in terms of developers being willing to talk about local hiring and stressed neighbourhood residents being targeted for anchor economic inclusion initiatives. Funding for lower-tier activities in the stressed neighbourhoods was tokenistic, “because they realise if they don’t, sooner or later the have-nots will be sitting on your doorstep” (Community 1), not transformative. The respective development (gentrification) and demolition (displacement) dynamics of the Port Covington and Project CORE initiatives were cited at the stakeholder workshop as examples of “things staying the same”. Governance strategies across the tiers continue to align with the meta-goal of deconcentrating poverty. One strategy is to attract the middle class, “to bring more white people back into city, to highlight the good that is existing in a lot of our neighbourhoods” (Anchor 1). At the workshop, stakeholders clarified that this quote should read “white people with full wallets”. Another strategy is the relocation of (poor, black) residents from stressed neighbourhoods subject to demolition, rather than continuing attempts to improve neighbourhoods perceived as beyond repair. Citizen activist and community group interpretations of these strategies as gentrification and displacement underscore the racialised (and spatialised) class structures of governance by exclusion or domination of those lacking power and resource. As one respondent usefully summed up, “the conversation may have changed but the systems aren’t changing” (Activist 5).

These systems have been shaped by and draw from previous governance conjunctures, wherein the city's decline and deprivation is deeply connected to the definitive nature of the spatial fix between the "increasingly smaller and poorer core city" (Orfield, 1998) and the surrounding region, reinforced by racist local and federal policies which have segregated its African American population. Within the city, the spatial pattern of redlining which commenced in the 1930s remains clearly visible in Brown's (2016) "black butterfly" of poor African American neighbourhoods west and east of the central north-south spine of the city, now classified as stressed in the neighbourhood typology. In the words of an interviewee, "inequality in Baltimore is so much grosser than it is in the nation as a whole... and it's cut on racial lines, which makes it all the more obvious and all the more oppressive" (Anchor 1). Resultant "rebellions of the poor" (Castells, 1977) such as the riot in the city in 1968 led to some ameliorative activities, but also responses (in particular punitive policing) which further contribute to the city's iniquitous governance as manifested today. The uprising of 2015 affirms that inequity remains "etched into the urban landscape" (Weaver, 2017), one respondent commenting "we will for sure have another uprising [given] the tensions when you have growth and inequality" (Non-profit 2).

## **Conclusion**

Taking a regime analytical approach, Stone (2015, p. 122) sees transformative potential if a "capable and policy-oriented local government" is combined with an expanded role for anchor institutions and local activism backed by foundation funding. Analysis of Baltimore's austerity governance reveals the absence of local government and confirms the power exerted by the city's anchors and foundations in promoting the dominant neoliberal logic. Stone argues that the transformational challenge is organisational - one of network construction founded in "concrete purposes" - rather than ideological, pointing to the accommodation of a

restive and assertive younger generation of African Americans in Atlanta through incremental adjustment but not fundamental alteration of the city's governing arrangements (Stone, 2015, p. 103). But in the case of Baltimore, a shift in focus from the incrementalism of the "concrete purposes" of regime analysis to the "ideological challenge" of urban governance theory, with its emphasis on ideas and values in both framing and structuring governance change (Pierre, 1999; 2011) is required given the city's iniquitous governance.

Some respondents emphasised the need for incremental accommodations of consensus, "ways of partnering in a positive manner" (Foundation 3), and in so doing contrasted oppositional with collaborative (potentially co-optative) behaviours, "you can impact by opposing things but you also can impact change by working with people to get things that you want in your neighbourhood" (Councilperson 2). But even these respondents, whilst welcoming the incremental adjustment of economic inclusion initiatives, commented that these were not focused on the "intentional dismantling of structural racism... the under girth of [the city's] continued challenge" (Foundation 3). Others made clear the ideological challenge in their call for transformational change. It was realised that "it's going to take courage... because these are systematic, inequitable things that are so entrenched in this city" (Non-profit 6), another relating the uprising to:

"[The] ton of unhappiness and dissatisfaction in the black community with the black leadership [of city government] and the extent to which the black establishment has really been acting in the interest of black neighbourhoods, poor black residents" (Non-profit 2).

Local activism protesting injustice and inequity has been invigorated since the uprising, indicating a shift in the ideological terrain. It was observed that "this whole angst and theme of balance, justice, fairness, opportunity" (Councilperson 1) is on the rise, as "the unrest

awakened many people”, who are “talking about things they’ve never talked about before” (Activist 4). City-based African American activist organisations that pre-date the uprising were widely mentioned. Traction is evident in their advocacy for policing and criminal justice reform, a realm seen by stressed neighbourhood community groups as a prerequisite for other change in the city:

*“Actual police reform... without change in the structure, the policies, the way they actually work in Sandtown and all of the urban neighbourhoods in the city, is the very first steps to actual change”* (Community 3).

But activist espousal of an alternative ideology with regard to the city’s development politics has gained less traction, pointing to the challenge of disrupting the logic and practices of austerity governance. The alternative ideology espoused encompasses “independent black institution building that’s so necessary for communities to actually have the power needed to address a lot of these problems” rather than “developers with black faces like the mayor and the city council controlling where the money goes” (Activist 4, group). Activists envisaged scope for transformative change with “two parallel tracks” - one “like Port Covington, a neoliberal city”, contrasted with their ability to produce a “parallel structure, a parallel narrative... [a] vision of community empowerment from the grassroots up, as opposed to seeing black folks as appendages of a neoliberal wave” (Activist 4, group).

Stakeholder workshop participants underscored the challenge of creating change because “we aren’t even having those conversations [about] the values driving choices being made and who is making these choices”. This points to the need to repoliticise the city, developing a cadre of political actors who are capable of imposing collective preferences on policy choice (Pierre, 2011, p. 23) despite the power of the city’s elites and the seeming entrenchment of

the logics and practices of austerity governance as the norm. A further challenge is posed by the constraints on mass mobilisation due to the city's neighbourhood structuring and attendant parochialism, reinforced by the imperative to engage in self-provisioning of services given longstanding state withdrawal, though such activities may also contain the seeds of political mobilisation.

Ultimately, the analysis points to the critical need to reconcile divisions within Baltimore as part of any change capable of moving it beyond continual fiscal squeeze and the violence and destitution associated with it. Without disturbing dominant ideologies with a unified mobilisation against the continued overriding priorities of austerity governance, little progress seems possible via incremental change to such a deeply flawed governance system.

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