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Cover Page

Liberal and Illiberal Peace-building in East Timor and Papua: Establishing Order in a Democratising State

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Biography

Claire Q. Smith (PhD, LSE; MIA, Columbia; BA Hons, Oxford) is a lecturer in the Department of Politics, University of York. Smith's research concentrates on national and sub-national processes of conflict and peace. She has published on the juncture of democratisation and peace-building in South-East Asia, focusing on Indonesia.

Key words

Civil war, illiberal peace-building, political order, democratisation, Indonesia, East Timor, Papua.

Abstract

States undergoing turbulent processes of democratisation frequently use illiberal peace-building methods to manage civil wars, as it enables them to secure order with the lowest risk. However, the existing literature on illiberal peace-building does not explain why governments sometimes opt for more liberal means, despite the risks involved. To explore this question, the paper draws on original primary sources and secondary evidence to compare the Indonesian government's management of two civil wars during democratisation. The Papua and East Timor cases constitute an ideal comparative case study as the government took starkly different approaches to managing conflict in each region, within the same period. While East Timor was resolved via liberal methods, the Papua conflict was managed via illiberal means. I argue that two dimensions need greater recognition and interrogation within the existing illiberal peace-building framework to explain this difference: first, the role of shifting internal power balances within national political elites, especially civilian-military relations and the relative power of moderates; and, second, the influence of external actors on these internal power balances.

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Liberal and Illiberal Peace-building in East Timor and Papua:

Establishing Order in a Democratising State

Introduction

The objectives of this paper are both empirical and conceptual. I explore the puzzle of why the Indonesian government took two starkly different approaches to managing conflict in East Timor and Papua during the early period of democratisation (1998-2001). I consider why initial practices of ‘illiberal’ peace-building in East Timor shifted to a negotiated liberal approach during the first civilian presidency, under B.J. Habibie; but why, in contrast, illiberal peace-building prevailed in Papua under the subsequent president, Abdurrahman Wahid, despite initial steps towards conciliation. I explore the strengths and weaknesses of the illiberal peace-building literature in explaining the government’s different reaction to these two conflicts, and, from this analysis, I draw some broader points to develop the concept of illiberal peace-building.ⁱ

Indonesia is an unfortunately good case for the study of peace-building approaches during post-authoritarian democratisation. Democratisation in late twentieth century Indonesia took place alongside the resurgence of several civil wars, multiple major incidents of ethno-religious violence, as well as a nationwide non-violent social movement for democracy. Looking within the same nation-state at different conflicts makes it possible to hold certain parameters relatively constant – state actors, political leadership, military force, social movements, and so on – in order to see the critical

differences between, and influences on, why the regime took different approaches to managing regional civil wars.ⁱⁱ

For East Timor, a negotiated settlement brokered by the UN in 1999 provided a political resolution to the 24-year conflict between the Indonesian government and Timorese resistance movement, enabling East Timor's formal independence. Although, in hindsight, East Timor's independence appeared inevitable, and Indonesia's economic loss from the territory was comparatively small, the negotiated political settlement to the conflict was a violent and fragile process, nearly derailed on many occasions, and resisted by most of Indonesia's political and military elite.ⁱⁱⁱ In the neighbouring region of Papua, illiberal peace-building - underpinning a non-negotiated position - prevailed almost throughout the early phase of democratisation, with a briefly more conciliatory approach and opening towards dialogue rapidly undermined.^{iv} Two moderate civilian leaders implemented these contrasting approaches to conflict in two neighbouring regions, both within a broadly liberal interventionist international environment. I seek to explain here why the illiberal model to managing conflict prevailed in Papua, with the support of international governments, while in East Timor this approach was overturned.

During the Suharto regime, the territories of both East Timor and Papua were aggressively incorporated into the unitary Indonesian state. While the military processes of annexation were similar, the political rationale and approach was different: and this had long-running effects. Having been part of the Netherlands East Indies, Papua was claimed in Indonesia's 1945 declaration of independence.^v For Sukarno's government, continued Dutch presence in Papua through to 1961 posed a strategic risk to national unity. When Suharto took power in 1965, the political pressure to take official control of

the territory only mounted. In contrast, East Timor was a Portuguese colony until 1974. With the collapse of Portuguese rule and the temporary triumph of a leftist government under Fretelin, following a brief civil war in 1975, East Timor posed a different kind of political threat for the anti-leftist Suharto government.^{vi}

The two territorial annexations were received quite differently in international fora during the Cold War. The UN recognised Indonesia's claim to Papua following the UN-supervised 1969 "Act of Free Choice", but gave no such recognition of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. This different international reception to Indonesia's claims to both territories had long running effects on East Timor and Papua. The perception of both territories as national security threats, although for different reasons, continued to influence Indonesian politics into the late 1990s, within the military and more nationalist political parties, but even within more reformist wings of the new government.^{vii}

Following Indonesia's official annexation of Papua in 1969, and the military occupation of East Timor in 1975, the government rolled out highly repressive and militarised modes of rule in similar ways across both territories. Suharto's government relied on a heavy security presence, civilian repression, and infrastructure and fiscal development investments in both territories. During more peaceful times locally brokered deals and occasional ceasefires between local leaders and government and military representatives were possible. These processes together formed a 'thick' version of illiberal peace-building, a method outlined further below.^{viii} Once democratisation got underway in the late 1990s, the central government's approach towards the two regions diverged. I propose that two aspects of illiberal peace-building analysis need developing further to explain this critical policy divergence, which had profound effects on each region.

The liberal peace-building literature focuses on the influence of international organisations, which means it has limited relevance to a context like Indonesia's. The concept of illiberal peace-building is more useful as it focuses on national approaches to internal conflict management. However, the illiberal peace-building literature has not yet elaborated why domestic regimes shift strategies, between more or less illiberal approaches. I contend that internal political dynamics mean that particular tensions within governments can, at key moments, create new more liberal pathways for conflict resolution. Further, while it is a useful corrective to focus on national dynamics, the illiberal peace-building literature has not sufficiently accounted for the impact of international pressures on internal politics. In comparing the two cases here, I find that a combination of shifting internal regime dynamics and variations in international responses had important effects on why these two conflicts were treated differently by the newly democratising Indonesian government.^{ix}

On the first issue, the illiberal peace-building literature has tended to treat states practicing illiberal peace-building as hegemonic and static, largely because of the literature's focus on authoritarian practices. While the literature has explained variance between more or less illiberal methods *across* regimes, it has not accounted for this variance *within* regimes.^x This paper highlights how democratising regimes are dynamic political organisations, vulnerable to pressures from competing parties, intra-elite conflicts and coalitions, as well as newly powerful interest groups and social movements with influence at the elite level. All such domestic dynamics interact with the incentives to control regional independence movements via military and economic means, both of which form a central mechanism of illiberal peace-building practice. The cases here

show that rapidly shifting internal power balances within the political and military elite, and their wider supporting groups, played a key role in driving a more liberal approach towards East Timor. However, this shift only took place when a particular constellation of external pressures also threatened key state interests. As internal power balances shifted back, in a more conservative direction, government policy reverted to preserving order in Papua via illiberal means, alongside ongoing nationwide democratic reforms.^{xi}

The contrasting international response to domestic policy was critical in determining the ways the government responded to resurgent demands for independence. The contrast between the historical legal and political positions of the international community towards Papua and East Timor was exacerbated by international attention to and civil society action on East Timor alone. To understand the variation in national government strategy across these two places, we therefore need to analyse not only internal politics, but the role of international influences on internal dynamics in producing more or less liberal approaches to peace-building during democratisation.

In broader policy terms, several key issues from these cases bear relevance across South-East Asia in 2019, where various governments undergo national political change while managing enduring regional conflicts, including in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines. First, international policymakers who provide support for internal moderates can have a big impact on balances of power. Dramatic moderate shifts within apparently recalcitrant governments, like Indonesia's in the period analysed here, can surprise even the closest observers. Second, promoting liberal settlements for particular conflicts can unleash a nationalist backlash from more hardline factions in government towards other conflicts. This uneven approach can undermine the prospects for more

liberal and nationally driven solutions nationwide. Both the positive and negative aspects of international influence on internal power balances, and the impact this has on the nature and trajectory of peace-building, needs to be more fully accounted for.

Negotiated settlements and illiberal peace-building

In this paper, I consider the under-examined field of national approaches to peace-building in transitional regimes, in particular why illiberal methods fail, succeed, or evolve. This responds to Cederman and Vogt's concern that despite the wide array of studies on termination and resolution in the civil wars literature, crucial gaps remain in understanding the phases of and endings to internal conflicts.^{xii} Based on the comparative analysis of two cases from Indonesia's transition, I reflect on the limits of the main arguments established thus far in the illiberal peace-building literature. To do so, I draw on studies of mass atrocity endings and conflict negotiations.

Civil wars are often fought over regional ethnic territory.^{xiii} In 'regional ethnic conflicts' a regionally concentrated ethnic rebel group (or groups) is concerned with establishing control over a specific territory, 'homeland' or 'nation'.^{xiv} According to Zartman, the demand for regional self-government falls on a spectrum moving from local home rule to secession, "and it usually slides back and forth along the spectrum during the conflict."^{xv} For a negotiated end to regional civil war, a sustainable conflict resolution formula along this spectrum, satisfying rebels, resistance groups, and the central government, has to be found. Zartman argues that moderates within *both* the regime and rebel groups must play a powerful role, in order to be able to seize 'ripe moments' for political negotiations to take place.^{xvi} Plus, a large enough coalition of parties must be interested in a negotiation to carry the rest of the group to settle the substantive issues.^{xvii}

Moderate coalitions on each side are therefore responsible for securing political negotiations.^{xviii}

But negotiated political strategies are notoriously difficult to achieve: while attempted in half of civil wars between 1940 and 1992, they succeeded in less than one third, and in most cases combatants chose to return to war.^{xix} The risks inherent in negotiated settlements underpin why non-negotiated illiberal peacebuilding approaches are more popular for democratising or transitional states.^{xx} For regimes simultaneously attempting to stabilise control of the centre, maintain political order across their territory, and manage transitional reforms, open-ended negotiated approaches to resolve regional ethnic conflicts are usually too high risk. Illiberal peace-building approaches, which focus on achieving overall political stability without offering negotiated political resolutions, can therefore be preferable. As these methods frequently draw on non-liberal and authoritarian modes of conflict management, they have been collectively described as “illiberal peace-building”, a term I elaborate on below.^{xxi}

Illiberal peace-building describes a range of nationally driven (as opposed to internationalised) practices aimed at managing sub-national conflicts, which diverge from prevailing liberal and post-liberal models in three key respects.^{xxii} First, illiberal peacebuilding contexts tend to have reasonably functioning states, without the heavy engagement of international interventions, and have been dominated by domestically-led processes. Second, forms of clientelism, co-option, and predation dominate over neo-liberal economic measures to achieve a form of ‘peace’. Third, illiberal norms of order, frequently based on repression, tend to trump liberal norms of liberty and equality.^{xxiii} In many contexts, at least in the short to medium term, these practices have produced

relatively stable political orders, minimising widespread violence, via the establishment of some form of “sustained hegemonic control” over a conflict-affected area.^{xxiv}

Until the 2010s, these nationally-driven modes of managing internal conflicts received much less attention in the literature than internationalised peace-building methods, but since then these modes have been increasingly recognised as common practice in many parts of the world.^{xxv} As Smith et al argue, a body of work has now grown around analysing these modes of conflict management as a distinctive set, rather than derogations from liberal practices.^{xxvi} Mukherjee, for example, argues that developing states in Asia tend to manage enduring regional ethnic conflicts via illiberal “containment” methods.^{xxvii} Such methods - a form of “thin” illiberal peace-building, which I explain further below - reduce violence in the interests of overall state order, but do not substantively resolve conflicts. In other cases, more militarised and authoritarian interventions - “thick” illiberal peace-building - have been strategically deployed, as in Sri Lanka, with the aim of terminating (not containing) civil wars.^{xxviii}

Toft and Walter have shown that outright military victory, found at the most extreme end of “illiberal” peace-building, can be a more effective end to civil wars than either liberal negotiated or illiberal containment approaches.^{xxix} However, as Mukherjee argues, such methods are difficult for many developing countries to implement due to their high economic cost when balanced against other public spending demands. In contrast, modes of containment can minimise costs and risks, while being less conclusive.^{xxx} Democratising states also face political constraints given rising scrutiny over anti-civilian military actions from domestic and international actors. Negative

publicity can provoke international sanctions, even intervention, prolonging political instability even further.^{xxxii} I return to these points in the case comparison.

‘Illiberal peacebuilding’ practices vary substantially across both “thin” and “thick” models. ‘Thin’ modes rely on a securitised and development focused mode of conflict management.^{xxxiii} These ‘thinner’ modes may include some reformist elements, and may be intended as interim conflict containment stages towards more liberal negotiated solutions, but the risks to state stability are perceived as too great for negotiations in the short term. A negotiated end state may never be reached.^{xxxiii} In contrast, “thicker” versions of illiberal peace-building are more authoritarian and highly militarised, and the illiberal means *are* the ends.^{xxxiv} “Thicker” versions avoid formally negotiated solutions, although interim localised deals can still sometimes be reached. Both thin and thick versions share the same short-term intention of containing large-scale violence against the state, producing overall regime stability and protecting contested territorial integrity.^{xxxv} In many cases illiberal methods have achieved these goals, allowing reasonable functioning of the state, although often with profound long-term costs.^{xxxvi}

“Thinner” illiberal peace-building has proved a practical way to maintain a degree of political order in transitional states by containing conflict at relatively low levels of violence, and providing sufficient political stability for central regimes to maintain power across contested territories, at least temporarily.^{xxxvii} More liberal governance or economic policies may be deployed at key moments, such as the redistribution of government funds to sub-national groups, in order to placate resistance groups.^{xxxviii} The “management” of civil wars via these processes also allows for informal and formal deal making at the sub-national level to reduce conflict, minimise violence, and avoid

exacerbating political crisis in the interests of overall stability.^{xxxix} Such deals do not allow rebels or resistance groups to substantively renegotiate membership of the central state, but they provide scope for limited reforms, and may allow for more liberal and democratic trajectories in the future.^{xl} These thinner illiberal modes of peace-building can sometimes be preferable to governments (and populations) than continued war.^{xli}

The more militarised “thicker” versions of illiberal peace-building are comparatively more expensive and controversial.^{xlii} While low levels of violence continue under “thin” arrangements, it is not at the same levels of “thicker” more repressive versions. By deploying thin illiberal peace-building, governments can limit (although not eliminate) state violence, meaning they can generally manage to maintain support from liberal international allies, without having to fully commit to an open and democratic political solution to regional conflicts.^{xliii} States applying these methods may also lobby Western allies extensively to ensure that human rights pressures are kept to a minimum, in return for an apparent liberalisation in conflict regions.^{xliv} “Thin” illiberal peace-building methods therefore offer many advantages to democratising states seeking to increase political order across their territory at the lowest political and economic risk.

Where the illiberal peace-building literature is limited, however, is in its ability to explain why a risk-averse and stability-focused government, like Indonesia’s newly established democratic regime, would move *away* from such illiberal methods, and towards much riskier, more liberal, negotiated conflict resolution policies, potentially threatening overall political order. It is this puzzle that I seek to explain here. I argue that conflict management policies in democratising regimes are dependent not only on the formation and nature of their institutions and broader interests, but also on how elites

within the regime bargain and contest for the power to influence these outcomes. I argue that these elite dynamics have international as well as national dimensions that need unpacking to understand national decisions over regional conflicts.

Drawing on the insights from Zartman's analysis of civil war negotiations, I explore the factors that triggered the Indonesian government to move away from an illiberal approach towards an internationally negotiated and liberal settlement in East Timor. I consider the role of and constraints on moderate leaders, both within the Indonesian government and wider political elite. Further, I seek to understand the external pressures required for this shift to a more liberal peace-building approach, and the long-term impact this had on an enduring illiberal approach to the Papua conflict. I argue that a coalition of moderate leadership within the Indonesian government managed, at a particular moment, to achieve a resolution to the East Timor conflict, but not for Papua, where it lacked a substantive coalition for reform. The failure to achieve a negotiated resolution for Papua was exacerbated by the lack of substantive international support for such a settlement, due in part to the international community's recognition of Indonesia's right to govern Papua from 1969 onwards.^{xlv}

Overall, then, in the empirical discussion that follows, I argue that it is attention to internal power balances - and within this, the role of moderates and civil-military relations - and the effects of external pressures on these power balances, that is currently missing from illiberal peace-building analysis. I show how attention to these factors sheds light on how more liberal and negotiated peace-building strategies emerged in the Indonesia case, despite the risks involved. These findings have relevance both to

developing the concept of illiberal peace-building, and to a better understanding of peace-building processes in democratising states.

Regime responses to two regional conflicts

For nearly three decades, the Suharto regime presided over three civil wars, in Aceh, Papua and East Timor. In these three conflicts the Indonesian military sustained the most persistent resistance from both armed rebel, clandestine and civilian organisations.^{xlvi} Papua and East Timor were largely contained by the regime in military terms by the 1980s, via similar modes of military annexation.^{xlvi} The Aceh civil war, in contrast, remained active through to the mid 2000s. However, in Papua and East Timor, non-armed civil activists and small numbers of armed units managed to survive the authoritarian era. In the run up to Suharto's fall, and as he stepped down, political leaders in both regions renewed their long-standing calls for independence.^{xlvi}

With significant social and political pressure from domestic organisations, and economic pressure from global financial institutions, the Indonesian government removed Suharto from power in 1998. This was one of Indonesia's most significant moments of political change since the establishment of national independence in the late 1940s and the anti-communist genocide of 1965-1966.^{xlix} The new government had to rapidly implement major political reforms, while also maintaining political stability in the centre, which meant placating the military and established political elite. At this critical political juncture, many regional leaders across Indonesia demanded a change to the terms by which they were governed, but in Papua and East Timor they also renewed their call for self-government.¹ The central government initially responded by reinforcing an illiberal

response to both regions: increasing levels of violence by military forces and pro-government militia against civil dissent.^{li}

At first, it seemed that independence activists were more active in East Timor than Papua, and the military response was concurrently harsher. But this perception was fuelled by the lack of outside organisations and foreign media reporting from Papua.^{lii} The greater levels of coordination across the Timorese resistance, between civilian activists in Indonesian cities, the clandestine front, and diplomatic wings, and the more established and internationalised campaign, meant both the cause of the resistance, and Indonesian military and militia violence against it, was better publicised.^{liii} Both regions raised similar demands for a political dialogue on independence, and the military responded to these demands in a similar illiberal fashion. Eventually, however, these two regions experienced different outcomes.

Within two years of Indonesian democratisation, East Timor was permitted to hold a referendum on formal independence, rapidly followed by military-led violence, UN intervention, supervised military withdrawal, and Indonesia's political withdrawal of claimed sovereignty by October 1999.^{liv} In contrast, during the same timeframe, Papua experienced initial violence, a brief period of low-level dialogue during the Papuan Spring (1998-2000), which subsequently collapsed, and was followed by a return to a broadly illiberal peace-building approach from the government. The following sections consider the reasons behind these contrasting outcomes in more detail.

East Timor

Several factors in the late 1990s affected the Indonesian government's response to the East Timor conflict. Underpinning these was the fact that the UN had never formally accepted Indonesia's invasion and annexation of East Timor from 1975. This situation directly contrasts with how the history of how the UN responded to Papua's incorporation. Following a brief history of the international position on East Timor, I outline the four contemporary factors that shifted Indonesia's response in the late 1990s. The first factor to consider is the critical role of Habibie as the new civilian president. Second, the influence of transnational pro-Timorese civil society and diaspora networks was also important. Third, the role of international pressure affected both civilian and military branches of leadership in new ways. Fourth, the military's response to this set of pressures, and eventual agreement to a political solution to the conflict, in return for maintaining a hardline approach elsewhere, finally shifted the balance.

Following East Timor's brief period of civil war in 1975, after the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule, a leftist Timorese government took power under the Fretelin party and declared independence. Indonesia then invaded and annexed East Timor between 1975 and 1976, with Cold War backing of the US and major Western allies, including Australia, who justified it in terms of preventing a communist domino effect.^{lv} The Security Council and the General Assembly condemned the 1975 invasion, and the East Timor situation remained on the UN agenda over the following decades, although Indonesia's policy did not substantively change until the late 1990s.^{lvi} Although Cold War politics meant that Indonesia's major Western allies did not advocate for Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor, the UN maintained direct and continuing interest in finding a political resolution to the conflict.

By the early 1980s, massive Indonesian counter-insurgency operations had largely crushed Falintil, the armed wing of the Timorese resistance, although it was never entirely eliminated, remaining a source of symbolic resistance. In the wake of the four-year military campaign to repress the territory, known as the “Encirclement and Annihilation” strategy, the Indonesian government established a vast network of military surveillance and repressive operations throughout the territory, and both the armed and civilian resistance went underground or into exile.^{lvii} Until Suharto’s fall in 1998, the military saw the ongoing occupation of East Timor as a core part of protecting Indonesia’s ‘territorial integrity.’ This view lasted well into the *Reformasi* (reform) era among much of the political class and military elite, although some in the civilian elite began to criticise Indonesia’s occupation through the late 1990s.^{lviii}

While the position of most of the national political elite in Jakarta over East Timor did not change leading up to Suharto’s fall from power, the international political position rapidly evolved under increasing pressure from pro-Timorese networks. As East Timor had never been recognised as a formal part of Indonesia meant civil society and Timorese diplomatic activists had been able to push their claim to independence through the 1980s and 1990s. The pro-independence Timorese leadership, both within Indonesia and in exile, in collaboration with a number of international human rights and activist organisations, increasingly lobbied international political leaders and multilateral organisations. Following widespread military defeat by the 1980s, the Timorese leadership had shifted to a politically-focused approach, via building this transnational network. This network helped to raise attention to East Timor at the UN General Assembly and Security Council through the 1990s.^{lix} International attention magnified

following international publicity of the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 and two further international events.^{lx}

International interest in the Timorese case mounted when the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to East Timor's Catholic Bishop Belo and the exiled Timorese leader, Jose Ramos Horta, reflecting the powerful advocacy of both the Catholic Church and Timorese activists and leaders both within Indonesia and internationally.^{lxi} In 1997, South African President Mandela was granted a meeting with the imprisoned Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao in Jakarta, further raising international interest. In 1997, the UN Secretary General then appointed a Personal Representative to push for a negotiated solution for East Timor.^{lxii} The UN had continued to seek a political settlement to the Timor situation since its occupation, but both national and international factors had not enabled this to take place. When other political factors shifted internally in Indonesia, alongside mounting pressure on the UN from the Timorese leadership, the Catholic Church and international civil society activists, this paved the way for a UN-backed resolution by the late 1990s.

In January 1999, the new Indonesian President Habibie took the decision - without the agreement of his key advisors, or most of the military leadership - to allow a referendum on East Timor's status.^{lxiii} The reasons behind Habibie's decision are still contested, as is the military leader Wiranto's eventual support for it.^{lxiv} For Habibie, East Timor, was the "pebble in the shoe", as his senior advisors called it, undermining Indonesia's democratic status, and which he sought to resolve conclusively with a referendum.^{lxv} For Habibie to achieve the widespread political reforms and economic recovery he sought domestically, he also needed international support: a referendum on East Timor was a

way to build this international credibility. The decision gained him some domestic support, as, although Habibie's decision ran against the positions of many in Indonesia's political elite, it won him support among parts of the reform movement, some of whom were also rising politicians, and national human rights organisations. Observers close to Habibie at the time claimed he wanted to be seen as a genuine democrat among both the national reform movement and the international community.^{lxvi} Crucially, Habibie, his advisors and Wiranto, did not foresee an anti-Indonesian vote: they saw the referendum as a way to settle the East Timor problem "once and for all".^{lxvii}

Habibie's decision to allow a referendum in East Timor was resisted by many most of the political establishment and the military, although supported by Wiranto, the TNI chief.^{lxviii} However, once offered, it was impossible to withdraw.^{lxix} This internal dissent within the post-Suharto civilian and military elite over the referendum opened a political window for the Timorese leadership. They perceived that Habibie's position, with Wiranto's support, was deeply fragile and unlikely to survive military and political opposition.^{lxx} Xanana Gusmao, the imprisoned Timorese leader and former commander of the armed resistance, along with the international Timorese coalition for independence, both perceived that the referendum offer could be quickly revoked.^{lxxi} Thus, however flawed in organisation, the referendum was seized by the Timorese leadership in exile and within Indonesia, as a key step towards enabling a political settlement towards formal independence. Transnational activists rapidly pressured governments in Portugal, Australia, and the US, to support the referendum.^{lxxii}

The situation escalated towards a political solution at the international level, which the Indonesian government was pressured on all sides to accept, alongside fierce resistance

on the ground. The TNI, along with their locally-deployed nationalist paramilitaries, responded to the September 4 1999 referendum's pro-independence result with extreme force, killing nearly two thousand civilians, burning and destroying much of East Timor's infrastructure, and displacing tens of thousands of people.^{lxxiii} International journalists were in East Timor, along with the UN Supervisory Mission, reporting on the rising violence. As internal tensions rose over how to respond, and violence in the territory by military-organised militia groups escalated, this was matched by a non-violent coordinated response from the Timorese resistance movement from both the armed and clandestine wings. The crisis escalated with violence from one side only, due largely to Xanana's decision to insist that the armed resistance leader TMR barrack the remaining Timorese remaining forces, estimated at less than a few hundred by this point but still with armed capabilities.^{lxxiv} This decision was crucial in enabling international support for the Timorese to continue during the escalating post-referendum violence.

As the post-ballot violence rose, Habibie's government faced a difficult choice. The government needed to regain nationalist military and civilian support, which they lost over the referendum, and so Habibie resisted further international intervention during the violence.^{lxxv} But the international community responded to the rising crisis by threatening widespread bilateral and multilateral sanctions unless the government effectively controlled the violence.^{lxxvi}

Habibie faced a united and unprecedented front at key international economic fora, including the major regional economic meeting of APEC, and both the IMF and World Bank made continued financial aid contingent on an end to the East Timor violence.^{lxxvii} The government needed this international aid and finance to continue to shore up the

economy, but by September 1999 three quarters of the \$12.3 billion IMF bailout had still to be transferred.^{lxxviii} The threat of economic sanctions came at a critical time for Habibie's government in Indonesia's post-economic crisis reconstruction process. When the US then threatened military sanctions, targeting the core of Indonesian national interests even further, rapidly followed by the decision to ready an international military force led by the Australians, Habibie's government faced a crisis point. As the President sought to balance the competing interests of international organisations, and the national political and military elite, this tension was unsustainable. Finally, in late September 1999, Habibie and Wiranto conceded to international pressure, and barracked Indonesian troops as international deployment was imminent.^{lxxix}

As Zartman argues, escalations in conflict can play a role in creating turning points for negotiations.^{lxxx} With escalating and well-publicised military and militia violence through 1999, the international community pushed harder for a political settlement for East Timor via the threat of sanctions and military intervention. The combined efforts of international civil society pressure on Western governments and at the UN produced a period of highly active diplomacy across the political and economic fronts.^{lxxxi} Under these international threats, and with Wiranto's eventual cooperation from the military, Habibie and the core political elite was finally pushed towards accepting a negotiated ending, despite remaining widespread military and political opposition.^{lxxxii}

As international pressure rose on both the economy and the military, the leadership's decision to barrack Indonesian troops and control the pro-Indonesian militia were critical factors enabling a political solution to the Timor crisis.^{lxxxiii} Other military figures, especially the former Special Forces Commander, Prabowo, opposed Wiranto and took the hardline nationalist line, seeking to maintain occupation of East Timor. But

Wiranto recognized the damage international sanctions and potential military intervention would do to the military, as well as his own political position.^{lxxxiv} The scenario of open confrontation with Australian troops heading a UN intervention was not one Wiranto wanted the Indonesian army to face.^{lxxxv} The influence of Wiranto over the military at that time, in collaboration with the threat to core state interests under extreme international pressure, briefly reconfigured internal regime politics. This reconfiguration provided for a brief military-civilian leadership agreement over withdrawing the military from East Timor.^{lxxxvi} The government's reliance on international financial and military aid made a crucial difference to the situation, with international actors temporarily able to influence decisions within both the military and civilian leadership.

However, when the military finally, reluctantly, and under significant international pressure, enabled a political solution to the East Timor crisis, this did not by any means imply an *overall* shift in military policy towards the Indonesia's other ongoing conflicts. Maneuvers within the military and political leadership enabled a trade-off: relinquishing military control of East Timor helped secure the military's economic and territorial assets in other conflict regions.^{lxxxvii} Further, Wiranto used the crisis to leverage control over his internal opponents, especially Prabowo.^{lxxxviii} Wiranto also ensured, 'that Habibie's political career rather than the army would bear the brunt of the repercussions, as subsequent events demonstrated.^{lxxxix} Wiranto temporarily shored up his political position in Jakarta, although he too shortly paid the price for enabling the East Timor withdrawal with a resurgent nationalist political and military elite.^{xc}

The brief moment of agreement between Western governments, transnational activists, Timorese independence leaders, and Indonesia's civilian and military leadership,

towards achieving an internationally negotiated political settlement to the East Timor conflict ended almost as soon as it had begun. East Timor left a scar, in the words of one high-level Indonesian official.^{xcⁱ} An externally enforced political solution to the East Timor crisis, culminating in formal independence, upset the political elite across the national spectrum, and triggered renewed hardline nationalism.

Following East Timor's secession, Habibie was discredited and subsequently lost the 1999 election. Wiranto shifted the blame onto Habibie, and briefly survived politically, up to early 2000, by ramping up military activity and anti-secessionist policy in Papua and elsewhere. From this point onwards, the civilian and military elite were resistant to national political engagement in dialogue, or other more 'liberal' approaches, as well as opposed to enabling international involvement in regional conflicts.^{xcⁱⁱ} Indeed, the government's handling of East Timor, and the military's failure to ensure the ballot went in Indonesia's favour, marked what Mietzner describes as, "the end of the early civil-military transition". This failure subsequently inhibited subsequent administrations from taking a more conciliatory and negotiated approach towards Papua.^{xcⁱⁱⁱ}

Papua

After Suharto's resignation in 1998, Papuan politics was dominated by public demands for independence in a period known as the "Papuan Spring". A brief period of open dialogue and conciliation between Jakarta and Papua under first Habibie and then Wahid's earliest year in office quickly closed. Three key factors influenced the Indonesian government's renewed illiberal response mode to the conflict in Papua from mid 2000, which I go through in this section. But underpinning these was the historical decisions by the international community during the Cold War to recognise Indonesia's

claim to the territory. This international position underpinned the limited scope for influence that changing contemporary factors could have on the government's response to the conflict, and had a long-lasting limiting effect on any claims Papuan pro-independence leaders could make to renegotiate their territorial status. It also had a long-running effect on the Indonesian political elite across the spectrum, who perceived Papua as a historic part of post-independence Indonesia.^{xciv}

After a brief history to Indonesia's formal and internationally accepted incorporation of Papua into the Indonesian state, I consider three changing contemporary factors. First, I look at the fluctuating influence of the civilian presidencies from 1998 to 2001. Second, I consider the renewed influence of the military during this period, following the East Timor crisis. Third, I examine how the lack of international pressure on Indonesia over Papua, and the post-Timor reassertion of nationalist political and military elites, allowed for a renewed illiberal response. This approach then lasted through five further Presidential elections, through to 2019.

During the late colonial era, the Dutch had administered the Western half of the island of New Guinea, and Indonesia included Papua in their 1945 proclamation of independence. However, Papua was not incorporated into the new Republic with the rest of the former Netherlands East Indies in the transfer of sovereignty in 1949.^{xcv} The Dutch maintained that the territory was distinctive, requiring a separate governance arrangement.^{xcvi} The new Indonesian government viewed the Dutch position as an ongoing campaign of colonialism and challenged their control of the territory.^{xcvii} Following the 1961 Political Manifesto issued by the Papuan National Committee, at the First Papuan Peoples

Congress, which asserted the right of Papuans to establish their own nation, Indonesia responded by physically occupying the territory.^{xcviii}

As a result of the UN-negotiated New York Agreement of August 1962, Indonesia took over Papuan administration from the UN in May 1963, although it was not yet the official government. In 1969, following the highly flawed UN-supervised Act of Free Choice, provided for in the 1962 New York Agreement, the UN sanctioned Indonesia's full incorporation of Western New Guinea. This was noted by the General Assembly on 19 November 1969, in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2504.^{xcix} Following UN Resolution 2504, the region was formally incorporated into the Indonesian state, removed from the UN agenda, and Indonesia renamed it Irian Jaya.^c With roots in the 1930s resistance to Dutch colonialism, Papuan independence activists re-launched their campaign for self-determination from 1969 onwards.^{ci}

From the early 1970s through to the early 1980s, Indonesia ran massive military and political repression operations across Papua to subdue the independence movement, in parallel with their operations in East Timor.^{cii} Tens of thousands of civilians were displaced, thousands more were killed, villages bombed, and highland populations encamped, as the full military and political weight of the Suharto military regime rolled out across the territory.^{ciii} By 1998, outright conflict in Papua had been largely subdued, but political resistance remained, with many of the Papuan leadership in hiding, exile or jail.^{civ} The independence movement had survived the Suharto regime politically, if not militarily, and demands for a dialogue over Papua's status resurged in 1998.^{cv}

The promise of democratisation created the space for a "Papuan Spring." Chauvel argues that, in the first year's after Suharto's resignation, "the public space in Papua was

dominated by the articulation of demands for independence.”^{cv} Habibie at first initiated a brief dialogue with Papuan leaders in 1998, and during government discussions over new regional autonomy legislation for Papua, a team of 100 Papuan leaders was invited to meet Habibie in Jakarta in February 1999. The Papuan “Team of 100” took the bold step of requesting independence at the meeting: apparently this had not been anticipated by Habibie.^{cvi} After this initial meeting, under pressure from the wider political and military elite, Habibie’s government abandoned a more open conciliatory approach.^{cvi} However, his successor, the first democratically elected President Wahid, then made further conciliatory moves.

Early in 2000, newly elected President Wahid made two striking public expressions of conciliation towards Papua. First, he issued a decree enabling the provincial name to be changed from Irian Jaya to Papua^{cix}; second, he permitted the Papuan nationalist flag, the Morning Star, to be flown alongside the Indonesian flag.^{cx} Between May and June 2000, Papuan leaders organised the Papuan Congress (*Kongres Papua*), at which over 50,000 Papuans attended, and which was partly funded by Wahid.^{cx} This meeting was dubbed the Second Papuan People’s Congress, recognising the First Papuan People’s Congress of 1961, which had sought Papuan self-determination, and the Congress issued a statement rejecting the 1962 New York Agreement and the 1969 Act of Free Choice, and calling for international recognition of Papua’s sovereignty.^{cxii} A government intelligence memo at the time noted the widespread enthusiasm for independence throughout Papua after the Congress.^{cxiii} While Papuan leaders and the local population took Wahid’s moves to be significant steps towards enabling independence negotiations, these actions triggered strong resistance from the military and wider political elite.^{cxiv}

Wahid had turned out to be far more reformist than many of his supporters had expected.^{cxv} His conciliatory approach to Indonesia's ongoing and historical conflicts ignored advice that only military force would repress secessionist tendencies.^{cxvi} Wahid also opened other highly sensitive historical issues by publicly apologising for the key role of the moderate traditional Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which he headed, in the 1965-66 anti-communist genocide. He removed some of the army's most influential officers from central military positions by putting them in his cabinet, and carried out a variety of other reforms designed to exert greater civilian control over the military.^{cxvii} But Wahid's ability to support a conciliatory approach to Papua, along with his other reform initiatives, was short-lived, as the mainstream in the armed forces subsequently blocked and overturned them.^{cxviii}

The military's response to Papuan activism from late 2000 became increasingly repressive and violent, with the detention of five leaders from the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council (*Presidium Dewan Papua*) following a series of clampdowns on celebrations of Papuan "Independence Day" on 1 December 2000, and public displays of the Papuan flag.^{cxix} Further mass arrests, torture and disappearances undermined Papuan pro-independence activism.^{cxx} One year later, in November 2001, Indonesian Special Forces assassinated one of Papua's most senior peaceful pro-independence leaders, Theys Eluay, who had taken part in the earlier political discussions with Wahid.^{cxxi} Despite Wahid's new political policies, the security forces made no distinction between non-armed political leaders and civilian activists, and armed rebel groups - both were treated as equal threats to the state.^{cxxii} While Wahid had started his presidency with greater ambitions than Habibie to achieve political dialogue with Papua, and he had much greater popular support, his influence was eventually

limited by the reassertion of military power, the stagnation of his reform project, and a resurgent nationalist political elite.^{cxxiii}

Wahid's reformist agenda on many issues, not only Papua, alienated many in the nationalist political elite and, combined with a variety of other political clashes, following his increasingly authoritarian and erratic behaviour, led to his gradual undermining and eventual impeachment.^{cxxiv} Without significant international support from Western governments, the UN, or transnational civil society, for his conciliatory moves towards Papua, Wahid's position had been unsustainable.^{cxxv} The subsequent election of the more hardline nationalist Megawati, Wahid's deputy, in late 2001, meant the resurgent illiberal approach towards managing the Papua conflict was cemented in government practice. Under Megawati, Papuan ambitions for greater dialogue and autonomy over the region's governance was further undermined, by ongoing repressive security sector activities and via her more conservative nationalist agenda.^{cxxvi} The application of the new Special Autonomy (*Otsus*) legislation from late 2001 is a good example of how the prospects for increasing Papuan autonomy were further undermined.

The first drafts of these reforms, started under Habibie and Wahid's governments, had intended to reduce demands for Papuan independence by improving local governance, and included Papuan architects in the process. Indeed, earlier drafts reflected many Papuan demands, including full withdrawal of the military from the territory.^{cxxvii} But all such content was removed during subsequent parliamentary negotiations. The final draft contained no provision for significant or substantive political or military reforms, allowing only for greater redistribution of economic revenues, under the rubric of governance reform.^{cxxviii} Close observers saw the legislation as a renewed "divide and rule" policy, undermining substantive reforms with technical governance changes.^{cxxix}

Implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, insofar as it could improve local self-government, was then systematically undermined during the Megawati Presidency, culminating in the 2003 decision to divide Papua into two provinces, contrary to the original agreement.^{cxxx}

The way the 2001 reform package was undermined was part of the government's "thin" illiberal peace-building strategy to balance different interests without substantive political reforms. Megawati's government allowed sufficient local reforms to increase access for local elites to local government budgets, as a means to gain their support, while simultaneously preventing further independence protests via a repressive security policy, and undermining the regional spirit of the legislation.^{cxxxi} The province wide reforms undermined earlier legislation that had increased Papuan representation in local government, thus pitting local Papuan elites against each other, and confusing local government legislation further.^{cxxxii} Meanwhile, the central government campaigned both at home and overseas to shore up international respect of its status and policies in Papua.^{cxxxiii} Megawati's strategy, dubbed the 'Prosperity Approach,' focused on this package of security force repression, the implementation of a regional investment and development strategy, and the complicated reorganisation of local governance via Special Autonomy legislation.^{cxxxiv} Political intimidation, assault, murder and incarceration of suspected pro-independence political groups continued alongside these partial reforms over the next two decades, limited overt resistance.^{cxxxv}

By the late 1990s, the UN position on Papua had not changed, with limited international pressure put on Jakarta to recognise the self-determination and negotiation demands of the pro-independence leaders. As neither the UN nor Indonesia's major Western allies changed their position on Papua, there was limited international scrutiny of Indonesian

actions in Papua, despite the efforts of the pro-independence Papuan exile groups to raise the issue.^{cxxxvi} By the 2010s support for Papua was increasingly raised via the Pacific island state forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, and from 2016, pro-Papuan civil society groups called for an independence referendum on Papua's status in the UK and elsewhere.^{cxxxvii} But these initiatives failed to reach the levels required for any major power to pressure the Indonesian government sufficiently to find an alternative approach to the Papuan conflict, while the Indonesian government continued to lobby against the pro-Papuan narrative.^{cxxxviii} The government's ongoing violence against Papuan civilians and activists in 2019 continued to avoid significant international scrutiny, which was compounded by the continued difficulties of independent access to monitors and journalists to the territory.^{cxxxix}

From the 2000s onwards, the majority of Papuan activists and political leaders shifted to a non-violent response mode within Indonesia. They also shifted their agenda into the international arena by 2015, concluding this was their best chance of opening a dialogue on Papua's official status.^{cxl} The history of integration into Indonesia, and the international community's recognition of Indonesia's claim, made international lobbying by pro-independence groups, such as the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), much more difficult than it was for the Timorese activists.^{cxli} By 2019, the political conflict in Papua remained unresolved, and continued to be managed via a package of increased economic spending, limited local governance reforms, and heavy security with impunity, in a 'thin' version of illiberal peace-building.

With the continued arrests, assassinations and torture of political activists in 2019, and ongoing violence in the highlands, the costs for Papuans to demand a political resolution to the conflict continued to be deadly, 20 years after the Papuan Spring.^{cxlii} The

government continued to blame local violent incidents on separatists, but independent reports separately attributed these protests to a wider array of local political issues.^{cxliii} The following section reflects on the different outcomes in these two neighbouring conflicts, illuminating some of the gaps in the illiberal peace-building literature in explaining the central government's divergent responses.

Revisiting the concept of illiberal peace-building

As I outlined at the start, the term illiberal peace-building describes a range of national practices to manage, rather than resolve, regional conflicts, which draw largely on illiberal and economically focused methods to reduce overt violence, avoiding formal political settlements.^{cxliv} The illiberal peace-building literature helps explain the newly democratic Indonesian government's initial preference for the deployment of 'thin' illiberal peace-building methods. However, it does not account for the subsequent evolution of the government's conflict policy, including the temporary period of conciliation towards Papua, and the eventual negotiated solution for East Timor.

I find that two crucial factors are missing in the illiberal peace-building framework, to explain the differences between the cases here. First, changing internal power balances within the government, and, in particular, the rise of moderate leadership, in competition with more hardline and military factions, had important policy influences at a crucial moment during democratic transition. Second, the international community, by supporting either moderate or hardline positions over the conflicts, and influenced by the historical factor of international recognition of Papua's incorporation into Indonesia, was also critical in explaining why particular modes of peace-building came to the fore. The interaction between these national and international factors explains how

momentary spaces for a negotiated solution emerged in one case, despite overall government preferences for illiberal solutions.

Internal regime dynamics

Mukherjee's discussion of containment provides a useful starting point to analyse why Asian states prefer 'thin' modes of illiberal peace-building.^{cxlv} The problem with this approach is that it treats states as behaving similarly, regardless of whether they are in the process of reform, or of changing internal power configurations. Political elites in states engaged in regional conflicts are too often treated as monolithic, and opposed to political approaches in all instances.^{cxlvi} The two cases here showed that Indonesia during democratisation was highly contested, and under particular conditions, domestic power configurations rapidly shifted the government's responses to regional conflicts.^{cxlvii} These responses varied depending on changing domestic and international political pressures, the type of leaders in place, and the balance of power in civil-military relations. Treating the Indonesian government as purely recalcitrant and violent in its approach to internal conflicts misses significant evolutions in the national leadership, which were then lost to a resurgence of hardline nationalists.

The illiberal peace-building literature has not yet accounted for internal national regime dynamics. But these internal dynamics mean that particular tensions within governments can, at key moments, create new more liberal pathways for conflict resolution. As Zartman argues, moderates can play a critical part in enabling negotiated endings.^{cxlviii} Democratising regimes are dynamic political organisations, vulnerable to pressures from competing parties, intra-elite conflicts and coalitions, as well as newly powerful interest groups and social movements with influence at the elite level.^{cxlix} All such domestic

dynamics interact with the incentives to control secessionist movements via other military and bargaining means. The competing interests within regional conflicts were weighed up by the central government, as they attempted to maintain overall power and order, while simultaneously protecting their own interests. As such, certain domestic balances of power lead to more moderate conflict approaches; other balances of power lead to more illiberal approaches.

Thus, analysis of ‘thin’ versions of illiberal peace-building in democratising regimes is a useful starting point to understand civil war management in Asian states, but it can only go so far. Indonesia during democratisation favored illiberal solutions to civil wars at some points, but more liberal and negotiated positions to others, as internal power balances shifted. When both moderate and reformist presidents Habibie and Wahid attempted to open dialogue towards Papua, this was directly challenged by the military and wider political elite on all sides. Both presidents did not have sufficient political capital (or interest) nationally and internationally to push a negotiated approach through for Papua, following the East Timor settlement.^{ci}

Peace-building policies in democratising regimes are dependent not only on the formation and nature of their institutions and broader interests, but also on how elites within the regime bargain and contest to influence these outcomes. These elite dynamics need further unpacking to understand national decisions over regional conflicts, perhaps in the vein of the “elite bargains” literature in relation to economic development patterns.^{cli} Tracing the evolution of national and sub-national elite bargains helps unpack the rationale behind changing regime policies towards managing civil wars during democratisation, when elites seek to maintain order and defend their own interests, as internal and external circumstances rapidly shift.

The comparative cases here showed that shifts within the national political elite played a key role in generating new policies towards two enduring conflicts. Understanding the nature of and shifting relations between moderates and hardliners, and between civilian and military forces, is critical to understanding how and when conflict management policies shift. The comparison here showed that even when the national military leadership promoted a militarised “thicker” mode of illiberal peace-building, this did not necessarily triumph. With a particular moderate coalition of national leadership, when backed by significant international support, more liberal options became possible.

Of particular importance to Indonesia’s rapidly evolving policies towards conflict during the democratic transition was the changing role of the military. When the military stood to lose influence and control over East Timor, this needed to be regained in other contested territories and in central politics. Accounting for the internal elite trade-offs made in this decision forms a vital part in explaining the puzzle of why the East Timor conflict was eventually negotiated, but Papua was not. By allowing East Timor to secede, via a negotiated political solution, the military could then push for a return to illiberal peace-building in Papua, as international support waned.^{clii}

Further, to understand the Indonesian government’s reluctance to open discussions over Papua, during the early phase of democratisation (1998-2001), and under subsequent presidencies, it is important to recognise that this conflict continued to provide political – not only economic - capital to significant elements of ruling elite. This political capital was even more important to the military following the loss of East Timor, which while never a significant economic asset, had reflected their extensive political control. Illiberal peace-building analysis focuses heavily on the political economy of conflict management, in particular the economic trade-offs and deals made in managing conflict.

But ideological and political elements are also crucial for explaining the persistence of illiberal patterns, as Lewis et al recognise.^{cliii} Preserving centralised control over Papua helped hardline nationalists in both the political and military wings of government maintain power, by exploiting the existential threat against the nation state. This discursive act is a common feature of regimes practicing illiberal peace-building worldwide, not only particular to Indonesia.^{cliv}

The two-case comparison showed that by tracing shifting patterns of national elite bargains, and the evolving nature of elite political interests, the changes – and consistencies – in national level approaches to regional conflicts can be unpacked. Doing so deepens our understanding of national peace-building practices, rather than assuming that national approaches will be consistently authoritarian, economically-focused and hegemonic.

International influence

The other crucial factor influencing the national government's different response to the two regional conflicts was the changing international political environment. The international dimension is largely missing in the illiberal peace-building literature, but it proved critical in determining the different peace-building approach in these cases.^{clv}

Under international law, East Timor was not recognised as a part of Indonesia, and the UN maintained that it had a responsibility to resolve the conflict, two facts which greatly aided the Timorese cause when the national political environment shifted in the late 1990s. With increasing UN attention to the East Timor crisis, combined with increased pressures on the liberal group of states led by the US, this threatened some of the core

interests of the Indonesian government. When combined with a moderate and reformist presidential leadership, this combination of factors enabled a negotiated response towards East Timor. In contrast, in Papua, without significant international interest, the government's 'thin' illiberal peace-building approach could 'remain under the mass atrocities radar', without substantive reforms.^{clvi} While preventing open negotiations with armed members of secessionist groups, and non-armed secessionist activists, the illiberal approach applied in Papua enabled informal and formal deal making, permitting some reforms at the sub-national level and reducing a level of violence.^{clvii} This policy achieved a degree of 'political order', rather than a substantive form of peace.^{clviii}

Illiberal peace-building analysis has not discussed the impacts that international scrutiny may have on domestic behaviour towards regional conflicts, in terms of recalibrating policies to be more or less authoritarian. But the cases here showed that external pressure affected the scale, if not the mode, of illiberal peace-building. Following East Timor's independence, the government feared further international intervention, but in the absence of a re-opening of the international legal status over Indonesia's incorporation of Papua, and an ongoing lack of substantive international interest in Papua, a policy of thin illiberal peacebuilding was sufficient to maintain overall order. By mimicking democratic reforms, expanding economic development, and reducing mass atrocities against civilians, the government was also able to minimise international interference in Papua.^{clix}

As Conley-Zilkic finds, the integration of democratising regimes into the international liberal order does not necessarily have a transformational effect on a government's approach towards violence against civilians: it may simply mean their assault on

civilians is sufficiently reduced to avoid external interference.^{clx} Thus the mode of illiberal peace-building may be recalibrated, but not overhauled, by international pressure. In Papua, containment policies were just liberal enough to be tolerable to the international community, while also being sufficiently oppressive to preserve state control.^{clxi} Similar processes have been observed in Bosnia and Guatemala, where elites, ‘had strong incentives to be seen as performing as liberal states,’ but without risking negotiated peace processes.^{clxii}

When international pressure is more interventionist, as in East Timor, it can force open the space for a more liberal and negotiated settlement.^{clxiii} But this only happened in Indonesia in conjunction with a sufficient shift in both political and military interests to allow such a settlement to take place. Aside from the enduring problem of international legal recognition of Indonesia’s claim to Papua, the better organised transnational activists supporting East Timor’s cause, the cohesiveness of the multi-dimensional Timorese resistance movement, across its armed, clandestine and diplomatic wings, and the (eventually) better publicised Indonesian atrocities all played a role. All of these factors coalesced to push leading Western governments to pay attention to East Timor - something the Papuan nationalist movement still sought to achieve in 2019.^{clxiv}

From late 2000 onwards, the Indonesian government returned to the default position of managing the Papua conflict via “thin” illiberal peace-building methods. International and regional protests from Papuan leaders could be largely ignored, despite rising attention from a number of Pacific island states in the 2010s.^{clxv} As Conley-Zilkic comments on Indonesia’s actions in Papua, ‘they developed a sustainably violent governance model that is nonetheless internationally acceptable.’^{clxvi}

The interaction of domestic and international factors

By comparing the same regime's response to two neighbouring conflicts, I have demonstrated the contingency of the negotiated liberal solution for East Timor. The right conditions had to arise at exactly the same time within *both* the central regime and the international arena for national policy to shift on East Timor. But this solution was permitted only if the regime then did not have to repeat this elsewhere. The liberal settlement for East Timor meant the scope for such settlements in Papua were greatly reduced, if not eliminated.^{clxvii}

Recalling Zartman's argument that two factors are crucial for a negotiated settlement - a large moderate coalition within both the regime and rebel group, and a ripe moment - both of these applied to East Timor. A temporarily moderate leadership in the political and military arenas of Indonesian government managed, at the last hour, to achieve, a negotiated political settlement.^{clxviii} But, within one year, moderates within the Indonesian leadership had lost the political ground required for any form of negotiated settlement for Papua. Understanding how the external and internal power shifts interacted helps to explain the government's different approach to, and constraints on, these two conflicts.

Zartman's approach also highlights how conflict stalemates can provide a stable and bearable compromise.^{clxix} Containing conflict via stalemates is often more effective for regimes than negotiation or military resolution. In Papua, the Indonesian government was able to maintain their claim to sovereignty, and to use the ongoing conflict as a mobilising national issue. Negotiation under such conditions becomes a zero-sum

game.^{clxx} While Papuan nationalist groups sought negotiation, which implies recognition of their claims, the government sought cooption or surrender. This dynamic created a cyclical trap, hard for both sides to break out of, and continuing as of 2019.^{clxxi}

Rather than treating national state policies as static and hegemonic, which illiberal peace-building theories have tended to do, it has been useful here to draw on Zartman's negotiation theory, which treats conflict resolution as a dynamic process within and across regimes. The shifting politics of conflict management was notable in both cases, where policy shifted from illiberal peace-building to negotiation and then back to illiberal peace-building (in Papua) within two years. Drawing on negotiation theory has helped explain how relations change between conflict actors, and regime responses evolve, even when conflicts are deeply entrenched, and illiberal peace-building methods the default mode.

Conclusion

I have argued here that while the concept of illiberal peace-building helps explain the Indonesian government's default mode for managing conflict in Papua, it does not explain when and why this policy shifted, whether temporarily towards Papua, or conclusively towards East Timor. The illiberal peace-building literature has overlooked the importance of internal political dynamics of the sort that made East Timor's liberal and negotiated political resolution possible during democratisation. It also overlooks the influence international actors can have on moderate domestic factions in democratising states, who can enable politically negotiated settlements to regional conflicts, as well as the significance of formal recognition of territorial status.

In the two conflicts compared here, the interaction between the national and international arenas (Zartman's "timing" element) played a significant role in determining the government's different responses to the two conflicts. The combination of three factors – internal balances, external pressures, and the interaction between them - meant a negotiated solution became possible for one conflict, but caused a more nationalist political configuration for the other. As illiberal peace-building approaches evolve, they should account for these dynamic patterns, across both the domestic and international political spheres.

The comparative analysis here also highlights the political costs faced by moderate national leaders in democratising states, when they enable externally supported liberal peace-building approaches. Successive moderate civilian presidents in Indonesia were personally responsible for these losses to the nation state, losing political capital and subsequent elections as a result. The prospects for resolving the ongoing Papua conflict in a more conciliatory way was lowered substantially as a result. International actors similarly lost political capital in Indonesia following intervention in East Timor. The political scars of East Timor's UN-backed independence still run deep in 2019, over twenty years on.

By comparing the results of the Papua and East Timor conflicts, several insights for international peace-building policy can be drawn. By encouraging a rapid negotiated transformation of the government's approach to East Timor, the international community helped undermine the prospects of a more conciliatory approach to Papua, even at a time when they still had great influence over government policy following the Asian economic crisis. By allowing an internationally negotiated settlement for East

Timor alone, the Indonesia military and nationalist parliamentary hardliners shored up political support for a more militarised approach elsewhere.^{clxxii}

If the international community had taken into account the full range of conflicts within Indonesia at the time of democratisation, rather than focusing only on military withdrawal from East Timor, other nation-wide peace-building options could have been negotiated. For example, the international community could have supported greatly increased democratic self-government and partial military withdrawal for *all* civil war affected regions. An overall approach to improving the quality of democracy and human rights and reducing state violence across all conflict territories might have benefitted more civilians. Instead, by pushing for an internationalised liberal resolution resulting in independence for one conflict, the chance for more conciliatory approaches in Papua was lost for at least a generation.

These policy issues bear relevance across South-East Asia in 2019, as various governments continue to manage civil wars, including in Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines.^{clxxiii} Policymakers should reflect on how promoting international liberal settlements in some conflicts can upset delicate political balances against the interests of political solutions in others, especially when delicate sub-national negotiations are in play. The prospects for a negotiated political settlement in Papua remained elusive in 2019, and the Indonesian government's fear (real or imagined) of a return of foreign troops to Indonesian soil and the loss of territory, kept it so. Via working with moderates, while taking national interests seriously, international actors could still influence the Indonesian government and parliament, encouraging a less violent and coercive approach to managing the ongoing conflict in Papua.

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ⁱ Including analysis from De Oliveira, *Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola*, Lewis et al. *Illiberal Peace?; Smith Illiberal Peacebuilding*; and Mukherjee, *Why Are the Longest Insurgencies*.

ⁱⁱ See Cederman and Vogt, *Dynamics and Logics*; Walter, *Committing to Peace*, 16; and Woolcock, *Towards a Plurality*. Cederman and Vogt highlight a key gap in the conflict literature in terms of analysis of particular stages of conflict. In response to this, I draw on qualitative primary data and secondary sources across a small number of cases to allow exploration of the processes involved in political decisions during critical stages of conflict management and resolution. Walter argues that while statistical analysis shows broader patterns, building causal theories of civil war resolution, which account for cultural political and historical influences, requires a qualitative case study approach.

ⁱⁱⁱ Author interviews with former senior UN negotiators, London, July 2 and 3, 2014. On the fragility of the negotiations over Timorese independence, see also, Martin, *Self-Determination*; Marker, *East Timor: A Memoir*; Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*; Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*. On the political economy dimensions of the Papua conflict, see Elmslie and Webb-Gannon, *A Slow-Motion Genocide*; Macleod, *Merdeka*; Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*; Saltford, *The United Nations*; and the Politics of Papua Project, *Assessment Report*. While the significant differences in political economy between Papua and East Timor - with Papuan natural resources from gas, minerals and timber providing significant income to Jakarta, and East Timor's relative poverty of resources - influenced Indonesia's interests in maintaining the Papuan territory, in this piece I consider the other political dynamics influencing how and why the central government responded differently to these conflicts. The majority of the national political and military elite was no more willing to open dialogue on East Timor, despite its relative economic deprivation, and the shift towards negotiation was hard won, not easily produced.

^{iv} On the complications of naming the region of Papua, see International Crisis Group, *Dividing Papua*, and Macleod, *Merdeka*. I follow the Asian Human Rights Commission and Amnesty International convention here, and use the term Papua to refer to the western half of the island of New Guinea, which since 1969 has been governed by Indonesia. The region is also described as West Papua, a term that carries a pro-independence meaning, and is used by pro-independence activists inside and outside Indonesia. The region was previously known as Irian Jaya, following official incorporation of the territory into Indonesia in 1969. The situation is further complicated as in 2003 the region was split into two provinces, officially known as West Papua and Papua.

^v See Droogleever, *Act of Free Choice*, for the most authoritative analysis of the incorporation of Papua into Indonesia. See the Politics in Papua Project, *Assessment Report*, on actions by Free Papua supporters in the 2010s to gain international recognition, especially within Melanesia. While Papua was part of the Netherlands East Indies, it was not included in the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949, and this caused an ongoing diplomatic (and sometimes military) struggle between Indonesia and the Netherlands

until the New York Agreement of 1962, negotiated via the UN. The 1962 New York Agreement provided for the 1969 “Act of Free Choice”, which resulted in a highly controversial but almost unanimous vote for joining the Indonesian nation state. The legitimacy of the Act of Free Choice remains a key source of contest by various Papuan pro-independence groups, in exile, including the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, and at home.

^{vi} See Smith, *Indonesia*. While the rationale for political annexation across the two regions was different, the modes of annexation at the territorial level were similar in terms of military strategy, processes of civilian encirclement and annihilation, and wider security operations.

^{vii} Author interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, former advisor to President Habibie, Jakarta, 15 November 2015. See also, Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*.

^{viii} For the definition of “thick” practices of illiberal peace-building, see the Introduction to this Special Edition: Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*. On wider practices of illiberal peace-building in Indonesia, see Smith *Illiberal Peace-building*.

^{ix} The divergent international response to East Timor and Papua in the late 1990s was also due to the UN recognising that it had an ongoing responsibility to resolving the East Timor conflict, an underlying factor I analyse further in the case study section.

^x See, for example, Lewis et al., *Illiberal Peace?*; Smith, *Illiberal Peace-building*; and Mukherjee, *Why Are the Longest*.

^{xi} See International Crisis Group, *Ending Repression*. The International Crisis Group argued in their 2001 analysis of the ongoing conflict in Papua, that post-Suharto governments struggled to formulate a regional governance policy in Papua that was compatible with the national democratisation process, while simultaneously preventing further state disintegration after the separation of East Timor.

^{xii} Cederman and Vogt, *Dynamics and Logics*.

^{xiii} See Mann, *The Dark Side*, as to why conflicts can have an ethnic element without being caused by ethnicity.

^{xiv} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 31; Bercovitch and DeRouen, *Managing Ethnic Civil Wars*

^{xv} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 31.

^{xvi} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 18.

^{xvii} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 22

^{xviii} Zartman, *Peacemaking*, 22.

^{xix} Walter, *Committing to Peace*

^{xx} Zartman *Elusive Peace*; Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*; Walter 2002.

^{xxi} The term is deployed, variously, in De Oliveira, *Illiberal Peace-building in Angola*; Lewis et al., *Illiberal Peace?*; Smith, *Illiberal Peace-building*.

^{xxii} For further elaboration, see Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*.

^{xxiii} Ibid. See Chandler, *International Statebuilding*, and Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*, for example, who critique liberal peacebuilding as too hegemonic and oppressive in its practice.

^{xxiv} See Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*, and Owen et al, *Interrogating Illiberal Peace*

^{xxv} Lewis et al., *Illiberal Peace?*, 2.

^{xxvi} Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*; De Oliveira, *Illiberal Peace-building in Angola*; Lewis et al., *Illiberal Peace?*; Piccolino, *Winning Wars*.

^{xxvii} Mukherjee, *Why Are the Longest*.

^{xxviii} Lewis et al., *Illiberal Peace?* See further debate, see Collier et al., *Escaping the Fragility Trap*, Cheng et al., *Synthesis Paper*, and De Waal, *Fragile Paradigm*. Collier et al and Cheng et al present variations on the argument that illiberal peacebuilding is a means of stabilising states for British foreign policy, following the perceived failure of liberal interventionism to produce stable states by the 2010s. De Waal critiques this illiberal turn in British state-building policy

^{xxix} Toft, *Securing the Peace*; Walter, *The Critical Barrier*.

^{xxx} Mukherjee, *Why Are the Longest*.

^{xxxi} Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction: How Mass Atrocities End*.

^{xxxii} See Mukherjee, *Why Are the Longest*, and Azca and Diprose, *Conflict Management*. Mukherjee finds that a majority of Asian states tend to manage regional ethnic conflicts by a combination of containment methods. Azca and Diprose explore how illiberal power-sharing arrangements managed via centre-periphery and sub-national bargains over natural resource rents has produced political stability in Riau, Indonesia, undermining support secessionist movements.

^{xxxiii} Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*, discuss how the means of peacebuilding often shapes the ends, which can make thin and thick versions of illiberal peacebuilding hard to distinguish.

^{xxxiv} See Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*, for further elaboration of these terms.

^{xxxv} Illiberal and liberal modes of peace-building can also co-exist. See Jarvis, *The Stabilising Impacts*, on the long-term stabilising consequences of corruption in Nepal, beyond conditions of violence and state collapse and even where peace was otherwise pursued via largely liberal means.

^{xxxvi} See De Oliveira, *Illiberal Peace-building in Angola*; Lewis et al., *Illiberal Peace?*; Smith et al., *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*, and McCargo and Senaratne, *Victor's Memory*, for case studies. McCargo and Senaratne explore the long-term costs to historical memory and reconciliation when violent conflicts end via state force, without the benefits of political processes.

^{xxxvii} Smith et al, in *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*, discuss the critical relationship between democratisation and illiberal peace-building.

^{xxxviii} See Smith, *Illiberal Peace-building*, on the links between illiberal peace-building and political stability in hybrid political orders.

^{xxxix} Smith, *Illiberal Peace-building*; Lewis et al. *Illiberal Peace?*

^{xl} See Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*, for further discussion of the scope for peace via “thin” modes of illiberal peacebuilding.

^{xli} Driscoll and Walter, *What Russia Might Teach*; Smith, *Illiberal Peace-building*.

^{xlii} See Mukherjee, *Why Are the Longest*, and Chalermripinyorat, *Dialogue without Negotiation*.

Mukherjee argues that containment is relatively low cost, compared to other modes of illiberal solution to conflicts, and enables resources to be deployed towards development. However, it is debatable as to whether thin illiberal peace-building modes are always less expensive. Chalermripinyorat shows how in Thailand’s long-running ‘thin’ approach to illiberal peace-building in the Deep South vast numbers of troops and development projects have been required at huge expense. It is yet another question whether high levels of civilian casualties always attract international condemnation

^{xliii} Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction: How Mass Atrocities End*.

^{xliv} Smith, *Indonesia*; Woodman, *Silencing West Papuan Independence*.

^{lv} On Timor-Leste, see Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; and Niner, *Xanana*. Rebel leadership and capacity also played an important role in making a political peace settlement possible, but there is not space to discuss this dimension here.

^{lvi} On Aceh, Papua and East Timor, see Aspinall, *Indonesia (Aceh) Case Study*, Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*; Bertrand *Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism*; Schulze, *From the Battlefield*. Also see, Chauvel, *Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists*. Chauvel writes how earlier in Indonesia’s post-independence history there had been other significant ethnic regional rebellions – such as the RMS rebellion in Maluku in the 1950s – but these had been sufficiently repressed for the conflicts to fail to re-emerge during democratisation in the late 1990s with great force.

^{lvii} See Taylor, *Encirclement and Annihilation*, p. 85 and pp. 166–67, and Smith, *Indonesia*. Despite the differences in the national process of integration and international recognition across the two territories, the processes of *military* annexation in the two territories was similar during the Cold War period. The military strategies deployed against civilians in both territories worked in parallel, for example via the strategy of “Encirclement and Annihilation” in East Timor, as outlined in Taylor. Indeed, the mode of annexation in East Timor was drawn from the success of the earlier Papua strategy (still ongoing at the time of East Timor’s integration). See Smith, *Indonesia*, on the common military strategies of annexation in both territories, which resulted in the highest levels of civilian casualties throughout both conflicts.

^{lviii} See Bertrand, *Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism*, Aspinall, *Indonesia (Aceh) Case Study*; and Lee, *Political Orders*. Bertrand analyses the institutional fractures that lead to a rise in nationalist ethnic conflict during democratisation. The Aceh conflict was a live armed conflict during democratisation, with significant rebel forces remaining, and was therefore approached differently by the Indonesian government under successive democratic presidents, so I have not included the case in the comparison here. On Aceh’s transition from war to peace, see Aspinall, *Indonesia*; and Lee, *Political Orders*.

^{lix} Bertrand, *Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism*; Robinson, *The Killing Season*.

ⁱ Bertrand, *Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism*.

^{li} Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*; Macleod, *Merdeka*; Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, Robinson, *If You Leave Us*.

^{lii} Macleod, *Merdeka*.

^{liii} Author interviews in Dili, Timor-Leste, April-May 2014. See Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*; Robinson, *If You Leave Us*; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; Smith, *Indonesia*; and Sword Gusmao, *Woman of Independence*, on the role of Timorese exiles and international activists. Former members of the civilian and student resistance reported that the widespread international media publicity around the massacre of civilians by Indonesian military forces at Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili in 1991 formed a major turning point in the success of the civilian resistance, generating great international sympathy, and spurring the international human rights campaigns for East Timor.

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- ^{liv} See Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*, for a detailed empirical evaluation of UN intervention and Indonesian withdrawal.
- ^{lv} Robinson, *If You Leave Us*. East Timor remained a non-self governing territory at the UN, and Australia was one of few states to grant official recognition of Indonesia's annexation.
- ^{lvi} See Robinson, *If You Leave Us*, and Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, for details on changes at the UN and in Indonesia in the later 1990s.
- ^{lvii} See Greenlees and Garran *Deliverance*; Niner, *Xanana*; Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*; Smith, *Indonesia*; and Taylor, *Encirclement and Annihilation*, on the Timorese resistance during and after Indonesian occupation, and on the Indonesian military strategy.
- ^{lviii} Author interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 15 November 2015. See also Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, 79.
- ^{lix} Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*.
- ^{lx} See Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*, for elaboration on the role of transnational civil society.
- ^{lxi} See Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*, for more details on the role of Timorese leaders, international civil society and religious activists in the advocacy process.
- ^{lxii} Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*.
- ^{lxiii} Author interviews, London, July and August 2014; and Jakarta, December 2015. See Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*; Lloyd, *The Diplomacy*; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; Marker, *East Timor: A Memoir*; and, Mietzner, *Military Politics*. Sources close to the Indonesian and UN negotiators at the time reported that under a different president, the referendum would very likely never have been permitted. Indeed, negotiators in the UN were themselves in disagreement over independence as the best outcome. See Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, on the debate within the Indonesian leadership. See Lloyd, *The Diplomacy*, 84; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; and Marker, *East Timor: A Memoir*, on the internal debate within the UN at the time. See Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 206, on the debate over Wiranto's endorsement of the ballot.
- ^{lxiv} See Mietzner, *Military Politics*, pp. 206-207, on the debate over Wiranto's decision. See also Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, p. 101.
- ^{lxv} Author interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 15 November 2015. See, also, Alatas, *The Pebble*, for a memoir of the period from within the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. It is not clear that Habibie predicted such a large vote for independence. Had Habibie understood the mood for independence in East Timor better, he may have been less keen on a referendum: his main objective was for the matter to be politically resolved via a democratic process, rather than the territorial loss of East Timor.
- ^{lxvi} Author interviews with former senior UN negotiators, London, July 2 and 3, 2014, and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 15 November 2015. See also, Alatas, *The Pebble*; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; and Marker, *East Timor: A Memoir*.
- ^{lxvii} Mietzner, *Military Politics*, p. 207. Author interviews with former senior UN negotiators, London, July 2 and 3, 2014, and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 15 November 2015. See, also, Alatas, *The Pebble*; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; and Marker, *East Timor: A Memoir*.
- ^{lxviii} Mietzner, *Military Politics*, p. 207.
- ^{lxix} Author interviews with former UNAMET officials, London, July 2 and 3, 2014; and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 15 November 2015.
- ^{lxx} Sword Gusmao, *A Woman of Independence*; Niner, *Xanana*; Smith, *Indonesia*.
- ^{lxxi} Sword Gusmao, *A Woman of Independence*. Also reported in an author interview with Sword Gusmao, Dili, Timor-Leste, 29 April 2015. See also, Niner, *Xanana*, and Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, p. 80.
- ^{lxxii} Author interview, former senior UN negotiator in both referenda, July 3, 2014, London. Indeed, having observed the UN's failure to provide a fair referendum in Papua in 1969, some UN officials were highly committed to supporting independence in East Timor, if the vote supported it.
- ^{lxxiii} Robinson, *If You Leave Us*; Smith, *Indonesia*, p. 110; Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*.
- ^{lxxiv} Sword Gusmao, *A Woman of Independence*.
- ^{lxxv} Mietzner, *Military Politics*, p. 15.
- ^{lxxvi} Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*
- ^{lxxvii} Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*
- ^{lxxviii} Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, p. 79. See Lane et al, *IMF Supported Programmes*, p. 4, on the IMF decision.
- ^{lxxix} See Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*, for a detailed analysis of this period.
- ^{lxxx} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, p.19.
- ^{lxxxi} Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*, 107; Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, 285.

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- ^{lxxxii} Author interview with Benny Wenda, Oxford, November 10, 2014. Papuan human rights activists and separatist supporters adopted a non-violent response by the 2010s. See, also, Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{lxxxiii} See Mietzner, *Military Politics*, pp. 208-210, on the pattern of TNI behaviour in East Timor, and especially the deployment of militia.
- ^{lxxxiv} Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*
- ^{lxxxv} Author interview with Ian Martin, former UNAMET chief, London, July 3, 2014. See also, Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*.
- ^{lxxxvi} See Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 201-207, on the continued influence of the military over national political decisions under Habibie, the important role of Wiranto in this, and the debate over Wiranto's support for the East Timor ballot.
- ^{lxxxvii} See Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*.
- ^{lxxxviii} Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, 80
- ^{lxxxix} Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, 79-81
- ^{xc} Schulze, *The East Timor Referendum*, 80. Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 210-211, shows how damaging the events in East Timor ultimately were to the military, as their failed operations in East Timor showed the TNI elite that their traditional New Order means of securing political order were being challenged by increased public scrutiny.
- ^{xci} Comment made under Chatham House rules, Indonesian Embassy, London, October 2018.
- ^{xcii} Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*, 225
- ^{xciii} Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 211.
- ^{xciv} See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, on the perception held by other Indonesians that Papuan populations are an inherent part of the nation-state. The internationally accepted integration of Papua into the Indonesian state in 1969 underpins this consensus view among the Indonesian political elite, and it has persisted into the post-democratisation era. When Wahid launched his dialogue with pro-independence Papuans, this national consensus meant Wahid's moves were rejected by a majority of the political elite, which I discuss further on.
- ^{xcv} Droogleever, *Act of Free Choice*
- ^{xcvi} Droogleever, *Act of Free Choice*
- ^{xcvii} See Droogleever, *Act of Free Choice*; Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism*; and Saltford, *The United Nations*.
- ^{xcviii} Many Papuans consider this Manifesto, along with the first Papuan flag-raising on 1 December 1961, to constitute a declaration of independence, and date the independence movement from this point.
- ^{xcix} UN General Assembly Resolution 2504 (XXIV).
- ^c Droogleever, *Act of Free Choice*; Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism*. Papua's formal incorporation into Indonesia in 1969 was the outcome of an arrangement developed early in the 1960s by key state actors, including the Netherlands, under the auspices of the UN, and sanctioned via the 1962 New York Agreement, which culminated in the UN supervised Act of Free Choice in 1969.
- ^{ci} Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{cii} See Smith, *Indonesia*, for more details. The two operations – in Papua and East Timor – followed similar modes during the same period.
- ^{ciii} Asian Human Rights Commission, *The Neglected Genocide*; Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{civ} See Asian Commission on Human Rights, *The Neglected Genocide*. Given the severe restrictions on independent media and researchers accessing Papua during the Suharto regime, few systematic independent reports on conflict casualties of the period exist. The best reports, such as *The Neglected Genocide*, detail particular massacres in the 1970s and 1980s.
- ^{cv} Bertrand, *Autonomy and Stability*; Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{cvi} Chauvel, *Electoral Politics and Democratic Freedoms*, 310.
- ^{cvii} Macleod, *Merdeka*, 126,
- ^{cviii} Author interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 15 November 2015. See also Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{cix} Robinson, *The Killing Season*; Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{cx} Chauvel, *Electoral Politics*, 310.
- ^{cxii} Macleod, *Merdeka*, 128; Chauvel, *Electoral Politics*, 310.
- ^{cxiii} The full statement of the Resolution of the Second Papuan Peoples Congress of 4th June 2000 can be seen at: <https://www.freewestpapua.org/documents/resolution-of-the-second-papuan-peoples-congress-4th-june-2000/> (accessed 2 July, 2019).
- ^{cxiiii} Cited in Chauvel, *Electoral Politics*, 310: official memo from the Director General of National Unity and Protection of Society to the Minister of Home Affairs.
- ^{cxiv} Walter, *Reputation and Civil War*, 160-161; Macleod, *Merdeka*.

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- ^{cxv} See Barton, *Gus Dur*, 285-358, for a detailed analysis of Wahid's broader politics and reform agenda when in office, from the honeymoon period to his subsequent fight for survival.
- ^{cxvi} Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 212.
- ^{cxvii} Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 212.
- ^{cxviii} See Chauvel, *Electoral Politics*, 310-311, on the end to the Papuan Spring; see Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 217-222, on the death of wider political reforms under Wahid, especially p. 217 on the armed forces rejection of Wahid's reform measures.
- ^{cxix} Chauvel, *Electoral Politics*, 310.
- ^{cxx} Author interviews with staff at international human rights organisations working on Papuan human rights (anonymity requested), London, November 2014, and Jakarta, November 2015. See, also, Macleod, *Merdeka*; and Walter, *Reputation and Civil War*, 164.
- ^{cxxi} Macleod, *Merdeka*, 187; Chauvel, *Electoral Politics*, 310.
- ^{cxxii} Amnesty International, *Don't bother*, 46.
- ^{cxxiii} See Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 217-222, for a detailed analysis of the stagnation of Wahid's reform drive and the resurgence of military influence between 2000 and 2001; see also Walter, *Reputation and Civil War*, 161.
- ^{cxxiv} See Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 222-224, for a detailed analysis of the internal politics surrounding Wahid's fall.
- ^{cxxv} See Macleod, *Merdeka*, on international support for Papuan leaders. See Smith, *Indonesia*, on the reasons behind limited UK governmental pressure on the Indonesian government to resolve the Papua conflict, in contrast to East Timor. Various international civil society groups, Pacific island governments, and political parties, supported Papuan activists - whether on dialogue, greater self-government, or independence - but this support was not significant enough to have a critical effect on the Indonesian government. Further research would be useful to interrogate the internal reasons behind limited international government support for a dialogue on Papua, and any potential lobbying by Wahid during this period.
- ^{cxxvi} See Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 225-230, for details on the Megawati-era conservative revival.
- ^{cxxvii} Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{cxxviii} Author interviews with officials and scholars (anonymity requested), Jayapura, Papua, November 2015. See also, Macleod, *Merdeka*; Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*.
- ^{cxxix} Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*; Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{xxx} Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*.
- ^{xxxi} Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*.
- ^{xxxii} Author interviews with officials and scholars (anonymity requested), Jayapura, Papua, November 2015. See also, Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*; Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{xxxiii} Personal observations of Indonesian government approaches in the UK, 2016-2018. See also, Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*.
- ^{xxxiv} On the failure of special autonomy and local governance reform in Papua, see Bertrand, *Autonomy and Stability*; Mollet, *The Dynamics of Contemporary*; and Ruhyanto, *The Perils of Prosperity*.
- ^{xxxv} Amnesty International, *Don't bother*; Macleod, *Merdeka*; Smith, *Indonesia*.
- ^{xxxvi} Author interviews with Benny Wenda, Leader, Free West Papua Campaign, Oxford, November 10, 2014; and Lord Harries, member of the International Parliamentarians for West Papua, London, November 24, 2014. See also Macleod, *Merdeka*. In the 2010s, the exiled Papuan leadership forged a new coalition movement to lead the different independence groups, both within Papua and overseas, following successive failed attempts to open negotiations with Jakarta, which lead to a renewed diplomatic effort at regional and global levels.
- ^{xxxvii} Macleod, *Merdeka*; Politics of Papua Project, *Assessment Report*.
- ^{xxxviii} Author interviews with Lord Harries, London, November 24, 2014; and former senior UN negotiator, London, July 3, 2014. Personal observations of Indonesian government strategy in the UK, 2016-2018.
- ^{xxxix} See Brett, *Guatemala: The Persistence*; and Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction: How Mass Atrocities*. This strategy serves as a central feature of semi-democratic states, including Guatemala and Bosnia, seeking to repress ethnic demands for improved self-governance, while also enabling the government to retain Western allies.
- ^{cxl} Author interview with Benny Wenda, Oxford, November 10, 2014. See also, Macleod, *Merdeka*.
- ^{cxli} See Politics of Papua Project, *Assessment Report*. From 2016, the ULMWP sought international support for an UN supervised referendum on Papua's status, to rectify this situation, and gained the

support of various international parliamentarians, including British opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn, for their project.

^{cxlii} Author interview with Benny Wenda, Oxford, November 10, 2014. See, also, Amnesty International, *Don't bother*; Macleod, *Merdeka*.

^{cxliii} See Amnesty International, *Don't bother*. This included protests against low wages, unemployment, missing relatives, and security force attacks on civilians.

^{cxliv} See Smith et al, *Illiberal Peace-building in Asia*, for further discussion of this definition.

^{cxlv} Mukherjee, *Why Are the Longest*.

^{cxlvi} See Elmslie and Webb-Gannon, *A Slow-Motion Genocide*, for their assessment of the Indonesian government's intentions regarding Papua. See, also, Wheeler and Dunne, *East Timor*, for their treatment of Indonesia as a "recalcitrant" state.

^{cxlvii} See Walter, *Reputation and Civil War*. As Walter notes, states are not uniform over time, and particular regimes are not uniform even at particular moments, meaning their responses to civil war can rapidly shift.

^{cxlviii} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*.

^{cxlix} See Grimm and Weiffen, *Domestic Elites*, 258

^{cl} See Lee, *Political Orders*. By the time of the Aceh peace negotiations, five years later, in 2005, a different president, directly elected and with greater political capital nationally, as well as much greater influence over the military, was able to push through a negotiated process, despite the opposition of hardliners in both the military and government.

^{cli} See Di John, *Conceptualising the Causes*, and Di John and Putzel, *Political Settlements* on elite bargains, as a way of understanding the trajectories of conflict in crisis states. See Khan, *Political Settlements*, on the relationship between elite bargains and growth.

^{clii} See Aspinall and Crouch, *The Aceh Peace Process*, 40. A senior military commander argued for maintaining military operations in Aceh during peace talks as the only way to secure any settlement in the military's interests.

^{cliii} Lewis et al, *Illiberal Peace?*

^{cliv} See Macleod, *Merdeka*, on the practice in Papua, and Lewis et al *Illiberal Peace-building?* on the practice more globally.

^{clv} Smith, *Illiberal Peace-building*, 1517, identifies the role of varying international pressure on the Indonesian government in determining how illiberal the practice of peace-building was in different contexts.

^{clvi} Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction*, 22.

^{clvii} See also, Lewis et al, *Illiberal Peace-building?*, and Smith, *Illiberal Peace-building*, on this point.

^{clviii} Driscoll and Walter, *What Russia Might Teach*.

^{clix} Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction*, 22.

^{clx} Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction*, 22

^{clxi} Conley Zilkic, *Introduction*, 22

^{clxii} Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction*, 22

^{clxiii} Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*; Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor*; Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*.

^{clxiv} See Jarvis and Smith, *Ending Mass Atrocities*, on the combined effects of these three factors on the international community. See Macleod on the Papuan civil struggle for international recognition.

^{clxv} Macleod, *Merdeka*.

^{clxvi} Conley-Zilkic, *Introduction*, 23

^{clxvii} It did not eliminate them for Aceh, for a number of other reasons. See Aspinall, *Indonesia (Aceh) Case Study*; and Lee, *Political Orders*.

^{clxviii} See Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 18 and 22; and Smith and Jarvis, *Ending Mass Atrocities*. Rebel leadership and capacity played a critical role in making a political settlement possible for East Timor, but there is not space to discuss this dimension further here.

^{clxix} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 10.

^{clxx} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 10.

^{clxxi} Zartman, *Cowardly Lions*, 10.

^{clxxii} It is unclear whether the international community recognised the impact of their actions in East Timor on the prospects of more liberal approaches to peace-building for other conflicts, then or subsequently: further research would be required to establish this.

^{clxxiii} For example, ongoing ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in Myanmar in 2018 has given rise to calls for international intervention to force a liberal political settlement to protect

this community. But with critical negotiations ongoing in multiple civil wars across the country, and delicate sub-national peace processes in play following the 2015 ceasefire agreement, the international community must balance support to these critical peace processes, alongside attention to the Rohingya crisis. By increasing international pressure on the Rohingya crisis unilaterally, opportunities to support the evolution of more liberal and negotiated settlements in other enduring civil wars may be lost. Reflections from the Myanmar panel, workshop on “Comparative Peacebuilding in Asia,” LSE, June 25, 2018 (held under Chatham House rules). See also, Hayton, *The Hard Truth*. On sub-national peace processes in Myanmar, see McCarthy and Farrelly, *Brokerage*.