Parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage: the relationship between institutional norms, reputation and accountability

While executive patronage brings important benefits in terms of governance and control, political influence over the selection of agency staff entails a democratic dilemma: how should the exercise of executive patronage be controlled? This article addresses this critical issue, examining Westminster's system of pre-appointment scrutiny by analysing an original database that encompasses every pre-appointment hearing held between 2007 and 2018. The article demonstrates that although the conduct of hearings accords with select committees’ longstanding commitment to cross-party working, members have not prioritized pre-appointment scrutiny relative to their other committee activities. By systematically disaggregating the factors which affect how select committees dispatch this account-holding responsibility, the article deepens previous analyses of pre-appointment scrutiny, and dovetails with scholarship examining the institutional determinants of select committee power. More broadly, it draws attention to the reputational dynamics of accountability, and how institutional norms can serve as vital reputational resources, enabling account-holders to demonstrate ‘responsible’ account-holding.