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The Politics of Security in Liberal Society: Responsibility for Crime Prevention in Mid-Victorian Britain

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the relation between private security and notions of individual responsibility in mid-Victorian Britain. Across the nineteenth century, the security landscape of British city centres was transformed: the gradual separation of residential from commercial property meant many proprietors no longer supervised their premises outside of business hours, while the formation of preventative police forces and the diffusion of brand-name security devices offered alternative, impersonal security solutions. Using the Cornhill Burglary of 1865 – a raid on a highly-fortified jeweller’s shop in the City of London – as a case study, it traces emerging fault lines in the politics of security. Both the police and the security industry received criticism for failure to prevent the break-in, yet most commentators emphasised the ultimate responsibility of the proprietor to supervise his premises personally. Reflecting concerns about the retreat of the affluent from city centres – and the consequent loss of moral oversight of the lower orders – the absent proprietor was subject to stinging moral censure. The public commentary surrounding the Cornhill case discloses a politics of security in transition, articulating between a paternalist ethic of personal superintendence and moral guardianship, and reliance on impersonal, technical and commodified forms of protection. By excavating competing discourses of responsibility in the mid-Victorian period, the chapter illuminates the varied political complexion of self-government in liberal society, and the difficulties of governing oneself as a liberal subject.

Article

Recent decades have undoubtedly witnessed major reconfigurations in security provision. One of the principal contributions of research within criminology was to disclose the political complexion of contemporary private security, by situating it within broader shifts in modalities of governance, and relations between states and citizens, in the contemporary era. Many scholars drew upon (and substantively developed) a portrait of contemporary governance which – inspired by Michel Foucault’s writings on ‘governmentality’¹ – foregrounds operations of power ‘beyond the state’, and the efforts of authorities to enrol various publics in their own self-government.² A key point of connection with security was strategies of ‘responsibilisation’ – attempts by state agencies, private companies and others to make private individuals bear responsibility for preventing crime and managing risks. Notably, Pat O’Malley argued that the prominence of such strategies bore the imprint of a wider transition to a neoliberal politics of ‘private prudentialism’ and the valorisation of a governmental ethic of private responsibility.³ In this respect, the ‘late-modern’ politics of security seemed to contrast with its direct antecedent – a ‘modern’ politics of security, in which the state claimed a monopoly over the response to crime through specialist police and penal institutions. Though some identified historical precursors to responsibilisation in security, these were located before the birth of the ‘new’ police, a moment closely identified with the formation of the modern criminal justice state.⁴ Thus, responsibilisation seemed to present a departure in the politics of security, bringing us closer to classical conceptions of civic virtue than to the culture of the ‘policed society’.⁵

This interpretation rests upon an influential view of modern crime control as rooted in the state institutions of criminal justice developed early in the nineteenth century.⁶ This connects in turn to the association of nineteenth-century Britain with the ‘growth of government’ and the rise of an interventionist, bureaucratic state.⁷ Such a view of the history of policing and crime control has recently been subject to searching criticism, and a new account – in which a monopolistic state is replaced by a ‘mixed economy’ of public, communal and private initiative – is taking shape.⁸ Meanwhile, other recent work – again invoking ‘governmentality’ – has recast understandings of the modern British state. This work is centrally concerned with the powers of liberalism as a mode of government – a project of constructing self-reliant, characterful individuals, capable of governing themselves.⁹ Of particular interest in much of this work is the role technologies and material infrastructures played in constructing the liberal subject – how sewerage systems, street lighting and other socio-technical interventions promoted self-regulation and associated liberal values of character, independence, free circulation,

transparency, civility and privacy.¹⁰ Such work provides an alternative basis for thinking about the politics of private security in its historical context, and a potential challenge to the purported turn to private responsibility outlined above. Yet the principal attempt to link ‘neoliberal’ security to a longer history of liberal government has actually reinforced the conventional view: from this vantage point, Pat O’Malley and Steven Hutchinson argued that risk-based modes of governance – including responsabilisation – failed to develop in nineteenth-century crime control, thanks to the dominance of a reactive, macho culture of policing.¹¹

This chapter connects the two bodies of literature outlined above – on neoliberal security and the history of liberal government – to advance a different interpretation of the history and politics of security in liberal society. To this end, it explores the ‘Cornhill burglary’ of 1865 – the famous raid on a premium jeweller’s shop in the heart of the City of London – and the extensive debate that followed concerning where responsibility for crime prevention should lie. Through this case study, the chapter offers the first extended study of historic debates surrounding private security, public policing and responsibility for crime prevention.¹² It draws deeply on evidence from contemporary newspaper reports: an initial sample obtained from the scrapbook collection of Chubb & Son, the leading lock and safe company of Victorian Britain, was supplemented through keyword searches of the British Newspaper Archive and other online databases,¹³ and combined with other relevant publications and archival records. The Cornhill debate demonstrates that responsabilisation in security is nothing new: just a generation after the foundation of the ‘new’ police, private individuals were enjoined to take responsibility for crime prevention. Yet it also raises questions concerning the seemingly simple conjunction of responsabilisation and (neo)liberal governance. By focusing on the details of a rich case study, this chapter illustrates the instability of self-government once exposed to the vagaries of social practice. Furthermore, by illuminating distinct political discourses of private responsibility, it underscores the diverse relations which may obtain between private security and political culture. Most broadly, by capturing the contingent process of a security culture in formation, what follows highlights the crucial role of events – particularly *failures* of security – in redrawing the bounds between public policing and private security.

The Cornhill Burglary and its Contexts

The break-in occurred one weekend early in February of 1865.¹⁴ Targeting Walker’s jeweller’s shop, the intruders initially secreted themselves in an office above an adjacent tailor’s shop, before it closed on the Saturday afternoon. Once all was quiet, they cut through the floor and

lowered themselves (via a rope ladder) into the shop. From there they attempted to cut through the wall into the jeweller's, but were thwarted by the protective iron lining. Undeterred, they cut through the floor to gain access to the basement (the tailor's cutting rooms, which ran under both premises), and there managed to penetrate through the ceiling into Walker's shop. Only then could they commence work on the safe – a Milner & Son number 3 'holdfast' model, purchased in 1858, and warranted secure against fire and (allegedly) theft. The team forced it open using a method apparently hitherto unknown: they repeatedly hammered small metal wedges into the frame of the safe, which eased the door out just enough to admit a jemmy or crowbar. Stopping frequently to hide from the passing police patrol, the men worked through the weekend, managing eventually to wrench the safe open. Their work was discovered early on the Monday morning, by which time they had made their escape with about 6,000 pounds' worth of jewellery.¹⁵

The case caused an immediate sensation, generating voluminous press commentary over the following eighteen months, from the initial reaction to the break-in, through the police investigation, the capture and trial of the offenders, and finally to a civil court case between Walker and Milner over the failure of the safe. It marked the culmination of a series of high-profile burglaries, including a raid on a bullion dealer in nearby Lombard Street the previous year. Moreover, it occurred almost simultaneously with a very similar raid on a jeweller's shop in Manchester, in which intruders likewise obtained access to the shop over the weekend (though here they drilled the safe open).¹⁶ All this made Cornhill a matter of major public interest: 'For years no occasion of this kind has caused more excitement', the *Times* reported just a few days after the break-in.¹⁷

Yet to make sense of the reaction to Cornhill, one must situate it more fully in its historical context. First, the case followed extensive legislative and administrative reforms to policing. Local governors in the City of London had a record of making improvements to policing stretching back generations, yet these reforms were matched by recurrent complaints concerning the inadequacy of police provision.¹⁸ Such complaints reached a new peak across London in the 1860s, as a rising crime rate, a series of violent robberies and the early release of apparently dangerous convicts severely tested public confidence in the police.¹⁹ Thus, the Cornhill burglary occurred amidst widely publicised criticism of the police. Second, by mid-century, anxieties about crime increasingly focused on an imagined 'criminal class', who made their living from offending, among whom the burglar figured as the consummate 'professional' criminal. An emerging feature of criminal professionalism was technical proficiency, and the

so-called 'scientific' burglar apparently pressed into criminal service the latest advances in science and technology.²⁰ Successful attacks on safes using drills and gunpowder lent some substance to these fears, and prepared the ground for Thomas Caseley – the purported mastermind of the Cornhill raid – to reveal a new mode of attack.²¹ Third, the break-in followed the emergence of a recognisable security industry in Britain, composed of brand-name lock and safe manufacturing firms. By the 1860s, several (including Chubb, Bramah, Milner and Hobbs Hart) were household names. They laid claim to a pioneering record in security design (including newly gunpowder-resistant locks and drill-proof safes), and even asserted that such technical innovation might provide 'perfect' or 'complete' security, forever thereafter outpacing advances in criminal methods.²²

The burglary also took place in a specific locale – the City of London – during its transformation into a specialist financial and commercial district. The 1840s, 1850s and 1860s saw rapid construction of specialist exchanges, banks and discount houses, and the proliferation of purpose-built offices blocks and warehouses.²³ As rental values increased, so the residential population dwindled: 128,000 people lived in the City in 1851, yet this fell to 76,000 by 1871.²⁴ In Cornhill itself, rental values rose more than fivefold between 1817 and 1871, while the number of properties almost halved.²⁵ Increasingly, the City's better-off inhabitants relocated to distant suburbs, carried by expanding omnibus (and later railway) services.²⁶ As early as 1845, the financial journalist David Morier Evans observed that 'a dwelling in the City is a thing not now considered desirable, – all move either towards the west, or emigrate to the suburbs'.²⁷ While some retailers and manufacturers continued to live above their shops, a growing number were choosing to live far removed from their premises. By the time of the Cornhill burglary, *The Era* observed that, after business hours, the City had become 'a perfect desert of empty shops, untenanted factories, and silent warehouses.'²⁸

The depopulation of the City posed a challenge for securing the valuable property reposed in commercial premises. Businesses in wealthy districts, such as Cornhill, had previously appropriated a portion of the local police as private guards. As a result, Cornhill was by 1816 one of the most intensively policed wards in the City, boasting one watchman for every ten buildings.²⁹ Yet as reformers sought in the 1820s and 1830s to rationalise policing provision, instituting more uniform police coverage of the City, Cornhill lost such special protection.³⁰ Some resorted to private security measures to fill the gap. By the mid-1860s, many proprietors in and around Cornhill had fortified their premises, relying for security on shutters, bars and bolts, high-tech locks and safes, and sometimes a private watchman. John Walker – the victim

of the Cornhill burglary – was exemplary of this movement. He deposited his jewels in iron safes, lined the internal walls with iron, and protected the windows with iron shutters. Crucially, Walker also solicited the vigilance of police constables and passers-by: he made apertures in the shutters, illuminated the shop with gas lamps after closing, positioned mirrors to offer a reflected view of hidden corners, and painted the safe door white, to help reveal any sign of tampering. Thus, as the *Times* explained, far from than concealing his valuables, ‘he invited the gaze and inspection of the whole world....That is the modern system of securing property, and it seems to be generally approved...’³¹ This ‘modern system’ substituted technical precautions against theft, and public inspection, for protection once offered personally by the proprietor himself.

Hence, for City proprietors particularly, the break-in at Walker’s shop offered a paradigmatic example of insecurity, disclosing the limitations of common means of securing commercial premises. According to the *Times*, it ‘produced a strong feeling of apprehension among merchants, bankers, and tradesmen for the safety of movable property of enormous value which they are accustomed, and, indeed, obliged to leave behind them at night to the guardianship of the police, and in some instances to that of private watchmen.’³² The case seemed to test technical safeguards, including patented security devices, against the new breed of ‘scientific’ criminals, and found them wanting. In Martin Innes’s terms, the burglary served as a ‘signal crime’: it cued collective concerns about crime and generated new perspectives on urban insecurity.³³ The case did not bring to light existing, settled ideas of where responsibility for crime prevention should lie; rather, it re-posed that familiar question in the changing social and material conditions of the mid-Victorian City. All recognised that greater security was needed; the key questions were what alternative preventative measures would suffice, and who was responsible for providing them.

Who was Responsible?

Predictably, the City Police drew criticism for failing to discover the thieves at work. The inhabitants and proprietors of Cornhill ward met shortly following the break-in to enquire into the ‘insecure state’ of commercial property, and ‘generally into the working of the City police; as to their efficiency in the protection of the vast amount of property necessarily entrusted to their protection.’³⁴ In an atmosphere of no small panic among bankers and merchants, the meeting heard complaints of police ‘non-efficiency’, of the ‘stupid men’ or ‘barn-door savages’ who constituted the force, and of their insolence. More considered contributors highlighted particular deficiencies in the preventative system, notably the lack of vigilance among novice

constables hired to replace experienced colleagues departing the force. Alderman Carter reported that such men 'walk up and down Cornhill...looking about like mere automatons',³⁵ a view supported to some extent by the experiment of local jeweller who one night purposely shut off his gaslight - normally left burning - to see if the constable would investigate, and found he did not.³⁶ These were common reflections on the limitations of preventative policing in practice;³⁷ more distinctive was the long-standing argument about whether the City Police – whose independence was hard won – should be amalgamated with the Metropolitan Police, as the Home Secretary had proposed the previous year.³⁸ Criticisms of the police reflected the social position and interests of local commercial men. One Mr Lund, an especially vociferous critic, expressed a widely shared view of the police as a kind of collective insurance for the local propertied community: 'Where we are called upon to contribute so largely to the police rates...it is but reasonable that we should receive an adequate protection.' He went on to assert that he and his peers had obtained better value for money in the days before the new police: 'the community were comparatively safe in the hands of the private watchmen, but now we have a police system which is practically a sham...I am inclined to think the sooner we return to the old Charley's [watchmen] the better though perhaps they might require a little renovation.'³⁹

The police hit back at their critics with considerable rhetorical force. In a public notice issued a month after the burglary, Colonel Fraser (Commissioner of the City Police) responded to 'an impression [which] somewhat extensively prevails in the City that the duty of protecting house property at night is one which belongs exclusively to the Police', and sought to outline 'the nature and extent of the protection which they [householders and proprietors] may reasonably expect to receive from the Police Force'. He deplored the practice of leaving shops and warehouses 'entirely untenanted' or 'habitually deserted' at night-time and over weekends, and the want of 'due care' in securing premises upon close of business. Denying that he had ever approved of proprietors leaving their shops illuminated at night to permit police inspection, Fraser progressed to his central principle: that 'the special watching over particular premises...is a duty which the Police cannot undertake to perform.'

'If a constable on duty were bound, each time he passed, to make a careful inspection of the interior of shops through the several apertures which individual shopkeepers may please to make in their shutters, he would obviously be unable to complete the circuit of buildings under his charge within the time appointed for that purpose, and the majority of houses on the beat, as well as passengers in the streets, would be left without that protection which the Police should properly afford.'

Fraser claimed the constable had above all to fulfil a *public* function – to prevent crime against all premises and persons on his beat – and therefore could not make up for shortcomings in private security:

‘they cannot be responsible for what may be occurring out of their sight, within deserted buildings to which they have no access, – they cannot keep stationary guard over the doors of unprotected warehouses unprovided with any locks or outer fastenings but such as are of the most worthless description, – they cannot prevent robberies being effected in premises to which thieves are admitted during the day and secured from all interruption when locked in for the night by the owners of the premises themselves, – nor can they, in justice to the legitimate claims which the majority of the Ratepayers have on the protection of the Police, employ the greater portion of their time in watching over the property of a few individuals, who invite attacks from thieves by omitting to take the precautions which common prudence enjoins.’⁴⁰

The basic argument was not new. Fraser had rehearsed it the previous year, following complaint from one Mr Johnstone, a Cornhill shopkeeper, regarding a large burglary on his premises. In a private meeting, Fraser had apparently told Johnstone: ‘There are millions worth of property constantly left in this City unprotected, and we do not place Policemen on duty to take charge of the property of any single or particular individual, but of the property of the inhabitants in general.’⁴¹ Nor was the argument as clear cut as it may seem; police constables were widely instructed to take particular notice of banks, shops and other places which housed valuable property, rather than to keep a strictly uniform watch over all parts of their beats. Their central task was to protect the local propertied community – the ‘Ratepayers’ Fraser referred to – against depredations, rather than to provide equal protection for all.⁴² Yet Fraser deployed this argument to assert the bounds of police responsibility. In his report to the City Corporation’s General Purposes Committee, he condemned Walker’s impersonal system of security: leaving premises uninhabited over the weekend, he wrote, ‘not only tends to burthen the Police with obligations which are foreign to their proper functions, but also to deprive the citizens generally of their fair share of the protection which they are reasonably entitled to receive.’ Regarding spy-holes and gas lighting, he thought that ‘owners of property are not unfrequently led to suppose that the adoption of such contrivances throws the responsibility, which ought otherwise to attach to them, entirely upon the Police.’⁴³ Fraser’s bid to recalibrate public expectations of police protection found general support in the press. The *Star* thought his notice ‘thoroughly sensible’, while the *Times* considered it ‘a very reasonable piece of common sense’.⁴⁴ The *Daily Telegraph* went further, skewering the Cornhill merchants for thinking that ‘nobody but the police can be to blame’.⁴⁵ Rather, ‘All the guardians

of public safety either can do, or profess to do, is to assist people in taking care of what belongs to them.' Police supervision 'must be an auxiliary to private vigilance, not a substitute for it.'⁴⁶ While the wider press was less forgiving of police shortcomings, rarely were they singled out the police for blame.⁴⁷

The burglary also revealed the limitations of branded security devices, inviting criticism of the security industry for failing to provide products able to counteract advances in criminal techniques. The new wedging method of safe-breaking suggested systemic shortcomings in design, which threw into question the protective capability of all safes on the market. The *Times* asked of leading safe-makers,

'Are their strongest safes so weak that a simply crowbar, judiciously applied can prise them open, and that, as an engineer suspects, in ten minutes' time? We were not prepared for so complete a failure of their art when matched against that of the burglar. No doubt, in the examples before us the robbers were first-rate hands, but then they operated against first-rate articles, and it is unpleasant to find them winning so easily.'⁴⁸

The 'engineer' was Robert Fairlie, a friend of Walker's who examined the safe shortly following the burglary, and informed the newspaper that no safe yet manufactured had sufficient lateral stiffness to bear the immense pressure exerted by a crowbar inserted in the door frame.⁴⁹ Thus, the difficulty was not a faulty model in Milner's range, but a general flaw in design almost industry-wide. The *Birmingham Daily Gazette* captured the issue succinctly: 'the present system of safe-making is based on a wrong principle...an entirely new method must be introduced if the public are to have safes that can be relied upon.'⁵⁰ Police statements suggesting that all safes on the market were now pregnable exacerbated such concern,⁵¹ and undermined the confident claims lock and safe firms had long made for their products.

However, like the police, the safe-makers contested the suggestion that they were collectively responsible for the security of commercial property. While some cautiously looked forward to further innovations in defensive design,⁵² others sought to turn the incident to commercial advantage, notably the Chatwood Patent Safe and Lock Company. Just weeks after the break-in, Samuel Chatwood organised a public demonstration of his latest model (against attack by drills, gunpowder and wedges) in Bolton, before an audience of local dignitaries, including the Chief Constable of Manchester. Following these 'highly successful' experiments, journalists cheered that Chatwood's state-of-the-art design was 'invulnerable to all the appliances which

burglars can bring to bear upon them.⁵³ In 1866, Chatwood proudly publicised that he had supplied Walker with a replacement for his broken Milner safe, and he welcomed any prospective customer to test his models prior to purchase ‘for thirty-six consecutive hours, with gunpowder, the [ratchet] lever drill, citizen’s friend, citizens or aldermen [slang terms for jemmies and crowbars, recently popularised by Caseley], under a forfeiture of £100 each safe, should they succeed in opening them.’⁵⁴ However, the industry’s most significant response came not through marketing boasts, but through the remarkable wave of new models which soon flooded the market. The years 1865-66 saw a staggering burst of new safe patents, as rival makers claimed to meet the ‘new’ criminal threat disclosed by Cornhill: 68 safe patents were granted in these two years, accounting for more than one-fifth of all such patents granted across the nineteenth century.⁵⁵ These new designs were noted with interest by the press,⁵⁶ and vigorously promoted by individual firms. One manufacturer – George Price – even wrote a pamphlet on the drilling, explosive and wedging attacks of recent years, designed to showcase the industry’s success in obstructing criminals at every turn, including specifically ‘what the Safe makers and others have done since the Cornhill Burglary towards making Iron Safes Wedge-Proof.’⁵⁷

Like Colonel Fraser, security firms stressed that ultimate responsibility for crime prevention rested with private individuals. For example, while Chubb & Son stood by the efficacy of its safes and the firm’s record of security design, they cautioned that ‘the custodians of valuable property...must remember that extra strength involves additional cost, and that reasonable care and watchfulness should not be dispensed with.’⁵⁸ Several of Chubb’s rivals directly impugned consumers for choosing cheapness over quality. Shortly after Cornhill, Hobbs Hart asserted that many safes recently broken open were ‘trash’ imitations of (more expensive) branded products.⁵⁹ Chatwood’s pronouncements were characteristically blunt: ‘if jewellers and bankers are robbed it is the fault of their parsimony’; ‘until parties are willing to pay for [actual] security, let them not expect immunity from the depredations of scientific burglars.’⁶⁰ Equally, many commentators in the press warned readers that they were imprudent to trust their property largely to locks and safes. The *Times*, disheartened to find safes less secure than previously imagined, advocated a renewed realism on this point: ‘No fortification is expected to hold out for ever. It does its work if it holds out against given means [of attack] for a given time and secures a proportionate delay. A good safe may be regarded much in the same light.’⁶¹ The *Standard* more decidedly followed the security industry’s script: declaring themselves ‘as anxious to protect the safe-makers as we are the police from any unreasonable complaints’, they complained that proprietors were not prepared to pay what was required to obtain effectual protection. Indeed, they drew a parallel between the economising instinct in

public policing and in private security: 'Rate-payers and safe-buyers may both expect sometimes a little too much for their money.'⁶² Such comments invoked an already pervasive understanding of the consumer (of both 'public' and 'private' goods) as ignorant, short-sighted, and fixated on cheapness.⁶³

Debate over the responsibility of security firms resurfaced the following year, when Walker unsuccessfully sued Milner for the failure of the safe. Walker stated that when he purchased the safe six years previously, Milner's foreman assured him that the model was 'warranted' thief-proof. Milner denied any such warranty, and claimed that, given the time elapsed since the purchase, the firm's liability was minimised by a statute of limitations.⁶⁴ Lord Chief Justice Cockburn made clear his view that Walker's claim was absurd – that it amounted to 'an absolute warranty of perfect security for all time to come'.⁶⁵ Wider commentators concurred; some even suggested that awarding damages in such cases would invite fraud from professed 'victims' of crime.⁶⁶ Cockburn also saw fit to criticise the security arrangements at Walker's shop: '[what] strikes me as rather startling is that Mr. Walker avowedly proposed to leave all his valuable property upon the premises from Saturday night to Monday morning without any person sleeping or residing there; so that he would be relying entirely upon the safe.' Furthermore, Cockburn argued that safes could only afford a limited measure of security, given the apparent 'arms race' vigorously pursued between safe-makers and safe-breakers.⁶⁷ Thus, the judge prescribed continual, critical vigilance and care on the part of proprietors towards security. It was not sufficient to obtain a quality safe and assume that it would afford protection for years to come; instead, as criminal ingenuity advanced, the consumer must reassess their security and, where necessary, re-enter the market in search of an upgrade.

As the foregoing material suggests, the strongest theme in the discussion following Cornhill was insistence that private persons were ultimately responsible for the security of their property. Walker was culpable for his own loss. Indeed, despite the very considerable precautions he took against intrusion, many strongly emphasised his negligence. The *Times* commented that the recent weekend burglaries 'should teach our shopkeepers to adopt some special precaution when they leave their property not merely for a night but for two nights and a day',⁶⁸ suggesting that Walker's efforts – lining the walls with iron, purchasing brand-name locks and safes, cutting spy-holes in his shutters, illuminating the premises – did not qualify as a 'special precaution'. An editorial in the *Daily Telegraph* rounded decisively on Walker, attributing the burglary to his 'carelessness':

'If a gentleman will walk about the streets with a handkerchief dangling from his pocket, he cannot expect that a policeman should follow him constantly to see that no thief filches away the article. If ladies will keep their purses in the folds of a distended dress, they cannot complain if they find themselves without a sixpence on leaving an omnibus. Exactly in the same way, if tradesmen will leave property at an enormous amount locked up in empty stores, without anybody to look after it, they have no right to grumble if some fine morning they find their safes empty and their tills broken.'

The newspaper detected in Walker a 'very undue confidence' in the ability of the police to detect break-ins, and in the efficacy of his security apparatus (especially the spy-holes).⁶⁹ Finally, pre-empting the moral of Fraser's public notice, the popular journal *John Bull* made much of the difference in social status between the City's merchant class and the majority of small ratepayers requiring police protection: 'The police are paid by the public to look after the average man's property, and not after such exceptional Golcondas [diamonds] as that which glowed on Mr. WALKER's shelves. Those who heap up these treasures ought not to shrink from the cost and responsibility of finding sufficient guardians for them.'⁷⁰ In sum, responsibility for crime prevention was rested squarely on the shoulders of private individuals. As the *Times* later put it, guarding retail property was 'the tradesman's own affair, not a public responsibility.'⁷¹

The Politics of Security

In many respects, Walker's efforts to protect his shop would seem to exemplify the liberal self-governing subject. He made use of technologies – most obviously the safe – to protect himself from the threat of crime, and the manner in which he configured security at his shop – use of spy-holes and light to promote general inspection of his property – is redolent of techniques familiar to historians of liberal governance.⁷² And yet contemporary commentators widely found Walker remiss, even culpable, in his security arrangements. How might one make sense of this reaction? And what does it reveal about the politics of security in 'liberal' society?

The Cornhill case strikingly illustrates the characteristic ambiguity and difficulty of governing oneself as a liberal subject. Existing historical research, which tends to focus on the conceptual schemes and technical infrastructures of formal government, has yet really to capture the often complex and confused situation of self-governing subjects.⁷³ Walker and his peers recognised their responsibility to safeguard their property. Yet the failure of security at Cornhill produced a broadly shared view regarding how proprietors should exercise this

responsibility, a view that clashed with the impersonal system adopted by Walker and others. Walker's precautions, which were considered and burdensome on their own terms, were swiftly deemed negligent by those who did not share the basic premise upon which they were founded – that technical protections against theft were a suitable substitute for personal protection. Walker's difficulty was to operate in a time of significant social change – in the shifting urban ecology and institutional landscape of the mid-Victorian City. As growing numbers of the City's merchants retired nightly to the suburbs, personal, proprietorial guardianship of the shop was no longer present by default.⁷⁴ Furthermore, a rationalised City Police now aimed at consistent coverage of its territory, and no longer operated a semi-private police of the local elite (or at least not to the same degree). Amidst such changes, proprietors searched for appropriate means to secure their property. Many, like Walker, vested confidence in an impersonal, technical system of protection, which harnessed reputed security devices and systematic police surveillance. That such a solution proved objectionable signals not culpable neglect on their part, but the difficulty, at this particular historical moment, of finding appropriate means of self-government against the threat of crime.

This episode also recasts the role of technology in liberal governance. Existing historical work on liberal government highlights the role of technical infrastructures, many provided through state institutions, in cultivating the self-governing liberal subject – though they recognise too that material apparatus were resisted and adapted in practice, and could even erode the very norms and values they were designed to instil.⁷⁵ Yet this scholarship has yet to embrace Frank Trentmann's point that ordinary people – as much as state planners and engineers – made up the material world, and that the manner in which they did so had political effects of its own.⁷⁶ The assemblage of locks, safes, iron, shutters, spy-holes and lights which protected many City premises was not the work of municipal officials – it was the collective result of innumerable 'private governments'.⁷⁷ The blossoming market in security devices afforded private individuals a means of acting autonomously and responsibly in crime prevention; yet it also allowed the formation of material ensembles that encoded practices and habits ultimately adjudged to fall below the standard expected of responsible proprietors. In configuring his shop as he did, Walker placed on the police, the safe-maker and the pedestrian public a burden of expectation that would be deemed reliant, and thus antithetical to the ideal of self-government.

Furthermore, evaluations of the impersonal, technical system of crime prevention indicates the breadth of (loosely) political discourses that may promote self-government. Predictably,

there were classic liberal themes in the debate. Lingering behind the *Telegraph's* denunciation of Walker were concerns that holding the police responsible would sponsor the development a bloated and overbearing police: 'a considerable increase in the muster-roll of constables...may be a necessary evil, but it would still be an evil for all that.'⁷⁸ Thus, self-government would secure popular liberty against the spectre of police oppression.⁷⁹ Furthermore, there is a sense that condemnation of Walker rested on his perceived lack of character, especially his failure to manifest courage, physicality and masculine exertion in confronting would-be burglars himself; his mode of crime prevention displayed considerable ingenuity, but perhaps insufficient will to satisfy mid-Victorian tastes.⁸⁰ Yet the response to Cornhill also has a definitely conservative flavour, exemplifying that infusion of conservative impulses into British liberalism which Jon Lawrence has termed 'tory liberalism'.⁸¹ This comes across in the diffuse valorisation of a security regime founded on personal, paternalist, patriarchal oversight rather than a system of impersonal, technical protections. The *Times* found something remarkable in the system adopted by Walker and others, 'which centuries hence will astonish our antiquaries. They will find [it]...one of the most extraordinary customs ever told of...that great numbers of houses in this City, containing immense wealth in the most portable form, are left without a soul to protect them or give the alarm...The statement sounds inconceivable, but such is the fact, as every Londoner knows.'⁸² This commentator perhaps misjudged what would 'astonish' future historians – not that technologies were trusted to secure valuable property, but that contemporary observers should remain so attached – in an era of striking technological change – to the figure of the human proprietor (or his servant) keeping watch. Yet, for several commentators, a person physically present on the premises was valued above all else. The Cornhill debate illustrates the limits of faith in new technologies (locks, safes) and institutions (the preventative police) to govern conduct in the mid-Victorian period. Like responses to the 'garrotting' panic of 1862 – or to early electrical burglar alarms, later in the century – commentary on the Cornhill burglary reasserted the need for direct, manly self-protection in the face of the criminal threat.⁸³

The yearning for personal vigilance over commercial premises communicated anxieties surrounding the flight of propertied inhabitants from the City to the suburbs. Contemporary observers feared that such movement threatened to erode personal bonds between rich and poor, as wealthy proprietors like Walker evacuated nightly their place of business, leaving valuable property exposed as a temptation to the lower orders, and relying on technical protections or paid servants (public or private) for security. The *Examiner* dubbed Walker's illuminated shop 'a standing temptation to crime', even 'a challenge to housebreakers', and bemoaned his lack of 'guardianship'.⁸⁴ The *Star* also picked up these themes: while 'No one

wishes to compel Mr. Walker to live at his place of business', it railed against traders who skimmed on the wages of private watchmen (tempting them to corruption), or threw the burden of protection on the police (and hence upon ratepayers). Instead, proprietors should watch their property themselves:

'Nobody can say what the police will be next called upon to do – perhaps to ring up the maids in the morning, take in the milk, and hearthstone the doorstep. They have sufficiently onerous public duties to perform without being pressed into private service as Mr. Walker would desire. If every Englishman's house is still to remain his castle, it must be fortified and manned by himself, and then the constables will keep watch over the outer approaches.'⁸⁵

Similarly, the *Daily Telegraph* satirised the pomposity of upwardly mobile traders, 'too high and mighty to live over their own shops', who nonetheless expected the police to safeguard their premises.⁸⁶ Such jibes further illustrate the conservative undertone to this discourse, and suggest that historians and social scientists have yet fully to expose the varied political complexion of responsabilisation and self-government.⁸⁷

In sum, responses to Cornhill suggest that one cannot easily reduce the culture of security in mid-Victorian Britain to a straightforward case of liberal self-government. That proprietors were ultimately responsible for the security of their property was never in doubt: the question was how they exercised that responsibility in practice. The Cornhill episode highlights the role of social change in disrupting established security routines and promoting innovation in practices and conceptions of responsible guardianship. It reminds us of the plurality of technical infrastructures assembled in the governance of social problems, and their multivalent political effects. And it suggests the breadth of political sentiments which may vitiate schemes of self-government. More broadly, it illustrates the limitations of the planner or strategist perspective in studies of security governance and governmentality, and the value of a more immersive exploration of competing rationalities and material practices of security in particular times and places.⁸⁸

Aftermath and Legacy

What were the consequences of the Cornhill burglary? Resigning themselves to the limited role of the police in crime prevention, the Cornhill merchants sought to reinstitute a system of private policing akin to that they had enjoyed a generation earlier. Mr Lund, that admirer of the old night watch, first mooted the idea in the immediate aftermath of the burglary: 'I think we

might by subscription establish a staff of private Watchmen whose presence on Cornhill...in addition to their immediate services would be practically to tell the present officers that they are a pack of old women.'⁸⁹ Four months later, fifteen of the ward's 'principal firms' (mostly jewellers and watchmakers) established a private police patrol, manned by members of the Corps of Commissionaires (a voluntary society recently formed to provide employment for veterans of the Crimean War).⁹⁰ The *Times* reported that 'the experiment has given great satisfaction to those immediately concerned', by fostering a newfound 'sense of security', and predicted that similar detachments of Commissionaires would soon be in demand across the City.⁹¹ Perhaps encouraged by the new patrol, Walker persisted with his impersonal security system, despite suffering a further attempted break-in the following year ('It would kill a person to sleep in the shop', he insisted).⁹² Meanwhile, Fraser's public notice became a point of reference for provincial police forces negotiating the bounds of public policing and private security. The Manchester Police office made note of it, pasting a reprint from the press in their news cuttings book.⁹³ And over twenty years later, in his first annual report, Chief Constable Webb of Leeds used Fraser's words to stress the limits of the police role in preventing crime: 'they [the police] cannot reasonably be held responsible for what may be occurring out of their sight, that is within buildings to which they have no access' (compare with p. 8, above).⁹⁴ As the development of central business districts in major provincial cities presented their publics with the same security dilemma as that faced by Walker and his peers, so some chief constables invoked Fraser's notice as a canonical statement of the bounds of police responsibility.⁹⁵

The Cornhill burglary was not a decisive turning point in the history of security – it did not sweep away one security regime and replace it with another. Rather, it was a staging post in a longer-term transition (very broadly) from a set of commercial security practices based on the direct, personal superintendence of private proprietors, to one based on security 'solutions' provided by specialists in both 'public' and 'private' domains.⁹⁶ Responses to the burglary allow us to glimpse a particular moment in the ongoing negotiation of responsibility in the process. We encounter police forces and security companies seeking to delimit their respective obligations, and to place the ultimate burden of responsibility on individual proprietors. We witness a wider, broadly conservative commentary on the need for personal superintendence of premises by propertied persons, which drew upon long-established themes in moral and political discourse. Perhaps most forcefully, we see that private responsibility was not just an ethic mobilised as part of a governmental strategy – it was a core characteristic of the mid-Victorian culture of security.

More broadly, the case study presented here signals the potential of historical scholarship to illuminate the ambiguities of living in a 'secured' and 'policed' society – the complex relationship between private security, public policing and individual precaution. Too often, scholars have treated plurality in security provision as a distinctive feature of the contemporary era, reinforcing the notion of an irrevocable break separating past and present.⁹⁷ The Cornhill episode shows that historic debates about security and private responsibility were replete with meaning, and might still serve as resources for thinking through the social dynamics and ethical dilemmas arising from private security today. It also exemplifies how historical enquiry into events – perhaps especially failures in security – can illuminate security cultures. The tendency in much sociological work is to analyse security cultures in terms of broad changes in social structure.⁹⁸ Such perspectives are crucial, including in the case study presented here. Yet this approach risks understating the contingency of security cultures. The response to Cornhill was not the logical resolution of tensions created by 'deep' social forces; it was rather the chance coming-together, in a specific time and place, of several lines of historical development.⁹⁹ It does not manifest a pre-existing set of cultural norms, but offers a view of attitudes and attachments in formation, in a specific historical setting. If it makes sense of speak of security cultures (at least in some respects) as the legacies or outcomes of such events, then it would seem they merit closer attention from scholars of private security.

¹ Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality' in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104.

² See Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, 'Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 43(2), 1992, 173–205; Graham Burchell, 'Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self' and Nikolas Rose, 'Governing "Advanced" Liberal Democracies', both in *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*, ed. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 19-36 and 37-64 respectively.

³ Pat O'Malley, 'Risk, Power and Crime Prevention', *Economy and Society*, 21(3), 1992, 252-75; Pat O'Malley, 'Risk and Responsibility' in *Foucault and Political Reason*, ed. Barry, Osborne and Rose, 189-207. See also David Garland, 'The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society', *The British Journal of Criminology*, 36(4), 1996, 445-71; Nikolas Rose, 'Government and Control', *The British Journal of Criminology*, 40(2), 2000, 321-39.

⁴ See especially Lucia Zedner, 'Policing before and after the Police: The Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime Control', *The British Journal of Criminology*, 46(1), 2006, 87-8.

⁵ Zedner, 'Antecedents', 92-3; cf. Allan Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society: a Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police, and Riot' in *The Police: Six Sociological Essays*, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), 1–24.

⁶ For a critical survey, see David C. Churchill, 'Rethinking the State Monopolisation Thesis: The Historiography of Policing and Criminal Justice in Nineteenth-Century England', *Crime, histoire & sociétés/Crime, History & Societies*, 18(1), 2014, 131-52.

⁷ A view critically assessed in Joanna Innes, 'Forms of "Government Growth", 1780-1830' in *Structures and Transformations in Modern British History*, ed. David Feldman and Jon Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 74-99.

⁸ See especially Victor Bailey, *Charles Booth's Policemen: Crime, Police and Community in Jack-the-Ripper's London* (London: Breviary Stuff Publications, 2014); David Churchill, *Crime Control and Everyday Life in the Victorian City: The Police and the Public* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁹ See especially Patrick Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City* (London: Verso, 2003); Tony Bennett, Francis Dodsworth and Patrick Joyce, 'Introduction: Liberalisms, Government, Culture', *Cultural Studies*, 21(4-5), 2007, 525-48; Chris Otter, *The Victorian Eye: A Political History of Light and Vision in Britain, 1800-1910* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).

¹⁰ Further to the studies cited above, see Thomas Osborne, 'Security and Vitality: Drains, Liberalism and Power in the Nineteenth Century' in *Foucault and Political Reason*, ed. Barry, Osborne and Rose, 99-121; Chris Otter, 'Making Liberal Objects: British Techno-Social Relations 1800-1900', *Cultural Studies*, 21(4-5), 2007, 570-90; *Material Powers: Cultural Studies, History and the Material Turn*, ed. Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).

¹¹ Pat O'Malley and Steven Hutchinson, 'Reinventing Prevention: Why did "Crime Prevention" Develop so Late?', *The British Journal of Criminology*, 47(3), 2007, 373-89.

¹² A few historians have previously touched upon connections between security and responsibility: see Eloise Moss, 'Burglary Insurance and the Culture of Fear in Britain, c.1889-1939', *The Historical Journal*, 54(4), 2011, 1056-9; David L. Smith, 'Securing the Englishman's Castle: Situational Crime Prevention in the Nineteenth Century', *Victorian Literature and Culture*, 40(1), 2012, 264-5; Churchill, *Crime Control*, 139-46; Pieter Leloup, 'A Historical Perspective on Crime Control and Private Security: A Belgian Case Study', *Policing and Society*, 29(5), 2019, 558-9.

¹³ I searched for 'Cornhill AND burglary' and 'Cornhill AND robbery' in London-based newspapers and periodicals, 1 February 1865 to 1 June 1866. I compared results to press cuttings in the scrapbooks to avoid duplicating references, and to identify unlabelled cuttings.

¹⁴ Further to what follows, see William M. Meier, *Property Crime in London, 1850-Present* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 16-21.

¹⁵ See London Metropolitan Archives (LMA): CLC/B/002/10/01/009/083D-F, 084A-B (*Times*, 9 February 1865).

¹⁶ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/082B-C (*Manchester Guardian*, 6 February 1865).

¹⁷ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/085A-D (*Times*, 9 February 1865).

¹⁸ See J.M. Beattie, *Policing and Punishment in London, 1660-1750: Urban Crime and the Limits of Terror* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Andrew T. Harris, *Policing the City: Crime and Legal Authority in London, 1780-1840* (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2004).

¹⁹ Wilbur R. Miller, *Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in New York and London, 1830-1870* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), ch. 5; Jennifer Davis, 'The London Garotting Panic of 1862: A Moral Panic and the Creation of a Criminal Class in mid-Victorian England' in *Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500*, ed. V.A.C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman and Geoffrey Parker (London: Europa Publications, 1980), 190-213; P.W.J. Bartrip, 'Public Opinion and Law Enforcement: The Ticket-of-Leave Scares in mid-Victorian Britain' in *Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth-Century Britain*, ed. Victor Bailey (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 150-81; Rob Sindall, *Street Violence in the Nineteenth Century: Media Panic or Real Danger?* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), ch. 6.

²⁰ David Churchill, 'Security and Visions of the Criminal: Technology, Professional Criminality and Social Change in Victorian and Edwardian Britain', *The British Journal of Criminology*,

56(5), 2016, 857-76. See also Moss, 'Burglary Insurance', 1039-64; Meier, *Property Crime*, ch. 1.

²¹ See George Price, *Forty Burglaries of the Years 1863-4-5* (London: E. & T.N. Spon, 1866).

²² David Churchill, 'The Spectacle of Security: Lock-Picking Competitions and the Security Industry in Mid-Victorian Britain', *History Workshop Journal*, 80, 2015, 52-74.

²³ John Summerson, 'The Victorian Rebuilding of the City of London', *The London Journal*, 3(2), 1977, 163-85; Derek Keane, 'The Setting of the Royal Exchange: Continuity and Change in the Financial District of the City of London, 1300-1871' in *The Royal Exchange*, ed. Ann Saunders (London: London Topographical Society, 1997), 263-9; David Kynaston, *The City of London: Volume 1: A World of Its Own 1815-1890* (London: Pimlico, 1994), 139-40; Jerry White, *London in the 19th Century: A Human Awful Wonder of God*, new edition (London: Vintage, 2008), 39-41.

²⁴ White, *London*, 41.

²⁵ Keane, 'Financial District', 268.

²⁶ White, *London*, ch. 3.

²⁷ D.M. Evans, *The City; Or, the Physiology of London Business; With Sketches on 'Change, and at the Coffee Houses* (London: Baily Brothers, 1845), 190, quoted in Kynaston, *City*, 140.

²⁸ Quoted in Kynaston, *City*, 244.

²⁹ Harris, *Policing the City*, 102; also 28, 78, 92.

³⁰ Harris, *Policing the City*, ch. 4-5.

³¹ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/083D-F, 084A-B (*Times*, 9 February 1865).

³² LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/085A-D (*Times*, 9 February 1865).

³³ See Martin Innes, *Signal Crimes: Social Reactions to Crime, Disorder, and Control* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

³⁴ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/015 (Cornhill Ward meeting poster, January/February 1865).

³⁵ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, minutes of Cornhill Ward meeting, 13.

³⁶ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/083C (unidentified newspaper, undated [February 1865]).

³⁷ See Miller, *Cops and Bobbies*, ch. 5; Churchill, *Crime Control*, 94-5, 235-40.

³⁸ See LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, press cuttings, 36 (*Sunday Times*, 19 February 1865), 42 (*News of the World*, undated [February 1865]).

³⁹ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, minutes of Cornhill Ward meeting, 17. His claims did not go unchallenged: one Mr Price reminded him that 'in those days the state of things was somewhat different. Citizens and their families then lived on their premises, and there was that amount of protection which under the present fashion of living out of Town does not exist' (30-1). On policing as insurance for propertied persons, see Carolyn Steedman, *Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces, 1856-80* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 62.

⁴⁰ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/092 (City of London Police notice, March 1865).

⁴¹ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, minutes of Cornhill Ward meeting, 9.

⁴² See Churchill, *Crime Control*, 66-9, 78-80.

⁴³ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, papers of General Purposes Committee, 22 February 1865, 6.

⁴⁴ Both reprinted in LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/098A-B (*City Press*, 1 April 1865).

⁴⁵ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/083G, 084C-G (*Daily Telegraph*, 11 February 1865).

⁴⁶ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/088A-C (*Daily Telegraph*, 16 February 1865).

⁴⁷ Cf. LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, press cuttings, 22 (*The Era*, 12 February 1865).

⁴⁸ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/095A-C (*Times*, 1 March 1865).

⁴⁹ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/085A-D (*Times*, 9 February 1865).

⁵⁰ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/042C-D (*Birmingham Daily Gazette* 8 March 1866).

⁵¹ See for example LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/093A-D (unidentified newspaper, 16 February 1865).

⁵² LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/090A (*Birmingham Daily Post*, 16 February 1865).

⁵³ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/093A-D (unidentified newspaper, 16 February 1865).

⁵⁴ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/040E (*Ryland's Iron Trade Circular*, undated [February 1866?]).

⁵⁵ This is based on a count of abridged patent specifications for safes, published by the Patent Office.

- ⁵⁶ See for example LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/007E (*The Engineer*, undated [1866?]); CLC/B/002/10/01/010/050G-H (*Wolverhampton Chronicle*, undated [1866?]); CLC/B/002/10/01/010/065D-E (*Manchester Courier*, undated [1866?]).
- ⁵⁷ Price, *Forty Burglaries*. Price's research included writing to rival manufacturers asking for details of design improvements and patents secured since 1865: LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/046 (letter, George Price to unidentified recipient [Chubb & Son?], 20 March 1866).
- ⁵⁸ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/095D (*Times*, 2 March 1865). See also CLC/B/002/10/01/010/030C (*Times*, 21 February 1866).
- ⁵⁹ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/095E (*Times*, 3 March 1865).
- ⁶⁰ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/093E (*Daily Telegraph*, 26 February 1865); CLC/B/002/10/01/010/040E (*Ryland's Iron Trade Circular*, undated [February 1866?]).
- ⁶¹ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/083D-F, 084A-B (*Times*, 9 February 1865).
- ⁶² LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/104A-D (*Standard*, 14 April 1865). See also LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, press cuttings, 34 (*Saturday Review*, 18 February 1865).
- ⁶³ See Frank Trentmann and Vanessa Taylor, 'From Users to Consumers: Water Politics in Nineteenth-Century London' in *The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World*, ed. Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 58-60.
- ⁶⁴ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/027A-C (*Times*, 15 February 1866).
- ⁶⁵ *Walker v. Milner and Another* [1866], 176 ER 773.
- ⁶⁶ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/036G-H, 037A (unidentified newspaper, undated [February 1866]).
- ⁶⁷ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/028B-C (*Times*, 16 February 1866).
- ⁶⁸ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/083D-F, 084A-B (*Times*, 9 February 1865).
- ⁶⁹ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/088A-C (*Daily Telegraph*, 16 February 1865).
- ⁷⁰ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, press cuttings, 21 (*John Bull*, undated [February 1865]). See also LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, press cuttings, 36 (*Reynolds's Newspaper*, 19 February 1865).
- ⁷¹ Reprinted in LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/098A-B (*City Press*, 1 April 1865).
- ⁷² See especially Otter, *Victorian Eye*, ch. 2.
- ⁷³ Simon Gunn, 'From Hegemony to Governmentality: Changing Conceptions of Power in Social History', *Journal of Social History*, 39(3), 2006, 716.
- ⁷⁴ See also Francis Dodsworth, *The Security Society: History, Patriarchy, Protection* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), especially 179-81.
- ⁷⁵ See Otter, 'Liberal Objects', 584-6; Tom Crook, 'Power, Privacy and Pleasure: Liberalism and the Modern Cubicle', *Cultural Studies*, 21(4-5), 2007, 564-6.
- ⁷⁶ Frank Trentmann, 'Materiality in the Future of History: Things, Practices, and Politics', *Journal of British Studies*, 48(2), 2009, 305-6.
- ⁷⁷ Clifford Shearing, 'Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments' in *Democracy, Security and the Governance of Security*, ed. Jennifer Wood and Benoît Dupont (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 11-32.
- ⁷⁸ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/088A-C (*Daily Telegraph*, 16 Feb 1865).
- ⁷⁹ On the genealogy of such arguments, see Francis M. Dodsworth, "'Civic" Police and the Condition of Liberty: The Rationality of Governance in Eighteenth-Century England', *Social History*, 29(2), 2004, 199-216.
- ⁸⁰ See Stefan Collini, 'The Idea of "Character" in Victorian Political Thought', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fifth series, 35, 1985, 29-50; Joyce, *Rule of Freedom*, 117-20. Such norms were central to the legitimation of policing in the nineteenth century: see Dodsworth, *Security Society*, ch. 5.
- ⁸¹ Jon Lawrence, 'Paternalism, Class, and the British Path to Modernity' in *The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain*, ed. Simon Gunn and James Vernon (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 147-64.
- ⁸² *Times*, 25 March 1865.
- ⁸³ On the 'garotting' panic, see Sindall, *Street Violence*, 95-100; on burglar alarms, see Dodsworth, *Security Society*, 236-8; Moss, *Night Raiders*, ch. 6.

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- ⁸⁴ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, press cuttings, 35 (*The Examiner*, 18 February 1865).
- ⁸⁵ Reprinted in LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/098A-B (*City Press*, 1 April 1865).
- ⁸⁶ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/009/083G, 084C-G (*Daily Telegraph*, 11 February 1865).
- ⁸⁷ See also Pat O'Malley, 'Volatile and Contradictory Punishment', *Theoretical Criminology*, 3(2), 1999, 175-96; Simon Gunn, 'Illuminating the Victorian City', *History and Technology*, 26(2), 2010, 154-5.
- ⁸⁸ See also Gunn, 'Hegemony to Governmentality', 716-18; Trentmann, 'Materiality', 302-6.
- ⁸⁹ LMA: CLA/048/AD/10/014, minutes of Cornhill Ward meeting, 18.
- ⁹⁰ See Peter Reese, *Our Sergeant: The Story of the Corps of Commissionaires* (London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1986).
- ⁹¹ LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/003B (*Times*, 21 June 1865).
- ⁹² LMA: CLC/B/002/10/01/010/032A (*Standard*, 15 February 1866).
- ⁹³ Greater Manchester Police Museum: Manchester Police Press Cuttings, vol. 1, 6 (*Times*, 25 March 1865).
- ⁹⁴ Leeds Local and Family History Library: L352.42 L517 (Leeds Police annual reports), 1889, 9. Webb consistently sought to encourage self-help in crime control, to limit the burden on the police: Churchill, *Crime Control*, 238-9.
- ⁹⁵ On provincial urban development, see Simon Gunn, *The Public Culture of the Victorian Middle Class: Ritual and Authority in the English Industrial City 1840-1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), ch. 2.
- ⁹⁶ For a developed account of something like this transition, see Dodsworth, *Security Society*.
- ⁹⁷ See David Churchill, 'History, Periodization and the Character of Contemporary Crime Control', *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, 19(4), 2019, 475-92.
- ⁹⁸ See, for example, Garland, *Culture of Control*.
- ⁹⁹ O'Malley has consistently emphasised the contingency of responsibilisation strategies in contemporary security culture: O'Malley, 'Risk, Power and Crime Prevention', 268; O'Malley and Hutchinson, 'Crime Prevention Develop so Late', 386-7.