
Article:
Shemmer, Y. (2020) Subjectivism about future reasons or the guise of caring. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101 (3). pp. 630-648. ISSN 0031-8205

https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12614

Subjectivism about Future Reasons
or
The Guise of Caring*

Yonatan Shemmer – The University of Sheffield

Abstract

According to Parfit one of the main weaknesses of subjectivism is its inability to account for our intuition that future reasons have present authority. Parfit is only partly right about the contours of our intuition however he does have a point: sometimes our future reasons do have authority in current deliberation. Subjectivists who grappled with his challenge have organized themselves along two battle lines: those who think that only current desires are fundamental sources of reasons and those who think that future desires are also fundamental sources of reasons. I belong to the first camp but I believe that focusing on the question of fundamentality obscures the real issue. The key to addressing Parfit's challenge is to shift our focus to a different question. We should ask ourselves what are the best policies to adopt towards our future reasons. Using resources developed by Bratman and Raz, and building on the insight that we often fail to recognize our true current concerns, I argue that we are sometimes justified in thinking of, and therefore treating, our future reasons as having present authority.

I. Introduction

Are my reasons for action ten years from now also reasons for me to act now? Philosophers diverge in their answers and in their justification of those answers. Objectivists typically give a positive answer; they think that if a fact constitutes a reason in the future then this fact also gives me a current reason[1]. Some subjectivists think that only my current desires give me reasons and thus give a negative answer. Other subjectivists think that principles of rationality require that future reasons 'transfer to the present'. The subjectivist literature is thus divided between those who think that our future reasons never give us current reasons and those who think that they always do. In this paper I develop a third subjectivist view which rejects both of these alternatives. On this view, future reasons sometimes give us current reasons but not always. I call this view 'Future Looking Subjectivism' (FLS).

I argue that the dichotomy between existing subjectivist camps is a result of a misguided focus on the question of the fundamentality of future reasons. What we ought to investigate instead is the extent to which we are justified in imposing stability on our current

* I would like to thank Christopher Bennett, Sarah Durling, Ilya Shemmer, Daniel Schwartz, Sergio Tenenbaum, and two anonymous referees for PPR, for their insightful criticisms and helpful suggestions.

[1] Parfit, 2011, p. 495.

attitudes towards the future. Once we combine this change in the focus of our investigation with the fact that the apparent objects of our caring often diverge from the real objects of our caring, and with the further fact that we have second order reasons to abide by policies whose aim is to preempt the effects of such apparent caring on our decision making, we have the necessary machinery to defend Future Looking Subjectivism.

I proceed as follows. In the second section I give examples of future reasons and explain what the debate is about. In section three I discuss some central background assumptions and give a preview of my position. In sections four and five I present and reject two prevalent subjectivist views about future reasons. In section six I present FLS and in section seven I claim that FLS can be justified using strategies developed by Bratman and Raz but argue that their particular versions of these strategies do not work. In section eight I discuss the Guise of Caring. In section nine I argue that in light of the Guise of Caring a new implementation of the Bratman/Raz machinery justifies FLS.

II. The problem

I like mountaineering. I go on a hike. I walk on the edge of immense cliffs to absorb the view. I am young, fearless and careless. I take chances. I don't use a security rope, I don't keep my distance from the edge, I jump from one rock to the other. I could fall and break my neck. If I do fall, I will suffer. I will be in terrible pain; I might end up disabled; and for the rest of my life I would curse my young, fearless and careless self.

However, nothing hurts me right now. So 'current pain' is not a reason for me to be more careful now.

To be sure some people are not as careless. They care now about the future. They now want not to suffer in the future or now want to have future options that would be blocked if they should fall. I, on the other hand, don't care about my future pain and discomfort. You tell me that being in a wheelchair for the rest of my life is a huge price to pay for my current feeling of freedom and I reply that I couldn't care less. Very well; but do I have *a reason* to be more careful? Does my future pain give me a current reason to be more prudent, and does the fact that I will have reasons in the future to avoid pain and suffering give me current reasons to behave more carefully now?

More examples? Smoking, driving fast, not working hard in college, not having a health insurance, having a bad diet – examples abound.

How should we think about these examples? On the one hand, the effect our actions have on our future selves is the most important consideration in our decision making; on the other hand, isn't this kind of consideration relevant only if we currently care that the future be a certain way? If we truly don't care about some aspect of our future life why should it influence us in the present?

III. Some assumptions and a thesis

A central example in the debate about future reasons concerns future agony[2]. Imagine you know now that unless you act to prevent it you will suffer some severe agony in the future. For the most part philosophers agree that while in agony you have a reason to try to stop it. But do you now necessarily have a reason to act so as to avoid your future agony[3]? Philosophers disagree about the answer to this question and thus disagree about the desiderata for a theory of future reasons. Some philosophers assume that future agony necessarily gives you current reasons to avoid it and that any theory of future reasons must explain this fact. This is Parfit's view; a view that plays a significant role in his arguments for objectivism. It is also Sobel's view and it plays an important role in the argument for his brand of subjectivism. Other subjectivists[4] do not share Parfit's and Sobel's intuition. They think that future agony never gives you current reasons. Importantly, all participants in this debate claim that our intuitions in this case generalize.

I think that both camps mischaracterize our intuitions. What we actually think is that sometimes future considerations give us current reasons and sometimes they don't. Sometimes they give us strong current reasons and sometimes weak current reasons. And, furthermore, that these reasons vary from one person to another. That this is what we think is evidenced by the varied ways we treat future considerations and by the fact that we don't think these varied treatments indicate any irrationality. Agony is an extreme example of a future consideration but in other ways is not special. Sometimes we treat it as a current reason, sometimes not, sometimes we treat it as a strong current reason and sometimes as a weak one. Unfortunately, the structure of the existing debate masks the complexity in our

[2] Parfit 2011, p. 73.
[3] The future considerations that are discussed in this debate all ground future reasons, I thus speak interchangeably of future consideration or future reasons as sources of current reasons.
[4] Street, 2009.

thinking about future reasons. That debate presents us with a binary question: are future reasons fundamental reasons in current deliberation or are they not. Sobel thinks that they are and other subjectivists that they aren't. This however is a non-productive question. A more helpful question is whether, and to what extent, we are justified in having stable attitudes towards future considerations. That new question is not a binary question but rather a question of degree. The answer, so I will argue, is that different people are, on different occasions, justified in having attitudes with a different degree of stability towards the future. When we think that these attitudes ought to be stable (in a sense to be explained in sections VII – IX) we see future reasons as relevant to current deliberation and when we do not, we see future reasons as irrelevant to current deliberation. Future Looking Subjectivism tries to accommodate our intuitions. It does so by offering us a subjectivist account of second order reasons to have stable attitudes towards future considerations.

While Parfit's work was a main catalyst for the debate, in the current paper I am only interested in the disagreement that his work generated within the subjectivist camp. I will thus be assuming that subjectivism is correct and merely ask what position a subjectivist should take on the question of the current status of future reasons.

IV. Sobel's subjectivism

Until the publication of Sobel's 2011 "Parfit's Case against Subjectivism" most, if not all, subjectivists were currentists[5]. According to currentism only my current desires give me non-instrumental reasons. On this view, both my future pain and the fact that in the future I will have a reason to avoid that pain cannot, when they are not mediated by a current desire, give me a current reason to be prudent. Parfit, assuming that currentism is the only possible form of subjectivism, argued that subjectivists cannot explain our intuition that future agony *always* give us reason to try now to prevent it since it is possible for a person not to care now about avoiding future agony[6].

[5] Among the proponents of the currentist view are Mackie (1977, pp. 77-8), Williams (1981, p. 112), Frankfurt (2004, p.26), Schroeder (2007, p. 59) and Street (2009, pp.281-292, 2012, p.52). It must be admitted that it is not always easy to tell whether a subjectivist is or is not a currentist, and indeed, many of the authors I mention above never discuss the issue explicitly. I do think, however, that in the cited contexts it is clear that they all speak only of the agent's *current* attitudes as determining her reasons. Indeed, Parfit, in *On What Matters,* assumes that subjectivism is always a currentist view (2011, p. 58).

[6] Parfit, 2011, pp. 58-82.

David Sobel[7] agrees with Parfit that we always have a reason to avoid future agony but thinks that subjectivists can explain this intuition if they reject currentism. Future agony, says Sobel, gives us future reasons[8] and future reasons 'transfer to the present'. The transfer of future reasons to the present is governed by a principle of rationality called the Reason Transfer Principle (Henceforth: transfer principle).

Transfer principle: If one will later have a reason to get Φ, then one now has a reason to facilitate the later getting of Φ.

But shouldn't a subjectivist object to principles that apply to all agents regardless of their (subjective) desires?[9] Sobel doesn't see a particular difficulty. Subjectivists, he says, have always assumed the existence of principles of rationality. Principles of rationality do not create reasons out of thin air, rather they take reasons we already have and 'direct them to the right place'. Consider the principle of instrumental reason[10]: while it is universal and thus applies to us whether or not we care about it, subjectivists have in fact always accepted it. The principle of instrumental reason does not create new reasons that are not subjectively respectable. Rather, it directs reasons, whose origins are in what we care about, to actions in accordance with the way the world is; in other words, it funnels our reasons to those actions that ensure we will be effective in achieving our goals.

The transfer principle, says Sobel, does the same thing. It takes reasons we already have in the future – genuine subjectivist reasons, since they have their origins in what we care about - and transfers them to the present, making us more effective in achieving our (future) goals. As Sobel puts it, "The reason to serve that principle is that in doing so one will serve one's concerns.[11]" Since by definition, according to Sobel, future 'agony' is the kind of state that we will have a desire to avoid, and since this desire gives us a future reason to avoid agony, we necessarily have a current reason to avoid future agony.

[7] Sobel, 2011.
[8] Although his reason for accepting this view differs from Parfit's reason. Sobel thinks that the state of disliking, a state that one is in by definition when one is in agony, is a kind of desire, and that it is this feature of agony that explains the fact that we have a reason to avoid it.
[9] See Parfit, 2011, p. 78.
[10] On one standard reading the principle of instrumental reason says that if I have a reason to bring about x, and y is necessary to bring about x then I also have a reason to bring about y.
[11] Sobel, 2011, p. 64.

Sobel's transfer principle stands in direct opposition to currentism. It impliess that future reasons – as well as current reasons - have a fundamental normative status in current deliberation. In my opinion the transfer principle should be rejected.

i. First problem - Justification

Principles of rationality are normative principles. They demand that we do things that would not be required of us were they not authoritative. While they do not impose substantive demands on their own, they affect the substantive demands that apply to us. Therefore, inasmuch as they have normative authority, this authority must be justified, just as the normative authority of substantive demands must be justified. Not every putative principle of rationality is acceptable, and certainly not all of them are acceptable to subjectivists. To accept Sobel's Transfer Principle is to accept the view that the agent's field of reasons during current deliberation should include all of her reasons over time and not only her current reasons. Whether or not this view is right is a substantive normative question, the answer to which cannot be established by stipulation.

Different understandings of the nature of norms call for different forms of justification. According to subjectivists, all norms must be grounded in the agent's states of desiring and caring[12]. So, unless the subjectivist offers a disjunctive account, according to which substantive norms are justified in one way and principles of rationality in another, he must also justify principles of rationality by appeal to the agent's states of desiring and caring. As I will explain now, it is not clear whether one can justify Sobel's transfer principle in that way.

Sobel says that the transfer principle is subjectively justified because, in abiding by it, "one will serve one's concerns."[13] Unfortunately, at least from the point of view of someone who has not yet adopted Sobel's subjectivism, this justification is circular. The crucial question that Sobel must address in justifying the principle is whether one's future concerns are concerns that one ought to care about in the present. To assume, as he does, that all our concerns – future and present – enjoy the same status in current deliberation on the basis that they are all simply 'our concerns', is to assume precisely what must be proven. In other words, before a subjectivist can justify the transfer principle by appeal to what the agent cares

[12] This requirement is at the heart of the subjectivist view and is fully endorsed by Sobel (2011, p. 67). Note that the requirement is not the same as Williams' requirement that all reasons have motivating force at the time of action. Sobel rejects the latter requirement and I do not rely on it here.

[13] Sobel, 2011, p. 64

about, she will already have to answer the question of whether, in the context of justifying normative demands, 'what the agent cares about' includes only her present concerns or whether it includes her future concerns as well.

Complaining as I have done that Sobel's justification is circular does not in itself weigh against the transfer principle. In fact, in the context of mounting an argument against the transfer principle, it would be equally circular for the currentist to assume that our current concerns are all that matters. The point is rather that Sobel's justification is inadequate and an alternative justification must be sought.

In defense of the claim that future reasons ought to count in present deliberation, Sobel argues that one's past and future self are one and the same person. Thus, the concerns of one's future self are reasons for the person regardless of her temporal position[14]. Sobel says: "However, I have been presupposing the commonsense view that the agents we are familiar with are temporally extended creatures. We are identical over time. If this were metaphysically true of an agent, then it is not arbitrary to say that the reasons of such a creature are responsive to the concerns of all of its parts." Sobel's argument seems to suggest that all of our reasons, past, present and future, should at all times be taken into account in deliberation. This view is clearly untenable. It entails the absurd conclusion that we should base our current deliberation even on past reasons to bring about states of affairs that would now be futile. Imagine that two years ago I desired, and therefore had a reason, to dig a ditch in front of my house to divert great floods. Imagine that I ended up not digging the ditch and that in the meanwhile my house was destroyed by a hurricane. In that case I certainly don't have a current reason to dig. Sobel worries about a less absurd but still untenable upshot of the view, namely, that my childhood desire to be a fireman when I grow up gives me a current reason to join the fire brigade. In reply he contends that the transfer principle does not determine which desires are reason-giving; and that if we maintained that only now-for-now[15] desires were sources of reason we would be able to overcome the difficulty since my childhood desire to become a fireman was a now-for-then desire. However, the resulting position is both ad hoc, since it gives no rationale for restricting the sources of normativity to now-for-now desires, and implausible, since most of our intrinsic desires concern the future, e.g. my current desire to dance tonight and my current desire to have chocolate ice-cream for dessert.

[14] See also Crisp, 2006, p 126.
[15] A now-for-now desire is a current desire to get something now. The terminology is from Hare 1981.

In any case, even if we were to restrict the transfer principle to future reasons its demands would be counter-intuitive. Imagine that my future self will lose all of his intellectual interests and will lead a life dedicated to the accumulation of wealth. Imagine further that while I do not judge this future pursuit to be illegitimate, I simply don't, currently, see the attraction of that kind of life. Must I now dedicate time and effort to the success of my future pursuit of money?[16],[17]

More importantly, any argument from the metaphysical unity of the self to the current relevance of future reasons is invalid. It does not follow from the fact that our future reasons are *our* reasons that we should take them into account in present deliberation just as it does not follow from the fact that my birthday in ten years' time is *my* birthday that today I should celebrate both my current birthday and my future one. More generally, that a future fact or event stands in a certain relation to my future self does not entail that the rational attitude towards this fact or event in the future is also the rational attitude towards it in the present[18]. Which one of one's reasons over time should be attended to at which point in one's life is an open normative question – claiming that these are all reasons of the same agent does not answer this question.

The first problem with the transfer principle, then, is that, while it must be justified[19], it is hard to see how to provide any non-circular subjectivist justification for it. [20,21]

[16] Sobel recognizes this difficulty (2011, footnote 36) but gives it no answer.

[17] Of course, even the currentist thinks that for many people the answer will be 'yes' due to contingent general current desires of the agent (see also p. 10,12), such as the contingent general current desire to be happy in the future. The question is whether I necessarily have a reason to dedicate time and effort to the success of my future pursuit of money, irrespective of my current desires.

[18] The implicit form of Sobel's argument is the following: Considerations of type X call for attitudes of type Y; consideration X_i is of type X; so, it calls for attitude of type Y. The argument assumes that the relation of 'calling for an attitude' does not vary with the relative temporal location of X and Y. But this is precisely what the argument was meant to prove.

[19] Another way to express the claim that the principle must be given a justification is to say that the burden of proof lies with Sobel. There are two reasons to think that Sobel would agree: first, because he is making a big effort to justify the principle and second, because he does not think that a principle of this sort is needed in the case of current desires. As opposed to future desires, he thinks that the normativity of current ones can be taken for granted.

[20] Drawing an analogy between the principle of instrumental rationality and the transfer principle does little to support the claim that the latter needs no justification. On any understanding of the principle of instrumental rationality according to which it makes normative demands, it stands in need of justification. Indeed, many have found it false. For a good summary of the debate, see Kolodny and Brunero 2016.

[21] As one referee rightly urged me to clarify, there is nothing in the idea of a 'subjectivist' view that excludes a position such as Sobel's. Whether our reasons have their source in our current or in our future desires, they still

ii. Second problem - A misfit with the normative phenomena

Sobel's transfer principle does not fit the normative phenomena. To see why, ask yourself how one should apply the principle. How should you count in your current considerations the fact that, unless you do something about it, you will suffer agony in a year? Should it be as important as avoiding current agony? Should it vary with your temporal distance from your future agony? Should your agony a year from now give you the same reasons as your agony 60 years from now? And finally, should your agony a year from now give you the same reasons as my agony a year from now should give me?

Sobel himself does not give answers to these questions. His transfer principle merely states that a future reason to Φ gives us a current reason to facilitate the later getting of Φ.

When we look at the experience of actual decision making it becomes apparent that each person places different weight on the importance of future reasons in deliberation. Some take their future reasons very seriously, while others do not care about them at all. Some see future reasons as having importance equal to their current reasons, whereas some see them as less important than their current reasons. Some attach significantly less importance to their future reasons a year from now than they do to their future reasons thirty years from now and others see them as equally important.

Sobel might well say that this is because people are irrational. But two considerations speak against this understanding of the phenomena. First, the extent of the deviation from any single way of weighing future reasons is so great that Sobel would have to say that almost all of us are irrational. Second, it is not clear even on reflection, what is the right answer to the question of how to weigh our future reasons in current deliberation. Why should it be more (or less) rational, for example, to count them as having half the weight of our current reasons than it is to count them as having two thirds of the weight of our current reasons? The only answer that is potentially less arbitrary is that they have exactly the same weight as our current reasons. But no one gives his future reasons the same weight as his current ones. Must we therefore assume universal irrationality to save Sobel's view?

Sobel might answer that such universal reduction in the weight we assign to future reasons in current deliberation can be explained as an epistemic discount: we are uncertain

---

have their origins in subjective facts. My complaint against Sobel is rather that he fails to justify his form of subjectivism.

about the future and therefore are rightly willing to put fewer resources into securing, or avoiding, future outcomes.

We do indeed apply an epistemic discount to the weight we assign to future reasons in current deliberation. But such a discount cannot fully explain the phenomena. We differ widely in our discounting of future reasons, and when we think about what weight to assign to future reasons we rarely appeal to epistemic uncertainty. Rather, we appeal to the extent to which we care now about satisfying our future needs and desires. This factor – how much we care about our future needs and desires – varies from one person to another, and varies as well within the agent at different times or with respect to different kinds of future circumstances.

Could Sobel not claim that the fact that the way we take into account epistemic uncertainty in our deliberation varies from one person to another is itself an indication of irrationality? I think not. While people are often irrational, they are usually quick to denounce irrationality when they see it around them. However, when we reflect on the fact that the extent to which people care about future reasons now determines the weight they assign to those reasons, we do not see them as ignoring their reasons or as being possessed by weakness of will.

The second problem with the transfer principle is thus, that it does not match the phenomena. Together these two problems suggest we should seek an alternative position. In the next section I consider and then reject the standard subjectivist view.

V. Standard subjectivism

Most subjectivists other than Sobel are currentists. They think that only our current desires have a fundamental normative authority in deliberation. Currentists realize that their position is incompatible with Parfit and Sobel's intuition. They therefore adopt a two-pronged approach in reply to Parfit's challenge[22]. First, they show that currentism can often explain Parfit's intuition. They point out that most of us in fact have subjective reasons to avoid future agony and that we therefore unsurprisingly (albeit mistakenly) think there is something defective in an agent who does not want to avoid it. Second, they claim that we

[22] Parfit uses agony as an intuition pump, but like Sobel he thinks that all future reasons are necessarily reason giving. Parfit, 2011, pp. 56-7.

would lose the intuition if we managed to imagine a consistent person who truly does not care now about being in agony in the future.

This is Street's approach. She claims that future reasons, and the desires and facts that ground them, are relevant to current decision making if and only if we have a current desire to satisfy these future reasons or to promote other goals affected by the future considerations that ground them. If I do not now care about my future health or about, say, my future ability to support my family, then the danger of a future lung cancer is not going to be relevant to my current decision making. Since most of us care about avoiding future agony and find it hard to imagine circumstances in which we won't have a reason to avoid future agony, and since people form intuitions by generalizing, often by over-generalizing, the conclusions drawn from their own experience, most of us, mistakenly, end up with Parfit's intuition.

Note that in appealing to current desires Street is not limited to desires for specific outcomes such as good health or financial security. Street may, and does, also appeal to more general desires. For example, to the desire to maximize future pleasure or the desire to maximize future well-being[23],[24]. An appeal to such general desires helps Street explain why even people who do not now have a particular desire for future health have reason to take into account considerations relevant to their future health, and thus helps to further explain away Parfit's intuitions.

However, the resulting view does not fully match our experience of deliberation. Many of us think that we should act to promote our future health even when current desires to ignore our future health are much stronger than any desires, direct or indirect, particular or general, to ensure future health. Indeed, we often think that ignoring our future health, even when the current desires in its favor are weak is a form of akrasia. We often think we should try to resist the temptation of our current desires and act on considerations relevant to our future reasons.

Currentists have at their disposal a variety of strategies that enable them to explain our sense that future reasons have a special authority in current deliberation. The following two

[23] See Street 2009, p. 291 for examples of appeals to our contingent desire to avoid pain, contingent moral considerations, and contingent compassion for our future selves.
[24] Some subjectivist prefer to describe our desires as background conditions and maintain that reasons are facts in light of which certain actions would promote a desire (Schroeder 2007). Put in these terms the currentist view is that future desires cannot act as fundamental background conditions in virtue of which certain facts are current reasons.

strategies in particular explain why at times we have reason to ignore present desires that conflict with future considerations. [25]

Strategy #1: Currentists may appeal to one of the several views according to which not all of our desires are ones we identify with or 'really' care about.[26] While these views vary in their analysis of identification, they all share the thought that only some of our desires represent us, or speak for us. If you superimpose these views onto the basic subjectivist position[27], you get a distinction between desires that are sources of reasons and desires that are not. Equipped with this distinction, subjectivists can claim that, at least on some occasions, our sense that we have reason to ignore some of our present desires in light of the importance of future reasons is explained by the fact that *these* present desires are not sources of reasons, whereas our present concern for, say, future well-being, is a source of reason.

It is, of course, not necessary to identify with our concern for future well-being. It is a contingent fact that some people do identify with this concern and do not identify with desires for immediate gratification. However, for these people and under these circumstances, the subjectivist will be able to account for the normative phenomenon of their experiencing deliberation as guided by the authority of future reasons over current desires.

Strategy #2: Realizing that present temptation often gets in the way of our investing in long-term goals, we may institute a policy of treating future considerations as reasons in forthcoming deliberation[28]. What enables us to institute such a policy is the fact that, at the time of instituting it, our current desire to achieve certain long-term goals is stronger than our current desire to spend our efforts in other ways.

The relation of this strategy to the previous strategy is complex. Tempting desires that we do not identify with may be motivationally potent but are not reason giving. However sometimes we do identify with tempting desires and these desires are reason giving – that is, they are desires that we consider tempting from our past and future perspective but are identified with at the time of action and therefore reason giving at that time. We may

[25] That is, why it is that (sometimes) agents who treat current desires as more important in deliberation than future reasons seems to us to suffer from weakness of will.
[26] The classic accounts are provided by Frankfurt (1971) and Watson (1975). The ensuing literature is replete with more complex variations on these accounts as well as with alternative accounts.
[27] As does Frankfurt (2004).
[28] Alternatively, we may institute such a policy with respect to particular future considerations, or to particular future considerations in conjunction with possible current temptations.

nevertheless wish to institute policies[29] with the aim of helping us avoid such temptation if at the time of adopting the policy we are not identified with the tempting desires, and if we can foresee that on most future occasions we will not be.

This suggestion raises questions about the justification for adhering to these policies at the time of decision making. The justification for adhering to policies of 'treating as a reason' after the institution of the policy appeals to pragmatic consideration; most often, to the fact that we lack time and/or cognitive resources to reconsider at decision time[30], [31], [32].

The currentist's appeal to general desires (e.g. the desire for future pleasure) together with strategies 1 and 2 go a long way towards explaining our intuition that, sometimes, future reasons should be taken into account in current deliberation. But these strategies still fail to explain our sense that, sometimes, future reasons should be taken into account in current deliberation qua future reasons[33]. Take, for example, the appeal to general desires. By caring now about my future pleasure I merely turn a consideration that is at most accidentally relevant to my future reasons into a relevant consideration in current deliberation. My future desires, and therefore my future reasons, play no role in my current deliberation in their capacity as future reasons. The following strategy addresses this concern.

Strategy #3: A currentist may adopt a desire-based understanding of wellbeing. On such an understanding a person's wellbeing is constituted by her (fully informed, identified, and instrumentally rational) desires or in other words is constituted by her reasons. It is then true that if a person now cares about her future wellbeing, she ipso facto cares about her future reasons *qua* future reasons, and she therefore has a reason to treat her future reasons

---

[29] Note that the strategy does not say anything about the psychological mechanisms that would be involved in implementing such policies or about the experience of someone who acts on such policies. While I use the term 'policy', the deliberating agent might not herself think of it as a policy, and might instead simply see herself as having a reason to prefer future reasons over current desires.

[30] Reasons for non-reconsideration are reasons for adhering with the policy - they are not reasons for the action required by the policy. See Bratman (1987, Ch. 5) for an account of these pragmatic justifications. Holton presents a similar account of non-reconsideration (2009, Ch. 6).

In a series of articles, Bratman has also explored the possibility of justifying the priority that certain policies about treating considerations as reasons have in determining what has agential authority, by appeal to the role of these policies in the constitution of an agent's cross temporal identity (see, for example, 2007a and 2007c). If this justification succeeds it could then be combined with the basic subjectivist position, according to which reasons are grounded in pro-attitudes with which the person identifies with, in order to explain why these policies also have normative authority. I do not, however, presuppose the success of Bratman's attempts as part of the second strategy discussed here.

[31] For an alternative strategy see Nozick 1993, pp. 18-19.

[32] The weakness of this strategy is that on reflection we may realize that the current reasons to revoke the policy are greater than the current reasons to follow it, even when we take all the long-term advantages of following it on this occasion into account. I return to this worry in my discussion of Future Looking Subjectivism.

[33] I.e. merely because they have the property of being future reasons.

qua future reasons as current reason.[34] While this strategy does not explain the current reason giving force of future desires for everyone it does explain their current reason giving force for the large group of people who do now care about their future well-being.

I don't know of any currentist who explicitly discusses all three strategies in the context of the debate about future reasons but these are familiar strategies and have been used by subjectivists in other contexts; they are part of the existing subjectivist tool-kit. Let us, therefore, call a currentist who supplements her view with strategies 1-3 a 'standard subjectivist'.

Despite its extended resources, standard subjectivism still fails to do justice to our experience of deliberation. Standard subjectivism fails to explain the common thought that, often, in assessing our reasons to promote our future health we need not and should not consult our current desires, or at least that, often, our current desires should count for less than our future desires. To see this, consider strategy #2 above. This strategy appeals to pragmatic considerations such as limited time and limited computational resources in order to justify not reconsidering a policy of resisting temptation. While this justification may make it rational to adhere to the policy as long as we do not reconsider it (and thereby ignore our current desires), and may even make it rational not to reconsider the policy, it does not justify adhering to the policy once we have started to reconsider it. Indeed, for all this strategy mandates, if we end up reconsidering our policy we are rationally bound to reject it in case our current desires for present gratification are stronger than our current desires for future consequences[35].

Thus, standard subjectivism cannot account for our experience of deliberation. It forces us to bite the bullet and claim that a full current deliberation, i.e. not one limited by

[34] See Sobel, 2001.

[35] Imagine you adopt a policy to not drink more than two glasses of wine when you are out with friends. If you already drank two glasses you shall not weigh the benefits of a third glass against the risk of losing control and getting drunk, you will simply follow the policy, will not order a third glass and stay sober. Moreover, you know that in the heat of the social excitement it is a bad idea to reconsider this policy. You are likely to mistakenly decide that it was the wrong policy and to imagine that your current situation should be governed by a more liberal policy, one that allows, say, three glasses. After all, when your friend heads to the bar and asks whether you want another glass, your thinking is not focused and you have no time to properly re-evaluate the policy. Now imagine the same story with a twist: the conversation around the table takes a philosophical turn and you end up discussing drinking policies and carefully considering their advantages and disadvantages. In that case you are back at the drawing board. Under these circumstances, when restrictions of time and reasoning resources are lifted, the only relevant question would be whether your old policy should be kept given your current desires.

time and computational constraints, must take into account *all and only* our current desires, or at least *all and only* the current desires with which we identify. I think, however, that the currentist can avoid biting this bullet. She can and should explain the normative phenomena: the sense in which we ought (albeit to varying degrees) to heed the authority of our future reasons even when their demands conflict with the demands of our current desires. What we need, in other words, is to find a middle ground between Sobel's view and the standard subjectivist view; we need to explain why it is that, even though our future reasons do not have a fundamental independent normative standing, as Sobel and Parfit would have it, it is nevertheless the case that we, sometimes, must see them as possessing normative authority that is not hostage to fluctuations in current desires. As I said above, the problem is in part one of framework. The existing debate is focused on the question of whether future reasons have a fundamental normative status in the present. This question allows for only two answers. What we need is a new question the answer to which will allow us to see the current authority of future reasons as a matter of degree. This, I claimed, is the question of the stability of our current attitudes to future considerations. Focusing on this new question we can say that we ascribe greater authority to future reasons to the extent that we are justified (as will be explained in the next section) in holding stable current attitudes towards these reasons.

Let us call the fact that future reasons have some authority, qua future reasons, for some people, some of the time 'the subjective authority of future reasons.' And let us call a currentist view that accounts for the subjective authority of future reasons 'Future Looking Subjectivism'. Our question then is how to justify Future Looking Subjectivism and our plan is to answer this question by appeal to the justification of stable (to a greater or lesser degree) current attitudes to future considerations.

VI. Future Looking Subjectivism

I started this paper with Parfit's 'agony challenge' and considered two subjectivists' attempts to deal with it. On one side is Sobel's approach. Sobel accepts Parfit's intuitions and tries to formulate a subjectivist view that accommodates them. On the other side of the subjectivist divide lies standard currentist subjectivism whose proponents either reject Parfit's intuitions or try to explain them away. I have argued that Sobel's view faces some justificatory challenges but more importantly that both his view and the currentist view mis-

describe our experience with respect to future reasons. Future reasons are sometimes seen as independent considerations in present deliberation and sometimes not. Furthermore, both Sobel's view and the standard currentist view lack the resources to give a theoretical account of that experience. In the current section I start explaining how an alternative currentist position – one I dubbed FLS – can both avoid the justificatory challenges faced by Sobel and account for our experience of deliberation about future reasons.

FLS is a currentist view[36]. It maintains that all reasons are grounded in our current desires. It does however, aim to explain the fact that we often treat anticipated future reasons as reasons and treat current desires that oppose those future reasons as bearing less weight in deliberation. At the heart of this explanation lies a strategy I call 'constitutional protection'.

Recall that according to strategies 1-3, once we start to reconsider a policy (designed to avoid temptation) it loses any justificatory status it may have had. A policy covered by a constitutional protection, on the other hand, has priority relative to a certain class of desires even during reconsideration: desires of a certain class cannot count as grounds for reasons to act against the policy or to repeal the policy. This priority is akin to the priority that constitutions have in the legislative process. First, constitutions have priority over regular laws in decisions concerning particular cases. Second, suggested laws that conflict with a constitution cannot become law. Third, amending a constitution requires a special majority. The idea, then, is that some of our current desires (and in particular some of our current policies) to treat future reason as reason in current deliberation have a constitutional status, and thus have overriding normative force relative to other current desires. For example, a policy to treat future reasons as reasons in current deliberation could have a protected status relative to all, or to a class, of conflicting desires[37]. In particular such protection means that protected policies do not lose their authoritative status during reconsideration, or at least do not lose that status vis-à-vis a certain class of desire. The idea of a policy enjoying a constitutional protection[38] is particularly effective in capturing our intuition that it is sometimes irrational to prefer current desires over future reasons.

[36] FLS *accepts and incorporates* all the currentist strategies described above; strategies whose aim is to explain our intuition with respect to future reasons. However, since it finds these strategies insufficient it supplements them as explained henceforth.

[37] For an earlier discussion of this idea see Shemmer, 2012, p. 174.

[38] We often adhere to policies without ever having decided to institute them and without thinking of them as policies. The same is true of constitutional protections.

Next, we should ask how such a constitutional protection might be justified. We can make some progress here by considering the circumstances under which we will want to give a policy or a law a constitutional protection. Legislators choose to give certain laws a constitutional status when they worry that future generations would be swayed by rhetoric and emotional reactions to ignore what is of true value. Similarly, individuals may give certain policies a constitutional status if they worry about their own future frivolity.[39]

The general structure of the justification of a constitutional protection is thus clear: we have reasons – reasons that stem from our concern about the possible frivolity of our desires and judgments - to have policies of treating future reasons as reasons in current deliberation and to ensure that these policies are not easily rescinded. The reasons that justify constitutional protections are second order reasons[40]. First order reasons are reasons to act one way rather than another, whereas second order reasons are reasons to treat considerations as reasons, or as reasons of a certain force, in deliberation. A constitutional protection is justified by second order reasons to give protected normative priority to certain consideration relative to other first order considerations.

So far, I have described the overall structure of the justification of a constitutional protection. I have not yet said what exact second order reasons provide the relevant justification; I have not explained how any second order reason could possibly demote the normative force of first order desires in deliberation nor did I explain how one can justify protecting a policy from being revoked.

VII. Bratman and Raz on treating as reasons and non-reconsideration

Since a constitutional protection is a type of policy one could try to justify it by appeal to pragmatic considerations of the type discussed above in strategy #2. The general idea of such justification is presented by Bratman in Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason[41]. It is originally discussed in the context of the non-reconsideration of policies about action, but is equally applicable to the non-reconsideration of policies of treating as reasons[42]. As I have

[39] The desires and value judgments against whose frivolity we want to protect are future desires relative to the time of institution of the policy; these are the desires I have up to now called 'current desires', since they are the desires we have at the time of deliberation about action.
[40] See Gibbard on higher order norms 1990, pp. 168-169, and Raz 1990, p. 184.
[41] Bratman 1987.
[42] Such extension is discussed in Bratman's further work, e.g. 2007b.

pointed above[43], this strategy has its limits. If a person happens to have the extra time and computational resources to reconsider her policy, its protected status loses its force. Thus this strategy by itself cannot offer us a full account of the normativity of constitutional protections and therefore cannot by itself support FLS. After all, a constitutional protection is one we adhere to even when we do have time to fully reflect on the options available to us. This is true in the political domain and is true in the case of future reasons. We worry about ignoring our future reasons not only when we have to decide fast but also when we have plenty of time to reflect.[44]

A second approach was presented by Raz in his discussion of Exclusionary Reasons. Raz is primarily concerned with the justification of political authority[45]. The question he aims to elucidate is how it could be that certain people or institutions are such that we ought to treat their demands as reasons. Raz does not often speak in terms of policies but is best understood in these terms. What he is looking for is a justification for a policy of treating the commands of an institution/person as a reason and a justification for the non-reconsideration of the demands of such policy. On Raz' view both justifications are grounded in the fact (if it is indeed a fact) that we suffer from an epistemic inferiority in light of which we are worse than another person, group or institution at assessing, with respect to a range of questions, what is the right thing for us to do[46]. There could be various reasons for a systematic (and therefore anticipated) epistemic inferiority in practical domains. Raz focuses on the idea of expertise. Some people, or institutions, may have expertise, due to experience, training and resources that would give them an epistemic advantage with regards to the right choice in a range of practical decisions. Thus doctors, political strategists, military personnel and economists might all have an epistemic advantage over the lay person with respect to questions that are in their sphere of expertise.

There are two obstacles to the use of Raz' account for the justification of a constitutional protection of future reasons. First, Raz applies his view to explain the authority

[43] Footnotes 31, 33, 36.
[44] In 2007a, p. 278, and more clearly in 2014 Bratman argues for the importance of regret in justifying the rationality of sticking with one's policies. The targets of that discussion, however, are the norms of rationality whose role is to govern behavior from within the agent's deliberative perspective, rather than the reasons that the agent in fact has.
[45] Raz' theory is a general theory of rules. It covers the kind of rules discussed by Bratman, rules directing us to adhere to our promises and more. His discussion of Exclusionary reason expands even beyond the justification of rules. He claims, for example, that we can justify the authority of decisions about future action, by appeal to such exclusionary reasons (1990, pp. 65-69). Nevertheless his main interest is in political authority.
[46] I offer here a simplified version of the view. The full account allows for a restriction of our epistemic inferiority not only to certain domains but also to a certain range of considerations.

of others (institutions or persons) over us. Second, Raz' view relies on a difference in expertise between ourselves and these others. The first obstacle is easy to overcome. One could think of our future or past selves as the 'others' who have authority over us. The second obstacle is harder to overcome. There is no reason to think that our past selves were, in general, better at assessing our current reasons than our present selves and there is no reason to think that, in general, our current anticipation of the reasons that will apply to our future selves better represents our current reasons than does the view of our present selves.

Both Bratman's appeal to time scarcity and Raz' appeal to a differential of expertise are not suitable to account for the justification of a constitutional protection of future reasons. Nevertheless, the structure they describe is exactly the one we need. Bratman and Raz' accounts share an overall structure: we are justified in acting on a policy of treating as a reason because by complying with the policy we are more likely to act on the reasons that apply to us, and we are justified in not-reconsidering the policy on particular occasions because – on these occasions and with respect to certain types of considerations – we are more likely, overall, to act on the reasons that apply to us if we do not reconsider the policy than if we do. I will argue in the next two sections that we can fill in the details of this overall justificatory structure in a different way so as to account for the constitutional protection of future reasons.

VIII. The guise of caring

In their discussions of temptation, philosophers have often focused on the phenomenon of akrasia. Akrasia is traditionally understood as action against one's better judgment, and such action, philosophers have often assumed, is to be explained by the mismatch between one's reasons and the motivational force of one's desires[47]. There have been significantly fewer discussions of an equally important phenomenon which is responsible for action not in line with one's reasons, namely the *motivated misrepresentation* of these reasons[48]. Most commonly the phenomenon takes the form of a motivated misrepresentation of the *force* of one's reasons. Thus, only rarely people see value in goals completely devoid of value (or no value in valuable goals) and more often people ascribe more (or less) value to a goal than it actually has. Sometimes a misrepresentation of the value

[47] See Holton 1999 and 2009 for an alternative understanding of Akrasia.
[48] An important exception is Holton in chapter 5 of his Willing, Wanting, Waiting. The work of Karniol and Miller (1983) cited by Holton gives strong empirical support to the claim that such motivated misrepresentations occurs.

of one's goals is the result of mere lack of information, but often it is itself the outcome of irrationality: distorting mechanisms cause us to misrepresent to ourselves the importance of certain goals. In many cases these mechanisms seem to serve the purpose of alleviating internal tensions. They reduce the cognitive dissonance between our better judgments and our passing passions and associated emotions by re-aligning our judgments with passions that have strong motivational force. As a result, we appear to ourselves to care about things in a way that is misaligned with how much we truly care about them; mere desires disguise themselves as true valuing[49]. This is what I have called above, a *motivated misrepresentation*. Among the input states that lead to motivated misrepresentations of the force of our caring we can list Anxiety, Social Pressure, Anger, Fear, Wishful Thinking and Temptation.

In this paper my concern is primarily with the last item on this list. When faced with attractive current goods we regularly mis-judge how important future goods are to us[50]. This is not to say that we are not also akratic about the future. We do sometimes know that investment of time or money or energy is necessary to achieve some subjectively important future goal and nevertheless fail to make that investment. But just as often we fail to recognize the subjective importance of our future goals, that is, their importance as determined by what we truly care about in the present. Our subjective value judgments are misaligned with our true preferences. As a result more time to deliberate would not help us reach the right decision since we enter deliberation with the wrong idea about what is important to us.

IX. Constitutional protections as exclusionary reasons

My aim in this section is to describe a new application of the Razian/Bratmanian strategy that would justify giving a constitutional protection to future reasons. This new application requires a certain generalization of the idea of exclusionary reasons. In Raz' writing exclusionary reasons are reason to fully exclude certain first order reasons from deliberation. We can instead see such full exclusion not as the only option but rather as the

[49] Here I depart from Holton. On his view (2009, p. 101) the change in valuing that a strong willed person ought to resist is real. Often, he thinks, our preferences really change and these changes entail a real change in our priorities.

[50] I have mentioned above Karniol and Miller's research about temptation. More generally we are in the midst of a revolution in the scientific understanding of the ways in which affects can influence judgment and decision making. For two reviews of that literature see Ditto et al. (2009) and Lerner et al. (2015).

end point on a spectrum. Thus, in line with Bratman's idea of 'giving weights to reasons'[51] we can think of a full exclusion as giving no weight to a reason/consideration. We can also give reasons a diminished weight. This is precisely what political constitutions do. They give a diminished weight to regular votes in public deliberation: if we need two thirds of the votes in order to overturn a constitutional rule then the value of each vote is three-quarters what it would have been had the constitution not been in force.

With that generalization in place we can now turn to the justification of constitutional protections of future reasons. As we have seen this justification cannot be grounded in time constraints[52] or in the superior general ability of our future (or past) selves to estimate what is good for our current selves. Rather what justifies the constitutional protection is the fact that it would help us overcome the effects of motivated distortions of our judgments concerning our own caring. We are thus *sometimes* justified in treating anticipated future reasons as reasons in current deliberation and in treating conflicting current reasons as having diminished weight in deliberation about what to do, and in deliberation about overturning the constitutional protection. Consider the following example. Ilya is 20 years old. He read that young drivers who take their friends for a ride are significantly more likely to make an accident. More generally he knows that social pressure wreaks havoc in one's ability to recognize what one considers important. Ilya plans a two-week road trip with a group of friends and expects he will face multiple decisions: how fast to drive, who to have sex with, what drugs to take? He decides, as a preventive measure, to always treat his future reasons as

[51] Bratman 2007b, p. 40.

[52] The account I offer here bears some similarities to the account offered by Luca Ferrero (2010) whose suggestions are also grounded in the work of Bratman and Raz. Some important differences are worth mentioning: first, Ferrero is interested in defending the current reason giving status of past decisions *to act*, whereas my interest is in decision (policies) to *treat as reasons*. Second, Ferrero, like Raz, thinks of the exclusion of a consideration as either completely in force or not at all, whereas I think in terms of weights. Third, my interest is in the use of Raz' ideas in the context of a subjectivist theory. Raz, who is no subjectivist, would have no objection as he himself considers the possibility of personal rules as exclusionary reasons. Ferrero could have made heavier use of this thought since there is no reason to think that past decisions about future action should have equal normative force in every individual. Ferrero ignores this complication. Finally, According to Ferrero the justification for seeing future directed decisions as exclusionary reasons is fundamentally a pragmatic justification; it is grounded first in the recognition of our limited cognitive/time resources, and second, in the thought that normally our prior decision anticipates what we would decide at the time of action in the same deliberative context. Indeed according to Ferrero if at the time of action we deem that re-opening deliberation would yield a different outcome, and that this different outcome is not the result of a deterioration in our deliberative capacities, we should ignore our past decision (2010, pp. 9, 15). But while Ferrero's account may work well for ordinary future directed decisions it cannot justify constitutional protections since it ignores the distorting mechanisms that constitutional protections are meant to overcome. These distorting mechanisms are such that any agent who is under their influence is going to *deem* (albeit wrongly) that her cognitive capacities have not deteriorated and that reconsidering her past decision is going to yield a different outcome.

a consideration of great importance. He then asks himself what he should do if during the long hours behind the wheel his friends try to convince him to drive faster than the speed limit. There will, after all, be ample time to reconsider his initial decision. However, he knows too well that the kind of influence that his friends are likely to have over him could distort his proper judgment of the relative importance for him, of the advantages of a shorter travel time vs the danger of an accident. Under the influence of social pressure, he will underweight the current importance of future outcomes. He therefore decides to afford his decision (policy) a constitutional protection. If his friends will taunt him to go faster, he will appeal to anticipated future agony, and to the reasons he can anticipate to have in the future to avoid such agony, as a reason for his refusal. The full story, he realizes, is more complicated. The grounds for his refusal to reconsider his policy are the danger of a distorted view of his then, current desires – but treating 'future agony' as an important current reason is the best way to protect against such distortion. It therefore makes sense to think of 'future agony' as his current reason.

I have just said that we are *sometimes* justified in employing personal constitutional protections. When would that be? The answer varies from one person to another. A constitutional protection of future reasons is justified if it is in force when and to the extent that a person tends to misrepresent the importance that the future has for them with respect to particular issues. [53]

The resulting normative structure matches the experience of deliberation. It explains why we *sometimes* treat future reasons as current reasons and why on those occasions their status as reason-giving considerations is protected. In particular our justification explains why, on the one hand, we often ignore the pestering of our current reasons to focus on the present, and why on the other hand we do not completely ignore our current reasons to focus on the present. After all, if the combined weight of current reasons to focus on the present is significant enough we do end up attending to their bidding – just as we would if more than two-thirds of the population wanted to overturn a political constitution.

In most cases abiding by a policy of constitutional protection would ensure that we act on our true current concerns. There are, however, cases in which abiding by a constitutional protection would lead to action that diverges from what our true concerns dictate and thus to action that is not mandated by our reasons. It may nevertheless be rational to abide by the

[53] Scientific research about the influence of affect on judgments is booming and yet the field is still in its infancy. Future research will no doubt change our views about whether or not a particular application of a constitutional protection is justified.

policy even in these cases if we are justified in thinking, contrary to the fact, that on this occasion as well, we would benefit from ignoring the current value judgments that conflict with the demands of our future reasons. The fact that according to FLS it is sometimes rational to act against one's true current reasons further supports the claim that the theory matches our experience. The theory confirms that it is indeed the case that, sometimes, future reasons have overriding current normative authority. Nevertheless, such authority is non-fundamental and is best understood in terms of the subjective current value of having stable current attitudes towards our future reasons[54].

X. Conclusion

Most of us think that, sometimes, our future reasons have authority in the present. To explain why this is so, we need not give up on the view that only current concerns are fundamental sources of reasons. Rather we need to explain why sometimes we have reasons to treat our anticipated future reasons as having authority in current deliberation.

I have shown how this can be done by combining ideas from Bratman and Raz about how to justify stable policies with an understanding of the distorting effects of temptation on our ability to recognize our own true concerns.

Bibliography

Bratman, Michael (1987) *Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

- (2007a) "Temptation Revisited," in *Structures of Agency* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- (2007b) "Reflection, Planning, and Temporarily Extended Agency," in *Structures of Agency* (New York: Oxford University Press).

[54] I have limited my discussion to existing subjectivist positions. An interesting alternative would be a form of subjectivism grounded in the Korsgaardian demand of coherence between one's desires over time. Such view would occupy an intermediate position between Sobel's view and the currentist view and might thus offer us another way of capturing the mixed pattern of intuitions that FLS was trying to explain. I leave the discussion of such an alternative for a different occasion. A currentist approach to 'coherence' is discussed in Shemmer 2012.

- (2007c) “Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency,” in *Structures of Agency* (New York: Oxford University Press).

- 2014 “Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint”, *Inquiry* , Volume 57, Issue 3.

Crisp, Roger (2006) *Reasons and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Ferrero, Luca (2010) “Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy and the division of Labor,” *Philosopher’s Imprint,* Volume 10, No. 2.

Frankfurt, Harry (1971) “Freedom of the will and the concept of a person,” *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1):5-20.

- (2004) *The Reasons of Love* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Gibbard, Allan (1990) *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (Harvard University Press)

Ditto, Peter H.; Pizarro, David A.; Tannenbaum, David (2009) “Motivated Moral Reasoning,” *Psychology of Learning and Motivation,* Volume 50, Chapter 10, Pages 307-338.

Holton, Richard (1999) “Intention and Weakness of Will,” *Journal of Philosophy*, 96, pp. 241-62.

- (2009) *Willing, Wanting, Waiting* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Hare, R. M. (1981) *Moral Thinking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Karniol, Rachel and Miller, Dale (1983) “Why Not Wait? A Cognitive Model of Self-imposed Delay Termination,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45: 935–42.

Korsgaard, Christine (2009) *Self Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Lerner, Jennifer S.; Li ,Ye; Valdesolo, Piercarlo; Kassam, Karim S. (2015) “Emotion and Decision Making,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 66:1, 799-823

Kolodny, Niko and Brunero, John (2016) "Instrumental Rationality", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/rationality-instrumental/>.

Mackie, John (1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Viking Press).

Nozick, Robert (1993) *The Nature of Rationality,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Parfit, Derek (2011) *On What Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Raz, Joseph (1990) *Practical Reasons and Norms,* 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Schroeder, Mark (2007) *Slaves of the Passions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Shemmer, Yonatan (2012) "Constructing Coherence" in eds. Lenman & Shemmer, *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Sobel, David (2001) "Subjective accounts of Reason for Action, *Ethics*, Vol. 111, Issue 3, pp. 461-492.

- (2005) "Pains for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Vol. 8, No. 4.

- (2011) "Parfit's Case against Subjectivism," *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Volume 6, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau

Street, Sharon (2008) "Constructivism about Reasons," *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Volume 3, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau

- (2009) "In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters," *Philosophical Issues* 19 (1):273-298.

- (2012) "Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason," In Lenman and Shemmer (eds.), *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Watson, Garry (1975) "Free agency," *Journal of Philosophy* 72 (April):205-20.

Williams, Bernard (1979) "Internal and External Reasons," In Ross Harrison (ed.), *Rational Action* (Cambridge University Press).