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‘Spreading Fields of Victory’?: The Reporting of Gallipoli, Jutland and  
the Somme in *The War Illustrated*

Jonathan Rayner

**Introduction**

This essay examines the reporting of three highly significant and chronologically close events in the First World War – the Gallipoli campaign, the Battle of Jutland, and the Somme offensive – in the contemporary British publication, *The War Illustrated*. *The War Illustrated* was a popular magazine which informed the British public about the details and controversies of the First World War: it described itself as a ‘weekly picture-record of events.’ Its image-led depiction was dominated by maps, photographs and war artists’ work which accompanied reporting, editorials and articles from notable figures such as H.G. Wells, Fred T. Jane and Millicent Fawcett. *War Illustrated* was published in London by William Berry, who was then owner of the *Daily Telegraph* and first appeared on 22 August 1914. Through most of the conflict the magazine was sold at a price of two pence (2d.), rising to three pence (3d.) in 1918. Since daily newspapers then sold for a penny (1d.) this cover price, along with the length and vocabulary employed in its articles, implies that an adult, middle-class readership was *War Illustrated*’s target audience. Yet its conception as an extensively illustrated, and therefore highly visual, account of the war suggests its appeal and ready accessibility to both lower-class and younger readers. *War Illustrated*’s reporting evolved to incorporate several consistent forms or serials as the war progressed. For example, within the first year weekly columns were included to give insight to the geographical span and technological change of the conflict, in reporting on ‘The War by Land’, ‘The War by Sea’ and ‘The War by Air.’ Crucial events or operations were given individual treatment, often including double-page illustrations, in a series entitled ‘The Great Episodes of the War’: examples included the Battle of Mons in 1914, and the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915. These pieces were usually anonymous, and were probably written by the magazine’s editor John Hammerton.

There is ample evidence of *War Illustrated* accepting establishment views and broadcasting the staples of propaganda (particularly in its most hyperbolic art work, often provided by the illustrator Stanley Wood). A powerful example of this is the narrative of the so-called ‘Rape

of Belgium' in which stories of German atrocities were reported as fact and embellished throughout the popular press during 1914-1915. Yet it also articulated what today may appear to be vocal, democratic and justifiable criticism of the conduct of the war. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the coverage of the Gallipoli campaign and the Battle of Jutland – one a highly controversial operation and the other a long-awaited but inconclusive engagement – stand as some of the most outspoken examples of this critical stance. However, the battle which might now be considered to epitomise the conflict's mismanagement, waste and futility, the Battle of the Somme between July and November 1916, received positive coverage. Reconsidering *War Illustrated's* reporting of these three landmark moments in the First World War provides an assessment of its often intricate and ambivalent balance of propaganda, patriotism and criticism which can be seen by turns to anticipate and contradict the abiding retrospective evaluations of the conflict. Interpreting or reinterpreting *War Illustrated* calls into question what is known (or assumed to be known), about this war, and explores how much of that presumed knowledge or opinion is discernible within, and formed or informed by, contemporary published sources.

### **Gallipoli: 'Gloom and Glory'**

*War Illustrated* covers the doomed campaign at the Dardanelles from the initiation of the naval bombardment and the amphibious landings in April 1915 until the ignominious evacuation in January 1916. Threads in the magazine's reporting reflect its shifts from a naval to a land battle, from an exotic alternative to the Western front to another form of stalemate, from military adventure to political disaster. Here the contemporary doctrines (political and cultural as much as national and military) encoded in the magazine's words and images are prominent and readable. Perceptions embedded within *War Illustrated's* reporting underpin notions of British national and imperial identity and the ideas on which Britain's war was founded, subsumed within and emerging from which were contemporary definitions of identity that positioned colonial allies as dogmatically as Turkish and German enemies. Also discernible is the coalescence of what has been labelled the 'cult of Gallipoli': the campaign as the origination of Australian national identity.<sup>1</sup> However, from a twenty-first century viewpoint, the magazine's account reveals prejudices and anxieties about this region of the world, its culture and inhabitants which resonate to the present day.

Although the landings of April 1915 were not recorded photographically, they were a subject suitable for affirmation as a ‘Great Episode of the War’, and the unseen action received expansive treatment in war artists’ visualisation and reporters’ high-flown prose.<sup>2</sup> Identifiable in this reporting are the foundations of the Anzac legend – the idolisation of soldiers from Australia and New Zealand and their contribution to the battle – with heightened descriptions of their heroism:

Certainly the Australians and New Zealanders had, from the beginning, a terrible time of it. If, when they were training in Egypt, they envied the heroism of our Regular soldiers in forcing the passage of the Aisne, they lost all ground for envy when they themselves landed in the light of a half-moon beneath the cliff of Gaba Tepe [...] the men of a remote and newly discovered continent in the southern seas had that within them which no Turk could withstand. The freest-born of all men, these sons of the new commonwealth of the Southern Cross, without the help of a single gun ashore, beat back the defenders of the Dardanelles, and then advanced again and again against the storm of shrapnel fire.<sup>3</sup>

Such self-conscious diction (echoing the phrasing of the first reports of the landings<sup>4</sup>) characterized these accounts, but the authenticity of pictures included in the magazine provided a sobering counterbalance. In the edition of 6 June 1915, photographs of Allied soldiers at Gallipoli brought a visual validity to the campaign comparable to pictures coming from the continental battlefields. While these photographs did not (as they claimed) appear to show British and Australian troops ‘under fire’ during the landings, they did capture the environment with some accuracy as troops disembarked, mustered on the beach and headed towards the trenches. Given the constraints (based on practicalities as much as propaganda) upon what is shown and what it is possible to show, it is the mundanity and realism of the everyday observation which often distinguishes *War Illustrated*’s photography, especially in contrast to its often ostentatious illustrations.

The hyperbole of war art and the realism of photography were frequently juxtaposed with the magazine’s reporting, which soon cast doubt on the conduct of operation. In ‘The War By Sea’ column of 8 May 1915, Carlyon Bellairs (the magazine’s ‘naval authority’ and a member of

Parliament) adopted a sceptical tone towards all aspects of the campaign to date, highlighting delays in initiating the operation which had given Turkish forces time to prepare, failures to appreciate the scale and intricacy of the difficulties to be faced, and the absence of anticipated assistance from Russia. Barely a fortnight after the landings, Bellairs identified these as political as much as military shortcomings, and already suggested the campaign was misguided and unworkable: 'If those facts had been known, no enlightened man would have supported the operations.'<sup>5</sup> Such scepticism levelled at the campaign within the magazine's regular features became more marked and frequent, and heightened the contrast between the realism of its visual representation and oratory of its reporting. Barely noticeable within the 'Great Episodes' account, was the condemnation of the preceding naval campaign as a 'serious disaster' and 'vain attempt' to force the passage guarded by Turkish forts.<sup>6</sup>

From the inception of the campaign the portrayal of the Turkish adversary formed a significant part of *War Illustrated*'s reporting, provoking comparisons with its demonization of the German enemy. The expected fall of Constantinople occasioned by the initial naval attack prompted a cover illustration with the caption 'Kismet! The coming doom of the Turk in Europe.'<sup>7</sup> The imperial narratives suggested by this illustration and which converged in the treatment of Turkey as an enemy are convoluted: in the image a Turkish officer standing in a decrepit graveyard watches with trepidation the appearance of British warships entering the Bosphorus. Turkey is characterised as inherently outdated, and about to be overwhelmed by the technological manifestations of Western imperial power. This tone is extended in a full page of photographs from May 1915, in which the anticipated collapse of the Ottoman Empire was described in terms of social Darwinism, under the title 'Turkey's Death Struggle with Forces of Progress.'<sup>8</sup> Edward Erickson has suggested that this sense of inherent superiority to their Turkish adversaries affected all levels of the Allied armies sent to the Dardanelles: a lack of reliable intelligence on Turkish defences was exacerbated by there being no perceived need for intelligence to be gathered against an obviously inferior enemy.<sup>9</sup> This page of photos is remarkable in that it is headed by shots of Turkish soldiers (described as on their way to combat the 'soldiers of civilisation'), below which are images of French Senegalese and Australian troops. In another cover illustration, the Dominions' soldiers are described as 'Young Lions of the Old Empire', underlining their filial duty to the age-less (rather than archaic) empire of the Mother Country.<sup>10</sup> The demise of the ancient Ottoman Empire is viewed as inevitable and appropriate, yet ironically occasioned by overseas troops mobilised by the modern empires of France and Britain. This nexus of imperial discourses (alongside the campaign's stated

objective being to support Imperial Russia) illuminates the paradoxical implications of the wider war for all its participants, in terms of progress and longevity, and imperial endurance versus national self-determination.

The reporting of the ‘young lions’ bravery in the landing battles, in what were presumed to be initial successes leading to eventual victory, stood in contrast to how the campaign and their portrayal developed as the battle continued. In an article from July 1915 entitled “‘The Great Adventure’: The Difficulties of the Dardanelles Campaign’, H. W. Wilson outlined what he called as the ‘cold truth’ of the operation.<sup>11</sup> Although the phrase ‘the Great Adventure’ (in inverted commas) had been used previously to describe the campaign, that nomenclature now assumed an acerbic irony. Wilson recalled the delays, overconfidence and misleadingly optimistic statements of Winston Churchill, chief architect of the operation:

Starting as obscurely as some subsidiary operation, only looming into mysterious greatness as the truth began to trickle through to the British public, our attack on the Dardanelles is now dimly understood to be one of the most gigantic efforts of the war. Weeks and weeks ago Mr Winston Churchill assured us that in the Dardanelles we were ‘within a few miles’ of the first decisive victory of the war. People have since been asking daily when those few miles are likely to be traversed.<sup>12</sup>

Despite his downbeat tone, Wilson drew on historical precedents of the Crimea and celebrated the courageousness of Australian soldiers, again described in mythological analogies to the heroes of Marathon, and declared they had created ‘new legends’ with their ‘superhuman bravery.’<sup>13</sup> This phrasing returned with the account of the first Australian to be awarded the Victoria Cross, Lance Corporal Albert Jacka (fig.1). In May 1915 Jacka defended a trench overrun by Turkish soldiers, killing seven singlehandedly in a feat of arms *War Illustrated* described as ‘more like classic mythology than actual fact.’<sup>14</sup>

The soubriquet of ‘supermen’ followed the Australians in reporting through 1915, with the valour of the Anzacs being reiterated in many picture captions (e.g. ‘the Australian Light Horse, whose work for the Empire on the Levant was as invaluable as it was courageous’).<sup>15</sup> Fortitude

in the face of indomitable Turkish resistance was the keynote of the captions accompanying images of the Dardanelles through the late summer of 1915, when the high cost of attacks for minimal gains again prompted comparisons with previous imperial wars:

Some idea of the magnitude of Britain's task in the Levant may be gathered from the fact that during the six months since the memorable landing-battles in Gallipoli a considerably larger number of casualties have occurred than during the whole of the Boer War [...] The heroism of the Anzac supermen is the lodestone of eventual victory.<sup>16</sup>

The pessimistic tone of Wilson's summary resurfaced in October, when the Allied offensive of the previous August to break the deadlock warranted treatment as another 'Great Episode.' However, on this occasion, the futility of all efforts to change the situation was evident from its alliterative title: 'The Gloom and Glory of the Sari Bair Battles.'<sup>17</sup> The herculean efforts of the Anzacs, in assaulting the heights defended by Turkish trenches as fresh British forces landed at Suvla Bay, proved unsuccessful despite the exalted terms in which they are related:

By fighting of a kind so desperate as to be almost superhuman, the Anzac forces at last won to the crests of both Chunuk Bair and the dark towering Sari Bair. It needed only a comparatively light thrust from the north, by the new army, to topple over the last line of Turks and win a decisive victory. The opening of the Dardanelles and the fall of the Ottoman Empire were events that seemed suddenly about to be realised, through the heroism of men belonging to nations which did not exist when the Turks first entered Europe ... [but] The heroic Anzac army, which had fought to the utmost limit of its powers, was slowly pushed back towards its former position, and [...] the general result of its long-sustained and incomparable exertions was indecisive.<sup>18</sup>

From this high point, though perhaps in rhetoric only, and its tacit admission of failure, the coverage of the campaign declined. Reporting on the Dardanelles became no more than a

significant minority element when most pages were devoted to France and Belgium and the advancing crises in Russia, Serbia and the Balkans. At the end of October 1915 the magazine's chief war correspondent F.A. McKenzie contributed an article in which the possibility of evacuation was finally acknowledged:

There is a growing feeling among people of all classes that it is better to recognise a mistake in time than to go on squandering untold lives in attempting to redeem it. Our men have fought with a courage never surpassed in the history of the British Empire. Australasians and British alike have time after time achieved the seemingly impossible. The full story of their sufferings and their glory cannot yet be told in print. When it is, two feelings will be aroused in the nation – admiration for the men, amazement and anger at the policy which made such desperate deeds as theirs necessary.<sup>19</sup>

While hyperbolic descriptions of heroism also characterised accounts of the European war (particularly of the British Army's defeats and retreats in 1914), the allegation of mismanagement and failure at command levels as affirmation or augmentation of the courage and victimhood of the ordinary soldier appears to enter the lexicon with the Dardanelles, at least as far as *War Illustrated* is concerned. Its coverage diverged from the contemporary discourses of the Western Front, in that it accorded with or anticipated the commonly held post-war view of the First World War as needless, pointless slaughter. While Gallipoli is ongoing, *War Illustrated* reported on fighting around Ypres which, though bloody and stationary, was never described in similar terms, and neither was the Somme offensive in the following year.<sup>20</sup> Perhaps, as H.W. Wilson's article intimated, Gallipoli was and should have been perceived differently, and this perception would eventually influence perceptions of the war itself. However, what is noteworthy about McKenzie's writings from a twenty-first-century perspective is its view of imperial power in the region. Despite condemnation of the campaign's failures, McKenzie insisted that it must continue as withdrawal would precipitate revolt against British imperial rule. Under a subheading 'The Danger of a "Jehad"', he wrote:



Up to now, Mohammedanism knows there is a possibility of our redeeming our position. Let us definitely withdraw from the Near East, and our hold on India and Egypt would be imperilled. We are in a very awkward position. To go on is like hammering our heads against a stone wall. To go back is to court worse disaster.<sup>21</sup>

McKenzie asserted that success or failure at the Dardanelles was not about defeating the German Empire, destroying the Ottoman Empire or even saving the Russian Empire, but about a test of character for the British Empire, and maintenance of its sphere of influence against a latent Muslim threat created or exacerbated by any show of Western weakness. In this early twentieth-century conceptualisation of Near-, Middle- and Far-Eastern domino-theory, the Dominions were implicitly co-opted into a far wider imperial project.

The evacuation of all Allied forces from the peninsular was celebrated in a final ‘Great Episode’ in January 1916, as a ‘surprising feat’ and (foreshadowing descriptions of Dunkirk) a ‘miraculous escape’ from the Turkish coast’s ‘Crescent of Death.’<sup>22</sup> The Anzac forces, like other survivors from the Dardanelles, were redeployed to other theatres, yet the embryonic legend of Gallipoli was already evident in subsequent reporting. The caption for a full-page illustration of Australians in action in the Middle East from June 1916 made this observation:

While awaiting the great day when they would meet their ‘favourite’ enemy the Germans on the west front, the Anzacs performed some good work for the Empire in Egypt. Their valour and their wonderful fighting experience gained on Gallipoli were used to considerable advantage among hostile Arabs.<sup>23</sup>

In this example, the Dardanelles experience was narrativised as preparation for service against other imperial enemies, before the true test with German foes. This might be interpreted as the only basis upon which the Dardanelles could be mentioned in *War Illustrated* at this point as the European theatre again took precedence, with anticipation of a North Sea fleet action and a British offensive on the Western Front.

## **Jutland: Tradition and ‘Truth’**

As a reflection of the popular appeal of and public interest in the Navy in the decades leading up to the war (a period distinguished by highly competitive naval construction in Britain and Germany<sup>24</sup>), images of and stories about the wartime activities of the Royal Navy occurred frequently in *War Illustrated*. The importance of naval rather than military imagery was manifested in the front cover illustration of the very first edition, a portrait illustration of the dreadnought battleship HMS *King George V*.<sup>25</sup> However, the perceived inactivity of the British battle fleet before the Battle of Jutland prompted a concentration on other aspects of the war at sea, despite the pre-eminence of the dreadnought in naval strategy and the public imagination, and the (frustrated) expectation that a modern Trafalgar would transpire in the North Sea when the Grand Fleet met (and inevitably defeated) the German High Seas Fleet.<sup>26</sup>

The naval matters which dominated the first months of the war in *War Illustrated* included: surface action in the North Sea (for example the Battles of Heligoland Bight and Dogger Bank); the world-wide pursuit and destruction of enemy commerce raiders like the SMS *Emden*; the blockade of Germany, and the Royal Navy’s strict observance of international law in doing so; attacks on merchant ships by U-boats (which are frequently linked to propaganda discourses on German tactics of ‘frightfulness’ and ‘piracy’); and operations by British submarines. Consistent features of the magazine which facilitated these discourses were the weekly articles on ‘The War By Sea’, and longer illustrated articles in the series entitled ‘The Great Episodes of the War.’ A lengthy report on the Battle of Heligoland Bight constituted the third in this sequence.<sup>27</sup> Subsequently the Battle of Dogger Bank and the sinking of the *Lusitania* were also treated as ‘Great Episodes.’<sup>28</sup> Photographs of ships (mostly seen at anchor or in port, sometimes at sea, and occasionally pictured in training as an analogy to or substitute for depictions of actual combat) enjoyed a privileged, documentary authenticity. Naval representation, then, from the war’s outset to the eve of Jutland, was determined by abiding visual and verbal characteristics and formal continuities in *War Illustrated*’s coverage. An unspoken underpinning continuity was the reporting of topical aspects of the naval war in spite of (or to distract from) the disappointing dormancy of the dreadnought fleet.

The battle fleet’s continuing inactivity, and the intangibility of its role in the public eye, were embodied and emphasized by a curious cover image from the following year. Here an illustration showed the bridge of a destroyer on patrol, awaiting the appearance of the High

Seas Fleet. One of the sailors on lookout has turned his angst-ridden face away from the horizon towards the reader. The caption ‘The North Sea Vigil: Will They Never Come?’, and the frustration and anxiety exhibited in the British sailor’s expression, appeared to confirm the public’s as much as the Service’s exasperation at the unchanging, unresolved naval equation.<sup>29</sup> This image, appearing after eighteen months of war, encapsulated the Navy’s public relations problem, which even a patriotic, propagandist publication could not solve or avoid highlighting. The devotion of a cover image to the effective but hardly heroic activity of the sea blockade of Germany underlined the difficulty of communicating the Navy’s invisible war-winning activity to the British public.<sup>30</sup>

Given this aura of national anticipation, the actual reporting and representation of the Battle of Jutland when it occurred was noteworthy for its ambivalence. The cover illustration from 17 June 1916 showed barefoot sailors on the decks of a doomed destroyer.<sup>31</sup> The caption read ‘Game to the Last! British Destroyer *Shark*, Decks Awash, Defies the German Fleet.’ This image appears highly reminiscent of Frank Salisbury’s famous painting from 1917 of Boy Cornwell VC, at his post during the battle aboard HMS *Chester*, and epitomised the equivocal contemporary coverage of the indecisive action. That a relatively minor war vessel, lost in a heroic night attack against German battleships, should stand for the entirety of the engagement on the magazine’s cover, again underlined the misapprehension of what the dreadnought fleet could or did achieve. The apparent inconclusiveness of the main action remained hidden and the question of victory or defeat deflected by the visual concentration on an unambiguous image of glorious, sacrificial bravery on the part of an under-dog ship: an extraordinary imagistic choice for representing the numerically-superior Grand Fleet, but perhaps an entirely understandable one under the pressure of the demands of propaganda.

However, given the weight of expectation surrounding the battle, *War Illustrated*’s reporting was both remarkably hedged and critical. An article by Percival Hislam expanded on the known facts of the engagement: pointedly it was not treated as one of the ‘Great Episodes of the War.’<sup>32</sup> Although it was headed ‘The British Victory in the North Sea’, Hislam’s article acknowledged the Admiralty’s *faux pas* in its reporting of the battle, and ended with an admonitory paragraph listing the questions which remained not only over the release of information, but over the conduct of the battle itself:

Why were Beatty's battle-cruisers left so long without support [...] Was the disposition of our forces faulty to begin with [...] Was Admiral Beatty so roused by the near approach of the enemy that he felt constrained to launch his attack, even at the risk of its being premature, and so, by giving them ample notice, enabled them to slip out of a trap that might have led to a twentieth-century Trafalgar?<sup>33</sup>

The two-page illustration (fig.2) which accompanied the article was significant in its vividness and yet its complete absence of detail: as an image of the battle it was impossible to discern what was going on amidst the clouds of coal- and gun-smoke, which ironically may have made it a very accurate representation of the battle from the Navy's as much as from the nation's perspective.<sup>34</sup> Perhaps the best indication of the ambivalence or awkwardness with which Jutland and the Navy were handled was in their subsequent coverage in the magazine. Revealingly, there were no further naval cover stories or illustrations until December 1916, when Admiral Beatty is pictured on the bridge of a battleship, to mark his assumption of command of the Grand Fleet.<sup>35</sup>

The comparative disappearance of the dreadnought fleet from the magazine's reporting and illustration for the remainder of 1916 did not, however, equate to the vanishing of Jutland as a subject. The disappointment palpable within Hislam's summary of the battle re-emerged in an article appearing nearly a year after the battle. Under the title of 'All's Well With the Navy', Gerard Fiennes reassured readers of the Navy's effectiveness in an echo of a defence of the Navy's (in)activity authored by Fred Jane in 1915.<sup>36</sup> However, Fiennes' article could not resist acknowledging the weight of expectation amassed by tradition and public perception:

The ordinary Briton went to war with a belief in his Navy as profound as it was unthinking. 'Britannia rules the waves' and 'England expects that every man will do his duty.' Such was his simple *Credo*. He knew the story of the Armada, of Trafalgar, and (perhaps) of Quiberon Bay [...] The German flag was to be swept from the sea forthwith.<sup>37</sup>

Countering the assumption that a decisive naval victory were possible under the circumstances of the present strategic situation (and that it could in any case affect the outcome of the entire war), Fiennes emphasised the undramatic truth of the battle's outcome: that irrespective of the relative losses suffered by both sides, the Royal Navy's control of the North Sea remained inviolate. However, Fiennes went on to concede an unthinkable and previously unutterable anxiety: 'It is that the British Navy possesses the gates of its enemy, and has banged, bolted and barred those gates upon him. He *may* yet defeat that Navy. Nothing is impossible in war.'<sup>38</sup> In countenancing thoughts of possible defeat, Fiennes' article appeared to embrace the criticism of the Navy underlying public concern since the war's outbreak. The criticism which had been piqued by the Scarborough raid of 1914 and focused by the 'failure' of Jutland became intensified by the manifestation of a genuine threat of defeat by Germany's unrestricted U-boat warfare at the start of 1917. This campaign, and British shipping losses, were at their height when Fiennes' article was published.

Although U-boat threat eventually diminished with the institution of a convoy system, concerns about Jutland continued to re-surface in *War Illustrated*. 'The Truth About Jutland', an article by Lovat Fraser appearing in November 1917, returned obsessively to the absence of detail and the aura of indecisiveness which continued to cling to the action: 'The Battle was waged in mist and haze and darkness, and that atmosphere still envelops its story [...] The truth about Jutland is that it was not a victory for anybody.'<sup>39</sup> In this evaluation, the battle was deprived of the consolation of even strategic victory. Fraser's final, downbeat sentence was redolent of the sentiments of June 1916, and the persistent, unanswered desire for a confirmed and convincing victory: 'Jutland was manifestly no Trafalgar, nor is any British naval action which leaves room for doubt.'<sup>40</sup> Albeit interpretable as a victory, Jutland remained 'no Trafalgar', a condemnation by cultural association and traditional yardstick that even final victory in the war could not expunge.

Recorded in pictures and photographs, the eventual surrender of the High Seas Fleet in 1918 (an outcome predicated on the direct consequences if not the desired conclusiveness of Jutland), was anointed by *War Illustrated* (without irony, and in further disparagement of Jutland) as 'Britain's Most Glorious Hour Since Trafalgar.'<sup>41</sup> In an article entitled 'Last Sailing of the Hun Armada', Edward Wright described the capitulation of the German Navy as an episode that both exemplified and outstripped an unbroken tradition: 'To the men of the island race, November 21<sup>st</sup>, 1918, was a day of victory such as Drake, Blake and Nelson had

not known.<sup>42</sup> Although not mentioned by name in this report, Jutland was referred to euphemistically as ‘the only fleet engagement of the war’, which was acknowledged to have been instrumental in Germany’s ultimate defeat. This curious yet valid recognition of the altered notion of victory at sea, achieved by sea control rather than conventional fleet action, still managed not to rehabilitate the nationally dissatisfying but strategically conclusive battle, which had nonetheless facilitated it.

The conspicuous recourse to reference to Nelson and Trafalgar which *War Illustrated* evinced throughout the war underlined the readiness with which such citations could be assumed to be made and shared with its readership in visualising the war at sea. However, this referential framework for its readership also encapsulated the pressure of decades of certainty and complacency, assumption and expectation, under which the Navy’s role in any future conflict would be judged. (Contemporary publications such as *The Illustrated War News* and *The Times History of the War* do not make comparable metaphorical or allusive naval references). Although decisive naval victory was eventually achieved, no contemporary Trafalgar occurred and no modern Nelson materialised.

Revised versions of the magazine introduced further intriguing details to its narrativisation of the battle, as the bound ‘album de luxe’ editions featured substantial re-editing and re-ordering of text and images. While in some cases this prompted only minor changes in tense to reflect the reappraisal of events, in others it produced notable alterations to the original publication. A remarkable addition to the bound editions was a series of sketches of key figures accompanied by valorising biographies forming the ‘Gallery of Leaders’, under the heading of ‘Personalia of the Great War’. Two instances were portraits of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty and Admiral Lord Fisher. What is remarkable about these textual augmentations is their commitment to the reaffirmation of naval tradition, through highlighting connections between both of these controversial officers and Nelson:

The name of Beatty is imperishably associated with that of England’s greatest admiral. There was a Beatty at Trafalgar – Nelson’s surgeon, Sir William Beatty. In our own time another Beatty has been carrying on the Nelson tradition in a way that Nelson himself would have approved.<sup>43</sup>

John Arbuthnot Fisher entered his teens and the Royal Navy at the same time, being the last midshipman to be received into the Senior Service by Admiral Sir William Parker, the last of Nelson's sea-captains [...] thus marking a link between the Nelson tradition and our own time, a link which has been strengthened throughout Lord Fisher's career.<sup>44</sup>

This insistence on the broadcasting of links between figures of the Navy's past and present counter-balanced the weekly publication's criticism of the service's conduct by its mediocre comparison to the same yardstick. Being (re)written mid-war, these portraits of modern Nelsons bolstered the primacy of tradition. The pronounced retrospection of these bound editions appeared already to anticipate a post-war memorialisation and celebration of the Navy's role in traditional terms, even before the war ended, or even (as in this case) before Jutland had occurred. Nonetheless, these editions were similarly subdued in their evaluation of Jutland, remaining muted and conditional in their celebration of the victory it represented:

A drawn battle between the British and German fleets must be accounted as a distinct moral victory for the Germans. Nelson did not deal in drawn battles [...] Assuredly if there was cause for jubilation it lay with the British [...] Nevertheless, the jubilation was very consciously limited. The losses had been grievous; and England would never feel satisfied with anything less than another Trafalgar.<sup>45</sup>

Here and throughout *War Illustrated's* coverage of the Navy and Jutland, shared and cited tradition remained both a source of assumed reassurance, and the basis of negative comparison.

### **The Somme: A 'Ceaseless Pageant'**

The anticipation surrounding the Allied offensive on the Western Front in 1916 rivalled the expectation of a North Sea fleet action, but when it occurred the British attack on the Somme perhaps topically distracted from the disappointment that tainted the aftermath of Jutland. *War Illustrated* lavished reports, photographic features and war artists' work on the documentation of the offensive which, due to the catastrophic losses incurred by the infantry, has since become enshrined as one of the worst events in the history of the British army and synonymous with

the view of the entire war as a futile waste of human life. From a centenary perspective, the magazine's coverage strikingly fails to acknowledge the full extent of the losses sustained on the first day, and therefore stands in marked all the more in contrast to the subdued and downbeat discussion of the 'victory' of Jutland.

Before the offensive began, its imminence had been signalled by visual emphases placed upon the recruitment of the volunteer army which would undertake it, in several series of full-page photographic portraits of the recently-formed regional units. An example from March 1916 depicted men of the 8<sup>th</sup> Battalion of the East Lancashire Regiment (all of whom are identified by name and rank), with the title 'Officers Who Will Lead Our New Armies to Victory.'<sup>46</sup> These pages of pictures appear particularly affecting in the light of the magazine's prevailing practice of including, in the rear pages of every edition, individual portraits of recently decorated, wounded or killed servicemen under a heading of 'The Empire's Roll of Honour.' Although *War Illustrated* frequently strives to inform its audience on military matters (in explaining unit and rank insignia for example) and on the histories of famous regiments, these photographs published before the 'great push' appear especially poignant given the magnitude of the losses experienced between July and November 1916.

The Somme offensive was distinguished by being covered by one in a series of extended articles labelled 'Battle Pictures of the Great War', which replaced the 'Great Episodes' sequence. Notably, this article by Edward Wright did not describe the offensive familiarly as the Battle of the Somme, but as 'The Glorious First of July.'<sup>47</sup> Although this reflected the actual starting date of the battle, this title was clearly intended to be recognised as an historical pun (ironically perhaps to the further denigration of Jutland) upon the Glorious First of June 1794, a famous naval victory against France. Wright's narrative of the attack emphasized the unprecedented artillery barrage which preceded the infantry assault:

A line of flame and thunder stretched for ninety miles from Ypres to the Somme River [...] Nothing like our bombardment has been seen in any field of the European War [...] It was the first grand triumph of the workers in our munitions factories. Our country was using shells by the million, and wearing out guns by the thousand, in order to save the lives of our soldiers.<sup>48</sup>



This conscious recognition and connection of the efforts of the population on the home front to the conduct of the war on the Western Front can be seen as a deliberate attempt to unite the British populace behind what was a predominantly British offensive operation. This emphasis was extended by the article's identification of many of the army units participating in the attack: 'The Gordons...the Surreys, Kents, Essex, Bedfords, and Norfolks [...] the Suffolks and the Tynesiders.'<sup>49</sup> While the article subsequently admitted the costs of the first day of attacks (describing the troops 'dropping in hundreds but never wavering') it nonetheless asserted that 'in our main assault our success was swift and complete.'<sup>50</sup>

Maintaining the rhetorical offensive in line with the military one, F.A. McKenzie, writing in his 'weekly survey' of the 'progress of the war' emphasized the exhilaration of soldiers on the attack, in stark contrast to the preceding months of static warfare and stalemate, and to his previously stated opinion of the losses sustained at Gallipoli:

We are advancing! I doubt if anyone who has not lived with fighting armies can understand the thrill of this phase, the fresh enthusiasm that sweeps the ranks, the triumphant emotion it brings. Losses seem to count for nothing, difficulties disappear, forlorn hopes are welcomed, and desperate sorties are sought when the army is going forward.<sup>51</sup>

Historical analogies were again recruited to celebrate the offensive in further commentaries. Under a subheading of 'The Great Advance', notes on the most recent events underlined the positive associations of the Somme with Henry V's victory at Agincourt.<sup>52</sup>

McKenzie's celebration of the offensive was more qualified in a later piece in the 'Progress of the War' series, in which the still-undetailed scale of casualties was at least acknowledged:

Our losses at the beginning of the second advance were surprisingly small, although as the fighting went on and the Germans rallied their forces, we lost more heavily.

Naturally, progress such as we are now making cannot be accomplished except at a heavy price. But it is cheaper to pay it than go on for months with dribbling fights and slow bleeding to death such as marked the siege war. From nowhere in this country or at the front does one here complaining or repining [...] In reading the long casualty lists now appearing daily in our newspapers, it is well to bear in mind that, thanks to the advances in medical science, the majority of men wounded in a battle recover sufficiently to go back to the fighting-line.<sup>53</sup>

This acknowledgement of casualties appeared to follow or respond to a page of photographs in the previous week's edition, which had depicted 'The First Wounded Heroes of the Somme.'<sup>54</sup> The captions for these pictures stated that the casualties, portrayed bandaged and bedbound, were recovering from their injuries in the UK, in hospital in London. The groups of casualties shown chatting were described as 'recounting their adventures' and 'telling the story of the victory', while one soldier isolated in an individual portrait, smiling directly at the camera, was said to epitomise the army as the 'type of British soldier wounded in the big push.'<sup>55</sup> This jovial treatment of the campaign was also conspicuous in a page of war artists' renderings of the offensive which were published more than a month after the beginning of the offensive. These drawings, showing the infantry advancing across a relatively flat and uncratered No Man's Land, exemplified the heroic style of artists' illustrations which had characterised the magazine's depictions since its inception. The drawings were notable also for again drawing attention to the identity of the regiments involved in the battle, to cultivate and recognise the regional and readers' pride, and for maintaining an attitude of blithe unconcern for danger:

When the East Surreys charged at Contalmaison, four platoons dribbled footballs towards the German trenches a mile and a quarter away. After the goal was won two of the balls were recovered in the captured traverses, and are now treasured trophies in the regimental depot in Kingston.<sup>56</sup>

This provincial emphasis within the magazine reflected the impact and outcome of the national recruitment drive which had produced the army committed to the Somme offensive, and it is noticeable that the most famous documentary films of the campaign, *The Battle of the Somme*

(1916) and *The Battle of the Ancre and the Advance of the Tanks* (1917) both also exhibited this tendency to identify and celebrate regional and regimental identities from many areas of the UK as a principal means through which to engage cinema audiences nation-wide.

However, the magazine's most striking illustrations of the Somme were manifested in a series of two-page photographic spreads which documented different aspects of the campaign through the months of its duration. These collages of photos illuminated, inculcated and defined the prominent facets of the battle already established in other reporting and imagery. The first of these which appeared in September 1916 was entitled 'The Epic Story of the Somme: Official Photographs from the Spreading Fields of Victory.'<sup>57</sup> The four large pictures represented the aftermath of the infantry attacks, including a column of marching men (described as 'strong-willed fearless children of a Spartan age [...] going forward to fight for a great ideal'), wounded German soldiers and prisoners being offered cigarettes by British soldiers (since 'Brave men bear no malice'). These still images again closely echo the detailed scenes from the front captured in *The Battle of the Somme*. *War Illustrated's* captioning, however, evinced a tone of nonchalance, irony and heroic understatement. A British casualty shown in a smaller image at the centre of the page was labelled as a 'wounded hero of the fight trudging philosophically to the ambulance', while two soldiers cooking amidst the ruins of a flattened farmhouse were described as enjoying 'a little grey and somewhat dilapidated home in the west.'

The second spread from October, 'Recording the Greatest Battle of the War', also concentrated on the infantry's war. These images portrayed engineers preparing to wire newly-occupied positions, a bombing party preparing for a trench raid (again subject to humorous understatement as 'a surprise visit to the German dug-outs'), and heavily burdened soldiers readying for the advance. The British soldiers are characterised as moving with 'wonderful deliberation, undismayed by heavy fire.'<sup>58</sup> Again, at the centre of the two page spread is a picture of a 'jubilant, though wounded' British soldier being stretchered to safety by German prisoners. These images of the frontline soldiers' experiences, duties and environment again chimed with the moving image documentation of the campaign achieved in *The Battle of the Somme* and *The Battle of the Ancre*, and therefore attain a veracity in representation and impact akin to those films' objectives in accurately portraying the war in the West to the British public.

The third photographic spread appearing in November illustrated the important role of the artillery in the offensive, and also introduced an abiding image of the Somme campaign by

recording the influence of the autumnal weather, which would ultimately halt the offensive in the winter of 1916. One photograph showed the innovation of light railways laid behind the lines to transport ammunition (also recorded in *The Battle of the Ancre*), but most of the images concentrated on the use of men and horses to move the heavy guns required to ‘pound a way for an infantry advance.’<sup>59</sup> The impassable landscape which came to characterise the Somme began its appearance in the pictures detailing the difficulties of movement, such as ‘transport mules floundering in a sea of mud.’ Similarly, a combined team of men and horses was depicted labouring to pull cannons in deplorable conditions: ‘Even twelve Shire thoroughbreds and twenty brawny arms experience no little difficulty in hauling the heavy weapon to the front through a Somme quagmire.’<sup>60</sup>

The final spread of photographs (fig.3) before the end of the year and the effective cessation of the offensive campaign depicted the most recent and most novel addition to the Western Front: the introduction of the tank. Photographic images of this secret weapon appeared in the popular press before of the circulation of the first moving images with the release of *The Battle of the Ancre* in 1917. The title for these images (Mysterious Monsters on the Muddy Somme: Land-Cruisers Luffing into the Battle Line’) underlines the almost comical peculiarity of the tanks’ first deployment.<sup>61</sup> This alliterative heading not only links the monstrosity of the machines with the deplorable conditions at the front, but the application of a deliberately nautical verb (‘luffing’) reinforces the nick-name of land-ship applied to the first tanks seeing action. The captions for the individual images composing the set (three showing tanks from varied angles and the fourth of recently-captured German prisoners with a tank in the background), extend the vocabulary applied to this wartime technological innovation. By turns the machine is rendered anthropomorphic (‘a monster of living steel [...] with blind implacable fury that recognises no obstacle’), historical (‘the “tank” goes into action with something of the bravado of the mediaeval knight’) and mythological (‘a mail-coated leviathan’). Two captions also expand on the nautical and naval metaphors, comparing the crews of tanks to those of another of the war’s cutting-edge technologies (submarines) and analogising the vehicles’ movements to those of warships: ‘Craters and shell-holes to the land-ship are like so many waves to a powerful destroyer.’ Yet the remarked-upon comical oddity of the machine is also inseparable from its enormity and intimidating effects upon the enemy:

While the “tanks” caused roars of laughter from Britons who witness the first move into action, the Germans suffered a painful surprise, and, in many cases utterly demoralised by the steely and apparently invulnerable novelty, surrendered en masse.<sup>62</sup>

*War Illustrated*'s coverage of new technologies applied to the conflict usually evinced awe and wonder (for example, in relation to flying machines and submarines) or hatred and contempt (for flame weapons, poison gas and submarines as used by the enemy). The tank, the technology destined to transform warfare and eventually overcome the ‘muddy’ impasse of the Western Front, was greeted paradoxically with both humour and awe. This approach appears strangely appropriate to the magazine’s treatment of the Somme, which had eschewed seriousness, adopted irony and used litotes in its picture captions while portraying the campaign, particularly in its later months, with photographic realism. While documenting the Somme as ‘the Greatest Battle of the War’, and thereby demoting all of its own previously elevated ‘Great Episodes’ in comparison, *War Illustrated* balanced its hyperbole and exaggeration with occasional economies with the truth, and with their opposites in irony and understatement. In relation to a battle which has been solemnly celebrated and exaggeratedly condemned in retrospect, this oblique contemporary treatment appears remarkable and, in comparison with those of Gallipoli and Jutland, unprecedented.

## **Conclusion**

*War Illustrated*'s reporting of these three key events represents a series of appraisals attuned to its British audience. It reflects not only the purveying of news and the promotion of certain views in contemporary terms, but also foreshadows the reappraisals of these events in post-war decades. The magazine’s coverage of the Dardanelles campaign underlines its difference from the war on the Western Front which preceded and succeeded it, and highlights the historical and cultural distinction the landings at Gallipoli gained from the moment they took place. While subsequent interpretations might define (or condemn) the entire conflict in terms of uncompromising imperial imperatives, *War Illustrated* assured its readers the European war is about Belgian neutrality, Western civilisation, Britain’s allegiances, and moral opposition to aggressive militarism. By contrast, the ‘war in the Levant’ was unequivocally imperial in

association, execution and intent, and candidly described as such. Turkey and Australia emerged with communal national discourses of military prowess and pride, and shared identities of victimhood at the hands of European imperial powers. The myth of a homogeneous Australian national identity arising from the campaign, or the entire conflict, is both an affirmation and simplification of the motivations, experiences and consequences of the Anzacs' involvement.<sup>63</sup> However, the contemporary consciousness of the futility of the Dardanelles battles, and perceptions of the wasteful expenditure of the Anzacs' virtues in the very battles which displayed them, are also maintained. While similarly eulogising the Anzacs' 'physical beauty and nobility of bearing', John Masefield furthered the image of their courageous victimhood in later wartime writing, by labelling them the 'heroic unhelped men.'<sup>64</sup> *War Illustrated* gives this understanding of the Anzac an unexpected voice in an anecdotal tale from December 1915:

Power to make phrases is a valued asset of some politicians, and it can be employed both usefully and effectively, but it has its dangers, especially if there is any suggestion of flippancy in its use. Mr Churchill's description of the Dardanelles operations as a legitimate gamble seems to have fallen unpleasantly on a good many Australian ears. 'It may be very clever,' one wounded Anzac said to me, 'and it may be a right way to talk, but it's only one of lots of things to do with the Dardanelles that have left a nasty taste in my mouth. I was only a small card, but I was one of a good many packs that were strewn on the ground.'<sup>65</sup>

Whether or not this 'wounded Anzac' actually existed, the words attributed to him embody a model of national character in their stoicism and irony, valorise and emancipate him for his service and sacrifice, and focus criticism of Gallipoli and the wider war in a fashion both persuasive and prophetic.

By comparison, the magazine's equivocal but recurrent coverage of Jutland, which remains unclosed as a topic of discussion and a subject of reference until the war's end can be seen to inaugurate the ambivalent standing of the battle in history and historiography of the conflict. The contestable or discreditable history of Jutland arguably has little to do with the significance of the battle within First World War strategy, and everything to do with the frame of reference

which *War Illustrated* applies to it and all naval war discourses: the history of the Navy itself, and specifically that of Nelson and Trafalgar. Therefore, unlike the contemporary polemics and politicisation of Gallipoli, the First World War ‘news’ of Jutland really pertains to pre-war, even pre-twentieth century discourses of British national identity. Nonetheless, *War Illustrated*’s obsessive returning to the battle of 1916 in its opinion pieces of 1917 and 1918 underlines not only the significance (and significant defence) of the dreadnought strategy which had dominated pre-war and wartime thinking, or the painful provocation of unrestricted U-boat warfare as stimulus for Jutland’s reappraisal, but the fascination with war’s only true fleet action continues to engender.

The magazine’s celebratory treatment of the Somme offensive may appear to be the most distant from retrospective understandings of the war in general, and that costly campaign in particular, and therefore the most prone to accusations of and dismissals as mere propaganda. The magazine’s sidestepping of the true nature and scale of British casualties in the offensive stands in contrast to the frank acknowledgment of death and loss in the documentary film *The Battle of the Somme*, though this contemporary text equally suggested the offensive was successful, if costly.<sup>66</sup> Although in the immediate post-war period the Somme became a byword for the conflict’s futility and mismanagement, subsequent historiography of the battle has re-evaluated and redeemed it as at worst ‘a strategic necessity’ and at best a point of positive progress towards final victory.<sup>67</sup> *War Illustrated*’s evaluations of the Somme can therefore be seen to converge with revisionist histories of the campaign and wider war, which have sought to repudiate the post-war censure of the Western Front, rehabilitate General Haig and redeem the British Army and its role in overall victory.<sup>68</sup> Far from being anachronisms, *War Illustrated*’s reports, editorials and articles on these three key events of the war essentially predate, transform and enrich our understandings of the First World War even as these are necessarily challenged in the course of the current centenary.

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John Terraine, *To Win a War* (London: Sedgewick and Jackson, 1978).

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<sup>1</sup> James Jupp, "Australia: A Changing Identity", *Australian Quarterly*, 79 (2007), 66

<sup>2</sup> The initial landings are portrayed (somewhat inaccurately) in a cover illustration: "Our Amphibious Heroes: Gallant Marines do good work on the shores of the Dardanelles," *The War Illustrated* 10 April 1915, front cover.

<sup>3</sup> Anonymous, "The Great Episodes of the War XXI: The Great Landing Battles of the Dardanelles", *The War Illustrated* 15 May 1915, 292, 294 (294).

<sup>4</sup> Alistair Thomson, *Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), 53. Thomson notes that the hyperbolic descriptions of the ANZACs first appear in the reports of Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, British correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*, in advance of the dispatches by Australian reporter C.E.W. Bean. Although anonymous, the rhetoric included in the "Great Episodes" article certainly appears to resemble Ashmead-Bartlett's writing for *War Illustrated*'s partner publication.

<sup>5</sup> Carlyon Bellairs, "The War By Sea", *The War Illustrated* 8 May 1915, 284.

<sup>6</sup> Anonymous, "The Great Episodes of the War XXI: The Great Landing Battles of the Dardanelles", *The War Illustrated* 15 May 1915, 292, 294 (292).

<sup>7</sup> "'Kismet': The Coming Doom of the Turk in Europe", *The War Illustrated* 13 March 1915, front cover.

<sup>8</sup> Anonymous, "Turkey's Death Struggle with Forces of Progress", *The War Illustrated* 15 May 1915, 295.

<sup>9</sup> Edward J. Erickson, "Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915", *Journal of Military History* 65 (2001), 983-5.

<sup>10</sup> "Young Lions of the Old Empire No. I: Canada", *The War Illustrated* 8 May 1915, front cover; "Young Lions of the Old Empire No. II: Australia", *The War Illustrated* 17 July 1915, front cover. In subsequent issues, troops from South Africa and New Zealand receive similar recognition.

<sup>11</sup> H.W. Wilson, "'The Great Adventure': The Difficulties of the Dardanelles Campaign", *The War Illustrated* 24 July 1915, 529-530 (529). The magazine's war correspondent F.A. McKenzie had already levelled criticism at Winston Churchill for the 'costly and desperate venture' in an earlier piece: F.A. McKenzie, "The War By Land", *The War Illustrated* 19 June 1915, 418.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Anonymous, 'One Australian Accounts for Seven Turks', *The War Illustrated* 21 August 1915, 13.

<sup>15</sup> Anonymous, "Some of the 'Anzac' Supermen at Anafarta Bay", *The War Illustrated* 18 September 1915, 99 ; Anonymous, "The Australians' Great Work in the Dardanelles" *The War Illustrated* 19 June 1915, 406.

<sup>16</sup> Anonymous, "Where Every Furlong counts a British Victory", *The War Illustrated* 2 October 1915, 151.

<sup>17</sup> Anonymous, "The Great Episodes of the War XXVII: The Gloom and Glory of the Sari Bair Battles", *The War Illustrated* 9 October 1915, 178.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* C.E.W. Bean identifies the causes of the failure of the Anzacs' attacks within the intellectual shortcomings of the British command and the physical inferiority, in comparison with the Australians, of the reinforcements raised from British urban populations. C.E.W. Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Vol.II: The Story of Anzac From 4 May, 1915 to the Evacuation* 11<sup>th</sup> ed. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1941), 715-16.

<sup>19</sup> F.A. McKenzie, "Our Day of Crisis in the Near East", *The War Illustrated* 30 October 1915, 260.

<sup>20</sup> Erickson observes that the Dardanelles Campaign should not be seen as more error-strewn, bloody or disastrous than any other Allied offensive operation before 1917. Erickson (2001), 1011.

<sup>21</sup> F.A. McKenzie, "Our Day of Crisis in the Near East", *The War Illustrated* 30 October 1915, 260.

<sup>22</sup> Anonymous, "The Great Episodes of the War XXXII: The Amazing Withdrawal from Gallipoli's Crescent of Death", *The War Illustrated* 15 January 1916, 506. Peter Liddle also notes the comparison with Dunkirk; Peter Liddle, *Men of Gallipoli: The Dardanelles and Gallipoli Experience August 1914 to January 1916* (London: Allen Lane, 1976), 259.

<sup>23</sup> Anonymous, "Anzac Swords and Bombs Scatter Enemies in Egypt," *The War Illustrated* 17 June 1916, 412.

- <sup>24</sup> Thomas Hoerber, "Prevail or perish: Anglo-German naval competition at the beginning of the twentieth century", *European Security*, 20 (2011), 65-79. See also Jan Rüger, "The Symbolic Relevance of the Navy and the Sea in Britain and Germany, c.1880-1918", in Katharina Hoffmann, Herbert Mertens and Silke Wenk (eds.) *Myth, Gender and the Military Conquest of Air and Sea* (Oldenburg: BIS-Verlag der Carl von Ossietzky Universität, 2015), 55-68.
- <sup>25</sup> *The War Illustrated* 22 August 1914. During 1915, photographic portraits of Royal Navy warships (the first example being HMS *Iron Duke*) in a series entitled "Britain's Watchdogs of the Deep" occupied the inner covers of the magazine's editions.
- <sup>26</sup> Jan S. Breemer, "The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World War", *Newport Papers* 6 (1993), 33-5.
- <sup>27</sup> Anonymous, "The Great Episodes of the War III: The Battle of Heligoland Bight", *The War Illustrated* 26 September 1914, 122-3.
- <sup>28</sup> Anonymous, "The Great Episodes of the War XIV: The Decisive Cruiser Action in the North Sea", *The War Illustrated* 6 February 1915, 594-7; Anonymous, "The Great Episodes of the War XXI: The Demoniacal Destruction of the *Lusitania*", *The War Illustrated* 22 May 1915, 318-9.
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- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 419.
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- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*
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- <sup>39</sup> Lovat Fraser, "The Truth About Jutland," *The War Illustrated* 10 November 1917, 249.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*
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- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 539.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 542.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>51</sup> F.A. McKenzie, "The Progress of the War", *The War Illustrated* 15<sup>th</sup> July 1916, lxxxvi.
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- <sup>54</sup> Anonymous, "The First Wounded Heroes of the Somme," 22 July 1916, 536.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*
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- <sup>58</sup> Anonymous, "With the Crown Camera Men on the Somme Recording the Greatest Battle of the War," *The War Illustrated* 21 October 1916, 228-9.
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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Anonymous, "Mysterious Monsters on the Muddy Somme: Land-Cruisers Luffing into the Battle Line", *The War Illustrated* 9 December 1916, 396-7.

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<sup>66</sup> See also John Buchan, *The Battle of the Somme* (New York: George H. Doran, 1917), another wartime text which acknowledges the carnage of the battle but which also asserts its overall necessity and success.

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