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Horne, J. and Silvestre, G. (2016) *Brazil, politics, the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup*. In: Bairner, A., Kelly, J. and Lee, J.W., (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics*. Routledge , London , pp. 483-495. ISBN 9781138792548

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315761930>

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in *Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics* on 04/10/2016, available online:
<http://www.routledge.com/10.4324/9781315761930>

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Brazil, Politics, the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup

John Horne & Gabriel Silvestre

Forthcoming in Kelly, John; Lee, Jung Woo; and Bairner, Alan (eds.) (2016) *Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics*. London: *Routledge*.

Introduction

Brazil has been, in less than a century and half, a monarchy, a republic, and a federation. It has been ruled by parliament, civilian presidents, military juntas, general-presidents, and by a civilian dictator (Rocha and McDonagh, 2014, p. 61).

Interest in the development of the political system of the largest nation in South America has been a long-standing feature of scholarly research (see for example Levine & Crocitti, 1999; McCann, 2008). Academic interest in sport in South America has been given a significant boost by the scheduled hosting of the two largest sports mega-events – the FIFA men's football world cup finals and the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games – in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro in 2014 and 2016 respectively. This is not to say that research has not been conducted until recently, but to acknowledge that the English-language literature has started to increase, and looks certain to grow even more rapidly in the coming years (for earlier research see Arbena, 1999). One of the reasons is that the staging of these 'megas' focuses the attention of the global media and academics on the host nation and cities involved.

Popular involvement in sport is one of the major accomplishments of the 100 years or so since modern sport was established. But sport is not naturally followed anymore than people naturally go shopping. Sport consumers and audiences are made not born. This is also an accomplishment of political agencies, such as central (federal), regional and municipal government. In *Soccer Madness* Lever (1995/1983, p. 6) contends that sport generally and, in Brazil, football specifically, has the 'paradoxical ability to reinforce societal cleavages while transcending them'. She argues that sport/football can 'create social order while preserving cultural identity', thus promoting rather than impeding goals of national development (Lever 1995, p. 22).

Anthropologists, historians, human geographers, political scientists and sociologists, amongst other scholars, have begun to investigate a number of recurring topics that enable us to begin to understand these and other developments in South America. Football, by far and away the

most popular sport throughout South America, features in articles about fans, elite migrant labour, professional organizations and globalization (Gordon and Helal, 2001; Raspaud and Bastos, 2013; Ribeiro and Dimeo, 2009). Alvito (2007) notes for example that football in Brazil has faced the twin challenges of commercialization and mediatization for at least the past 30 years. Mega-events attract accounts about the history of South American involvement, involvement in the Football World Cup and the Olympics and also the impacts of hosting on marginalised communities (Curi, 2008; Gaffney, 2010; Silvestre and Oliveira, 2012; Sánchez and Broudehoux, 2014). In addition to football, sports and other forms of physical culture discussed include surfing in Brazil and capoeira – the Brazilian martial art that combines elements of dance, acrobatics and music (Knijnik et al, 2010; Almeida et al, 2013). Specific accounts of the development of policies for sport in Brazil, and discussion of the development of leisure in Brazil and gender divisions and sport also appear in the literature (Almeida et al, 2012; Dias and Melo, 2011; Petca et al, 2013).

Several articles contain overviews that summarise the history and development of sport and leisure in South America more generally, as well as those that discuss the complex composition of South American societies in the wake of centuries of immigration and colonial exploitation (Arbena, 1986, 2001; Guedes, 2011; Mangan, 2001). Hence the diaspora of Europeans – the British, the Dutch, the French, the Germans and the Italians – as well as Portuguese and Spanish are rivalled by that of Japanese people, creating in Brazil the largest Japanese-speaking population outside of the Far East (Cuéllar, 2013). In future, as research grows, at least in the English-language literature, it will undoubtedly fill some of the gaps in our understanding and thus overcome the exoticisation of South American culture often presented in popular travel programmes and documentaries. South America contains both economic giants, such as Brazil, and relatively smaller developing economies.

In the past 30 years most of the developed and developing world have joined in the competitive marketing of places as social and economic opportunities seeking capital investment. Many ‘Cariocas’ (Rio de Janeiro locals) glued themselves to their TV screens at 11am local time on October 2nd, 2009, awaiting the results of a decision about whether or not Rio de Janeiro would host the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. On Copacabana beach, proposed site of the 2016 beach volleyball competition, a huge party was scheduled whether or not Rio was selected. The decision to award the Olympics to Rio was very much the icing on a decade of steady development. Brazil’s had been one of the few economies that had remained stable and growing,

leading to it being hailed as one of the BRICS, the so called major emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China (and additionally, South Africa).

The BRICS account for over 2.8 billion (40 percent) of the world's population, but only command 25 percent of global GDP, and hence they are also referred to as 'emerging economies'. Given the hosting of the Olympic Games by Beijing (2008), the Commonwealth Games by Delhi (2010), the FIFA World Cup by South Africa (2010), the Winter Olympic Games by Sochi (2014) and the FIFA World Cup by Russia (2018), as well as the Brazilian involvement in staging the Pan-American Games (2007), the FIFA World Cup (2014) and the Olympics (2016), some have suggested that a 'BRICS-style' of hosting sports mega-events may be emerging (Curi et al, 2011). Curi et al point out that between 1950 and 2007 no major international sports event was hosted in Rio de Janeiro, the city lost its status as capital to Brasilia in 1960 and when it did stage the 2007 Pan-American Games they were the most expensive of that series of competitions ever held. The 2007 Pan-AMs were marked by very tight security including the erection of walls to separate games attendees from the local, poorer, population. Hence bidding to host these events has to be seen in a context where consumption-based development is seen as a solution to urban problems as much as national ones (Gaffney 2010).

Whilst there were no groups organized in Rio specifically against the Olympic bid, there were several groups on the ground concerned with the legacy these Olympics would bring to Rio, and especially to the marginalised communities living in favelas (sometimes referred to as 'slums'). While eviction in low-income, informal areas has become a not-uncommon consequence of mega-event planning worldwide, housing rights violations have reached significant proportions during recent Olympics. It is in this way that sport, and sports mega-events such as the Olympics especially, may appear superficially as credible tools of development. Yet they do so in ways that does not challenge inequalities or neo-liberal development. In fact the hosting of sports mega-events may be a most convenient shell for the promotion of neo-liberal agendas, since they do not deviate from top down notions of economic and social development.

This chapter comprises two parts: a very brief history of socio-cultural and political aspects of sport (especially football) in Brazil that provides the background and context for the second that discusses contemporary aspects of mega-event bidding and hosting in Brazil. The first part focuses on the role of football in forging national identity and the growth in

popularity of the sport. The politics surrounding Brazil's involvement in the FIFA World Cup since 1950 is discussed. The domestic politics of Brazilian football and key figures João Havelange and his former son-in-law Ricardo Teixeira are also considered. The second part will consider bidding and national politics underpinning the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympics, public protest and security, and demonstrations before and during the 2014 World Cup. The chapter concludes by considering the impact of mega-event hosting on political agendas and the outlook for football and other professional sports post-mega-events in Brazil.

Part I Sport and Politics in Brazil

”There is no dictatorship in Brazil. Brazil is a liberal country, a land of happiness. We are a free people. Our leaders know what is best for (us) and govern (us) in a spirit of toleration and patriotism” (Edson Arantes Nascimento da Silva (Pelé) speaking in 1972, quoted in Levine, 1980, p. 244).

“I was kind of vague about these things, I didn't talk about politics” (Pelé interviewed in 1993 about the 1970s, in Levine and Crocitti eds. 1999, p. 256).

A number of more journalistic accounts of football in Brazil are available that discuss the connection with nationalism and politics (see for example Humphrey, 1986; Goldblatt, 2014; Zirin, 2014). Here we briefly refer to two of the key academic sources that these journalistic accounts rely on (Lever, 1995/1983; and Levine, 1980) to provide a brief historical contextualisation of the relations between politics and sport in Brazil.

Levine (1980, p. 233) recognises the possibility of viewing sport, and especially football, as a form of opiate and distraction and thus an agency of social control. He also acknowledges the alternative view that sport provides a source of group identity and social integration, and thus can act as a unifier of local, regional and national populations. He argues however that in the case of Brazil ‘futebol's chief significance has been its use by the elite to bolster official ideology and to channel social energy in ways compatible with prevailing social values’. Thus he appears to adopt a perspective more in keeping with that of Antonio Gramsci, or ‘hegemony theory’.

Lever (1995, p. 56), adopting the integration perspective, argues that ‘sport promoted national integration in Brazil long before other social organizations criss-crossed the nation’. By 1914 Brazil had a national federation of sports clubs, the Confederação Brasileira de Desportos

(CBD), or 'Brazilian Sports Confederation', and the football club as an institution dates from the late 19th century. Levine (1980, p. 234) suggests that the development of football in Brazil falls into four broad periods: 1894-1904, the development of private urban clubs for foreigners (especially the British, German and Portuguese); 1905-1933, the amateur phase which nonetheless saw a marked growth in interest; 1933-1950, professionalisation and participation on the world stage, including the hosting of the fourth FIFA World Cup Finals in 1950; and since 1950, world-class recognition and the growth of commercialism. This remains a useful way of understanding the emergence of the sport in Brazil (for greater detail see Bellos, 2002; Gaffney, 2008; Goldblatt, 2014).

The first football clubs to be established in Rio reflected the influence of foreigners – Vasco da Gama established in 1898 at the Lusitania club for Portuguese merchants and bankers, Fluminense developed out of the British 'Rio Cricket and Athletic Association' in 1902, Botafogo were a spin-off from a rowing club (1904) and Flamengo, formerly another rowing club, was formed in 1915 when athletes defected from Fluminense. Thus are great sporting rivalries created within the boundaries of one city. Indicative of the growth of national pride associated with football, Levine (1980, p. 233) notes that:

Following four matches in July 1929 by the touring Chelsea Football Club against Brazilian teams, Mr Steele, of the British Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, officially recommended that such future visits be discouraged, since the local partisans had behaved outrageously, intimidated the referees, and, twice victorious, "claim as a nation to have beaten England".

Popular interest in the sport was aided, as in other nations, by the growth of media reporting of the results by the newspaper press from the 1900s and radio from the 1930s.

Levine (1999, p. 44) notes how Government expanded into everyday life, including sport, in Brazil in the 1930s. The Government seized upon the Brazilian victory in the 1932 South American Cup and a year later football became a national institution when it was professionalised under the auspices of the CBD. In 1941 the club network in Brazil was linked to the federal government by President Vargas's centralization programme. A National Sport Council (CND) within the Ministry of Education and Culture was established to 'orient, finance, and encourage the practice of sport in all of Brazil' (Lever, 1995, p. 56). Lever (1995, p. 59) argues that from the beginning of the diffusion and adoption of modern sport, 'sport and government more than coexist; their relationship is better described as symbiotic'. Whilst

individual athletes, such as tennis player Maria Bueno, who won four times at Forest Hills and three times at Wimbledon between 1959 and 1966, and racing driver Emerson Fittipaldi who was at his best in Formula One racing in the 1970s, may have been used to symbolise Brazilian greatness, Lever (1995, p. 55) argues that it ‘is through team sports, with their highly organised structure that precedes and outlives any particular set of athletes, that more than momentary unification of a nation is established’. She argues that in Brazil ‘politicians have spurred the growth of both spectator and participant sport; sport, in return, has helped politicians court popularity and has helped the Brazilian government achieve its nationalistic goals’ (Lever, 1995, p. 59). In many ways therefore her argument can be seen as complementary to that of Levine.

Lever (1995, p. 59) argues that the modern history of Brazil is ‘one of social and economic change through authoritarian centralization’. Sport has played its part in this in various ways. The military coup d’état in 1964 saw the establishment of army presidents. In 1968, as repression intensified, the President, General Emílio Garrastazu Médici, began taking an interest in Flamengo and the national team. When Brazil won the FIFA World Cup for an unprecedented third time in Mexico in 1970 the team was flown directly from Mexico City to the capital Brasilia, and the players were personally received by Médici in the Planalto Palace (Levine, 1980, p. 246). Two days of national celebration followed and shortly after the military took over the CBD (eventually renamed the Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) after a demand by FIFA in 1979).

Although there was considerable interest in football it is clear that less attention was paid to developing other ‘Olympic sports’ (Levine, 1980, p. 249). When it was suggested to President-designate General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, that amateur sport should be given greater emphasis to improve Brazilian performance at the Olympic Games, he retorted that the Olympics were: “political propaganda for nations who needed that sort of thing” (quoted in Levine, 1980, p. 250). Brazil’s achievements at the Summer Olympics continue to be middle ranking, including never having secured a gold medal in either the men’s or women’s football competition. The top medal producing sports have been volleyball, sailing and judo.

Lever (1995, pp. 61-62; see also Goldblatt, 2014 pp. 122-157) provides several examples of the way in which football and politics mixed in Brazil during the dictatorship. When she was conducting interviews with workers in the early 1970s, a low increase in the monthly minimum wage was augmented with the giving away of 15,000 free tickets for the match between

Flamengo and Fluminense (the team of the masses versus the team of the elite). At the time, the state also regulated maximum ticket prices for entrance to the ‘popular’ sections of public stadia, such as the ‘geral’ in the Maracanã in Rio. Football club directorships were also stepping-stones to political careers, and politicians have used the sport to further their interests (Kuper, 1994). Admiral Helenio Nunes, President of the CBD and ARENA (the official government political party) in the state of Rio de Janeiro used matches prior to the 1978 World Cup in Argentina as political rallies, featuring ARENA’s banners and military bands. Political figures claimed to be fans even when they were not. In June 1973 when the government announced President Médici’s successor, a not well-known (military) man, the newspaper *Jornal do Brasil* featured his photograph on the front page with the caption:

“Gaúcho [meaning from the state of Rio Grande do Sul] from Bento Gonçalves [his hometown] 64 years old, fan of Internacional in Porto Alegre and Botafogo in Rio, brother of two generals, married, with one daughter, Ernesto Geisel will be the 23rd president of the republic” (cited in Lever, 1995. p. 64).

Part II Sport, politics and the hosting of mega-events in Contemporary Brazil

Since the re-democratization process in the late 1980s sports other than football have slowly attained greater prominence in the national political agenda resulting in the creation of a dedicated ministry under the government of President Luis Inacio (‘Lula’) da Silva of the Workers’ Party. Attention and resources have been mostly oriented towards professional sports and were lately dominated by the hosting of mega-events (Almeida et al, 2012). The bidding campaigns for the FIFA 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games were fully endorsed by the national government and in the passionate support of President Lula who on the occasion of the awards declared that football was “more than a sport for Brazilians, it is a national passion” and that with the Olympics “Brazil gained its international citizenship ... [t]he world has finally recognised it is Brazil’s time.” (BBC Sport, 2007; Rohter, 2010:223). Such claims demonstrate the political capital to be explored in relation to two audiences: the Brazilian electorate and the international opinion.

In the next two sections we pay attention to the political aspects of the preparation for the two events, here broadly defined to include the agendas of the federal and local governments, the interests of sports organisers and civil protests that have marked the build-up and staging of the football World Cup. We retrace the bidding and preparation history of the events whilst

reflecting on their expected contributions and impacts, a debate that rose to international prominence with the scenes of nation-wide protests.

The FIFA 2014 World Cup

Following the controversies surrounding the voting for the 2006 World Cup – when the South African bid was beaten by one vote after the sudden change of mind of one delegate – FIFA introduced a continental rotating system to designate host countries, starting with Africa and followed by South America. Since last hosting the event in 1950 Brazilian interest in organising a World Cup was unconvincingly presented in 1988 when its candidature received only two votes to host the 1994 World Cup (US Soccer, 2013). The new rotating system was thus an opportune occasion to which the then chairman of CBF, Ricardo Teixeira, worked in getting the support of the recently elected President Lula da Silva.

Presidential support for the bid was initiated in 2004 when both Teixeira and Lula attended a friendly match between Brazil and Haiti in Port-au-Prince as part of a United Nations peacekeeping mission led by Brazilian troops. Despite expressing their interest both Argentina and Colombia would withdraw their candidatures leaving Brazil as the sole contender. In October 2007 Brazil was confirmed the host of the 2014 World Cup in an unusual situation since the host cities were still to be decided. From a shortlist of eighteen cities twelve were finally chosen in May 2009 after FIFA conceded the request to include more host-cities than the usual eight or ten. It included traditional venues in cities like Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte, as well as less obvious football destinations such as the cities of Manaus, Cuiabá and Brasília.

A higher personal benefit seemed to hold for Teixeira, who accumulated the position of chairman of the local organising committee, whose intentions in running for the presidency of FIFA were speculated only for him to fall into disgrace. Chairman of CBF since 1989 and a former son-in-law of João Havelange, FIFA president from 1974 to 1998, Teixeira became a powerful figure in football politics by exploiting his position and networks at CBF and as an executive member of FIFA. Despite enduring congressional probing commissions into corruption in Brazilian football, personal wrongdoings and allegations of embezzlement by the international press, he found himself at odds with Lula's successor, President Dilma Rousseff, indisposed with his association to her government. Polemic declarations in the press stating that in 2014 he could do the 'most slippery, unthinkable, Machiavellian things' such as 'denying press credentials, barring access, changing game schedules' yet still nothing would

happen to him (Pinheiro, 2011), sparked media and public outrage on the eve of the World Cup qualifying draw with public demonstrations calling for 'out with Teixeira'. Alleging personal health reasons he finally stepped down in 2012.

The preparations for the World Cup were poised to be one of the main symbols of Rousseff's government following the announcement of an overall programme package in Lula's last year in office. A suite of agreements with state and municipal authorities were signed detailing works in stadiums, public transport, airports, tourism infrastructure and roads and highways. In order to facilitate and speed up the tendering of contracts, special regulations were enacted to flexibilise both the tendering process and the cap of municipal and state levels of indebtedness. State and local governments were responsible for tendering and contracting out the projects under their responsibility leading to varied outcomes as some projects were substantially reviewed, suspended by irregularities and even abandoned given the improbability of their conclusion on time, as many related to urban mobility such as underground transportation lines and light railways.

The progress of works was at times obfuscated by the turbulence in the relationship between FIFA and the Brazilian government leading to the approval of a general set of laws in relation to the organisation of the event. These included the application of guarantees previously signed by the Brazilian government in relation to tax exemptions, the approval of visas and restrictions on ambush marketing, and also to other items that triggered heated debates such as concessionary tickets, the licensing for the sale of alcohol at the venues and the activities of street vendors in the surroundings of the venues. Minor concessions were made, such as half-priced tickets for students and the elderly and the acquiescing for the permanence of the traditional baianas selling Afro-Brazilian food in Salvador. Still, the relationship with FIFA became more strained as delays became all too apparent.

The immediate run-up to the event was plagued by delays, cost overruns, fatalities and nation-wide protests. The national government stayed firm with the discourse of expected benefits accruing from the event with constant reference to the legacies that would benefit the majority of the population. There was mounting criticism from the press with the escalating budget figures, particularly with the costs of stadiums and their post-event use. In one of the extreme cases, the predicted final figure for Brasilia's National Stadium was almost double the original estimate while the future of the stadium post-World Cup remained uncertain given the absence of a competitive team in the upper tiers of the Brazilian football competitions. A similar

situation beckoned for the stadiums in Natal, Cuiabá and Manaus. Up to the completion of the stadiums 10 deaths of construction workers were registered as progress was rushed to meet deadlines. Half of the venues were unveiled for the Confederations Cup in 2013, the FIFA rehearsal tournament for the World Cup, despite ongoing works visible in the venues. Up to that point the expected budget for World Cup-related expenditure had already increased five-times on the original estimates. One year to go and facing mounting challenges in several planning areas, the organization of the event found itself caught in the middle of a massive public protest that swept across the country.

In June 2013 scenes of public demonstrations in the streets of Brazilian cities and heavy-handed police response were widely covered by the international press. What had started as a local protest in São Paulo against the rise in bus fares which brought some of its main thoroughfares to a halt, quickly triggered demonstrations elsewhere in the country after it was met by disproportionate repression by the police. Thousands poured into the streets of more than 350 cities to express not only their indignation to scenes of police brutality widely circulated in social networks of the internet but also to release their discontentment with corrupted politics and the neglected state of public services.

The composition of the masses, as political scientist Andre Singer (2014) observed, was made up of two large strata, that of the middle classes and what he identified as the ‘new proletariat’, a young working class with formal jobs but nonetheless poorly paid and with poor working conditions (p.24-5). Their banners also reflected different foci: while the former expressed their anger with the continuous corruption scandals that marred national politics and the Workers’ Party, the latter manifested their revolt against issues closer to their daily lives; the poor condition of the public health, education and transport systems.

The arrival of the Workers’ Party in the federal government in 2002 coincided with a period of strong economic growth, improvement of social indicators and rising levels of consumption by the lower sections of the social scale that helped them to endure the global financial crisis relatively unscathed (Anderson, 2011). Its continuance in power was sealed via a familiar politic strategy in Brazil of securing support via shady deals. Exposed during the denouncement of a vote-buying scheme in 2005 that led to the sentencing of some of the party’s top ranks, this long evolving story was also represented on some of the banners during the June 2013 protests. Hence although able to afford more consumer goods, the urban poor have endured an ambiguous existence of formal jobs in precarious conditions and with poor public services. The

two agendas thus converged around a related and immediate event: the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2013.

Protesting against the vilified ‘FIFA standards’ often evoked in official discourses justifying the spending on football venues, Brazilians demanded the same level of quality in the delivery of public services. The ever-rising budget for the event, the finding of irregularities and the suspension of projects served to confirm the general sentiment that only the powerful and rich would benefit. Long-standing campaigning groups such as the Comitês Populares da Copa (‘Popular Committees of the World Cup’) highlighted the displacement of thousands of people from low-income communities by works related with the event, with estimates ranging between 170,000 to 250,000 (Montenegro, 2013), and the appropriation of public improvements by private companies as the operation of the venues were privatised (Gaffney, 2014). Protest videos posted online went viral. The otherwise football-crazy image that characterised the portraying of Brazilian fans was nowhere to be seen in the Confederations Cup tournament as chants of ‘Não vai ter Copa!’ (‘There won’t be a World Cup’) and ‘Da Copa eu abro mão, quero meu dinheiro pra saúde e educação’ (‘I give up the World Cup, I want my money to go into health and education’) echoed in many of the host cities.

While some municipalities backtracked on their decision to raise transport fares the federal government responded with a public announcement from President Rousseff acknowledging the demands and condemning acts of vandalism. National programmes and new governmental intentions in healthcare, education and transport were announced. If the measure managed to placate widespread demonstrations, other protests smaller in numbers continued to be carried over in the following months. This was accompanied by a wave of strikes in the professions - especially the police, teachers, road sweepers and public transport operators - for improved pay and work conditions. FIFA continued to refute criticism of its role by stating that it was Brazil’s decision to bid for the event and to propose the projects associated with the stadiums.

The total cost of expenditure announced by the Brazilian government on the eve of the World Cup in 2014 was \$11.3 billion (Boadle, 2014; the predicted total at the time of writing in February 2015 is now closer to \$15 billion). It was a far-cry from initial government statements such as that of the minister of sports back in 2007 that it would be the ‘World Cup of the private sector’, meaning that essential works such as those destined for the venues would be covered by private companies. The final financial breakdown saw almost 83% of the costs attributed to governmental spending or financed by state banks (Folha de São Paulo, 2014). It was perhaps

no wonder that, with the exception of one or two rather tame decorations celebrating the arrival of yet another World Cup, the vivid signs of popular excitement on the walls and streets of Brazilian cities that might have been expected with the hosting of a World Cup on home soil did not initially materialise in 2014.

The Rio 2016 Olympic Games

The 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic project bears some resemblances with the 2014 World Cup, in which big politics and long-time serving sports leaders played a pivotal role in securing the rights to host the event for the first time in a South American country. However, differently from the World Cup, in which football politics determined the urban agenda of hosting cities, it was the urban politics of Rio de Janeiro city that determined the Olympic project.

Rio de Janeiro had previously unsuccessfully attempted to bring the 1930 and 1960 Olympic Games and the separate equestrian competition of the 1956 Olympics. A new bid would be prepared for the 2004 Olympic Games, this time as the outcome of an inter-urban policy exchange. The local elections of 1992 brought the conservative candidate Cesar Maia to government promising to bring urban order and modernise public administration. An important element of Maia's agenda was to elaborate a strategic plan then in vogue in North American and European cities to set a vision for the city in collaboration with other representative groups. The initiative was pursued with the consulting services of policy-makers from Barcelona freshly after the organisation of the 1992 Olympic Games. It was out of this relationship that the concept of an Olympic bid was born, as a way to promote urban development and city marketing.

Hastily prepared, the bid attempted to incorporate the general precepts of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games by earmarking declining urban areas for regeneration and a multi-cluster organisation. The event was also expected to turn around the image of a city synonymous with rampant crime and police-led carnage. The bid generated great support from the public while new promises were announced, including a bold social development agenda aimed to improve living conditions by eradicating poverty and upgrading slums. However, the bid failed to impress the IOC inspection and was not shortlisted in the final voting round. The dismal result frustrated some of the key promoters of the bid leaving re-elected Mayor Maia and the president

of the Brazilian Olympic Committee, Carlos Nuzman, to pick up the pieces and to drastically rearrange the Olympic project.

Working his way through the Olympic system and becoming a member of the IOC, Nuzman translated the message that Brazil had to first prove its credentials by convincing Maia to support a bid to host the 2007 Pan American Games, the regional Olympic-styled competition for the Americas. Giving an otherwise modest competition an ‘Olympic treatment’ the event had original estimates multiplied by four as a set of venues were specially built for the event including an Olympic stadium, a velodrome, an indoor arena and an aquatics centre. This time the spatial planning privileged the expanding and wealthy district of Barra da Tijuca with the athlete’s village adding to the local gated-community stock. Criticism, particularly in relation to the inflated costs, was somehow held-off as the experience was justified as an Olympic rehearsal with a new bid quickly announced for the 2016 Games.

Up to this point the national government had played a supporting and guarantor role. President Lula had confirmed in 2003 the commitment of his government with the preparations for the 2007 Pan American Games and his backing to a short-lived bid for the 2012 Olympics. The contribution of the federal government to the total budget for the 2007 event increased substantially in the run-up period as municipal finances were compromised. The 2016 bid would then become more aligned with Brazil foreign policy discourse, reflecting the country’s increasing prominent role, and having in President Lula an active poster boy. Acquired organising expertise, geopolitics, booming national and local economies and branding opportunities in bringing the event for the first time to South America were the raw elements that the team of seasoned consultants, with previous experience in the Sydney 2000 and London 2012 candidatures, tailored to the IOC audience. Rio was then selected as the 2016 Olympic Games host in October 2009.

The masterplan of the 2016 Games reinforced the concentration of venues and facilities at Barra da Tijuca but whereas the Pan American Games brought little contribution to the city’s internal system, new transport networks and the regeneration of the port area embodied the expected material legacies. The new government of Mayor Eduardo Paes in 2009 reproduced at the local level the political coalition present at the state and national governments which then facilitated a shared agenda to release municipal, state and federal land for the regeneration of the port area. Despite not featuring any sports facilities, the project has been strongly associated as a legacy of the event with the Olympics providing a deadline for the conclusion of several

works that will transform it into a new mixed-use district of corporate towers, museums and residential area. The other visible programme associated with the Games is the construction of 250 kilometres of segregated bus rapid transit (BRT) lanes and an extension of the underground, which together will improve the link of Barra with the other parts of the city.

Without proper disclosure of the details of the projects a range of low-income communities learned their displacement for Olympic-related works as municipal staff turned up to mark their houses for demolition (Silvestre and Oliveira, 2012). A study of the Comitê Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro (2013) estimated that almost 11,000 families had been affected by these works, and were offered temporary rental assistance, financial compensation or relocation to social housing estates in the western fringes of the city. Another element that has substantially affected the lives of the inhabitants of Rio favelas is the security programme of Police Pacifying Units (PPU) launched in 2008. Consisting of a joint effort between the Brazilian Army and the state's elite police squad it occupies gang-controlled communities driving away drug traffickers while constructing police bases inside the favelas. Despite not being directly linked with the mega-events projects the geography of police occupations demonstrates the proximity to competition sites and tourist areas. Initial positive receptiveness by local residents has been marred by police abuse, the delayed arrival of public services, gentrification and the continuation of criminal activity.

The indignation of part of the population together with rising living costs helped to fuel the local June 2013 demonstrations, with some estimated 300 thousand people taking to the streets of central Rio on 20 June (G1, 2013). Some concessions were announced by the state governor in backtracking on the decision to demolish the athletics and aquatics centre together with the museum of indigenous people at the Maracanã complex to make way for car parking spaces for the main stadium. The Rio mayor, Eduardo Paes, announced that evictions were to be temporarily suspended until detailed studies were produced, although these did not emerge in the following months.

The same criticisms levied at the World Cup for its lavish spending and also for worrying project delays were also directed at Rio's preparation for the Olympics as a string of negative comments on the readiness of the venues were the focus of press coverage. Two years prior to the opening ceremony Rio was reported to have just 10% of facilities ready (Jenkins, 2014) while the Olympic Park was still a desolate site with no erected structures and the sports cluster of Deodoro still awaiting tenders for development.

Conclusion

The year 2014 marked several anniversaries for Brazil. It was 50 years since a military coup d'état brought about a twenty-one year long period of dictatorship and 29 years since it's replacement and re-democratization. During this time, and before, sport has remained firmly connected to politics in Brazil. When Lula became President in 2002 he inherited several problems from his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Public debt had doubled, the current account deficit was twice the average for South America, interest rates were over 20 percent and the Brazilian currency was depreciating fast (Anderson, 2011). Whilst Lula introduced policies that materially impacted on the poorer sections of society, such as the 'Bolsa Familia', which involves a monthly cash transfer to poor mothers against proof that they were sending their children to school and getting regular health checks, he also became aware of the potential value of aligning with those interested in hosting sports mega-events.

Through extension of Lever's argument, mentioned in the introduction, Arbena (1995, p. 225) argues that 'the case could also be made that international competition can likewise diminish nationalism in favour of a greater sense of transnational community, if only through a sense of shared experiences and the consequences of operating within similar institutions and regulations'. The global impacts on the local via urban politics (Sanchez et al, 2014); but globalization also brings with it an amplification of existing contradictions in society and in football especially (Alvito, 2007). These include the Brazilian football player diaspora, club insolvency, youth talent capture by foreign clubs, consumerization of the fans, and media monopolies' influence over the organization of football competitions and seasons. Whilst attempts have been made to resist these developments by organising football fans, these have not had great success (Gaffney, 2013). Hence the seleção for the 2014 World Cup featured 20 out of 23 players who played outside of Brazil, including, at the time of selection in early May, four from Chelsea in the English Premier League (EPL).

What was initially thought of as a timely opportunity for domestic and foreign politics, as well as for personal benefits for those at the heart of the project, the 2014 FIFA World Cup turned into an anathema. Anger directed towards FIFA and their expected record profit from the event affected even more the problematic reputation of the institution while it struggled with corruption scandals from other episodes (discussed elsewhere in this collection). International press coverage highlighted many problems with the preparation of the event and the contrasts between the lavish stadiums and precarious social conditions of many Brazilians. However, the

forecasts of a doomed event did not materialize, at least not from where it was expected. The press, FIFA, athletes and fans alike positively reviewed the general running of the event. Contrary to the scenes of the previous year, protests did not generate the same amount of support and were fewer and smaller, if still suppressed heavy-handedly. It was rather on the pitch that Brazilian hopes for some positive vision was crushed, including the biggest defeat in the history of the seleção, 7-1 by the eventual World Cup winners, Germany. As Alex Bellos (2014: 388-389) had noted before the competition:

The parallels with 1950 are strong. Brazil has more swagger than it did but it remains an insecure country, desperate to show the world that it is a serious, competent and modern nation. Its own self image could again depend on a single goal.

Or maybe 7! In 2016 however the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games will take place in Rio, and so a second opportunity awaits Brazilian hosts to demonstrate to the world their capacity to stage a large multi-sport mega-event. As with all such mega-events the political implications will comprise a mixture of the local, regional, national, international, as well as the sporting.

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