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# Spending, canvassing and electoral success in marginal constituencies: England and Scotland in 2017

## ABSTRACT

Substantial evidence shows that candidates' and parties' performances in constituencies at UK general elections are influenced by the intensity of their local campaigns, but that evidence is almost invariably based on analyses of voting across all constituencies. Most constituencies are unlikely to change hands, however. This paper explores whether the impact of spending varies according to seat marginality and analyses the pattern of spending and canvassing in the 123 Labour-Conservative marginals in England and all 59 constituencies in Scotland. The results are consistent with expectations: campaigning and canvassing matters most where campaigning and canvassing should matter most.

Considerable research shows that each party's performance across the country's constituencies at British general elections is a function of the intensity of its campaigning there. Various indicators all show that the greater the intensity of candidates' local campaigns the better their performance (Johnston 1987; Denver and Hands 1997; Fisher et al. 2014; Johnston and Pattie 2014; Pattie et al. 2017).

Most of that research has analysed all constituencies, which is of marginal relevance to appreciating campaigning's importance to the overall election result. The outcome in most British constituencies is almost certain; they are 'safe' for one of the parties and very unlikely – save a major shift in opinion – to change hands. The focus is thus on the marginal seats, which now comprise about one-seventh of the total (Curtice 2018a). The more votes a party garners in a marginal seat, the greater its probability of victory there, contributing to the overall outcome. Elsewhere, winning more votes may embellish the candidate's reputation but have no influence on the outcome – either locally or nationally.

This paper focuses on those competitive seats at the 2017 general election, valuable for this purpose for two reasons. First, in England the relative performance of the two main parties in the marginal constituencies varied considerably; there was no uniform swing and each gained seats from the other. Secondly, Scotland, with a very different pattern of party competition from England, saw a strong, but spatially variable, shift of support across the country away from the SNP, which won 56 of the 59 seats in 2015 but lost 21 of them two years later.

Two indicators of local campaign intensity are deployed: the amount each candidate spent; and the volume of contact between candidates' campaigns and individual voters. The spending data come from candidates' returns to the Electoral Commission;<sup>1</sup> as the maximum that can be spent varies according to constituency type (urban or rural) and electorate, the amount is expressed as a percentage of that maximum. Most expenditure is on printing posters and, especially, leaflets and similar material.

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<sup>1</sup> The data on constituency campaign spending at recent UK General Elections are compiled and published by the Electoral Commission: <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/uk-general-elections/candidate-election-spending>

Contact data come from respondents to the British Election Study's (BES) 2014-2017 internet panel survey.<sup>2</sup> In the immediate post-election survey (Wave 13) they were asked if they had been contacted by each of the parties during the previous four weeks and whether that contact was by: letter/leaflet, phone, at home, in the street, via social media, and by email, allowing calculation of the percentage of each constituency's respondents contacted by each party by each mode.<sup>3</sup> Although not a random sample of the local electorate, these percentages provide a general indicator of how active each party was canvassing support there. The analyses focus on contact that is personalised and intentional, excluding that via leaflet and letter.<sup>4</sup> Social media and email contacts mainly use the parties' databases of voters' contact details and are aimed at mobilising believed probable supporters; home visits are largely concentrated on areas where known supporters live. The intent is to mobilise likely supporters and achieve maximum turnout rather than to convert, especially in the marginal seats (although Cowley and Kavanagh, 2018, suggest that the Conservatives' campaigns were not well targeted in 2017; they also discuss – pp. 308ff. – the parties' social media campaigns, whose reach cannot readily be accessed through the available data).

### **Are campaigns in the marginals different?**

The first analyses examine whether campaign effects differ between marginal and less competitive seats. Parties devote greater resources to the former than the latter (Pattie and Johnston 2003; Johnston and Pattie 2014; Pattie et al. 2017), but does the marginal reward for additional campaign effort differ between more and less competitive seats? If it does, there is good reason to examine campaign effects in the marginals separately.

We look at the effects of the Conservative and Labour constituency campaigns across all seats, and then separately for: seats won by either the Conservatives or Labour at the 2015 election; seats gained by the Conservatives in 2015; and seats gained by Labour then. Investigating Conservative- and Labour-held seats separately allows assessment of incumbency effects – parties' local campaigns tend to yield larger results where they are the challenger locally than where they are defending a seat (Pattie et al. 2017).

The dependent variable is the percentage point difference between Labour and Conservative 2017 vote shares: positive values indicate seats where Labour outpolled the Conservatives; negative values the reverse. The independent variables are: the percentage point difference between Labour and Conservative 2015 vote shares (measuring the seat's marginality); 2017 constituency campaign spending by Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats; and the interactions between the 2015 Labour-Conservative vote difference and each campaign spending variable. These interactions allow exploring whether the marginal effects of campaign effort vary depending on seat marginality. As the Conservatives were generally believed to have benefited most from the collapse in UKIP's

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<sup>2</sup> This very large survey – an unweighted total of 31,197 respondents – covers all British constituencies with an average of just under 50 in each.

<sup>3</sup> For details of the questions, go to <https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>.

<sup>4</sup> Some of the contact by phone may be through random dialling of numbers and contact in the street may involve a serendipitous meeting between a canvasser and a voter. We exclude the percentage contacted by letter or leaflet for two reasons. First, unfortunately this confounds two separate forms of canvassing. Many candidates circulate leaflets to a substantial proportion of the local electorate using the provision that allows them to send one item through the postal system for free; these provide information but little more. Letters to voters are increasingly personalised (and in many cases sent from the party's national or regional headquarters rather than from the local candidate) and are part of the careful targeting of potential supporters in marginal seats, but the nature of the data makes it impossible to separate out this type of canvassing from the distribution of leaflets. Secondly, since most of the money spent on local campaigns goes on the printing of leaflets, there is strong collinearity between the amount spent and the percentage of respondents receiving a leaflet.

support between the two elections (from 12.6 to 1.8 per cent), UKIP's 2015 vote share was included, plus a dummy variable for whether it fielded a candidate in 2017 (it fielded 624 in the 632 constituencies in 2015 but only 378 two years later; the constituency held by the Speaker is excluded from these analyses).

The regression results are in Table 1; the significant spending coefficients show, for example, that Labour's spending had a positive impact on the 2017 outcome – the more Labour spent the better its performance relative to the Conservatives (because of the interactions between each party's campaign spending and the 2015 vote share, the main effect of spending is when the 2015 contest is at its most competitive, i.e. when the 2015 margin is zero). Figure 1 displays the interactions graphically with the estimated coefficient for each party's spending along the 2015 Labour-Conservative vote gap on the y-axis and the 2015 vote difference on the x-axis. This marginal effect is calculated by adding the coefficient for a party's spending to the product of the marginality score and the coefficient for the interaction between that party's spending and marginality.

In the model containing all constituencies the marginal effect of Labour's spending is uniformly positive (Figure 1a), changing very little between those seats where Labour was furthest behind the Conservatives in 2015 (to the left of the graph) and those where it was furthest ahead (to the right); the harder Labour campaigned in a constituency, the better its performance there relative to the Conservatives' *regardless of the seat's competitiveness*. For the Conservatives, the marginal effect of spending declines steeply (i.e. moving from left to right on the graph). Because the dependent variable is coded as (Labour vote share minus Conservative vote share), this negative marginal slope suggests that the Conservatives did *better* the harder they campaigned but, importantly, this effect varied according to the seat's marginality, with the largest campaign dividends coming where the Conservatives were furthest behind Labour in 2015.

This overall pattern changes somewhat in analyses of constituency sub-groups. Among seats won by either party in 2015 (Figure 1b), in the great majority of which they occupied the first two places, Labour's marginal campaign effect declines as its competitive position relative to the Conservatives improves. For the Conservatives, the opposite pattern occurs, with the coefficient negative throughout. In seats defended by either party, therefore, they enjoyed their largest campaign dividends in seats where the Conservatives did much better than Labour at the previous election. As Labour's position vis-à-vis the Conservatives improved, both parties experienced diminishing returns from their 2017 campaigns.

Separate analyses of seats won by Labour in 2015 (Figure 1c) and the Conservatives (Figure 1d) confirm these conclusions. In the former (Figure 1c) both parties gained their largest campaign boosts in the most marginal seats but in their safest seats additional campaign efforts began to tell against them. Once Labour's 2015 lead exceeded 45 percentage points, the marginal effect of increasing Conservative campaign effort in 2017 was to boost Labour's lead, while the marginal effect of increasing Labour campaign spending reduced it (in seats Labour was very unlikely to lose).

Those nuances aside, these analyses clearly indicate that campaign effects are not uniform across constituencies; they are related not just to incumbent or challenger status but also to the seat's marginality, where the returns from more spending are greatest, hence the following analyses of marginal seats only.

### **England's marginals in 2017**

This section focuses on the 123 English constituencies where Conservative and Labour occupied the first two places in 2015 and the winner's majority was under 15 percentage points.<sup>5</sup> Labour won 57 of those seats in 2015, losing six to the Conservatives in 2017; the Conservatives lost 21 of the 66 seats they won in 2015. Figure 2 shows no uniform shift of support between the parties; the 2015 margin of victory accounts for only 47 per cent of the variation in constituency margins in 2017.

Figure 3 shows that Labour spent close to the maximum in most seats it was defending (i.e. to the right of the vertical line), but less in most of the six it lost in 2017 (Figure 3a). Its spending was more variable in Conservative-held marginals, averaging 64 per cent (compared to 90 per cent in Labour-held seats) with a standard deviation of 23 points; it spent above that average in most of the seats gained in 2017. Conservative spending (Figure 3b) varied considerably in both the seats won in 2015 (mean 77 per cent, standard deviation 15 per cent) and lost (mean 84 per cent, standard deviation 12 per cent) with little evidence that campaigning intensity was linked to success; it spent close to the margin in several seats lost to Labour and no more than average in most of those gained.

Figure 4a shows the percentage of respondents in each constituency contacted at home by Labour, averaging 32 per cent in constituencies it was defending and 21 per cent where it came second in 2015; on average it contacted fewer voters in seats lost to the Conservatives in 2017 and more in those gained from its opponent. The Conservatives contacted many fewer respondents overall (averaging 11 per cent in seats they were defending and 13 per cent in those Labour was defending), with little evidence that winning or losing a seat in 2017 was linked to the intensity of that form of campaigning (Figure 4b).

To test for campaigning efficacy we estimated regression models with the dependent variable as the 2017 margin (Labour % of the votes cast minus Conservative %) and the independent variable the same measure for 2015. These models controlled for UKIP support in 2015 and whether UKIP fielded a candidate in 2017. In addition to spending by Labour and the Conservatives in the first set of models, Liberal Democrats' spending was included because they were hoping for a revival from their poor performance in 2015.

The results show three significant relationships (Table 2), including the expected strong link between the results in 2015 and 2017. Negative significant coefficients for UKIP's 2015 support show that the Conservatives benefited most from its collapse in 2017. Positive significant coefficients for Labour spending indicate that the more intensive its campaign the better its candidates' performances, especially in Labour-held seats (e.g. column 2); for each additional 10 per cent of the allowed spending (on average, about £1,400), Labour's victory margin in Labour-held seats increased, compared to 2015, by 1.8 percentage points, whereas in Conservative-held seats an additional 10 per cent spending by Labour decreased the Conservative 2015 victory margin by 0.7 percentage points (because the dependent variable is coded Labour minus Conservative vote share). Conservative spending had a very small, insignificant impact.

The next set of models replaced the spending variables by the percentage of each constituency's residents contacted by each party by phone, at home, in the street, by social media and by email. Given small sample sizes, those ten variables were added using a stepwise procedure, after the first three predictors had been included. The results for all 123 constituencies (Table 3) show that Labour performed better the more voters it contacted at home and in the street, indicating that its campaigning strategy of relying strongly on inter-personal contacts clearly worked (on that strategy, developed in 2015 and maintained in 2017, see Watson, 2015); contacts at home were effective in Conservative-held seats and contacts in the street in those Labour was defending. The only

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<sup>5</sup> Fourteen Labour-Conservative marginals in Wales were not included because of the complexity introduced by the presence of Plaid Cymru candidates.

significant relationship with Conservative contact was a positive link between its telephone contacts in Conservative-held seats, but the more voters contacted by the Conservatives in that way the better Labour's performance!

A final set of models included both spending and contact variables, entered stepwise (Table 4). Labour's spending was only effective in Conservative-held seats, where its contacts on the doorstep also significantly influenced the outcome – for each 10 per cent of allowed spending, the Conservative margin of victory in 2015 was reduced by 0.70 percentage points. Contacts on the street were most effective in Labour-held seats. Although the challenger party benefited from its campaigning across the marginal constituencies, therefore, the incumbent party of government did not.

## **Scotland 2017**

The Scottish electoral scene and map has seen considerable recent volatility after a long period of Labour predominance (Johns 2018; Johnston et al. 2018). The SNP won 19.9% of the votes and six seats in 2010. Building on the momentum of the (ultimately unsuccessful) 2014 referendum campaign for Scottish independence and its eight years in power in the Scottish government, that share surged to 50% in 2015, delivering 56 of the 59 seats (Henderson and Mitchell 2018). The main loser was Labour; like the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, it retained only a single seat (losing 40).

The SNP's vote share dropped substantially in 2017 to 36.9%, losing 21 seats. Labour and the Liberal Democrats gained 6 and 3 more seats respectively. Given the large Scottish majority against Brexit at the 2016 EU Referendum the SNP's new leader tried to capitalise on the UK's decision to leave the EU by proposing a further independence referendum. This proved unpopular with referendum-weary Scottish voters in 2017, however, and helped the Conservatives, whose leader campaigned against a further referendum, win 28.6% of the votes and gain 12 seats.

Virtually every seat was strongly contested in 2017 whatever the SNP's 2015 victory margin, although its main opposition varied across the constituencies: at least one of the three other parties spent at least 66 per cent of the maximum in 28 of the constituencies and at least 50 per cent in 34; the SNP spent over 50 per cent in 35. Figure 5 shows each party's spending in 2017, according to its margin of victory/defeat in 2015. The SNP varied from spending close to the maximum in some seats to as little as 20-30 per cent in others that appeared reasonably safe (i.e. won by more than 20 percentage points in 2015). Many where it spent close to the legal maximum were lost, however, all but one to the Conservatives.

Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats spent either close to the maximum (in a minority of seats) or to the minimum, whereas Labour's spending was more widely spread – its strength across most of the country until 2015 meant that it still had an organisation capable of raising funds in many constituencies. The Conservatives spent close to the maximum in all twelve seats gained from the SNP – although in five others similar high spending did not bring victory. They spent more than 50 per cent in few of the seats won by Labour and the Liberal Democrats, or in most of those retained by the SNP, suggesting a spatially very focused, largely successful, campaign. Labour also spent more on average in the seats it gained, but also more than half of the maximum in several others. The Liberal Democrats' spending was concentrated in very few seats; it gained three but lost in four others.

Figure 6 shows that all four parties contacted no voters at home in a substantial number of seats. The Conservatives were most active and were successful in most seats where they canvassed

extensively winning five from the SNP where they contacted more than 12 per cent of the electorate. The other parties contacted few voters in most seats, although both Labour and the Liberal Democrats saw some apparent returns where that limited activity was greatest.

Four stepwise regression models were fitted, one per party, with the dependent variable its majority at the 2017 contest (a positive value if the party won there, negative if it lost). The first stage included the party's 2015 majority; the second stage added all four parties' spending percentages, if statistically significantly related to the dependent variable; the final stage added the contact variables in a stepwise procedure.

For all four parties, the 2017 outcome was positively related to its performance two years earlier (Table 5), accounting for around half of the variation. For three, but not the SNP, inclusion of the spending variables substantially increased the  $R^2$  values: the more the three opposition parties spent in a constituency the better their performance – for every additional 10 per cent of spending the Conservatives increased their 2017 vote share by 2.2 percentage points; for the same spending increase Labour increased its by 1.8 points, the Liberal Democrats by 3.3 points. Moreover, the more the Conservatives spent the weaker the SNP and Labour party performances; and the Conservatives' own performance was negatively impacted by the other opposition parties' spending. If the SNP is considered the 'incumbent party' in Scotland, these findings are consistent with other studies: intensive constituency campaigns are only effective for opposition parties.

Finally, the parties' contact with voters had little overall impact. For Labour, as in England, the more voters contacted at home, the better its performance; both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats performed better the more voters they contacted by email.

## **Conclusion**

These findings are largely consistent with, and substantially extend, other studies (e.g. Johnston and Pattie 2014; Fisher 2018a, 2018b). Campaigning by opposition parties is more generally more effective than that by the party in power immediately preceding the election – a conclusion considerably extended here which, unlike previous investigations, focuses on England's 2017 Labour-Conservative marginals and on Scotland, where most seats were strongly contested. In the English marginal constituencies the governing Conservatives obtained no significant benefits from either their spending or their canvassing; that was also the case for the SNP, defending its incumbency in all but three Scottish constituencies.

Indeed, the difference between the results for the Conservative party in the two countries is stark. In Scotland, where it was presented as the SNP's most viable opposition overall, it targeted constituencies where victory appeared feasible, potentially benefiting from anti-SNP tactical voting by some who might otherwise have voted either Labour or Liberal Democrat – and the Conservatives won a majority of those constituencies (Curtice 2018b). In England's marginal constituencies, on the other hand, the Conservatives' spending and canvassing had little impact. As their lead in the polls dwindled through the six-week campaign, so too did the probability of wins there; a few seats were gained from Labour, but they were not those where the Conservatives campaigned hardest. Labour, however, placed great reliance on face-to-face campaigning by its activists and volunteer workers, including large numbers of Momentum members mobilised to campaign for the party's leader and his anti-austerity programme, with clear and substantial benefits.

Much research has identified the substantial impacts local campaign spending and canvassing has on constituency results at British general elections, particularly for opposition parties. These analyses not only extend those findings to the 2017 general election but, by focusing on marginal

constituencies (which few other studies have done), have highlighted those impacts in the places where elections overall are won and lost. Across all constituencies the more that a party, especially a challenger party, spent in 2017 and the more contacts it made with voters, the better its performance. Returns on that campaigning were greater in the marginal seats: campaigning and canvassing matters most where campaigning and canvassing should matter most.



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**Table 1.** Regression models of the impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election on vote share (Labour – Conservative) in Great Britain

Model	All GB Seats	Lab or Con Seats	Lab-Held Seats	Con-Held Seats
Constant	2.375 (1.370)	<b>19.060</b> (1.327)	<b>-21.254</b> (5.007)	5.396 (3.625)
Margin 2015	<b>0.860</b> (0.034)	<b>0.923</b> (0.026)	<b>0.993</b> (0.111)	<b>0.720</b> (0.096)
UKIP % 2015	<b>-0.372</b> (0.058)	<b>-0.919</b> (0.051)	<b>-1.182</b> (0.072)	<b>-0.590</b> (0.072)
UKIP Candidate 2017	<b>1.547</b> (0.677)	0.708 (0.519)	0.027 (0.849)	1.195 (0.624)
Labour Spend	<b>0.161</b> (0.016)	<b>0.053</b> (0.014)	0.088 (0.056)	0.044 (0.027)
Conservative Spend	<b>-0.084</b> (0.014)	<b>-0.059</b> (0.012)	<b>-0.084</b> (0.031)	0.016 (0.046)
LibDem Spend	<b>0.054</b> (0.013)	0.008 (0.011)	0.062 (0.042)	<b>0.078</b> (0.031)
Lab spend * Margin 2015	-0.000 (0.001)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	-0.002 (0.001)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.001)
Con spend*Margin 2015	<b>-0.001</b> (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)
LD spend * Margin 2015	<b>0.001</b> (0.000)	<b>0.001</b> (0.000)	-0.002 (0.001)	<b>0.003</b> (0.001)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.940	0.969	0.913	0.879
N	604	554	228	325

*Notes:* Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients statistically significant at  $p < .05$  are in bold.

**Table 2.** Regression models of the impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election on vote share in Labour-Conservative marginal seats in England

Model	All Seats	Lab-Held	Con-Held
Constant	<b>17.51</b> (4.43)	7.64 (9.33)	8.01 (5.72)
Margin 2015	<b>1.04</b> (0.08)	<b>1.65</b> (0.19)	<b>0.79</b> (0.19)
UKIP % 2015	<b>-1.26</b> (0.13)	<b>-0.17</b> (0.16)	<b>-0.84</b> (0.18)
UKIP Candidate 2017	-1.07 (1.16)	-1.78 (1.57)	-1.05 (1.55)
Labour Spend	<b>0.06</b> (0.03)	<b>0.18</b> (0.08)	<b>0.07</b> (0.03)
Conservative Spend	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)
LibDem Spend	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.78	0.75	0.49
N	123	57	66

*Notes:* Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients statistically significant at  $p < .05$  are in bold.

**Table 3.** Regression models of the impact of various canvassing modes at the 2017 general election on vote share in Labour-Conservative marginal seats in England

Model	All Seats	Lab-Held	Con-Held
Constant	<b>16.42</b> (2.23)	<b>20.13</b> (2.23)	7.37 (3.99)
Margin 2015	0.99 (0.07)	1.50 (0.16)	<b>0.61</b> (0.20)
UKIP % 2015	<b>-1.11</b> (0.11)	<b>-1.53</b> (0.13)	<b>-0.72</b> (0.16)
UKIP Candidate 2017	-1.21 (1.04)	-1.65 (1.32)	-2.03 (1.45)
Contact Labour Home	<b>0.11</b> (0.04)	- -	<b>0.19</b> (0.07)
Contact Labour Street	<b>0.26</b> (0.09)	<b>0.50</b> (0.11)	- -
Contact Cons Phone	- -	- -	<b>0.36</b> (0.15)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.81	0.81	0.56
N	123	57	66

*Notes:* Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients statistically significant at  $p < .05$  are in bold.

**Table 4.** Regression models of the impact of campaign spending and various canvassing modes at the 2017 general election on vote share in Labour-Conservative marginal seats in England

Model	All Seats	Lab-Held	Con-Held
Constant	<b>16.42</b> (2.24)	<b>20.11</b> (2.06)	2.43 (4.49)
Margin 2015	<b>0.99</b> (0.07)	<b>1.51</b> (0.17)	<b>0.51</b> (0.20)
UKIP % 2015	<b>-1.11</b> (0.11)	<b>-1.53</b> (0.13)	<b>-0.71</b> (0.16)
UKIP candidate 2017	-1.21 (1.06)	-1.63 (1.34)	-1.95 (1.41)
Labour Spend	- -	- -	<b>0.07</b> (0.03)
Labour Contact Home	<b>0.11</b> (0.04)	- -	<b>0.15</b> (0.07)
Labour Contact Street	<b>0.26</b> (0.09)	<b>0.50</b> (0.11)	- -
Cons Contact Phone	- -	- -	<b>0.41</b> (0.14)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.81	0.81	0.58
N	123	57	66


Notes: Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients statistically significant at p<.05 are in bold.

**Table 5.** Stepwise regression models of the impact of campaign spending and various models of canvassing at the 2017 general election on vote share in Scotland


Model	SNP	Con	Labour	LibDem
Constant	<b>-10.31</b> (2.54)	-7.17 (6.30)	-2.13 (4.61)	<b>-28.82</b> (6.78)
Majority 2015	<b>0.65</b> (0.10)	<b>0.29</b> (0.12)	<b>0.47</b> (0.12)	0.07 (0.10)
SNP Spend	-	-		<b>-0.15</b> (0.04)
Conservative Spend	<b>-0.06</b> (0.02)	<b>0.22</b> (0.04)	<b>-0.17</b> (0.02)	
Labour Spend	-	<b>-0.12</b> (0.04)	<b>0.18</b> (0.05)	
LibDem Spend	-	<b>-0.12</b> (0.04)		<b>0.33</b> (0.07)
Party Contact Phone				
Home			<b>0.44</b> (0.19)	
Street				
Social Media				
Email		<b>0.34</b> (0.14)		<b>0.82</b> (0.26)
R <sup>2</sup>				
Stage 1	0.54	0.57	0.47	0.50
Stage 2	0.58	0.77	0.76	0.77
Stage 3	0.58	0.79	0.78	0.80
N	59	59	59	59

Notes: Cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients statistically significant at  $p < .05$  are in bold.


**Figure 1a.** The impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election, all constituencies




**Figure 1b.** The impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election, all constituencies won in 2015 by either the Conservative or the Labour party



**Figure 1c.** The impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election, constituencies won by Labour in 2015.




**Figure 1d.** The impact of campaign spending at the 2017 general election, constituencies won by the Conservatives in 2015.







**Figure 2.** Marginality at the 2015 and 2017 general elections in the 123 Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies




**Figure 3.** Spending by Labour and the Conservatives in the 123 Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies in 2017.



**Figure 4.** Canvassing contact at respondents' homes by Labour and the Conservatives in the 123 Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies in 2017.



**Figure 5.** Spending by the four political parties at the 2017 general election in Scotland according to constituency marginality.



**Figure 6.** Canvassing of voters at home by the four political parties at the 2017 general election in Scotland according to constituency marginality.

