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The North-South Divide, the Euro and the World

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The North-South Divide, the Euro and the World*

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Abstract

The European north-south divide has been an issue of a long-standing debate. We employ a Global VAR model for 28 developed and developing countries to examine the interaction between the global trade imbalances and their impact within the euro-area framework. The aim is to assess the propagation mechanisms of real shocks, focusing on the interconnections among the north euro area and the south euro area. We incorporate theory-based long-run restrictions and examine the effects of (i) non-export real output shocks, (ii) expansionary shocks and (iii) real exchange rate shocks. The results provide support for symmetric adjustment in the euro area; an expansionary policy of the north euro area and increased competitiveness in the south euro area can alleviate trade imbalances of the debtor euro area economies. From the south euro area perspective, internal devaluation is the most beneficial policy. North euro area and U.S. origin shocks to domestic output exert a dominant influence in the rest of the Europe and Asia while the strong linkage between trade flows within the euro area is confirmed.

Keywords: North-South Euro Area Trade Imbalances, Global Trade Imbalances, International Linkages, Global VAR, Spillover Effects

JEL Classification: C33, E27, F14

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“And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.”

— *Mark 3:25 New Testament*

1 Introduction

The global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession (accompanied by the collapse of the global trade activity¹) revived questions about the adopted economic policies and their macroeconomic implications. With the debate still open, trade imbalances have been suggested as a contributor to the global financial crisis. An intuitive view is that current account surpluses of the emerging economies supported deficit countries which, in turn, fueled the risk-taking behavior of the advanced economies, thereby sowing the seeds of the international financial crisis (see [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009](#)).² In this context, it is important to investigate the sources and the patterns of these disparities in the trade relationships. In the European context, this theme is reflected in the disparities between the north and the south euro area: the former with an export-oriented economy and the latter depending more on domestic demand.³

[Hassel \(2014\)](#) explains that the organization of a country’s political economy includes the structure of corporate governance, industrial relations, finance, the labour market education and training. The dynamic interaction of these sectors produces different economic systems. On the one hand, North Euro-Area (NEA) countries such as Germany, Austria, Finland, Netherlands and Belgium have organized coordinated market economies which are built on institutions and policies that promote the Export-Led-Growth (ELG)

1 The global financial crisis of 2008 has been followed by an unprecedented slowdown in world trade. In fact, imports and exports in major economies dropped more than 20% from 2008Q2 to 2009Q2 (see <https://voxeu.org/article/great-trade-collapse-what-caused-it-and-what-does-it-mean> for more details). Among the vast literature on the subject, [Baldwin and Taglioni \(2009\)](#) trace the causes of the reduction in world trade to the decreased world demand while [Ahn et al. \(2011\)](#) point out the contribution of financial factors to the phenomenon.

2 [Borio and Disyatat \(2011\)](#), by looking at gross instead of net capital flows and the silent trends in international banking system, show that the link between the financial crisis and current account imbalances was rather weak.

3 The Financial Times on the 20th of August 2018 report that “Germany is on course to have the world’s largest current account surplus for the third year in a row a situation likely to put more international pressure on Berlin to rebalance its economy” and “Berlin has also argued that Germany’s ageing population prefers to save significant amounts of income rather than spending it on imported goods”, see <https://www.ft.com/content/07610a3a-a492-11e8-926a-7342fe5e173f>.

policies.⁴ Northern euro-zone economies tend to benefit from a high production base of exported goods which leads to increased savings and external lending. On the other, South Euro-Area (SEA) economies like Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, rely more on increased domestic consumption as a mechanism of growth promotion.⁵ The heterogeneous economic structures led to cumulative disparities of the euro area such as since the inception of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, SEA current account deficits (on average 4.6 % of GDP) are mirrored to the NEA surpluses (on average 3.4 % of GDP, see Figure 1).⁶

The existence of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has made it difficult for the two growth paradigms to co-exist without the formation of trade imbalances. Exchange rate depreciation or devaluation is not a tool disposable to policymakers and changes in the real exchange rate are slow (internal devaluation). There were two complementary issues for the co-existent of two countervailing policies and the subsequent trade imbalances in the euro area. First, “over-optimism” resulting in a strong growth in domestic demand and appreciation of the real exchange rate driven by wage/price rigidities in the SEA countries. Second, financial integration and expectation of convergence within the euro area has provided the desired capital to fund the current account deficits in the SEA.⁷

There is a vivid discussion on the policy front that favours an expansionary policy of the NEA through the channel of real imports to stimulate real exports and economic recovery in the SEA and accelerate the current account adjustment. For example, the [US Treasury \(2017\)](#) argues that Germany’s huge current account surplus is harmful, creating “a deflationary bias for the euro area, as well as for the world economy”. Furthermore,

4 The most prominent effects of exports are attributed to increased productivity, benefits from economies of scale, greater utilization of resources and expanded aggregate demand. Furthermore, the export sector of the economy can create positive externalities in the non-export sector of the economy ([Feder, 1983](#)). On the other hand, a neglected factor of the ELGH is the constructive aftereffect of imports on growth, known as the import-led growth hypothesis (ILGH).

5 This divergence of the two growth models and the adjunct asymmetries that emerge has been pointed as the main source of the lingering recovery in the euro-zone ([Regan, 2017](#)).

6 See also Figure A.1 in Appendix.

7 More formally, [Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) argue that the continued easy financing before the crisis allowed deficit countries to continue appreciating the real exchange rate driven mainly by the nominal appreciation of the euro.

Krugman (2013) claimed that “The narrowing of trade imbalances should have been symmetric, with Germany’s surpluses shrinking along with the debtors’ deficits”. The main argument was that “a country that runs a trade surplus is diverting spending away from their goods and services to its own, and thereby taking away jobs”. What made this possible in a monetary union was the devaluation of German real effective exchange rate (REER) through the decline of Unit Labor Cost (ULC). However, the IMF argues that while the German REER was devalued by 10-20%, consumer spending has fallen to 54%, far lower than in the US and the UK.⁸ Therefore, in line with Krugman’s argument, if workers were paid more they could spend more on the domestic product which will reduce export and increase imports. The counter-argument raised by Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) suggests a menu of policy options for the confrontation of European trade imbalances such as fiscal policies that aim to increased government savings, internal devaluation through a reduction of unit labour cost, increased productivity and tightening financial policies to curb credit and improve the quality of loans.

The aim of our study is to evaluate the view that an expansionary policy from NEA accompanied by an improvement of competitiveness of SEA can accelerate current account adjustment in euro area. We do so by simulating numerous scenarios based on the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) as proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and developed further by Pesaran and Shin (1998). We examine the regional trade interdependencies between the NEA countries, the SEA countries, USA and the rest of the world by implementing the Global VAR (GVAR) framework proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004) and developed further by Dees et al. (2007b). This approach enables us to simultaneously assess the global nature of the macroeconomic factors and the interlinkages of the different regions under consideration.^{9, 10} Note that the multi-country dimension of the

⁸ The IMF showed that the German REER was devalued by 10-20 % while ULC fall by 16%. For more details see <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/07/08/the-good-and-bad-in-germanys-economic-model-are-strongly-linked>.


⁹ Applications of the GVAR methodology can be found in the areas of international financial spillovers (Galesi and Sgherri, 2013), macroeconomic modelling (Dees et al., 2007a; Pesaran and Smith, 2006) and assessment of the global trade linkages and imbalances (Bussière et al., 2012; Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2012; Bettendorf and Leon-Ledesma, 2015; Bettendorf, 2017). Pesaran (2015) provide a detailed review of the empirical GVAR applications.

¹⁰ Alternatives to the GVAR modelling approach are the Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) or the Panel VAR (PVAR) models. However, while in the former model is difficult to identify the unobserved


problem has been overlooked by the existing studies. For example, papers such as [Chinn and Prasad \(2003\)](#) used panel regression where the countries included in their analysis were treated as independent units, ignoring any dynamic or static interdependence.

Figure 1: Trade Imbalances in the Euro Area (Average values from 1999 - 2016)

(a) Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) (b) Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)



(c) Current Account Balance (% of GDP)



This study deviates from the existing literature in two ways. First, we augment the model of [Bussière et al. \(2012\)](#) by considering the implications of the export-led growth model and imposing long-run restrictions that correspond to the distinct structural features of each country/region. The latter allows us to identify “equilibrium” relationships and extract shocks that consolidate the theory.¹¹ Second, we divide the euro area into two

factors, the latter approach in certain cases becomes operational by imposing restrictions on Dynamic, Static Interdependences (DI) and on cross-sectional heterogeneity. For further details see [Pesaran \(2015\)](#) and [Canova and Ciccarelli \(2013\)](#).

¹¹[Garratt et al. \(2012\)](#) show that, in the context of macroeconomic modelling, there is a broad consensus concerning the nature of long-run restrictions.

different regions and assess the linkages and the transmission of shocks between NEA and SEA, within a global framework. There is a gap in the literature concerning the trade imbalances between the northern and the southern euro area and this study attempts to fill it. Our focus is on the spillover effects that shocks, emanated from northern and southern euro area, have on domestic output, trade and competitiveness. We also consider shocks to the US variables, as the largest economy in the world, as well as oil price.

First, we evaluate the impact of a positive output shock proxied by an increase of non-export real output shock to the NEA on the SEA macroeconomic variables.¹² The aim is to investigate the view that a growth shock in NEA can be used as a tool to eliminate the trade imbalances between NEA and SEA. Note that within the context of an open economy new-Keynesian framework similar to that of [Lubik and Schorfheide \(2007\)](#) and [Walsh \(2010\)](#), the impact of a positive shock to foreign output on the domestic economy depends on the intertemporal rate of substitution, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.¹³ Second, we investigate the effects of a positive shock to real imports both of the NEA and the SEA. We treat import shocks as a complementary positive demand shock, which can not be captured by output shocks due to the low values of the intertemporal rate and the elasticity of substitution effects between domestic and foreign goods. In a third scenario, we simulate the response of the global economy to a real exchange rate depreciation of the SEA. In doing so, we can assess the view that global imbalances in general and in the euro area specifically were associated with the appreciation of the real exchange rate in the SEA. Note that the implications of all three scenarios are consistent with the view that expansionary policy from NEA accompanied by improvements of competitiveness in the SEA can accelerate current account imbalances in euro area. Next, we account for the effects of foreign -from the euro area perspective- positive output shocks originated from the US. Although the euro area overall is not characterized by significant imbalances, adjustments at the global level could

¹²We assume that output shock can be either demand or supply determined.

¹³Although an increase in foreign output is expected to have positive impact on domestic output this might not be significant for low values of a positive foreign output intertemporal rate of substitution, and elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (see [Walsh, 2010](#) and [Caglayan et al., 2017](#)).

still have a significant impact on Europe. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) show that a reduction of US deficit and surpluses run by Asia and oil exported countries would have important implication for the exchange rate and the level of production of major economies (including Europe). Therefore, we estimate (fourth scenario) the effects of a positive real output shock and depreciation of the real US exchange rate. Finally, we consider the impact of exogenous supply shocks proxied by a negative oil supply shock (fifth scenario).

The analysis is conducted using quarterly data from 1980 until the end of 2016 for a multi-country framework that consists of 28 developed and developing economies. The sample includes the period after the Great Trade Collapse (GTC) of 2008. The results of the GVAR model support the argument that current account adjustment in the euro-zone should be symmetric. Although positive demand shocks, in both regions, have positive effects on exports and investment, current accounts deteriorate or at best remain stable. However, there is evidence that a devaluation of the real effective exchange rate in the SEA leads to an increase in exports without affecting imports. Our results support the argument that demand shocks in NEA accompanied by an improvement in the competitiveness of SEA can help to eliminate trade imbalances within the euro-zone. With regard to the foreign shocks (foreign from a euro-zone perspective), the dominant role of the US economy in the global trade is confirmed. We reiterate that the real demand in the US is an important factor for the expansion of the global real exports. Finally, we assess the global impact of the previous shocks with a particular focus on the spillovers effects from the NEA and the USA to the rest of the world.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the empirical literature on trade models, imbalances and the theoretical background. Section 3 presents the GVAR model and section 4 contains the model specification and estimation. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, while the last one concludes.

2 Global Trade Imbalances: A Brief Discussion of the Literature

The variations of external positions in the major economies, particularly after the 2000s, have set the premises for global imbalances. Although the latter has a wider meaning, it is common to associate excess current account deficits/surpluses with the distortions in the global financial and macroeconomic system. In this context, the persistent current account deficits of the USA and other developed economies are accompanied with current account surpluses in many emerging economies such as China, India and some East Asian economies. The backdrop is similar in the case of the EMU; northern euro area countries have seen a significant melioration in their external trade position whereas southern euro area countries support their current account deficits through external borrowing. This section attempts to highlight briefly the determinants of such divergence in global trade.¹⁴

An abundance of factors is related to the rise in external imbalances: [Bracke et al. \(2010\)](#) separate the determinants of global imbalances into structural and cyclical. The former factors mainly focus on the impact of financial market imperfections on the magnitude and direction of capital flows at a global level. [Bracke et al. \(2010\)](#) argue that if the global imbalances are mainly driven by structural factors, a rapid unwinding is rather unlikely to occur. Alternatively, cyclical or “macroeconomic policy-induced” factors have fired trade imbalances. In particular, if economic agents question the sustainability of macroeconomic policies then overreaction might unfold global economic imbalances. Therefore, one of the objectives of our analysis is to estimate the impact of cyclical factors on trade imbalances.

[Bracke et al. \(2010\)](#) separate cyclical factors into two groups: i) those factors that have a cyclical impact on private aggregate demand such as an increase of permanent income and of financial wealth and ii) those factors affecting the demand of public sector. The literature concerning the first set of factors indicates that there is a positive but rather weak correlation between private consumption and current account.¹⁵ An ample literature

¹⁴For a thorough discussion of the relevant literature on trade imbalances see [Bracke et al. \(2010\)](#).

¹⁵Note that an increase of private consumption can be driven by productivity shocks which increase

of the factors affecting public aggregate demand focus on explaining the “twin deficit” or “twin divergence hypothesis”.¹⁶ Most of the studies which investigate the impact of fiscal policy on current account argue that there is a negative but moderate effect of fiscal deficit on the trade balance. For example, [Chinn and Prasad \(2003\)](#), [Gruber and Kamin \(2007\)](#) and [Bussière et al. \(2010\)](#) found a very low response of trade balance to fiscal deficit. However, [Kim and Roubini \(2008\)](#) provide significant evidence of a positive relationship between the fiscal deficit and trade balance known as the “twin divergence” hypothesis. In contrast to the prediction of most theoretical models, [Kim and Roubini \(2008\)](#) show that a fiscal policy shock improves the current account and depreciate the real exchange rate. They explain that a boost in government spending will increase the real interest rate which in turn will reduce consumption and will lead to the depreciation of the exchange rate. Note that an increase of the real interest rate will raise savings and reduce investments. In doing so, an expansionary fiscal policy can improve the current account.

Although the argument of [Kim and Roubini \(2008\)](#) can explain the “twin divergence” hypothesis in the US, this might not be consistent with the empirical evidence for the euro area.¹⁷ For example, [Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) show that the key adjustment mechanism of the euro area debtor countries was not operating. In particular, while trade deficits in debtors required a depreciation of the real exchange rate, the euro nominal exchange rate led to further real appreciation which, in turn, deteriorated export performance.^{18, 19} Fur-

permanent income and by a rise of financial wealth as reflected by an increase of assets prices. [Glick and Rogoff \(1995\)](#) show that a 1% increase in productivity in the US decrease the current account by 0.15%. Furthermore, [Bussière et al. \(2010\)](#) have shown that a 10% increase in equity wealth in the US could deteriorate the trade balance by 1%.

¹⁶The “twin deficit” argument postulates that the fiscal deficit is the main force that generates current account deficit.

¹⁷The majority of the literature has focused on the imbalances originating from the U.S. and the relationship between U.S. external position and Asian surpluses. Interestingly, some studies attempt to assess the intra-eurozone imbalances and the structural gaps between core euro-zone economies and the periphery.

¹⁸[Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) document that while the relative price movement within the euro-zone contributes to the appreciation of the real exchange rate of the debtor countries, the lion share of the appreciation between 2000 and 2009 was accounted for by the nominal appreciation of the euro vis-a-vis other countries.

¹⁹[Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) also show that the external deficit of the euro-zone debtor countries was financed by capital flows from the core euro area countries such as Germany and France leading to weaker real exchange rate adjustment mechanisms.

thermore, [Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) point that euro area current account imbalances depict the asymmetric response of the member countries to foreign (from a euro area perspective) trade shocks, possibly due to variations in foreign income export elasticities. Alternatively, [Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon \(2010\)](#) underline the role of decreased private savings in the SEA countries as a driver for the trade imbalance in the euro area. Utilizing current account regressions, they link declined current accounts with the financial liberalization of the EMU that depressed saving rates and funded less productive sectors.²⁰ [Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon \(2010\)](#) suggest a menu of policy options for the confrontation of European trade imbalances such as fiscal policies that aim to increased government savings, internal devaluation through a reduction of unit labor cost, increase productivity and tightening financial policies to curb credit and improve the quality of loans.²¹

3 Econometric Methodology

The global financial crisis has illustrated that the linkages among economies have become increasingly complex. It is imperative, for the methodology employed, to account for the global interactions of macroeconomic factors. A fundamental problem of global macroeconomic models is the curse of dimensionality, which arises when the number of variables is large compared to the time dimension. To overcome the curse of dimensionality [Pesaran et al. \(2004\)](#) (PSW hereafter) developed a global VAR for the analysis of global interdependencies and the propagation of shocks across the world economy. The GVAR methodology consists of two steps. In the first, country-specific VARX* models are estimated, which account for the outside economy via the cross-section average of foreign variables known as the “star” variables.²² In the second step, the estimated country-specific VARX*s are stacked in a GVAR.

²⁰[Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon \(2010\)](#) claim that the introduction of the euro lowered current accounts in both NEA and SEA through the maintenance of high levels of investment.

²¹The appealing properties of a decreased real exchange rate in the debtor countries of the euro-zone are also highlighted by [Belke and Dreger \(2013\)](#).

²²[Dees et al. \(2007b\)](#) (DdPS hereafter) motivate the GVAR approach as an approximation to the global factor model. DdPS use the cross-sectional average of the foreign variables to reflect the unobserved common factors of the global economy. [Chudik and Pesaran \(2011\)](#) motivate the GVAR approach as an approximation to a large system where all variables are determined endogenously. Note that the foreign variables were assumed to be weakly exogenous.

There are alternative approaches for modelling a large number of variables such as FAVAR, PVAR and large Bayesian VAR. Factor models have been used as data shrinkage procedures, which summarize the information of a large number of variables in a small number of selected factors. However, the economic interpretation of the extracted factors is a rather difficult task.²³ Alternatively, PVARs or large-scale Bayesian VARs solve the problem of dimensionality by restricting the parameter space. In particular, the PVAR imposes restrictions on the dynamic and static interdependence and on the cross-sectional homogeneity.²⁴ Although the GVAR model provides a coherent framework to model the global economy and to assess both global shocks and shocks that emanate from a specific country, to the best of our knowledge there are only three papers; Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2012), Bussière et al. (2012) (BCS hereafter) and Bettendorf (2017) that apply GVAR to the issue of international trade and global imbalances.²⁵

BCS employ a GVAR approach as proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2011) to a set of four domestic variables (exports, imports, GDP and real exchange rate) and one global variable (oil price) for 21 economies. Results from GIRFs indicate that a positive shock in the output of US leads to increased output and exports in almost all the countries pointing out the significance of the US economy in the world. Similarly, a positive shock in the German output affects positively mainly the European countries output due to the importance of the German economy in the European business cycles. Bettendorf (2017) investigates the impact of a German wage moderation shock on the European current account imbalances.²⁶ Moreover, show that although the German current account was significantly affected by wage moderation shocks, its contribution to European current

²³Unlike the FAVAR, the GVAR models allow for country-specific dynamic explicitly and account for cointegration relationships.

²⁴Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) show that a PVAR shrinks the parameter space by assuming that the unknown parameters can be decomposed into a component that is common across cross-sectional units, across all variables, a variable specific component, lag specific component and idiosyncratic effects.

²⁵The GVAR has been widely applied in many fields such as global financial spillovers (PSW; Galesi and Sgherri, 2013; Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011; Favero, 2013), international transmission of macroeconomic shocks and global business cycles (DdPS; Eickmeier and Ng, 2011; Garratt et al., 2013), global inflation linkages (Galesi and Lombardi, 2009), forecasting of economic and financial variables (Pesaran et al., 2009) and common fiscal policies assessment in the EU (Hebous and Zimmermann, 2013; Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández, 2015).

²⁶Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2012) benefit from a larger set of data with 33 countries (26 regions) and conduct several probabilistic forecasting exercises with a particular focus on the USA, China, the euro area and Japan based on the model of DdPS.

account imbalances was negligible. Therefore, Bettendorf (2017) concludes that German labor market reforms cannot be the lone driver of European imbalances. Bilateral current account imbalances have received more attention. Obviously, this result can incite the discussion regarding the determinants of the observed trade imbalances between northern and southern euro area with an international perspective. Hence, the global dynamics of international trade relations and patterns can be fully utilized under the GVAR framework.

3.1 The Global VAR Modelling

We consider a world that consists of N countries, indexed by $i = 0, \dots, N - 1$ where $i = 0$ stands for the numeraire country (USA in our case). We assume that \mathbf{x}_{it} is a $k_i \times 1$ vector of country-specific endogenous variables and $\mathbf{x}_{it}^* = \sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij} \mathbf{x}_{jt}$ is a $k_i^* \times 1$ vector of the country-specific foreign variables, where $w_{ij} \geq 0$ are the set of trade weights with $\sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij} = 1$ and $w_{ii} = 0$. Note that $w_{ij} \geq 0$ represents the share of country j to the total share of country i . The first step in the GVAR methodology is to specify and estimate the individual country-specific VARX*(p_i, q_i) models. We consider the case of VARX*(2, 1):

$$\mathbf{x}_{it} = \mathbf{a}_{i0} + \mathbf{a}_{i1}t + \mathbf{\Phi}_{i1}\mathbf{x}_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{\Phi}_{i2}\mathbf{x}_{i,t-2} + \mathbf{\Lambda}_{i0}\mathbf{x}_{it}^* + \mathbf{\Lambda}_{i1}\mathbf{x}_{i,t-1}^* + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{i0}\mathbf{d}_t + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{i1}\mathbf{d}_{t-1} + \mathbf{u}_{it} \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbf{\Phi}_{il}$ for $l = 1, 2$ are $k_i \times k_i$ matrix of lagged coefficients and $\mathbf{\Lambda}_{i0}$ and $\mathbf{\Lambda}_{i1}$ are $k_i \times k_i^*$ matrices of the corresponding foreign variables coefficients.²⁷ Also, \mathbf{d}_{it} is a $m_d \times 1$ vector of global variables (such as oil price), \mathbf{a}_{i0} is a $k_i \times 1$ vector of intercept terms and \mathbf{a}_{i1} is a $k_i \times 1$ vector of trend coefficients. The vector of country-specific shock is given by \mathbf{u}_{it} , where $E(\mathbf{u}_{it}\mathbf{u}_{js}) = \mathbf{\Omega}_{ij}$ for $t = s$ and $E(\mathbf{u}_{it}\mathbf{u}_{js}) = \mathbf{0}$ for $t \neq s$. Equation (1) indicates that spillover effects across countries can occur through three distinct but interrelated channels: i) direct and lagged impact of \mathbf{x}_{it}^* on \mathbf{x}_{it} ; ii) dependence of country-specific variables on common global exogenous variables (i.e. \mathbf{d}_{it}); and iii) non-zero

²⁷Any further generalization to different lags of domestic and foreign variables is straightforward.

contemporaneous dependence of shocks via cross covariances $\mathbf{\Omega}_{ij}$. Equation (1) can be written as:

$$\mathbf{A}_i \mathbf{z}_{it} = \mathbf{B}_{i1} \mathbf{z}_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{B}_{i2} \mathbf{z}_{i,t-2} + \boldsymbol{\phi}_{it} + \mathbf{u}_{it} \quad (2)$$

where $\mathbf{z}_{i,t-1} = (\mathbf{x}'_{i,t-1}, \mathbf{x}^*{}'_{i,t-1})'$ is a $k_i + k_i^*$ dimensional vector, $\mathbf{A}_i = (\mathbf{I}_{k_i}, -\mathbf{\Lambda}_{i0})$, $\mathbf{B}_{i1} = (\mathbf{\Phi}_{i1}, \mathbf{\Lambda}_{i1})$, $\mathbf{B}_{i2} = (\mathbf{\Phi}_{i2}, 0)$ and $\boldsymbol{\phi}_{it} = \mathbf{a}_{i0} + \mathbf{a}_{i1}t + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{i0}\mathbf{d}_t + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{i1}\mathbf{d}_{t-1}$.

The second step of the GVAR model consist of stacking the N country-specific VARX*(2,1) models in one global VAR. In particular, collecting all the country-specific variables in a $k \times 1$ vector $\tilde{\mathbf{x}} = (\mathbf{x}'_{0t}, \mathbf{x}'_{1t}, \dots, \mathbf{x}'_{Nt})'$ where $k = \sum_{i=0}^N k_i$ and using the $(k_i + k_i^*) \times k$ link matrices $\mathbf{W}_i = [\mathbf{E}'_i, \widetilde{\mathbf{W}}_i]$, where \mathbf{E}_i and $\widetilde{\mathbf{W}}_i$ are $k \times k_i$ and $k \times k_i^*$ dimensional selection matrices respectively, we can write:

$$\mathbf{z}_{it} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x}_{it} \\ \mathbf{x}^*_{it} \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{W}_i \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_t \quad i = 0, \dots, N-1 \quad (3)$$

Substituting (3) into (2) yields:

$$\mathbf{A}_i \mathbf{W}_i \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_t = \mathbf{B}_{i1} \mathbf{W}_i \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{t-1} + \mathbf{B}_{i2} \mathbf{W}_i \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{t-2} + \boldsymbol{\phi}_{it} + \mathbf{u}_{it} \quad (4)$$

And by stacking each country-specific model in (4), we obtain the GVAR(2) model for all the endogenous variables x_t :

$$\mathbf{H} \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_t = \mathbf{F}_1 \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{t-1} + \mathbf{F}_2 \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{t-2} + \boldsymbol{\phi}_t + \mathbf{u}_t \quad (5)$$

$$\text{where } \mathbf{H} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{W}_0 \\ \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{W}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{A}_{N-1} \mathbf{W}_{N-1} \end{pmatrix}, \mathbf{F}_1 = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B}_{01} \mathbf{W}_0 \\ \mathbf{B}_{11} \mathbf{W}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{B}_{(N-1)1} \mathbf{W}_{N-1} \end{pmatrix}, \mathbf{F}_2 = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B}_{02} \mathbf{W}_0 \\ \mathbf{B}_{12} \mathbf{W}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{B}_{(N-1)2} \mathbf{W}_{N-1} \end{pmatrix}, \boldsymbol{\phi}_t = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{\phi}_{0t} \\ \boldsymbol{\phi}_{1t} \\ \vdots \\ \boldsymbol{\phi}_{(N-1)t} \end{pmatrix} \text{ and}$$

$$\mathbf{u}_t = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{u}_{0t} \\ \mathbf{u}_{1t} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{u}_{(N-1)t} \end{pmatrix}.$$

The reduced form of the GVAR(2) solution is obtained from:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_t = \mathbf{G}_1 \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{t-1} + \mathbf{G}_2 \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{t-2} + \tilde{\boldsymbol{\phi}}_t + \tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t \quad (6)$$

where $\mathbf{G}_1 = \mathbf{H}^{-1}\mathbf{F}_1$, $\mathbf{G}_2 = \mathbf{H}^{-1}\mathbf{F}_2$, $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\phi}}_t = \mathbf{H}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\phi}_t$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t = \mathbf{H}^{-1}\mathbf{u}_t$. The GVAR model (6) is solved recursively and used for the impulse response function analysis.

4 Data and Model Specification

The employed dataset is of vital importance for this study. We do not consider countries with data that are unavailable, unreliable or have a short time span. Our analysis consists of quarterly data from 1980Q1 to 2016Q4 (148 observations in total) for 28 developed and developing countries. In line with our objectives and theoretical framework, we group the euro area countries into two sub-regions: NEA (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands) and SEA, (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). There are a number of reasons to justify this. For example, the SEA has experienced higher inflation, unemployment rates and government debt than the NEA. Another distinction emerges from the current account imbalances between the NEA and SEA economies. We choose not to include France and Ireland to any of the above regions as there is no clear evidence for their insertion in one or another sub-region (they are included in the GVAR model as separate entities though). All the remaining countries of the paper are treated as independent entities. Thus, the constructed GVAR model consists of 21 entities (see Table 1). These countries/regions cover on average 80% of the nominal world GDP over the last five years. In comparison to the work of BCS, we broaden the sample of countries included in the analysis (28 countries relative to 21 in BCS) and extend the sample with

9 additional years. Furthermore, we increase the number of endogenous variables in the GVAR model to five as we extend the set of exports, imports, output and real exchange rate in the BCS analysis with the gross capital formation.

In particular, we construct a country-specific VARX* including 5 endogenous variables; domestic output (ny_{it}), gross capital formation (gcf_{it}), exports (ex_{it}), imports (im_{it}) and the real effective exchange rate ($reer_{it}$). Domestic output for the country i is proxied by the difference between the real GDP and the real exports of goods and services at time t .²⁸ In addition to the 5 endogenous variables, we consider three foreign variables ($ny_{it}^*, gcf_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*$). We exclude foreign variables of exports ex_{it}^* and imports im_{it}^* from the individual models due to the possibility of collinearity.^{29,30} The estimation and dynamic analysis of the GVAR model is conducted using the GVAR toolbox 2.0 created by [Smith and Galesi \(2014\)](#). We also incorporate the oil price as an exogenous global variable ($poil_t$). Therefore, the vectors of country specific domestic and foreign variables are:³¹

$$\mathbf{x}_{it} = (ny_{it}, gcf_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it})' \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, N - 1 \text{ and}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_{it}^* = (ny_{it}^*, gcf_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil_t)' \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, N - 1$$

For the case of the USA (where $i = 0$) we follow [Dees et al. \(2007b\)](#) and treat the oil price as an endogenous variable. Thus, the USA vectors of domestic and foreign variables are:

$$\mathbf{x}_{0t} = (ny_{0t}, gcf_{0t}, ex_{0t}, im_{0t}, reer_{0t}, poil_t)' \text{ and}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_{0t}^* = (ny_{0t}^*, gcf_{0t}^*, reer_{0t}^*)$$

To construct the foreign variables, we used trade weights that correspond, for each country in the sample, to the trade shares of foreign countries in total export and imports over the

²⁸All variables are referring to natural logarithms of real values and are seasonally adjusted.

²⁹As [Greenwood-Nimmo et al. \(2012\)](#) point out, the assumption of weak-exogeneity between the foreign trade variables and the domestic endogenous trade variables can not be sustained in a model that takes into account the majority of the world trade as $ex_{it} = im_{it}^*$ and vice-versa.

³⁰For a detailed description of the data sources see [Table A.1](#) in the Appendix.

³¹Due to data unavailability, we exclude from the VARX* model the real gross capital formation of China as an endogenous variable. Therefore, the corresponding domestic variables vector for China is: $\mathbf{x}_{it} = (ny_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it})'$.

period 2012-2016.³² The regional variables of the NEA and SEA were constructed using a weighted average scheme for each individual country. Following the relevant strand of the literature, we employ average PPP-GDP weights over the period 2012-2016.

4.1 Long Run Relationships in the GVAR analysis

We adopt the approach of Garratt et al. (2012) and allow the short-run dynamics to be estimated flexibly within a VARX framework while we impose theory-consistent long-run restrictions. Garratt et al. (2012) argue that economic theory is typically more informative about the long-run relationships than it is on the short-run dynamic.³³ Garratt et al. (2012) also argue that there is a degree of consensus regarding the long-run properties of macroeconomic models whether they have been developed within the Simultaneous Equation Models (SEMs), structural VAR or the DSGE approaches. Alternatively, there is less agreement about how to model short-run dynamic adjustment. Following, the GVAR literature, we estimate a VECMX* representation of the reference equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \mathbf{x}_{it} &= \mathbf{c}_{i0} - \alpha_i \beta_i' [\mathbf{z}_{i,t-1} - \mu_i \mathbf{d}_{i,t-1} - \gamma_i (t-1)] \\ &+ \Gamma_i \Delta \mathbf{x}_{i,t-1} + \Lambda_i \Delta \mathbf{x}_{it}^* + \delta_{i0}^* \Delta \mathbf{d}_t + \delta_{i1}^* \Delta \mathbf{d}_{t-1} + \mathbf{u}_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where α_i is a $k_i \times r_i$ matrix of rank r_i and $\beta_i = (\beta_{ix}', \beta_{ix}^*, \beta_{id}')'$ is a $(k_i + k_i^* + m_d) \times r_i$ matrix of rank r_i . The country-specific VECMX* in (7) allows for cointegration between domestic and foreign variables. The identification of the long-run equilibrium is not trivial because there are many linear combinations of the cointegrating vectors that are observationally equivalent and link the level of domestic output (GDP net of exports) with the levels of capital, exports and imports of goods and services in an economy.³⁴

³² Although the choice of weights for the construction of foreign variables is a subject of discussion, Forbes and Chinn (2004) argue that bilateral trade is one of the most important determinants of the linkages among countries. Moreover, PSW point out that trade weights show the extent that one country/region is linked to another. We utilize a 21×21 trade weights link matrix using bilateral trade, based on data from the Direction of Trade Statistics. Table 2 reports the trade weight matrix for the countries/regions of major interest.

³³This is because economic theory is frequently silent concerning the sequence of economic decisions, the structure of information sets across agents and the nature of rigidities arose from transaction cost.

³⁴Note that we can choose any non-singular $r \times r$ matrix \mathbf{Q} such as $\alpha_i \beta_i' = \alpha_i \mathbf{Q}' \mathbf{Q} \beta_i' = \alpha_i^* \beta_i^{*'}'$. The new coefficient matrices α_i^* and $\beta_i^{*'}'$ are observationally equivalent to $\alpha_i \beta_i'$ respectively.

Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function that depends on imported goods and exports, we can show that domestic output net of export is given by:

$$ny_{it} = c_{it} + c_{1i}gcf_{it} + c_{2i}ex_{it} + c_{3i}im_{it} \quad (8)$$

We consider equation (8) as a long run representation of the ELGH theory. This suggests that the volumes of domestic output, capital, exports and imports would cointegrate. In addition, if there is no evidence that equation (8) holds as an entity, we consider the “enhanced” trade equations suggested by BCS. The “enhanced” trade equations allow for cointegration among exports and imports along with the traditional demand and price variables. Finally, we test for cointegration among the volumes of exports and imports for each country. The following table summarizes the long-run relationships considered in our GVAR analysis.³⁵

The Long-Run Relationships in the GVAR Analysis

Export-Led-Growth Hypothesis		$ny_{it} - c_{1i}k_{it} - c_{2i}ex_{it} - c_{3i}im_{it} \sim I(0)$
“Enhanced” Trade Equations	Exports Equation	$ex_{it} - a_{1i}im_{it} - a_{2i}ny_{it}^* - a_{3i}reer_{it} \sim I(0)$
	Imports Equation	$im_{it} - \beta_{1i}ex_{it} - \beta_{2i}ny_{it} - \beta_{3i}reer_{it} \sim I(0)$
Stationarity of the Trade Balance		$ex_{it} - im_{it} \sim I(0)$

4.1.1 Modelling Strategy

It is worth noting that possible misspecification of the cointegrating vectors will have implications for the stability of GVAR, the behaviour of impulse response functions and

³⁵In order to estimate the corresponding long run unrestricted coefficients of the cointegrating relationships, we employed smaller scale VAR(q) models, separately for each of the 21 entities of the model. These estimations were based on a country-specific VAR model consisting of 9 variables (5 endogenous variables, 3 weakly exogenous “star” variables and the oil price for each entity. For the case of China, there are 4 endogenous variables due to lack of data for the gross capital formation). In particular, we imposed the appropriate long-run restrictions to the set of 9 variables in each VAR model in order to retrieve the long run unrestricted values of the $c_{1i}, c_{2i}, c_{3i}, a_{1i}, a_{2i}, a_{3i}, \beta_{1i}, \beta_{2i}$ and β_{3i} parameters as described under the long run relationships which our analysis takes into account (see the relevant Table on page 16). The estimations of the long run relationships which imposed in the GVAR analysis are presented in Table 4.

the shape of the persistence profiles. Here, we follow the modelling strategy suggested by BCS given that the estimation of the long-run cointegrating vectors is very sensitive to the number of selected lags. Using Monte Carlo experiments, BCS show that the sensitivity of estimated cointegrating vectors was driven by the dimensionality problem of large-scale country-specific VARX* models (9 variables). Motivated by these findings, BSC focus on a smaller-scale VARX* models including a sub-set of country-specific variables. A cointegrating vector was imposed only if there is evidence (varying from 1 to 3 vectors in our case) from the smaller-scale models of cointegrating vectors and only those cointegrating vectors which are consistent with the relevant theory. The estimated (theory-based) cointegrating vectors were imposed in the full country-specific VARX*. Tests for the validity of the implied overidentifying restrictions were also implemented in the latter. The tests of overidentifying restrictions were based on a likelihood-ratio test using bootstrapped critical values at the 1% significance level.³⁶ Finally, we impose only the long-run relations that satisfy the likelihood-ratio test and at the same time exhibit satisfying Persistence Profiles (PPs)³⁷, impulse responses and stability of the estimated coefficients.

We estimate an unrestricted VARX*(p_i, q_i) by selecting the lag order of the domestic variables p_i based on the Akaike information criterion with $p_{(i,max)} = 2$. Due to data limitations, we include one lag for the foreign variables where $q_i = 1$. Table 4 presents the estimated cointegrating vectors of our model along with the likelihood-ratio test results. We observe that all the imposed overidentifying restrictions hold as the null hypothesis can not be rejected.³⁸ Table 4 also shows that for the cases of NEA and France cointegrating vectors provide evidence of export-oriented growth strategy pursued by these countries. The estimated cointegrating vectors for the SEA and the UK satisfy the import equation. Finally, there is evidence that the export equation and the trade

³⁶Table 3 presents the individual specifications for the unrestricted estimation of the country-specific VARX* models.

³⁷See Figure A.2 in the Appendix.

³⁸In general, we include overidentifying restrictions for 15 of the 21 entities of our model. For the countries that we could not establish a long-run relationship (Brazil, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland), we imposed the cointegrating vectors that suggested by the unrestricted VARX* models.

balance are stationary for the USA and China respectively.

4.2 Unit Root Tests

The implementation of the GVAR requires that the variables included in a country-specific VARX*(p_i, q_i) are integrated of order one ($I(1)$). We test for unit root using the weighted-symmetric Augmented Dickey-Fuller (WS ADF) introduced by Park and Fuller (1995).³⁹ Table A.2 in the Appendix summarizes results from the unit root tests. Results suggest that we can not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the large majority of the domestic variables.⁴⁰ Results also demonstrate that all foreign “star” variables and the oil price are $I(1)$ processes.

4.3 Weak Exogeneity Test

The main assumption underlying the estimation of a VARX*(p_i, q_i) is that the country-specific foreign variables are \mathbf{x}_{it}^* are weakly exogenous. Weak exogeneity of \mathbf{x}_{it}^* in the VECMX* (p_i, q_i) model implies that domestic variables \mathbf{x}_{it} do not affect foreign variables \mathbf{x}_{it}^* in the long run, without ruling out any short-run feedback between the two set of variables.⁴¹ If the weak exogeneity assumption is not rejected then \mathbf{x}_{it}^* is considered as a “long-run forcing” for \mathbf{x}_{it} .⁴² Following the approach of DdPS, we employed a test for the weak exogeneity based on Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998) who suggested an F -test to check whether the estimated error correction terms are statistically significant in the marginal distribution of \mathbf{x}_{it}^* . In particular, for each variable l of \mathbf{x}_{it}^* the following auxiliary model is estimated:

³⁹The lag length of the test was determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).

⁴⁰However, some minor exceptions do exist. Real domestic output in Brazil and Ireland found to be $I(2)$ while in Mexico found $I(0)$. Moreover, real exports are $I(0)$ in the case of Japan and Switzerland (the Swiss imports also found $I(0)$). In addition, the real effective exchange rate in Mexico and Sweden appears to be a $I(0)$ process.

⁴¹The lag orders of the test for the domestic p_i^* and foreign q_i^* variables need not be the same with the estimated VARX*(p_i^*, q_i^*) models. For this reason, we conduct the tests for weak exogeneity based on both the lag structure determined by the AIC (where $p_i^* = 1$ and $q_i^* = 1$) and the lags of the underlying estimated VARX* models. We also use a larger set of lags ($p_i^* = 4$ and $q_i^* = 4$) in order to capture any sensitivity effects of the model.

⁴²This implies that the error-correction term do not provide any information about the marginal distribution of \mathbf{x}_{it}^* .

$$\Delta x_{it,l}^* = \alpha_{i,l} + \sum_{j=1}^{r_i} \theta_{ij,l} ECM_{ij,t-1} + \sum_{s=1}^{p_i^*} \phi_{is,l} \Delta x_{i,t-s} + \sum_{s=1}^{q_i^*} \psi_{is,l} \Delta \hat{x}_{i,t-s}^* + e_{it,l}$$

where $ECM_{ij,t-1}$, $j = 1, \dots, r_i$ are the estimated error correction terms which correspond to the r_i cointegrating relations (overidentifying restricted when long run relations imposed) for the i -th country model. Note that, $\Delta \hat{x}_{i,t}^* = (\Delta x_{it}^{*'}, \Delta \text{poil}_t)$ where Δpoil_t is the global variable of the oil price. The test for weak exogeneity is a joint test that $\theta_{ij,l} = 0$ for $j = 1, 2, \dots, r_i$.

Results from the F-test are summarized in Table 5 and indicate that the null hypothesis, at the 5% significance level, is rejected for 16 out of the 83 foreign variables (19% of the cases).⁴³ It is worth noting that when we increase the lag order of the VARX*(p_i^* , q_i^*) to $p_i^* = 4$ and $q_i^* = 4$, the null hypothesis is rejected only in 7 out of the 83 foreign variables (8%).⁴⁴ Overall, weak exogeneity can not be rejected.

4.4 The Impact Elasticities between the Domestic and the Foreign Variables of the Model

An informative aspect of our analysis involves the contemporaneous effects of the foreign variables to their domestic counterparts, which can be interpreted as the impact elasticities of the former variables to the latter. These are derived from the country-specific VECMX* estimations. High impact elasticities would reflect the connectedness of the global economy and the interdependence of the domestic variables across countries. Table 6 presents the impact elasticities between domestic and foreign variables along with the associated heteroscedasticity consistent Newey and West t -ratio's.

Most of these elasticities are high in magnitude and statistically significant. For example, we observed that in most countries/regions, the elasticity of real net export output captured through the impact of ny_{it}^* on ny_{it} is positive and significant. In particular, in SEA and China there is evidence that a 1% change in the foreign real net export output (i.e. ny_{it}^*) is linked with positive and statistically significant effects by 0.28% and 0.29%

⁴³Note that the null hypothesis is rejected for the foreign output of France and China and for the real effective exchange rate of the NEA and the USA.

⁴⁴All exogeneity test have been implemented conditional on the theory-based overidentifying restrictions.

respectively on their domestic counterparts (i.e. ny_{it}); UK and France will observe an impact increase in their domestic output by 0.36% and 0.17% respectively. Interestingly, the Korean domestic output has the greatest impact elasticity (1.42) which is compatible with the outward-oriented structure of the Korean economy. Alternatively, we observed a weak contemporaneous and no significant dependence of the real US output by the foreign activity.⁴⁵

Table 6 also provides evidence that the impact elasticity of real effective exchange rate ($reer_{it}$ and $reer_{it}^*$) is negative and significant in export-oriented economies such as NEA, the UK, Japan and Ireland. This implies that a global appreciation is associated with a domestic depreciation of the exporting economies, which has positive effects on their competitiveness. Separately, when we examine the response of gross capital formation (gcf_{it} and gcf_{it}^*), we observe that in most of the countries it is positive and mainly significant, especially for the developed economies.⁴⁶

4.5 Average Pair-Wise Cross Section Correlations

An extension of the diagnostics concerning the weak-exogeneity of the foreign variables in the sense that $Cov(x_{it}^*, u_{it}) \rightarrow 0$ when $N \rightarrow \infty$ is provided by the average cross-section pair-wise correlations of the country-specific error terms. This informal test offers evidence of the degree at which the constructed foreign variables act to reduce cross-section correlations in the GVAR model.

Table 7 presents the average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations for the level and the first difference of the endogenous variables, as well as the associated model's residuals.⁴⁷ Results show that the average cross-section correlations for the levels of endogenous

⁴⁵This is consistent with the argument that the US is a relatively closed economy.

⁴⁶Exception to this is capital elasticities for the Asian economies (Japan, Korea, India and Indonesia) which are negative indicating a trade-off in the allocation of investments between the Western and the Asian economies.

⁴⁷For example, the average pair-wise correlation of real output of country i is given by:

$$\overline{ny_i} = (1/N) \sum_{j=1}^N \rho_{ij}(ny_{ij})$$

where ρ_{ij} is the correlation of the real output of country i with country j , N is the number of countries included in our sample. The residuals are obtained after estimating all country-specific $VARX^*(p_i, q_i)$ models.

variables are high with the exception of the real effective exchange rate. The highest correlations are observed in the trade variables with an average of 97% whilst the correlations for the cases of net trade output and capital formation vary between 75% and 83%. When the first difference of the variables is considered, the correlations fall substantially for all variables and for all countries.⁴⁸ Finally, the residual interdependencies for all VARX* models are relatively small which enhance the view that the weakly exogenous foreign variables successfully capture the common factors among the variables.

4.6 Structural Stability Tests

An issue that can arise in our empirical framework is the presence of structural breaks. We employ a battery of tests to determine the stability of the estimated parameters of the country-specific models. As the short-run parameters reflect the propagation of shocks across countries, we focus on the stability of the short-run coefficients in the VECMX* models. Following Ploberger and Kramer (1992) our set of structural stability tests is based on the cumulative sums of the OLS residual tests denoted by PK_{sup} and PK_{msq} . We also employed the Nyblom (1989) test for time-varying parameters and sequential Wald tests such as QLR , MW and APW .⁴⁹

Table 8 summarizes the results obtained from the structural stability test at the 5% significance level under the null hypothesis of parameter stability. Evidence from structural stability tests are rather mixed. In particular, using the PK_{sup} and PK_{msq} tests the null hypothesis was rejected in 11 and 10 cases respectively out of the possible 105. However, results obtained from the non-robust version of sequential Wald tests indicate a high rejection rate of the null hypothesis varying from 40% to 50%. These results could be rather worrying but the heteroscedasticity-robust version of these tests provide a different outcome with the rejection rate being halved in most cases.⁵⁰ Furthermore,

⁴⁸For example, the average cross-section correlations have declined in net export real output and gross capital formation to 3% and 7% respectively.

⁴⁹Note that PK_{sup} and PK_{msq} refer to maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistics. QLR refers to the likelihood ratio statistic proposed by Quandt (1960) while MW refers to a Wald statistic based on Hansen (1992) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). APW is an exponential average statistic based also on the work of Andrews and Ploberger (1994). For further details on structural stability test statistics see Dees et al. (2007b).

⁵⁰It is worth noting that results vary across the different endogenous variables. For example, the rejection

the rejection of the null hypothesis was mainly driven by breaks in the error variance and not on the parameter coefficient. We account for the problem of possible variation of error variances by using robust standard errors when investigating the impact of the foreign variables.

5 Empirical Analysis

In this section, we examine the dynamic behaviour of the estimated GVAR model. We focus on the global transmission mechanisms of real demand-side shocks and real expansionary shocks with a particular focus on the degree of regional interdependencies among northern and southern euro-zone. We also assess the domestic and international effects of changes in real competitiveness based on different simulations of real effective exchange rate shocks. To investigate the dynamic properties of the model, we employ the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) as proposed by [Koop et al. \(1996\)](#) and developed further by [Pesaran and Shin \(1998\)](#). We do so because of (i) the absence of strong prior information and (ii) the multi-country setting that includes 105 endogenous variables. These two factors make the identification of structural shocks in the underlying structural model particularly challenging.

Unlike the conventional orthogonalized impulse response functions, the GIRFs are order-invariant. Although they reflect the impact of a unit shock and not the impact of an unobserved structural shock, they can still provide useful information concerning the dynamic properties of the model.⁵¹ Alternatively, we could impose either a recursive structure or sign restrictions on the endogenous variables of a core country-region assuming that shocks across countries are correlated.⁵² Note that while recursive identification based on exclusion restrictions has been severely criticized as being atheoretical the sign-identified VAR models are only set identified. In particular, there is a wide range

rate for the trade variables is slightly higher than the other domestic variables which might be due to the collapse of global trade in 2009.

⁵¹Indeed, in practice real demand, output and trade shocks are likely to be highly correlated across the different regions of the model. All shock responses refer to mean estimates of 2000 bootstrap replications along with the corresponding 90% error bounds.

⁵²The former approach has been followed by [Dees et al. \(2007a\)](#) while the latter from [Eickmeier and Ng \(2011\)](#) and [Georgiadis \(2015\)](#).

of structural models that satisfy the identifying sign- restrictions. The conventional practice was to report the central tendency proxied by the median of the impulse responses, which satisfy the sign restriction. However, Fry and Pagan (2011) and Kilian (2011); Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017) argue that the vector of the median is not the median of the vector so that median responses is likely to stem from different structural models. Fry and Pagan (2011) suggest selecting the impulse response that minimizes the distance from the median response across models and horizons. However, Kilian and Murphy (2012) and Inoue and Kilian (2013) argue that the posterior median response function can be very misleading about the most likely dynamic response in the sign-identified models.⁵³ It is clear that there is no consensus of which statistic to report about the identification of theory-consistent structural shocks. Therefore, we focus on the implication of GIRFs which provide useful information about the dynamic properties of country-specific shocks, which are assumed to be correlated across countries and regions.

We pay special attention to the interaction of shocks emanated from the NEA and SEA respectively. In doing so, we also estimate a small-scale GVAR including only the two regions (i.e. NEA and SEA) and we test for exogeneity of the endogenous variables. Evidence of exogeneity will help to identify the spillover of shocks across the two regions.⁵⁴ Table A.3, in the Appendix, presents exogeneity test among the NEA and SEA variables. There is a strong evidence that when we estimate a GVAR including only NEA and SEA for the large majority of the cases we can not reject the null of exogeneity. An exception to this is the capital formation which found to be endogenous in most cases. This implies that shocks across the two regions are exogenous while they are endogenous within regions.

⁵³Inoue and Kilian (2013) show that the most likely structural model can be computed by the model of the joint distribution of admissible models. Inoue and Kilian (2013) also propose a measure based on the highest-posterior density of credible sets that characterize the joint uncertainty of all admissible structural models.

⁵⁴Note that identification of individual shocks will still require sign or zero restrictions.

5.1 Shocks to the Euro Area Domestic Variables

In what follows we examine the time profile of shocks to macroeconomic variables. In particular, we simulate the following scenarios: i) the impact of a positive non-export real output shock to the NEA on SEA variables; ii) the effects of a positive shock to real imports of both the NEA and the SEA; iii) we simulate the response of the global economy to a real exchange rate depreciation shock of the SEA; iv) the effects of positive output shock emanated from the US; v) we consider the impact of a negative oil supply shock.

5.1.1 Positive Real Output shock to the NEA

Figure 2a illustrates the impact of a positive one standard-deviation shock to the non-export real output of the NEA. We observe that, both in the NEA and the SEA, there is a significant increase of output which remains positive both in the medium and the long-run.⁵⁵ In response to a positive output shock, investments in the NEA increase and current account deteriorates.⁵⁶ The counter-cyclical movement of the current account is consistent both with the traditional and modern theories of current account model. The traditional theories claim that an increase in output will increase demand for foreign goods and this worsens the current account. Modern theories argue that an increase of output might reflect a positive productivity shock which in turn will have a positive impact on investments.⁵⁷ Therefore, an increase of output driven by a positive and persistent productivity shock will increase investment and worsen the current account.⁵⁸

There is also evidence that in the SEA, there is a deterioration of the trade balance as exports decline significantly while the response of imports is not statistically significant from zero. Furthermore, the response of investment is not significantly different from zero due to a significant appreciation of the real exchange rate. Note that an appreciation

⁵⁵In particular, on the impact output increases by 0.35% and 0.05% in NEA and SEA respectively.

⁵⁶Note that we have proxied investments by using gross capital formation.

⁵⁷Mendoza (1991) shows that an increase of real interest rate is a likely response to a positive and persistent productivity shock.

⁵⁸Current account is given by $CA = (Y + rB - T) - C - I + (T - G)$ or $CA = \text{Private Saving} - \text{Investment} - \text{Budget Deficit}$. Note that I denotes investment and private saving is the sum of GDP (i.e. Y) plus income on net foreign assets (i.e. rB minus taxes and (i.e. T) and consumption (i.e. C) while budget deficit is the difference between government spending and taxes (i.e. $G - T$).

of the real exchange rate might reflect either an improvement in terms of trade (i.e. a decline of foreign prices) or an increase in unit labour cost (ULC).^{59,60} An appreciation of the real exchange rate driven by an increase of ULC might reflect capital misallocation in SEA.⁶¹ This is consistent with evidence provided by [Gopinath et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon \(2010\)](#). However, [Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) show that appreciation of the real exchange rate in the SEA is mainly due to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. In summary, a positive output shock in NEA has a negative impact on the trade balance of both NEA and SEA.

Figure 2b indicates the spillovers effects of a positive shock to the non-export real output of the NEA to the real output of the rest of the economies available in our sample. In general, there is a positive and significant response in European economies such as France, Switzerland and Sweden while non-export output in the USA will respond in an insignificant manner. Finally, there is a noticeable positive impact on Asian economies including China, India and Japan.

5.1.2 Positive Expansionary shock to the NEA

Figure 3a depicts the impulse responses of NEA and SEA variables to a positive one-standard-deviation shock to the NEA real imports. There is evidence of a strong positive response of real import and cross-capital formation in both regions (i.e. NEA and SEA). A positive response of investment might be due to an appreciation of nominal exchange

⁵⁹[Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) show that we can decompose the real exchange rate into three components:

$$REER = \left(\frac{SP^{*NEAT}}{P^T} \right)^{\alpha\gamma} \left(\frac{P^{EA-T}}{P} \right)^{\gamma(1-\alpha)} \left(\frac{(SW^{NEA})^\alpha (W^{*EA})^{1-\alpha}}{W} \right)^{1-\gamma}$$

where S is the nominal exchange rate defined as domestic prices relative to foreign prices. Note that in our empirical estimation, we used data defined the other way around. P^{*NEA-T} is the price level of non-eurozone trading partners, P^{*EA-T} is the euro-zone trading partners, α is the share of trade with the non euro-zone countries, γ indicates the share of tradable goods and P is the domestic price level. An appreciation of will improve the terms of trade as reflected by the first term while worsens the relative wage competitiveness proxied by the third term.

⁶⁰[King and Rebelo \(1999\)](#) show that productivity shocks will lead to an increase in the real interest rate and an appreciation of the real exchange rate which, in turn, will affect exports negatively. Appreciation of real exchange rate is also consistent with [Corsetti et al. \(2006\)](#).

⁶¹Note that the non-significant response of real exchange rate in NEA might be due to the reduction of ULC which offset an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, For further details see [Chen et al. \(2013\)](#).

rate which raises the real return on domestic investments.⁶² More formally, [Obstfeld and Rogoff \(2000\)](#) argue that due to the limited integration of capital market there is home bias on demand shocks. Therefore, a positive demand shock will appreciate the terms of trade and improve the real return of domestic investments.⁶³ Yet, the response of output in the SEA is insignificant while there is an initial decline in output in NEA for two quarters following the shock. The frail response of output to an import shock might be driven by a boosted of exports as observed in [Figure 3b](#). However, exports in both regions (i.e. NEA and SEA) increase less than imports following the import shock in NEA. Therefore, an expansionary demand shock in NEA leads to a deterioration of the NEA and SEA current account, albeit the deterioration is rather marginal.

We next focus on the impact of real NEA import shocks to the exports of the countries included in our sample. [Figure 3b](#) indicates that an expansionary shock in NEA yields a statistically significant increase in the global real exports highlighting the importance of the trade linkages in the transmission of shocks around the world.⁶⁴ This implies that increasing imports in NEA might be used as an adjustment mechanism for the trade imbalances between NEA and SEA. Furthermore, [Figure 3b](#) also shows that import expansion in NEA has a positive impact on the exports of France, UK, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. This implies that increasing imports in NEA might be used as an adjustment mechanism for the trade imbalances in euro area.

⁶²Figure [3a](#) indicates that there is no a significant response of real exchange rate to NEA demand shock. In fact, in the SEA we observed that on the impact real exchange rate depreciate. However, [Chen et al. \(2013\)](#) show that for the period 2000-2010 real appreciation of the euro primarily reflected nominal appreciation in all current account deficit countries. In Germany, the real exchange rate was at equilibrium level due to a reduction of ULC that offsets the nominal appreciation of the euro. Therefore, an internal devaluation pursued by the debtor countries after the crisis has cancelled out the nominal appreciation of euro.

⁶³The terms of trade is given by $\frac{P_D}{P_F}$ where P_D is the price of domestically produced goods while P_F is the price of goods produced in foreign countries. [Corsetti and Müller \(2006\)](#) show that the return to investment in real terms is given by: Real Return to investment = (Marginal product in terms of domestic goods) $\times \frac{P_D}{P}$ where P denotes the price of domestic consumption. Therefore, an increase in the ratio due to an expansionary fiscal shock and home bias will have a positive impact on the real return of domestic investments.

⁶⁴Concerning the response of real exports in NEA and SEA we observed an increase of 0.6% and 0.4% respectively.

5.1.3 Positive Expansionary shock to the SEA

The third shock that we simulate examines whether SEA relies on domestic consumption as a mechanism of economic growth. Therefore, Figure 4a shows the impact of a positive one standard-deviation shock on the real imports in the SEA. In general, we observed that there is a positive and significant response of all SEA variables (imports, output, gross capital formation and real exchange rate) while in NEA there is a significant increase only for real imports. We also observe in Figure 4b that there is a positive significant increase of exports both in NEA and SEA.⁶⁵ However, while the response of export in NEA crowding out the response of import the reverse is true in the SEA. Our results provide support of the view that the co-existence of two growth strategies led to the accumulation of trade imbalances between NEA and SEA. In particular, NEA countries have built on institutions and policies that promote the ELG policies. Alternatively, SEA economies, rely on increased domestic demand as a mechanism of growth promotion. This structure generated cumulative current account surpluses and incited external lending in NEA mirror by current account deficit and net borrowing in SEA.

5.1.4 Real Depreciation of the SEA

In this part, we examine the view that improving competitiveness in the SEA will accelerate the current account adjustment. Note that although demand shocks both in NEA and SEA have a positive impact on investments and exports of SEA, the current account adjustment was incomplete. In particular, there is a deterioration of the current account due to a higher increase of imports than exports following a demand shock as proxied by a shock on imports. Therefore, we investigate the role of the real exchange rate as a mechanism of current account adjustment. In so doing, we provide information concerning the argument that demand shocks accompanied by an improvement in competitiveness can help to eliminate trade imbalance within the euro-zone. To this end, we consider the impact of a one-standard-deviation negative shock (i.e. a depreciation) to the SEA real

⁶⁵The effect on other European economies is also statistically significant with French, the UK and Swedish exports increasing by approximately 0.25% after one year. There is also evidence of a positive effect on Chinese, Turkish and Japanese exports.

effective exchange rate on both the real exchange rates and on the real exports of the rest of the countries in our sample. Figure 5a provides evidence that for most of the euro-area countries real exchange rate depreciates but by less than the depreciation of the real exchange rate in SEA.⁶⁶ For example, while the real exchange rate in SEA depreciates by 0.8%, it is marginally significantly different from zero in NEA and insignificant for the UK and Switzerland. Alternatively, for the non euro area countries real exchange rates appreciate but in most cases, appreciation is not statistically different from zero.⁶⁷

Figure 5b indicates that a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate increased real exports in SEA by 0.7% per quarter while the response of real imports is not significant. We also observed that a depreciation has a negative impact on real output and investment but are significant only in the short-run (i.e. 2 quarters following the shock). This might be due to the negative impact that a depreciation has on the real return of domestic investment.⁶⁸ Alternatively, the response of NEA variables to a depreciation shock of the real exchange rate of the SEA is rather frail. Only the real output decreases significantly but only a few quarters. This finding is in line with [Belke and Dreger \(2013\)](#) who suggest the depreciation of the real exchange rate of debtor euro-zone countries as a tool to current account adjustment.

5.2 Shocks to the US domestic variables

The second set of shocks concerns the domestic variables of the USA. In particular, we are interested in examining two widespread issues in the literature. First, a positive shock on the real domestic demand of the US economy and its implications on global non-export real output and real exports. The dominant role of the USA in the global economy is expected to induce notable effects on international trade. Second, we assess the impact of the real exchange rate depreciation of the US dollar on the US current account adjustment process. Indeed, it has been pointed out that a depreciation of the

⁶⁶This might reflect a reduction of ULC imposed by structural reforms in SEA after the financial crisis of 2008.

⁶⁷In particular, the real exchange rates in the USA and China appreciate statistically significant by a 0.3% and 0.4% respectively after 4 quarters. There is also evidence of appreciation in Japan, Turkey and emerging Asian economies. Note that in all cases appreciation was not statistically significant.

⁶⁸For further details see [Corsetti et al. \(2006\)](#).

US dollar is imperative in order to meliorate the external deficit of the USA (see [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005](#)).

5.2.1 Positive Shock to the Output of the US.

Figure 6a shows that a positive one standard deviation shock on the US non-export real output leads to an increase in investments and deterioration of the current account. In particular the first year following the shock, real gross capital formation and real imports rise 1.4% and 0.8% respectively. Deterioration of the current account is reflected by the stronger positive response of imports compared to the response of exports to output shock. US real exports increase by 0.2% on impact and by 0.4% in the long-run. This is because an increase of output driven by a productivity shock will increase investments and worsen the current account. Alternatively, if an output increase is due to a demand shock such as fiscal expansion, investment will increase because the marginal product of capital in terms of consumption will increase.

Figure 6b show that the effects of the real non-export US output shocks on the real output of the rest of the world (i.e. countries including in our sample) are rather weak. The shock is accompanied by a positive and statistically significant response of non-export real output only in the cases of Australia and New Zealand. The response of real exports to the US real non-export output shock is, in general, positive and significant with the higher amounts appeared in Brazilian, Canadian and Japanese exports (see Figure 6c). The real exports of the European countries, including the north and south sub-regions of the euro area, increase by approximately 0.2% each quarter during the first year following the shock. The results clearly highlight the importance of the US domestic demand in the evolution of the global trade.

5.2.2 A real depreciation of the US economy

The effects of the real exchange rate depreciation of the US dollar on domestic variables are displayed in Figure 7a. We observe that the current account improves as exports

increase significantly while imports decline, albeit non-significantly.⁶⁹ Our evidence provides support to the view that real exchange rate can be used as an instrument to correct the US current account deficit.⁷⁰ The conclusion that can be drawn is that competitiveness in the US economy tends to stimulate the external adjustment when studied under a global context. However, reduction of the US current account balance might have a significant impact on the European economy and the other countries in our sample. In Figure 7b there is no any evidence that the depreciation of the US real exchange rate has any impact on the exports of the outside world.⁷¹ This is so because the US is rather a closed economy.

5.2.3 A positive shock to the global variable of real oil price

The final scenario involves one s.d. positive shock (5.1% on impact) in the real oil price (Figure 8a). The shock has a negative and statistically significant effect on the non-export real output in a plethora of oil importing countries (see Figure 8b); NEA, UK, China and India face an approximately 0.1% decrease in domestic output after 2 quarters of the shock. The economy of the USA is negatively affected only in the long-run (2 years after the shock).⁷² It is worth noting that, while an oil price shock affects negatively NEA, it does not have any significant impact on SEA. This might reflect that NEA economies are based on ELG policies which highlight the importance of supply side of the economy as a key factor of economic growth.

Figure 8c indicates that the oil price shock has a positive impact on the real exports of NEA, SEA, France, UK US, China and Japan. For example, real exports in NEA increased by 0.35% and in SEA by 0.25%, respectively.⁷³ Chen et al. (2013) show that

⁶⁹Figure 7a indicates that US real exports increase by 0.2% on impact and increases approximately to 0.8% per quarter one year following the shock.

⁷⁰Alternatively, IMF, 2004, 2005 advocates domestic fiscal consolidation as a necessary measure to restore the US trade imbalances.

⁷¹European economies, for example, do not show any statistically significant responses. The only significant responses arise from the increased Korean and Brazilian real exports and the decreased of Australian real exports.

⁷²On the other hand, real output in Canada and Brazil is increased by 0.07% and 0.2% the first couple of quarters following the shock. Domestic output in Ireland and Turkey has also a positive short-run response.

⁷³The response of imports, which we do not present here for the sake of brevity, is of the same magnitude. These results are available from the authors upon request.

higher income of oil-producing countries will increase demand for machinery and equipment goods produced, for example, in Germany. However, Figure 8d indicates that an oil price shock leads to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate in NEA without affecting the real exchange rate of SEA.⁷⁴ Although there is an appreciation of the real exchange rate of NEA, exports increase significantly in response to an oil price shock. Therefore, oil prices shocks do not affect trade imbalances in the sense that they have a positive and symmetric impact on both exports and imports.

5.3 Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition

A complementary extension of the impulse response functions is the traditional analysis of forecast error variance decomposition. Under the GVAR model, the implemented GIRFs correspond to Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (GFEVDs) as explained by DdPS. In this case, GFEVDs show the proportion of the n -step ahead forecast error variance of the i -th element of x_t accounted for the innovations in the j -th element of x_t . Note that this approach allows for contemporaneous correlations, the shocks across countries are not orthogonal, and are invariant to variable ordering. Hence, GFEVDs need not sum to unity.

This section presents the GFEVDs of some selected scenarios of interest, focusing on euro area real trade flows. Table 9 shows the proportion of forecast error variance for the top 12 determinants of the NEA real imports and the SEA real exports and imports, for the first 12 quarters. Total sum indicates the sum of GFEVDs contributions across all countries. The results point out that NEA real imports depend primarily on domestic variables such as imports, exports and gross capital formation which account for the half variation during the first year. The real exchange rate and non-export real output of NEA have a minor impact while the oil price and SEA domestic variables hold a respectable contribution, especially after 2 quarters. SEA real exports depend on domestic variables as well, where the contributions of real imports and real exchange rate are important in

⁷⁴There is also evidence that the real exchange rates in the UK, Canada, Australia, Korea, New Zealand and Norway appreciate by 0.3% - 0.4% two quarters after the shocks. The shock renders a negative effect of approximately 0.4% on the real exchange rates of the major economies which rely on imported energy such as the USA, China and India, during the first couple of quarters.

explaining SEA real exports variations. This confirms the import dependence of exports in the SEA and the significant role of competitiveness. Interestingly, NEA real trade flows explain approximately 10% of the SEA export variation after one year while the contribution of the non-export output of NEA and oil price is similar. In addition, a major contributor of the SEA real imports (except the variable itself) is the domestic gross capital formation followed by domestic real exports and non-export real output. Despite the heterogeneity in the dispersion of contributions, we also trace an important influence by the NEA real trade flows. The GFEVDs analysis for the euro area real trade variables confirms the GIRFs outcome that there is a strong relationship between NEA and SEA real trade flows. As expected, domestic variables are the main determinants of the variation of the GFEVDs in each region.

Table 10 contains the GFEVDs results for the real imports of the two major global importers, China and the USA. For the case of U.S. real imports, the contribution can be attributed to domestic variables (imports, gross capital formation, exports and non-export real output) as they account for the 57% of the total variation during the first year. With respect to foreign variables, NEA, French and Swedish originated exports and real exchange rates are also significant determinants of the U.S. import forecast error variance decomposition. Moreover, Canadian real trade flows are among the top determinants of U.S. real imports which is in align with the strong relationship between the two economies. The case of Chinese real imports offers heterogeneous results, as we can not trace a particular geographical pattern to the top determinants of the Chinese import forecast error variance decomposition. A fact that stands out is the confirmation of the trade balance stationarity; Chinese exports account for the 20% variation in the long-run import performance (after 3 years).

6 Conclusion

The global imbalances that emerged after the 2000s have been blamed as a contributor to the recent financial crisis of 2008. [Obstfeld and Rogoff \(2009\)](#) argue that current

account surpluses from emerging economies have been used to fund deficits in developed economies, which in turn has fueled the risk-taking behavior of the latter countries, thereby sowing the seed of the global financial crisis.⁷⁵ Therefore, it is important to investigate sources and patterns of trade imbalances. The aim of our study is to analyze trade imbalances within the euro-zone, accounting for the global macroeconomic environment. The co-existence of two growth models within the euro-zone made inevitable the development of trade imbalances between the north and the south euro area: the former with an export-oriented economy while the latter based on domestic consumption.

There is a view supported by the [US Treasury \(2017\)](#) and [Krugman \(2013\)](#) that the current account adjustment within the euro-zone should be symmetric in the sense that NEA surpluses should shrink along with the SEA deficits. The counter-argument of this view endured by [Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon \(2010\)](#) is that the SEA should pursue policies that increase government saving, productivity and competitiveness through internal devaluation. Our paper contributes to the debate by evaluating the view that an expansionary policy from NEA accompanied by an increased competitiveness in SEA can accelerate the adjustment of trade imbalances within the euro area.

We do so by using a GVAR model for 28 countries including the NEA, SEA regions, the USA, China and other European and non European countries. The GVAR model provides a framework that allows investigating the spill-over effects of demand or competitiveness shocks emanating from any country in our sample. Here we focus on the spillover effects of demands shocks from NEA and SEA across the two regions. In doing so, we can provide information on the argument that expansionary policy from NEA can be used as a mechanism to boost economic growth and current account adjustment in the SEA. However, current account adjustment driven mainly by demand forces is likely to unwind if the economy moves to a different phase of business cycle. For example, although an expansionary policy pursued during expansion might improve the current account of SEA countries, it will have unwelcome effects once the economic slowdown and move into a

⁷⁵Alternatively, [Borio and Disyatat \(2011\)](#) argues that from a macroprudential point of view the main factor that drives the international crisis of 2008 was the phenomenal increase of gross capital flows. They show that the link between the financial crisis and trade imbalances was rather weak.

recession. Therefore, we also investigate the impact of competitiveness shocks as reflected by a devaluation of the real effective exchange rate of the SEA on the current account of both regions.

Empirical results support the argument that current account adjustment in euro-zone should be symmetric. In particular, we observe that although positive demand shocks, in both regions, as proxied by an increase in imports has positive effects on exports and investment, current accounts deteriorate or at best remain stable. However, there is evidence that a devaluation of the real effective exchange rate in SEA leads to an increase in exports without affecting imports. Therefore, our results highlight that the imperative external adjustment of the SEA sub-region should be composed of two coordinated policies: First, increased consumption of the NEA, which will stimulate the demand for imported goods in the sub-region and thus, will expand the export sector of the SEA. Second, a devaluation of the real exchange rate in the SEA, possibly through the mechanism of wage and labour costs, should provide a valuable policy tool for competitiveness and current account adjustment in the sub-region.

Our results should be translated with caution. From the perspective of the SEA if one has to choose a policy then an internal devaluation will have a positive effect on their exports and negative (but not statistically significant) on their imports. The alternative policy would be an expansionary shock to the NEA. This would affect SEA exports positively (not as much as in the previous scenario though) and their imports positively. The cautionary note that should not be underestimated here is that the devaluation in the SEA might have a negative impact on investment and economic growth (see [Corsetti et al., 2006](#)). To answer these type of questions we need to decompose the devaluation of real exchange rate into components driven by the nominal exchange rate and into components due to a reduction of ULC. We will also need to include data on productivity so that we can have a proxy of the real return of capital as stressed by [Obstfeld and Rogoff \(2000\)](#) and [Corsetti et al. \(2006\)](#). We leave this for a future work.

Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model

China	South Europe	<i>Scandinavia</i>	<i>Rest of the World</i>
France	Greece	Norway	India
Japan	Italy	Sweden	Indonesia
UK	Portugal		Korea
USA	Spain		South Africa
			Turkey
North Europe	<i>Other Developed Economies</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	
Austria	Australia	Brazil	
Belgium	Canada	Mexico	
Finland	Ireland		
Germany	Switzerland		
Netherlands	New Zealand		

Table 2: Trade Weights of the GVAR model

Country/Region	China	France	Japan	NEA	SEA	Sweden	UK	USA
China	0.00	0.02	0.14	0.13	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.25
France	0.06	0.00	0.02	0.44	0.20	0.02	0.07	0.08
Japan	0.33	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.22
NEA	0.12	0.17	0.03	0.00	0.16	0.04	0.12	0.12
SEA	0.07	0.18	0.02	0.37	0.00	0.02	0.08	0.08
Sweden	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.43	0.07	0.00	0.09	0.07
UK	0.09	0.07	0.02	0.32	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.13
USA	0.20	0.03	0.07	0.10	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.00

Note: Trade weights based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.

Table 3: The specification for the country-specific unrestricted VARX* models

Country/Region	Individual VECMX*models specification				Endogenous Variables	Exogenous Variables
	p_i	q_i	Deterministics Case	r		
USA	2	1	IV	3	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}, poil\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*\}$
North Europe	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
South Europe	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
UK	1	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
France	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
China	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Japan	2	1	IV	2	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Korea	2	1	IV	2	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Canada	2	1	IV	3	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Australia	1	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Ireland	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Sweden	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Switzerland	2	1	IV	3	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Norway	2	1	IV	2	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
New Zealand	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Mexico	2	1	III	2	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Brazil	2	1	IV	3	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Indonesia	2	1	III	2	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
India	2	1	III	0	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
Turkey	2	1	III	2	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$
South Africa	2	1	III	1	$\{ny_{it}, k_{it}, ex_{it}, im_{it}, reer_{it}\}$	$\{ny_{it}^*, k_{it}^*, reer_{it}^*, poil\}$

Notes: Deterministics case IV indicates constant and restricted trend in the VECMX* estimation. Case III indicates only constant. r refers to the number of cointegrating relationships as indicated by the Johansen's test.

Table 4: Over-identified Long Run Restrictions in the GVAR model

Country/ Region	Imposed Restrictions	Theoretical equation	r	LLR(df)	99% CV
Australia	$ny_t - 0.90k_t - 0.38ex_t + 0.47im_t$	ELGH	1	16.96(8)	31.34
Brazil			3		
Canada	$ex_t - im_t$	TB \sim I(0)	1	51.72(9)	53.83
China	$ex_t - im_t$	TB \sim I(0)	1	24.15(7)	32.65
France	$ny_t - 1.54k_t - 0.58ex_t + 1.18im_t$	ELGH	1	27.05(8)	34.92
Indonesia	$im_t - 0.38ex_t - 1.01ny_t - 0.44reer_t$	Imports Equation	1	26.85(8)	33.60
India	$ex_t - im_t$	TB \sim I(0)	1	12.69(8)	42.05
Ireland	$ny_t - 0.55k - 0.60ex_t + 0.53im_t$	ELGH	1	16.29(8)	31.75
Japan			2		
Korea	$ex_t - im_t$	TB \sim I(0)	1	29.00(9)	46.09
Mexico			2		
North Europe	$ny_t - 3.14k_t - 3.38ex_t + 5.02im_t$	ELGH	1	10.68(8)	29.92
Norway	$ny_t - 2.29k_t - 0.35ex_t + 3.03im_t$	ELGH	1	46.08(9)	53.41
New Zealand	$ex_t - 0.69im_t - 0.25ny_t^* + 0.67reer_t$	Exports Equation	1	14.98(8)	29.81
South Africa					
South Europe	$im_t - 0.86ex_t - 0.94ny_t - 1.02reer_t$	Imports Equation	1	22.61(8)	34.73
Sweden			1		
Switzerland			3		
Turkey	$ny_t - 0.55k_t - 1.72ex_t + 1.67im_t$ $ex_t - 0.85im_t - 0.41ny_t^* + 0.17reer_t$	ELGH Exports Equation	2	46.95(14)	53.78
UK	$im_t - 0.57ex_t - 1.40ny_t - 0.24reer_t$	Imports Equation	1	28.85(8)	31.78
USA	$ex_t - 0.47im_t - 0.82ny_t^* + 1.6reer_t$	Exports Equation	1	10.62(9)	31.77

Notes: Imposed restrictions refer to the theory-based equations that imposed to the cointegrating vector β_i of each individual VECMX*model. r refers to the number of cointegrating vectors imposed. Log-Likelihood Ratio test was based on 2000 bootstrapped replications.

Table 5: Weak Exogeneity Test of the Country Specific Foreign Variables and Oil Price

Country/Region		Foreign Variables			
		<i>ny</i> *	<i>k</i> *	<i>reer</i> *	<i>poil</i>
USA	F(1,134)	0.72	1.08	7.65*	
North Europe	F(1,134)	0.82	1.15	6.84*	2.81
South Europe	F(1,134)	0.01	4.93*	0.36	2.72
UK	F(1,134)	0.68	3.01	0.72	1.38
France	F(1,134)	14.32*	1.85	0.41	0.57
China	F(1,135)	8.58*	3.96*	0.37	1.76
Japan	F(2,133)	0.09	2.78	0.53	1.59
Korea	F(1,134)	0.70	0.33	0.69	2.08
Canada	F(1,134)	7.84*	1.07	1.45	0.45
Australia	F(1,134)	4.97*	1.03	0.00	0.00
Ireland	F(1,134)	0.22	0.39	0.03	0.19
Sweden	F(1,134)	0.43	0.50	0.01	1.42
Switzerland	F(3,132)	0.46	0.68	0.42	4.15*
Norway	F(1,134)	16.68*	1.98	2.00	1.42
New Zealand	F(1,134)	0.06	18.90*	12.62*	0.15
Mexico	F(2,133)	0.17	0.74	5.47*	0.31
Brazil	F(3,132)	0.74	0.46	1.13	0.23
Indonesia	F(1,134)	4.46*	0.06	1.31	4.51*
India	F(1,134)	1.34	1.90	1.38	0.02
Turkey	F(2,133)	0.33	0.29	5.18*	0.11
South Africa	F(1,134)	1.05	2.21	0.13	0.06

Note: (*) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of the test.

Table 6: Impact Elasticities between Domestic and Foreign Variables

Country/Region	Domestic Variables		
	<i>ny</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>reer</i>
USA	0.07	0.60	0.11
	[0.56]	[3.28]	[0.52]
North Europe	0.19	0.54	-0.44
	[0.82]	[3.56]	[-2.85]
South Europe	0.28	0.54	0.31
	[3.11]	[3.66]	[1.22]
UK	0.36	0.45	-1.78
	[2.58]	[1.86]	[-3.78]
France	0.17	0.42	1.09
	[2.92]	[3.28]	[5.90]
China	0.29		0.30
	[2.10]		[0.59]
Japan	0.30	-0.06	-0.92
	[1.65]	[-0.47]	[-4.42]
India	0.27	-0.08	0.45
	[1.86]	[-0.65]	[2.13]
Korea	1.42	-0.04	0.08
	[2.16]	[-0.10]	[0.30]
Canada	0.35	0.45	0.03
	[1.72]	[2.02]	[0.19]
Australia	0.23	0.57	0.26
	[1.71]	[2.21]	[0.72]
Ireland	-0.47	0.40	-0.82
	[-0.85]	[1.18]	[-2.97]
Sweden	0.46	0.93	0.08
	[3.31]	[5.94]	[0.21]
Switzerland	1.50	-0.25	-0.64
	[1.19]	[-0.44]	[-1.93]

Note: Newey-West t-ratio's in brackets.

Table 7: Average pair-wise cross section correlations

Country/Region	<i>ny</i>		<i>k</i>		<i>ex</i>		<i>im</i>		<i>reer</i>	
	Levels	1st Diff.	Levels	1st Diff.	Levels	1st Diff.	Levels	1st Diff.	Levels	1st Diff.
USA	0.83	0.08	0.85	0.14	0.98	0.25	0.97	0.27	-0.06	-0.14
North Europe	-0.14	0.05	0.83	0.12	0.98	0.23	0.98	0.26	0.03	-0.01
South Europe	0.76	0.09	0.73	0.14	0.98	0.27	0.95	0.27	0.02	0.04
UK	0.83	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.99	0.17	0.98	0.19	-0.06	-0.03
France	0.83	0.09	0.87	0.14	0.98	0.30	0.98	0.28	0.15	0.04
China	0.81	0.00			0.98	0.14	0.97	0.08	0.17	-0.04
Japan	0.75	0.03	0.44	0.08	0.98	0.28	0.96	0.25	-0.25	-0.18
Korea	0.78	0.05	0.84	0.04	0.98	0.12	0.98	0.11	0.19	0.09
Canada	0.79	0.06	0.87	0.13	0.96	0.20	0.98	0.25	0.27	0.14
Sweden	0.78	0.09	0.84	0.15	0.98	0.24	0.98	0.29	0.15	0.06
Switzerland	-0.41	0.03	0.79	0.01	0.96	0.11	0.97	0.09	-0.17	-0.06

Table 8: Structural Stability Tests, number of rejections of the null hypothesis

Structural Stability Tests	Domestic Variables (rejection %)						Numbers of rejections(%)
	<i>ny_{it}</i>	<i>k_{it}</i>	<i>ex_{it}</i>	<i>im_{it}</i>	<i>reer_{it}</i>	<i>poil</i>	
PKsup	2(9.5)	1(5)	6(28.5)	2(9.5)	0(0)	0	11(10.4)
PKmsq	3(14.2)	1(5)	5(23.8)	1(4.8)	0(0)	0	10(9.5)
Nyblom	6(28.5)	7(35)	9(42.8)	6(28.5)	8(38)	1	37(35.2)
Robust-Nyblom	2(9.5)	4(20)	5(23.8)	5(23.8)	7(33)	1	24(22.8)
QLR	7(33)	9(45)	10(47.6)	13(61.9)	12(57.1)	1	52(49.5)
Robust-QLR	7(33)	6(30)	6(28.5)	3(14.2)	4(19)	0	26(24.7)
MW	7(33)	7(35)	9(42.8)	8(38)	10(47.6)	1	42(40)
Robust- MW	6(28.5)	5(25)	6(28.5)	4(19)	8(38)	0	29(27.6)
APW	9(42.8)	10(47.6)	9(42.8)	14(67)	12(57.1)	1	55(52.3)
Robust- APW	6(28.5)	5(25)	6(28.5)	4(19)	7(33)	0	28(27)

Note: All tests are conducted at the 5% significance level.

Table 9: GFEVD of the NEA and SEA real trade flows


Proportion of forecast error variance		<i>n</i> -step quarters ahead						
		0	2	4	6	8	10	12
		North Euro Area Real Imports (%)						
North Euro Area	im	83.23	73.53	70.67	69.60	69.09	68.84	68.75
North Euro Area	ex	26.47	36.38	37.30	36.94	36.71	36.25	35.84
North Euro Area	k	27.80	28.67	27.42	26.42	25.60	25.01	24.62
North Euro Area	reer	7.78	7.93	8.41	8.63	8.83	8.87	8.87
Mexico	im	6.72	6.12	6.20	6.25	6.33	6.42	6.47
Oil Price		3.26	6.06	6.42	6.63	6.64	6.58	6.51
North Euro Area	ny	3.42	4.64	5.15	5.49	5.74	5.94	6.15
South Euro Area	im	3.75	5.02	5.23	5.18	5.12	5.03	4.93
China	ny	1.23	3.49	4.71	5.27	5.42	5.38	5.22
Japan	ex	1.36	3.47	3.81	3.81	3.72	3.61	3.51
South Euro Area	k	2.08	2.96	3.28	3.35	3.32	3.29	3.24
South Euro Area	ex	1.84	3.11	3.28	3.25	3.19	3.14	3.09
Total Sum		232	253.3	258.	258.7	258.6	257.9	257.2
		South Euro Area Real Exports (%)						
South Euro Area	ex	80.23	72.94	68.87	66.29	63.98	61.93	60.18
South Euro Area	im	23.28	22.48	23.15	23.86	24.40	24.91	25.45
South Euro Area	rer	3.78	8.69	11.73	14.27	16.48	18.21	19.63
North Euro Area	ex	9.41	13.21	13.10	12.40	11.42	10.44	9.52
North Euro Area	im	6.67	10.42	11.46	11.71	11.51	11.29	11.02
France	ex	9.47	10.07	9.87	9.67	9.40	9.11	8.79
Japan	ex	8.46	10.26	10.09	9.63	9.12	8.60	8.14
North Euro Area	rer	2.54	5.24	6.78	7.71	8.44	8.88	9.21
Canada	im	6.22	6.96	7.01	6.96	6.94	6.85	6.79
North Euro Area	ny	2.60	4.14	5.22	5.80	6.23	6.53	6.73
Oil Price		3.98	5.46	5.77	5.72	5.48	5.26	5.00
South Euro Area	ny	9.65	6.06	5.18	4.70	4.35	4.06	3.78
Total Sum		259.2	280.5	287.6	290.6	291.0	290.0	288.6
		South Euro Area Real Imports (%)						
South Euro Area	im	78.18	70.10	67.37	66.16	65.62	65.36	65.10
South Euro Area	k	31.01	36.58	37.47	37.96	38.32	38.44	38.51
South Euro Area	ex	22.09	17.03	14.51	13.14	12.30	11.68	11.18
South Euro Area	ny	1.61	11.50	14.49	15.80	16.55	16.99	17.34
North Euro Area	im	9.06	10.12	9.91	9.70	9.52	9.39	9.27
North Euro Area	ex	7.53	9.65	9.34	8.85	8.43	8.12	7.76
Sweden	im	6.93	7.41	7.42	7.35	7.31	7.29	7.30
France	ex	3.32	5.20	5.42	5.42	5.37	5.34	5.25
Japan	ex	4.67	5.61	5.24	4.85	4.62	4.39	4.20
Canada	im	4.77	4.81	4.55	4.43	4.37	4.36	4.28
Turkey	ny	2.67	4.07	4.33	4.41	4.43	4.41	4.34
China	ex	4.75	4.51	4.22	3.97	3.77	3.63	3.50
Total Sum		268.6	288.7	287.5	285.0	283.3	281.4	279.4

Table 10: GFEVD of the USA and China Real Imports


Proportion of forecast error	<i>n</i> -step quarters ahead							
	0	2	4	6	8	10	12	
variance	USA Real Imports (%)							
USA	im	85.81	74.45	70.04	67.14	64.62	62.43	60.54
USA	k	32.08	43.79	44.04	43.73	43.17	42.30	41.33
USA	ny	12.59	34.74	38.00	39.41	39.79	39.62	39.36
USA	ex	12.24	17.82	17.85	17.66	17.29	16.77	16.28
France	ex	6.25	7.27	7.59	7.79	7.95	7.91	7.87
North Euro Area	rer	3.15	4.06	4.51	5.21	5.87	6.44	6.98
Canada	im	5.16	3.76	3.67	3.66	3.64	3.62	3.59
Sweden	ex	3.40	4.02	4.03	3.83	3.65	3.43	3.21
Sweden	rer	2.06	3.80	4.09	3.99	3.77	3.57	3.34
North Euro Area	ny	1.99	2.98	3.44	3.77	4.02	4.22	4.36
China	ny	0.77	2.90	4.05	4.42	4.31	3.97	3.66
Canada	ex	4.17	3.35	3.23	3.28	3.42	3.54	3.66
Total Sum		257.1	297.6	300.5	301.3	300.3	298.2	296.2
	China Real Imports (%)							
China	im	95.58	89.70	84.62	80.77	77.93	75.81	74.15
China	ex	22.69	30.38	36.77	41.68	45.14	47.57	49.29
China	ny	5.23	6.27	7.15	8.10	9.22	10.07	10.91
Turkey	k	7.74	6.17	5.61	5.33	5.12	5.01	4.94
Norway	ny	5.28	5.48	5.41	5.29	5.16	5.05	4.96
Switzerland	k	5.31	5.19	4.68	4.22	3.86	3.59	3.40
South Africa	im	3.59	4.17	4.42	4.48	4.48	4.44	4.36
Brazil	ex	3.44	3.81	4.09	4.23	4.31	4.32	4.32
South Africa	ex	3.64	3.76	3.85	3.87	3.76	3.69	3.60
Canada	ex	4.03	3.95	3.71	3.50	3.31	3.17	3.08
Korea	ny	4.04	3.69	3.35	3.12	2.94	2.79	2.68
Switzerland	ex	5.27	4.07	3.36	2.89	2.54	2.29	2.13
Total Sum		255.2	253.5	253.3	253.7	254.3	254.8	254.7

Figure 2: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to North Euro Area Domestic Demand*

(a) response of Euro-area variables




(b) Effects on real domestic demand after 4 quarters




*Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.

Figure 3: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to North Euro area Real Imports*

(a) response of Euro-area variables




(b) Effects on real exports after 4 quarters




*Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.

Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to South Euro Area Real Imports*

(a) response of Euro-area variables




(b) Effects on real exports after 4 quarters




*Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.

Figure 5: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Negative one s.d. shock to South Euro Area Real Exchange Rate*

(a) Effects on real effective exchange rates after 4 quarters




(b) response of Euro-area domestic variables




*Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.

Figure 6: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to US real domestic output*


(a) response of U.S. variables



(b) Effects on non-export real output after 4 quarters




(c) Effects on real exports after 4 quarters




*Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.

Figure 7: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Negative one s.d. shock to US real exchange rate*

(a) response of U.S variables




(b) Effects on real exports after 4 quarters



*Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.

Figure 8: : Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to the real oil price*



*Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.

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Table A.1: Data Sources

Country	Real GDP	Real GCF	Real exports	Real imports	REER
Australia	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Austria	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Belgium	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Brazil	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Canada	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
China	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}		<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Finland	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
France	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Germany	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*} / <i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Greece	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*} / <i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
India	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>OECD</i>
Indonesia	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾ / <i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾ / <i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>OECD</i>
Ireland	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾ / <i>WDI</i> ^{(3)*}	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Italy	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Japan	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Korea	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i>
Mexico	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Netherlands	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
New Zealand	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Norway	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Portugal	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
South Africa	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ^{(1)*}	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Spain	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Sweden	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Switzerland	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
Turkey	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ^{(1)*}	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽²⁾	<i>OECD</i>
UK	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾
USA	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>OECD</i> ⁽¹⁾	<i>IFS</i> ⁽⁴⁾

Notes: ⁽¹⁾ Economic Outlook No 101. ⁽²⁾ Quarterly National Accounts. ⁽³⁾ World Development Indicators. ⁽⁴⁾ IMF, International Financial Statistics. (*) Interpolated from annual data. REER indicates real effective exchange rate.

Table A.2: Unit Root Tests

Country	<i>ny</i>			<i>k</i>			<i>ex</i>			<i>im</i>			<i>reer</i>		
	<i>Level</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>D</i> ²	<i>Level</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>D</i> ²	<i>Level</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>D</i> ²	<i>Level</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>D</i> ²	<i>Level</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>D</i> ²
Australia	-2.62	-6.64	-13.23	-3.12	-7.48	-9.55	-1.72	-9.40	-10.55	-3.42	-6.26	-8.37	-2.12	-7.90	-10.02
Brazil	-1.35	-2.29	-8.97	-1.28	-3.81	-10.18	-0.97	-5.87	-7.21	-0.67	-3.38	-9.73	-3.10	-5.23	-10.14
Canada	-1.55	-5.60	-8.80	-3.11	-7.28	-10.21	-1.08	-4.29	-9.22	-1.23	-6.74	-9.18	-2.13	-6.75	-10.02
China	-2.33	-3.08	-7.80				-0.28	-4.71	-8.30	-1.34	-5.93	-7.45	-0.25	-6.55	-8.72
France	-1.06	-4.26	-14.04	-3.11	-5.09	-15.07	-1.42	-6.60	-8.49	-2.01	-6.07	-7.71	-2.76	-6.47	-9.50
Indonesia	-1.96	-7.72	-10.50	-1.64	-4.74	-9.42	-3.46	-9.48	-10.48	-3.17	-8.01	-8.50	-1.88	-8.21	-10.70
India	0.53	-4.63	-10.94	-0.57	-4.22	-11.57	0.05	-3.86	-9.91	-0.97	-4.34	-9.74	-0.86	-5.59	-10.04
Ireland	-2.09	-2.34	-6.28	-1.23	-5.45	-8.52	-1.81	-6.81	-8.41	-1.52	-5.88	-8.74	-1.60	-4.99	-9.52
Japan	-0.05	-4.55	-9.34	-1.14	-6.29	-8.63	-3.97	-7.15	-8.91	-2.25	-7.32	-14.43	-1.53	-5.45	-8.20
Korea	-0.59	-4.86	-9.09	-1.31	-7.68	-11.28	-0.86	-6.12	-9.59	-1.87	-8.23	-10.34	-3.19	-6.50	-9.60
Mexico	-3.78	-7.96	-9.29	-2.32	-7.10	-8.49	-1.94	-9.81	-10.24	-2.18	-5.72	-8.75	-4.12	-6.01	-15.00
NEA	0.54	-5.27	-8.90	-2.82	-4.90	-8.23	-2.81	-6.36	-7.86	-2.18	-6.16	-8.34	-2.61	-6.45	-8.70
Norway	-1.83	-11.32	-11.11	-2.64	-8.56	-10.43	-0.56	-11.77	-11.33	-2.14	-7.70	-10.72	-2.21	-8.56	-11.07
New Zealand	-1.86	-6.30	-9.36	-3.30	-9.11	-10.39	-0.85	-9.99	-10.27	-4.18	-7.28	-8.03	-2.51	-4.97	-9.77
South Africa	-1.71	-9.85	-12.25	-1.23	-3.83	-8.94	-1.56	-7.38	-13.35	-2.81	-7.08	-10.67	-4.19	-6.32	-7.95
SEA	-1.81	-2.59	-8.29	-1.33	-5.99	-9.58	-1.72	-6.19	-7.44	-1.39	-5.75	-8.76	-2.46	-6.27	-9.73
Sweden	-1.85	-6.44	-10.04	-2.70	-5.72	-9.90	-2.08	-6.47	-11.02	-3.14	-6.43	-8.40	-3.62	-6.35	-9.79
Switzerland	-3.19	-8.28	-10.69	-3.12	-8.43	-13.05	-4.75	-7.43	-9.48	-4.76	-8.33	-10.80	-2.76	-6.71	-9.21
Turkey	-2.49	-8.14	-9.07	-1.99	-4.36	-9.77	-0.05	-5.04	-8.38	-3.98	-7.94	-8.65	-1.37	-8.52	-10.21
UK	-1.75	-6.38	-10.18	-2.69	-5.88	-9.81	-1.82	-9.56	-10.24	-1.33	-6.46	-10.06	-3.19	-7.19	-9.53
USA	-1.66	-4.31	-7.77	-2.08	-6.54	-9.09	-1.63	-6.14	-9.44	-1.67	-5.24	-8.27	-2.34	-5.53	-9.29


Notes: Unit root tests based on weighted-symmetric ADF test (WS). Lag Length chosen based on AIC. Values in bold indicate rejection of the null hypothesis. D and D2 indicate first and second differences of the levels respectively.

Table A.3: Weak Exogeneity Test among NEA's and SEA's Variables

chosen lags $p^* = 1, q^* = 1$					
South Euro Area Variables					
	ny^{south}	k^{south}	ex^{south}	im^{south}	$reer^{south}$
North Euro Area Model	4.90*	0.97	1.00	1.94	0.03
North Euro Area Variables					
	ny^{north}	k^{north}	ex^{north}	im^{north}	$reer^{north}$
South Euro Area Model	0.36	5.81*	0.02	1.92	0.13
chosen lags $p^* = 2, q^* = 1$					
South Euro Area Variables					
	ny^{south}	k^{south}	ex^{south}	im^{south}	$reer^{south}$
North Euro Area Model	1.12	4.35*	1.26	3.57	0.32
North Euro Area Variables					
	ny^{north}	k^{north}	ex^{north}	im^{north}	$reer^{north}$
South Euro Area Model	0.02	7.29*	0.11	3.53	1.42

Notes: This table refers to weak exogeneity tests for the NEA's variables on SEA's region-specific VECM model and vice-versa. Weak exogeneity test is based on the works of Johansen (1992) and Harbo *et al.* (1998). See subsection 4.3 for more information. * denotes rejection of the test's null hypothesis.

Figure A.1: Regional Current Account Balances as percent of GDP



Source: OECD, World Bank and authors' calculations.

Figure A.2: Bootstrap Means of Persistence Profiles

