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Opportunities for all the team: Entrepreneurship and the 1966 and 1994 Soccer World Cups

Key Words:

Entrepreneurship, FIFA World Cup, Mega-event, Commercialization, Swarm

Abstract:

Little research has been published as to the ways in which the commercial aspects of FIFA World Cups are organized. Extant literature has instead tended to focus upon infrastructure issues, economic geography and cultural aspects. Drawing upon Swarm theory and Vamplew's typologies of entrepreneurial activity in sport we compare and contrast the commercial aspects of two World Cups; firstly, the 1966 tournament held in England, the first time that a serious attempt had been made to produce and licence a mascot character ('World Cup Willie') to exploit merchandising opportunities. This approach became an important part of World Cups thereafter; Secondly, the 1994 tournament in the USA, the most commercially successful World Cup ever, realising record profits and catalysing the re-launch of elite professional soccer in the USA. These cases enrich understanding of the networks and entrepreneurial activity of the World Cup, one of the most significant sporting and cultural mega-event projects in the world.

The planning and delivery of large-scale projects requires organizations and individuals to work together, so that the event gains in ways unachievable if those involved were to operate on their own. This type of working has been referred to by Gloor as *Swarm creativity* – taken from studies into how insects such as bees and ants work individually and together in colonies – and it is fast being recognized as a highly efficient and productive *modus operandi* for human interaction.¹

Tennent and Gillett have applied the Swarm concept to the business history of sport.² They observed a Swarm of 'Actors', comprising organisations and individuals, collaborating as a virtual organisation, where each contributed value to the outcomes of an overall project,

the FIFA World Cup. They used the honey-bee metaphor popularized by Gloor to illustrate their network as a 'hive' of activity. Their application of Swarm theory to the 1966 World Cup represented as a complex and heterogeneous network or 'Swarm'. It portrayed them as bees swarming to establish a new colony or nest, originating from multiple countries and different sectors of the economy, for a limited period of time, to produce 'value'. In this model (Figure 1) the participant organizations would simultaneously cooperate to organize, manage, and deliver the sporting event, apparently without a high degree of deliberate central coordination. This model also reveals the short-term nature of the network, with little consideration given to longitudinal benefit; Long-term focus associated with successful relational approaches to marketing were therefore lacking. The theoretical implication is that the Chandlerian view of organizations is insufficient to explain the virtual project organisations that deliver sport mega-events. Chandler's view postulates that large multi-divisional (M-form) organizations were necessary for economic and entrepreneurial success.³ Tennent and Gillett focus on project-form (P-form) organizations, which are deliberately temporary and virtual rather than 'built to last' multidivisional conglomerates.

Porter critiques the Swarm analogy for its limited explanatory power, arguing that the 1966 tournament's legacy was 'unmanaged and essentially unmanageable....the attempt to integrate it into the conceptual framework here seems rather forced'.⁴ Neither does it fully contextualize the reasons for stakeholders wanting to host the event, or explain its legacy. In order to strengthen the framework and its explanation as to the tournament's legacy, Gillett and Tennent have responded by examining the levels of decision-making, as well as the motives for hosting the event.⁵ However, the framework developed from a project management perspective remains based upon a single case.

Wray Vamplew's recent work on the history of entrepreneurship in sport is useful here. He has modified Stephen Hardy's pioneering contribution to create an 'explanatory framework of entrepreneurial innovation' which identifies a broad range of entrepreneurs, their objectives, and the products created to fulfil identified wants or needs. Vamplew has also re-categorized Hardy's tripartite sports product to give a more precise definition of the character of the innovation. The broad range of stakeholders in Vamplew's analysis potentially constitutes a network, although he does not define it as such. The concept of a network, we argue, is important in relation to entrepreneurship in sport, especially with reference to mega-events, such as the World Cup. Theoretical explanations of entrepreneurship refer explicitly to the importance of networks possessing tangible resources (land, equipment, stadium facilities) or intangible resources (tactical expertise, judgment of player ability, knowledge of customer requirements) that are significant for venture creation in this field.⁶

Figure 1 about here

By applying the Swarm framework alongside Vamplew's model of sports entrepreneurship and commercial opportunities, a more powerful tool is created. Applying the analytical tool has revealed important findings that enrich understanding of the network dynamics of the World Cup tournament, one of the most significant sporting and cultural mega-event projects globally. Tennent and Gillett's unit of analysis is the project itself, focusing on the successful delivery of the tournament. The importance of commerce and entrepreneurship in sport is a relatively undeveloped theme within sports history literature. Using Vamplew's framework in conjunction with the Swarm creates a more effective tool for analysing subsequent World

Cups and potentially other global sporting mega-events such as the Olympics. By using Vamplew's version of the tripartite sports product in conjunction with the Swarm framework it is possible to identify an extended range of stakeholder 'bees' thus allowing a more extensive model of entrepreneurial interaction around mega-events, for example the 1994 FIFA World Cup held in the United States, considered one of the more financially successful global sport mega-events to date.

The FIFA World Cup Business Model

The World Cup is very important to FIFA historically as its main revenue stream and its flagship activity; it also serves as a global showcase for association football. FIFA was formed in 1904 and grew into the world governing body for the sport. Initially it was a very Eurocentric organization with membership limited to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The four oldest associations, the British 'home nations' initially refused to join, and their involvement would be intermittent until they permanently joined in 1946.⁷ FIFA held its first World Cup tournament in Uruguay in 1930, initially featuring teams from only mainland Europe and the Americas.

The FIFA World Cup developed to become FIFA's primary revenue stream. FIFA's business model settled into a four-year cycle in which the tournament funded the organization's routine operations, including its Zurich headquarters and its outreach activities. By 1966 FIFA had enlarged to 124 full members but was still an essentially Eurocentric organization, albeit with a large membership in the Americas. The decolonization process reluctantly pursued by European powers meant that many African, Asian, Caribbean and Oceanian countries had achieved independence, and joined FIFA. Such

was the speed of expansion that 25 new national associations, mostly from Africa joined between October 1964 and June 1966.⁸ Many colonies and former colonies were marginalized to a large extent by the FIFA establishment who, despite the rapid expansion of the organization, limited African and Asian participation in the 1966 FIFA World Cup finals to just one place between both continents. This policy did not go unnoticed by those nations' football associations, many of which boycotted the tournament.

Nevertheless, the 1966 tournament effectively established the business model that FIFA have applied ever since, though it has been significantly refined and extended over the years, with the increasing opportunities that sponsorship and broadcasting rights would offer.⁹ In 1966 FIFA was able to use the surplus from the tournament to sustain itself financially over the following four-year period until 1970, when the next World Cup finals took place.

Whilst the growth of FIFA was a challenge for its administrators it also presented an opportunity, not unnoticed by the Brazilian football administrator and former Olympian João Havelange, who ousted the incumbent FIFA President, the Englishman Sir Stanley Rous, in 1974. This ushered in a new approach more inclusive to African and Asian members and also to the increased commercialization which was required to fund the outreach projects that drove continued expansion. Thereafter the World Cup became even more lucrative for its organizer with FIFA increasing its control over sponsorship and media access, exploiting improvements in television technology.¹⁰ To understand this more clearly we should consider the business model of the World Cup.

David Teece defines a business model thus:-

A business model articulates the logic and provides data and other evidence that demonstrates how a business creates and delivers value to customers. It also outlines

the architecture of revenues, costs, and profits associated with the business enterprise delivering that value.¹¹

The FIFA World Cup articulates the logic of international football competition valued by FIFA's members; FIFA's power stemming from its monopolistic position. National football organizations deliver the tournament under license from FIFA. This business model is essentially a franchise with the organizers at national level assuming operational responsibility and much of the financial risk involved in staging the finals. The main revenue stream of the FIFA World Cup has evolved from gate receipts at the stadiums to income from media rights. Thus, the World Cup has become an increasingly attractive platform for sponsorship and advertising augmented with opportunities for merchandizing and other licensing opportunities. The monopoly was so strong that early World Cups generated sufficient profits for FIFA from gate receipts alone, but later tournaments became increasingly complicated and risky, especially for the national and local organizers. Yet the potential revenue derived from staging the finals is so great that, whilst it is not the only reason why a country might want to host the FIFA World Cup, finance remains an important driver.¹²

Applying Swarm theory to Vamplew's framework is a useful way to analyse the involvement of the component stakeholder groups, and to identify the significant areas of entrepreneurial activity within the World Cup project. With consideration to two longitudinal case studies located in different national and temporal contexts (1966 World Cup - England, and the 1994 World Cup - USA) we identify the main areas of commercial innovation that emerged. Our study goes on to compare and contrast these areas so as to identify commercial activity and the entrepreneurial and innovative achievements of the individual stakeholder organizations.

The 1966 FIFA World Cup, England

Three key areas of the organization of the world cup tournament are media, ticketing and merchandizing. Applying Swarm analysis reveals important stakeholders who contributed to the 1966 FIFA World Cup – FIFA, the English FA and the spin-offs created especially for the event - the World Cup Organization and the Local Organization Committees.' These stakeholders engaged in entrepreneurial activity in relation to Vamplew's 'spectator' and 'associated' components of the sports product. The World Cup Organization had a quasi-independent managerial structure under its Chief Administrative Officer, Ken Wilson, who was appointed on a fixed term running from 2 September 1963 until 31 March 1967.¹³ Wilson's office was based at one of the host venues, London's White City Stadium, and attended to much of the administrative and operational detail for the FA, including liaising with clubs to arrange ticketing and merchandizing. The linkage between the Swarm stakeholders and the components of the tripartite sports product as categorized by Vamplew are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 here.

As owners of the World Cup finals competition, FIFA took ownership and ensured the strategic direction of the competition, while the English FA (hereafter the FA) as hosts were responsible for its implementation. The FA basically became contractors to FIFA, using their local knowledge and expertise to market FIFA's 'product' in England in what amounted to a form of Foreign Direct Investment Licensing.¹⁴ The exact division of responsibility was set out in late 1962. Although the FIFA committees had overall responsibility for the design of

the tournament, most of the actual logistics of organization had been left to the FA committee, although its actions were subject to FIFA approval.

Another important sphere of entrepreneurship was broadcast and media. The commercialisation of the FIFA World Cup appears to have evolved in tandem with the growth of interest from broadcast media and newspapers, and with technological changes that enabled international transmission of matches via television. This World Cup would have the legacy that future tournaments would seem increasingly ‘constructed by, for, and in, the mass media.’¹⁵ Indeed, the 1966 World Cup finals were notable because television coverage ‘took a great leap forward during this tournament.’¹⁶ During the 1962 World Cup in Chile broadcasters had flown film back to Europe, but now the whole continent could watch live.¹⁷ By 1966, the Cold War and the associated space race were creating new opportunities through improved broadcasting and communication technologies for spreading the game’s popularity globally.¹⁸ Indeed, Robinson, *et al.* report that for the 1966 World Cup 2,158 press, photographers, radio and television accreditations were issued to people from 62 countries. Sixty radio organizations would be broadcasting live from the grounds and TV images would be beamed to 69 stations around the world.¹⁹

Prior to 1966, the BBC was the most ‘robust institutional framework for developing sports coverage’,²⁰ although it was the American TV networks which, with four channels to fill, pioneered the formal commercialization of sports rights in the late 1940s.²¹ The BBC together with other European public service broadcasters formed the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), known on screen as Eurovision, which had shown nine live matches during the 1954 FIFA World Cup. The EBU paid nothing for the privilege but had demonstrated the market for live World Cup football, and had stimulated sales of TV sets. Then, in 1960, the European Cup Final became the first match to be broadcast live across the entire European continent, the rights sold for £8,000.²² England 1966 was, therefore, the first *tournament* to

be widely televised.²³ As with the wider format of the tournament, the implementation of the agreement was left to the FA and hosting clubs as well as the hosting broadcasters, the BBC and ITV (the UK's commercial network), although with some supervision from the FIFA Organizing Committee as the tournament approached.

In 1966 television as a technology remained in its relative infancy, still being in black and white. The deal with the EBU, which helped FIFA gain the widest possible exposure, ensured the tournament would be mostly covered by free-to-air public service broadcasters. In radio broadcasting, which remained more important than television in some countries, there was no body analogous to the EBU and the BBC, as the UK's sole authorised radio broadcaster at this time, was given the radio rights by default.²⁴ EBU member broadcasters were also granted the right to carry non-commercial sound broadcasts of matches for free, whether live or deferred, as were public service broadcasters around the world, although commercial stations, which were dominant in Brazil and Argentina, were charged.²⁵ Some stations from France, Spain, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay also bought broadcasting rights to some matches.²⁶

Radio was not monetized in the same way as TV, except in the main markets for soccer where live TV broadcasting from England was not yet technically possible. Thus a compromise was struck between the exploitation of the broadcasting rights and gaining maximum exposure for the tournament. Underlining the technologically transitional nature of the 1960s, the film rights also remained important. Although sale was initially considered to a British company, Associated British-Pathe, FIFA eventually sold the rights to a French company, CEPAS, despite concern that they overlapped with the TV rights sold to the EBU.²⁷ FIFA did not move to sell these rights as quickly as the television rights, only conducting negotiations in 1964.

A clause in the contract prevented FIFA from using the TV broadcasts to carry advertising to any third parties, which would go on to be interpreted as a ban on any pitch-side or other advertising in grounds.²⁸ Ironically the only advertisement at Wembley would be for the BBC's own *Radio Times* listing magazine, as it could not be considered a third party. This was clearly a missed opportunity to generate revenue for FIFA and the FA. After the ratings success of 1966 FIFA would be more aware in future World Cups and not allow broadcasters to close down this potential source of revenue.

Ticketing was another important area of entrepreneurial activity. For the FA and the clubs individually the main source of revenue for the tournament was gate receipts. Season tickets were provided to cover all the matches played on any one ground. Although some semi-final and final tickets would be held for purchasers of these tickets, it was assumed that a ballot would be required as demand would probably outstrip supply. It was also decided that box offices, based at the host stadiums, would be able to supply tickets for matches at any ground. A related programme of ground improvements was also driven forward by the Labour government's 'Minister for Sport', Denis Howell, who saw the tournament as an opportunity to advertise British business and secured a government grant of £500,000 to invest in improving stadiums and hospitality facilities so as to showcase British organizing abilities in the best possible light.²⁹

A standardized gradation of ticket prices was introduced across all grounds, although Wembley, White City and Old Trafford had larger capacities and extra gradations were added for those grounds. An analysis of capacity gave an estimated total ticket income of £1,724,694 assuming a maximum sale of tickets; this would prove to be somewhat optimistic.³⁰ Ticket prices finalized, the accent was now on implementation with the first sales anticipated to start at least a year before the tournament. Local organizing committees hoped for a temporary tourism boost in World Cup hosting towns and cities.³¹ Local

authorities followed Howell's lead tasking their industrial, development officers to liaise with businesses in order to welcome foreign supporters and showcase and the local economy. Local employers were co-opted to organize tours of their workplaces, including steel products factories in Sheffield, glass works in Sunderland, and the Littlewoods Pools Competition Office in Liverpool. Retailers in Sunderland were asked to give their window displays a 'festive air', and around the country language students were drafted in to act as translators. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that these activities generated any additional exports or even tourism in the years following the tournament.³²

By March 1966 season tickets covering all 10 matches that it would be possible for one spectator to attend had sold out, and overseas sales were reported to be healthy.³³ In May club secretaries were finally given the go-ahead to organize one last push for ticket sales through their clubs, although Manchester United had already been reduced to limited availability by February.³⁴ Despite the challenges explained above, 1966 proved to be one of the best attended tournaments in World Cup history – therefore it is possible to conclude that the tournament was a sales success, particularly among English fans, although some matches did not quite attract the crowds hoped for.

One of the highest profile areas of entrepreneurial activity in 1966 was merchandizing. World Cup 1966 appears to be an important evolutionary moment in the commercialisation of sporting mega-events. As discussed, innovation and entrepreneurial activity included efforts associated with broadcasting and the media, and the approach to ticketing encouraged supporters to advance purchase a complete 'season ticket package' for all stages of the tournament, meaning a cash advance to the organisers as spectators paid up front. The 1966 tournament also involved extensive merchandizing on a scale not previously seen, although this was somewhat experimental. These innovations were driven by Ken Wilson, and his World Cup Organization which, in corresponding with fans, clubs, the FA's

constituent county associations, and other stakeholders, spotted entrepreneurial opportunities to capture value from the tournament.³⁵

Initially, the World Cup Organization wanted to produce a souvenir brochure but was unable to secure advertisers to finance its production, and the idea was ultimately scaled down to a folding leaflet and given a smaller print run.³⁶ Similarly, souvenir programmes were a great concern, The sudden death of the FA Chairman, J. H. W. Mears on 1 July, just days before the tournament was due to begin, necessitated some changes to the programme, and this was the reason given for a cost overrun in its production, leaving a profit of £4,824 4s 8d, although leftover copies were still being sold to souvenir hunters.³⁷

Perhaps the most significant merchandizing innovation was the introduction of a mascot character for the first time in FIFA World Cup history. ‘World Cup Willie’, a cartoon lion wearing a soccer shirt emblazoned with the Union Flag, was introduced deliberately as an accessible and noticeable visual to be used on merchandizing. The design of Willie was a response to the original and more detailed emblem, which included an image of the trophy and the Union Flag, but was less obviously noticeable from distance. The original logo would be used as an official letterhead and as a more formal emblem, but it was Willie, in particular, that catalysed the most extensive merchandizing effort of any World Cup Finals to date.

The FA’s agents, Walter Tuckwell & Associates, and Foote, Cone and Balding Ltd. were permitted to have 99 separate products licensed.³⁸ The FA’s report after the tournament listed a number of them:

All kinds of souvenir articles were produced – souvenir cloths, reflective emblems, jig-saw puzzles, playing cards, pottery, braces, belts, balloons, plastic badges, gummed labels and car stickers, pennants, handkerchiefs, scarves, dolls, periscopes, T-shirts, hats, caps, rosettes, diaries, scrapbooks, autograph

albums, calendars, confectionery, potato crisps, footballs, masks, dartboards, key rings, slippers, glove puppets, money boxes, horse brasses, bedspreads, bath mats, cigarette lighters, cigars, glassware, cake decorations, towels, car badges, plaques, cuff-links and plastic figures among them. A well-known brewery firm produced a World Cup ale, and there was a World Cup Willie song from a firm of music publishers, as well as a World Cup March and a World Cup Waltz. One way or another, World Cup Willie was really swinging.³⁹

Several of the officially-licensed products were prominently advertised through matchday programmes and soccer magazines in the months before the World Cup. It was intended by the FA Organising Committee that these products, mostly emblazoned with World Cup Willie and some with the official World Cup emblem, would help to cross-promote the tournament, and indeed, each other. This very deliberate commercial strategy did not really pay off as hoped; the FA's maximum license fee was limited to five per-cent of the net selling price, and royalties amounted to just £16,285.⁴⁰ The *Financial Times*, on the day of the final, July 30 1966 estimated that the revenues from merchandizing would be far greater than this; they had calculated that if £2 million worth of branded products were sold, the FA and Tuckwell would share £100,000.⁴¹ In both the official report and their report back to FIFA, the FA tried to play this down, insisting that the publicity generated by the merchandizing enterprise had been worthwhile. Given the scale of the job that Ken Wilson undertook it would be unfair to be overly critical as he had limited resources and no prior entrepreneurial model of World Cup merchandizing upon which to base his approach. With the benefit of hindsight, not as much was achieved for merchandizing as might have been, and despite the obviously global reach of the tournament little effort appears to have been

made to license products outside of the UK. Wilson's efforts had a legacy - merchandizing was a theme that future World Cups would develop much further.

The main impact of World Cup Willie was that it was the first official FIFA World Cup mascot and the first official mascot for a major international sporting event. Since 1966, every World Cup has had its own mascot, the Olympic Games followed suit in 1972 (or 1968, unofficially) and the UEFA European Championship in 1980. World Cup Willie paved the way and is therefore an influential legacy. Reflecting on the experience of the 1966 World Cup, FIFA President Sir Stanley Rous recommended that FIFA claim ownership of any mascots and merchandising in the future, but that the host football association could benefit from licensing royalties within its own national boundaries.⁴² Even today, World Cup Willie memorabilia can still be found for sale, not only the collector market for original items, but also as new or reproduction souvenir products, meaning there is a legacy market.⁴³ In 2007 FIFA trademarked the phrase 'World Cup Willie' for thirty categories encompassing use on coffee, telecommunications and the organization of religious meetings, demonstrating that the brand still has value.⁴⁴

Tennent and Gillett's Swarm allows us to identify various participants that might have engaged in entrepreneurship. Vamplew's entrepreneurial framework can then be applied to further understand the motives for the contribution of each. In 1966 this entrepreneurial activity was relatively new in the context of a World Cup and, although the tournament generated a surplus for its organizers through some of its activities, the merchandizing was experimental and not particularly successful from a financial perspective. Nonetheless, it may have resulted in symbolic legacy and was influential for subsequent sport mega-event branding.⁴⁵ To further demonstrate the utility of applying Tennent and Gillett's Swarm, and Vamplew's frameworks together it is useful to apply these to another case.

The 1994 FIFA World Cup, USA

As in the above analysis of the 1966 World Cup, the Swarm framework was used to identify important stakeholders. Their entrepreneurial activities in the areas of marketing, broadcasting and media, ticketing, and merchandizing were classified using Vamplew's typology. An important contextual point is that the opportunities for broadcast media were more developed and significant by 1994.

The 1966 tournament had been important for the dissemination of soccer in other markets, such as the US and Canada, where there was an expansion of interest in the commercial possibilities of the sport leading indirectly to the establishment of the first professional US (and Canada) national league, the North American Soccer League (NASL), in 1968.⁴⁶ The US was able to take a live feed of the final via the 'Early Bird' satellite, being aired by NBC in the New York area.⁴⁷ The United States Soccer Football Association (USSFA) was clearly able to exploit the new interest in the game caused by the 1966 FIFA World Cup to popularise the game at grass roots level and in education, a process that matured with the 1994 FIFA World Cup held in the US and the subsequent domination of international women's football by the American national team.

In 1984, ten years before it hosted the FIFA World Cup, the NASL collapsed as the television broadcasters, its main source of finance, lost interest. Although this appeared to be the 'end' of the USAs post-1966 bubble of interest in professional soccer, the year was also significant to the subsequent resurgence of the game because of the Summer Olympics. Los Angeles was the official host city of the 1984 Olympic Games, however unlike most other

events the Olympic Soccer tournament was held at venues around the country. The surprise success of this soccer tournament, which was very well attended - with 102,799 at the final - and contributed to a record profit for the Olympic Games, impressed FIFA's President João Havelange and he encouraged the United States Soccer Federation (also known as US Soccer) to bid to host the 1986 FIFA World Cup, originally scheduled for Columbia.⁴⁸

The 1986 tournament was eventually moved to Mexico, an established soccer nation that had hosted in 1970, but in a ceremony on 4 July 1988 the USA was awarded hosting rights for 1994. Nadel refers to the United States as 'soccer's and FIFA's final frontier'. Although soccer had been played in the USA since the late nineteenth century when its first national governing body, the American Football Association (AFA), was established in 1884. The AFA later merged with a rival association to form the United States Football Association (USFA), which joined FIFA in 1914. International games between the USA and Canada took place shortly after the formation of the AFA, with fixtures recorded in 1885 and 1886.⁴⁹ Although by the mid-twentieth century US domestic sport was dominated by American Football (particularly College Football), Baseball, Basketball and Ice Hockey and there was passionate support for its Olympians, by the late 1980s and the early 1990s entrepreneurs and speculators hoped that there might again be a growing appetite for soccer, particularly after the national men's soccer team had reached the final stages of the 1990 FIFA World Cup in Italy.⁵⁰ Ultimately, the USA failed to progress beyond the Group Stages but this appearance was significant for being the first time since 1950 that the USA had even qualified.

As well as an improving national team, the USA offered a large population, established TV networks, a legacy of young people who had attended soccer training during and after the NASL era, and a predicted demographic shift as the Hispanic and Latino proportion of the population was projected to grow significantly – in 1994 there were already

approximately 43 million immigrants living in the USA, of which 27 million were classed as Hispanic.⁵¹ This demographic shift had been noticed by marketers representing blue chip brands since at least the 1980s, something that Nadal attributes to the creation of Spanish language media; for example cigarette companies, aware that around 5% of the US market were Hispanic or Latino, had started sponsoring soccer tournaments and events primarily aimed at these communities from the mid-1980s. By 1990 it was estimated that these communities had a buying power of over \$200 billion and a middle class of 9.5 million people. Marketers considered soccer as an effective way to target this growing demographic.⁵²

Furthermore, the USA had an infrastructure of ready-made stadiums, albeit without much experience of hosting soccer, let alone the FIFA World Cup. However, this inexperience had not been an obstacle in 1984 when the successful Olympic soccer tournament took place at campus stadiums of a military academy (Maryland) and two universities (Harvard and Stanford) more used to hosting American Football than soccer, as well as the Rose Bowl athletics stadium in Pasadena. But could the achievements of 1984 be up-scaled for the FIFA World Cup? FIFA seemed to have thought the risk was worth taking and hoped that the 1994 tournament would rejuvenate the game in the USA.⁵³ Their confidence was partly due to having been impressed by the personnel at US Soccer, some of whom, such as Alan Rothenberg, played pivotal roles in organizing the 1984 Olympic Soccer tournament. Further prestige was added by a video message from President Ronald Reagan expressing support, though not volunteering public funds.⁵⁴

FIFA placed an important condition on the award of the World Cup to the USA: that it would launch a new professional soccer league prior to staging the finals. US Soccer countered that it would be more effective to launch a league after the American public had experienced a World Cup on their own soil.⁵⁵ Yet critics pointed to the heterogeneity of the

United States, which Davies described as ‘a baffling vastness’, and a British newspaper article warned that ‘it may be that the World Cup will be huge in vast cities, and that in Kansas or Idaho they won’t give a cuss.’⁵⁶ For FIFA and other stakeholders with a stake in the success of a new professional league in the USA, there was considerable risk in holding the tournament in a country where soccer was not popular as a spectator sport in large areas of the country.

The risk paid off. The 1994 World Cup was significant for FIFA as a catalyst for professional soccer in the USA. As well as being influential for the growth of the sport, ‘USA ’94’ was the most profitable World Cup to date. The tournament broke at least two FIFA World Cup records - total ticket sales amounted to 3.6 million and overall income generated was \$350million, returning a profit to US Soccer of \$60 million, enabling it to sustain its activities and invest in grass-roots soccer.⁵⁷ While the USA was not yet a mature soccer economy sophisticated business models were used to market the tournament and optimize it as a commercial opportunity. Cosmetically, the process of soccer’s development as a spectator sport had been interrupted by the collapse of the NASL in 1984, but national professional men’s soccer was restored in the USA and Canada by Major League Soccer (founded in 1993, with its inaugural season in 1996) and still exists today.

The case of the 1994 FIFA World Cup compares and contrasts with that of the 1966 tournament. Similar themes emerge but the entrepreneurial activity was more sophisticated than in 1966. The linkage between Vamplew’s categories of entrepreneurship and the Swarm stakeholder categories are summarized by Table 2 and explained below.

Table 2 here

In 1990, shortly before the start of the negotiation process with FIFA, the lawyer of the World Cup 94 organizing committee (World Cup 94 Inc.), Scott Parks LeTellier, acted entrepreneurially to assert his organization's property rights by trademarking multiple permutations of the name 'USA '94' in the English and Spanish languages, strengthening their licensing rights and providing a legal foundation for protecting marketing revenue. This was entrepreneurial because it allowed for the creation of a new category for World Cup sponsorship, 'Local Marketing Partner'. - Six tiers of sponsorship were offered, ranging from national level 'Official Sponsors' to 'Equipment Suppliers' and 'Official Licensees', which could sit alongside FIFA's established Global Marketing Partners.⁵⁸ Since Rous's reflections on the 1966 tournament FIFA had tried to assert more control over branding. Against this, LeTellier's aggressive trademarking circumvented FIFA's official World Cup branding stipulations as explicated in the 1994 FIFA World Cup Terms of Reference document, issued in 1987.⁵⁹ A range of USA '94 branded products could be produced and sold without any FIFA World Cup branding or trademarks on the items.⁶⁰

Uncertainty was then caused by US Soccer's establishment of an eight-year agreement with a for-profit British sports marketing agency, Soccer USA Partners (SUSAP), that would control all of their marketing, sponsorship, licensing, 'game-day' events and broadcast rights. This risked undermining FIFA's role as 'franchisors' as they had spun-out their own marketing company, International Sports and Leisure. The relationship eventually settled down to SUSAP acting as a liability shield for US Soccer, which needed to develop awareness of the US national team and of the World Cup tournament.

SUSAP underwrote the financial risk, hoping to make a profit. To this end sponsors were presented with three basic options – 1) sponsoring the US national team, 2) sponsoring the tournament, or 3) both.⁶¹ Whilst soccer in the USA may have appeared to be a risky option, for the major sponsors their relationship with FIFA and the World Cup presented

global as well as national opportunities – the World Cup having a global audience, and FIFA having more members than the United Nations. The relationship of some American corporations with FIFA as a global organization encouraged them to run World Cup promotions in the US market; Gillette ran a sweepstake aimed at the Hispanic audience, while Procter & Gamble organized ‘soccerfests’ involving veteran players. There was also a campaign for members of the American national team to become household names in the run-up to the tournament, though this was not fully realized, albeit the hairstyles of Alexi Lalas and Cobi Jones did create some interest!⁶²

In a break with tradition the draw was held in the US rather than Zurich to publicise the event ahead of time.⁶³ The US, of course, had a well developed television industry, with roots in the English language stretching back to the 1940s.⁶⁴ Among the ‘Big Three’ English language networks, ABC carried only 11 games on free to air television, with the other 37 appearing on its cable sports affiliate ESPN.⁶⁵ Further evidencing the tournament organizers’ efforts to appeal to Hispanic fans, the Spanish language cable channel Univision showed all 52 matches of the tournament.⁶⁶ There were, however, rumours that American television would force changes to the format of the game, perhaps most controversially splitting the game into four quarters instead of two halves, although this did not materialize!⁶⁷

This was perhaps the most sophisticated ticketing operation of any FIFA World Cup to date. A tiered pricing model was again adopted, but unlike 1966 there was no established professional domestic league to use as a promotion channel. Perhaps for this reason the 1994 World Cup relied to a larger extent upon publicity stunts, the creation of shortages and the lure of added extras to stimulate demand, and designed to command high price points at the upper end, even extending to \$1,000 for a ‘platinum’ package, which was initially confined to a run of just 1,000 tickets.⁶⁸ The Organizing Committee’s advertising agent announced that ‘World Cup’s challenge is to sell as many as we can.’⁶⁹

A tiered suite of packages with added benefits such as better seats in the stadium, complimentary food and beverages, and parking was offered through both directly marketed sales and also through corporate channels, including Chambers of Commerce. Ticket releases were phased into five stages, the first targeting members of the 'US Soccer Family' (coaches, players and administrators), prior to a public sale of 300,000 tickets.⁷⁰ In the third stage a random lottery was held to allocate tickets for the final stages. The fourth stage, a second 'soccer family' round was really intended to generate free publicity, and to create or reinforce perceptions of exclusivity a limited release of tickets was 'leaked' creating an overload of the telephone hotline. This was then followed by a final fifth round, consisting of 450,000 unsold tickets from the overseas ticket release, made available on the 1st May 1994. In a similar move to the 1966 tournament, spectators were encouraged to purchase multiple tickets for the series of games at a stadium, rather than cherry pick particular games, but this was augmented with additional services such as travel and accommodation. The organizers proactively targeted amateur and youth players with a direct marketing campaign to rustle up support for the US national team.⁷¹

Alongside the national push local organizing committees played an important role in generating sales, pushing platinum, gold, silver and bronze packages which carried commission, which went to the local organizing committee.⁷² Platinum tickets offered entry to any ten games during the tournament, while gold and silver offered mid-field seating positions and an 'option' to buy a ticket to the final.⁷³ Many further privileges were offered; for games in the Washington DC area, three 'black-tie' events were held for silver ticket holders, while platinum and gold ticket holders were given a range of benefits including hospitality passes, preferred parking, access to hotels, free programmes and souvenir brochures, free souvenirs, stadium tours, special gifts and even access to US national team training sessions.⁷⁴ Additionally, even more embellished 'Founders Committee' packages

were made available, one including an extra ticket for a US v Germany game to be played in December 1993.⁷⁵ The marketing techniques applied to the ticketing strategy should be seen as part of the wider promotional and ticketing efforts of the World Cup 1994 business strategy.

There are obvious similarities between the emblems and mascots of the 1966 and 1994 World Cup tournaments. Some of these can be explained by the identical red, white and blue colour schemes based on the British and USA flags, but there are other comparative elements. In 1966 the mascot was a footballing lion, which is a national symbol of Britain and the English FA that includes three on its official crest. For 1994 the organisers opted for a footballing dog, Striker, presumably chosen mainly for its marketability and appeal to children rather than any symbolic value. Apart from the red, white and blue, even the skin tones of Striker and World Cup Willie are almost identical. The emblems also follow the same basic template, a football superimposed on the national flag. Perhaps this was due in part to the limitations of the format, but perhaps also the British influence from SUSAP.

An extensive product range of merchandise featuring 60 products was made available, including the usual badges, sweaters, trading cards, baseball caps and T-shirts, but the local liaison committees marketed these products more directly, both to fan and corporate audiences than had been the case in 1966. A more joined-up approach was pursued than in England with catalogues and other promotional materials produced and distributed, showcasing the various tie-in products.⁷⁶ A full corporate identity for the tournament was designed to provide a uniform 'look' across all nine venues as well as for promotional events, with a uniform type-font and colour scheme, as well as promotional goods including window banners and hand-held flags. A promotional tent emblazoned with a 'USA 94' tournament logo was designed to circulate soccer matches and other events to draw attention to the fact that the world's greatest soccer tournament was coming to America. Technological advances

meant that new tie-in opportunities were available such as VHS video box sets and the inaugural FIFA computer game, the first in a long-running series.⁷⁷ A retail store was also opened in Los Angeles, said to be selling \$30,000 worth of merchandise per month in summer 1993.⁷⁸ Product catalogues indicate attempts to leverage the Mexico–USA rivalry, merchandize including t-shirts directly targeted at fans of Mexico was included alongside products for fans of the USA team. T-shirts and other goods featuring Striker were also produced.⁷⁹

At the local level the tournament was supported by events for people who could not obtain tickets, and the production of maps and venue guides for those who could. In Washington DC, for instance, a three-day ‘community wide party’ was organized, including many free events, such as food festivals, art shows, and open air music performances with an international flavour, as well as a Youth Soccer Cup held on the Mall.⁸⁰ There were also affiliated ‘big ticket’ events which appear to have been organized to generate a ‘buzz’ to promote the tournament as well as to entertain spectators, for example a golf tournament featuring former Brazilian star player Pelé, who was a well known celebrity in the USA, having finished his playing career at New York Cosmos. Municipalities and local organisers were provided with protocols for banners and displays featuring official World Cup 1994 logos and emblems.⁸¹ The approach more structured and coordinated than had been the case in 1966, when local organising committees and authorities were more or less left to their own devices.

Final Thoughts

The main contribution of this paper has been to apply Tennent and Gillett's Swarm framework (derived from Gloor), together with Vamplew's framework of sports entrepreneurship and commercial opportunities, to data from the FIFA World Cup tournaments of 1966 and 1994. Findings demonstrate how the limitations of each framework can be overcome, and a more powerful tool is created. These frameworks have particular strengths and weaknesses, which will now be discussed.

Tennent and Gillett's Swarm model uses a honey-bee analogy to show the ways in which the stakeholders worked together to plan and deliver a World Cup. By applying it with Vamplew's framework it is possible to better understand the nature of the relationship between some of these organizations in the context of the commercial and entrepreneurial activities that were involved. FIFA is very much dominant and yet remote at the same time – with reference to the honey-bee metaphor it can be thought of as the queen bee in the hive. However, national football associations, local organizing committees, and other stakeholder organizations are far more than worker drones. They fulfil the function of protecting FIFA from much of the risk by shouldering that burden themselves.

On its own the Swarm framework is mainly useful in that it helps to identify a set of stakeholder categories for sorting information. It therefore has limited explanatory power. On the other hand, Vamplew provides a tool for analysing entrepreneurship and the commercial activities of sport, though without the context of networks. However, by using the frameworks together to create a new table (as applied in Table 1 and Table 2), it is possible to analyse the entrepreneurship and the commercial activities associated with the networks that plan and deliver the FIFA World Cup. Applying this tool has enriched understanding of the network dynamics of the world cup – which is one of the most significant sporting and cultural mega-event projects in the world.

One important finding has been that the role of entrepreneurial individuals within those organizational structures was highly significant. We identify some key names. In this article we have concentrated on Ken Wilson in 1966 and Scott Le Tellier in 1994 because they emerged from the Swarm analysis as being most closely involved with the entrepreneurial merchandizing activities. We show they were also team players, and so we are not suggesting a 'Great Man' theory of history, rather our analysis draws attention to the organizations and the network as a collection of people, including but not limited to these entrepreneurs, working within and at times between organizational structures and boundaries towards common or compatible objectives. Findings also demonstrate the shift in approach to organizing World Cup tournaments, as 1994 clearly involved a more corporate approach than was the case in 1966. Also in 1994 the assertion of property rights was more aggressive – something which enabled the organisers to leverage merchandizing opportunities more profitably, despite FIFAs expectation of having ultimate control of branding. By leaving out the term 'FIFA', World Cup 94 Inc. was able to license official memorabilia for which it had sole ownership of the trademarks. In this way, 1994 can perhaps be viewed as a return to the approach pre-1970, before FIFA increased its control of World Cup merchandizing in light of Rous's reflections on 1966.

It is important to acknowledge the temporal contexts of the two cases narrated. The 1966 World Cup occurred at a time of mid-century modernity; 1994 fell firmly within Geoffrey Jones' third globalisation phase in which trade barriers were falling and markets increasingly integrating, alongside increasing deregulation within domestic economies.⁸² This increased the opportunities but perhaps also the expectation for globalized merchandizing and related commercial revenue. To demonstrate the potential viability of professional soccer in the United States it was important that 'USA '94' should be profitable so as to 'prove' the

value of integrating the game, then often regarded as a 'foreign', into American mainstream culture.

Aspects of these cases seem to be typical of their temporal context, but they also demonstrate novelty and innovation in the staging of the FIFA World Cup. The organizers identified and responded to the arising commercial opportunities. They predicted, and stimulated demand. This was a demand for the supply of World Cup soccer – which in 1966 catalysed increased attendances in English domestic football and the creation of a club level league in the USA. 1994 rejuvenated professional football in the USA and arguably led to the hosting of another soccer-based mega-event, the women's World Cup in 1999. Both the 1966 and 1994 World Cup Tournaments were profitable, but the entrepreneurial activity did not involve the construction of new stadiums but focused instead on broadcasting, ticketing and branded merchandise.⁸³ Though no new stadiums were constructed these World Cups have lived on in popular memory and have been influential in their own ways.

Overall, the impact of the 1966 tournament was relatively temporary with little deliberate legacy, and the commercial activities other than ticketing were supplementary, augmenting the event rather than central income streams.⁸⁴ However, the business model set the template for subsequent World Cups. The 1994 tournament was deliberately planned to have more (and more significant) revenue streams beyond gate receipts, mainly television rights and sponsorship, but also with a more targeted approach to merchandizing. There was more evidence of customer segmentation, with the Hispanic and Latino demographic and corporate clients clearly targeted. Perhaps even more significantly there was a planned long-term commercial legacy, the launch of Major League Soccer (MLS). Finance for the MLS's launch came partly from a \$5m loan from the United States Soccer Federation Foundation Inc., a not-for-profit vehicle set up with the financial surplus from the 1994 FIFA World Cup. It was considered that to be financially sustainable the MLS would rely on appealing to

corporate clients as well as to the Hispanic and Latino demographics and suburban America, still excited by the ‘buzz’ of 1994. As FIFA and MLS organizers would discover, this would be more challenging than was envisaged.⁸⁵

The points raised in this discussion warrant further research in relation to entrepreneurship and organizational networks with reference to other World Cups and sport mega-events, such as the Olympic Games. Other geographic and temporal contexts may reveal comparative or contrasting findings. Additionally, there may be important factors not covered by the frameworks presented within this paper, and historians should consider the significance of, for example, institutional logics in professional sport and/or theories of the entrepreneurial process.⁸⁶ A further point is that theories of entrepreneurship point to the presence of opportunity, whether it is objectively present as a phenomenon that entrepreneurs actively respond to, or as with Holt and Popp’s historicization, brought into being through lived experience and imagination.⁸⁷ Other than identifying that sports clubs provided an opportunity to form social capital with like-minded people, Vamplew’s framework provides no dimension for the analysis of the market need for entrepreneurial activity. The Swarm network is not concerned with the reasons for opportunity either - it just shows how a network forms to address an opportunity. This suggests that we should seek to explore the concept of entrepreneurial opportunity as it relates to the sports product in more depth

¹ Peter Gloor, *Swarm creativity: Competitive advantage through collaborative innovation networks* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 75.

² Kevin D. Tennent and Alex G. Gillett, *Foundations of Managing Sporting Events: Organising the 1966 FIFA World Cup* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 166-9.

³ Alfred D. Chandler, *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990).

⁴ Dilwyn Porter, ‘Book Review: Foundations of managing sports events: organising the 1966 FIFA World Cup’, *Sport in Society* 20, no. 7 (2017), 989-990, 990.

⁵ Alex G. Gillett, and Kevin D. Tennent, 'Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject: The Case of the 1966 Soccer World Cup', *Project Management Journal* 48, no. 6 (December 2017), 93-116.

⁶ Wray Vamplew, 'Products, Promotion and (Possibly) Profits', *Journal of Sport History* 45, no. 2 (summer 2018). Entrepreneurs in this context are defined broadly to include club owners and tournament promoters, consumers of the sport product including spectators and players, and wider stakeholders such as the media, builders, and members of the public sector. For example, for association football, a 'spectator product' was the extended season, the example being the use of playoffs in the English Football League. A 'player product' could involve performance improvement through a new coaching method, and an 'associated product' could be the branded merchandise introduced through football clubs' own labels. For a deeper literature on entrepreneurship see Birger Wernerfelt, 'A resource based view of the firm', *Strategic Management Journal* 5, no. 2 (April – June 1984), 171-180; Jay Barney, 'Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage', *Journal of management* 17, no. 1 (March 1991), 99-120; Robert F. Lusch, and Stephen L. Vargo, *The service-dominant logic of marketing: Dialog, debate, and directions*, (New York, Routledge, 2014); Saras D. Sarasvathy, 'Causation and effectuation: Toward a theoretical shift from economic inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency', *Academy of Management Review* 26, no. 2 (April 2001), 243-263.

⁷ Tennent and Gillett, *Foundations of Managing Sporting Events*, 12; Alan Tomlinson, 'FIFA and the World Cup: The expanding football family', in John Sugden, and Alan Tomlinson (eds.), *Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup*, (Aldershot, Arena, 1994).

⁸ FIFA Document Centre EFSG, *Federation Internationale de Football Association, Report Covering the Period October 1964 to June 1966, Congress XXXV Agenda 1966 Item VI, 2*.

⁹ Tennent and Gillett, *Foundations of Managing Sporting Events*

¹⁰ Tomlinson, *FIFA and the World Cup*, 13-34.

¹¹ David Teece, 'Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation', *Long Range Planning* 43, no. 2-3, (2010), 172-194.

¹² The non-financial as well financial outcomes of WCs are covered by Gillett & Tennent, 'Dynamic Sublimes'.

¹³ Football Association World Cup Organization Committee Minutes (hereafter WCOC), 23 May 1963, 30 June 1963.

¹⁴ John Dunning, 'The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories of MNE activity', *International Business Review*, (2000), 9, 163-90.

¹⁵ Steve Redhead, 'Media culture and the World Cup: The last World Cup?', in John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson (eds.), *Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup*, (Aldershot, Hants: Arena, 1994), 291.

¹⁶ David Goldblatt, *The Ball is Round: A Global History of Soccer*, (London, UK: Penguin, 2007), 452.

¹⁷ Ibid., Fabio Chisari, *The age of innocence*.

¹⁸ Phil Scranton, 'Technology, science and American innovation', *Business History* 48, no. 3 (July 2006), 311-331; Fabio Chisari, *The age of innocence: a history of the relationship between the football authorities and the BBC Television Service, 1937-82*, (2007, unpublished PhD thesis, Leicester, De Montfort University)

¹⁹ Peter Robinson, Doug Cheeseman and Harry Pearson, *1966 Uncovered*, (London, UK: Mitchell Beazley, 2006), 63.

²⁰ David Goldblatt, *The Ball is Round*, 402.

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- ²¹ James L. Baughman, *Same Time: Same Station: Creating American Television 1948-1961*, (Baltimore, NY: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 44-7.
- ²² Goldblatt *The Ball is Round*, 402.
- ²³ Hans Westerbeek, and Aaron Smith, *Sport in the Global Marketplace*, (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 100.
- ²⁴ Harold Mayes, *The Football Association: World Cup Report 1966*, (London, UK: William Heineman Ltd., 1967), 62-3.
- ²⁵ FIFA Document Centre (hereafter FIFA), World Cup England 1966 File, Section 5, TV, Contract between EBU and FIFA.
- ²⁶ FIFA, World Cup England 1966 File, Section 5, TV, minutes of a meeting concerning radio with Mr Max Muller (BBC) held at the Windsor Hotel on 8th June, 1966.
- ²⁷ FIFA World Cup Bureau letter from T. Ashwood, British Pathe to Dennis Follows, 23 June 1964. Chisari, *Age of Innocence*, 285.
- ²⁸ Chisari, *Age of Innocence*, p. 285. WCOC, July 22 1965, September 28 1965.
- ²⁹ Tennent and Gillett, *Foundations of Managing Sporting Events*, 87-109.
- ³⁰ WCOC, 10 June 1964.
- ³¹ WCOC, 22 September 1964.
- ³² Tennent and Gillett, *Foundations*, 110-24; Tosh Warwick, 'Northernness, Sheffield and the 1966 World Cup: The "Steel City" on Display', *International Journal of Regional and Local History* 12, no. 2 (2017), 92-106.
- ³³ WCOC, 8 March 1966.
- ³⁴ WCOC, 17 May 1966, Manchester United FC programme, Manchester United v Benfica, European Cup Quarter Final – First Leg, February 2 1966, 11.
- ³⁵ Ken Wilson Personal Archive.
- ³⁶ WCOC, 26 January 1965.
- ³⁷ FIFA, World Cup England 1966 File, Section 6, Finance Budget. 'Programmes'.
- ³⁸ WCOC 20 September 1965; Mayes, *World Cup Report*, 44.
- ³⁹ Mayes, *World Cup Report*, 44.
- ⁴⁰ FIFA, World Cup England 1966 File, Section 6, Finance Budget. 'Merchandizing Report'. WCOC 20 September 1965. Mayes, *World Cup Report*, 44-45.
- ⁴¹ 'Who's made money out of the World Cup?', *Financial Times*, July 30 1966, 8.
- ⁴² FIFA, Enclosure to Executive Committee meeting no 9, Item 3.3. *1966 World Cup and Congress – Reflections with recommendations for the next: A memorandum from the President*.
- ⁴³ To illustrate, one of the authors purchased a World Cup Willie fridge magnet as a souvenir of a visit to England's National Football Museum. For a detailed review of the branding, ephemera, and identity associated with the England football team from 1966 onwards, see Mike McGuinness, 'Some Reflections on Representations of the England Football team through Ephemera from the 1966 World Cup to the Present', *Idrotta*, (2011), available online: <<http://idrottsforum.org/articles/mcguinness/mcguinness110330.html>>.

accessed on 29 January 2016.

⁴⁴ EU trademark number EU006537039.

⁴⁵ Gillett and Tennent, *Dynamic Sublimes*

⁴⁶ John Sugden, 'USA and the World Cup: American nativism and the rejection of the people's game', in John Sugden, and Alan Tomlinson, (eds.), *Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup*, (Aldershot, Arena, 1994) 220, 242.

⁴⁷ Tennent and Gillett, *Foundations of Managing Sporting Events*, 135; Chisari, *Age of Innocence*, 316.

⁴⁸ US professional soccer did carry on in the form of indoor soccer. John Sugden, 'USA and the World Cup', 220. See also Gary Hopkins, *Star, Spangled Soccer: The Selling, Marketing and Management of Soccer in the USA*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010), 9.; Claire and Keith Brewster, 'He hath not done this for any other nation': Mexico's 1970 and 1986 World Cups', in Stefan Rinke, and Kay Schiller, (eds.), *The FIFA World Cup 1930-2010: Politics, Commerce, Spectacle and Identities*, (Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2014), 199-219.

⁴⁹ Hopkins, *Star, Spangled Soccer*, pp. 10-11; Joshua H. Nadel, 'A Cup of Welcome?' in Stefan Rinke, and Kay Schiller (eds.), *The FIFA World Cup 1930-2010: Politics, Commerce, Spectacle and Identities*, (Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2014), 303; Sugden, 'USA and the World Cup', 219-220.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 'Paving the Way for Americans Abroad', *The Frank MacDonald Blog*, 8th October 2015, <http://www.frankmacdonald.net/?p=1191> (accessed 10 April 2018).

⁵¹ Nadel, 'A Cup of Welcome?', 302; US Census, "Selected Social Characteristics of All Persons and Hispanic Persons, by Type of Origin: March 1994," <https://www.census.gov/data/tables/1994/demo/hispanic-origin/1994-cps.html> (accessed 29 Jan 2018).

⁵² Nadel, 'A Cup of Welcome?', 312-314.

⁵³ Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*, 8.

⁵⁴ Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*, 10.

⁵⁵ Sugden, *USA and the World Cup*, 219; Bill Murray, *The World's Game: A History of Soccer*, (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 186.

⁵⁶ P. Davies, 'Tomorrow the World', *Guardian*, June 26 1993. Cited in Redhead, 'Media Culture and the World Cup', 295.

⁵⁷ Nadel, 'A Cup of Welcome?', 303; Hopkins, *Star, Spangled Soccer*, 70; Kevin Baxter, 'World Cup in 1994 gave U.S. soccer the kick in the pants it needed', *LA Times*, May 31st 2014, available online: <http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-us-world-cup-mls-20140601-story.html> (accessed 11th April 2018).

⁵⁸ Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*, 61.

⁵⁹ FIFA, 1994 FIFA World Cup: Terms of Reference (for the Organising Football Association).

⁶⁰ World Cup 1994 Inc. Promotional Catalogue.

⁶¹ Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*, 56-57.

⁶² Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*, 57-58.

⁶³ Murray, *The World's Game*, xiii.

⁶⁴ Baughman, *Same Time, Same Station*.

⁶⁵ Nadel, 'Cup of Welcome?', 304; Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*, 316.

⁶⁶ Nadel, 'Cup of Welcome?', 304.

⁶⁷ Redhead, 'Media Culture and the World Cup', 299.

⁶⁸ Stanford University Special Collections (hereafter SC), SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993.

⁶⁹ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993.

⁷⁰ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993; Hopkins, *Star Spangled Soccer*, 62-63.

⁷¹ Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*, 61-64.

⁷² SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, 6 May 1993; 30 July 1993.

⁷³ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993.

⁷⁴ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993.

⁷⁵ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 26 1993, 'Premier Ticket Pricing and Revenues.'

⁷⁶ SC538 Box 4, Merchandizing Flyer.

⁷⁷ World Cup 1994 Inc Promotional Catalogue.

⁷⁸ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993.

⁷⁹ SC538 Box 4, Merchandizing Flyer.

⁸⁰ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993.

⁸¹ SC538 Box 1, Memorandum, July 1 1993.

⁸² Geoffrey Jones, *Entrepreneurship and Multinationals*. (Cheltenham, Gloucester: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).

⁸³ Gillett and Tennent, *Foundations*, 142-154; Gillett and Tennent, *Dynamic Sublimes*; Hopkins, *Star Spangled Soccer*.

⁸⁴ There was however a substantial cultural legacy. See Dilwyn Porter, 'Egg and Chips with Connellys: Remembering 1966', *Sport in History* 29 No. 3, (2009), 519-539; Chas Critcher, 'England and the World Cup: World Cup Willies, English Football and the Myth of 1966', in John Sugden, and Alan Tomlinson, (eds.), *Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup*, (Aldershot, UK: Arena, 1994); Tony Mason, 'England 1966 and All That', in Stefan Rinke, and Kay Schiller, (eds.), *The FIFA World Cup 1930-2010: Politics, Commerce, Spectacle and Identities*, (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein Verlag, 2014); John Hughson, *England and the 1966 World Cup: A Cultural History* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2016).

⁸⁵ Hopkins, *Star-Spangled Soccer*.

⁸⁶ Alex G. Gillett and Kevin D. Tennent, 'Shadow Hybridity and the Institutional Logic of professional sport: Perpetuating a sporting business in times of rapid social and economic change', *Journal of Management History*, (2018 – in press). Sarasvathy, 'Causation and effectuation', 243-263.

⁸⁷ Scott Shane, and Sankaran Venkataraman. "The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research." *Academy of management review* 25, No. 1 (2000): 217-226; Mark Casson, *Entrepreneurship: Theory, Networks and*

History. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010). Popp, Andrew, and Robin Holt. "The presence of entrepreneurial opportunity." *Business History* 55, no. 1 (2013): 9-28.

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