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**Article:**

Ritchie, Kay L., White, David, Kramer, Robin S.S. et al. (3 more authors) (2018) Enhancing CCTV: Averages improve face identification from poor-quality images. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*. pp. 671-680. ISSN: 0888-4080

<https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3449>

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## Enhancing CCTV: Averages improve face identification from poor quality images

Journal:	<i>Applied Cognitive Psychology</i>
Manuscript ID	ACP-17-0177.R2
Wiley - Manuscript type:	Research Article
Keywords:	face identification, averages, pixelated images, CCTV

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Review

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Low quality images are problematic for face identification, for example when police identify faces from CCTV images. Here we test whether face averages, comprising multiple poor quality images, can improve both human and computer recognition. We created averages from multiple pixelated or non-pixelated images, and compared accuracy using these images and exemplars. To provide a broad assessment of the potential benefits of this method, we tested human observers ( $n = 88$ ; Experiment 1), and also computer recognition, using a smartphone application (Experiment 2) and a commercial one-to-many face recognition system used in forensic settings (Experiment 3). The third experiment used large image databases of 900 ambient images and 7980 passport images. In all three experiments, we found a substantial increase in performance by averaging multiple pixelated images of a person's face. These results have implications for forensic settings in which faces are identified from poor quality images, such as CCTV.

Key words: Face identification, averages, pixelated images, CCTV.

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2     18 **Introduction**  
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6     20 Police forces use CCTV images for suspect identification, and this process can utilise both  
7     21 human operators and computer face recognition systems. It is important, therefore, to  
8     22 understand the effect of poor quality images on both human and computer performance. Our  
9     23 goal here is to test a quick and easy method of image enhancement, namely averaging, to  
10    24 establish whether this can improve face recognition from poor quality images for both human  
11    25 observes and computer systems.  
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16     26 Although human observers are accurate in identifying familiar people from poor quality  
17     27 CCTV footage (Burton, Wilson, Cowan & Bruce, 1999), studies have shown that accuracy in  
18     28 identifying unfamiliar people from CCTV is poor (Bruce et al., 1999; Davies & Thasen,  
19     29 2000; Davis & Valentine, 2009; Walker & Tough, 2015). Pixelation also harms the ability to  
20     30 identify familiar people from both static and moving images (Lander, Bruce & Hill, 2001),  
21     31 and can completely extinguish this ability at very high levels of pixelation (Demanet, Dhont,  
22     32 Notebaert, Pattyn & Vandierendonck, 2007). As the quality of the CCTV is reduced due to  
23     33 image compression, the ability to make face identifications from the videos decreases (Keval  
24     34 & Sasse, 2008). Recently, however, it has been shown that experts such as forensic facial  
25     35 examiners are able to overcome this problem to some extent (White, Phillips, Hahn, Hill &  
26     36 O'Toole, 2015), but their expertise is most advantageous when working with high quality  
27     37 images (Norell et al., 2015; White, Norell, Phillips & O'Toole, 2017).  
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30     39 A recent study examined performance on a face matching task in which participants were  
31     40 required to indicate whether two simultaneously presented images showed the same person or  
32     41 two different people. When one image in the face pair was pixelated, face matching  
33     42 performance was surprisingly robust, only dropping below chance level with images  
34     43 presented at a resolution of 8 pixels in width (Bindemann, Attard, Leach & Johnston, 2013).  
35     44 At a level of pixelation which reduced performance, but not as low as chance, performance  
36     45 was significantly improved by reducing the size of the pixelated image, thus reducing the  
37     46 perceptual effect of the large-scale edge information in the image.  
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40     48 Computer recognition of faces as assessed with standard evaluation measures such as the  
41     49 FERET (Phillips, Moon, Rizvi & Rauss, 2000) and the FRVT (Blackburn, Bone & Phillips,  
42     50 2001) typically outperforms human unfamiliar face recognition (O'Toole et al., 2007) but  
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2       52 does not perform perfectly (O'Toole et al., 2007; Phillips, Flynn, Scruggs, Bowyer & Worek,  
3       53 2006; Zhao, Chellappa, Phillips & Rosenfeld, 2003). Direct comparisons of humans and face  
4       54 recognition algorithms have shown that, although algorithms outperform humans on frontal  
5       55 face images (Phillips & O'Toole, 2014), for images showing extreme illumination and pose,  
6       56 humans win out against computer algorithms (Phillips, Hill, Swindle & O'Toole, 2015).

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9       58 Recent work in the field of computer science has utilised a variety of techniques such as noise  
10      59 suppression and super-resolution, in an attempt to overcome the harmful effects of poor  
11      60 image quality on computer face recognition, achieving various degrees of success (Buciu &  
12      61 Gacsadi, 2011; Rudrani & Das, 2011). To date, these techniques have only been applied to  
13      62 images in such a way as to test for improvements in machine recognition. Other techniques  
14      63 seek to assess image quality and improve face recognition performance by simply rejecting  
15      64 images which fall below a given threshold, but this is problematic because there is no  
16      65 agreement on a reliable indicator of quality (Luo, 2004; Fronthaler, Kollreider & Bigun,  
17      66 2006; Beveridge et al., 2011). Moreover, in some situations poor quality images may be all  
18      67 that is available, for example when poor quality CCTV footage is the only evidence linking a  
19      68 suspect to a crime scene.

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22      70 Here we address this problem by examining whether combining information across multiple  
23      71 poor quality images can benefit human and computer matching accuracy. In applied settings,  
24      72 multiple images of a person are often available, for example multiple screenshots from CCTV  
25      73 footage. We focus on one promising approach that has been shown to improve both human  
26      74 and computer matching - averaging together multiple images of a single identity, as shown in  
27      75 Fig 1 (Burton, Jenkins, Hancock & White, 2005; Jenkins & Burton, 2008; White, Burton,  
28      76 Jenkins & Kemp, 2014). In a prior study, images of celebrities were uploaded to an online  
29      77 implementation of an industry standard face recognition system (FaceVACS). Accuracy of  
30      78 identification of exemplars was only 54%, climbing to 100% for average images (Jenkins &  
31      79 Burton, 2008). A subsequent study showed that the automatic face recognition algorithm used  
32      80 in Android smartphone devices' "face unlock" system was improved from 45% for single  
33      81 images to 68% for averages (Robertson, Kramer & Burton, 2015). One study has also shown  
34      82 that average images also improve human accuracy for face matching tasks (White et al.,  
35      83 2014). Accuracy for matching an average of 12 images of an individual to one exemplar  
36      84 image was higher than accuracy for matching two exemplars.

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88 Averaging together multiple pixelated images from CCTV footage, for example, ought to  
89 reduce the noise introduced by the pixelation, and lead to a clearer representation of the  
90 identity. Simply by taking multiple low resolution images whose noise is uncorrelated, and  
91 averaging them together in a high resolution space, one increases the amount of information  
92 present by comparison to a single image. Here, we apply the technique of face averaging to  
93 the problem of face identification from poor quality images. We present three experiments  
94 investigating the effect of averaging multiple degraded images in order to produce a better  
95 representation of the person pictured. The first experiment tests human face matching, the  
96 second experiment uses a smartphone app, available to the general public, and the final  
97 experiment tests a commercial face recognition application, currently used in the security  
98 industry. The final experiment also uses a large number of images in two different databases  
99 – an ambient image database of 900 images from the *labelled faces in the wild* set (Huang,  
100 Ramesh, Berg & Learned-Miller, 2007), and images taken from an existing database of 7980  
101 real passport images.

### 102 103 **Experiment 1. Human face matching**

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105 This experiment investigates the effect of pixelation and averaging on human face matching  
106 performance. In a face matching task, participants are shown two images simultaneously and  
107 asked to decide whether or not they show the same person. A recent study found that  
108 pixelating one of the two images in a matching task reduces performance (Bindemann et al.,  
109 2013). Here, we averaged together multiple pixelated images to establish whether averages  
110 would give rise to higher accuracy than single pixelated images. We hypothesised that  
111 unfamiliar face matching accuracy will be poorer for pixelated than unpixelated images, and  
112 that averages of pixelated images would produce an increase in accuracy compared to  
113 pixelated exemplars.

### 114 115 **Method**

### 116 117 **Participants**

118 Eighty-eight participants took part in this experiment (16 males; mean age: 24 years, range:  
119 18-65 years). All were members of the University of York, UK, or the University of Lincoln,

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3 120 UK, and took part voluntarily or in exchange for course credit. This study was approved by  
4 the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of York and the School of  
5 Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the University of Lincoln. All participants gave  
6 written informed consent.  
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9 125 **Stimuli and Procedure**  
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12 126 Eleven images of 96 different unfamiliar identities (50% women) were downloaded from the  
13 Internet using Google Image searches for celebrities from different countries, and were  
14 selected in order to be unfamiliar to our UK-based participants. Familiarity checks on a  
15 different group of participants (not tested in the current studies) confirmed the IDs were  
16 unfamiliar to UK viewers. Images were broadly full-facing, but sampled natural variability in  
17 facial and environmental parameters, akin to those used in previous face matching research  
18 (Ritchie et al., 2015). In addition, for each identity, one 'foil' image was collected. This was  
19 an image of another unfamiliar identity (not appearing in the original 96) matching the verbal  
20 description of the target identity. The images were high quality, and cropped to 380x570  
21 pixels. Each of these images was also downsampled to size 30x45 pixels and then resized  
22 back to their original dimensions. This method provided pixelated and unpixelated versions  
23 of the image set.  
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26 139 We created average images by initially deriving the shape of each image using a semi-  
27 automatic landmarking system designed to register 82 points on the face aligned to  
28 anatomical features. Each average was created by warping the 10 images of an identity to the  
29 average shape of those 10 images, and then calculating the mean RGB colour values for each  
30 pixel. The unpixelated images were landmarked using our semi-automatic system (where  
31 only five locations are selected manually – for details, see Kramer, Young, Day & Burton,  
32 2017). After pixelation, the images were again landmarked using the system. Therefore,  
33 landmarking of the pixelated images was inherently less precise, given that our system (and  
34 the human user selecting the five locations) had far less photographic detail to work with.  
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37 149 Ten images of each identity, unpixelated and pixelated, were used to form averages, with the  
38 one excluded image used as the 'match' image. Note that 'pixelated averages' are therefore  
39 averages of pixelated images, not averages created and then themselves pixelated. The  
40 'mismatch' image was the foil collected previously for that identity. Due to the procedure  
41 used for creating the averages, all background information was removed from the average  
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3 154 images. Therefore, to ensure that reference exemplar images were consistent with the  
4 averages, all background information was also removed from reference exemplars. Match  
5 and foil images were presented naturally with background information intact (see Fig 2).  
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9 158 Figure 2 here  
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13 160 Each trial consisted of the reference image (unpixelated exemplar, pixelated exemplar,  
14 average of unpixelated images, average of pixelated images) presented on the left of the  
15 screen, and the test image (match or foil) presented on the right. Each participant saw each ID  
16 once in the experiment, with each ID counterbalanced by condition across participants. There  
17 were 12 trials per condition (always 50% women).  
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23 166 **Results and Discussion**  
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25 167 Fig 3 shows mean accuracy for the human face matching task. Following previous research  
26 (White et al., 2014), we analysed the data for match and mismatch trials separately, using a 2  
27 (image type: exemplar, average) x 2 (pixelation: unpixelated, pixelated) ANOVA.  
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31 171 For match trials, there was a significant main effect of image type ( $F(1,87) = 35.00, p < .001,$   
32  $\eta_p^2 = .29$ ), a significant main effect of pixelation ( $F(1,87) = 38.84, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .31$ ), and a  
33 significant interaction between image type and pixelation ( $F(1,87) = 4.11, p = .046,$   
34  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ ). We therefore considered the simple main effects of pixelation at each level of  
35 image type. These simple main effects were significant for both exemplars ( $F(1,174) = 38.25,$   
36  $p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .18$ ) and averages ( $F(1,174) = 13.90, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$ ), meaning that  
37 unpixelated exemplars and averages were more easily matched to the test image than  
38 pixelated exemplars and averages. We also considered the simple main effects of image type  
39 at each level of pixelation. These simple main effects were significant for both pixelated  
40 ( $F(1,174) = 32.63, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .16$ ) and unpixelated images ( $F(1,174) = 8.71, p < .005,$   
41  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ ), meaning that averages outperformed exemplars for both image types. The effect  
42 size for the average advantage was much greater for pixelated than for unpixelated images,  
43 suggesting that image averaging is especially beneficial where image quality is low.  
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47 185 A 2 (image type: exemplar, average) x 2 (pixelation: unpixelated, pixelated) ANOVA on  
48 mismatch trials found a significant main effect of pixelation ( $F(1,87) = 70.41, p < .001,$   
49  $\eta_p^2 = .45$ ), a non-significant main effect of image type ( $F(1,87) = .26, p = .611, \eta_p^2 < .001$ ),  
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3 188 and a non-significant interaction between image type and pixelation ( $F(1,87) = .68, p = .412,$   
4  $\eta_p^2 = .01$ ). For mismatch trials, pixelated images gave rise to poorer performance than  
5 unpixelated images, but there was no effect of averaging. The result is in-line with the  
6 previous work on this topic (White et al., 2014), where averaging improved performance on  
7 match but not non-match trials.  
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11 193 Figure 3 here  
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16 196 Analysis of accuracy scores on match trials show that averages improve performance for both  
17 pixelated and non-pixelated images, with a greater effect of averaging for pixelated images.  
18 However, because this interaction was not observed in non-match trials, it may reflect a  
19 response bias. In order to clarify whether the interaction was driven by improvements in  
20 perceptual sensitivity, we analysed the results using a signal detection theory model. In this  
21 analysis, hits correspond to correct match trials and false alarms correspond to incorrect  
22 mismatch trials. Paired samples  $t$ -tests on d-prime ( $d'$ ) values showed a significant difference  
23 between accuracy for pixelated exemplars ( $M = .43$ ) and pixelated averages ( $M = .80$ ),  $t(87) =$   
24  $3.797, p < .001, d = 0.41$ , but a non-significant difference between accuracy for unpixelated  
25 exemplars ( $M = 1.32$ ) and unpixelated averages ( $M = 1.44$ ),  $t(87) = 1.431, p = .156, d = 0.15$ .  
26 Therefore, averaging improved sensitivity only for pixelated images and not for unpixelated  
27 images.  
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30 206 Paired samples  $t$ -tests on criterion (c) values showed a significant difference between the bias  
31 for unpixelated exemplars ( $M = -.12$ ) and unpixelated averages ( $M = .01$ ),  $t(87) = 3.275, p =$   
32  $.002, d = 0.35$ , and between the bias for pixelated exemplars ( $M = -.10$ ) and pixelated  
33 averages ( $M = .05$ ),  $t(87) = 2.724, p = .008, d = 0.29$ . Taken together, these results show that  
34 face averages comprising high quality images increased participants' bias to respond that two  
35 images show the same person, without increasing overall sensitivity.  
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38 215 Overall, the results of Experiment 1 show that accuracy on a face matching task is reduced  
39 when one image in the pair is pixelated. Averaging together several pixelated images,  
40 however, reduces this cost to performance. Further, the interaction between pixelation and  
41 averaging suggests that averaging is especially beneficial to human performance when image  
42 quality is poor. Creating face averages is computationally inexpensive and easy to achieve  
43 with various freely available softwares such as Psychomorph (Tidemann, Burt & Perrett,  
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2 222 2001) or InterFace (Kramer, Jenkins & Burton, 2017). We therefore suggest that this  
3 technique could be used in a variety of settings to improve human face matching.  
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7 225 While Experiment 1 addressed the effect of pixelation and averages on human face matching,  
8 we were also interested in establishing whether averaging can overcome difficulties  
9 associated with poor quality imagery in computer face recognition systems. In the following  
10 experiments, we turned our attention to testing the effect of image averaging with commercial  
11 face recognition software.  
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17 231 **Experiment 2. Face recognition using a publicly available smartphone app**  
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21 233 In this experiment, we tested a smartphone face recognition app with our pixelated images  
22 and averages. The use of automatic face recognition systems has rapidly increased in recent  
23 years to the point where these are commonly used in consumer electronics, for example as a  
24 security feature or as a means of organising personal photo albums. The developers of these  
25 systems typically do not publish the algorithms on which they operate as these are  
26 commercially sensitive. However, recognition accuracy is typically high, without being  
27 perfect, though performance is somewhat dependent on the quality of images. We therefore  
28 decided to test a contemporary, publicly available smartphone app. We expected the app to  
29 show reduced performance with pixelated photos – and we aimed to establish whether  
30 accuracy with these degraded images could be improved by averaging them.  
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38 244 We used the smartphone application *FaceDouble* version 1.0 (TeamSOA, Inc.) which is  
39 designed to return a celebrity lookalike for an image uploaded by the user. Following the  
40 procedure of a previous study (Jenkins & Burton, 2008) which used a similar face recognition  
41 app, we uploaded one celebrity face image at a time, to test whether the app would return an  
42 image of that same celebrity as the best ‘lookalike’. This gives us the opportunity to use  
43 ambient, naturally-occurring images to test automatic recognition: A face is ‘recognised’ if  
44 the app returns an image of the same person as presented to it.  
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52 252 **Method**  
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55 254 We used 30 probe images of each of 10 Hollywood celebrities (5 female) selected from  
56 Google Images, used in previous research (Burton, Kramer, Ritchie & Jenkins, 2016). Images  
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3 256 showed head and shoulders, and sampled natural variability. As in Experiment 1, the 30  
4 original images of each identity were also pixelated from the original size of 380x570 pixels  
5 to 32x48 pixels (and then re-enlarged). This again gave us the same set of 30 unpixelated and  
6 pixelated images for each celebrity. We created 30 averages for each identity by randomly  
7 selecting 30 sets of 10 images to be averaged together (allowing overlap between  
8 sets/averages), repeating this process for unpixelated and pixelated image sets. Averages in  
9 each set were correspondent such that the first average of each set comprised the same 10  
10 images (pixelated and unpixelated) and so on (see Fig 4 for example stimuli).

11 264  
12 265 Each image was uploaded individually into the FaceDouble application on an Apple iPhone5  
13 handset. When the returned identity matched that of the uploaded image, we recorded a 'hit'.  
14 266 Otherwise, we recorded a 'miss'. The app responds with a celebrity 'lookalike'. When the  
15 app returns the lookalike, it shows the celebrity's profile, as opposed to the closest matching  
16 image of that celebrity. Therefore it is not possible to eliminate identical picture returns as  
17 has been done previously (Jenkins & Burton, 2008). The image that the app uses in its profile  
18 of each celebrity was not included in our original sets of 30 images per celebrity.

19 272  
20 273 Figure 4 here  
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### 22 275 **Results and Discussion**

23 276  
24 277 Fig 5 shows the mean percent of correct identity responses from the smartphone app. A 2  
25 (image type: exemplar, average) x 2 (pixelation: unpixelated, pixelated) ANOVA revealed a  
26 significant main effect of image type ( $F(1,9) = 93.20, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .91$ ), a main effect of  
27 pixelation ( $F(1,9) = 77.36, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .90$ ), and a significant interaction between image  
28 type and pixelation ( $F(1,9) = 47.25, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .84$ ). Simple main effects showed an  
29 effect of image type at both the unpixelated ( $F(1,18) = 7.91, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .31$ ) and the  
30 pixelated level ( $F(1,18) = 139.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .89$ ), meaning that averages outperformed  
31 exemplars both when the exemplars and the images comprising the average were unpixelated,  
32 and when they were pixelated. Simple main effects also showed an effect of pixelation for  
33 both exemplars ( $F(1,18) = 123.77, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .87$ ) and averages ( $F(1,18) = 12.77,$   
34  $p < .005, \eta_p^2 = .42$ ), meaning that unpixelated exemplars and averages comprising  
35 unpixelated images led to higher accuracy in identity recognition than pixelated exemplars  
36 and averages comprising pixelated images.

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3 290  
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8 293 These results show a number of interesting effects. First, the overall level of performance of  
9 294 the automatic recognition system is rather good. The system recognised 86% of celebrities'  
10 295 images in their raw (unpixelated) form. This is rather impressive performance, given the  
11 296 unconstrained nature of the images used – simply collected from internet search. Second,  
12 297 there is a considerable advantage to recognition of averages – as with previous research  
13 298 (Jenkins & Burton, 2008), the system recognised 100% of all averages of the celebrities  
14 299 tested.

19 300  
20 301 As predicted, pixelation severely damaged the recognition rates of the automatic system, with  
21 302 performance dropping to a quarter of that of the original images (22% accuracy). However,  
22 303 this drop in performance was almost entirely overcome by averaging the pixelated images  
23 304 together. In this case, we see performance of standard images (at 86% in Fig 5) being almost  
24 305 equalled by the simple graphical manipulation on very severely degraded pixelated images  
25 306 (79% in Fig 5). This is a very impressive performance boost for the automated recognition  
26 307 system.

32 308  
33 309 The results of this experiment are promising, in that it appears a simple averaging procedure  
34 310 can enhance automatic recognition of poor quality images. However, from this single  
35 311 experiment, we cannot judge whether the result will generalise to other automated systems.  
36 312 Furthermore, we had no control over the database of images used for matching, and so we do  
37 313 not know whether the results are dependent on the type of images available for internet  
38 314 searches on celebrities. In the next experiment, we tested a rather different face recognition  
39 315 system, designed for forensic and security purposes rather than for consumer electronics. This  
40 316 allowed us to control the composition of the image database and extract more detailed  
41 317 performance measures, as described below.

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48 319 **Experiment 3. Commercial face recognition system and large image databases**  
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53 321 Here, we test the benefit of image averaging using a commercially available face recognition  
54 322 system. We had the opportunity to test the effectiveness of our averaging technique using  
55 323 *FaceVACS-DBScan 5.1.2.0* running Cognitec's B10 algorithm (Cognitec, 2017) which

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3      324 compares a face image to a large image database. We created two large image databases: an  
4      325 ambient image database comprising 900 celebrity images from the ‘labelled faces in the wild’  
5      326 set (Huang, Ramesh, Berg & Learned-Miller, 2007); and a passport image database  
6      327 comprising 7980 passport images of Australian citizens. The *ambient image database*  
7      328 comprised images captured in unconstrained environmental conditions, typically taken by  
8      329 photojournalists. Here, we use this database to simulate the type of imagery commonly found  
9      330 in forensic casework. The *passport image database* simulates the type of imagery stored in  
10     331 databases of secure identity documents, which may be accessed in the course of forensic  
11     332 casework (Grother & Ngan, 2014; Garvie, Bedoya & Frankle, 2016).

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19     333 We added ten ambient images of each of our target celebrities to the ambient image database,  
20     334 and two passport-compliant images of each of the target celebrities to the passport image  
21     335 database. We used these databases to test our averaging technique by entering our  
22     336 experimental stimuli (i.e., unpixelated exemplars, unpixelated averages, pixelated exemplars,  
23     337 and pixelated averages) as probe images, and recorded hits when the system returned the  
24     338 same identity from the database.

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## 341 **Method**

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343 We evaluated the effectiveness of the averaging technique using two large test databases. The  
344 *ambient image database* consisted of 1000 images, one image each of 900 identities (450  
345 female), taken from the ‘labelled faces in the wild’ set that has been used in recent  
346 benchmark tests of automatic face recognition software (Huang et al., 2007). We ensured that  
347 the images of the 900 non-matching identities in this dataset did not duplicate any of the  
348 target celebrities. We added 100 images of the target celebrities (10 images of each) to the  
349 database. So as to keep these images consistent with the other images in the database, we  
350 sourced them from the internet using the same collection method as described in the paper  
351 accompanying the original database (Huang et al., 2007), and cropped them to 250 x 250  
352 pixels to be the same size as the database images (Fig 6A). The database images of our target  
353 celebrities were not included in our original image set for each identity, ensuring that there  
354 could not be identical image matches, and the database images did not contribute to any of  
355 our averages.

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3 357 The *passport image database* comprised 8000 images. Non-matching images in this database  
4 358 were one passport photograph each of 7980 Australian citizens selected to be of a similar age  
5 359 to the target celebrities (i.e., between ages of 30 and 60). We added two images of each of the  
6 360 10 target celebrities. So as to keep these images as consistent as possible with the database  
7 361 images, we selected these to be compliant with passport photo guidelines (front-facing,  
8 362 background removed; see Fig 6B). We divided the test database into 3990 male and 3990  
9 363 female identities and conducted tests of male and female probe images separately.  
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17 365 Figure 6 here  
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21 367 The probe images used to search the databases in Experiment 3 were 10 images of each of the  
22 368 10 celebrities in each image type (unpixelated exemplar, unpixelated average, pixelated  
23 369 exemplar, pixelated average). This resulted in a total of 400 probe images. These were a  
24 370 subset of the images used in Experiment 2.  
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28 372 **Results and Discussion**  
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31 373 We compared matching accuracy for the four probe image types using the following  
32 procedure. First, we counted how many times out of 100 probe images a target image of the  
33 374 correct identity was returned by the algorithm as the top ranking match. For the *ambient*  
34 375 *image database*, 99/100 unpixelated exemplars resulted in matches at rank 1, 100/100  
35 376 unpixelated averages, 76/100 pixelated exemplars, and 96/100 pixelated averages. For the  
36 377 *passport image database*, the total of 98/100 unpixelated exemplar probe images, 100/100  
37 378 unpixelated averages, 68/100 pixelated exemplars and 97/100 pixelated averages returned an  
38 379 image of the correct identity at rank 1.  
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46 383 The rank 1 position results show a pattern consistent with previous experiments. Face  
47 384 identification for unpixelated images was very high, but pixelating these images reduced  
48 385 performance by around a quarter. Averaging improved performance to 100% in the  
49 386 unpixelated condition, but more markedly in the pixelated condition, averaging poor quality  
50 387 images together produced performance equivalent to unpixelated single images.  
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56 389 Next, we counted how many of the 10 target images of the correct identity appeared in the  
57 390 top N ranked images returned by the system, the ‘candidate list’, for each of the 100 probe  
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3 391 images in each condition. We repeated this analysis for 5 levels of candidate list size (10, 20,  
4 392 40, 80, 160). This test protocol reflects the operation of algorithms configured for 1:n  
5 393 database search. In operational scenarios, the top N ranked match images are shown to a  
6 394 human reviewer who must inspect the images and decide if the target identity appears in this  
7 395 image gallery (White, Dunn, Schmid & Kemp, 2015; Grother & Ngan, 2014). Therefore here,  
8 396 the number of correct images of the target identity returned to the gallery represents the  
9 397 performance of the system across different levels of algorithm threshold. For the *ambient*  
10 398 *image database*, the maximum number of hits per probe was 10 and for the *passport image*  
11 399 *database*, the maximum number of hits was 2.

12 400

13 401 Figure 7 here

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15 403 Fig 7 shows the mean number of hits for each probe image type as a function of gallery size  
16 404 for both the Ambient Image and Passport Image test sets. It is clear that results replicate the  
17 405 pattern found in previous experiments. Averaging improved performance of the recognition  
18 406 software for both pixelated and original images, and this benefit was largest for pixelated  
19 407 images.

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21 409 For consistency with analysis of previous experiments, we conducted 2 (image type) x 2  
22 410 (pixelation) ANOVAs separately for ambient image and passport image database tests. A  
23 411 single ANOVA was conducted for each test, collapsing over levels of gallery size. For both  
24 412 tests, there was a significant main effect of image type (ambient:  $F(1, 99) = 179.20, p < .001$ ,  
25 413  $\eta_p^2 = .64$ ; passport:  $F(1, 99) = 20.52, p < .001; \eta_p^2 = .17$ ), pixelation (ambient:  $F(1,$   
26 414  $99) = 477.30, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .83$ ; passport:  $F(1, 99) = 31.78, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .24$ ) and a  
27 415 significant interaction between factors (ambient:  $F(1, 99) = 104.71, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .51$ ;  
28 416 passport:  $F(1, 99) = 16.58, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .14$ ). Analysis of simple main effects showed that  
29 417 averaging benefited accuracy for both unpixelated and pixelated images with the ambient  
30 418 image database (unpixelated:  $F(1, 198) = 7.64, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .04$ , pixelated:  $F(1,$   
31 419  $198) = 281.04, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .59$ ). For the passport image database, averaging benefited  
32 420 accuracy for pixelated ( $F(1, 198) = 37.09, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .16$ ) but not unpixelated probe  
33 421 images ( $F(1, 198) = 0.47, p = .494, \eta_p^2 < .001$ ). Simple main effects also showed a significant  
34 422 detrimental effect of pixelation for both exemplars and averages for the ambient image  
35 423 database (exemplars:  $F(1, 198) = 532.21, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .73$ , averages:  $F(1, 198) = 87.39,$   
36 424  $p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .31$ ). Finally, simple main effects showed a significant detrimental effect of

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3 425 pixelation for both exemplars and averages for the passport image database (exemplars:  $F(1,$   
4  $198) = 48.10, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .20$ , averages:  $F(1, 198) = 7.04, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .03$ ).  
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8 428 Thus, results of Experiment 3 replicate the findings of the previous experiments; showing that  
9 averaging improves face matching performance, especially when averaging low resolution,  
10 pixelated images. The fact that averaging did not benefit performance for unpixelated probe  
11 images in the passport image database appears to be due to the ceiling level accuracy on this  
12 portion of the test.  
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18 434 The databases used in this experiment were intended to simulate those used in real forensic  
19 face identification settings. The results produced in the experiments here were conducted by  
20 the researchers, and should therefore not be construed as a maximum-effort full-capacity  
21 result. In practice, it is unlikely that a database would include more images of the target  
22 identity than non-matching identities as our databases did here. Nonetheless, this experiment  
23 goes some way to simulating the real-world problem of identifying a suspect from low  
24 quality CCTV images when provided with a database of high quality previously-collected  
25 images. The results show that averaging together multiple independent, poor quality images  
26 may provide a better representation of the suspect for use in automatic face recognition  
27 systems. In practice, many of the systems used in real-world settings have a front-end where  
28 investigators can manipulate images. Based on our current results, we would suggest that  
29 averaging could be built into these systems at this initial stage in order to improve accuracy  
30 for pixelated images.  
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36 448 **General Discussion**  
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43 450 In all three experiments, recognition of pixelated images was worse than unpixelated  
44 originals. Pixelation, at the resolutions tested here, is clearly detrimental to recognition.  
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46 452 Further, we have presented a method for overcoming this by averaging together multiple  
47 pixelated images. In all three experiments, averages of pixelated images outperformed  
48 pixelated exemplars. The first experiment tested unfamiliar human observers, the second used  
49 a publicly available smartphone app, and the third investigated a commercially available face  
50 recognition system. These three methods mimic the real world settings of automatic and  
51 human face recognition from poor quality images such as face recognition algorithms used by  
52 police, and suspect identification from poor quality images.  
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5 460 Each of these three methods were sensitive to our manipulations of pixelation and averaging,  
6 and show broadly similar patterns of results. In Experiments 2 and 3, we have shown that the  
7 accuracy of two different implementations of automatic face recognition systems can be  
8 improved by using the average of multiple pixelated images. For the automatic systems,  
9 average images outperformed single exemplars, and the averages of unpixelated exemplars  
10 gave rise to near-perfect accuracy. In Experiment 1, we tested human observers on a face  
11 matching task using pixelated and unpixelated exemplars and their averages. Performance  
12 was poorer for pixelated than unpixelated exemplars, with a greater increase in accuracy  
13 when averaging was applied to pixelated images compared to individual exemplars.  
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17 470 Pixelation is often used as a method of masking identity for privacy purposes (Boyle,  
18 Edwards & Greenberg, 2000; Kitahara, Kogure & Hagita, 2004; Padilla-López, Chaaraoui &  
19 Flórez-Revuelta, 2015). It has been shown, however, that the effect of pixelation can be  
20 overcome by various computer algorithms so as to achieve accurate face identification from  
21 individual pixelated images (Newton, Sweeney & Malin, 2005) and when comparing a de-  
22 pixelated image to a very similar high quality image of the same person (Gross, Sweeney, De  
23 la Torre & Baker, 2006). The averaging technique we have used here provides a  
24 computationally inexpensive route to improving identification from pixelated images,  
25 provided that multiple images are available. Our results provide further evidence to suggest  
26 that pixelation is not a reliable form of image redaction for masking identity, in cases where  
27 multiple images are available.  
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31 482 The results of this study have clear and important implications for face identification in  
32 applied settings, particularly where automatic face recognition algorithms are in use. In  
33 settings such as police identification of suspects, it is common to compare a poor quality  
34 image to a database of high quality images using face recognition software. From the results  
35 of the experiments presented here, we suggest that creating an average of several poor quality  
36 images which have been obtained from different sources may improve face identification  
37 performance. We have also shown that this technique improves human face matching  
38 performance, which adds to a growing literature showing that image averaging can improve  
39 identification accuracy (e.g. Burton et al. 2005; Bruce, Ness, Hancock, Newman, & Rarity,  
40 2002; Frowd, Bruce, Plenderleith, & Hancock, 2006; Hasel & Wells, 2007; White et al.  
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5 We have shown that averaging improves machine and human face identification, especially  
6 when image quality is low. These findings have implications for law enforcement where  
7 suspects are often identified from poor quality images. The face averaging method we have  
8 used is computationally inexpensive, easy to achieve, and yields clear benefits for both  
9 human and computer face recognition.  
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Fig 1. Example photographs and their average. Individual images vary in head angle, expression, lighting, etc. Averaging together multiple images of the same face produces a more stable representation. [Copyright restrictions prevent publication of the face images used in all experiments, though these are available from the authors. Images used in Figs 1, 2, 4 and 6 are illustrative of the experimental stimuli. The individuals pictured in these images did not appear in the experiments, and have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.]

71x20mm (300 x 300 DPI)

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Fig 2. Example stimuli for Experiment 1. A) Unpixelated exemplar mismatch trial; B) Pixelated exemplar match trial; C) Unpixelated average mismatch trial; and D) Pixelated average match trial. The individuals pictured have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.

57x47mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 3. Face matching accuracy. Mean accuracy (percent correct) for the face matching task. Error bars denote standard error of the mean (SEM).

522x216mm (72 x 72 DPI)




Fig 4. Example stimuli for Experiment 2. A) Unpixelated exemplar; B) Average of ten unpixelated images; C) Pixelated exemplar; and D) Average of ten pixelated images. The individuals pictured have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.

24x38mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 5. Accuracy of identity returned from Experiment 2 using the FaceDouble application. Error bars denote standard error of the mean (SEM).

93x55mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 6. Example stimuli for Experiment 3. A) Image of a target identity cropped to be consistent with the ambient image database images from the 'labelled faces in the wild' set (Huang et al., 2007). B) Image of a target identity chosen to meet passport photo guidelines and edited to remove the background to be consistent with the passport photo database. Images are representative of the stimuli used in Experiment 3 but for reasons of privacy we are not able to provide examples of the passport images used in the database.

The individuals pictured have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.

24x16mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 7. Results of Experiment 3. Identification performance is shown as a function of Gallery size for the Ambient Image test (left) and the Passport Image test (right). Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM).

190x94mm (300 x 300 DPI)