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
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
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Enhancing CCTV: Averages improve face identification from poor quality images

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60**1 Abstract**

2

3 Low quality images are problematic for face identification, for example when police identify
4 faces from CCTV images. Here we test whether face averages, comprising multiple poor
5 quality images, can improve both human and computer recognition. We created averages
6 from multiple pixelated or non-pixelated images, and compared accuracy using these images
7 and exemplars. To provide a broad assessment of the potential benefits of this method, we
8 tested human observers (n = 88; Experiment 1), and also computer recognition, using a
9 smartphone application (Experiment 2) and a commercial one-to-many face recognition
10 system used in forensic settings (Experiment 3). The third experiment used large image
11 databases of 900 ambient images and 7980 passport images. In all three experiments, we
12 found a substantial increase in performance by averaging multiple pixelated images of a
13 person's face. These results have implications for forensic settings in which faces are
14 identified from poor quality images, such as CCTV.

15

16 Key words: Face identification, averages, pixelated images, CCTV.

17

18 Introduction

19
20 Police forces use CCTV images for suspect identification, and this process can utilise both
21 human operators and computer face recognition systems. It is important, therefore, to
22 understand the effect of poor quality images on both human and computer performance. Our
23 goal here is to test a quick and easy method of image enhancement, namely averaging, to
24 establish whether this can improve face recognition from poor quality images for both human
25 observers and computer systems.

26
27 Although human observers are accurate in identifying familiar people from poor quality
28 CCTV footage (Burton, Wilson, Cowan & Bruce, 1999), studies have shown that accuracy in
29 identifying unfamiliar people from CCTV is poor (Bruce et al., 1999; Davies & Thasen,
30 2000; Davis & Valentine, 2009; Walker & Tough, 2015). Pixelation also harms the ability to
31 identify familiar people from both static and moving images (Lander, Bruce & Hill, 2001),
32 and can completely extinguish this ability at very high levels of pixelation (Demant, Dhont,
33 Notebaert, Pattyn & Vandierendonck, 2007). As the quality of the CCTV is reduced due to
34 image compression, the ability to make face identifications from the videos decreases (Keval
35 & Sasse, 2008). Recently, however, it has been shown that experts such as forensic facial
36 examiners are able to overcome this problem to some extent (White, Phillips, Hahn, Hill &
37 O'Toole, 2015), but their expertise is most advantageous when working with high quality
38 images (Norell et al., 2015; White, Norell, Phillips & O'Toole, 2017).

39
40 A recent study examined performance on a face matching task in which participants were
41 required to indicate whether two simultaneously presented images showed the same person or
42 two different people. When one image in the face pair was pixelated, face matching
43 performance was surprisingly robust, only dropping below chance level with images
44 presented at a resolution of 8 pixels in width (Bindemann, Attard, Leach & Johnston, 2013).
45 At a level of pixelation which reduced performance, but not as low as chance, performance
46 was significantly improved by reducing the size of the pixelated image, thus reducing the
47 perceptual effect of the large-scale edge information in the image.

48
49 Computer recognition of faces as assessed with standard evaluation measures such as the
50 FERET (Phillips, Moon, Rizvi & Rauss, 2000) and the FRVT (Blackburn, Bone & Phillips,
51 2001) typically outperforms human unfamiliar face recognition (O'Toole et al., 2007) but

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3 52 does not perform perfectly (O’Toole et al., 2007; Phillips, Flynn, Scruggs, Bowyer & Worek,
4 53 2006; Zhao, Chellappa, Phillips & Rosenfeld, 2003). Direct comparisons of humans and face
5
6 54 recognition algorithms have shown that, although algorithms outperform humans on frontal
7
8 55 face images (Phillips & O’Toole, 2014), for images showing extreme illumination and pose,
9
10 56 humans win out against computer algorithms (Phillips, Hill, Swindle & O’Toole, 2015).

11 57

12 58 Recent work in the field of computer science has utilised a variety of techniques such as noise
13
14 59 suppression and super-resolution, in an attempt to overcome the harmful effects of poor
15
16 60 image quality on computer face recognition, achieving various degrees of success (Buciu &
17
18 61 Gacsadi, 2011; Rudrani & Das, 2011). To date, these techniques have only been applied to
19
20 62 images in such a way as to test for improvements in machine recognition. Other techniques
21
22 63 seek to assess image quality and improve face recognition performance by simply rejecting
23
24 64 images which fall below a given threshold, but this is problematic because there is no
25
26 65 agreement on a reliable indicator of quality (Luo, 2004; Fronthaler, Kollreider & Bigun,
27
28 66 2006; Beveridge et al., 2011). Moreover, in some situations poor quality images may be all
29
30 67 that is available, for example when poor quality CCTV footage is the only evidence linking a
31
32 68 suspect to a crime scene.

33 69

34 70 Here we address this problem by examining whether combining information across multiple
35
36 71 poor quality images can benefit human and computer matching accuracy. In applied settings,
37
38 72 multiple images of a person are often available, for example multiple screenshots from CCTV
39
40 73 footage. We focus on one promising approach that has been shown to improve both human
41
42 74 and computer matching - averaging together multiple images of a single identity, as shown in
43
44 75 Fig 1 (Burton, Jenkins, Hancock & White, 2005; Jenkins & Burton, 2008; White, Burton,
45
46 76 Jenkins & Kemp, 2014). In a prior study, images of celebrities were uploaded to an online
47
48 77 implementation of an industry standard face recognition system (FaceVACS). Accuracy of
49
50 78 identification of exemplars was only 54%, climbing to 100% for average images (Jenkins &
51
52 79 Burton, 2008). A subsequent study showed that the automatic face recognition algorithm used
53
54 80 in Android smartphone devices’ “face unlock” system was improved from 45% for single
55
56 81 images to 68% for averages (Robertson, Kramer & Burton, 2015). One study has also shown
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58 82 that average images also improve human accuracy for face matching tasks (White et al.,
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60 83 2014). Accuracy for matching an average of 12 images of an individual to one exemplar
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85 84 image was higher than accuracy for matching two exemplars.

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3 86 Figure 1 here

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5
6 88 Averaging together multiple pixelated images from CCTV footage, for example, ought to
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8 89 reduce the noise introduced by the pixelation, and lead to a clearer representation of the
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10 90 identity. Simply by taking multiple low resolution images whose noise is uncorrelated, and
11
12 91 averaging them together in a high resolution space, one increases the amount of information
13
14 92 present by comparison to a single image. Here, we apply the technique of face averaging to
15
16 93 the problem of face identification from poor quality images. We present three experiments
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18 94 investigating the effect of averaging multiple degraded images in order to produce a better
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20 95 representation of the person pictured. The first experiment tests human face matching, the
21
22 96 second experiment uses a smartphone app, available to the general public, and the final
23
24 97 experiment tests a commercial face recognition application, currently used in the security
25
26 98 industry. The final experiment also uses a large number of images in two different databases
27
28 99 – an ambient image database of 900 images from the *labelled faces in the wild* set (Huang,
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101 Ramesh, Berg & Learned-Miller, 2007), and images taken from an existing database of 7980
102
103 real passport images.

103 **Experiment 1. Human face matching**

104
105 This experiment investigates the effect of pixelation and averaging on human face matching
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107 performance. In a face matching task, participants are shown two images simultaneously and
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109 asked to decide whether or not they show the same person. A recent study found that
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111 pixelating one of the two images in a matching task reduces performance (Bindemann et al.,
112
113 2013). Here, we averaged together multiple pixelated images to establish whether averages
114
115 would give rise to higher accuracy than single pixelated images. We hypothesised that
116
117 unfamiliar face matching accuracy will be poorer for pixelated than unpixelated images, and
118
119 that averages of pixelated images would produce an increase in accuracy compared to
120
121 pixelated exemplars.

115 **Method**

117 **Participants**

118 Eighty-eight participants took part in this experiment (16 males; mean age: 24 years, range:
119 18-65 years). All were members of the University of York, UK, or the University of Lincoln,

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2
3 120 UK, and took part voluntarily or in exchange for course credit. This study was approved by
4 121 the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of York and the School of
5 122 Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the University of Lincoln. All participants gave
6 123 written informed consent.
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11 125 **Stimuli and Procedure**

12 126 Eleven images of 96 different unfamiliar identities (50% women) were downloaded from the
13 127 Internet using Google Image searches for celebrities from different countries, and were
14 128 selected in order to be unfamiliar to our UK-based participants. Familiarity checks on a
15 129 different group of participants (not tested in the current studies) confirmed the IDs were
16 130 unfamiliar to UK viewers. Images were broadly full-facing, but sampled natural variability in
17 131 facial and environmental parameters, akin to those used in previous face matching research
18 132 (Ritchie et al., 2015). In addition, for each identity, one ‘foil’ image was collected. This was
19 133 an image of another unfamiliar identity (not appearing in the original 96) matching the verbal
20 134 description of the target identity. The images were high quality, and cropped to 380x570
21 135 pixels. Each of these images was also downsampled to size 30x45 pixels and then resized
22 136 back to their original dimensions. This method provided pixelated and unpixelated versions
23 137 of the image set.
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33 139 We created average images by initially deriving the shape of each image using a semi-
34 140 automatic landmarking system designed to register 82 points on the face aligned to
35 141 anatomical features. Each average was created by warping the 10 images of an identity to the
36 142 average shape of those 10 images, and then calculating the mean RGB colour values for each
37 143 pixel. The unpixelated images were landmarked using our semi-automatic system (where
38 144 only five locations are selected manually – for details, see Kramer, Young, Day & Burton,
39 145 2017). After pixelation, the images were again landmarked using the system. Therefore,
40 146 landmarking of the pixelated images was inherently less precise, given that our system (and
41 147 the human user selecting the five locations) had far less photographic detail to work with.
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50 149 Ten images of each identity, unpixelated and pixelated, were used to form averages, with the
51 150 one excluded image used as the ‘match’ image. Note that ‘pixelated averages’ are therefore
52 151 averages of pixelated images, not averages created and then themselves pixelated. The
53 152 ‘mismatch’ image was the foil collected previously for that identity. Due to the procedure
54 153 used for creating the averages, all background information was removed from the average
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154 images. Therefore, to ensure that reference exemplar images were consistent with the
155 averages, all background information was also removed from reference exemplars. Match
156 and foil images were presented naturally with background information intact (see Fig 2).

157
158 Figure 2 here

159
160 Each trial consisted of the reference image (unpixelated exemplar, pixelated exemplar,
161 average of unpixelated images, average of pixelated images) presented on the left of the
162 screen, and the test image (match or foil) presented on the right. Each participant saw each ID
163 once in the experiment, with each ID counterbalanced by condition across participants. There
164 were 12 trials per condition (always 50% women).

166 Results and Discussion

167 Fig 3 shows mean accuracy for the human face matching task. Following previous research
168 (White et al., 2014), we analysed the data for match and mismatch trials separately, using a 2
169 (image type: exemplar, average) x 2 (pixelation: unpixelated, pixelated) ANOVA.

170
171 For match trials, there was a significant main effect of image type ($F(1,87) = 35.00, p < .001,$
172 $\eta_p^2 = .29$), a significant main effect of pixelation ($F(1,87) = 38.84, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .31$), and a
173 significant interaction between image type and pixelation ($F(1,87) = 4.11, p = .046,$
174 $\eta_p^2 = .05$). We therefore considered the simple main effects of pixelation at each level of
175 image type. These simple main effects were significant for both exemplars ($F(1,174) = 38.25,$
176 $p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .18$) and averages ($F(1,174) = 13.90, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$), meaning that
177 unpixelated exemplars and averages were more easily matched to the test image than
178 pixelated exemplars and averages. We also considered the simple main effects of image type
179 at each level of pixelation. These simple main effects were significant for both pixelated
180 ($F(1,174) = 32.63, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .16$) and unpixelated images ($F(1,174) = 8.71, p < .005,$
181 $\eta_p^2 = .05$), meaning that averages outperformed exemplars for both image types. The effect
182 size for the average advantage was much greater for pixelated than for unpixelated images,
183 suggesting that image averaging is especially beneficial where image quality is low.

184
185 A 2 (image type: exemplar, average) x 2 (pixelation: unpixelated, pixelated) ANOVA on
186 mismatch trials found a significant main effect of pixelation ($F(1,87) = 70.41, p < .001,$
187 $\eta_p^2 = .45$), a non-significant main effect of image type ($F(1,87) = .26, p = .611, \eta_p^2 < .001$),

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3 188 and a non-significant interaction between image type and pixelation ($F(1,87) = .68, p = .412,$
4 189 $\eta_p^2 = .01$). For mismatch trials, pixelated images gave rise to poorer performance than
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6 190 unpixelated images, but there was no effect of averaging. The result is in-line with the
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8 191 previous work on this topic (White et al., 2014), where averaging improved performance on
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10 192 match but not non-match trials.

11 193
12 194 Figure 3 here
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16 196 Analysis of accuracy scores on match trials show that averages improve performance for both
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18 197 pixelated and non-pixelated images, with a greater effect of averaging for pixelated images.
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20 198 However, because this interaction was not observed in non-match trials, it may reflect a
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22 199 response bias. In order to clarify whether the interaction was driven by improvements in
23
24 200 perceptual sensitivity, we analysed the results using a signal detection theory model. In this
25
26 201 analysis, hits correspond to correct match trials and false alarms correspond to incorrect
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28 202 mismatch trials. Paired samples *t*-tests on *d*-prime (*d'*) values showed a significant difference
29
30 203 between accuracy for pixelated exemplars ($M = .43$) and pixelated averages ($M = .80$), $t(87) =$
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32 204 $3.797, p < .001, d = 0.41$, but a non-significant difference between accuracy for unpixelated
33
34 205 exemplars ($M = 1.32$) and unpixelated averages ($M = 1.44$), $t(87) = 1.431, p = .156, d = 0.15$.
35
36 206 Therefore, averaging improved sensitivity only for pixelated images and not for unpixelated
37
38 207 images.

39 208
40
41 209 Paired samples *t*-tests on criterion (*c*) values showed a significant difference between the bias
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43 210 for unpixelated exemplars ($M = -.12$) and unpixelated averages ($M = .01$), $t(87) = 3.275, p =$
44
45 211 $.002, d = 0.35$, and between the bias for pixelated exemplars ($M = -.10$) and pixelated
46
47 212 averages ($M = .05$), $t(87) = 2.724, p = .008, d = 0.29$. Taken together, these results show that
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49 213 face averages comprising high quality images increased participants' bias to respond that two
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51 214 images show the same person, without increasing overall sensitivity.

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54 216 Overall, the results of Experiment 1 show that accuracy on a face matching task is reduced
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56 217 when one image in the pair is pixelated. Averaging together several pixelated images,
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58 218 however, reduces this cost to performance. Further, the interaction between pixelation and
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60 219 averaging suggests that averaging is especially beneficial to human performance when image
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221 220 quality is poor. Creating face averages is computationally inexpensive and easy to achieve
with various freely available softwares such as Psychomorph (Tidemann, Burt & Perrett,

2001) or InterFace (Kramer, Jenkins & Burton, 2017). We therefore suggest that this technique could be used in a variety of settings to improve human face matching.

224

While Experiment 1 addressed the effect of pixelation and averages on human face matching, we were also interested in establishing whether averaging can overcome difficulties associated with poor quality imagery in computer face recognition systems. In the following experiments, we turned our attention to testing the effect of image averaging with commercial face recognition software.

230

231 **Experiment 2. Face recognition using a publicly available smartphone app**

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In this experiment, we tested a smartphone face recognition app with our pixelated images and averages. The use of automatic face recognition systems has rapidly increased in recent years to the point where these are commonly used in consumer electronics, for example as a security feature or as a means of organising personal photo albums. The developers of these systems typically do not publish the algorithms on which they operate as these are commercially sensitive. However, recognition accuracy is typically high, without being perfect, though performance is somewhat dependent on the quality of images. We therefore decided to test a contemporary, publicly available smartphone app. We expected the app to show reduced performance with pixelated photos – and we aimed to establish whether accuracy with these degraded images could be improved by averaging them.

243

We used the smartphone application *FaceDouble* version 1.0 (TeamSOA, Inc.) which is designed to return a celebrity lookalike for an image uploaded by the user. Following the procedure of a previous study (Jenkins & Burton, 2008) which used a similar face recognition app, we uploaded one celebrity face image at a time, to test whether the app would return an image of that same celebrity as the best ‘lookalike’. This gives us the opportunity to use ambient, naturally-occurring images to test automatic recognition: A face is ‘recognised’ if the app returns an image of the same person as presented to it.

251

252 **Method**

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We used 30 probe images of each of 10 Hollywood celebrities (5 female) selected from Google Images, used in previous research (Burton, Kramer, Ritchie & Jenkins, 2016). Images

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3 256 showed head and shoulders, and sampled natural variability. As in Experiment 1, the 30
4 257 original images of each identity were also pixelated from the original size of 380x570 pixels
5 258 to 32x48 pixels (and then re-enlarged). This again gave us the same set of 30 unpixelated and
6 259 pixelated images for each celebrity. We created 30 averages for each identity by randomly
7 260 selecting 30 sets of 10 images to be averaged together (allowing overlap between
8 261 sets/averages), repeating this process for unpixelated and pixelated image sets. Averages in
9 262 each set were correspondent such that the first average of each set comprised the same 10
10 263 images (pixelated and unpixelated) and so on (see Fig 4 for example stimuli).

11 264

12 265 Each image was uploaded individually into the FaceDouble application on an Apple iPhone5
13 266 handset. When the returned identity matched that of the uploaded image, we recorded a 'hit'.
14 267 Otherwise, we recorded a 'miss'. The app responds with a celebrity 'lookalike'. When the
15 268 app returns the lookalike, it shows the celebrity's profile, as opposed to the closest matching
16 269 image of that celebrity. Therefore it is not possible to eliminate identical picture returns as
17 270 has been done previously (Jenkins & Burton, 2008). The image that the app uses in its profile
18 271 of each celebrity was not included in our original sets of 30 images per celebrity.

19 272

20 273 Figure 4 here

21 274

22 275 **Results and Discussion**

23 276

24 277 Fig 5 shows the mean percent of correct identity responses from the smartphone app. A 2
25 278 (image type: exemplar, average) x 2 (pixelation: unpixelated, pixelated) ANOVA revealed a
26 279 significant main effect of image type ($F(1,9) = 93.20, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .91$), a main effect of
27 280 pixelation ($F(1,9) = 77.36, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .90$), and a significant interaction between image
28 281 type and pixelation ($F(1,9) = 47.25, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .84$). Simple main effects showed an
29 282 effect of image type at both the unpixelated ($F(1,18) = 7.91, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .31$) and the
30 283 pixelated level ($F(1,18) = 139.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .89$), meaning that averages outperformed
31 284 exemplars both when the exemplars and the images comprising the average were unpixelated,
32 285 and when they were pixelated. Simple main effects also showed an effect of pixelation for
33 286 both exemplars ($F(1,18) = 123.77, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .87$) and averages ($F(1,18) = 12.77,$
34 287 $p < .005, \eta_p^2 = .42$), meaning that unpixelated exemplars and averages comprising
35 288 unpixelated images led to higher accuracy in identity recognition than pixelated exemplars
36 289 and averages comprising pixelated images.

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4 291 Figure 5 here

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6 292

7 293 These results show a number of interesting effects. First, the overall level of performance of
8 294 the automatic recognition system is rather good. The system recognised 86% of celebrities'
9 295 images in their raw (unpixelated) form. This is rather impressive performance, given the
10 296 unconstrained nature of the images used – simply collected from internet search. Second,
11 297 there is a considerable advantage to recognition of averages – as with previous research
12 298 (Jenkins & Burton, 2008), the system recognised 100% of all averages of the celebrities
13 299 tested.

14 300

15 301 As predicted, pixelation severely damaged the recognition rates of the automatic system, with
16 302 performance dropping to a quarter of that of the original images (22% accuracy). However,
17 303 this drop in performance was almost entirely overcome by averaging the pixelated images
18 304 together. In this case, we see performance of standard images (at 86% in Fig 5) being almost
19 305 equalled by the simple graphical manipulation on very severely degraded pixelated images
20 306 (79% in Fig 5). This is a very impressive performance boost for the automated recognition
21 307 system.

22 308

23 309 The results of this experiment are promising, in that it appears a simple averaging procedure
24 310 can enhance automatic recognition of poor quality images. However, from this single
25 311 experiment, we cannot judge whether the result will generalise to other automated systems.
26 312 Furthermore, we had no control over the database of images used for matching, and so we do
27 313 not know whether the results are dependent on the type of images available for internet
28 314 searches on celebrities. In the next experiment, we tested a rather different face recognition
29 315 system, designed for forensic and security purposes rather than for consumer electronics. This
30 316 allowed us to control the composition of the image database and extract more detailed
31 317 performance measures, as described below.

32 318

33 319 **Experiment 3. Commercial face recognition system and large image databases**

34 320

35 321 Here, we test the benefit of image averaging using a commercially available face recognition
36 322 system. We had the opportunity to test the effectiveness of our averaging technique using
37 323 *FaceVACS-DBScan 5.1.2.0* running Cognitec's B10 algorithm (Cognitec, 2017) which

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3 324 compares a face image to a large image database. We created two large image databases: an
4 325 ambient image database comprising 900 celebrity images from the ‘labelled faces in the wild’
5 326 set (Huang, Ramesh, Berg & Learned-Miller, 2007); and a passport image database
6 327 comprising 7980 passport images of Australian citizens. The *ambient image database*
7 328 comprised images captured in unconstrained environmental conditions, typically taken by
8 329 photojournalists. Here, we use this database to simulate the type of imagery commonly found
9 330 in forensic casework. The *passport image database* simulates the type of imagery stored in
10 331 databases of secure identity documents, which may be accessed in the course of forensic
11 332 casework (Grother & Ngan, 2014; Garvie, Bedoya & Frankle, 2016).
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19 334 We added ten ambient images of each of our target celebrities to the ambient image database,
20 335 and two passport-compliant images of each of the target celebrities to the passport image
21 336 database. We used these databases to test our averaging technique by entering our
22 337 experimental stimuli (i.e., unpixelated exemplars, unpixelated averages, pixelated exemplars,
23 338 and pixelated averages) as probe images, and recorded hits when the system returned the
24 339 same identity from the database.
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340

341 **Method**

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343 We evaluated the effectiveness of the averaging technique using two large test databases. The
344 *ambient image database* consisted of 1000 images, one image each of 900 identities (450
345 female), taken from the ‘labelled faces in the wild’ set that has been used in recent
346 benchmark tests of automatic face recognition software (Huang et al., 2007). We ensured that
347 the images of the 900 non-matching identities in this dataset did not duplicate any of the
348 target celebrities. We added 100 images of the target celebrities (10 images of each) to the
349 database. So as to keep these images consistent with the other images in the database, we
350 sourced them from the internet using the same collection method as described in the paper
351 accompanying the original database (Huang et al., 2007), and cropped them to 250 x 250
352 pixels to be the same size as the database images (Fig 6A). The database images of our target
353 celebrities were not included in our original image set for each identity, ensuring that there
354 could not be identical image matches, and the database images did not contribute to any of
355 our averages.
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3 357 The *passport image database* comprised 8000 images. Non-matching images in this database
4 358 were one passport photograph each of 7980 Australian citizens selected to be of a similar age
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6 359 to the target celebrities (i.e., between ages of 30 and 60). We added two images of each of the
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8 360 10 target celebrities. So as to keep these images as consistent as possible with the database
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10 361 images, we selected these to be compliant with passport photo guidelines (front-facing,
11 362 background removed; see Fig 6B). We divided the test database into 3990 male and 3990
12 363 female identities and conducted tests of male and female probe images separately.
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14 364

15
16 365 Figure 6 here
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18 366

19 367 The probe images used to search the databases in Experiment 3 were 10 images of each of the
20 368 10 celebrities in each image type (unpixelated exemplar, unpixelated average, pixelated
21 369 exemplar, pixelated average). This resulted in a total of 400 probe images. These were a
22 370 subset of the images used in Experiment 2.
23
24 371

25 372 **Results and Discussion**



26 373
27 374 We compared matching accuracy for the four probe image types using the following
28 375 procedure. First, we counted how many times out of 100 probe images a target image of the
29 376 correct identity was returned by the algorithm as the top ranking match. For the *ambient*
30 377 *image database*, 99/100 unpixelated exemplars resulted in matches at rank 1, 100/100
31 378 unpixelated averages, 76/100 pixelated exemplars, and 96/100 pixelated averages. For the
32 379 *passport image database*, the total of 98/100 unpixelated exemplar probe images, 100/100
33 380 unpixelated averages, 68/100 pixelated exemplars and 97/100 pixelated averages returned an
34 381 image of the correct identity at rank 1.
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37 383 The rank 1 position results show a pattern consistent with previous experiments. Face
38 384 identification for unpixelated images was very high, but pixelating these images reduced
39 385 performance by around a quarter. Averaging improved performance to 100% in the
40 386 unpixelated condition, but more markedly in the pixelated condition, averaging poor quality
41 387 images together produced performance equivalent to unpixelated single images.
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44 389 Next, we counted how many of the 10 target images of the correct identity appeared in the
45 390 top N ranked images returned by the system, the 'candidate list', for each of the 100 probe
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3 391 images in each condition. We repeated this analysis for 5 levels of candidate list size (10, 20,
4 392 40, 80, 160). This test protocol reflects the operation of algorithms configured for 1:n
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6 393 database search. In operational scenarios, the top N ranked match images are shown to a
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8 394 human reviewer who must inspect the images and decide if the target identity appears in this
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10 395 image gallery (White, Dunn, Schmid & Kemp, 2015; Grother & Ngan, 2014). Therefore here,
11 396 the number of correct images of the target identity returned to the gallery represents the
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13 397 performance of the system across different levels of algorithm threshold. For the *ambient*
14 398 *image database*, the maximum number of hits per probe was 10 and for the *passport image*
15 399 *database*, the maximum number of hits was 2.

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19 401 Figure 7 here

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22 403 Fig 7 shows the mean number of hits for each probe image type as a function of gallery size
23 404 for both the Ambient Image and Passport Image test sets. It is clear that results replicate the
24 405 pattern found in previous experiments. Averaging improved performance of the recognition
25 406 software for both pixelated and original images, and this benefit was largest for pixelated
26 407 images.

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32 409 For consistency with analysis of previous experiments, we conducted 2 (image type) x 2
33 410 (pixelation) ANOVAs separately for ambient image and passport image database tests. A
34 411 single ANOVA was conducted for each test, collapsing over levels of gallery size. For both
35 412 tests, there was a significant main effect of image type (ambient: $F(1, 99) = 179.20, p < .001,$
36 413 $\eta_p^2 = .64$; passport: $F(1, 99) = 20.52, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .17$), pixelation (ambient: $F(1,$
37 414 $99) = 477.30, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .83$; passport: $F(1, 99) = 31.78, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .24$) and a
38 415 significant interaction between factors (ambient: $F(1, 99) = 104.71, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .51$;
39 416 passport: $F(1, 99) = 16.58, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .14$). Analysis of simple main effects showed that
40 417 averaging benefited accuracy for both unpixelated and pixelated images with the ambient
41 418 image database (unpixelated: $F(1, 198) = 7.64, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .04$, pixelated: $F(1,$
42 419 $198) = 281.04, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .59$). For the passport image database, averaging benefited
43 420 accuracy for pixelated ($F(1, 198) = 37.09, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .16$) but not unpixelated probe
44 421 images ($F(1, 198) = 0.47, p = .494, \eta_p^2 < .001$). Simple main effects also showed a significant
45 422 detrimental effect of pixelation for both exemplars and averages for the ambient image
46 423 database (exemplars: $F(1, 198) = 532.21, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .73$, averages: $F(1, 198) = 87.39,$
47 424 $p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .31$). Finally, simple main effects showed a significant detrimental effect of

425 pixelation for both exemplars and averages for the passport image database (exemplars: $F(1,$
426 $198) = 48.10, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .20$, averages: $F(1, 198) = 7.04, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .03$).

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428 Thus, results of Experiment 3 replicate the findings of the previous experiments; showing that
429 averaging improves face matching performance, especially when averaging low resolution,
430 pixelated images. The fact that averaging did not benefit performance for unpixelated probe
431 images in the passport image database appears to be due to the ceiling level accuracy on this
432 portion of the test.

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434 The databases used in this experiment were intended to simulate those used in real forensic
435 face identification settings. The results produced in the experiments here were conducted by
436 the researchers, and should therefore not be construed as a maximum-effort full-capacity
437 result. In practice, it is unlikely that a database would include more images of the target
438 identity than non-matching identities as our databases did here. Nonetheless, this experiment
439 goes some way to simulating the real-world problem of identifying a suspect from low
440 quality CCTV images when provided with a database of high quality previously-collected
441 images. The results show that averaging together multiple independent, poor quality images
442 may provide a better representation of the suspect for use in automatic face recognition
443 systems. In practice, many of the systems used in real-world settings have a front-end where
444 investigators can manipulate images. Based on our current results, we would suggest that
445 averaging could be built into these systems at this initial stage in order to improve accuracy
446 for pixelated images.

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448 **General Discussion**

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450 In all three experiments, recognition of pixelated images was worse than unpixelated
451 originals. Pixelation, at the resolutions tested here, is clearly detrimental to recognition.
452 Further, we have presented a method for overcoming this by averaging together multiple
453 pixelated images. In all three experiments, averages of pixelated images outperformed
454 pixelated exemplars. The first experiment tested unfamiliar human observers, the second used
455 a publicly available smartphone app, and the third investigated a commercially available face
456 recognition system. These three methods mimic the real world settings of automatic and
457 human face recognition from poor quality images such as face recognition algorithms used by
458 police, and suspect identification from poor quality images.

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4 460 Each of these three methods were sensitive to our manipulations of pixelation and averaging,
5 461 and show broadly similar patterns of results. In Experiments 2 and 3, we have shown that the
6 462 accuracy of two different implementations of automatic face recognition systems can be
7 463 improved by using the average of multiple pixelated images. For the automatic systems,
8 464 average images outperformed single exemplars, and the averages of unpixelated exemplars
9 465 gave rise to near-perfect accuracy. In Experiment 1, we tested human observers on a face
10 466 matching task using pixelated and unpixelated exemplars and their averages. Performance
11 467 was poorer for pixelated than unpixelated exemplars, with a greater increase in accuracy
12 468 when averaging was applied to pixelated images compared to individual exemplars.

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14 470 Pixelation is often used as a method of masking identity for privacy purposes (Boyle,
15 471 Edwards & Greenberg, 2000; Kitahara, Kogure & Hagita, 2004; Padilla-López, Chaaoui &
16 472 Flórez-Revuelta, 2015). It has been shown, however, that the effect of pixelation can be
17 473 overcome by various computer algorithms so as to achieve accurate face identification from
18 474 individual pixelated images (Newton, Sweeney & Malin, 2005) and when comparing a de-
19 475 pixelated image to a very similar high quality image of the same person (Gross, Sweeney, De
20 476 la Torre & Baker, 2006). The averaging technique we have used here provides a
21 477 computationally inexpensive route to improving identification from pixelated images,
22 478 provided that multiple images are available. Our results provide further evidence to suggest
23 479 that pixelation is not a reliable form of image redaction for masking identity, in cases where
24 480 multiple images are available.

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26 482 The results of this study have clear and important implications for face identification in
27 483 applied settings, particularly where automatic face recognition algorithms are in use. In
28 484 settings such as police identification of suspects, it is common to compare a poor quality
29 485 image to a database of high quality images using face recognition software. From the results
30 486 of the experiments presented here, we suggest that creating an average of several poor quality
31 487 images which have been obtained from different sources may improve face identification
32 488 performance. We have also shown that this technique improves human face matching
33 489 performance, which adds to a growing literature showing that image averaging can improve
34 490 identification accuracy (e.g. Burton et al. 2005; Bruce, Ness, Hancock, Newman, & Rarity,
35 491 2002; Frowd, Bruce, Plenderleith, & Hancock, 2006; Hasel & Wells, 2007, White et al.
36 492 2014).

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4 494 We have shown that averaging improves machine and human face identification, especially

5 495 when image quality is low. These findings have implications for law enforcement where

6 496 suspects are often identified from poor quality images. The face averaging method we have

7 497 used is computationally inexpensive, easy to achieve, and yields clear benefits for both

8 498 human and computer face recognition.

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Fig 1. Example photographs and their average. Individual images vary in head angle, expression, lighting, etc. Averaging together multiple images of the same face produces a more stable representation. [Copyright restrictions prevent publication of the face images used in all experiments, though these are available from the authors. Images used in Figs 1, 2, 4 and 6 are illustrative of the experimental stimuli. The individuals pictured in these images did not appear in the experiments, and have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.]

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


Fig 2. Example stimuli for Experiment 1. A) Unpixelated exemplar mismatch trial; B) Pixelated exemplar match trial; C) Unpixelated average mismatch trial; and D) Pixelated average match trial. The individuals pictured have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.

57x47mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 3. Face matching accuracy. Mean accuracy (percent correct) for the face matching task. Error bars denote standard error of the mean (SEM).

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


Fig 4. Example stimuli for Experiment 2. A) Unpixelated exemplar; B) Average of ten unpixelated images; C) Pixelated exemplar; and D) Average of ten pixelated images. The individuals pictured have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.

24x38mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 5. Accuracy of identity returned from Experiment 2 using the FaceDouble application. Error bars denote standard error of the mean (SEM).

93x55mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 6. Example stimuli for Experiment 3. A) Image of a target identity cropped to be consistent with the ambient image database images from the 'labelled faces in the wild' set (Huang et al., 2007). B) Image of a target identity chosen to meet passport photo guidelines and edited to remove the background to be consistent with the passport photo database. Images are representative of the stimuli used in Experiment 3 but for reasons of privacy we are not able to provide examples of the passport images used in the database. The individuals pictured have given permission for their images to be reproduced here.

24x16mm (300 x 300 DPI)




Fig 7. Results of Experiment 3. Identification performance is shown as a function of Gallery size for the Ambient Image test (left) and the Passport Image test (right). Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM).

190x94mm (300 x 300 DPI)