**Pragmatics and Society**

**Order in disorder: Audience responses and political rhetoric in speeches from the second round 2012 French presidential election.**

--Manuscript Draft--

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| **Abstract:** | Recent research has established that Japanese political oratory and audience behaviour (Bull & Feldman 2011; Feldman & Bull 2012) are fundamentally different to those found in British political speeches (Heritage & Greatbatch 1986). To further develop these cross-cultural analyses of political rhetoric, speaker-audience interaction was analysed in ten speeches by the two second-round candidates in the 2012 French presidential elections (François Hollande; Nicolas Sarkozy). Analogous to British speeches, French speeches were characterised by "implicit" affiliative response invitations and asynchronous speaker-audience interaction, in contrast to Japanese "explicit" invitations and synchrony. These results were interpreted in terms of Hofstede's (2001) individualism-collectivism cultural dimensions. Dissimilarities in audience responses between the two candidates were also identified and discussed. The analysis of cross-cultural differences continues to reveal the intricate differences between societies, and ensures academic understanding on rhetoric is not boxed into crude universal rules. |
| **Author Comments:** | Acknowledgements: a special thanks would like to be conferred to the second rater, who assisted in data coding reliability. |
| **Response to Reviewers:** | Dear Dr. Jacob Mey,  Many thanks for your kind comments and acceptance of the article.  The following is a list of changes made to the article in response to the previous comments:  The author's names, affiliations and short biography were added after the title. In the bibliography the first names of authors were provided.  The commas in in-text references were deleted.  Reference withheld occurrences were replaced with the author's name. Occasional typos were corrected.  A short (footnote) explanation of aizuchi was added on page 8.  For any further correspondence please refer to my email registered on the website (ledoux.s.e@gmail.com). |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Kind regards, Sarah Ledoux |
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# 4 Order in disorder: Audience responses and political rhetoric in speeches from the

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# 7 second round 2012 French presidential election.

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# 4 Abstract

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7 Recent research has established that Japanese political oratory and audience behaviour

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10 (Bull & Feldman 2011; Feldman & Bull 2012) are fundamentally different to those found

11

12 in British political speeches (Heritage & Greatbatch 1986). To further develop these

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14

15 cross-cultural analyses of political rhetoric, speaker-audience interaction was analysed in

16

17 ten speeches by the two second-round candidates in the 2012 French presidential

18

19

20 elections (François Hollande; Nicolas Sarkozy). Analogous to British speeches, French

21

22 speeches were characterised by “implicit” affiliative response invitations and

23

24 asynchronous speaker-audience interaction, in contrast to Japanese “explicit” invitations

25

26

27 and synchrony. These results were interpreted in terms of Hofstede’s (2001)

28

29 individualism-collectivism cultural dimensions. Dissimilarities in audience responses

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32 between the two candidates were also identified and discussed. The analysis of cross-

33

34 cultural differences continues to reveal the intricate differences between societies, and

35

36

37 ensures academic understanding on rhetoric is not boxed into crude universal rules.

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40 **Key words:** political speeches, rhetoric, audience responses, applause, French, cross-

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42 cultural

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# 46 Introduction

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48

49 Skilled oratory is critical during election campaigns. Political speeches can be used to

50

51

52 present policies to voters, and more importantly, create charismatic personas to boost

53

54 opinion polls. The limited number of ways an audience can react – with approval

55

56

57 (applause, cheering, laughter) or disapproval (booing, jeering, heckling) – may test the

58

59 speaker’s ability to communicate successfully. There is extensive literature on rhetorical

4 devices used by politicians to invite affiliative audience responses (particularly applause),

5

6 which is reviewed below. The current study is based on an analysis of speeches delivered

7

8

9 in the 2012 French presidential election by the two principal candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy

10

11 and François Hollande. The principal research aim was to compare this analysis with the

12

13

14 results of previous studies of British and Japanese speeches. Of additional interest was

15

16 the potential relationship between audience responses and political party affiliation.

17

18

19

20 The analysis of speaker-audience communication patterns in politics was pioneered by

21

22 Atkinson (e.g., 1983, 1984a, 1984b), reflecting the belief that the linguistic study of

23

24 conversation should be framed by its discourse genre and context (Waugh 1995).

25

26

27 Atkinson compared speaker-audience interaction with the way in which people take turns

28

29 in speaking conversation, a phenomenon previously identified in dialogue analysis by

30

31

32 Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974). From this analysis, four formulaic rhetorical

33

34 devices (or claptraps, from now on RDs) were identified, whereby speakers invite

35

36

37 applause. The first, the *three-part list* (a list of three items), was claimed to be the most

38

39 common, where the final item is typically preceded by “and” ”, which enables the

40

41 audience to anticipate the completion point and the appropriate place to applaud. The

42

43

44 second is the *contrast* (or antithesis), which involves the sequential juxtaposition of an

45

46 item with its opposite. The third is projecting the *naming* of a person or group, often

47

48

49 proceeded by a character description, and commonly paired with *gratitude,* the final

50

51 applaudable formula*.* Atkinson (1984a) also discussed the role of other features such as

52

53

54 speech content, timing, coordinated hand gestures, and eye contact.

55

56

57 An analysis of 476 speeches from the 1981 British party conferences was conducted by

58

59 Heritage and Greatbatch (1986). In addition to *three-part lists* and *contrasts*, they

18

19 emphasis, and finally, when the audience does not immediately respond to an invitation,

20

21 the speaker can reiterate the message through what is termed a *pursuit.* Overall, these

22

23

24 seven RDs accounted for 68% of all collective applause. Despite this groundbreaking

25

26 evidence in favour of Atkinson’s (1984a) theory, almost a third of collective applause

27

28 remained unexplained by invitational techniques.

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30

31

32 In attempt to uncover limiting issues in previous research, Bull and colleagues (Bull

33

34 2000; Bull & Feldman 2011; Bull & Noordhuizen 2000; Bull & Wells 2002; Feldman &

35

36

37 Bull 2012) identified three unaccounted fundamental variables influencing speech

38

39 analysis: speaker-audience synchrony, variability of audience responses, and the role of

40

41 culture. From the perspective of pragmatics, speech synchrony can be understood as the

42

43

44 correct inference by the addressees (the audience) of the speaker’s implication (Huang

45

46 2015). Firstly, it should be noted that speaker-audience synchrony, the smooth transition

47

48

49 from speaker utterance to audience response, is not as common practice as was originally

50

51 thought. Demonstrating that only 61% of all applause in British 1996-1997 party

52

53

54 conference speeches was synchronous, Bull and Noordhuizen (2000) highlighted that

55

56 over a third of applause had been neglected in previous research. In a further analysis of

57

58

59 applause in political speeches by the leaders of the principal British political parties in

4 1996, Bull (2000) demonstrated that instances of asynchronous applause were either

5

6 interruptive (speaker interrupting applause; or applause interrupting the speaker), isolated,

7

8

9 or a response to applaudable speech content. This challenged previous research, which

10

11 assumed content was insufficient to ensure a response (Atkinson 1984a), and more likely

12

13

14 to be applauded if expressed with the appropriate RD (Heritage & Greatbatch 1986). Bull

15

16 (2006) withheld argued that whether or not a RD is interpreted by the audience as an

17

18

19 applause invitation is dependent upon the speaker’s “delivery” – non-vocal features,

20

21 such as hand-gestures and posture, as well as vocal features, such as pitch and tone of

22

23

24 voice–; it is not just a response to the RDs per se.

25

26

27 As an aside, it is important to note asynchronous applause does not automatically indicate

28

29 communication failure. For example, interruptive applause may indicate audience

30

31

32 enthusiasm for the speaker. Furthermore, preventing an audience response can be used

33

34 strategically, to build anticipation, eventually causing applause to burst irrepressibly,

35

36

37 giving the appearance of overwhelming popularity. According to Grice’s cooperative

38

39 principle (1975), speakers will do whatever it takes for conversation to succeed, even

40

41 more so if it required by its participants (again this would be the audience). However,

42

43

44 Atkinson (1985) claimed strategic asynchronous speech making to be unusual, used only

45

46 by skilled orators such as Anthony Wedgewood Benn, John F. Kennedy, and Martin

47

48

49 Luther King, politicians known for their memorable speech performances.

50

51

52 In examining 15 conference speeches by the leaders of the three principal parties in 1996-

53

54

55 2000, Bull and Wells (2002) identified two additional applause-eliciting RDs. These were

56

57 *jokes*, expressed as humorous expressions, and *negative namings,* used to bring shame to

58

59 a named person or group. Of course, these RDs can be expected to invite other audience

4 responses; *jokes* being likely to invite laughter, and *negative namings* to invite booing.

5

6 Up to this point, studies had been limited to the analysis of applause, leaving cheering,

7

8

9 laughter, booing, and verbal exclamations unaccounted for. To explore this, Clayman

10

11 (1993) analysed and distinguished booing from applause, noting its slower initiation, due

12

13

14 to its embarrassing nature when evoked out of context. Uninvited booing was identified

15

16 as performed by audience members using “mutual monitoring” to ensure collectivity in

17

18

19 the response, resulting in a staggered onset as people observed and imitated others.

20

21 Clayman’s (1993) analysis of British and American speeches was limited essentially to

22

23

24 disaffiliative booing, in which the audience boo the speaker, yet booing has also been

25

26 shown to be affiliative, where the audience align with the speaker against a rival

27

28 politician (Bull & Miskinis 2015). Hence, a second major limitation of Atkinson’s

29

30

31 research is the exclusive focus on applause. Given the potential of diversity in audience

32

33 behaviour, in this study all audience responses were analysed.

34

35

36

37 In his book, Atkinson speculated that his findings may “ … . .eventually be shown to

38

39 have cross-cultural applicability far beyond the English speaking world” (Atkinson

40

41 1984a: 85). However, recent evidence suggests otherwise, and this represents a third

42

43

44 limitation on Atkinson’s research. The mistaken assumption that conversation analysis

45

46 can be replicated to any language as a universal rule is limiting, and has previously been

47

48

49 criticised (Keenan 1976). In an analysis of 36 speeches from the Japanese 2005 general

50

51 election, Bull and Feldman (2011) identified seven additional RDs used to invite

52

53

54 affiliative responses. In *greetings,* the speaker greets the audience by custom expecting a

55

56 collective audience response, which is typically followed by *expressing appreciation* to

57

58

59 thank the audience for their attendance. Further devices are: *requesting agreement,*

4 asking the audience to agree with a previous statement; *jokes* (Bull & Wells 2002)*,*

5

6 redefined to include affiliative responses of laughter with or without applause; *asking for*

7

8

9 *support,* straightforward requests seeking for audience support; *description of campaign*

10

11 *activities,* sharing details of recent activities to demonstrate ability to communicate and

12

13

14 work hard; and finally, the category *other* was introduced for miscellaneous statements

15

16 that received audience responses that otherwise did not fit into other categories. In

17

18

19 contrast with the original RDs identified by Atkinson (e.g., 1984a) that were typically

20

21 structured implicitly as part of the speech, Bull and Feldman (2011) observed that most

22

23

24 of the aforementioned new devices overtly requested audience participation, and were

25

26 thus characterised as “explicit”. Explicit RDs accounted for 71% of audience responses in

27

28 Japanese speeches, compared to the mostly implicit response invitations (68%) in British

29

30

31 speeches (Heritage & Greatbatch 1986). Bull and Feldman (2011) also addressed the

32

33 applause bias seen in previous research, revealing that laughter and cheering accounted

34

35

36 for 41% of responses in Japanese speeches.

37

38

39 Although Bull and Feldman’s (2011) study was based on a substantial sample of political

40

41 speeches, they were drawn from only one general election campaign. Without replication,

42

43

44 it is uncertain whether these findings were typical of Japanese political speech-making in

45

46 general, or specific just to those particular speeches or that one general election campaign.

47

48

49 Hence, a follow-up study was conducted, based on 38 speeches from the 2009 Japanese

50

51 general election (Feldman & Bull 2012). The Japanese RD patterns were replicated, with

52

53

54 further analyses demonstrating Japanese audiences predominantly responded with

55

56 applause (40%) or laughter (39%) rather than composites (applause with laughter or

57

58

59 cheering: 9%).

4 An additional response, unique to Japanese speeches, were *aizuchi*, listener responses the

5

6 audience would use to answer ritualistic questions (e.g., speaker: “Don’t you think so?”;

7

8

9 audience: “That’s how it is”)1. The appearance of culture-specific responses reflects

10

11 research by Monaghan, Goodman and Robinson (2012: 247) that explained cultural

12

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14 differences in communication through the speech community at stake which is “a group

15

16 of people who share rules for using and interpreting at least one communication practice

17

18

19 (…) [which] might involve specific events, acts, or situations”. In this case however, the

20

21 Japanese specific *aizuchi* accounted for only 3% of all responses.

22

23

24 Japanese speeches were particularly distinct from British speeches due to the absence of

25

26

27 *negative naming*, isolated applause, or any other form of asynchrony (Feldman, personal

28

29 communication, April 16, 2014). These differences can be understood in terms of cultural

30

31

32 context, where, according to Hofstede’s (2001) individualism-collectivism dimension,

33

34 Japan is regarded as a collectivist society, in which groups are prioritized over the

35

36

37 individual and institutions over personal ambition. Synchrony in Japanese responses

38

39 reflects the ideal group collaboration, facilitated by the use of explicit invitations. The

40

41 lack of *negative naming* may also be understood in terms of differences in politeness

42

43

44 norms, where for a Japanese politician to invite audience affiliation by holding up another

45

46 politician or political party to publicly ridicule might reflect worse on the speaker than

47

48

49 the individual or political group under attack (Bull & Feldman 2011). Differences

50

51 between Japanese and English speakers have also been identified in conversational

52

53

54 dialogue (or speech acts), whereby in Japanese it is preferred to answer indirect questions

55

56 than direct ones (Mey 2016). These language-specific differences are classified as

57

58

1. 1 *Aizuchi* are used by listeners to indicate their interest in the speaker and reassure them of their continued
2. attention, for example “hai” “ee” –yes, “hontō”, “hontō ni” –really (Bull, 2016).

4 “linguacultures” that are associated with a variety of dialects each with their own social

5

6

7 implications; in the present case the dialect would be related to political speeches.

8

9

10 The results of these cross-cultural studies highlight important differences between the UK

11

12 and Japan in terms of both the rhetoric of the politicians, and the responses of the

13

14

15 audience. Of course, these findings may reflect differences between the UK and Japan

16

17 not only in culture but also in language. A study of American speeches (Bull & Miskinis

18

19

20 2015) recently demonstrated striking similarities in rhetorical devices with the UK,

21

22 suggesting speechmaking may be related to culture and language.

23

24

25 Thus, in the study reported here, this cross-cultural approach was extended to the analysis

26

27

28 of political speeches in France, a country that differs from the UK and the USA in terms

29

30 of language, but is more similar in terms of culture than Japan. Cross-cultural differences

31

32

33 in individualism were interpreted using literature by Geert Hofstede (2001; Hofstede,

34

35 Hofstede & Minkov 2010) complemented by specific country scores (Hofstede et al.

36

37 2010). Whereas the UK has been rated to have one of the highest levels of individualism

38

39

40 in the world, scoring 89 with France close behind (71), Japan is considered far less

41

42 individualistic scoring just 46 (scores range from 0 to 100). On this basis, it was proposed

43

44

45 that French politicians like the British would invite affiliative audience responses

46

47 implicitly, giving their individualist audiences greater freedom as to whether or not to

48

49

50 respond (Hypothesis 1).

51

52

53 According to Hypothesis 2, it was predicted that French audience behaviour would be

54

55 more asynchronous than British audiences. The French are outspoken on the democratic

56

57

58 and social aspects of the constitution of their fifth republic, given its arduous past going

4 from monarchy to revolution, which brought to life the establishment of its first republic,

5

6 to Napoleonic dictatorship followed by more revolutions during the XIXth century,

7

8

9 culminating in its current existence (Howarth & Varouxakis 2003: 2):

10

11

12 *To cut a long story short, a disproportionately great part of French political*

13

14

15 *debate during the two centuries that followed the outbreak of the French*

16

17 *Revolution has been dedicated either to rehearsing the same battles,*

18

19

20 *arguments, passion, or to interpreting them, trying to make sense of the*

21

22 *revolutionary experience (…).*

23

24

25 Moreover, public involvement in French politics is particularly dynamic, as it is viewed

26

27

28 as the largest influence public opinion can have on government policymaking (Dalton

29

30 2013). The recent rise in support for French nationalism and the extreme right – arguably

31

32

33 the result of the 2008 economic recession (Urban 2014) – has fuelled political conflict

34

35 between the dominant parties, and has divided a France of *liberté, egalité, fraternité*

36

37 (Cole 1998). *Liberté* is a particularly important word, as Wierzbicka (1997: 133) points

38

39

40 out in her cross-cultural linguistic analysis, it is a word that stands for “the opposite of

41

42 slavery and oppression, and the rise of democracy”. This in turn has increased social

43

44

45 sensitivity over related political topics such as immigration, social hierarchy, and gender

46

47 equality. Given that asynchrony might be seen to reflect the dynamic involvement of the

48

49

50 French public with their democratic suffrage and more recent division over sensitive

51

52 topics, speech content was anticipated to provoke more asynchronous and uninvited

53

54

55 audience responses.

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57

4 According to Hypothesis 3, it was predicted that there would be differences in audience

5

6 behaviour between the two political parties. Specifically, it was hypothesised that the

7

8

9 centre right-wing party, *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* (Union for a Popular

10

11 Movement), in favouring nationalist policies (Urban 2008), would be more disciplined

12

13

14 and synchronised with fewer asynchronous responses, than the centre left-wing party,

15

16 *Parti Socialiste* (Socialist Party). In the latter case, it was hypothesised that the audience

17

18

19 behaviour would be more asynchronous, and that they would be more likely to respond to

20

21 *content* buzz-words, such as *liberté* and *laïcité* (secularism), a word related to division

22

23

24 over immigration policies targeted at Arabic migrants practicing Muslim customs in

25

26 France. This is supported by Rob Grootendorst and Frans van Eemeren’s argumentation

27

28 theory which analyses the art of persuasion, “itself an indispensable preliminary to any

29

30

31 political discussion and decision” (Capone & Mey 2016: 8-9).

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38 **Method**

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## 41 Participants

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43

44 The two second-round nominated candidates running for the French 2012 presidential

45

46

47 election: Nicolas Sarkozy, incumbent president and candidate of the *Union pour un*

48

49 *Mouvement Populaire;* François Hollande, candidate of the *Parti Socialiste.* The

50

51 campaign meetings, at which the speeches were recorded, were all open to members of

52

53

54 the public.

55

56

57 ***Materials***

4 The speeches were chosen based on the availability of video recordings and their

5

6 corresponding transcripts. Ten speeches were analysed, selected from the official start of

7

8

9 the campaign (20 March 2012) to the date of final election (6 May 2012). The speeches

10

11 were delivered both indoors: in large conference rooms or stadium-like rooms

12

13

14 accommodating considerable audience size (Bercy), and outdoors: in city centres where

15

16 historical political figures have previously spoken (Toulouse, where a speech was given

17

18

19 by former President François Mitterrand) or in front of famous monuments (Place de la

20

21 Concorde). The average speech length was 54:20 minutes. A complete list of the speech

22

23

24 locations, dates and durations is given below.

25

26

27 Nicolas Sarkozy (2012)

28

29

30 1. Ormes, *indoors*- 26 March (51:21 minutes).

31

32

33

34 2. Porte de Versailles, Paris, *indoors*- 31 March (44:29 minutes).

35

36

37 3. Place de la Concorde, Paris, *outdoors*- 15 April (41:32 minutes).

38

39

40 4. Nice, *indoors*- 20 April (58:36 minutes).

41

42

43

44 5. Raincy, *indoors*- 26 April (59:40 minutes).

45

46

47 François Hollande (2012)

48

49

50 1. Nice, *outdoors*- 28 March (46:55 minutes).

51

52

53

54 2. Besançon, *indoors*- 10 April (1:02:38 minutes).

55

56

57 3. Charleville-Mézières, *outdoors*- 20 April (47:28 minutes).

4 4. Bercy, Paris, *indoors*- 29 April (1:20:31 minutes).

5

6

7 5. Toulouse, *outdoors*- 3 May (50:07 minutes).

8

9

10

11 Analysis was carried out using videos of the entire speeches uploaded online (see

12

13 Appendix 1). The speech transcripts were also obtained via the Internet, through party

14

15

16 affiliated websites.

17

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21

22 ***Procedure***

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24

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26 The transcripts of each speech were checked and corrected against each video recording

27

28 to ensure a verbatim record. In accordance with previous research, audience responses

29

30 were categorised under applause, laughter, cheering (Bull & Feldman 2011), as well as

31

32

33 collective chanting and booing (Bull & Miskinis 2015). Responses were manually added

34

35 to the transcripts using the notations as described below. From this analysis, it was found

36

37

38 that all incidences of booing were affiliative (i.e, the audience aligned with the speaker

39

40 against his opponent); hence disaffiliave booing (where the audience boo the speaker)

41

42

43 was not coded in this study.

44

45

46 Collective applause was represented by a succession of lower and upper case crosses

47

48 (xxXXxx), to indicate quieter or louder applause respectively, and was coded throughout

49

50

51 the duration of the occurrence. Using different letters, laughter (hH), cheering (cC), and

52

53 booing (bB) were transcribed in the same way. To denote an isolated response of either

54

55

56 applause, cheering or booing, the corresponding letter was noted between dashed lines

57

4 (e.g., -x-). In the event of two responses occurring simultaneously (e.g., applause and

5

6

7 cheering), the corresponding annotations were written out fully on separate lines:

8

9

10

11 ccCCcc

12

13

14

15 xxXXxx

16

17

18

19 Individual verbal comments, often expressing agreement and support throughout the

20

21 speech, were written out in full. Where comments were indiscernible, these were coded

22

23

24 as “(shouts)”. Other nonverbal responses included whistling, marked as “(whistle)”, and

25

26 blowing of the vuvuzela trumpet, marked as “(vuvuzela)” (the vuvuzela was popularised

27

28

29 in South Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup). A dashed annotation (e.g., “Yeah!” –

30

31 ) indicated a collective and drawn out verbal response, and similarly to represent

32

33

34 prolonged whistling or vuvuzela blowing. Chanting that occurred collectively was written

35

36 out in full, without the dash annotation. Chants were either speaker specific (e.g.,

37

38 “Nicolas président!”, ”François président”) or appeared in both party meetings (e.g., “On

39

40

41 va gagner!” [We are going to win!]), and were written out in full. In the occurrence of

42

43 undecipherable and non-collective chanting, the annotation “(chanting)” was used. All

44

45

46 collective responses were analysed separately (e.g., laughter, cheering) in order to count

47

48 the proportions of each response evoked (Bull & Miskinis 2015). In a second analysis,

49

50

51 composites were also noted (e.g., laughter & cheering) to facilitate comparisons with pre-

52

53 existing Japanese data (Feldman & Bull 2012). All audience responses (both collective

54

55 and isolated) were coded as either synchronous or asynchronous, together with the

56

57

58 presumed instigation for asynchronous responses.

4 After transcript coding, speaker use of RDs that successfully received collective

5

6 responses was identified. The original four RDs identified by Atkinson (1984a) –

7

8

9 *contrasts*, *lists, naming* and *gratitude –* were coded along with the seven additional

10

11 devices, namely, *puzzle-solution*, *headline-punchline, position taking, pursuit,*

12

13

14 *combinations* (Heritage & Greatbatch 1986) *jokes, negative naming* (Bull & Wells 2002).

15

16 The six explicit devices investigated in Japanese discourse – *greetings/salutations,*

17

18

19 *expressing appreciation, request for agreement, asking for support, descriptions of*

20

21 *campaign activities* and *other –* were also included to facilitate cross-cultural

22

23

24 comparisons. In the analysis, RDs which occurred together were counted both

25

26 separately and as *combinations*. So, for example, a *three-part list* which included a

27

28 *contrast* would be counted as both a *three-part list* and a *contrast*, but also as a

29

30

31 *combination*.

32

33

34 Finally, additional features to *position taking, negative naming,* and *greetings* were

35

36

37 suggested to incorporate specific patterns identified in French speeches. So for example,

38

39 *position taking* was occasionally emphasised with the use of “Voilà!”. This might be

40

41 translated as “This is why/what…”, and regularly resulted in large audience responses,

42

43

44 e.g.:

45

46

47 “(…) les mensonges font toujours davantage de mal que la vérité ! Voilà la

48

49

50 vérité de la place de la Concorde !” (Sarkozy, Place de la Concorde, 15 April,

51

52 Appendix 2: 2.1.) (….. lies always harm more than the truth! That is the truth

53

54

55 of the place de la Concorde!)

56

57

58

4 *Negative naming* in French political speeches was frequently taken further than simply

5

6 *naming* with negative connotations. In order to openly ridicule their opponents, French

7

8

9 speakers purposefully denounced campaign policies to invite booing.

10

11

12 “Il nous dit qu’il est allé à Fukushima pour constater le tsunami et ses effets.

13

14

15 J’ai vérifié : il n’est jamais allé à Fukushima.” Hollande, Besançon, 10 April,

16

17 Appendix 2: 2.2. (He told us that he went to Fukushima to attend to the

18

19

20 tsunami and its effects. I checked: he never went to Fukushima.)

21

22

23 *Greetings* describe the customary introduction expected in Japanese speeches. Despite

24

25 being brief, French speeches also ritualistically began with “Mes chers amis” (My dear

26

27

28 friends), resulting in large audience responses. Additionally, both French candidates were

29

30 found to have customary sign-off greetings. Sarkozy finished with “Vive la République et

31

32

33 vive la France!” (Long live the republic and long live France!), whereas Hollande, less

34

35 consistently, referred to election day, thanked the crowd, shouted his campaign slogan, or

36

37

38 again, ended with “Vive la République et vive la France!”

39

40

41 In addition to these RD feature extensions, two further devices used in French speeches

42

43 were coded. *Questions*: often using a polar format where only one of two answers are

44

45

46 possible, with the expectation of receiving a collective audience answer

47

48

49 “C’est pour toujours à la Droite, le pouvoir. Et vous laisseriez faire? Eh bien

50

51 non”. (Hollande, Besançon, 10 April, Appendix 2: 2.3) (Power is always

52

53

54 given to the Right. And you are going to let that happen? [No!]).

55

56

57 *Referring to the audience,* speakers attempted to create a bridge with the audience to

58

59

60 associate themselves with the crowd:

4 “Et ceux qui ont le souvenir cruel d’avoir fait ce choix en 2007, il doit bien en

5

6 avoir —non pas parmi vous, je vous connais tous —”

7

8

9 “Non!”-

10

11

12 Hollande, Charleville-Mézières, 20 April, Appendix 2: 2.4. (And those who

13

14

15 have the cruel memory of having made that choice [i.e., voting for Sarkozy] in

16

17 2007, there must be some —not among you, [No!] I know all of you—)

18

19

20 Non-RD responses resulting from *content-*driven information (Bull 2000) were noted to

21

22

23 be interruptive, in reaction to topics such as youth, gender equality, secularism and

24

25 immigration. Any remaining miscellaneous statements that received an audience response

26

27

28 that did not correspond to previous categories were coded as *other.*

29

30

31 All the transcription and coding was conducted by the first author. Inter-rater reliability

32

33

34 was carried out with the help of a francophone familiar with French politics. Descriptions

35

36 and examples for each device were provided to the second rater, who then practised with

37

38 feedback, using a speech from each politician. After training, the second rater coded one

39

40

41 (randomly selected) speech in its entirety (Sarkozy, Ormes, 26 March).

42

43

44 **Results**

45

46

47 Using Cohen’s k (Cohen, 1960), inter-rater reliability for coding rhetorical devices was

48

49

50 found to be satisfactory (κ=0.71).

51

52

## 53 Cross-cultural Analysis

54

55

56

# 57 Analysis of rhetoric.

4 The two French candidates’ use of RDs was positively correlated (Pearson’s *r* = +0.79

5

6 *p*<.001). According to Hypothesis 1, the French politicians were predicted to invite

7

8

9 affiliative audience responses implicitly, in similar proportions to British audiences, and

10

11 in contrast to explicit invitations in Japanese speeches. Table 1 shows the results from the

12

13

14 French speeches in parallel with data from British (Heritage & Greatbatch 1986) and

15

16 Japanese speeches (Feldman & Bull 2012). Implicit RDs accounted for 75% of all

17

18

19 audience responses in French speeches, where 46% were *lists, headline-punchline* and

20

21 *position taking.* Only 12% of responses were invited using explicit RDs, and most non-

22

23

24 rhetorical invitations were initiated through *content.*

25

26

27 Table 1 near here

28

29

30 Cross-cultural statistical comparisons could not be calculated because of differences in

31

32

33 variable measures. First, the British analysis was restricted to applause, and the impact of

34

35 other responses on the data is unknown. Second, RD classification in British research was

36

37 limited, leaving 32% of invitations classified as miscellaneous. Third, *combinations* were

38

39

40 recorded differently in this study from the British and Japanese speeches. In addition to

41

42 recording each *combination* as an individual device, the devices used in each

43

44

45 combination were also specified. Despite these discrepancies, it is reasonable to conclude

46

47 from the data presented in Table 1 that French and British speakers rely more heavily on

48

49

50 implicit RDs (75% and 68% respectively) than Japanese speakers (19%).

51

52

# 53 Speaker-audience synchrony.

54

55

56

57

4 According to Hypothesis 2, it was predicted that French audience behaviour would be

5

6 more asynchronous than British, given the context of French politics as outlined in the

7

8

9 Introduction.

10

11

12 ***Synchrony.***

13

14

15

16 Synchrony in British political speeches has been analysed only in terms of applause

17

18 (61%) (Bull & Noordhuizen 2000). French political speeches resulted in a much lower

19

20 proportion of synchrony (44%), but included all types of audience response. All

21

22

23 responses in Japanese speeches were found to be synchronous (Feldman, personal

24

25 communication, April 16, 2014).

26

27

28

## 29 Isolated responses.

30

31

32 In French speeches, isolated responses amounted to 21% of all responses. Table 2

33

34 demonstrates the proportions of isolated responses, occurring as a result of an RD, from

35

36

37 content, or randomly.

38

39

40 Table 2 near here

41

42

43 On average, the largest percentage of isolated responses was verbal (61%), and just under

44

45

46 half of them (48%) occurred in parallel with, or following RDs. No instances of isolated

47

48 applause were identified in Japanese speeches; however, in British speeches, (Bull &

49

50

51 Noordhuizen 2000) reported 4.7% of applause as isolated, compared to 8% in French

52

53 speeches.

54

55

56

## 57 Inter-speaker Analysis

58

59

# 60 Audience Responses.

4 According to Hypothesis 3, it was predicted that there would be differences in audience

5

6

7 behaviour between the two political parties.

8

9

## 10 Collective and composite responses.

11

12

13 Between the two French speakers, subtle dissimilarities in audience responses were

14

15

16 identified. In terms of collective response types (see Table 3), Hollande received more

17

18 whistling and vuvuzela (15%) than Sarkozy (8%).

19

20

21 Table 3 near here

22

23

24

25 Composite responses, shown in Table 4, demonstrate that Hollande invited considerably

26

27 more booing (14%) and verbal responses (12%) than Sarkozy (9%, 5%). Conversely,

28

29

30 Sarkozy received far more applause (18%) and laughter (13%) than Hollande (6%, 6%).

31

32 The dominant composite response however, remained applause with cheering for both

33

34 speakers (55%).

35

36

37

38 Table 4 near here

39

40

41

42

43

## 44 Isolated Responses and Synchrony

45

46

47

48 Dissimilarities in audience behaviour were emphasised by differences in occurrences of

49

50 isolated responses. This divide was further demonstrated by levels of synchrony. Isolated

51

52

53 responses made up 18% of Sarkozy speech responses, whereas 23% of responses to

54

55 Hollande were isolated. From Table 2, it can be seen that Hollande’s speeches contained

56

57 more isolated cheering (24%) and whistling (14%) than those by Sarkozy (17%; 3%

58

59

60 respectively). Thus, not only did Hollande receive a greater variety of isolated responses,

4 but also had a larger proportion of isolated responses than Sarkozy. Nevertheless, for

5

6 both speakers, isolated verbal responses occurred with the greatest frequency (Hollande

7

8

9 54%; Sarkozy 67%).

10

11

12 Speaker-audience synchrony also varied between the two speakers. Whilst 50% of

13

14

15 Sarkozy’s audience responses were synchronous with speech, the comparable figure for

16

17 Hollande was only 38%. A contributing effect to synchrony for both speakers was the

18

19

20 continuation of speech over audience response (e.g., Sarkozy, Ormes, 26 March; see

21

22 Appendix 2: 2.8.). Audience involvement also gave rise to asynchronous audience

23

24 collective responses, as in the following example:

25

26

27

28 “On veut savoir à qui dire merci quand ça va bien et à qui se plaindre quand

29

30 ça va mal !”

31

32

33 Au chef!

34

35

36 Sarkozy laughs and nods

37

38

39 (Sarkozy, Ormes, 26 March, Appendix 2: 2.9. (We want to know whom to

40

41

42 thank when things are going well, and whom to complain to when things are

43

44 going badly! [To the boss!])

45

46

## 47 Verbal responses.

48

49

50

51 Verbal participation frequently took the form of shouting “Ouai!” (Yeah!) or “Bravo!”.

52

53 All audible isolated and collective responses of these two words were recorded. For

54

55

56 Hollande, the preferred response was “Ouai” (94%), for Sarkozy “Bravo” (79%).

57

58

4 Audience verbal contributions are customary and expected by the speakers, in the

5

6

7 following example, Hollande even prepared his audience:

8

9

10 Et je vais vous poser des questions simples pour que vous y répondiez

11

12 directement, (…) Voulez-vous l’alternance? [Ouai!] Alors c’est maintenant!

13

14

15 (…) Voulez-vous la victoire ? [Oui!] Alors c’est le 22 avril! [Ouai!]”

16

17 Hollande, Charleville-Mézières, 20 April, Appendix 2: 2.10. (I am going to

18

19

20 ask you simple questions so that you can give me straightforward answers, Do

21

22 you want change? [Yeah!] Then it is now! Do you want to win? [Yes!] Then it

23

24 is the 22nd of April! [Yeah!]).

25

26

27

28 Thus, overall all the above analyses supported hypothesis 3, that there would be

29

30 discernible differences in audience behaviour between the two French political

31

32

33 parties.

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43 **Discussion**

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45

46 All the three main hypotheses of this study were supported by the results presented above.

47

48 The analysis of implicit RD-use confirmed the hypothesis that French political speech

49

50

51 structure resembled British in contrast to Japanese speechmaking. Moreover, the

52

53 hypothesis that French speeches would show greater asynchrony was supported with

54

55

56 evidence of both speakers talking over responses, and audience isolated and collective

57

58 interruptive responses. Finally, differences in speaker-audience interaction arising

4 between the candidates substantiated the hypothesis that French parties have dissimilar

5

6

7 behaviours. These results are discussed in more detail below.

8

9

10 The strong similarity in RD-use between Hollande and Sarkozy (*r*=0.79) provided

11

12 evidence for a French speechmaking framework, enabling the comparison of French

13

14

15 rhetoric to other cultures. Findings supported the hypothesis that French speechmaking

16

17 resembles British implicit structure more than that of Japanese speeches. As expected,

18

19

20 French audience responses were heavily associated with implicit RDs (75%), reflecting

21

22 the 68% in the 476 cross-party British speeches analysed by Heritage and Greatbatch

23

24 (1986). However, unlike the British speeches, where the most frequently applauded RDs

25

26

27 were *contrasts* (33%) and *lists* (13%), French audiences responded predominantly to

28

29 *position taking* (20%), *lists* (13%), and *headline-punchlines* (10%), suggesting that

30

31

32 *contrasts* were not as influential. Despite these differences, both cultures contrast

33

34 drastically with Japanese political rhetoric. In the Japanese studies of the 2005 and 2009

35

36

37 general elections (Bull & Feldman 2011; Feldman & Bull 2012), explicit RDs received

38

39 the highest proportion of audience responses (71%, 76%), compared to only 12% in this

40

41 study. The two new explicit devices identified in this study, namely *questions,* and

42

43

44 *referring to the audience,* only accounted for 3% of audience responses, fitting the

45

46 established pattern of higher French response to implicit RDs. Therefore, the analysis of

47

48

49 French speakers’ use of RDs confirmed the first hypothesis that invitations were

50

51 predominantly implicit. In his book, Atkinson (1984a, p.84) referred to “preliminary

52

53

54 evidence” that “…applause-elicitation devices work in much the same way in France,

55

56 Germany and Netherlands”, although he gave no details of what that preliminary

57

58

4 evidence might be. However, his observations are certainly supported by the evidence

5

6

7 presented for French speeches in this study.

8

9

10 A noteworthy difference in one of the RD definitions between French and Japanese

11

12 speeches is the *jokes* device*.* Originally, when distinguishing implicit and explicit RDs,

13

14

15 Bull and Feldman (2011) classified *jokes* as explicitly inviting the audience to show

16

17 amusement. However, invitations of laughter in French speeches were not as clear-cut,

18

19

20 although non-verbal delivery seemed to clarify whether or not laughter was invited (e.g.,

21

22 smiling and nodding: Sarkozy, Nice, 20 April). Moreover, French *jokes* were often paired

23

24 with *negative naming*, a non-existent device in Japanese speeches. In conversational

25

26

27 discourse research, negative forms of joking have been interpreted as play to convey

28

29 solidarity between conversationalists, (Norrick 1994; 2010). This may very well be a

30

31

32 similar strategy to signal rapport between speaker and audience, being a tool to invite

33

34 audience response in French speeches. Yet it appears the structure of *jokes* is culturally

35

36

37 variable, and may not fit in a straightforward fashion within the explicit-implicit scale.

38

39

40 According to the second hypothesis, it was predicted that compared with Japan and the

41

42 UK, there would be greater asynchrony in French speeches, which was confirmed by

43

44

45 higher levels of asynchrony and a higher proportion of isolated responses. Notably, there

46

47 was no evidence for any asynchrony in the Japanese speeches, either from isolated

48

49

50 responses, silences, or simultaneous speech. In the analysis of British political party

51

52 conferences in 1996-1997, Bull and Noordhuizen (2000) identified 61% of applause as

53

54

55 synchronous, compared to 44% of all responses in this study. Furthermore, British

56

57 speeches had less isolated applause (4.7%) than French speeches (8%). However, isolated

58

59 applause in French speeches only accounted for 12% of all isolated responses, where

4 isolated verbal responses (61%) and cheers (20%) were far more frequent. Atkinson’s

5

6 (1984a) references to isolated applause give the impression they reflect incompetence on

7

8

9 the part of the speaker, possibly because they result from poor delivery in making an

10

11 affiliative response invitation sufficiently clear. However, isolated responses can also be

12

13

14 interpreted as demonstrating audience enthusiasm and support for the content of speech

15

16 (Bull & Noordhuizen 2000).

17

18

19

20 How audiences respond is culturally highly variable. For example, in Iran audiences

21

22 refuse to respond with the western practice of applause, preferring to use chants instead

23

24 (Atkinson 1986a: 84-85). In Japan, Bull and Feldman (2011) found in their study of the

25

26

27 2005 Japanese general election that audiences responded exclusively with applause

28

29 (59%), laughter (25%) or cheering (16%). In their study of the 2009 election, Feldman

30

31

32 and Bull (2012) found much more laughter (39%) and less cheering (9%), yet the scope

33

34 remained confined principally to the three responses (but with the inclusion of *aizuchi*,

35

36

37 just 3%).

38

39

40 However, in this study, French audience responses were found to be much more diverse

41

42 than those in Japan. Although the French used applause (35%), cheering (30%), and

43

44

45 laughter (4%), they also used whistling (12%), chanting (7%), verbal replies (7%) and

46

47 booing (5%). Similarly, American audiences also responded with booing and chanting,

48

49

50 applause, laughter, and cheering (Bull & Miskinis 2015), as well as verbal reactions

51

52 which were identified in Capone’s (2010) study on Barack Obama’s South Carolina

53

54

55 speech. This suggests a possible trend in Western cultures of more variable audience

56

57 responses than those observed in Japan. However, whereas the studies of Japanese,

58

59 American and French speeches included all audience responses, the focus of British

4 studies has been exclusively on applause, so the relative frequencies of laughter, cheering,

5

6

7 or any other form of audience response in British audiences are so far unknown.

8

9

10 Of particular interest is the occurrence of chanting in response to French speeches. It is

11

12 similar to that found in sports tournaments, and notably distinct from other audience

13

14

15 responses, in that it was both uninvited and independently coordinated by the audience.

16

17 As such, it would certainly repay further investigation.

18

19

20 Another response of interest was booing, which was invited (5%) more frequently than

21

22

23 laughter (4%). This contrasted greatly with Japanese audiences, where booing was never

24

25 observed in all the analysed 74 speeches (Bull & Feldman 2011; Feldman & Bull 2012).

26

27

28 Booing as a disaffiliative response was analysed by Clayman (1993) in the context of

29

30 both British and American speeches. However, in this study, booing was found to be

31

32

33 exclusively affiliative, invited by the speaker to attack the rival candidate, typically

34

35 through the rhetorical device of *negative naming*. *Negative naming* was originally

36

37 identified in British speeches as a form of applause invitation (Bull & Wells 2002), but in

38

39

40 this study, it was found that affiliative booing could be invited through this rhetorical

41

42 device in just the same way as applause. Similarly, in American speeches, examples of

43

44

45 invited affiliative booing were identified by Bull and Miskinis (2015), again

46

47 predominantly through the device of *negative naming*. However, Bull and Miskinis

48

49

50 (2015) also proposed that invited booing can be disaffiliative, arguing that the Republican

51

52 candidate (Mitt Romney) strategically invited the audience to boo him in order to make

53

54

55 himself look good in the eyes of audiences not present in the auditorium.

56

57

58

59

4 Another noticeable difference between French and Japanese audiences was the relative

5

6 frequency of composite responses (e.g., applause with cheering), where Japanese

7

8

9 audiences responded with far fewer composites than French audiences. In their study of

10

11 the 2009 Japanese general election, Feldman and Bull (2012) analysed composite as well

12

13

14 as unitary responses, and found that only 9% of responses were composites. In contrast,

15

16 the predominant French audience response was a composite of applause and cheering

17

18

19 (54% of all audience responses). Thus, not only is the timing of Japanese response

20

21 invitations carefully managed through explicit RD-use, but the responses themselves are

22

23

24 much more homogeneous, hence show greater coordination between audience members

25

26 and in this respect also can be regarded as more synchronous.

27

28

29 These cross-cultural findings can be interpreted in terms of Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions

30

31

32 of individualism and collectivism. Just as western cultures such as France and the UK

33

34 may be contrasted as individualist societies to northeast Asian collectivist societies such

35

36

37 as Japan, so too French and British speech structure and audience behaviour may be

38

39 contrasted with those of Japan. Japanese collectivist attitudes, where the group is

40

41 prioritised over the individual, were characterised by the use of explicit RDs, enabling

42

43

44 audience members to immaculately anticipate response invitations to respond without

45

46 asynchrony, resulting in smooth speaker-audience turn-taking. It is important to note

47

48

49 however, that culture and for that matter collectivism cannot be empirically defined as

50

51 totally homogeneous. This is particularly relevant in the study of Japanese discourse, in

52

53

54 which the association of dialogue synchrony to cultural politeness is context-dependent

55

56 (Pan 2011), whereby the context of speeches remains a situation where homogeneity is

57

58

59 highly respected. Okamoto (1999: 61) demonstrates the opposite effect when analysing

4 Japanese conversations, where in some cases the breakdown of “grammar of politeness”

5

6

7 is used as a strategic move to create a relaxed atmosphere.

8

9

10 In contrast, Britain and France uphold levels of individualism that are far more apparent,

11

12 where self-ambition trumps group welfare. According to Hofstede et al. (2010: 95-97),

13

14

15 the UK has a higher score of individualism, yet French speeches demonstrated more

16

17 individualistic features, such as the high use of implicit RDs (giving freedom to respond),

18

19

20 variability in audience responses and combinations of composite responses, asynchronous

21

22 and isolated responses, as well as speaker-audience overlap. It seems therefore, that the

23

24 Hofstede dimension system does not apply perfectly to the variation in political speech

25

26

27 discourse structure between cultures. Rather, the collectivism and individualism scales

28

29 can be used to identify cultural discourse differences, but cannot be used to explain them.

30

31

32 In order to deepen this hypothesis, further evidence can be found in the analysis of

33

34 Chinese and Korean political speeches, two societies with higher collectivism levels than

35

36

37 Japan (Hofstede et al. 2010).

38

39

40 The two new RDs identified in this study, namely *questions* and *referring to the public*,

41

42 were found to resemble the Japanese explicit RD *request for agreement*. The use of these

43

44

45 RDs in French speeches might be understood as an attempt to bridge a bond with the

46

47 audience, alluding to the socialist principle that all individuals are equal. Thereby, despite

48

49

50 fundamental differences in speech structure and delivery between French and Japanese

51

52 speeches, the aim of tailoring political presentation to encourage the audience to respond

53

54

55 and show support remains similar. Comparably, Wong (2014: 39), notes in his research

56

57 on Singaporean English that “… in any attempt to understand intercultural

58

59 communication, the analyst needs to take into consideration the social relationship of the

4 two speakers”. In this case, the relationship is between a political speaker and their

5

6

7 audience and its country-specific particularities.

8

9

10 According to the third hypothesis, it was predicted that there would be differences in

11

12 audience behaviour between the two political parties, based on the country’s turbulent

13

14

15 past. As Howarth and Varouxakis put it “The very terms ‘right’ and ‘left’ used to

16

17 describe political forces or camps, come from the French Revolution (…)” (2003: 2).

18

19

20 Most notably, the audience divide was symbolised by the principal use of “Ouai” (Yeah)

21

22 for Hollande (94%) and “Bravo!” for Sarkozy (79%); “Ouai” may be regarded as more

23

24 informal than the more sophisticated “Bravo”. Secondly, Hollande invited far more

25

26

27 booing (14%) and verbal responses (12%) than Sarkozy (9%; 5%), whereas Sarkozy

28

29 received more applause (18%) and laughter (13%) than Hollande (6%; 6%). Finally,

30

31

32 despite generally low levels overall of synchronised audience responses to speaker

33

34 rhetoric, Sarkozy’s speeches still proved more synchronous (50%) than those by

35

36

37 Hollande (38%).

38

39

40 These results suggested that audience differences between Sarkozy and Hollande may

41

42 reflect the left-wing/right-wing divide (Cole 1998), although it should be acknowledged

43

44

45 that three of the speeches by Hollande were delivered outdoors as opposed to only one by

46

47 Sarkozy. It is also important to consider whether differences in audience synchrony might

48

49

50 have arisen due to Sarkozy’s known oratorical skills (LeFigaro 2011). Nevertheless, on

51

52 this occasion right-wing audiences demonstrated far more synchrony than the left-wing.

53

54

55 Considering the recent events in the 2016 United States presidential campaign, it would

56

57 be interesting to investigate this phenomenon of party differences in audience responses

58

4 at US political speeches given the information amassed on the particular divisions

5

6

7 between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump supporters (Rhodan 2016).

8

9

## 10 Conclusions and wider implications

11

12

13 Overall, the results confirmed that French speechmaking resembled British more than

14

15

16 Japanese, specifically with the predominant use of implicit RDs. However, French

17

18 speeches were more asynchronous than not only the Japanese but also the British, with a

19

20 greater diversity of audience responses, greater variety of composite responses, and more

21

22

23 isolated responses. There is a marked similarity here with American audience responses,

24

25 which also showed greater asynchrony and response diversity, including booing, laughing,

26

27

28 and chanting (Bull & Miskinis 2015). Notably, booing by French audiences was directly

29

30 comparable to that of American audiences, as it was affiliative and seemingly invited by

31

32

33 speakers in the same way as applause, in marked contrast with Japanese political

34

35 speeches where no instances of booing were observed (Bull & Feldman 2011; Feldman &

36

37

38 Bull 2012).

39

40

41 French asynchrony is not necessarily the result of unsuccessful audience orchestration,

42

43 but possibly consequent upon the speaker’s intention to evoke disorderly responses.

44

45

46 Based on Atkinson’s (1985) notion of speaker-audience overlap, this might be understood

47

48 as a technique whereby speakers make themselves appear more popular. Whether this

49

50

51 style of speechmaking reflects French political oratory in general would need additional

52

53 evidence to confirm it. Overall, the results were conceptualised in terms of cultural

54

55 differences in RD-use and audience responses, based on Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions of

56

57

58 individualism, associated with the UK, USA and France, in contrast to the collectivism of

4 Japan. The individualism-collectivism scale was found to be indicative of cultural

5

6 differences in speech discourse, yet it was suggested that the research be replicated to

7

8

9 Korean and Chinese speeches to confirm its applicability.

10

11

12 The implications of these cultural differences in political rhetoric are highly relevant to

13

14

15 the practice of international diplomacy, given that applying the appropriate cultural

16

17 norms during intercultural negotiation requires a “professional savoir-faire” (Hofstede

18

19

20 2001: 435-437). Additional research on political oratory is currently in the process of

21

22 uncovering cross-cultural differences in speaker-audience interaction, suggesting

23

24 rhetorical practices are rooted in societal differences, be it on the individualistic scale or

25

26

27 other possible characteristics. A better understanding of these differences may offer

28

29 politicians the opportunity to study and tailor speechmaking to target different cultures,

30

31

32 thereby avoiding potential risks of intercultural miscommunication, a skill that is most

33

34 wanted in contemporary politics.

35

36

37

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Table 1 [Click here to download Table Table 1.docx](http://www.editorialmanager.com/pragsoc/download.aspx?id=3043&amp;guid=d4b72331-2a37-4203-bb12-1ebdadccde4b&amp;scheme=1)

**Table 1.** Differences in RD use: comparing French, British and Japanese speech making.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | British | French | Japanese |
| **Implicit RD (%)** | **68** | **75** | **19** |
| List | 6 | 13 | 0 |
| Contrast | 25 | 9 | 1 |
| Puzzle-Solution | 3 | 7 | 0 |
| Headline-Punchline | 5 | 10 | 5 |
| Combinations | 10 | 15 | 5 |
| Position Taking | 7 | 20 | 7 |
| Pursuits | 12 | 1 | 1 |
| Gratitude | - | 2 | - |
| Naming | - | 4 | - |
| Negative Naming | - | 9 | 0 |
| **Explicit RD (%)** | **-** | **12** | **76** |
| Greetings | - | 1 | 7 |
| Expressing Appreciation | - | 0 | 10 |
| Request Agreement | - | 0 | 8 |
| Jokes | - | 7 | 34 |
| Asking for Support | - | 1 | 16 |
| Concerning Campaign | - | 0 | 1 |
| Questions | - | 1 | - |
| Referring to Audience | - | 2 | - |
| **Non-RD (%)** | **32** | **14** | **4** |
| Other (Miscellaneous) | 32 | 2 | 4 |
| Content | - | 12 | - |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Percentage totals subject to rounding.

**Table 2.** Summary of isolated responses: types and proportions.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Audience response (%)** | Hollande | Sarkozy | **Mean** |
| Applause | 9 | 15 | **12** |
| Cheering | 24 | 17 | **20** |
| Booing | 1 | 2 | **2** |
| Laughter | 0 | 1 | **1** |
| Whistling or vuvuzela | 14 | 3 | **8** |
| Chanting | 2 | 1 | **1** |
| Verbal response | 54 | 67 | **61** |
| **Invited using (%)** |  |  |  |
| Rhetorical Device | 35 | 61 | **48** |
| Content | 39 | 20 | **29** |
| Random | 26 | 19 | **23** |

**Table 3.** Summary of all collective audience responses and candidate breakdown. All figures in percentages

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Response | Applause | Cheering | Booing | Laughter | W/V\* | Chanting | Verbal | Total |
| (%)  Hollande | 32 | 32 | 6 | 2 | 15 | 7 | 6 | 100 |
| Sarkozy | 38 | 27 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 100 |
| Mean | 35 | 30 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 7 | 7 | 100 |

\*Whistling and vuvuzela

**Table 4**. Comparison of composite responses invited by each speaker.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Responses (%) | Applause | Cheering | Applause and Cheering | Booing | Laughter | Verbal | Total |
| Hollande | 6 | 7 | 55 | 14 | 6 | 12 | 100 |
| Sarkozy | 18 | 1 | 53 | 9 | 13 | 5 | 100 |