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1 **Abstract**

2 Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are increasingly recognised for their  
3 potential contributions to health service delivery in Low-and Middle-Income Countries  
4 (LMICs). As well as playing a role in improving the provision of health services under  
5 everyday “normal” circumstances, ICTs can also be important in preparing for, mitigating,  
6 responding to, and recovering from disasters. This research explores the use of ICTs in a  
7 natural disaster situation in Nepal, a country affected by a series of strong earthquakes in  
8 2015. In March and April 2016, in-depth semi-structured interviews (n=24) and focus group  
9 discussions (n=4) were conducted with key informants: those affected by the earthquake, and  
10 those forming part of the formal or informal health system responses. Data was collected and  
11 analysed across three levels, from the bottom “upwards”, namely: (i) village level; (ii) district  
12 level, and (iii) central/national level. Perceptions of the role and value of ICTs varied greatly  
13 – as did patterns of use. While access and capability were found to be key barriers to use  
14 rurally, ICTs were nevertheless an important part of the informal response, helping people to  
15 gather information, express needs, and cope emotionally. They also helped relief agencies in  
16 allowing for networking and coordination among actors. Use of ICTs in the formal health  
17 system response, however, was severely lacking in many areas, relying more on traditional  
18 methods of disaster management. This reflects a general deficiency in, and underuse of, ICTs  
19 in the pre-earthquake Nepali healthcare system. We conclude by calling for a redoubling of  
20 efforts to improve and increase the adoption, diffusion, integration and regular use of ICTs  
21 within the Nepali health system – an approach that will assist with day-to-day service  
22 delivery but also provide a crucial platform upon which to build during future crises.

23

24 **Introduction**

25 Health systems, encompassing, broadly, “any set of activities whose primary intent is to  
26 improve or maintain health” (Murray and Frenk, 2000) have the potential to benefit  
27 substantially from the rapid developments in Information and Communication Technologies  
28 (ICTs) over recent decades (Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, 2001). ICTs comprise both physical  
29 technologies such as radios, computers, mobile phones and tablets, as well as virtual  
30 technologies that these devices give access to, such as surveillance tools, document sharing  
31 platforms and social media sites – also known as “Web 2.0” – which allow real time virtual  
32 interactions through online “Web-based” platforms (O’Reilly, 2005). In resource-limited  
33 settings in particular, increased and regular use of ICTs in the health sector holds huge  
34 potential. Examples include further developing the health workforce through remote training  
35 and management of healthcare workers, and delivering some health services remotely  
36 through “telemedicine” (Bhatta 2015). In addition to such benefits under usual (“normal”)  
37 conditions, ICTs also have the potential to help transform health information collection and  
38 sharing, as well as access to healthcare and disaster management services for all, in times of  
39 crises (Sendai Framework, United Nations, 2015).

40         Disaster management includes specific measures undertaken in preparation for, as  
41 well as in response to, a disaster. Although this study focuses primarily on the response stage  
42 of a recent disaster, it is important to note that response forms part of a broader disaster  
43 management cycle, which includes mitigation, preparation, response and recovery stages  
44 (Alexander, 2002).

45         Disaster management has historically utilised a top-down approach: the remit of  
46 formal and, generally, government-led systems that are often – especially in low- and middle-  
47 income countries (LMICs) – supported by (International) Non-Governmental Organizations,  
48 International Organizations, and foreign aid donors. The health system’s roles in disaster

49 management are varied, including search and rescue operations, treating the wounded and  
50 sick, effecting medical evacuations, managing contamination and the spread of diseases, and  
51 communicating with the public to reduce potential threats to public health, amongst other  
52 tasks (Auf der Heide and Scanlon, 2007).

53         However, more recently, there has been an increased focus on people, relationships  
54 and communities as instrumental in disaster management processes (Wulf *et al.*, 2013; Yates  
55 and Paquette, 2011; Palen *et al.*, 2010; Palen and Liu, 2007) and, more generally, in health  
56 systems strengthening and promoting resilience (Sheikh *et al.*, 2011). Not only do people  
57 contribute to the coping ability of their communities, they are also active agents in seeking  
58 out, distributing, and validating information which is of use to other members of their  
59 community, as well as to the formal health system response. Even though disaster  
60 management has traditionally privileged a top-down command and control approach, it has  
61 recently been argued that resilience can be increased by shifting to a model of collaboration  
62 and decentralisation (O’Sullivan *et al.*, 2010), which involves empowering those not  
63 traditionally considered as agents in the health system – the disaster victims themselves. As  
64 Palen *et al.* (2010) suggest, ordinary people tend to be the true first responders. Indeed,  
65 efforts of individuals and communities acting outside of the formal system may have large  
66 impacts, especially where compensating for a deficit in the formal response. For example, in  
67 the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake in 2010, informal local responders played critical roles  
68 in fundraising and providing information to media outlets (PEJ New Media Index, 2010), as  
69 well as other roles which may have traditionally been perceived as responsibilities of the  
70 formal system. A more recent goal of disaster management has therefore been to enable and  
71 empower individuals and communities to access, create, and act on information in response  
72 to disasters, as well as to strengthen links between affected communities and those  
73 responsible for coordinating disaster management.

74 Correlating with their increased general use, ICTs have been playing a growing role in  
75 all stages of disaster management. In the response stage, coordination between emergency  
76 personnel, media, government bodies and other actors involved in the relief effort is key  
77 (Watson *et al.*, 2007). ICTs are valued for their ability to provide a common platform for  
78 interaction between these groups (Yates and Paquette, 2011) and to gather, share and analyse  
79 large amounts of data to assist in determining priorities (Williams and Phillips. 2014). The  
80 informal community-level response is similarly often facilitated by ICTs, which have enabled  
81 new communication channels between citizens and government as well as private sector  
82 organizations, with potential for health information and health services to be more readily  
83 available and more responsive to the needs of citizens (Pearce *et al.*, 2015). ICTs may also  
84 play a role in fulfilling people’s health, safety, and social needs after disasters. However,  
85 ICTs are merely tools; they are only as good as their adoption, diffusion, integration and  
86 actual use, during pre-disaster (“normal”) conditions allows them to be (Wulf *et al.*, 2013).

87 Whilst the involvement of ICTs in disaster management is not a new field of research,  
88 studies have historically focused primarily on high-income countries, where access to, use of,  
89 and capability to use ICTs are more widespread (Yap, 2011). However, in the context of  
90 LMICs, although penetration of ICTs such as mobile phones is steadily increasing  
91 (International Telecommunication Union, 2015), poverty, poor education, and lack of  
92 communication infrastructure present common barriers to the process of developing  
93 collective intelligence and communication channels for use in responding to disasters. If the  
94 full potential of using ICTs to enhance resilience in the face of disaster is to be realised,  
95 research must now also focus on the relationship between formal and informal response  
96 efforts in LMICs, and the potential use of ICTs in both (as well as between them), for the  
97 benefit of those most affected by disasters.

98           In April 2015, a series of earthquakes – the largest of which measured a magnitude of  
99 7.8 – and numerous resulting landslides and aftershocks struck central Nepal, with the  
100 epicentre of the first earthquake being located near the rural village of Barpak, Gorkha  
101 District (Figure 1). The effects were devastating; nationwide there were a total of 8,856  
102 reported deaths and 22,309 reported injuries (Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Portal, 2015), as  
103 well as significant damage to transportation routes and to sites of cultural value (Roy *et al.*,  
104 2015). With ICT use in Nepal growing (NTA 2015; NTA 2016), there were many diverse and  
105 innovative uses of ICTs in the response and recovery efforts by Nepalis, as well as by the  
106 international community and diaspora. For example, Facebook’s Safety Check was activated,  
107 allowing friend networks to check on the wellbeing of their family and friends. Many young  
108 people were reported to have started up small organisations that leveraged mobile and web  
109 platforms, such as the Rapid Response Team, which started a “text for information” service  
110 ([www.facebook.com/rrtnepal](http://www.facebook.com/rrtnepal)). The day after the earthquake, Kathmandu Living Labs  
111 deployed a map ([www.QuakeMap.org](http://www.QuakeMap.org)) which accepted, verified, and published information  
112 from citizens, adding over 2,000 reports and exemplifying ICT’s capacity for organising large  
113 quantities of data. Hashtags also served to group information, with “#nepalphotoproject”,  
114 created by one individual in Nepal, being used on Twitter and Instagram to collate visual  
115 depictions of damage and to link people to relevant relief organisations. Whilst ICTs clearly  
116 had a role in this informal (and often ad hoc) disaster response, these efforts were often  
117 separate from the formal institutional response, which was criticised for its slow progress  
118 due, in part, to “political instability and inadequate institutional mechanisms for disaster risk  
119 reduction nationally” (Sharma, 2015), as well for more general bureaucratic inefficiencies  
120 (seen, for example, in the delays in forming the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA),  
121 which took nine months to become active (NRA, 2016)).

122 An estimated 83% of Nepal's population lives in rural and remote parts of the country  
123 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012) and, whilst the most recent figures produced by the Nepal  
124 Telecommunications Authority show mobile phone ownership is widespread, and Internet  
125 penetration is reportedly at 47% nationally (NTA, 2016), this obscures a situation of vastly  
126 different rates of ownership and use by gender, geography, socio-economic status, and caste.  
127 As such, those outside of the relatively modern capital city may have experienced this  
128 disaster, and the formal and informal responses to it, very differently from their urban  
129 counterparts. With the 2015 Gorkha earthquake as a point of departure, here we explore how  
130 individuals, communities, organizations and the Nepali health system used ICTs to meet  
131 health and wellbeing needs, and how this impacted on resilience of the formal and informal  
132 health systems in the broadest sense, which includes not only the "hardware" structures such  
133 as hospitals and health centres, but also the "software" of people and their communities  
134 acting informally to protect and support each other's health.

135

## 136 **Methods**

### 137 Study area and sampling population

138 A total of 24 in-depth interviews and 4 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted  
139 across rural and urban settings of Nepal in March and April 2016, one year post-disaster.  
140 Data collection took place at three key locations, namely: (1) at village level in Barpak, the  
141 rural village closest to the epicentre of the earthquake; (2) at district level in Gorkha, the  
142 capital of the district in which Barpak is located; and (3) at central level, in Kathmandu  
143 (Figure 1, Table 1). A "bottom-up" approach was taken, which intended to focus primarily on  
144 the voices of individuals with personal experience of the earthquake at village-level before  
145 triangulating with the views of those representing agencies (government and non-  
146 government) at the district and central levels. This was done in order to allow for comparison

147 between the reported experiences of those most directly affected with the “official views” of  
148 local and central government, national and international humanitarian aid providers, and  
149 others involved in the response.

150

151 *< insert Figure 1 about here >*

152

153 Purposive sampling was used to select study participants at all levels to ensure  
154 representation of both men and women, young adults, older adults, those of Dalit caste,  
155 village health care workers, pharmacy workers, representatives of national and international  
156 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and those who had become activists or ad hoc  
157 responders as a result of the earthquake. In addition, snowball sampling was used to aid in the  
158 identification of hard to reach individuals or groups. At village level, we attempted to include  
159 a representative sample of the community as a whole, assisted by a local ‘fixer’. At district  
160 and central/national levels, participants were invited according to their roles in disaster  
161 management and recovery, ensuring representation from as many key groups as possible.  
162 Members of the research team have worked both directly and indirectly with the Government  
163 of Nepal and many of the agencies involved in responding to the earthquake over a number of  
164 years. These professional networks were drawn upon at district/national levels to identify  
165 potential participants. All participants had direct experience of responding to the earthquake,  
166 either as a victim of the earthquake, an informal “first responder”, or a professional involved  
167 in the formal earthquake response, relief and recovery processes, and all were thus well  
168 placed to offer insights specific to the phenomenon in question (Patton 2002). All participants  
169 agreed to take part in the study. Interviews/FGDs took place in a range of settings depending  
170 on the location of the participant, including in/surrounding domestic residences, private  
171 offices and board rooms. All village level (and in some cases at district level)

172 interviews/FGDs were conducted in Nepali, due to necessity and/or participant preference,  
173 with the aid of an experienced translator trained in nursing and social science research, whilst  
174 at central/national level all interviews/FGDs were conducted in English.

175

176 *< insert Table 1 about here >*

177

178 The study of ICT use set out in this paper is part of a larger ongoing collaboration between  
179 the University of Sheffield, UK and Tribhuvan University, Nepal, examining health system  
180 resilience and reconstruction in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes.

181

#### 182 In-depth interviews

183 Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted in-person at all three levels of data  
184 collection, lasting between 35 and 90 minutes each. Comfort of the participants was fostered  
185 by situating interviews, where possible, in locations familiar to them (e.g. workplace or  
186 communal area), and care was taken to ensure privacy. Dress reflected appropriate cultural  
187 norms and was more formal for interviews in Kathmandu, where participants were often  
188 interviewed in their professional capacity. With the informed consent of participants,  
189 interviews were recorded using an audio device; where consent for recording was not given,  
190 notes were taken and the researcher recorded an audio summary immediately following the  
191 interview. A detailed reflective field diary was also kept and updated promptly. All audio  
192 data was anonymised using a code, and then professionally transcribed, whilst also checking  
193 for accuracy of the translation where appropriate.

194 An interview guide, designed to allow probing and follow-up questions (Bryman,  
195 2016), was informed by key themes identified during an extensive inter-disciplinary literature  
196 review. The guide aimed to identify the roles of the individual; their use and understanding

197 of, and beliefs about ICTs; behaviour change since the earthquake; cultural ways of using  
198 ICTs; instances and examples of ICTs impacting health, wellbeing, and service delivery. The  
199 guide remained somewhat adaptable and flexible enough to incorporate new or spontaneously  
200 arising information, in order to minimise hypothesis-confirmation bias (Kumar, 1987).  
201 Recordings were listened to and discussed between all team members in the field to  
202 determine when sufficient data had been collected; practical concerns such as time and cost  
203 constraints also contributed to this decision-making.

204

#### 205 Focus Group Discussions

206 At village level in Barpak, 3 FGDs were conducted with separate groups for men, women and  
207 young women (aged 18-25 years). Women were split into two groups by age in order to  
208 enable greater participation of young women, who are more likely than young men to not  
209 participate when older members of the same gender are present. Women and men were  
210 separated to ensure cultural appropriateness in a generally patriarchal society (Dhungana,  
211 2006), as well as to explore potential age- and/or gender-based digital divide(s) (Antonio and  
212 Tuffley, 2014). The FGDs were held in Nepali, and translated into English, and were  
213 recorded upon consent of all group members. The recording was then professionally  
214 transcribed, whilst also checking for accuracy of the translation.

215 At central/national level an “executive” FGD was held, in English, in the form of an  
216 all-day workshop with 17 senior members of (I)NGOs, government, international  
217 organisations and donors. Of these attendees, seven represented International Non-  
218 Governmental Organisations (INGOs), all of which specialised in either health, emergencies,  
219 or both. Three attendees were from Nepali non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); five  
220 represented the Government of Nepal (three from the Ministry of Health, one from the  
221 Department of Water Supply & Sewerage, and one member of the Disaster Preparedness and

222 Response Committee); one represented a UN agency; and one represented a foreign  
223 government aid department. The meeting was divided into three sections: (i) the immediate  
224 period after the first earthquake; (ii) the remainder of the year; and (iii) lessons learned from  
225 the disaster. In order to encourage candid responses, the meeting was held under the Chatham  
226 House rule and thus not recorded, but extensive hand-written notes were taken by 4 members  
227 of the research team and then shared and discussed internally. Additionally, an audio-  
228 summary was recorded by the team immediately after the workshop ended.

229

### 230 Data analysis

231 A standard framework for analysis was used (Ritchie and Spencer, 1992). This involved,  
232 firstly, familiarisation with data through repeated exposure and self-immersion in the raw  
233 data from the interviews/FGDs, in combination with notes on body language and other forms  
234 of written or recorded information. Secondly, using the constant comparison method,  
235 significant sections of the interview transcripts were highlighted and coded as both pre-  
236 figured and new themes were identified, with frequent revisiting of data, as well as  
237 comparison and triangulation across levels. Thirdly, themes were indexed using the  
238 qualitative data analysis software programme NVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 11,  
239 2015), in order to facilitate data organization and retrieval. Data was searched for “general  
240 statements” and relationships (Marshall and Rossman, 1999), explanations for which were  
241 tested by looking for contrasting evidence using negative case analysis, as described by  
242 Lincoln and Guba (1985), in order to increase the quality and rigour of the findings, which  
243 are presented in the following section from the community level, “upwards”, mirroring the  
244 research design. Finally, exemplary quotations from the data were selected to illustrate key  
245 findings.

246

247 **Results**

248

249 Participant characteristics

250 Participants of interviews and FGDs (total n = 99) contributed a wide range of experiences,  
251 both professional and personal, as the earthquake had a significant impact on all areas of their  
252 lives. All participants were adults. Women made up 44% of all participants (53% of FGD  
253 participants and 25% of interview participants) (Table 2). Nine interviews (n = 9) and three  
254 FGDs (n = 58) took place at village level; ten interviews at district level (n = 10), and 5  
255 interviews (n = 5) and one FGD (n = 17) at central/national level (Table 3). Most participants  
256 had been present in the country during the time of the earthquake, although a handful of men  
257 in Barpak had been working overseas and returned home as a direct result of the earthquake.  
258 Likewise, some NGO staff in Kathmandu had arrived immediately following the earthquake.  
259 The majority had never experienced a natural disaster of this scale (or indeed any) previously.

260

261 *< insert Tables 2 and 3 about here >*

262

263 Although initial consideration had been given to the interaction of ICTs with all stages of  
264 disaster management, during data collection there was a clear and strong focus by participants  
265 on the response phase. This was due to the ongoing nature of that stage at the time of data  
266 collection (many participants noted that the country had not by that stage moved from the  
267 response into the longer-term reconstruction phase). These results are reflected here.

268

269 ICTs in the community-level response

270 Interviews and focus groups conducted with rural participants in the village of Barpak  
271 contributed to the understanding of community-level use of ICTs. Participants used ICTs to

272 meet many of their practical and emotional needs – including around physical health and  
273 mental wellbeing – in this time of crisis, which can be seen to have contributed to their  
274 coping ability in the response phase. Rather than being passive victims of the earthquake, or  
275 later passive recipients of aid, we found that some at the village level had exercised  
276 considerable agency in seeking to meet their own needs, and that ICTs had (for some) been  
277 an important facilitator of this.

278

### 279 *Contact with family and diaspora*

280 At village level, participants reported an immediate and strong desire to contact family  
281 members living away from home, nationally and internationally:

282 *If the family members are dispersed during a catastrophic situation we*  
283 *[are] really, really worried.* (FGD 2, females, village level)

284 Reasons given for this were both practical (e.g. requirements for financial aid) and emotional  
285 (reassurance), both of which appeared vitally important to respondents' wellbeing. Mobile  
286 phone calls, the usual method of contact prior to the earthquake, were relied on heavily.  
287 Although some telecommunications infrastructure sustained damage, NCell, the provider  
288 whose systems fared best after the earthquake, was widely praised:

289 *We could not imagine life at that time if phones were not there. It would*  
290 *have been impossible for us to contact our family member overseas if*  
291 *NCell were not [functioning]. Now everybody has understood the*  
292 *importance of mobile phones... NCell was a lifeline.* (FGD 1, males,  
293 village level)

294 Communication with family helped participants feel emotionally safe and connected to their  
295 loved ones, and it also helped them gather and share information from, and with, other parts  
296 of the country and internationally.

297

298 *Information gathering and need expression*

299 Participants at village level focused on the value of ICTs for gathering information about the  
300 wider effects of the earthquake and news of family living elsewhere, as well to express their  
301 own and their family's needs to those they saw as able to help them, particularly the need for  
302 supplies such as food, shelter and medication. Need expression, although vital, was clearly  
303 determined by a level of status and social capital:

304 *People who can talk [have their voice heard], they have received [relief*  
305 *materials] but people who were not able to talk [have their voice heard],*  
306 *didn't get anything. (FGD 2, females, village level)*

307 ICTs conferred some power, enabling needs to be met from further afield. Interestingly,  
308 although provision of emergency material would usually be seen as a role of the formal  
309 disaster response system, the formal system was bypassed by some participants, who instead  
310 went directly to their own contacts. This may indicate that the formal system was not  
311 perceived to be accessible or reliable. Needing to rely on personal contacts may disadvantage  
312 groups without such advantageous networks, creating inequality in recovery processes:

313 *We requested materials like solar because there was no power supply, tents*  
314 *because there was heavy rain. We requested these materials through our*  
315 *personal contacts via phone and SMS. (FGD 1, males, village level)*

316 However, in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, damage to network towers  
317 temporarily rerouted communication from mobile phones to face-to-face, bringing affected  
318 groups into contact with representatives of the formal response, who were at that time more  
319 easily reachable in person. When digital or virtual forms of information sharing and  
320 communication were not available, people living in Barpak are reported to have travelled on  
321 foot for an entire day or longer via earthquake-affected roads in order to speak with district

322 level staff. Aid workers took motorbikes or, where roads were too damaged, walked to rural  
323 areas to assess the situation. Meanwhile, members of the Nepali diaspora living overseas,  
324 whose access to ICTs had not been affected, used internet and email to contact local radio  
325 stations to request lists of the injured and dead. Although radio station staff reportedly  
326 obtained this information from local police and rescue efforts (part of the formal system)  
327 (Participant 14, male, district level), it was informal channels which had been chosen by  
328 individuals to act as a liaison.

329 ICTs were used opportunistically in rural Barpak: provision of free WiFi for a number  
330 of months by NCell in an attempt to aid response efforts resulted in an upturn of interest in  
331 and use of online platforms. Whilst it was widely praised, this effect was reversed once free  
332 WiFi was removed.

333 *Yes, we used it [social media] at that time but not now. There isn't free WiFi*  
334 *now.* (FGD 1, males, village level)

335

### 336 *Grief and coping*

337 There was some evidence that ICTs interacted with people's grief processes, with potential  
338 implications (both positive and negative) for mental wellbeing. For example, one participant  
339 told us about how a foreign film crew exploited him by making a documentary about the  
340 physical injuries he sustained during the earthquake and the effect this had had on his life and  
341 family. The footage was made available for profit in which the participant did not share.  
342 Despite occasional instances of such exploitative practices, technology was recognised as  
343 vital for expressing grief and trauma by many village-level participants, whether online or,  
344 more commonly, by telephone or radio. Its only limitation was insufficient intimacy when  
345 compared with a face-to-face conversation:

346           ...only phone was not enough to express our loss... (FGD 2, females, village  
347           level)

348

349   *Barriers to greater ICT use*

350   Patterns of ICT use at the community level were shaped by barriers such as low access and  
351   lack of capability, which are often concentrated in rural areas like Barpak. Capability and  
352   access are clearly played out in a “digital divide” and low representation of certain groups in  
353   the Web 2.0 domain (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2001), caused by and resulting in increased  
354   inequality and resource power imbalance.

355           Capability was found to be a key determinant of ICT use in Barpak. Many rural  
356   respondents confessed to knowing about tools such as social media sites, but never having  
357   used them, nor knowing how to use them. In some instances this stemmed from illiteracy – a  
358   major barrier to accessing online spaces and information through channels other than voice,  
359   especially for older generations. Online operating language was found to be an additional  
360   barrier, particularly in rural areas. A Kathmandu-based relief worker who used social media  
361   to gather volunteers acknowledged this:

362           *I write in English you know, and people don't read English, so there is*  
363           *obviously that barrier that exists.* (Participant 22, female, central/national  
364           level)

365   Importantly, capability and access issues appeared to also be age-related, with young people  
366   more likely to use social media platforms in particular. Young people were professed by the  
367   older generations to “use Facebook” (FGD1, FGD2, males and females, respectively, village  
368   level), which appeared to be a catch-all phrase for Internet use and familiarity.

369           *Yes these days we know about Facebook but we don't know how to use it.*

370           *Only young people use it.* (FGD2, females, village level)

371 However, there was evidence of resourcefulness in overcoming such barriers. Two female  
372 participants owned and operated basic phones despite their illiteracy, through setting speed-  
373 dial numbers and memorising keyboard placement. Additionally, communal use of ICTs, as  
374 in groups listening to the radio on one mobile phone (Participant 11, male, district level),  
375 partially alleviated inequalities of access within the community, although control of devices  
376 remained primarily with those of higher socioeconomic status.

377         The earthquake created additional barriers to ICT use both through damage to  
378 physical technologies and by worsening electricity provision – existing load shedding was  
379 added to by physical damage. Although mobile phones were largely spared from damage  
380 because “everybody had mobile [with them].... usually it’s in [their] pocket” (Participant 11,  
381 male, district level), physical damage claimed many televisions, computers and radios, which  
382 were left in people’s homes as they escaped. In Barpak, distribution of small solar charging  
383 devices soon after the earthquake was said to have enabled easier charging of devices,  
384 compensating for lower and more sporadic supply from regular means. This damage to  
385 equipment and fluctuation in power supply appeared to have no lasting (negative) effect on  
386 ICT use, as people re-built their lives. Indeed, participants both at rural community level and  
387 district (town) level reported an increased ownership of mobile phones as a result of their  
388 perceived value during the earthquake response, particularly among females:

389             *...now in the remote area mothers and sisters they have got one simple*  
390             *mobile phone and they easily use that.* (Participant 13, male, district level)

391 The “mothers and sisters” in our focus groups concurred that levels had increased, noting also  
392 that their own awareness of the importance had been raised.

393             *We have realised the importance of communication.* (FGD 2, females,  
394             village level)

395 However, despite these reports, men still appear to have greater access and connectivity,  
396 demonstrated anecdotally by the 11 phone calls that interrupted the male FGD compared with  
397 only one in the female FGD. Additionally, phone ownership does not necessarily correlate  
398 with use of Internet and other online tools due to limited functionality of older “non-smart”  
399 phones and high costs of data. This raises the question of whether increased access to ICTs  
400 for women in particular might support coping capabilities of the families and networks they  
401 are part of, especially when families are spread across countries:

402

### 403 ICTs in the informal response

404 There was extensive evidence of an informal response to the earthquake which was motivated  
405 both by altruism and as a direct reaction to the perceived lack of action taken by the formal  
406 system. The informal response was made up of individuals often acting outside of their  
407 conventional roles, whether the conventional role was as a citizen, radio broadcaster,  
408 international diaspora, or even as part of the formal health system itself. Most participants  
409 generally agreed with the sentiment that:

410 *First responders were not INGOs, NGOs, or the government. The first*  
411 *responders were the people of Nepal (Participant 22, female,*  
412 *central/national level)*

413 For example, in Barpak, a small private pharmacy dispensed all their stock in the first day,  
414 treating fellow villagers for free before the army and additional medical services arrived, as  
415 the health post was largely inaccessible due to damage. Men in the focus group asserted that:

416 *Respondent 1: Before actual support, there is one private doctor from*  
417 *Medical Hall [pharmacy] who provided free treatments.*

418 *Respondent 2: She is not a doctor: pharmacist.*

419            *Respondent 1: She provided free treatments to all as much as she can...*

420            *she distributed all the medicine which she had in her Medical Hall*

421            *[pharmacy] free of cost*

422 Further from the epicentre, many people living in Kathmandu or in other less-affected parts  
423 of the country rapidly returned to their home villages, taking emergency supplies with them,  
424 or sought to collect materials and money to send home. One Kathmandu-based activist said:

425            *What happened in Nepal was something I have really never seen. You*

426            *know people just like coming together, literally digging their own purses,*

427            *sleeping out at night, whatever it took people did. (Participant 22, female,*

428            *central/national level)*

429 The informal response was seen rurally, at district level, and in the urban capital, but ICT use  
430 was higher the more urban the setting, facilitating coordination and efficiency.

431

432 *Information gathering and need expression*

433 Social media was recognised for its ability to express need to an audience with whom  
434 interaction might normally be limited. Informal responders reached global audiences using  
435 social media to “make [donating money] a trend” (Participant 21, male, central/national level)  
436 through the use of public approval/rating functions of these tools. The needs (especially  
437 health needs) of affected groups living rurally were picked up by urban activists and  
438 broadcast more widely. One participant stated that “young people in the capital got  
439 information of where was particularly in need and posted it on Facebook” (Participant 24,  
440 male, central/national level) and indeed several other participants at central/national level  
441 reported doing this themselves, bypassing the formal system.

442 Decision-makers and politicians were able to be reached and lobbied by broadcasting,  
443 through radio and online channels, issues perceived as important, such as receiving the house  
444 rebuilding grant in a lump sum rather than in separate instalments:

445 *...the phone call made by a single individual might be forgotten, but if the*  
446 *same thing goes via [mass] media it will give pressure to them [the*  
447 *government/politicians]. (Participant 14, male, district level)*

448 In this way, ICTs were used to apply social pressure, with shame and reward being powerful  
449 motivators.

450

#### 451 *Coordination*

452 The dispersed nature of the informal response led to more creative uses of ICTs to create and  
453 coordinate networks, and to connect and partially integrate with the formal system. Examples  
454 include a radio station broadcaster taking calls from remote areas and broadcasting them by  
455 holding his personal phone up to the microphone, thereby alerting army and government  
456 personnel to conditions in rural areas (Participant 14, male, district level). At national level,  
457 volunteers used phone cameras to make videos and social media to share them to raise funds,  
458 posted pictures of damage online for verification, and collected materials to take to affected  
459 areas themselves. Some verified trustworthiness of potential project partners through mutual  
460 friends on Facebook (Participant 22, female, central/national level).

461

#### 462 *Resilience and flexibility to adapt*

463 In urban settings the informal responders adapted their use of ICTs as a result of earthquake-  
464 caused disruption, improving resilience and, ultimately, effectiveness. One participant, a  
465 woman who had returned to Nepal after the earthquake to assist in the response from the

466 capital city, reported recording scheduled load-shedding times and “café hopping” between  
467 powered areas, using free WiFi to coordinate her grassroots response efforts.

468         ICT also facilitated resilience through its capacity for validation. In the aftermath of  
469 the earthquake rumours were rife, spreading suspicions regarding the cause of the earthquake  
470 (Participant 25, male, central/national level), the spread of diseases (FGD 4, mixed gender,  
471 national level), an ensuing volcanic eruption (Participant 14, male, district level) and that  
472 another earthquake would strike on the 1-year anniversary (Participant 21, male,  
473 central/national level). If not well managed, ICTs had the potential to intensify the spread of  
474 incorrect information, creating further fear and conflict. However, participants observed that  
475 the system policed itself to an extent; several participants at central/national level spoke  
476 positively about a rumour tracking website named the Accountability Lab  
477 ([www.accountabilitylab.org](http://www.accountabilitylab.org)), which identified and clarified misleading or potentially  
478 damaging information.

479

#### 480 ICTs in the formal response

481 The formal health system response was made up of the Nepali government and its  
482 coordination of other agencies via its One Door policy (The Asia Foundation, 2015); the UN  
483 cluster system which covered both health and other relevant clusters such as shelter and  
484 communication, and which operated at both district and national levels; as well as hospitals,  
485 health posts and other structures of the formally managed government health system. Views  
486 on ICT use from both within this response, and from others about this response, highlighted  
487 its difference from the informal response. Although some individuals with roles in the formal  
488 response reported using ICTs, this was not in a systematic, integrated or formalised way, and  
489 traditional communication methods were more common. For example, the health post in  
490 Barpak had not introduced electronic patient records and, apart from the Officer in Charge

491 using his personal mobile phone for work purposes, there were no other physical or virtual  
492 ICTs available for use prior to the earthquake or during the response phase. Rather, paper  
493 records were kept and periodically forwarded to district HQ. Aside from the mobile phone,  
494 no means of accessing online information was available either before or after the earthquakes.

495

#### 496 *Coordination*

497 The extent to which ICTs were used to organise and co-ordinate relief activities was lower in  
498 the formal compared with the informal response. ICT use within the formal health system  
499 was less frequent and generally limited to more conventional methods: of the fourteen  
500 participants who had roles within the formal system, only two particularly dynamic  
501 individuals spoke about ICTs other than mobile phones, with one describing his use of  
502 Google Drive, Dropbox, Internet, websites, and Skype, among others. This was partly due to  
503 the importance of face-to-face coordination both at district and national level, where key  
504 players involved in coordinating the response effort tended to be located physically close to  
505 one another, and to know each other personally. This allowed representatives of the various  
506 agencies involved to be drawn together quickly without using ICTs to enable coordination.  
507 Some informal volunteer responders, frustrated by perceived low levels of ICT use by the  
508 formal responders, emphasised that what was necessary was not complicated “rigorous  
509 regression analysis or linear programming” (Participant 22, female, central/national level),  
510 but rather simple methods of document sharing and flexible means of virtual connection.

511

#### 512 *ICTs in future planning and resilience*

513 Some participants, particularly those involved in the informal response, claimed that there  
514 had been a surge in general ICT use, which was expected to connect and empower people,  
515 potentially increasing the coping capacity of rural areas. However, those representing formal

516 response agencies appeared to place very little emphasis of the potential role of ICTs in  
517 future resilience. Their primary focus for future-proofing against further disasters was on  
518 physical structures, stemming from a very literal translation of the concept of “building back  
519 better”, and from agreement with the common refrain that “it’s not the earthquake that killed  
520 people, rather it was the [poor] construction” (Participant 15, male, district level).

521

### 522 *Barriers to ICT use*

523 Factors shaping the often-limited use of ICTs by those working in the formal system were  
524 alluded to by some participants. The first factor is a general sense of uncertainty which  
525 prevented the formal system – which could be seen as more risk averse than the informal  
526 response, or needing to act with greater accountability – from providing information in public  
527 and recordable ways using ICTs. After the earthquake, the paucity of provision of reliable  
528 information was attributed by one participant to organisations’ fear of being held accountable  
529 within an uncertain and fluid context:

530 *Different partner organisation are afraid to disseminate those information*  
531 *because it will be changing and they think they will be responsible in front*  
532 *of beneficiaries later on. (Participant 20, male, district level)*

533 Instead, information was said to be withheld from the public.

534 The second potential barrier to use of ICTs in the formal system may be capability.  
535 Although literacy and language issues are much less likely to be a barrier than at rural  
536 community level, it may be that some individuals acting as part of the formal response are not  
537 familiar with some forms of ICT which are beginning to be thought of as a standard part of  
538 disaster management elsewhere: for example geographical mapping databases. This is  
539 supported by the impression that the quality of the formal response was shaped by chance,

540 being “more down to who was where and the different personalities involved” (Participant  
541 25, male, central/national level).

542

### 543 **Discussion**

544 This work is concerned with community-level, informal, and formal response uses of ICTs  
545 during times of emergency, and the reasons behind these patterns of use. The results focus on  
546 the immediate response phase following the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, starting at the village  
547 closest to the epicentre and working “upwards” and outwards. It extends the limited body of  
548 literature linking the use of ICTs with disaster response and resilience in LMICs.

549 To claim that Nepal was resilient is partly to fail to recognise the severity of the  
550 disaster and the failures to create systems and structures to protect people against its effects.  
551 Failures included cases of poor preparedness witnessed even in aid organisations; reports of  
552 failures to communicate some plans or advice from the formal system – not just the health  
553 system, but the interaction of all responders who had formal responsibility for action – to  
554 affected groups; and a delay in setting up the NRA which led to unapproved, self-funded and  
555 less-safe rebuilding work being undertaken through necessity. This research did, however,  
556 find multiple examples of human agency and inventiveness in the face of disaster, although  
557 these were coupled with a range of systemic barriers. McKinsey (2014) found four key  
558 barriers to ICT use globally, including lack of incentives, affordability, user capability, and  
559 poor infrastructure. We found that incentives for, and affordability of, ICT use temporarily  
560 increased, through sheer need and also due to innovative policy responses to the disaster. The  
561 telecommunications infrastructure coped better than expected in this setting, with the NCell  
562 tower in Barpak, for example, continuing to function. Problems of capability and access,  
563 however, persisted in the rural area.

564 In disaster situations, lack of ICT access and capability restricts voices, particularly  
565 when these barriers are unevenly distributed, as is the case in Nepal. Although older literature  
566 suggests that only key people such as health workers need access to ICTs for a community to  
567 gain benefit (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2001), this arguably no longer applies. ICTs have  
568 moved beyond devices such as radios and phones, to Web 2.0 platforms, which achieve  
569 maximum benefit only when access is near universal, as in many high-income country  
570 settings. In low-income settings such as Nepal, these technologies are now starting to become  
571 more accessible across different social groups, and can be seen to be democratising  
572 information access and sharing. They create online communities which support collective  
573 intelligence (Liu *et al.*, 2008), enabling affected individuals to “become a serious, valuable  
574 and respectful partner during and after emergencies” (Jaroslav Varuch, Ushahidi cited in  
575 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011:32).

576 Indeed, this study confirms the assertion that disaster victims and the informal  
577 response are often the first true responders (Palen *et al.*, 2010). Their empowerment, and  
578 connection with other sectors that have disaster management responsibilities, is needed to  
579 take advantage of their motivation to help and their access to local information. The formal  
580 systems involved in disaster response must recognise the value of informal responders and  
581 work to partner with them. These individuals also need to be able to transmit information to  
582 each other in the face of a dearth of local information from official sources (Shklovski *et al.*,  
583 2008). As such, we concur that ICTs can be key tools to “leverage the power of the collective  
584 intelligence of the citizenry” (Palen *et al.*, 2010: 2). Moreover, innovative approaches  
585 described by participants have the potential to reach a greater audience than traditional  
586 means, making them highly valuable in managing information and misinformation during  
587 crises (Starbird *et al.*, 2014). Further research in Nepal, and in other settings, may indicate  
588 how this can be harnessed for crisis resilience.

589           This study supports previous theories that ICTs are only as effective as their  
590 congruence with cultural methods of communication (Wulf *et al.*, 2013; Dodson *et al.*, 2013).  
591 The data also suggests that micro-cultures may be as influential as national ones within the  
592 study setting. The culture of networking within the informal response was facilitated by  
593 social media, which also allowed “vetting” of new connections through mutual friends. Other  
594 disasters have presented evidence of the same function being served in formal systems, as  
595 seen after the Haiti earthquake, where Wikipedia pages visible to all government agencies  
596 superseded the traditional formal liaison structures by allowing all staff access to other  
597 agencies and their information (Yates and Paquette, 2011). In this study, examples from  
598 within the formal system were typically from individuals going above and beyond their  
599 official duties, blurring their role between formal and informal responses. Although social  
600 media may begin to blur boundaries between the formal and the informal through facilitation  
601 of activities such as citizen journalism, a key challenge remains connecting the two groups to  
602 each other in order that the information held by each group may be transmitted for the benefit  
603 of the other (van Gorp, 2014). There is an urgent need for formal systems – both health and  
604 governance systems more widely – to become more interactive, communicative, and creative  
605 in order to capitalise on the additional roles of “new” citizen actors. Technologies enabling  
606 this may have a crucial role in future disasters, particularly where formal responses remain  
607 under-budgeted, poorly staffed, rigid or non-existent. Literature agrees that use of ICTs by  
608 the formal health system facilitates faster decision-making and information sharing (Yates  
609 and Paquette, 2011).

610           One of the main problems the formal health system faced in using ICTs in the disaster  
611 response was the scant use of ICTs before the crisis. As mentioned above, the Barpak health  
612 post had no ICT facilities other than the mobile phone belonging to the OIC, which was used  
613 pre-earthquake to communicate with higher-ranked health system officials at the district level

614 when necessary. This meant that post-earthquake there was little in terms of routine ICT use  
615 for the formal emergency response to build upon. Furthermore, the OIC was away from his  
616 health post at the time of the first earthquake, increasing the reliance on community-led and  
617 informal responses such as the work of the private pharmacist.

618         The potential for greater health system use of ICTs in the village was there. Although  
619 there was some disruption to electricity and mobile phone communications, in Barpak  
620 communication services continued for the most part – to the surprise (and relief) of many  
621 informants. The barriers to greater ICT use within the formal health sector response were not,  
622 at least in the case of Barpak, primarily technical ones. Although efforts are underway in  
623 Nepal to expand the use of ICTs within the health system, coverage remains patchy and is not  
624 country-wide. As in Barpak, this means that there is limited ICT infrastructure within the  
625 day-to-day running of the health system that can be leveraged in response to future  
626 emergencies. This highlights the important relationship between health system functions in  
627 “normal” times and during times of emergency. A resilient ICT infrastructure within the  
628 formal health system would ideally deliver benefits in both times.

629         When considering these results it is important to acknowledge some limitations. First,  
630 given the sensitive nature of the research topic, is the difficulty of separating participants’  
631 interviews (especially at district and central levels) as either professional or personal, as the  
632 earthquake impacted on all areas of participants’ lives. As such, there is a significant level of  
633 inherent complexity which must be recognised. Second, this research was conducted one year  
634 after the earthquakes struck, during which time migration may have removed those with  
635 sufficient resources from the study area, and many aid workers would have left. An event as  
636 traumatic as the earthquake studied here could cause memory to be preserved, or to decay,  
637 perhaps being intentionally left behind and therefore affecting the data collected. Third, as the  
638 epicentre of the earthquake, and with historically strong military links with the UK and with

639 India, Barpak is also not typically representative of Nepal's earthquake-affected areas. This  
640 may limit generalisability to other rural areas in Nepal which may not have had such  
641 relatively high resource power, access to ICTs, or contacts living overseas or in urban Nepal  
642 to leverage for help. However, Barpak was chosen specifically because of some of its unusual  
643 characteristics: the link with the Gurkhas meant that frequent international connections  
644 increased the population's exposure to ICTs, and its location as the epicentre meant that it  
645 was the focus of much attention from the media (and social media) and the recipient of  
646 relatively high levels of early relief efforts. Fourth, the role of the researcher is crucial in  
647 qualitative research and can affect the kinds of data collected. The experience and diversity of  
648 the research team in terms of nationality, age, gender, and disciplinary background allowed  
649 particular interviewers to be chosen based on appropriateness, i.e. female interviewers for the  
650 young women's focus group, and interviewer bias to be minimised (Kumar, 1987). Fifth,  
651 social desirability bias may have resulted from participants' desires to be seen in a positive  
652 light, potentially heightened by the research team's perceived authoritative status. However,  
653 this is not believed to be the case; care was taken to establish rapport and to express empathy  
654 in interactions. Continuous discussion within the project team throughout the study allowed  
655 for challenges to be raised and for discrepancies to be addressed, thereby increasing  
656 robustness and transparency.

657         This study has highlighted the need to take context into account when considering  
658 how to improve and capitalise on the use of ICTs in formal and informal health system  
659 disaster responses, particularly in resource-poor settings where there may be educational and  
660 literacy implications much broader than the field of disaster management. Improving access  
661 is likely to require research involving telecommunications companies, current government  
662 policy, and feasibility studies to explore access measures such as physical infrastructure to  
663 expand signal coverage and ways of providing financially viable access to the Internet. This

664 could capitalise on the desire, seen especially in the young, to connect, and would inform  
665 progress to overcome current barriers to ICT use for the general population.

666 Overall, we have illustrated that ICTs play important roles in community-level  
667 responses, in local and national-level informal response activities, and (at least potentially) in  
668 the formal health system response. It was in the latter case that ICTs appear to have been  
669 most underused in relation to their potential, pointing for a need for greater adoption,  
670 diffusion, integration and use of ICTs within the formal Nepali health system.

671 Methods to better connect the informal with the formal health system responses  
672 should also be explored. Research has found that formal health systems, particularly in  
673 developing countries, may lack the resources or capability for innovative ICT use for needs  
674 analysis and for information, education and communication purposes. However, information  
675 provided by, or about, local community contexts after disaster could be of great benefit to  
676 government efforts, as well as to NGOs and INGOs. At present, this is a vastly unfulfilled  
677 opportunity.

678 In summary, this work highlights the importance of integrating a variety of ICTs –  
679 both physical and virtual – into health systems during “normal” times, to make the health  
680 system more resilient in all stages of disaster management by creating means of capitalising  
681 on the agency of people and communities at the centre of the disaster. Qualitative data from a  
682 range of sources provided new and rich insights to understand the events during, and after,  
683 the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, and to inform future health systems strengthening, including the  
684 formal health system which plays a key role in disaster management activities in Nepal and  
685 more widely.

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