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<ct>Industrial Relations</ct>

<author>Andrew Taylor </author>

Introduction

Trade union and industrial relations reform had been central concerns of the Thatcher governments because they were regarded as fundamental to the government's ambition to transform the UK; realising this objective inevitably involved confrontation with the unions. After passing five major pieces of legislation, and following a sharp decline in union membership and the incidence of industrial conflict, there was an assumption that union and industrial relations reform were problems solved. One of the main reasons for John Major's emergence as party leader and Prime Minister was that he was perceived as less aggressive and confrontational than Mrs Thatcher, and there was an expectation by some that this changed tone would apply to industrial relations.

The Major government was not ideologically different from its Conservative predecessors.¹ Smith and Morton, for example, portray the Major years as 'another step in the evolution of the Conservative government's project to diminish union power and one which marks a new confidence and a willingness to jettison past inhibitions'.² The memoirs of John Major and his ministers devote little space to industrial relations or union reform, which testifies to their reduced significance; however, the Major government was responsible for one major piece of legislation, the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act (TURERA, 1993). This showed the government remained wedded to the Thatcher government's strategy of legal change, promoting free markets and deregulation, and responding to events that revealed lacunae in legislation.³ The government's approach and emphasis on individual rights (*Every*

business, every worker, freedom *from the dictatorship of union militants*’) fitted neatly with the Citizen’s Charter, which John Major regarded as the centrepiece of Conservatism in the 1990s.⁴ It is therefore wrong to regard the Major government as a non-event in policy terms.

This chapter argues the Major government was the first to oversee the industrial relations system that developed out of the changes begun in the 1980s and manage the consequences of the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. Three features of post-industrialism command our attention: first, the collapse of manufacturing industry and the decline of its associated unions saw the rise of the service industry economy with a low level of unionisation. Union membership as a proportion of employees declined from 38.6 per cent in 1989 to 30.2 in 1997, with membership in the public sector being significantly higher than in the private sector. So, second, the decline of private sector trade Unionism and collective bargaining was not matched in the public sector where unions remained relatively more powerful. The percentage of private sector employees covered by collective agreements in 1997 was 22.0 per cent and 74.9 per cent in the public sector. Third, some unions remained strategically important, developing responses that utilised the legislation as well as exploiting growing job insecurity, inequality, recession, de-regulation, and privatisation.

Did the legal and other changes of the 1980s constitute a degree of change sufficient to solve the union and industrial relations problems? Whatever the answer, the political case for legislation remained strong. Conservatives had enjoyed the reputation of being the party best able to deal with the unions and industrial relations, and the Labour Party suffered from the opposite evaluation. This reputation created an incentive for legislation for party-political advantage intended to embarrass Tony Blair and New Labour.⁵ However, it proved difficult to brand New Labour as the trade union party. Other reasons justifying further legislation were internal Conservative politics and the Major government’s acute consciousness of the

threat posed by the EU's social agenda to party unity and the changes of the 1980s.⁶ The next section considers the Major government's inheritance.

John Major's Inheritance

In 1979 industrial relations were dominated by collectivism and the voluntarist tradition, which held that in general the law should interfere as little as possible in employee-employer relations conducted via collective bargaining. The negotiation and distribution of reward through collective bargaining was essentially a private activity albeit one supported by the state. But this collectivist-voluntarist tradition was progressively weakened during the 1980s, and by 1990 this tradition was undermined fatally. The earlier conception of industrial relations was delegitimised and subject to extensive attack; the critical period was 1984–90 and the pattern established continued in the 1990s.⁷ By 1998, many workplaces continued to recognise unions but not collective bargaining, and the result was a 'hollow shell' compared to what had existed before. This decline in joint workplace regulation was accompanied by a sharp fall in union membership (Table 1) with indications that employees had lost their appetite for union membership. In workplaces of 25+ collective bargaining remained fairly intact, but there were sharp declines in private sector manufacturing and services.⁸

One difference between the Major government and its predecessors was a change in tone. Talk of 'the enemy within' faded with the decline in union membership, industrial action, and changes in industrial relations, which meant this charge carried little conviction with the public. Given John Major's political persona and strategy, such language would have seemed incongruous. However, the change in tone was of secondary importance compared to the government's fixity of purpose and commitment to his predecessor's strategy. The 1992 Conservative manifesto declared that the previous Conservative governments' legislation had transformed industrial relations, returning power from militants to ordinary union members.

This individualisation was part of a wider programme of deregulation (removing obstacles to the market's operation and managerial prerogatives) intended to promote job creation, and the manifesto promised further measures to promote these objectives.⁹ In his autobiography John Major described his government's economic inheritance as 'unpromising' (in 1991 1,150 companies went into liquidation and unemployment was 2.3 million, or 8.3 per cent). But notwithstanding this, Major insisted the UK had been transformed. Union and industrial relations reform had been central to this transformation because it 'had removed the stranglehold of militancy over our affairs'. Supply-side economic changes had boosted the flexibility and well-being of the economy. Privatisation had broken down the monolith of public ownership, and once-derelict public services were now hugely competitive private companies. Private enterprise had won the battle against socialism.¹⁰ Trade union and industrial relations legislation was a signifier of contemporary Conservatism and a key measure of its success, and so inevitably would feature in the Major government's policy repertoire. The overall strategy rested on the premise that the unions were voluntary associations that had outgrown their legitimate role and become serious obstacles to economic growth and disruptive political actors, so their power had to be reduced.

A notable feature of the 1990s was the decline in industrial action and the salience of industrial relations and trade union power as a political issue. The number of working days lost due to disputes peaked in 1979, followed by a sharp and continuing decline (Table 1). The Major government, therefore, enjoyed historically low levels of industrial conflict. This decline was accompanied by a decline in union membership, which had also peaked in 1979. In the 1990s membership declined continuously, a decline that was the result of domestic economic changes such as the closure of large, heavily unionised plants and workplaces in the public and private sectors and the effects of globalisation (the data shows that the already high openness of the UK economy increased during the 1990s).¹¹ The 1980s legislation

addressed three problems: first, the gap between the interests of union leaders and members; second, that unions enjoyed too much power in the polity and workplace; and third, that unions were controlled by extremists. Table 2a shows that around 40 per cent of union and non-union members agreed union leaders were out of touch with their members; Table 2b shows one third agreed unions were too powerful but over time this declined to one in four; an average of 74 per cent of union members disagreed compared to 55 per cent of all adults. Despite the decline in industrial action around one in three agreed unions were controlled by militants and a bare majority (57 per cent) of union members disagreed (Table 2c), but the legitimacy of unions (Table 2d) as protection was accepted by both groups (an average of 78 and 89 per cent). Unions were still considered to be necessary, but this was balanced by public opinion's continued perception of unions being under militant control and their leaders disengaged from the membership. However, the Conservatives lost strikes and the unions as an issue. In answer to the question *'Which political party do you personally think would handle the problem of strikes and industrial relations the best?'*, Labour overtook the Conservatives after May 1992 (between 1992 and 1997 Labour's average was 40 per cent, the Conservative average was 36 per cent) and industrial relations ceased to be the 'most urgent problem' facing the country.¹² The residual ambivalence of public opinion towards aspects of trade Unionism, however, created an incentive and opportunity for the Major government to undertake further legislation.

John Major's inheritance had three broad components: the deregulation of the labour market, the promotion of individual over collective rights, and squeezing the unions out of policy-making. Their exclusion from policy-making was an essential contribution to creating a governance that stressed the primacy of government authority, whilst the unions' exclusion from employment relations would be a signal contribution to creating a low-tax, flexible, high-productivity, economy in which the state's role was to facilitate domestic adaptation to

an increasingly globalised political economy. Further legislation was promised in the 1992 Queen's Speech and John Major and his ministers expected this would be controversial.¹³ Union exclusion thus remained the object of policy but the Major government sponsored no initiatives comparable to those of the 1980s. Nevertheless, government policy posed a serious threat to the remaining organisational strength and presence of trade unions, and its actions showed the government had 'perfected the art of spinning legal webs around them.'¹⁴ The next section considers the policies of the Major government.

Government Policy

The Major government's emphasis was, as I have argued, on exclusion: 'reducing the role of unions within the labour market, the employment relationship and as representatives of a separate "labour interest" in society'.¹⁵ By the time Mrs Thatcher left office the political case for legislation seemed less strong and Michael Howard, the Employment Secretary, speculated in January 1990 that the reform agenda was now complete.¹⁶ Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, hinted at a broader agenda, seeking to use the changes of the 1980s, which had de-fanged the unions and brought them under the rule of law, as an important foundation for his competitiveness agenda and intervention strategy.¹⁷

In 1991 the Department of Employment issued a Green Paper, Industrial Relations in the 1990s, and in 1992 published the White Paper, People, Jobs and Opportunity that outlined the post-Thatcher approach. Neither departed from Thatcherism's precepts.¹⁸ The continuity between the Thatcher and Major governments meant the rejection of any idea that nothing more needed to be done; the government was interested in extending, not consolidating, Thatcherism, and any relationship with the unions would be contained in this framework.¹⁹ Howard argued that the Green Paper built upon existing changes, addressed weaknesses in the legislation, and increased the rights of the public and union members through an emphasis

on ballots and changes to union governance. As a result of previous policies ‘we have now’, Howard declared, ‘reached a decisive stage in the history of industrial relations in this country. As a result of the legislation that the government have introduced since the 1980s, our industrial relations have achieved a degree of stability and a maturity that seemed unattainable during the 1970s.’²⁰ The proposals combined regulation and restriction based on an individualist conception of citizenship that undercut collective action and sought to force unions to abandon collective action and recast themselves as ‘service providers’ to their members and, ideally, management. TURERA was the *point d’appui* of an established approach that reflected the Major government’s determination to complete the transformation of industrial relations.²¹

Thatcherism’s approach to industrial relations was restated in the Green Paper and the White Paper, and both embodied an individualist ethos in industrial relations, with further measures restricting and regulating union activity and governance. Building on the foundations laid in the 1980s, the Major government focused on continuing the unions’ exclusion, and reducing and circumscribing their role in the employment relationship, in the labour market, and the policy process. Exclusion was encapsulated in the oft-stated intention of ‘giving the unions back to their members’ that meant creating a pattern of individualised participation, captured by the emphasis of ballots, that inevitably and necessarily de-emphasised the collective.²²

The 1992 crisis over pit closures is not directly relevant to the Major government’s industrial relations or trade union policies, but the closures provide an insight into Britain’s changing industrial relations. Industrial relations in the deep-mined coal industry had been transformed on lines familiar throughout the rest of industry as a result of the NUM’s defeat in 1984–85 and the founding of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM) as a competitor to the NUM. The decision to privatise the remnants of deep mining had been announced in the 1992

Conservative manifesto but the closures (an essential precursor to the privatisation of both the coal and the electricity supply industries), coming three weeks after the UK's humiliating ejection from the ERM, seemingly confirmed the government's reputation for incompetence and mismanagement. The majority of closures were concentrated in the Nottinghamshire and Central coalfields, where the majority of mineworkers were members of the UDM who had played a crucial role in the defeat of the NUM. Ingratitude was therefore added to the charge of incompetence. Notwithstanding the public and political outcry over a poorly prepared and presented policy, the primacy of privatisation and the de-regulation of the electricity supply industry triumphed and the affected mines were quickly closed.²³

Rothwell thought 1992 was possibly a 'watershed year' for industrial relations but the continued recession and the fallout from the UK's ejection from the ERM included redundancies at, inter alia, Ford, Jaguar, Rolls-Royce, and British Aerospace. Surveys of management found 80 per cent expected restructuring to continue and that this would stimulate extensive cultural change in the workplace that would be to the unions' detriment. Labour's defeat in the 1992 general election ended the immediate prospect of a Labour government instituting pro-union changes and this was reinforced further when Tony Blair became party leader, determined to recast the traditional party-union relationship. Another potential avenue for change was blocked by the ERM crisis. The ERM crisis stimulated and reinforced Conservative hostility to the EU's social role, which reinforced the Major government's determination to opt out of as much of this European social agenda as possible.²⁴ However, this proved difficult. For example, many of the measures in TURERA dealing with individual employment rights were the result of EU policies (Figure 1).

TURERA further regulated union activity and governance. Gillian Shephard, Howard's successor as Employment Secretary, argued the Bill continued an established reform process

and it had two strategic objectives: 'first to strengthen and extend the rights of the individual – both employees and individual trade union members; secondly, to increase the competitiveness of the economy and remove obstacles to the creation of new jobs.'²⁵

Legislation had, for instance, played a crucial role in the decline in industrial action, and so

<ext>Now more than ever we need to make sure that the progress we have made ... is maintained in the future. Without investment we shall not have the new jobs that we want to see. But without industrial peace there will be no investment. Nothing could be more damaging to the prospects of employment growth than a return to the strike-happy ways of the 1970s.²⁶</ext>

Fewer than 50 per cent of the workforce was now covered by collective bargaining and only 30 per cent by national agreements and Shephard presented the case for continued reform as a series of questions:

<ext>what is unreasonable about allowing trade union members freedom to choose which union they join? What is unreasonable about giving trade union members a right to a postal ballot before they are called out on strike? What is wrong with allowing union members to decide how they pay their subscriptions? And what is wrong with giving the citizens of this country the protection of the law if they victims of an unlawful strike?²⁷</ext>

Auerbach argues the legislation was presented as delivering modest, common-sense changes designed to promote the individual rights agenda but TURERA's effects went far wider than this.²⁸ Neither recession nor the post-ERM economic upturn fed through into increased

disputes or union membership, which was interpreted as signalling the acceptance and institutionalisation of 'the new industrial relations'. TURERA, whilst not on the scale of the earlier legislation was, notwithstanding, a significant measure, extending the law even deeper into union governance and further promoting union exclusion. Miller and Steele concluded TURERA 'evidences a determination ... to continue the Thatcherite agenda' and the Act's overall effect was to continue to 'slay the union dragon' despite it having 'lost much of its fire and is increasingly constrained by legal requirements.'²⁹

Two other developments testify to the unions' exclusion from the policy process. The first was the abolition of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC, or 'Neddy') founded in 1962, a tripartite – management, government and unions – quasi-corporatist planning-consultative body with sectoral offshoots (the 'little Neddies') intended to promote economic growth. The NEDC had been ignored in the 1980s and in 1995 the Major government delivered the coup de grace. The second event, the abolition of the Department of Employment (DE) as part of John Major's post-leadership election reshuffle in June 1995, was more significant. The DE's abolition marks the end of an institution and political style that dated from the establishment of the Ministry of Labour in 1916 (which traced its antecedents back to the Board of Trade's Labour Department in the 1890s) as labour's entrée to the bureaucracy as the demands of total war and governance required the unions' participation in making policy. After 1916 the Ministry of Labour became the major conduit for the labour interest into the state (and vice versa) and in its various incarnations it represented a type of quasi-corporatist politics that was the dominant form of governance in British politics for much of the twentieth century, but which the post-1979 Conservative governments were determined to eradicate.³⁰ The DE's functions were transferred (for example, its industrial relations function to the Department of Trade and Industry; unemployment and training services to Education and Training) to a variety of other

government departments. In macro-political terms the abolition of the DE expressed the political exclusion of organised labour and the end of quasi-corporatist politics.

The response of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to this hostile environment under its General Secretary, John Monks, was to try and develop the 'New Unionism', which was influenced by foreign models such as that employed by the AFL-CIO in the United States. This 'New Unionism' (a successor to then TUC General Secretary, Len Murray's 'New Realism' of 1983) focused on delivering benefits to union members as selective incentives to encourage union membership. Fundamentally this was a recruitment strategy that aspired to reflect the diversity of the emerging workforce (such as the growth in part-time women workers and the rise of the service economy) and rebuild the union movement from the bottom up. In terms of the relationship with management the New Unionism urged unions to cooperate with employers, sometimes described as 'fighting for partnership', promote workforce flexibility and improve productivity. In July 1994 David Hunt, the Employment Secretary, addressed a TUC conference offering cooperation on achieving full employment. But this went nowhere as the dominant Conservative attitude was that full employment was best achieved by free markets and de-regulation. Monks' approach was criticised by some union leaders and activists as legitimising the government's accusation that unions did not truly represent their members' interests, and it proved difficult to implement by the TUC organisationally in the face of both union activist and employer opposition. New Unionism regretted the demise of cooperation between the government and the TUC and placed considerable emphasis on the positive role of the EU and the potential of its social agenda for augmenting the trade unions' influence, something which the government strongly opposed. John Monks argued that what had emerged was an unstable, rather than a flexible, labour market, that was unsustainable, but he conceded the changes were not reversible: 'we have largely decentralised the labour market since the break-up of most private-sector national

negotiating bodies. It is no longer feasible for the nation's pay to be set in talks between the government, the TUC and the CBI in smoke-filled rooms over beer and sandwiches.'³¹

Although not calling for a return to beer and sandwiches, Monks argued that the absence of any central contacts or coordination would result in adverse consequences for the country and he pointed to the success of European social models. Moreover, there remained the potential for significant industrial unrest.

In 1996 there occurred 'the Summer of Discontent II' (the 'Summer of Discontent I' occurred in 1989) and involved, amongst others, the postal service, the Liverpool docks, London Underground, the airline and car industries, and the public sector. These disputes were often defensive, concerned with protecting established working practices and the cooperative conduct of workplace industrial relations in the face of managerial aggressiveness. The mini-strike wave led to the government threatening legislation against strikes in essential services. In reaction to the postal dispute, the government ended the Post Office monopoly on deliveries. The public funding of union ballots and the rights of unions to be consulted over redundancies were ended, and the government also threatened to remove the employment rights of workers in small firms. Continued privatisation led to the further undermining of centralised collective bargaining. These led the ILO to condemn the British government for failing to observe its legal obligations.³²

Conclusions

The data shows that in the 1990s industrial conflict was no longer a serious problem, although this did not rule out crises, over, for example, pit closures and the Summer of Discontent II, but the unions were no longer the presence either in the workplace or the polity they had once been. These changes were the combined result of legislation, radical change in the structure of industry, changing managerial attitudes, and the shift of power in the

workplace, especially the private sector workplace. The Major government's legislation, TURERA, led inter alia to further restrictions on union immunities, the conditions of union membership, union governance, and abolished minimum wage regulation. The government abolished the last vestiges of corporatism (the NEDC and the Wage Councils) and continued public sector wage restraint; more state industries were returned to the private sector.

Significant also was the institutionalisation of a globalised post-industrial economy.

Rosamund concludes that, 'the attitude of the Major government to trade unions displayed continuity with the previous Thatcher administrations as well as change'.³³ True, but the similarities and continuities were infinitely more significant than the dissimilarities and discontinuities. In marked contrast to his predecessor, however, John Major lost the unions and industrial relations reform as Conservative issues.³⁴ The Major government continued to identify Labour as the party of union power but the growth of New Labour and Tony Blair's commitment to a recast of the party-union relationship, as well as the decline of the unions as a political issue, reduced markedly the effectiveness of this charge. However, the successive changes made the legislations' irreversible, reinforcing Tony Blair's New Labour project.

Union power, as understood previously, was diminished and managerial prerogatives were restored, and the voluntarist-collectivist tradition in workplace and polity was eliminated.

Legal intervention, de-industrialisation and globalisation had destroyed the voluntarist non-interventionary tradition in industrial relations, but many Conservatives remained convinced there was still work to do. The EU's Social Chapter was significant because the TUC and some unions saw the EU as offering an opportunity to defend and even extend union influence and this was something Conservatives, both Eurosceptic and Europhile, opposed.

From the government's point of view, hostility to EU policy was a relatively politically cost-free response meshed with the party's hostility to the Union and its determination to transform industrial relations. Several of TURERA's provisions enacted EU social legislation

but were couched in the language of extending individual, not collective, rights. Despite the transformation of the 'sick man of Europe', the 1997 manifesto promised the banning of strikes in essential services; legal immunity would be removed from individual actions having a 'disproportionate' (not defined) effect, and strikes would need a majority of all eligible voters and be repeated at regular intervals to be legal.³⁵ Some Conservatives also urged further action on union funding of the Labour Party, and in privatising the rail and coal industries the Major government could plausibly claim to be more radical than Mrs Thatcher's.

The Major government's significance lies less in its policy than in presiding over a post-industrial political economy and the emergence of many of the features and problems associated with contemporary Britain. The determination of all British governments to create a high-wage, low-tax, high-productivity, flexible labour market capable of exploiting the globalised international economy has not been realised. The continuing decline of manufacturing and dependence on services, low skills, poor productivity, casualisation, labour-force insecurity not flexibility, and gross income inequalities first emerge clearly during the 1990s under John Major.

Figure 1 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act (1993) Main Provisions

The Public

<bullets>Individuals able to seek injunctions against unlawful action</bullets>

Trade Unions

<bullets>Creation of Commissioner for Protection Against Unlawful Industrial Action

Seven days' notice of ballots and of industrial action

The members to be balloted to be clearly specified

Replacement of TUC's Bridlington procedures on union recognition

Written consent required from employees for check-off of union dues every three years

Union financial records, including officials' salaries, to be public

Independent checks on election ballots

Independent scrutiny of strike ballots

All industrial action ballots to be postal

Postal ballots on union mergers

Certification Officer to check union finances

Higher penalties against unions failing to keep proper accounts

'Wilson/Palmer' Amendment (offered incentives to those moving to individual employment contracts)</bullets>

Individuals

<bullets>Maternity leave increased to fourteen weeks with no length of service requirement

Right to a written statement of duties within eight weeks for those working over eight hours a week

Unlawful to dismiss health and safety representatives during the course of their duties and those walking off an unsafe site

Individual right to challenge collective agreement in contravention of equal treatment terms

Changes to Transfer of Undertakings Regulations

Consultation on changes to redundancy terms</bullets>

Miscellaneous

<bullets>Abolition of Wages Councils

Changes to Employment Tribunals procedures</bullets>

Source: <http://www.ier.org.uk/resources/chronology-labour-law-1979-2008>

Table 1 Trade Union Membership and Working Days Lost, 1990–98

Year	Trade Union Membership	Total Working Days Lost (000s)
1990	9810	1903
1991	9489	761
1992	8929	528
1993	8666	649
1994	8231	278
1995	8031	415
1996	7938	1307
1997	7801	235
1998	7852	282

Source: DBIS, Trade Union Membership 2015. Statistical Bulletin (London: DBIS, 2016).

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/525938/Trade_Union_Membership_2015_-_Statistical_Bulletin.pdf

Table 2 Attitudes to Trade Unions

a) *'Trade union leaders are out of touch with their members.'*

	All Adults			Trade Union Members		
	Agree	Disagree	Net	Agree	Disagree	Net
Aug 1993	45	22	+23	48	30	+18
Aug 1994	42	27	+15	38	41	-3
Aug 1995	41	26	+15	42	35	+7
Average	47	25	18	43	35	17

b) *'Trade unions have too much power in Britain today.'*

	All Adults			Trade Union Members		
	Agree	Disagree	Net	Agree	Disagree	Net
Dec 1989-	35	54	-19	15	75	-60
Jan 1990						
Aug 1990	38	45	-7	22	66	-40
Feb 1992	27	64	-37	14	82	-68
Dec 1992	24	56	-32	16	71	-55
Aug 1993	26	55	-29	17	70	-53
Aug 1994	26	56	-30	7	79	-72
Aug 1995	24	57	-33	14	73	-59
Average	29	55	-26	15	74	-59

c) *'Most trade unions are controlled by extremists and militants.'*

	All Adults			Trade Union Members		
	Agree	Disagree	Net	Agree	Disagree	Net
Aug 1990	50	30	+20	43	44	-1
Dec 1992	34	42	-8	26	26	-30
Aug 1993	35	40	-5	28	55	-27
Aug 1994	30	47	-17	19	68	-49
Aug 1995	31	45	-14	23	61	-38
Average	36	41	-5	28	57	-29

d) 'Trade unions are essential to protect workers' interests.'

	All Adults			Trade Union Members		
	Agree	Disagree	Net	Agree	Disagree	Net
Dec 1989-	69	21	+48	85	10	+75
Jan 1990						
Aug 1990	80	11	+69	90	7	+83
Feb 1992	81	14	+67	93	6	+87
Dec 1992	74	12	+62	86	9	+77
Aug 1993	80	10	+70	92	4	+88
Aug 1994	82	10	+72	93	6	+87
Aug 1995	79	10	+69	88	4	+84
Average	78	12	66	89	7	+82

Source: IPSOS MORI, Attitudes to Trade Unions 1975–2014 London: IPSOS MORI 2014).
<https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/94/Attitudes-to-Trade-Unions-19752014>

¹ T. Bale, *The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) p.34

² P. Smith, and G. Morton, ‘Union exclusion - the next steps,’ *Industrial Relations Journal*, 25/1 (1994), p.6. See also, P. Smith and G. Morton, ‘Union Exclusion and the Decollectivisation of Industrial Relations in Contemporary Britain,’ *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 31/1 (1993), pp.6–23

³ In addition to TURERA the government passed the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (1992) that drew together existing trade union and employment legislation in a single Act; the Employment Rights Act (1992) covered conditions of employment, family, domestic, and parental leave, dismissal and unfair dismissal, and redundancy payments; and the Employment Tribunals Act (1996) that revised the procedures of the employment tribunals system.

⁴ S. Hogg and J. Hill, *Too Close to Call. Power and Politics - John Major in No10* (London: Little, Brown, 1995), p.136

⁵ A. Seldon, *Major. A Political Life* (London: Phoenix Books, 1998), p.739

⁶ K. Miller and M. Steele, ‘Employment Legislation: Thatcher and After,’ *Industrial Relations Journal*, 24/3 (1993), p.223

⁷ S. Machin, ‘Union Decline in Britain,’ *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 38/4 (2000), pp.631–45

⁸ D. Blanchflower, A. Bryson, and J. Forth, ‘Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain, 1989–2004,’ *Industrial Relations Journal*, 39/1 (2007), pp.285–302

⁹ Conservative Central Office, *The Best Future for Britain* (London: Conservative Central Office, 1992) <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1992/1992-conservative-manifesto.shtml>.

¹⁰ Major, *The Autobiography*, p.203

¹¹ The data below uses the KOF Globalisation Index which gives the degree to which an economy is globalised. Economic globalisation involves long distance flows of goods, capital and services, plus the information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. For definitions and method see:

http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2016/03/03/method_2016.pdf

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Germany	57.63	58.66	57.66	57.78	58.53	58.96	60.49	64.49
France	59.13	62.05	63.1	64.45	60.37	62.29	63.59	66.56
United Kingdom	67.21	66.71	65.77	67.51	67.77	68.44	69.8	71.36
United States	57.55	57.52	56.59	57.11	57.91	59.5	60.54	62.04

Higher values = greater globalization (100 = complete globalization/0 = complete closure).

Source of data: <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>

¹² A. King, R. J. Wybrow, and A. Gallup, *British Political Opinion 1937–2000. The Gallup Polls* (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2001), p.89

¹³ A. Seldon, *Major. A Political Life* (London: Phoenix Books, 1998), p.291

¹⁴ T. Morris, ‘Annual Review Article 1994,’ *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 33/1 (1995), p.126

¹⁵ Smith, and Morton, ‘Union exclusion – the next steps,’ p.6

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- ¹⁶ S. Auerbach, 'Mrs Thatcher's Labour Laws: Slouching towards Utopia,' *The Political Quarterly*, 61/1 (1993), p.44
- ¹⁷ M. Heseltine, *Life in the Jungle. My Autobiography* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2000), p.415
- ¹⁸ Department of Employment, *Industrial Relations in the 1990s Cm1602* (London: Department of Employment, HMSO 1991) and, *People, Jobs and Opportunities Cm1810* (London: Department of Employment, HMSO 1992)
- ¹⁹ For a brief discussion of the Major government's handling of Mrs Thatcher's legacy see, P. Dorey, *The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions* (London: Routledge, 1995) p.167; and his 'No Return to "Beer and Sandwiches": Industrial Relations and Employment Policies under John Major, 1990–1997', in P. Dorey (ed.) *The Major Premiership: Politics and Policies under John Major, 1990–1997* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999).
- ²⁰ House of Commons Debates Vol.195, 24 July 1991, col.1165
- ²¹ J. Purcell, 'The End of Institutional Industrial Relations,' *Political Quarterly*, 61/1 (1993), pp.6–23. This volume is a special issue on industrial relations in the 1990s.
- ²² P. Fosh, H. Morris, R. Martin, P. Smith, and R. Undy, 'Politics, Pragmatism and Ideology: The "Wellsprings" of Conservative Union Legislation,' *Industrial Law Journal*, 22/1 (1995), p.19
- ²³ For an account of the closure crisis see A. J. Taylor, *The NUM and British Politics. Volume 2, 1969–1995* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), pp.297–318. The author remembers an early-morning train journey to London in late-1992 that was joined by the NUM President, Arthur Scargill, who was greeted with an ovation from a carriage full of business people.
- ²⁴ S. Rothwell, 'Annual Review Article 1992,' *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 31/1 (1993), p.135
- ²⁵ House of Commons Debates Vol.214, 17 November 1992, col.168.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.* col.175
- ²⁷ *Ibid.* col.180
- ²⁸ Auerbach, 'Mrs Thatcher's Labour Laws,' p.48
- ²⁹ Miller and Steele, 'Employment Legislation,' p.233
- ³⁰ On macro-political significance of the DE and its predecessors see, K. Middlemas, *Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979) and R. Lowe, *Adjusting to Democracy: The Influence of the Ministry of Labour on British Politics, 1916–1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). On Neddy see K. Middlemas, *Industry, Unions and Government: Twenty-One Years of NEDC* (London: Macmillan, 1983), whose title captures the political style Conservatives were determined to extirpate.
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- ³² E. Heery, 'Annual Review Article 1996,' *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 31/1 (1997), p.90
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- ³⁵ Conservative Central Office, *You Can Only Be Sure With The Conservatives* (London: Conservative Central Office, 1997) <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1997/1997-conservative-manifesto.shtml>