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
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Building Peaceful Citizens? Nation-building in divided societies

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Introduction

Nation-building and citizenship formation practices in divided and post-conflict societies often prioritise the promotion and entrenchment of 'peace' as a cornerstone for sustained socio-economic development and the strengthening of robust political institutions. Such agendas are often driven by international policy interventions that prioritise a double-agenda of peace- and democracy-building in 'troubled' states (Hippler, 2008), and which are rooted in dominant liberal and neo-liberal political and economic ideologies. Efforts to promote 'peace' are thus entwined not only in tensions over differing definitions, meanings and practices of 'peace', but also the scales at which 'peace' exists, and also questions regarding with whom 'peace' is supposed to be achieved. Interventions aimed at building democratic institutions are often linked to projects to (re)build the political institutions of the state *and* 'roll back' the state while promoting civil society as a key sphere to realise democracy and development (Cubitt 2013). Simultaneously, peace-building efforts seek to mould, through pedagogical practices, responsible citizens who participate in and legitimize those democratic institutions and promote – through their disposition and practices – peaceful citizenship. These peace-promotion activities inherently involve the expression and assertion of power in defining 'peace' and associated language and behaviours, and also defining who is included or excluded from belonging, citizenship and security. Peace, therefore, needs to be acknowledged as a potential arena of governmentality on multiple scales. It is recognised that peace is a contested and complex concept, imbued with and deployed to exert power (see Galtung, 1969, 1990; Lloyd, 2012; Richmond, 2008a; Williams and McConnell, 2011; also the exchanges between Springer and Megoran: Megoran, 2011, 2014; Springer, 2014a, b). Dominant international pedagogies and policies for peace-building are often critiqued for being neo-colonial interventions which serve to entrench existing geopolitical power hierarchies and promote (neo)liberal ideologies. Meanwhile, local peace-building initiatives may be lauded as providing contextually-sensitive responses to violence and conflict, but attention must be paid to potentially exclusive aspects and marginalisation of claims to justice in the name of peaceful reconciliation (Lundy and McGovern 2008).

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3 Across these scales, discourses of peace may be used to stifle dissent and criticism through exhortations
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5 to patriotism, unity, civility, and nation-building: in other words, peace and peace-building may be
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7 deployed as tools of governmentality.
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10 Such discursive strategies do not go unchallenged; these practices often depend on pedagogies of
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12 citizenship to promote top-down notions of peace-building which are often disrupted in the learning
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14 process (Pykett, 2010). Everyday encounters with, and negotiations of, pedagogies of peace can
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16 encourage a reflexive scepticism rather than a uniform reproduction of prevailing liberal notions of
17
18 peace or citizenship. In addressing peace-as-governmentality there is a need to understand the situated
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20 knowledges and contextual definitions of peace – in Koopman’s (2011: 193-194) words, to ‘unsettle
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22 “peace” by exposing how it is both portrayed and visualized, as well as practiced and materialized’. To
23
24 do so allows us to understand peace as mutable and dynamic, ‘a socio-spatial relation that is always
25
26 made and made again’ (Koopman, 2011: 194). The ‘goodness’ of peace not only makes this concept a
27
28 useful technique of governance, but also gives it a productive ambiguity which allows it to be re-claimed
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30 and re-defined to suit counter-hegemonic political purposes that open up questions over the meanings
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32 and practices of ‘peace’ and the power inherent in dominant ‘liberal peace’ agendas.
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37 The rest of this article explores peace as a tool of governmentality and the deployment of this in efforts
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39 to promote and produce ‘peaceful citizens’. The article begins with a conceptual exploration of ‘peace’,
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41 before examining the complex ways in which discourses of peace are used to promote nation-building
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43 and citizenship-formation in divided societies. This framework allows us to think about peace as a
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45 mechanism to facilitate specific forms of citizenship rooted in liberal approaches to peace, and thus to
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47 explore the problematic experience of these efforts in (politically) divided contexts.
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50 **Defining Peace**

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54 The perception of peace as a universal good means it is easily martialled into hegemonic political
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56 discourse, most commonly the ‘liberal peace’ orthodoxy dominant in Western policy realms (Boege et
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3 al., 2009; Richmond, 2008a; Stokke, 2009). This concept of liberal peace is rooted in Kantian thought
4
5 and tied to efforts to promote democratisation, founded on the belief that 'democracies do not go to
6
7 war with each other' (Mac Ginty 2008: 143). At its core liberal peace is concerned with exporting liberal
8
9 democratic and market ideals to (post)conflict environments and the promotion of stability, justice and
10
11 the entrenchment of human rights therein (Chandler, 2010; Richmond 2008a, 2008b; Jones 2012). Such
12
13 efforts not only require international co-operation but also underpin the Westphalian political and
14
15 global economic systems, as well as the security and development (pre)requisites of the liberal
16
17 democratic system: in other words, serving to entrench the *status quo* of international geopolitics and
18
19 power relations (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). Thus, discourses of liberal peace are enrolled in
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21 governance projects across a variety of scales, from post-conflict state-building efforts (e.g. Manning
22
23 2006) to local peace-building programs seeking to mould democratic citizen-subjects through the
24
25 promotion of participation, empowerment, and engagement (e.g. Manning 2007). Such efforts are
26
27 orientated not only at constructing democratic institutions and actors (citizens), but also co-opting them
28
29 as agents promoting liberal peace and democracy (Zahar, 2012; Jones 2012: 129).
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33
34 However, such efforts to promote and entrench a formulaic and universal understanding of liberal
35
36 peace fail to adequately acknowledge local historical and political contexts, the long and bloody history
37
38 of liberal peace in the West, and the various power dynamics infusing the discourses, practices and
39
40 politics of peace (Boege et al., 2009; Öjendal and Ou, 2015; Williams, 2015). The outcomes of these
41
42 practices, critics argue, is the realisation in post-conflict settings of 'virtual' or 'negative' peace; the
43
44 absence of war and existence of empty institutions providing a veneer of peaceful existence without
45
46 promoting efforts to social integration, social justice and the overcoming of structural violence (Galtung,
47
48 1964, 1969; Richmond, 2008a; Sooka, 2011). Goetschel and Hagmann (2009) offer a similar critique,
49
50 arguing that peace-building missions focus on bureaucratic issues and produce an instrumentalist and
51
52 depoliticised 'donor peace', a process illustrated by Stokke's (2009) work on the elite-driven peace
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54 process in Sri Lanka. Richmond (2009: 324) argues that the failure of many liberal-peace-building
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56 interventions to achieve substantive change and peace has resulted in recipient communities remaining
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3 as 'subjects' rather than 'becoming agential, liberal citizens'. Building on this critique, it is evident that
4
5 failing to acknowledge the grassroots social, political, and economic drivers of conflict, as well as local
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7 understandings of peace, risks exacerbating conflicts and of peace being viewed as an abstract outcome
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9 or status rather than a grounded, everyday process (see Lloyd, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008; Öjendal and Ou,
10
11 2015; Williams, 2015).

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13
14 Recognising peace as an ongoing process exposes the multi-scalar politics and power relations that are
15
16 continually negotiated to produce socially-, spatially- and temporally-specific forms of peace (Williams,
17
18 2015). These engagements underpin ideas of 'hybrid' and 'everyday' peace (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond,
19
20 2009; Williams, 2015) while providing space to think through different conceptions, forms and
21
22 understandings of peace and violence as physical, structural, psychological, emotional, cultural, and
23
24 representational (Galtung, 1969, 1990; Lloyd, 2012). These ideas have emerged in response to a key
25
26 critique of liberal peace approaches, namely that liberal approaches can reproduce the individualism
27
28 associated with (neo)liberalism while overlooking the indirect and structural forms of violence which
29
30 undermine peace-building efforts by 'replicating the conditions of inequality that gave rise to the
31
32 conflict in the original instance' (Ross, 2011: 198). Such criticisms often call for a focus on social justice
33
34 and greater engagement with the power relations that frame efforts at peace-building – dynamics
35
36 which may be deployed by elites to disrupt or prevent the realisation of social justice and peace
37
38 (Richmond, 2008a: 446; Williams, Megoran, and McConnell, 2014: 14). Mac Ginty (2010: 394)
39
40 summarises these critiques, arguing that liberal peace 'is an essentially conservative and realist
41
42 philosophy that reinforces the position of powerholders... [and thus] becomes a neoliberal peace and
43
44 engages in "aggressive social engineering", whereby the private sector is privileged over notions of the
45
46 common good'.
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52 In response to the liberal peace discourse, the 'local turn' in peace literatures emerged during the 1990s
53
54 (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). This approach focuses on the agency of individuals and communities
55
56 to realise peace rather than on higher-level state- and peace-building agendas (Paffenholz, 2015). The
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1
2
3 local turn prioritises contextually-rooted and bottom-up approaches to sustainable peace-building while
4
5 recognising that the 'local' is not simply a cartographic location but is a more holistic collective of
6
7 people, institutions and other factors that inform and frame any peacebuilding context (Schierenbeck,
8
9 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Furthermore, emphasis is also placed on ensuring critical recognition of local
10
11 power dynamics and the agency of all involved actors and their negotiations of and entanglements with
12
13 broader power structures and influences (Schierenbeck, 2015). Thus, concerns often focus on local
14
15 institutions and issues of accountability, transparency, governance and legitimisation of decisions and
16
17 decision makers (Schierenbeck, 2015).
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21 Critics of the local turn have noted a tendency to homogenise, in dichotomous ways, local and global
22
23 actors and reify the local as a source of resistance or opposition to liberal peace agendas *or* to assume
24
25 the local is readily co-opted into these agendas (Paffenholz, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015; Williams, 2015).
26
27 Instead, the importance of 'placing' peace is linked to recognising how the local is a site of contestation
28
29 and negotiation of multiple peaces, violences and peacebuilding agendas (Paffenholz, 2015;
30
31 Schierenbeck, 2015; Williams, 2015). This effort represents a move beyond the binary dichotomy of
32
33 local and global or vernacular and liberal forms of peace, and towards notions of 'hybrid' and 'everyday'
34
35 peace. This idea of 'hybridity' provides for recognition not only of the ambivalence *and* agency of
36
37 multiple actors in peace processes (while avoiding essentialising the different agents involved) as
38
39 intertwined and implicated in liberal and illiberal manifestations of peace governance (Paffenholz, 2015:
40
41 863). This approach allows for peace to be recognised not as an inevitable outcome of structural
42
43 process, but as a 'highly contingent' situated practice or social construction (Kobayashi 2009, p. 825;
44
45 Williams, 2015). This allows for the development of contextually-sensitive engagements that
46
47 acknowledge multiple actors, scales and spaces as implicated in everyday peace and violence: from the
48
49 intimate and domestic, to the communal, national and international (Dutta et al., 2016; Lloyd, 2012;
50
51 Mac Ginty, 2008, 2010). As Richmond (2009: 331) outlines, this provides the foundations for a 'post-
52
53 liberal peace' or an 'everyday peace' grounded in a 'hybridized form of peacebuilding, aware of its built-
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55 in dynamics, of its own structure and agency issues, and of the dangers of depoliticization'.
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3 Recognising the multiple power relations, scales and discourses at play in contextual negotiations of
4
5 peace informs Williams' (2015) call to 'place peace', and the need to understand peace as an ongoing
6
7 process (rather than a status) comprising multiple layers of understanding and practice (Dutta et al.,
8
9 2016; Williams, 2015; see also Staeheli, 2010). Everyday peace, therefore, is not only contextually
10
11 rooted and dependent upon individual agency and capacity to negotiate the power dynamics of both
12
13 governance structures and informal spheres of interpersonal and intergroup interaction. Rather, it is
14
15 'the practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups in deeply divided societies to avoid and
16
17 minimize conflict and awkward situations at both inter- and intra-group levels' (Mac Ginty, 2014: 553).
18
19 This thinking allows for greater recognition of the everyday encounters with power, violence and peace,
20
21 and the need to understand these in terms of intimate and embodied experience (see Brickell, 2015;
22
23 Kobayashi, 2009; Pain, 2015; Richmond, 2009), resonating with feminist geopolitics approaches to
24
25 peace and conflict as everyday, embodied practices (Hyndman 2000).
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28
29 Williams and McConnell (2011: 929) similarly advocate for more research on the multiple sites and
30
31 scales at which 'peace is differentially constructed, materialized and interpreted' in different places. This
32
33 entails widening the frame of analysis to include 'peace-ful' concepts such as 'tolerance, friendship,
34
35 hope, reconciliation, justice, cosmopolitanism, resistance, solidarity, hospitality, and empathy' (Williams
36
37 and McConnell, 2011: 930). In so doing, however, there needs to be awareness of and sensitivity
38
39 towards both the discursive power of these terms (and their potential use as tools of governmentality)
40
41 *and* the assumed universal meanings and acceptance of these ideals. As Lloyd (2012) reminds us,
42
43 different groups of people and different institutional actors deploy terms like war, peace, and violence
44
45 in different ways, constituting a field of discursive struggle over the meanings of violence and peace. For
46
47 instance, justice can be understood in multiple ways and based on varied priorities and conditionalities
48
49 – when talking of justice, are we referring to retributive, restorative, transitional or another form of
50
51 justice? Do the ideals which underpin each of these approaches have traction and acceptance locally, or
52
53 are they also contested, imposed constructs? As Mutua (2015) discusses, while transitional justice may
54
55 often be lauded as a grass-roots basis for post-conflict justice, the underpinning assumption of a
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3 universal understanding and acceptance of human rights is flawed, and the prioritisation of political and
4
5 civil rights over social and economic rights may overlook local conditions and priorities. Thus, the need
6
7 remains to engage with questions of power in peace, by asking who benefits from certain formulations
8
9 of peace and what work these discursive practices perform (Williams et al., 2014) as well as how
10
11 dominant approaches to/understandings of peace spread and how the liberal scripts of peace are learnt
12
13 and reworked through networks of power and influence (see Megoran, 2011; also Jeffrey and Staeheli
14
15 2015).

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19 By picking apart the contingencies of peace, highlighting mundane peaceful processes *and* challenging
20
21 the dominant discourses of liberal peace, we can open up hermetically sealed notions of peace to
22
23 critical examination in order to identify potential forms of power and violence concealed within.

24
25 Through such practices, it is possible to question the political processes which, in promoting liberal
26
27 peace, may result in the 'replicat[ion of] the conditions of inequality that gave rise to the conflict in the
28
29 original instance' (Ross, 2011: 198) and hinder the realisation of social justice and substantive peace
30
31 (see Richmond, 2008).

32 33 34 35 **Peace And Governmentality**

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38 The promotion of liberal peace-building agendas is often intended not only to maintain international
39
40 political and economic stability, but also to foster the spread and entrenchment of Western liberalism
41
42 (Hippler, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). Approaches to and policies for peacebuilding reflect
43
44 underlying political concerns and as such vary over time and space, and reflect the priorities and
45
46 interests of the 'interveners' (Hellmüller 2013; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). For instance, we see how
47
48 the priorities of the UN's Peace Building Fund – to promote peaceful conflict resolution, economic
49
50 revitalisation and administrative rebuilding – prioritise democratic political stability and economic
51
52 growth as foundations to realising peace (Boege et al., 2009; Stokke, 2009). While the specific priorities
53
54 and activities favoured by different donors and actors vary, there is often a convergence of outcomes
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3 around the production of peaceful citizens and institutions of democracy, including a key role for civil
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5 society (Stephenson and Zanotti, 2012;).

6
7
8 Integral to such practices are efforts towards the production of peaceful, democratic citizens who will
9
10 both facilitate the development of, and respect the authority of, state institutions and agencies charged
11
12 with providing stability, security and social control to maintain peace and repress alternative sources of
13
14 violence (Hippler 2008). Discourses of peace and reconciliation are often deployed in profoundly
15
16 powerful and political ways through formal and informal education strategies promoting particular
17
18 forms of participation, empowerment and engagement and moulding democratic citizen-subjects as
19
20 agents for both democracy *and* peace (Jones, 2012; Zahar, 2012). Peace, therefore, is often used as a
21
22 tool of governmentality, a (neoliberal) technique of government used to achieve security through
23
24 encouraging self-management by promoting the production of specific kinds of citizen-subjects who will
25
26 be productive, supportive members of the nation (Foucault, 2008; Lemke, 2001).

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29
30 The quest to develop 'peaceful citizens' can therefore be seen as in keeping with the desire of states to
31
32 build citizens as governable political subjects and community members (Staeheli and Hammett, 2010).

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34 Such practices are foregrounded by citizenship formation projects which seek to inculcate certain
35
36 approaches to and embodiments of citizenship. The renegotiations of these by citizens(-in-the-making)
37
38 demonstrate that citizenship is a site and process of political struggle (Staeheli and Hammett, 2010).

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Citizenship formation programmes, meanwhile, seek to root citizenship not only in the status of being a
citizen but also in the emotional connections and practices associated with this belonging (Osler and
Starkey, 2005). These efforts are orientated towards producing 'good' citizens who actively participate
in political, social and economic life in specific ways (Isin, 2009; Staeheli and Hammett, 2010).

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Citizenship education programmes, whether formal or informal, embody practices of governmentality:
they are aimed at producing self-disciplined citizens who are productive and constructive members of
society. However, such pedagogies and ideals of citizenship are contested and renegotiated by citizens(-
in-the-making) (Pyckett, 2010). Citizenship is not simply a top-down set of structural conditions, but is

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2
3 remade through the agency of those claiming and reworking the meanings of both official narratives of
4 belonging and the claiming of alternatives spaces and practices of citizenship (Barbero, 2012; Lazar and
5 Nuijten, 2013). Within these practices, peace operates as both a core value – often linked to social
6 justice – and as a tool of governmentality. The deployment of a dominant narrative of peace – not only
7 as an ideal but with associated practices, behaviours and dispositions – can marginalise space for
8 dissent and a critical public sphere, producing a procedural rather than substantive version of peace
9 which perpetuates hierarchies of power (Durrheim, 1997; Foucault, 2008; Hammett, 2010; Mahrouse,
10 2006; Waghid 2009).

11 Discourses and pedagogies of peace in post-conflict societies frequently utilise ideals of
12 cosmopolitanism to promote ideals of (social) justice, care and non-violence (Osler and Starkey, 2003).
13 Through such interventions efforts are made to mould and govern citizens, providing a framework for
14 their relations with each other, as well as with ideals of peace, tolerance, reconciliation and democracy
15 (Durrheim, 1997). The permeation of peace- and democracy-building agendas into citizenship ideals are
16 evidenced in both civic education materials as well as in funding and other support for citizenship
17 development and peacebuilding (see Marshall and Staeheli, 2015; Nagel and Staeheli 2014). The
18 dominance within such efforts of Western liberalism (and thus, liberal peace ideals) risks not only
19 overlooking but also actively excluding local contextual factors, understandings and histories that may
20 be integral to realising substantive, sustainable peace: as Richmond (2009: 329) reminds us, we need to
21 ask “What type of peace is produced and for whom?”.

22 The projection and reception of particular understandings of peace can therefore determine not only
23 who is included or excluded from the ‘peaceful’ nation, but also which histories, injustices and identities
24 form part of both the peacebuilding process *and* the legitimating narrative of the nation. Who belongs is
25 thus not simply a legal administrative concern but a potentially divisive socio-political process rooted in
26 the social construction of citizenship and both historic and contemporary regional, ethnic, religious and
27 other divisions (Bah, 2010). These concerns highlight the importance and complexity of developing a

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2
3 narrative of collective history of a divided society both in resolving contested claims of belonging and in
4
5 reconciling histories of division, oppression and conflict between groups of citizens (Bah, 2010). Thus, if
6
7 liberal peacebuilding depends upon the emergence of a liberal state in which all citizens are treated
8
9 equally, then a reciprocal dynamic is required: governments and political leaders must provide the
10
11 conditions for liberal citizenship *and* be accountable to the people for the people to 'act' in expected
12
13 ways (Richmond, 2009; see Hammett, 2008 for an example of when this fails).
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16
17 These complexities have been identified in various divided societies, from the difficulties of
18
19 remembering and discussing the injustices of apartheid while seeking to build a multi-racial South Africa
20
21 (Staeheli and Hammett, 2013) to the deployment of a 'culture-of-peace' narrative in Guatemala
22
23 (Oglesby, 2007). As Oglesby (2007: 80) observes, the culture-of-peace pedagogy is a powerful tool of
24
25 governmentality, instilling an individualized notion of rights while delimiting boundaries of acceptable
26
27 memory. By placing responsibility for society's failings back on the individual citizen, this framework
28
29 instructed 'peaceful' ways of being embedded in a liberal democratic subject (Oglesby, 2007). Thus,
30
31 while this discourse of peace opened up a space to talk about violence and war the discourse itself was
32
33 limited to a closed-loop tautological argument about a cultural of violence being the cause of the
34
35 violence.
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38
39 Marshall (2014) has similarly argued in the case of Palestine that interventions promoting 'peaceful'
40
41 forms of expression among Palestinian youngsters may themselves be forms of violence, foreclosing
42
43 potentially productive political understandings of the Israeli occupation. Promoting vague notions of
44
45 peace obscures the inherent structural inequalities of asymmetric warfare, limiting young people's
46
47 political understanding of violence in ways that damage their sense-making and resiliency (Sousa and
48
49 Marshall 2015). Exacerbating these concerns are the agendas and histories of those providing and
50
51 receiving messages of peaceful citizenship, meaning these stakeholders also use their own agency and
52
53 experience to contest and negotiate the messages and ideals being communicated (Hammett, 2008;
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55 Jones, 2012: 127; also Staeheli and Hammett, 2010, 2013).
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3 While peace may have the potential to build inclusive citizenship and realise social justice, processes of
4
5 peace are imbued with power and practices of governmentality meaning they 'more often conceal[...]
6
7 and perpetuate[...] uneven relations of power' (Williams, 2015: 178). Williams (2015) goes further,
8
9 cautioning the such practices – which we argue are forms of governmentality – are often used to
10
11 develop narratives of violence and (in)security that provide the discursive foundations for illiberal
12
13 mechanisms to produce 'liberal' peace. These discussions highlight how deeper understandings of the
14
15 ways in which – and outcomes of – liberal peacebuilding projects highlight the necessity to go beyond
16
17 conceptualising peace, conflict and in/security as technical concerns, and confront the political, social,
18
19 historical and economic contributors to peace and violence, as well as the governmental power of
20
21 discourses of peace.
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24 25 **Experiencing and Contesting 'Peace'** 26

27
28 As outlined above, 'peace' in peace-building programmes is often 'liberal peace' focussed on promoting
29
30 democracy and preventing conflict (Jones, 2012). Drawing upon ongoing research addressing youth
31
32 citizenship promotion as a mode of peace-building, this section briefly examines the efforts of NGOs to
33
34 foster peace through the production of peaceful citizens in BiH and Lebanon. Despite very different
35
36 historical and political contexts, many NGOs of varying size in both countries take strikingly similar
37
38 approaches to promoting peace through encouraging youth citizenship and engagement. As part of
39
40 efforts to foster dialogue, tolerance, and reconciliation, for example, many youth-focused peace-
41
42 building efforts emphasize leadership and organizational skills, entrepreneurialism, project
43
44 management and budgeting. Moreover, there is an overriding emphasis on addressing local, practical
45
46 problems relevant to youth and working on achieving immediate, tangible solutions including organizing
47
48 park clean-ups, school renovations, and playground construction. Such projects not only underscore
49
50 how youth can 'make a difference,' but are also supposed to increase trust between groups.
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52 Significantly, however, organizers also view these localized peace-building and citizenship promotion
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3 projects as enhancing trust between individuals and government bodies. Such efforts seek to create
4
5 peaceful and tolerant individuals, and also employable and productive citizens.
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7

8 Although such youth citizenship promotion across these distinct contexts draw upon similar techniques
9
10 of neoliberal governance (including an emphasis on individual responsibility, empowerment, and
11
12 volunteerism), these is not a frictionless uniformity in their application or outcomes. In both contexts,
13
14 the terms upon which such peace-building/citizenship promotion efforts are based were highly
15
16 contested, revealing divergent understandings and priorities among donors and NGOs. In Lebanon many
17
18 NGOs avoid using the term 'peace' or 'peacebuilding,' which has connotations of peace with Israel.
19
20 Instead what many NGOs in Lebanon aim for is 'silm ahli' meaning a civil peace, or living together
21
22 (International NGO, Lebanon, 28 Oct. 2014). In BiH some NGOs reported a suspicion or cynicism
23
24 surrounding terms like 'reconciliation,' 'dialogue,' and 'tolerance' as being at best 'cheap' and
25
26 meaningless or at worst concealing a hidden Western donor agenda (International NGO, BiH 3 July
27
28 2013). Moreover, reconciliation has the connotation of forgiveness without accountability or justice for
29
30 crimes committed during the war. At best, what many NGOs aim to enhance is understanding and
31
32 eventually trust.
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35
36 These divergent understandings of 'peace' and 'reconciliation' illustrate the need to recognise how
37
38 intersections of geopolitics and regional histories inform their deployment in citizenship pedagogies.
39
40 The utilisation of terms like 'silm ahli' and 'trust' connotes a form of 'negative peace', one where there
41
42 is simply an absence of war or conflict. There is little sense of the possibility of a near-times realisation
43
44 of a more 'positive peace', one in which an absence of war is supplemented by greater social justice (a
45
46 lack of indirect violence (Roberts, 2008)). This also indicates a fragility to peace in this citizen-building
47
48 process; peace is correlated with tolerance rather than meaningful reconciliation (people living together
49
50 but not in a 'normal' relationship). Within this context, peace-building projects are caught in a nexus of
51
52 power relations, linguistic nuances and contested realms of governmentality. Peace thus becomes a site
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54 – and term – of contestation, one that reflects religious difference, geopolitical tensions and
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3 experiences of partially-delivered citizenship, and that is rooted in a history of conflict and division: the
4
5 scars of which remain evident today, but which is largely silenced in discussions of peace- and nation-
6
7 building.

8
9
10 Despite the plasticity or emptiness of terms like 'trust', 'dialogue' and 'peace,' there is nevertheless a
11
12 certain uniformity to youth citizenship promotion projects in Lebanon and BiH that seek to foster peace
13
14 through practical, locally oriented youth engagement activities. For example, we see how NGOs working
15
16 to promote youth citizenship and engagement utilise direct actions and practical involvement of youth
17
18 in community-based or community-orientated projects to both promote a sense of responsibility linked
19
20 to actions of citizenship and belonging in ways that offer alternatives to division and sectarianism. In
21
22 creating spaces of civic participation, these moments provide opportunities for interaction and
23
24 engagement between young people from different social groups outside of 'formal' spaces of politics.
25
26 The aspired-for outcomes of such contact is increasing trust (as going beyond simply tolerance)
27
28 between young people, and well as between young people and local or national institutions.
29
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32
33 Allied to these efforts, we see how various endeavours seek to produce tolerant individuals who can
34
35 instil peace in their local communities through a focus on practical cooperation. Rather than addressing
36
37 contentious issues, organizations seek to create neutral spaces for dialogue to take place through
38
39 concrete collaboration, including organizing collective activities –practical material or social
40
41 interventions, sporting activities and tournaments, etc –for young people in divided schools. Though
42
43 many recognize that continued social distance prevents sustained inter-group cohesion, what such
44
45 activities aim for is transformation in individual behaviour and attitudes, including the capacity to listen
46
47 and speak non-combatively, and an enhanced trust and understanding of others (BiH NGO 3 July 2013).
48
49 Significantly, just as in Lebanon, such actions are seen as increasing trust among young people and
50
51 between citizens and local government. In BiH, this focus on local issues is, in part, a reflection of the
52
53 politically paralyzing complexity of national-level governance institutions (consisting of the Republika
54
55 Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which itself is subdivided into ten autonomous
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2
3 cantons, as per the 1995 Dayton Agreement.) Although Lebanon's power-sharing government is
4
5 similarly hampered by political infighting and stalemate, national institutions like the army and a sense
6
7 of overarching Lebanese identity garner widespread cross-sectional support and acceptance.
8

9
10 Nevertheless, in both BiH and Lebanon there is an emphasis on building peace through producing
11
12 peaceful citizens who are trustful and trustworthy, as well as accountable to and active in their local
13
14 communities even when government bodies are not.
15

16
17 What these various peace-building through citizen-building projects have in common is the aim of
18
19 embedding trust, tolerance and dialogue in daily life and mundane places. Promoting trust as a
20
21 cornerstone for peace-building recognises how distrust contributes to division and conflict, that trust
22
23 can be both acquired and lost and is a vital commodity for fostering positive inter-community and
24
25 government-community relations. In divided societies, it is often the marginalised and poorer who feel
26
27 most distrust towards governments and elites. The danger in such situations is that a sense of exclusion,
28
29 distrust and un-entitlement (Hammett, 2008) may build, pushing groups and individuals away from a
30
31 common, civil, peaceful citizenship.
32
33

34
35 Distrust between citizens and the state contributes to inter-communal tensions and conflict, meaning
36
37 that peace-building in divided societies requires more than the simple replication of Western liberal
38
39 democratic institutions. Rather, the realisation of meaningful – and contextually appropriate –
40
41 democracy, represented through functioning and accountable institutions and practices of democracy
42
43 are necessary to achieve peace. However, the process of building 'real democracy' and substantive
44
45 peace is never straightforward and often requires directly confronting the barriers meaningful
46
47 democratic participation. Such thinking builds on ideas from transnational justice scholars, who argue
48
49 that peace-building strategies must include efforts towards social justice, reconciliation, emotional
50
51 reparations and both economic and socio-political security at multiple scales (Pillay, 2011). In other
52
53 words, a (perceived or actual) lack of equality or any opportunity to overcome (individually or
54
55 collectively) marginalisation can undermine peacebuilding; as Murtagh and Keaveney (2006: 188) argue
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3 peace requires 'new *spaces of hope* [for greater social justice be offered] to a beleaguered underclass'.
4
5 Failures to address social injustice may undermine efforts to build peaceful citizens, as citizens (rightly
6
7 or wrongly) perceive themselves unfairly subjected to various forms of state-backed violence or denied
8
9 protection from non-state-backed forms of violence (see Hammett, 2008; Roberts, 2008; Zahar, 2012).
10
11 In contexts marked by division and injustice, the promotion of peace and of 'peaceful' citizens therefore
12
13 requires greater attention to the need for states to hold greater legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens
14
15 due to historically developed distrust arising from the suppression of dissent and (sometimes violent)
16
17 exploitation of citizens and civil society by ruling (political) elites (Roberts 2008).
18
19

20
21 The rebuilding of trust, as necessary to underpin stability and peace, can be achieved through the
22
23 appropriate use of and control over legitimate use of force, the delivery of social/public goods provision,
24
25 and ensuring the improvement of living standards for all (Roberts 2008), and – the second issue – the
26
27 use of discourses of 'peace' in inclusionary ways that continues to provide space for dissent and critical
28
29 opposition. However, discourses of peace and peaceful citizenship can also be used in exclusionary and
30
31 oppressive ways, stifling opposition or dissent and turning 'peace-building' in to 'pacification': peace as
32
33 governmentality to produce self-disciplining citizen-subjects. In seeking to construct ideological
34
35 consensus (or hegemony) such practices, either directly or indirectly conducted, contribute to the
36
37 emergence of a post-political context within which political and philosophical disagreements are closed
38
39 off and arenas of debate constrained, producing a form of liberal tolerance (Gill et al., 2012). Peace,
40
41 therefore, can be deployed for progressive *and* regressive political purposes, either as a means towards
42
43 greater social justice or as a tool of governmentality that protects the *status quo* and can result in a
44
45 partial peace: peace for one group while entrenching violence and injustice for another (see Alatout,
46
47 2009; Baker, 2003).
48
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51 52 **Conclusions**

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55 The discussions above highlight the emergent tensions around how peace is defined, negotiated and
56
57 practiced within a wider temporal processes and a specific political context. Although many
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1
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3 practitioners are aware of the deployment of peace as a 'mechanism for the transmission of Western-
4 specific ideas and practices' (Mac Ginty, 2008: 144), they also often pursue their own goals for systemic
5 change under a broader conceptualization of peace. Although the practices and interventions of these
6 organisations are intended to foster trust and the institutionalisation of nonviolent conflict
7 management (Zahar, 2012: 74), the demands these organizations make for meaningful democratic
8 participation and accountability may also challenge the very institutions of governance that donors see
9 them as maintaining. Within these efforts, a key problematic remains the reliance upon liberal peace as
10 a universal concept and one applied without sensitivity to context, temporality of conflict, historic social
11 injustices, and the presence or absence of a common sense of nationhood or belonging (Boege et al.,
12 2009; Mac Ginty, 2008). As Schierenbeck (2015) reminds us, local contextual understanding is vital for
13 sustainable peace, but this must not be based upon pre-conceptions of who, what, where and when the
14 'local' is as this will undermine peacebuilding engagements.
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30 Disentangling the complex interplay between and deployment of multiple (and contested) meanings of
31 peace, democracy, and security are integral to understanding efforts to build peace through the terrain
32 of citizenship. The intricacies of these negotiations highlight how the pedagogies of peaceful citizenship
33 are continually challenged and adapted to fit local circumstances and demands. Key questions within
34 these negotiations – ones we raise here but do not offer answers to – are what are the limits to peace?
35 Whose version of peace is to be maintained? In the quest for 'peace' what kinds of peaceful citizens are
36 imagined, desired and created? If it is only governments that are responsive to their citizens, efficient in
37 service delivery, and equitable in protection of rights, that can maintain the necessary legitimacy and
38 authority to secure peace, do pedagogies of peaceful citizenship potentially prevent the emergence of
39 such a state by delegitimizing ways of holding the state accountable other than participation in the
40 formal democratic process? In other words what kind of peace is being promoted, peace between
41 citizens, or passive citizens who maintain their civil peace with the state?
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3 Firstly, our thanks to the reviewers for their careful and considered reading of our manuscript. We
4 have endeavoured to respond constructively to the comments raised, while keeping within the
5 length-limits of the journal. Our revisions are detailed below:
6
7

8 Reviewer: 1

9 A) At the moment it is not entirely clear what purchase or originality this approach brings, beyond
10 arguing for a situated approach to peace vis-à-vis top down liberal peace projects, as others have
11 done.
12

13 **We have sought to draw the originality of the paper out further – namely, the engagement with**
14 **peace as a tool of governmentality. To do this, we have rewritten the introduction to the paper to**
15 **make this argument far clearer, and have sought to draw this through the entire paper in a more**
16 **coherent and high-profile manner.**
17
18

19 B) Much has been done to unpack ‘peace’ but similar (albeit briefer) treatment is required of your
20 approach to citizenship.
21

22 **We have added in a few brief comments on this, however the restrictions of word count etc mean**
23 **this discussion is brief. We hope the new additions address this concern.**
24
25

26 C) Justice - briefly and tantalisingly mention the relationship between citizenship, peace and justice
27 but don’t take the opportunity to elaborate here in more detail
28

29 **Again, a few further comments have been added but the restrictions of word length mitigate**
30 **against developing this in great detail. Also, this specific discussion is something of a tangential**
31 **aspect of the paper so to pursue in too much depth would, we feel, be something of a distraction.**
32
33

34 D) I was surprised not to see Oliver Richmond’s work on ‘hybrid peace’ mentioned, and a look at
35 Philippa Williams’ book on peace and citizenship might be worthwhile.
36

37 **Thank you for highlighting these texts – they have been consulted and included in the revised**
38 **submission, along with a further set of papers which we hope have helped us draw out some of**
39 **the nuance of our argument further.**
40
41

42 E) The paper is very well written, however it requires a thorough edit and double check of references
43 where a number are omitted from the bibliography.
44

45 **Much of the paper has been rewritten, and the rest has been proof-read. We have also double**
46 **checked the reference list and (we hope!) picked up and added-in the missing sources from the**
47 **reference list.**
48
49

50 Reviewer: 2

51 F) The purpose of the paper is too broad and vague, and the larger part of the article reads like a
52 general and somewhat unfocused review of peace studies
53
54

55 **We hope that the revised introduction provides a clearer and more focused starting point for the**
56 **paper. The reworking of the rest of the paper should also have provided a more active**
57 **engagement with the key idea/argument being presented and ensured a more substantive**
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3 **discussion of the key concepts utilised in this document – specifically around notions of peace as**
4 **governmentality and the efforts to manifest this in everyday life through the construction of**
5 **peaceful citizens.**
6
7

8
9 G) The discussion of international peacebuilding is overgeneralized.

10 **This is a valid point, and one we hope to have addressed with the rewriting of the paper which has**
11 **strengthened the engagement with the political aspects of peace(building) and the complex and**
12 **heterogeneous dimensions to this.**
13

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17 H) The case study is not sufficiently integrated with the overall agenda. I find that the article has two
18 big components, one theoretical and one contextual-empirical, with relatively weak links between
19 them.
20

21 **We have tried to strengthen the links between the sections of the paper. However, as the**
22 **empirical component is intended as illustrative rather than substantive we have instead reduced**
23 **this section while bolstering the theoretical materials.**
24

25
26 I) There is a striking absence of reflections on research methodology.
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28 **Some comments on methodology are included in the revised manuscript.**
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