Optimal incentives for collective intelligence

Mann, RP orcid.org/0000-0003-0701-1274 and Helbing, D (2017) Optimal incentives for collective intelligence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114 (20). pp. 5077-5082. ISSN 0027-8424



Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: (c) 2017, National Academy of Sciences . This is an author produced version of a paper published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Keywords: collective intelligence; game theory; democracy; diversity; markets
  • Accepted: 4 April 2017
  • Published (online): 1 May 2017
  • Published: 16 May 2017
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences (Leeds) > School of Mathematics (Leeds) > Pure Mathematics (Leeds)
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2017 11:09
Last Modified: 11 Sep 2020 08:39
Status: Published
Publisher: National Academy of Sciences
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1618722114

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